The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 112.4143(3)(a), and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), by committing the acts alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact All times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent served as a member of the Mexico Beach Planning and Zoning Board (Zoning Board). Respondent began his service on the Board in mid-March, 1995. In that public position, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. Respondent owns and operates a marina in Mexico Beach, Florida which he sought to expand. To accomplish the expansion, Petitioner needed to purchase certain parcels of property adjacent to his marina and have the parcels rezoned from single family residential to tourist commercial. If the Zoning Board granted the rezoning request, Respondent planned to buy the land and expand his business. The Zoning Board is empowered to make decisions relative to the zoning or rezoning of property in Mexico Beach, Florida. Thus, on June 12, 1995, Respondent presented to the Board a request to rezone certain parcels of property adjacent to his marina from single family residential to tourist commercial. Respondent participated in the Zoning Board's discussion on the matter. However, prior to his participation in the discussion, Respondent failed to formally announce his interest of the matter. Respondent failed to file a written memorandum disclosing his interest in the matter prior to the June 12, 1995, Board meeting. Respondent also failed to make an oral disclosure of his interest in the matter at the June 12, 1995 Board meeting. Respondent abstained from voting on the rezoning request on June 12, 1995, but did not file a Memorandum of Voting Conflict with respect to the rezoning request within fifteen days of that meeting. The matter was reheard by the Board on August 1, 1995. At that time, Respondent again made a presentation and requested that the Zoning Board rezone the property adjacent to his marina. Following his presentation, Respondent also participated in the Zoning Board's discussion of the matter. Respondent's objective in participating in the discussion was to persuade the Zoning Board to grant the rezoning request. However, prior to his participating in the Zoning Board's discussion, Respondent failed to formally announce his interest in the matter. Respondent did not file a written memorandum prior to the August 1, 1995, Zoning Board meeting disclosing his interest in the matter. On August 1, 1995, Respondent abstained from voting on the rezoning request, but did not file a written memorandum disclosing his interest in the rezoning request within fifteen days of the Zoning Board meeting. Respondent filed a Form 8B, Memorandum of Voting Conflict with respect to the rezoning matter, but did not do so until August 24, 1995.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order and Public Report be entered by the Florida Commission on Ethics finding that Respondent, Jim McCullough, violated Sections 112.3143(4) and 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and imposing a civil penalty of $200.00. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Scott Assistant Attorney General Attorney's General's Office The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kerrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Mr. Jim McCullough 105 North 36th Street Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Suite 101 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Suite 101 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issue is whether to approve Petitioners' application for a beneficial use determination (BUD) on their property in Key Largo, Florida, and if approved, to determine the type of relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners purchased their property in September 2006 for $60,000.00 (or at the peak of the Florida housing boom). The parcel is located at the corner of Meridian Avenue and Lycaloma Avenue, mile marker 94.5, on the Gulf of Mexico side of U.S. Highway 1 in Key Largo. It is also identified as Block 9, Lot 1, Section 3 of the Bay Haven Subdivision, an older, partially-developed subdivision comprised of four sections and several hundred lots. Since September 15, 1986, the subdivision, including Petitioners' lot, has been zoned Suburban Residential (SR), which allows only one residential unit per two acres. No challenge to that action was taken by any person, and no contention has been made that the County failed to follow the established procedure for adopting its LDRs. A challenge to the validity of the LDRs is now barred by the statute of limitations.1 See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. The Bay Haven Subdivision is located in South Key Largo and was first platted after World War II. Building permits for all existing homes in the subdivision were applied for before the zoning change became effective in September 1986. Due to the SR restrictions, around 250 lots remain vacant at this time, including 99 in Section 3 where Petitioners' lot is located. Many of these vacant lots have been deeded by their owners to the County for conservation purposes in exchange for points that can be used with a Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO)2 allocation to develop other property in the County. Petitioners' corner lot lies at the intersection of two streets and has an irregular shape with a large radius at the intersection. It is bordered on two sides by single-family homes, measures 8,276 square feet, or around 0.19 acres, and is somewhat larger than the typical subdivision lot size of 5,000 square feet. Mr. Beauchamp, who resides in Wisconsin, testified that he purchased the property with the expectation of building a home when he retired as an air traffic controller. Before purchasing the property, he assumed that it was zoned Improved Subdivision (IS) because this was the zoning incorrectly shown on the multiple listing service sheet provided by his realtor. Neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor was familiar with County zoning classifications or permissible uses for the parcel.3 Sometime in 2006 they visited a County office to secure further information. Mr. Beauchamp says they spoke with two unidentified "planners," who told them that a single-family home could be built on the property. However, nothing was confirmed in writing, and there is no record of the meeting. Other than this meeting, neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor took any other steps to verify the zoning on the property and/or any development restrictions that might apply. Based solely on the oral advice given by these two unnamed County employees, the Beauchamps purchased the lot. According to Petitioners' expert, Robert Smith, before purchasing a vacant lot in the Keys, normal due diligence would require a prospective purchaser to arrange a pre-application conference with Planning Department staff and secure a written Letter of Understanding confirming the rights of the property owner. See § 110-3, M.C.C. However, Petitioners (and their realtor) did not complete appropriate due diligence; they simply checked with an unidentified County employee and without any other assurance purchased the property.4 In May 2012, Petitioners' agent, Randy Wall, a builder and former Planning Commissioner but not an attorney, met with a representative of the County Building Department to begin the process of securing approval to build a single-family residence on the property. Mr. Wall was advised that the zoning on the property was SR, which allows only one dwelling unit per two acres. This was confirmed in an email dated July 13, 2012, from the Assistant Director of Planning, which stated as follows: The parcel has a zoning designation of SR which requires Two (2) acres per residential unit. As noted by planning staff, this parcel does not have sufficient land area for the zoning and associated density. At the meeting, Mr. Wall also inquired about the possibility of changing the zoning on the property from SR to IS (which would allow construction of a single-family home), but decided not to pursue that option because he recognized the poor prospects of securing a zoning change for a single lot in a large subdivision, when scores of other lots were subject to the same restriction. He assumed, probably correctly, that this might invite a spot zoning challenge. Other than having a discussion with County representatives, Mr. Wall did nothing more. He did not file an application for a residential dwelling unit allocation under the County's ROGO process, or any other formal application for relief, such as a change in the zoning district or land use designation, a variance, or an exception. Believing that the County staff would "fix the problem" because the County had made "a mistake" in reclassifying the entire subdivision as SR, Mr. Wall prepared and filed a BUD application, which was eventually deemed to be complete on September 27, 2013. The BUD process is intended "to provide a means to resolve a landowner's claim that a [LDR] or comprehensive plan policy has had an unconstitutional effect on property in a nonjudicial forum." § 102-103(a), M.C.C. An applicant for a BUD must include a statement "describing the [LDR], comprehensive plan policy, or other final action of the county, which the applicant believes necessitates relief under this division." § 102-105(b)(5), M.C.C. The application at issue simply stated that "the adoption of the land use designation of SR for the subdivision of Bay Haven constituted a compensable taking." The application did not refer to any comprehensive plan policy or final action taken by the County. As relief, the application requested that the County take one of the two following actions: (a) change the Future Land Use Map and zoning designations to allow a residence to be built on the lot; or (b) notwithstanding the SR zoning, issue a permit for development. The BUD process requires applicants to state whether they are alleging a facial or as-applied regulatory taking as the basis for administrative relief. See § 102-104, M.C.C. Unless a landowner asserts that a LDR or comprehensive plan provision, on its face, has caused a taking of his property, relief is permitted only after "the landowner has received a final decision on development approval applications from the county, including building permit allocation system allocations, appeals, administrative relief pursuant to section 138-54, and other available relief, exceptions, or variances." Id. Mr. Wall did not formally apply for any type of development approval and received no final decision, as contemplated by the Code. However, Mr. Wall testified that he "understood" the County was waiving that requirement in this instance. He also stated in the application that "Joe Haberman contracted [sic] the Beauchamps and informed them that staff had deemed this phase unnecessary and to move directly to submitting a [BUD] application." Other than this assertion, there is no evidence to confirm this understanding, and the County's Principal Planner testified that a waiver had not been granted. She also confirmed that no development approval application had been filed, and no final decision had been made, both required by the Code in order to seek relief under an "as applied" theory. Therefore, rightly or wrongly, as plainly stated in the application, Petitioners' basis for relief is that the LDR on its face constitutes a taking of their property.5 Besides a single-family home, which is impermissible here due to size limitations of the lot, two other uses are permitted as of right in the SR district: community parks and beekeeping. See § 130-94, M.C.C. Also, a property owner may apply for a minor conditional use, subject to approval by the Planning Director. Permissible minor conditional uses include public or private community tennis courts and swimming pools; public buildings and uses; parks and community uses; institutional uses; and churches, synagogues, and houses of worship. Id. However, Mr. Beauchamp testified that he is not interested in any of these uses since he believes most, if not all, would be offensive to a residential neighborhood or simply impractical due to the size of his lot. The property can also be sold to the owners of adjacent Lot 11 to be used as a side yard, its use before being purchased by Petitioners. Finally, the Principal Planner testified that there are transferable development rights (TDRs) on the property, whose value at this time is unknown. See § 130-160, M.C.C. Therefore, the Beauchamps are not deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property. Cf. § 102-110(c), M.C.C. ("[t]he highest, common, or expected use, is not intended as an appropriate remedy, unless expressly required by applicable statute or case law"). There was no evidence from a property appraiser on the fair market value of the parcel, as encumbered by the regulation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of County Commissioners deny Petitioners' application for relief under the BUD Ordinance. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2014.
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File following the Notice of Dismissal filed by Petitioners, A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(c) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. Final Order No. DCA10-GM-039 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned designated Agency. Clerk, and that true and correct copies furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this ebreary? 2010. March, * U.S. Mail: The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Jeffrey Brown, Esq. Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant, P.A. P.O. Box 1110 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esq. Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant, P.A P.O. Box 1110 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 Michael P. Donaldson, Esq. Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 P.O. Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 Robert C. Apgar, Esq. Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 e been day of Paula Ford Agency Clerk Sherry Spiers, Esq. Greenberg Traurig, P.A. P.O. Box 1838 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Deborah S. Minnis, Esq. Ausley & McMullen, P.A. P.O. Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert A. Routa, Esq. Robert A. Routa, P.A. P.O. Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 Martha Harrell Chumbler, Esq. Carlton Fields, P.A. ; 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 P.O. Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 Nancy G. Linnan, Esq. P.O. Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 Hand Delivery: Matthew Davis Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs - 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Final Order No. DCA10-GM-039
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by misusing his position as Chairman of the Town Council to obtain a personal benefit by attempting to change zoning classifications.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution, and Section 112.320, Florida Statutes, the Commission is empowered to serve as the guardian of the standards of conduct for the officers and employees of the state. Pursuant to Sections 112.324 and 112.317, Florida Statutes, the Commission is empowered to conduct investigations and to issue a Final Order and Public Report recommending penalties for violations of the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees (Code of Ethics). Mr. Bennett is subject to the Code of Ethics. Mr. Bennett, at the time of the hearing, had served as a town councilman of the Town of Pierson, Florida, for approximately 17 years. During all times pertinent he was the Chairman of the Town Council of Pierson, Florida. Pierson, Florida, is a town of about 3400 people. It is known for the production of ornamental ferns. The Pierson Town Council has the power, through the adoption of ordinances, to change the zoning classifications of parcels of land within the Town of Pierson. Prior to 1992, this was accomplished by maintaining a file of city ordinances affecting zoning. There was no zoning map. In 1994, a zoning map, printed on a vellum-like medium, was produced. This map, which will hereinafter be referred to as the "official zoning map," actually consisted of three separate sheets. It was precise and accurate in its depiction of the location of individual parcels and roads and streets. However, the lines denoting zoning were crudely drawn with a grease pencil. In 1999, it was believed it lacked completeness in that some changes made by ordinance had not been entered upon it. The "official zoning map" of the Town of Pierson was maintained by the Town Clerk. The Town Clerk's duties included maintaining personal control of the map. The Town Clerk, as a matter of policy, would not permit the map to leave the clerk's office unless accompanied by the Town Clerk. The map was locked in a safe in the clerk's office except when it was being viewed by someone in the presence of the clerk. This policy was in effect to deter the possibility that someone might surreptitiously alter the map. Robert Allen Keeth (Mr. Keeth), is employed as a planner for the Volusia County Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). The Town of Pierson contributes to the cost of the operation of the MPO, and receives services from it. As a planner for the MPO, Mr. Keeth works with the Town of Pierson and he has done so since at least the early 1990's. In accomplishing these duties, he works with the Town Council; the town attorney, Noah McKinnon; the Planning Commission; and other citizens of Pierson. Mr. Keeth has known Mr. Bennett since at least 1990. With substantial input from Mr. Keeth, the Town of Pierson adopted a comprehensive land use plan, entitled the Unified Land Development Regulations (ULDR). The Town Council adopted the ULDR on February 22, 1994. Subsequent to its adoption, the ULDR provides a regulatory scheme for storm water management, resource protection, signs, and zoning, among other things. The ULDR provides a method for amending the zoning scheme. Section 10.6.1 provides for the application process; Section 10.6.2 provides for Planning Commission review and for a public hearing; Section 10.6.3 provides for a Town Council review and a public hearing; and Section 10.6.4 provides that amendments to zoning must be made consistent with the comprehensive plan by amending the plan if necessary to achieve that goal. The fee for amending the zoning classification of a parcel of land, was set at $150. By 1995, digitalized mapping became commonplace and Mr. Keeth suggested to the Town Council, during 1995, that the "official zoning map" of Pierson be replaced with a digital map. The council agreed that a digital map should be prepared and adopted. The council did not immediately act on this decision. It was probable that there would be some changes in connection with the adoption of the digitalized map. This is because the "official town map" then in use was crudely drawn and might not be completely accurate in some respects and because ordinances had been passed affecting zoning and these changes were not reflected on the official town zoning map. Moreover, when one changes an original map to a digital map it is unlikely to scale correctly or align correctly. The process of preparing a digitalized map is not designed to bypass the processes set forth in Sections 10.6.1 through 10.6.4 of the ULDR. The creation of a new map through digitalization was described by Mr. Keeth as, "replacing a map." "Replacing a map" is a form of administrative rezoning. Administrative rezoning occurs when, after notice and hearing, an authorized governmental body changes the zoning of a parcel of property without receipt of an application from the owner. Section 166.041, Florida Statutes, addresses administrative rezoning. It was Mr. Keeth's understanding that the Town Council desired that Mr. Bennett, would work with him in preparing the new map. Mr. Keeth and Mr. Bennett had discussions with regard to the process involved with producing an accurate digitalized map. Mr. Keeth told Mr. Bennett, and other members of the Town Council, that they could make suggested changes which might be reflected in the new, digitalized map. In other words, it was possible that zoning changes might be effected which were not supported by any ordinance. This would not occur, in Mr. Keeth's opinion, until after public workshops and hearings. On November 2, 1999, at approximately 9:00 A.M., Mr. Bennett entered the Town Clerk's office. The Town Clerk at that time was Deborah LeBlanc (Ms. LeBlanc). Mr. Bennett demanded that Ms. LeBlanc turn over the "official zoning map" to him so that he could take it out of the Town Hall. Ms. LeBlanc had never permitted the "official zoning map" to be removed from the Town Hall. Ms. LeBlanc resisted Mr. Bennett's demand that she relinquish possession of the map because it was against policy for the map to leave the Town Hall without being in her possession. By using the force of his authority, Mr. Bennett was able to make Ms. LeBlanc yield the map. Mr. Keeth on this occasion had a discussion with regard to the map at Mr. Bennett's house and in his car. Either Mr. Keeth at Mr. Bennett's directions, or Mr. Bennett, made suggestions for changes in zoning on the "official zoning map" by marking it with a pencil. Mr. Bennett had an interest in each of the properties marked. Mr. Bennett returned to the Town Hall at lunch time, accompanied by Mr. Keeth. Mr. Bennett returned the "official zoning map." Later that afternoon, Ms. LeBlanc noticed that pencil markings had been entered upon the map. The following changes were found by Ms. LeBlanc: A parcel south of West Palmetto Avenue had B-2 written in pencil. This may be found in the upper left, or northwest corner, of the section of the "official zoning map" which also depicts the town park. A parcel adjacent to West Palmetto Avenue west of County Road 3, but east of the parcel mentioned in "a" above, had MH-1 written in pencil. A parcel between West Second Avenue and Short Street near the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad track had B-1 entered in pencil. This area is below the center of the section of the "official zoning map" which also depicts the town park. A parcel on the corner of Hagstrom Road and County Road 3 had B-2 entered in pencil. This area is the upper center of the section of the "official zoning map" which also depicts Lake Botts. A designation as B-1 means property may be used for general retail commercial development. A designation as B-2 means property may be used for heavy commercial and industrial development. A designation as MH-1 means property may be used for medium density mobile home development. Except for the Short Street parcel, the parcels were zoned A-1, agriculture. The Short Street parcel was zoned R-3, medium density single family residential development. It is the opinion of Mr. Keeth that all of the proposed changes made with regard to Mr. Bennett's properties were "up-zoning" in that they would reflect an increase in the value of the property. Moreover, Mr. Bennett testified under oath that if the suggested changes had been made they would have been to his benefit. It is found as a fact that either Mr. Bennett made these changes, or that they were made by Mr. Keeth at Mr. Bennett's direction, during the time the "official zoning map" was out of the presence of Ms. LeBlanc. Ms. LeBlanc believed that misconduct was occurring, and beginning December 1, 1999, recorded activities concerning the map and the map replacement process in a log or on "while you were out" pads. She also called Mr. Keeth and asked him how the changes could occur without supporting ordinances. Mr. Keeth told her that Mr. Bennett had told him that there were ordinances supporting the four proposed changes written in pencil by or at the direction of Mr. Bennett. As a result of Ms. LeBlanc's conversation with Mr. Keeth, concerning the changes made in pencil, Ms. LeBlanc, and Mr. Keeth spent an entire day attempting to locate ordinances which would support the marks made on the "official zoning map" by Mr. Bennett or at his direction. They also attempted to find a supporting ordinance for Councilwoman Jones who had also made pencil changes on the "official zoning map." No supporting ordinances for any of these changes could be found. This search occurred in November or December of 1999. The only other person to make pencil marks on the map was Ms. Jones, who was also a town councilperson. Mr. Keeth considered these marks to be "suggestions" rather than changes. Mr. Keeth knew of no formal process, nor was the council aware of any formal process, for converting the official zoning map to a digital map. However, it is clear that Mr. Keeth believed that there would be public workshops as part of the process and he believed that the Town Council would have to approve the final draft by ordinance. That he was correct in that belief is evidenced by the process which eventually resulted in the adoption of a final map on September 12, 2000. On or about December 1, 1999, a draft map dated November 1999, was delivered to Town Hall with an accompanying memorandum to Mr. Bennett dated November 29, 1999. The memorandum notes that the draft reflected the changes Mr. Bennett had suggested. It also noted that if the changes were approved by Mr. Bennett the draft should be forwarded to Ms. LeBlanc for the purpose of scheduling a public hearing. There were several draft maps produced during the period November 1999 through the winter and spring of 2000, but the drafts were not numbered or dated. As many as six draft maps were produced and some never left Mr. Keeth's office. The maps were stored in the hard drive of his computer. On some drafts the words "Ordinance number ## , Jan ## , 2000" appeared. On the maps entered into evidence, some of the suggestions made by Mr. Bennett were incorporated. Changing a zoning classification does not automatically mean that the market value of the property is enhanced. However, because people do not ordinarily act contrary to their economic interest, it is found that the zoning suggestion made by Mr. Bennett, would have represented value to him had the change been made. During various times in the Spring of 2000, Ms. LeBlanc had several conversations with citizens who had concerns with regard to the map situation. During a discussion on April 14, 2000, Mr. Keeth told Ms. LeBlanc that Councilperson Jones had asked that the suggestion that she made be discarded. He further stated that Mr. Bennett had not made such a request. The Town Mayor visited Ms. LeBlanc on April 17, 2000, and informed her that he was going to ask a respected citizen, Mr. Greenland, to talk with Mr. Bennett about the changes he made to the "official zoning map" and to convince Mr. Bennett that what he had done should be undone. On April 25, 2000, Mr. Keeth called Ms. LeBlanc and told her that Respondent had called and asked him to put the map back to its original state. In time, more and more citizens of Pierson learned of the penciled changes, and as a result, rumor and innuendo with regard to the changes coursed through the community. As late as the July 11, 2000, Town Council meeting, the Bennett suggestions were still displayed on the draft. In early July, Mr. Keeth concluded that the matter was getting out of hand. On July 10, 2000, in a memorandum to the Town Council, he noted that there was a perception that the map was being amended without full disclosure and review. Amendments were made on the draft maps as the result of other citizens making suggestions to Mr. Keeth. These amendments affected the Community Christian Assembly, Lois Taylor, Wilsey Bennett, and Shane Crosby. These suggestions were discussed at the July 11, 2000, Town Council meeting. In the case of Wilsey Bennett, the changes were made to conform to an existing use. In the case of the Community Christian Assembly, the property was subject to a special exception. Neither the Town Council, nor the unhappy and vocal citizens present at the council meeting of July 11, 2002, indicated that there was any question about the propriety of these changes. There is no evidence in the record as to the circumstances of the amendments in the case of Taylor or Crosby. It cannot be determined if these amendments resulted in substantial changes or whether they were made to reflect existing uses or to indicate prior changes which should have been previously placed on the "official zoning map." By whatever process used, the changes were not made by merely penciling in the change and neither the Town Council, nor the unhappy and vocal citizens attending the council meeting of July 11, 2002, indicated that there was any question about the propriety of these changes. At a Town Council meeting on July 13, 2000, it was decided that Mr. Keeth would work with the Town Clerk to prepare another zoning map which represented the current state of zoning. This was to be done by looking at town records and the "official zoning map," without reference to the pencil marks entered with regard to Ms. Jones' or Mr. Bennett's property, and without reference to any other suggestions for change. At a Town Council meeting on September 12, 2000, it was affirmatively decided that the digitalized zoning map would be accepted which reflected only changes supported by properly prepared ordinances. A final draft was approved by Ordinance Number 00-03.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order and public report be entered finding that Respondent, Samuel G.S. Bennett, violated Subsection 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Commission recommend that he be publicly censured and reprimanded and that he be assessed a fine in the amount of $4,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Ty Harris, Esquire Allen Watts, Esquire Cobb, Cole & Bell 150 Magnolia Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 James H. Peterson, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Advocates for the Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issues for determination are: Whether Respondent violated section 112.3135, Florida Statutes,1/ by voting on the appointment and/or advocating for the appointment of her relative to a position within her agency and/or her agency voting to appoint and/or advance her relative and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using her position to appoint her relative to the position of City of Midway Mayor Pro Tem and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using a City of Midway-owned vehicle and/or City of Midway-issued gasoline credit card for personal use and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, by failing to report the gift of the personal use of the City of Midway-owned vehicle and/or the City of Midway-issued gasoline credit card and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent served as a member of the Midway City Council (City Council). She was initially appointed to the City Council in 2000 and served until 2003. She was subsequently elected to the City Council in 2015 and served until May of 2019. Respondent became the Mayor of the City of Midway in May of 2017. As a member and/or mayor of the City Council, Respondent is subject to article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, and the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, Code of Ethics. In January 2018, Respondent attended and received ethics training from the Florida League of Cities. That training included information on and examples of nepotism, misuse of position, and the receipt and disclosure of gifts. It also included information about the Commission issuing advisory opinions and how to contact the Commission. Nepotism Allegation The form of government the City of Midway (the City) provided under its Charter is the "Council-Manager Government,” under which all powers of the City are vested in an elected council. The City Council consists of five citizens who are residents of the City and electors eligible to vote in the City elections. From its members, the City Council elects a Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. The election of the Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem occurs at the first regular council meeting after the City election. According to the Midway City Charter, the Mayor presides at all meetings of the City Council and performs other duties consistent with the office as imposed or designated by the City Council. The Mayor has a voice and vote in the proceedings of the City Council. The Mayor is referred to as Mayor-Councilmember in the execution of any legal instruments or writing or when functioning to meet other duties arising from the general laws of Florida or from the City Charter. The Mayor is recognized as the head of City government for all ceremonial purposes, for service of process, execution of contracts, deeds and other documents. The Mayor may take command of the police and govern the City by proclamation during the times of grave public danger or emergency and the Mayor has the power during such times to appoint additional temporary officers and patrolmen. The power and duties of the Mayor-Councilmember are such as they are conferred upon him/her by the Midway City Charter and no other. The Midway City Charter provides that the Mayor shall: “(a) See that all laws, provisions of this charter, and acts of the council, subject to his/her direction and supervision are faithfully executed; (b) Submit the annual budget message; (c) Summon the appropriate law enforcement officers to suppress civil disturbances and to keep law and other during times of emergency; (d) Make such other reports as the council may require concerning the operations of city departments, offices, and agencies subject to his/her direction in time of emergency; (e) Attend, preside, and vote at all council meetings; (f) Sign contracts on behalf of the city pursuant to the provisions of applicable ordinances; (g) Be recognized as the city official designated to represent the city in all agreements with other governmental entities or certifications to other governmental entities as approved by the vote of the city council; (h) Annually prepare a state of the city message, set forth the agenda for all meetings of the council, name committees of the council, make recommendations of members for city boards to the city council; (i) Perform such other duties as specified in this charter or may be required by council.” The population of the City is less than 4,000 residents. The City Council has land use and/or zoning responsibilities. In April 2016, there was a vacancy on the City Council caused by a Councilmember departing prior to the end of that Councilmember’s term. Respondent’s first cousin, Sam Stevens, wanted to be appointed to the City Council to fill the vacant seat. Prior to any action on the matter, Respondent telephoned Commission legal staff member, Grayden Schafer, Esquire, and inquired whether she would be in violation of the anti-nepotism statute if the Council appointed her first cousin to serve the unexpired remainder of a departing Councilmember's term. Following his telephone conversation with Respondent, on April 21, 2016, Attorney Schafer sent an e-mail to Respondent at rangewanda@yahoo.com, summarizing Respondent’s inquiry and the advice he provided. The last page of that e-mail (Schafer’s E-mail) states: a public official can be held in violation of the anti-nepotism provision if the appointment is made by the collegial body on which she serves, even if she did not participate in the appointment. Given the foregoing, it appears that you can be held in violation of the anti-nepotism statute not only if you directly participate or advocate for your first cousin's appointment but also if the City Council decides on its own to appoint him, regardless of whether you vote or participate. According to Respondent, she did not receive the Schafer E-mail in 2016 and did not see it until after the filing of the complaints initiating this case against Respondent. Regardless of the timing of Respondent’s receipt of Schafer’s E-mail, the evidence is persuasive that the topic was discussed between Respondent and Attorney Schafer, and that, as a result of her telephone conversation with Attorney Schafer in April 2016, Respondent understood that, because of her kinship with Sam Stevens, she could not vote to appoint or advocate to appoint Sam Stevens to the City Council. She also was aware that, even if she recused herself from voting or participating in the discussion to appoint Sam Stevens to the City Council, if the City Council voted to appoint her first cousin to the vacant seat, she would be in violation of the anti-nepotism provision. After her conversation with Attorney Schafer, in April 2016, Respondent advised the City Council of her research and that she had contacted the Commission to inquire as to whether she could vote to appoint her cousin to the City Council. She explained that she could not and would have to resign if he was appointed, even if she did not participate in the vote. Sam Stevens was not appointed to fill the vacant City Council seat in 2016. The next year, Sam Stevens was elected to the City Council during the April 2017 municipal election. He was not elected or appointed by the City Council, but rather was elected by City citizens voting in the election. The following month, at its May 4, 2017, meeting, the City Council considered the issue of electing a Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem as provided by the City Charter. At that meeting, Councilman Colston asked if it was legal for relatives to vote for each other. The minutes of the City Council for that date indicate that “Interim City Attorney Thomas explained he had heard the rumor and did research and it is legal.” Contrary to the City Council minutes, in his deposition testimony, City Attorney Thomas denied that he gave that advice, but rather explained that he opined that Respondent and Councilman Sam Stevens could serve together on the City Council, but could not promote or advocate for one another. Despite his denial, during his interview with the Commission’s investigator, City Attorney Thomas “recalled researching the matter and advising Respondent that it was not a voting conflict for her to vote to appoint her cousin to serve as mayor pro tem." Considering the conflicting evidence, it is found that the preponderance demonstrates that the City Attorney advised that it was not a voting conflict for relatives to vote for each other for Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. Respondent did not reveal her 2016 conversation with Attorney Schafer to the City Council on May 4, 2017, nor did she provide a copy of Schafer’s E-mail dated April 21, 2016, to either the City Council or the City Attorney prior to the City Council’s votes for Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. However, at the May 4, 2017, City Council meeting, a citizen confronted Respondent with a copy of Schafer’s E-mail, reading portions of Schafer’s E-mail aloud. Respondent testified that she did not acknowledge an ethical dilemma regarding Attorney Schafer’s opinion because she believed it addressed appointment as opposed to election, and her cousin had been elected a year later, not appointed. Schafer’s E-mail does not address the situation in which both Respondent and her first cousin are elected members of the City Council and whether Respondent can vote to elect him as the Mayor Pro-Tem in that context. At that meeting, Respondent nominated herself to serve as Mayor. Her nomination was seconded by Councilman Smith. Respondent was elected as Mayor when the City Council voted three to two for Respondent to serve as Mayor with Councilman Smith, Councilman Sam Stevens, and Respondent voting “yes,” and Councilman Ronald Colston and Councilwoman Carolyn Francis voting “no.” Respondent, as the Mayor, received an $800 stipend, which is $100 more than the other councilmembers. At that same May 4, 2016, meeting, Councilman Colston nominated Councilwoman Francis to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem. That nomination failed two to three, with Respondent, Councilman Smith, and Councilman Stevens voting “no.” Councilman Smith then nominated Councilman Stevens to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem. The City Council voted three to two for Councilman Stevens to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem with Respondent, Councilman Stevens, and Councilman Smith voting “yes,” and Councilman Ronald Colston and Councilwoman Carolyn Francis voting “no.” According to the City Charter, the Mayor Pro-Tem: “shall preside over the meetings of the council during the absence of the mayor- councilmember, and in general in the absence or the incapacity of the mayor- councilmember, he/she shall do [sic] perform those acts and things provided in this Chapter to be done by the mayor- councilmember. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as to preclude the member succeeding himself or herself as Mayor- Council member.” The City provides no additional compensation for a Councilmember serving as Mayor Pro-Tem. Vehicle Use and Gift Disclosure The City has two vehicles. One is a white Ford Taurus that has air conditioning (Vehicle). The other is a white Ford Taurus with a red stripe that does not have air conditioning. Respondent was given a 2002 MPV Mazda Van by her daughter, Temika Smith, on Mother’s Day in 2016. While serving as Mayor, Respondent had use of the Vehicle for personal use. Respondent began using the Vehicle in September or October 2017 following a hurricane and had access to the Vehicle until she stopped using it in May of 2019. During this time, the Vehicle was generally parked on property adjacent to Respondent’s residence. While Respondent had a set of keys to the Vehicle, there was another set of keys at the City Hall. In addition to Respondent’s access, other city employees or city council members could use the Vehicle. Former City Manager Steele used the Vehicle on occasion during the time that Respondent had access to the Vehicle. When former City Manager Steele wanted to use the Vehicle, she would pick it up from Respondent’s residence and return it to City Hall. Respondent used the Vehicle for a variety of City- related purposes. She used it to travel to Florida League of Cities’ conferences. In addition, she used the Vehicle to attend events in Midway, in Gadsden County, and in Tallahassee, including meetings with the City’s lobbyist and members of the Florida Legislature, as part of her duties and responsibilities as Mayor. Respondent was also observed driving the Vehicle to meetings at the City Hall. Respondent’s personal use of the Vehicle included, but was not limited to, traveling roundtrip between Midway and Tallahassee. She may have had her daughter in the Vehicle on two or three occasions, and on occasion, drove the Vehicle to her daughter’s house in Tallahassee. On one of the occasions when Respondent drove the Vehicle to her daughter’s house in Tallahassee, which occurred on March 15, 2018, Respondent had a run-in with a Midway resident who had followed Respondent to her daughter’s house. The Midway Resident took pictures of the Vehicle at Respondent’s daughter’s house and also the Mazda MPV van, which was without a license plate. On that occasion, Respondent had gone to check on the house because her daughter was out of town. At the final hearing, Respondent admitted that there was a time when the Mazda MPV was in the shop a lot, and, since she had access to the Vehicle, she turned in the Mazda’s tag to save on insurance payments. On another occasion in 2018, Respondent was stopped by a Gadsden County Deputy Sheriff in Midway after midnight for having a tag light out and the incorrect tag on the Vehicle. Respondent had been returning from Tallahassee. No citation was issued with respect to that stop. Other examples presented at the hearing illustrating Respondent’s use of the Vehicle included her transporting a child from Midway to Florida High in Tallahassee, taking a Midway resident from Midway to Tallahassee to drop him at his place of employment, and taking an individual to Liberty County to retrieve that person’s vehicle left when evacuating because of a hurricane. While providing such accommodations is not listed within Respondent’s responsibilities as Mayor or Councilmember, arguably, they served a public purpose. While Respondent had access and use of the Vehicle, the City did not have a vehicle-use policy. The evidence indicates that former City manager Ford also used a City-owned vehicle for personal use. Former City Manager Steele could not recall if any other city employees or city council members had used the Vehicle. Respondent testified that employees of the City’s public works department might also have used the Vehicle. City Councilman Ron Colston testified that he never used the Vehicle. At the May 3, 2018, Midway City Council meeting, Councilman Colston publicly requested that Respondent stop driving the Vehicle, stating that citizens had approached him with concerns about Respondent driving the Vehicle. Minutes of that City Council meeting indicate that Councilman Coston commented that he had received some calls from citizens concerned with Respondent driving the City-owned vehicle and suggested that she should park the Vehicle because of the number of complaints and that it is a liability. In response to that comment, City Attorney Thomas suggested that the City Council come up with some policy and procedures on the use of City vehicles. Respondent did not stop driving the Vehicle at the time of Councilman Colston’s request. By the end of October 2018, the Vehicle needed a tune-up and to have its brakes checked. In October 2018, Respondent started using a rental car when she got a job with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for debris monitoring. Respondent was not reimbursed by FEMA for the rental. In January 2019, Respondent purchased a new vehicle, a 2019 Mitsubishi G4 Mirage. At the time of the final hearing in this case, the City was in the process of developing a policy regarding the use of City vehicles and City Fuel Cards. Respondent did not report the use of the vehicle on her income taxes and did not file a gift disclosure to report her personal use of the City-owned vehicle as a gift. Fuel Card Use and Gift Disclosure Respondent used a City-issued Pilot Travel Center credit card for gasoline for the Vehicle. City-issued Pilot Travel Center credit card #007 (City Fuel Card) was assigned to the Vehicle. The City Fuel Card was the only one numbered #007 and it remained in the Vehicle. While some of the fuel purchases charged to the City Fuel Card were related to City business, Respondent acknowledged that fuel was also purchased using the City Fuel Card during her personal use of the Vehicle. Records of City Fuel Card #007 from November of 2017 through December of 2018 show the following charges: November 2017: -November 1, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $33.67 -November 5, 2017- 425 Midway FL- $20.71 -November 5, 2017- 4556 Wildwood FL- $20.00 -November 8, 2017- 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.30 -November 9, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $24.72 -November 13, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $21.77 -November 13, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $35.42 -November 20, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $42.68 -November 20, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $30.78 -November 27, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $32.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida, from November 5 through November 8, 2017. As to the multiple charges on November 13, 2017, and November 20, 2017, Respondent explained that she traveled on City business because “we were giving out turkeys during that time.” December 2017: -December 2, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $30.91 -December 12, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $34.06 -December 15, 2017– 425 Midway FL- $30.27 -December 22, 2017– 425 Midway FL- $27.03 January 2018: -January 9, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $33.82 -January 17, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $22.03 -January 18, 2018- 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.00 -January 21, 2018- 4556 Wildwood FL- $8.20 -January 22, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $15.50 -January 23, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $8.57 -January 24, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $10.01 -January 26, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $24.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida, during the period from January 18 through 22, 2018. February 2018: -February 2, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $34.26 -February 15, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $32.00 -February 22, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $30.01 March 2018: -March 14, 2018- 425 Midway FL - $31.00 -March 28, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $32.07 April 2018: -April 7, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $25.00 -April 17, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $35.44 -April 28, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $7.52 66. May 2018: -May 14, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $37.01 -May 20, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $29.02 -May 26, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $41.00 67. June 2018: -June 1, 2018– 4556 Wildwood FL- $25.03 -June 2, 2018– 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.02 -June 4, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $20.00 -June 9, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $31.00 -June 15, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $28.04 -June 29, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $33.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida during the period from May 31, 2018, through June 2, 2018. 68. July 2018: -July 18, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $35.06 August 2018: -August 3, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $21.08 -August 14, 2018- 622 St. Lucie FL- $20.01 -August 14, 2018- 091 Jacksonville- $24.00 -August 19, 2018- 624 Dade City FL- $27.02 -August 20, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $19.33 -August 24, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $33.01 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Hollywood, Florida during the period from August 14 through 18, 2018. September 2018: -September 4, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $37.00 -September 13, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $35.50 -September 29, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $36.01 October 2018: -October 10, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $39.07 November 2018: -November 21, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $33.07 December 2018: -December 5, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $18.80 In addition to the fact that some of Respondent’s use of the City Fuel Card to put fuel in the Vehicle included her personal use of the Vehicle, Respondent used the City Fuel Card to purchase gasoline for the Vehicle when she was using the Vehicle for travel on City business, including travel to Florida League of Cities’ conferences in November of 2017, as well as while traveling on City business in and around Midway and Gadsden County, and to and from Tallahassee. Respondent also used the City Fuel Card to pay for gasoline while traveling on City business to attend Florida League of Cities’ conferences in a rental vehicle. These conferences occurred January 18 through 22, 2018; May 31 through June 2, 2018; and August 14 through 18, 2018. There was no evidence presented that Respondent used the City Fuel Card to purchase anything other than fuel for the Vehicle or fuel for a rental car while on business for the City. As the City Fuel Card was kept in the Vehicle, other City Council members or City employees would have had access to the City Fuel Card when they were driving the Vehicle. Respondent did not file a gift disclosure to report her use of the City Fuel Card to put gasoline in the Vehicle on those occasions when she used the Vehicle for personal use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Respondent, Wanda Range, violated section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, and recommending the imposition of a nominal civil penalty of $1.00 for that violation, and further finding that Respondent Wanda Range did not violate sections 112.313(6), or 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2019.
Findings Of Fact On or about February 13, 1995, Petitioner, Hillary Sklar, filed Petitioner's Second Amended Petition. Ms. Sklar has challenged the Department's determination that an amendment to the City's comprehensive plan adopted by Ordinance No. 94-2-2 was "in compliance." In the second amended petition Ms. Sklar made the following allegations concerning her standing to institute this proceeding: * * * 2. The Petitioner's address is 11321 Southwest 49th Place, Fort Lauderdale, 33330, in the County of Broward, Florida. * * * 4. On February 8, 1994, the Respondent passed Ordinance NO. 94 -2 -2 authorizing the implement- ation of Land Use Plan Amendment 94 - S - 1. The Land Use Plan Amendment affects property located at 11791 Southwest 49th Street, Cooper City, in the County of Broward. . . . * * * Petitioner's property is located in a section of unincorporated Broward County which abuts and adjoins the property in question. Petitioner's property has been defined by Respondent as an "enclave." Petitioner's property is similarly situated to those of property owners in Cooper City and will be affected more than those property owners located in Cooper City; including, but not limited to, the allegations contained in Paragraphs 10 through 17, inclusive. Petitioner made objections to the ordinance at the February 8, 1994 City Council meeting discussing adoption of the ordinance. . . . * * * Ms. Sklar has still failed to allege that she resides, owns property or operates a business located with a City of Cooper City address or which otherwise is subject to the jurisdiction of the City of Cooper City. The oral objections made by Ms. Sklar were made at a public hearing of the City of Cooper City Council held on February 8, 1994. According to the minutes of that meeting, Ms. Sklar "said the zoning is a done deal and the annexation and sale was a done deal. Why should it be a done deal before the Public Hearing was held, she asked." The factual information contained in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order is hereby incorporated by reference.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Second Amended Petition, filed by Hillary Sklar. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward R. Curtis, Esquire Bruce Botsford, Esquire 1828 S.E. 1st Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Suzanne H. Schmith Certified Legal Intern Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Silvia Morell Alderman, Esquire Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue Whether an amendment to the Broward County Comprehensive Plan, PC-92-20, which was adopted by ordinance number 92-50 rendered the Broward County Comprehensive Plan not "in compliance", within the meaning of Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is a state agency. The Department is charged pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), with responsibility for, among other things, the review of comprehensive growth management plans and amendments thereto. The Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government charged with the responsibility pursuant to the Act for developing a comprehensive plan for future development in the unincorporated areas of the County and the approval of amendments to the County's comprehensive plan. The Intervenor, Susan Edn, is a resident of, and owns real property located in, Broward County, Florida. Ms. Edn submitted written and oral comments to the County concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. General Description of the County. The County is a generally rectangular-shaped area located on the southeastern coast of Florida. The County is bounded on the north by Palm Beach County, on the south by Dade County, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean and on the west by Collier and Hendry Counties. The County's Comprehensive Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act on March 1, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "County Plan"). Volume 1 of the County Plan includes the Broward County Land Use Plan, which applies to, and governs, future land use throughout the County, including the unincorporated areas of the County. The Future Land Use Element. The County Plan includes a Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element dealing with future land use in the unincorporated areas of the County. See Volume 2 of the County Plan, Edn exhibit 15. The Future Land Use Element of the County Plan required by the Act consists of the Broward County Land Use Plan and the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element. The Future Land Use Element identifies a number of land-use categories, including a "residential" category. Densities of development on land designated "residential" are also established. There are eight designated residential future land uses identified and defined in the Future Land Use Element of the County Plan. Those designations and densities are as follows: Estate (1) Residential: up to 1 dwelling unit per gross acre. Low (2) Residential: up to 2 dwelling units per gross acre. Low (3) Residential: up to 3 dwelling units per gross acre. Low (5) Residential: up to 5 dwelling units per gross acre. Low-Medium (10) Residential: up to 10 dwelling units per gross acre. Medium (16) Residential: up to 16 dwelling units per gross acre. Medium-High (25) Residential: up to 25 dwelling units per gross acre. High (50) Residential: up to 50 dwelling units per gross acre. The density of development for the Rural Estate category is up to 1 dwelling unit per gross acre. The density for the Rural Ranch category is up to 1 dwelling unit per 2.5 gross acres or up to 1 dwelling unit per 2 net acres. The County Plan includes Goal 08.00.00, titled Public Facilities and Phased Growth, and Objective 08.01.00, which provide: GOAL 08.00.00 PHASE GROWTH CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES AND FACILITIES. OBJECTIVE 08.01.00 COORDINATE FUTURE LAND USES WITH AVAILABLE REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES AND SERVICES Coordinate future land uses with the availability of regional and community facilities and services sufficient to meet the current and future needs of Broward County's population and economy without endangering its environmental resources. The following policies related to Goal 08.00.00 and Objective 08.01.00 are included in the County Plan: POLICY 08.01.04 In order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of Broward County's residents, development should not be permitted in those portions of Broward County with inadequate potable water and wastewater treatment facilities. . . . . POLICY 08.01.09 Private septic tanks and wells in Broward County should be phased out and replaced with centralized water and wastewater systems, where necessary, to protect the health, safety, and welfare of Broward County's residents. POLICY 08.01.10 Local government entities shall require existing development on septic tanks and private wells to hook up to centralized sewer and water facilities as they become available. The evidence failed to prove that the amendment which is the subject of this proceeding is inconsistent with the policies quoted in finding of fact 14 or any other goal, objective or policy of the County Plan. The Subject Amendment: PC-92-20. The Board of County Commissioners of the County adopted Ordinance 92- 50 on December 9, 1992. Ordinance 92-50 included nineteen amendments to the County Plan, including amendment PC-92-20. PC-92-20 (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Amendment"), is the amendment to the County Plan challenged in this proceeding by Ms. Edn. The Challenged Amendment amends the land use designation of approximately 2,453 acres of land. Of the 2,453 total acres, the designation of 2,272 acres is changed from Estate (1) Residential to Rural Ranch and the designation of the remaining 180.7 acres of land is changed to Rural Estate. Pursuant to the Challenged Amendment the change in designation also results in a change in density from one dwelling unit per acre to a density of one dwelling unit per two and one-half acres for the Rural Ranch and a density of one dwelling unit per two net acres for the Rural Estate. The Subject Property. The 2,453 acres of land which are the subject of the Challenged Amendment are located in the unincorporated area of the County, east of Southwest 148th Avenue, south of Griffin Road, west of Flamingo Road and north of Sheridan Street. Dwellings currently exist on approximately 85 percent to 90 percent of the subject property. Existing dwellings are served by septic tanks and wells. Pursuant to the County Plan, without the Challenged Amendment, the 10 percent to 15 percent of the subject property not yet developed may be developed at a higher density using septic tanks and individual wells. The subject property is not currently serviced by a sewer service provider or a water service provider. The County Plan recognizes and accepts the foregoing existing conditions. See Map 12-1 of the County Plan Map Series titled "Existing and Proposed Sanitary Sewer Service Area", and Map 14-1 of the County Plan Map Series, titled "Existing and Proposed Potable Water Service Area." The Challenged Amendment does not modify the existing conditions of the subject property except to decrease the density of development allowed on the property. The subject property is not located within a public wellfield zone of influence. See County Plan Land Use Plan Natural Resource Map Series, titled "Existing and Planned Waterwells & Zones of Influence." The Department's Review of the Challenged Amendment. The Department reviewed the Challenged Amendment as originated by the Act. After review of the Challenged Amendment, the Department raised no objections. As part of the Department's initial review of the Challenged Amendment pursuant to Section 163.3184(6), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), the Department considered comments of various entities, including the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the South Florida Regional Planning Council, the South Florida Water Management District and others concerning the Challenged Amendment. Some of those comments were critical. The critical comments concerning the Challenged Amendment pertain to the use of wells for potable water and the use of septic tanks in the effected area. Those concerns were considered by the Department and ultimately determined to be insufficient to find the Challenged Amendment not "in compliance." The Department's conclusion was based, in part, upon the fact that the Challenged Amendment will reduce the demand on sewer by 477,400 gallons per day and the demand on water by 380,800 gallons per day. The Department's conclusion was also based upon the fact that the majority of the area effected has already been built-out. Ms. Edn offered the critical comments of various governmental entities who provided comments to the Department pursuant to Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), into evidence. Evidently, Ms. Edn believes that those comments were not adequately considered by the Department or that they prove that the Challenged Amendment is not "in compliance." The evidence failed to prove either suggestion. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's consideration of critical comments about the Challenged Amendment was not adequate or that the Department's conclusions concerning those comments were not reasonable and proper. On the contrary, the evidence proved that the Department did consider all comments and decided that the Challenged Amendment was "in compliance" despite the critical comments. The evidence also proved that the Department's rationale for still finding the Challenged Amendment in compliance was reasonable. Additionally, Ms. Edn failed to present evidence to support a finding that the entities that made critical comments concerning the Challenged Amendment during the initial review of the Challenged Amendment still believe those comments are valid. Therefore, the evidence failed to prove that the critical comments concerning the Challenged Amendment were still valid as of the date of the final hearing of this matter. Data and Analysis-Sewer and Potable Water Services. The evidence failed to prove that the County did not provide data and analysis concerning the impact of the Challenged Amendment on sewer and potable water services. Facility and service capacity data and analyses concerning the impact of the Challenged Amendment on the availability of, and the demand for, sewer and potable water services was provided to the Department by the County. Based upon the data and analysis provided, the Challenged Amendment will tend to reduce the demand on sewer and potable water services. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis provided was inadequate. Data and Analysis-Soil Suitability. The evidence failed to prove that the County did not provide data and analysis concerning soil suitability. The County submitted data and analysis concerning the impact of the Challenged Amendment on soil and natural resources, including waterwells and zones of influence, to the Department. The County concluded that the Challenged Amendment would preserve the natural function of soils in the area and Ms. Edn failed to prove the inaccuracy of the County's conclusion. See the County Land Use Plan Natural Resource Map Services titled "Soils." Data and Analysis-Wellfield Protection. The evidence failed to prove that the County did not provide data and analysis concerning the impact of the Challenged Amendment on wellfield protection. The County relied upon the County Land Use Plan natural Resource Map Series titled "Existing and Planned Waterwells and Zones of Influence" and concluded that the area impacted by the Challenged Amendment is not located within a public wellfield zone of influence. The evidence failed to prove the inaccuracy of the County's conclusion. Data and Analysis-Biscayne Aquifer. The evidence failed to prove that the County did not provide data and analysis concerning the impact of the Challenged Amendment on the Biscayne Aquifer. The South Florida Water Management District has not designated the area of the County impacted by the Challenged Amendment to be a "prime groundwater recharge area" for the Biscayne Aquifer. Proliferation of Urban Sprawl. Pursuant to Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, (1992 Supp.) and Rule 9J-5.006(3)(b)7, Florida Administrative Code, comprehensive plans are required to discourage the proliferation of "urban sprawl". The Department has provided a definition of "urban sprawl" in a November 1989 Technical Memorandum: . . . scattered, untimely, poorly planned urban development that occurs in urban fringe and rural areas and frequently invades lands important for environmental and natural resource protection. Urban sprawl typically manifests itself in one or more of the following patterns: (1) leapfrog development; (2) ribbon or strip development; and (3) large expanses of low-density single- dimensional development. The evidence failed to prove that the foregoing definition or any other pronouncement in the Technical Memorandum constitutes policy of the Department. The evidence also failed to prove that the reduced densities allowed by the Challenged Amendment constitute "urban sprawl." The State Comprehensive Plan. The State Comprehensive Plan is contained in Chapter 187, Florida Statutes. Goals and Policies of the State Comprehensive Plan are contained in Section 187.201, Florida Statutes. The evidence failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with any provision of the State Comprehensive Plan. The Regional Comprehensive Policy Plan. The South Florida Planning Council has adopted the Regional Plan for South Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Regional Plan"). The Regional Plan was adopted pursuant to Chapter 186, Florida Statutes, to provide regional planning objectives for the County, Dade County and Monroe County. In the petition filed in this case, Ms. Edn alleged that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with Goal 13.4.10 of the Regional Plan. Goal 13.4.10 of the Regional Plan provides the following: Within the study area of the Southwest Broward/Northwest Dade Subregional Study, any existing or new user of on-site disposal systems in Broward County and within the Dade County urban development boundary should be required to hook up to a centralized wastewater collection when available. The evidence failed to prove that centralized wastewater collection is "available" to require existing or new users of on-site disposal systems in the area of the Challenged Amendment to hook up to. The evidence failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with the Regional Plan.
