The Issue At issue in this case is whether Sections 403, 404, 410, 503, 506, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 1805, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1909, 1911, and 2710 of the Bay County Land Development Regulations (the "LDRs"), as adopted by Bay County Ordinance No. 04-30 on September 21, 2004, are inconsistent with the Bay County Comprehensive Plan (the "Plan").
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at the final hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Standing Petitioners Cornelia F. Hammond and Estelle M. Hicks reside within Bay County and own residential property in unincorporated Bay County. A "substantially affected person" may challenge a land development regulation pursuant to Subsections 163.3213(2)(a) and (3), Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners are substantially affected persons and have standing to bring this administrative challenge. The Challenged LDRs Section 403 Section 403, titled "Discouraged Activities," states that it is the "specific intent" of the LDRs "to promote homeowner's quiet use and enjoyment of property, and to minimize the potential for public nuisances." In furtherance of that intent, Section 403 lists activities that are "discouraged" in all new subdivisions with individual lots of less than one-half acre created after the effective date of the LDRs. The list includes: the raising or keeping of farm animals or livestock; raising, keeping, or boarding animals as a business activity; commercial activities other than those associated with home occupations; the storage or accumulation of wrecked motor vehicles, junk, derelict vessels, or debris; storage of building materials used as part of a business activity; the use of recreational vehicles for residential purposes; and any activity that would result in excessive and ongoing noise, odor, glare, fumes, dust, telecommunications interference, or other public nuisance. Petitioners allege that this LDR is inconsistent with Plan Objectives 8.5 and 8.9 and Policies 1.2.1.2, 1.2.1.4, 1.2.1.5, and 1.2.1.9, because it "discourages" rather than prohibits the listed activities, and because it applies only to new subdivisions. Chapter 8 is the Housing Element of the Plan. Objective 8.5 states that it is the Plan's objective to "[p]reserve and protect the character, compatibility, and aesthetics of residential areas and neighborhoods through the enforcement of land use regulations." Policy 8.5.1 is the provision directly implemented, in part, by Section 403. Policy 8.5.1 provides: Specific criteria will be included in the Land Use Code4 for the preservation and protection of residential areas. These criteria will include, but may not be limited to: Maintaining compatibility between types of residential buildings; Ensuring that residential areas will be used primarily for residential purposes; Avoiding overcrowding of residential units; Avoiding accumulations of junk and debris; Avoiding nuisances such as excessive noise, dirt, glare, odors, noxious fumes and telecommunications interference, and; Avoiding the raising or keeping of farm animals. Petitioners criticize Section 403 as deviating from Policy 8.5.1, because Section 403 does not contain all of the criteria listed in the policy, because Section 403 uses the word "discourage" rather than the policy language of "avoiding," and because Section 403 limits its application to new subdivisions with lots of one-half acre or less created after adoption of the LDRs. The County points out that neither "discourage," nor "avoiding" constitutes language of absolute prohibition and, therefore, the LDR does not deviate from the objective or the policy. The County concedes that Section 403 applies only to subdivisions created after the effective date of Ordinance No. 04-30, but notes that the County has adopted a nuisance ordinance (Ordinance No. 04-37, as amended by Ordinance No. 05- 35) that applies to all real property. The nuisance ordinance classifies activities, such as failure to store garbage within a sealed container and exceeding certain sound levels, as public nuisances subject to citation and fines. The County reasonably decided to limit the application of Section 403 to subdivisions created after the effective date of Ordinance No. 04-30 to accommodate existing activities that would otherwise be prohibited. Petitioners point to no statute, rule, or Plan provision stating that an LDR implementing a certain policy is required to implement each and every aspect of that policy. The fact that Section 403 fails to expressly implement Policy 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.3 does not render it inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners contend that, by "discouraging" rather than prohibiting the listed activities, Section 403 is inconsistent with Objective 8.9, which states that it is the Plan's objective to "[p]rotect residential property values and ensure that each homeowner has the opportunity for quiet use and enjoyment of their residence." Petitioners, further, contend that this failure to "fully implement" Policy 8.5.1.1 renders Section 403 inconsistent with certain provisions of Policy 1.2.1, which provides, in relevant part: Findings and Purposes: This Plan is predicated upon and intended to promote the following findings and purposes: * * * 1.2.1.2: Encourage the most appropriate use of land, water and resources consistent with the public interest. * * * : Deal effectively with future problems that may result from the use and development of land within unincorporated Bay County. : To preserve, promote, protect and improve the public health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, law enforcement and fire prevention, and general welfare. * * * 1.2.1.9: To recognize and respect judicially acknowledged or constitutionally protected private property rights. It is the intent of this Plan that all provisions, requirements, regulations, ordinances, or programs adopted under authority of this Plan be developed, implemented and applied with sensitivity for private property rights and not be unduly restrictive, and property owners must be free from actions by others which would harm their property. Full and just compensation or other appropriate relief must be provided to any property owner for a governmental action that is determined to be an invalid exercise of the police power which constitutes a taking, as provided by law. Any such relief shall be as provided by law. Petitioners contend that Section 403's failure to include the requirement of Policy 8.5.1.3 that overcrowding of residential units should be avoided constitutes a conflict with Policy 3.6.1.2, which requires the LDRs to ensure the compatibility of adjacent uses and provide for open space. None of Petitioner's contentions is well-founded in terms of establishing Section 403's inconsistency with the Plan. As noted above, there is no requirement that an LDR implementing a given Policy must implement each and every aspect of that Policy. Petitioner's evidence on this issue consists of resident's anecdotal complaints that adjacent seasonal/resort uses cause increased noise, traffic, and safety hazards, evidence, which did not establish inconsistency between the LDR and the Policy. Petitioners contention that Section 403 would be more effective if it prohibited rather than "discouraged" the listed activities is inarguable, but beyond the scope of this proceeding. In its Plan, the County has chosen to "avoid" the listed nuisances. For better or worse, the Plan's language is hortatory, not mandatory. Section 403 is not inconsistent with Policy 8.5.1 or with the other Plan provisions cited by Petitioners. Section 404 Section 404 delineates the allowable uses, conditional uses, and accessory uses and structures allowed in the R-1 single-family residential zoning category. The allowable uses include: single-family dwellings built to Florida Building Code Standards pursuant to Chapter 553, Florida Statutes; community facilities such as neighborhood centers, golf courses, swimming pools, and tennis courts; family day care homes; not-for-profit parks and playgrounds; and "low impact public utilities." Conditional uses are those that may be allowed in the R-1 zones subject to such conditions as are necessary to preserve the integrity of the zone. Conditional uses include: public or private schools and houses of worship, subject to buffering and traffic impact mitigation; community residential homes provided they are not located within 1,000 feet of one another and do not substantially alter the nature and character of the surrounding area; electric power substations, to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; and "others as determined by criteria specified in Chapter 12." Chapter 12 of the LDRs sets forth the application and permitting procedures for conditional uses, which are "intended to provide additional flexibility in the zoning process where a particular use might not be specifically allowed in a particular zone, but would still be compatible with allowed uses in that zone when certain qualifying conditions are applied." Accessory uses and structures, such as unattached garages, carports, swimming pools, storage sheds and docks, are allowed only when a principal use or structure already exists. They must be located in side or rear yards, unless the lot is abutting a body of water, when they may be placed in front of the principal use or structures. Petitioners contend that Section 404 allows incompatible uses in single-family zones and is inconsistent with Objectives 3.9, 8.5, and 8.9, and Policies 3.9.1, 8.5.1, 8.9.1, 1.2.1.2, 1.2.1.4, 1.2.1.5, 1.2.1.9, and 2.1.2.2 of the Plan. Petitioners contend that Section 404 is inconsistent with the listed Plan provisions for the following reasons: while it requires buffering for schools and churches, it does not require buffering between single-family homes and other uses that are known to create nuisances; it allows electrical power substations, which are known health risks; it creates uncertainty by authorizing unspecified conditional uses so long as they are consistent with the criteria of Chapter 12 of the LDRs; it contains no restrictions on noise that is incompatible with the quiet use and enjoyment of a homeowner's residence; and it does not allow manufactured homes. As to the first reason, Petitioners have offered insufficient support for their contention that the absence of language requiring a buffer between residences and uses that are known nuisances is inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners offer a list of "nuisances" that includes parks, playgrounds, and community facilities, which are not commonly considered "nuisances" in residential areas. Housing Element Policy 8.5.1 of the Plan requires the LDRs to include criteria that maintain compatibility between types of residential buildings, and Policy 8.9.1 requires the County to establish zoning districts in the LDRs that promote compatibility between residential uses and reduce the potential for public nuisances. The County has elected to require buffering in the R-1 zone between residences and churches and schools, but not to require buffering between residences and parks, playgrounds, and community facilities, or between residences and "nuisances" generally. Section 404.2.f provides that "other" conditional uses are required to seek permits under Chapter 12, a process through which compatibility is addressed and buffers could be required as a condition of approving the conditional use. As to the Petitioner's claim regarding electrical power substations, Subsection 163.3208(4), Florida Statutes (2006), requires local governments to allow new electrical substations as a permitted use in all comprehensive plan categories and zoning districts, except those designated as preservation, conservation, or historic preservation. Subsection 163.3208(6), Florida Statutes, provides express conditions for the placement of electric substations in residential areas, requiring the utility to consult with local government regarding site selection and to propose at least three alternative sites, including sites within nonresidential areas. The local government has the authority to make the final decision as to substation placement. Further, electrical substations are classified as conditional uses by Section 404 and, therefore, must meet the requirements of Chapter 12 of the LDRs in order to be approved. One such requirement, in Section 1206.1, is that the conditional use must be "consistent with all applicable provisions of the Plan." Table 3A of the Future Land Use Element ("FLUE") specifically lists public utilities as an allowable use in the Residential land use category. Section 1206.2 provides that a conditional use request "shall not adversely affect adjacent properties in terms of creating a nuisance, reduction in property values, or other quantifiable measure." Section 1206.3 provides that the request must be "compatible with the existing or allowable uses of adjacent properties." Section 1206.7 provides that the request "will not adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare." Section 1205 grants the County's Planning Commission the authority to impose such conditions and safeguards on conditional uses "as deemed necessary to protect and enhance the health, safety and welfare of the surrounding area." In summary, electrical power substations are naturally and appropriately considered "public utilities" and are, therefore, specifically allowed in residential areas under the Plan. Section 404.2.e lists electrical power substations as conditional uses "to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis." As conditional uses, electrical power substations are subject to the review process of Chapter 12 of the LDRs. The health risks of the substations must be considered under Section 1206.7, which prohibits adverse effects on the public health, safety or welfare. Finally, state law in the form of Section 163.3208, Florida Statutes, has preempted any authority the County may have had to completely prohibit electrical substations in residential areas. Petitioners have, also, alleged that Section 404.2.f allows any number of unidentified potential uses that could create nuisances and destroy the character, compatibility and aesthetics of their neighborhoods, which would be inconsistent with Objective 8.5 of the Plan, and that could interfere with the quiet use and enjoyment of their property, which would be inconsistent with Objective 8.9. Petitioners have pointed to no statute, rule, or Plan provision that would require the County to list every possible conditional use for the R-1 zoning category in the LDR. Section 404.2.f simply clarifies that any conditional use not expressly named in Section 404.2 is subject to the permitting criteria of Chapter 12 of the LDRs, which themselves limit conditional uses to those compatible with existing or allowable uses of adjacent properties and that do not create nuisances. Regarding the alleged lack of noise standards, Petitioners have referenced no provision of the Plan requiring noise to be addressed in the LDR that sets forth allowable uses in the R-1 zoning category. The conditional use requirements of Chapter 12 are intended to ensure compatibility of adjacent uses and forestall the creation of nuisances. As noted above, the County, also, has a nuisance ordinance that applies to all property. Finally, Petitioners complain that manufactured homes are not listed as allowable uses in the R-1 single-family zone despite the fact that Table 3A of the FLUE portion of the Plan includes "manufactured housing" among those land uses that are allowable in residential areas. Objective 8.7 of the Plan is to provide for the location of affordable housing, including manufactured housing, in residential districts while avoiding "undue concentrations" of affordable housing in any one area. Policy 8.7.2 of the Plan provides: The Board recognizes that mobile homes and/or manufactured houses are commonly used to provide affordable housing. The Board will provide for the placement of these structures by designating certain land use districts in the Land Use Code in which mobile homes, manufactured homes, mobile home parks, and mobile home subdivisions will be allowed. These areas will be designated in such a way as to avoid undue concentrations in any one particular geographic area. Manufactured homes are listed, either specifically or by reference to another zoning category, as allowable uses in the R-2 (Duplex Dwellings and Manufactured Housing Zones) and R-3 (Duplex, Triplex, and Quadraplex Zones), but not in the R-1 (Single-Family Zones) zoning category. An exception is a manufactured home that meets the Florida Building Code Standards of Chapter 553, Florida Statutes, which is allowed in all residential zoning districts. That fact that Table 3A of the FLUE allows manufactured housing in residential areas does not mean that manufactured housing must be allowed in every zoning category included under the "residential" designation. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 404 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 4105 Section 410, titled "Bulk Regulations," sets forth the bulk regulations for all residential zoning categories. Petitioners have alleged that this LDR is inconsistent with Objectives 3.9, 8.5 and 8.9, and Policies 1.2.1.2, 1.2.1.4, 1.2.1.5, 1.2.1.9, 3.6.1, 3.9.1, 3.9.2, and 8.5.1. Section 410 includes Table 4.1, which establishes standards for each residential zoning category set forth in Chapter 4 of the LDRs. These bulk regulations include maximum densities, minimum lot frontages, yard setbacks, maximum building heights, and impervious surface ratios for each zoning category, further divided into urban, suburban, and rural community areas. Petitioners allege that the failure of the bulk regulations to mandate a minimum lot size and the allowance of 15 dwelling units per acre in the urban R-2 and R-3 zones would allow a developer to enter an existing neighborhood, buy an adjacent vacant parcel or assemble several lots and build at a higher density than the existing neighborhood. Petitioners point out that R-2 zoning covers the majority of land in Laguna Beach, and that the overall density in that area is about eight to ten units per acre. However, under Section 410, a developer could assemble an acre and build up to 15 dwelling units per acre. This density is nearly double the eight units per acre allowed in the R-1 zoning category. Petitioners contend that such increased density in existing neighborhoods has the potential to destroy the character, compatibility and aesthetics of these neighborhoods, which is inconsistent with Objective 8.5, and the potential to create nuisances with excessive noise and traffic, inconsistent with Policy 8.5.1. These impacts would have the cumulative effect of interfering with the residents' quiet use and enjoyment of their homes and would devalue their property, inconsistent with Objective 8.5. Despite the Petitioners' concerns, the Plan contains no minimum lot size requirements in the Residential FLUE category. Therefore, no minimum lot size is required for the residential zoning bulk regulations. The Residential FLUE category in Table 3A of the Plan allows a density of no more than 15 dwelling units per acre in urban/coastal areas. The provisions of Section 410 are identical to those of the Plan, limiting density to 15 dwelling units per acre in the urban areas of the R-2 and R-3 zones. While they have voiced legitimate concerns regarding the impact of increased densities imposed on existing neighborhoods, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 410 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 503 Petitioners have alleged that Section 503, dealing with the SR-1 Seasonal/Resort Residential zoning category, is inconsistent with Objectives 8.5 and 8.9 and Policy 3.9.1, because the allowable uses under this LDR do not protect existing neighborhoods in or adjacent to the SR-1 zones, specifically the existing single-family residential neighborhoods in the Beaches Special Treatment Zone south of U.S. 98. The alleged incompatible allowable and conditional uses include motels/hotels, condominiums, beach rental vendors, and parking garages. The Seasonal/Resort FLUE category in Table 3A of the Plan states that the purpose of the category is "[t]o provide areas for a functional mix of compatible seasonal/resort land uses where the clientele are predominantly seasonal or temporary visitors and tourists." Listed allowable uses include condominiums, multi-family structures, motels, hotels, lodges, restaurants, convenience stores, and lounges and bars as accessory uses to multi-family structures, hotels, motels, or restaurants. Under the heading "Development Restrictions," Table 3A expressly provides that year-round, permanent residences should not be located in the seasonal/resort areas. Petitioners complain that the seasonal/resort land use category and the SR-1 and SR-2 zoning categories were assigned to many existing R-1 single-family residential structures, and that many of these homeowners have petitioned the County to change their designation from seasonal/resort back to residential. However, Petitioners have not shown that the SR-1 category described in Section 503 of the LDRs is inconsistent with the criteria of the Seasonal/Resort FLUE category set forth above. Section 503.1.a specifically recognizes that the R-1 uses in the seasonal/resort area are not nonconforming. Elliott Kampert, the County's chief planner, testified that many, if not most, of the single-family residences in this area were non- homestead properties being used as rental properties by their owners. Petitioners counter that the Plan does not distinguish between full-time, seasonal, or rental uses in applying compatibility standards or requiring protection of the character and aesthetics of residential areas and the opportunity for the quiet use and enjoyment of homes. Policy 3.9.1 of the Plan defines "compatibility" as "a condition in which land uses or conditions can coexist in relative proximity to each other in a stable fashion over time such that no use or condition is unduly negatively impacted directly or indirectly by another use or condition." This is the same definition of "compatibility" found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(23). Petitioners contend that Section 503 is inconsistent with Objective 3.9 generally and with Policy 3.9.1 in particular. Petitioners argue that, because SR-1 is a residential zone that has been applied to existing neighborhoods, Objectives 8.5 and 8.9 are also relevant. Objective 8.5 requires the preservation and protection of the character, compatibility and aesthetics of residential areas and neighborhoods "through the enforcement of land use regulations." Objective 8.9 requires protection of residential property values and ensures the homeowner's quiet use and enjoyment of his residence. Petitioners contend that the development allowed under Chapter 5 of the LDRs, including 60-foot high motels/hotels, 100-foot high condominiums and apartment houses, and 45-foot high parking garages, will interfere with the quiet use and enjoyment and change the character and aesthetics of the existing single- family neighborhoods. The stated purpose of the Seasonal/Resort FLUE category is to accommodate primarily seasonal or temporary visitors and tourists. Table 3A of the Plan expressly states that year-round, permanent residences should not be located in this area. Therefore, the allowable and conditional uses listed for the SR-1 category in Section 503 of the LDRs are appropriate and consistent with the relevant portion of the Plan. Petitioners' arguments, at most, demonstrated that the Seasonal/Resort criteria and standards set forth in Table 3A are inconsistent with Objectives 8.5 and 8.9 of the Plan, to the extent that the County has imposed the Seasonal/Resort designation to existing residential neighborhoods despite the express criterion that permanent residences should not be located in this area. Internal inconsistencies in the Plan are beyond the limited scope of this proceeding. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 503 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 5066 Section 506 includes Table 5.1, which establishes standards for each seasonal/resort zoning category set forth in Chapter 5 of the LDRs. These bulk regulations include minimum lot areas, maximum densities, minimum lot frontages, minimum setbacks, maximum building heights, and impervious surface ratios for each zoning category. Petitioners contend that this LDR is inconsistent with Objectives 3.11, 8.5, and 8.9, as well as Policies 1.2.1.2, 1.2.1.4, 1.2.1.5, 1.2.1.9, and 3.9.1 of the Plan. Section 506 allows residential structures to be built three feet from the side-yard property line, commercial structures to be built ten feet from the side-yard property line, and contains no floor-to-area ratios. The LDR allows heights up to 60 feet for residential structures and up to 230 feet for commercial structures. Petitioners complain that Section 506 would allow construction of a 230-foot tall hotel ten feet from the property line of an existing single-family home. Petitioners contend that the setback provisions do not require sufficient side yards to preserve the integrity of the area or to protect adjacent property from the ill effects of the allowed uses. Petitioners, also, contend that Section 506 lacks objective measurements of density or intensity to control the bulk and mass of new construction. Table 5.1 includes height limits and impervious surface ratios, but does not include floor-to-area ratios, which Petitioners argue are necessary in order to have meaningful density and intensity controls. The County correctly responds that the Plan does not establish minimum setbacks or floor-to-area ratios for buildings in the Seasonal/Resort FLUE category and, therefore, neither the minimum setbacks prescribed in Table 5.1, nor the lack of floor- to-area ratios in Table 5.1 is in derogation of any provision of the Plan. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 506 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 703 Petitioners contend that Section 703, which sets forth the allowable, conditional, and prohibited uses in the Conservation Preservation Zone, is inconsistent with the Plan, because it does not address maintaining water quality standards. Table 3A of the FLUE, in stating the purpose, uses, density and intensity allowed in the Conservation Preservation Zone, states the following "Development Restriction": "No development allowed that can be reasonably expected to degrade water quality standards." Petitioners contend that this statement should have been incorporated into the text of Section 703. Petitioners contend that Section 703 allows uses with the potential to degrade water quality, such as public utilities and infrastructure, docks, piers, seawalls, jetties, groins, boathouses, and "other similar uses."7 Petitioners contend that incorporating the specific language from Table 3A into Section 703 would enable the County to address potential development that could impair water quality. The County points out that environmental standards are set forth in a separate chapter of the LDRs, Chapter 19. Section 1904.2.e of the LDRs provides: "No new development will be permitted that would reasonably be expected to cause violation of state or federal water quality standards." Chapter 18 of the LDRs sets forth the development review process and specifically references Chapter 19 in the provisions stating the environmental information that must be included in a development application. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 703 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 704 Petitioners contend that Section 704, which sets forth the allowable, accessory, and prohibited uses in the Conservation Recreation Zone, is inconsistent with the Plan, because it is inconsistent with the development standards set forth in Table 3A of the FLUE for the Conservation Recreation land use category. Table 3A states that the purpose of the Conservation Recreation Zone is "[t]o provide areas that are used jointly for both conservation and recreation purposes." Table 3A sets forth the allowable uses in the Conservation Recreation Zone: "Agriculture (when BMPs are used), Recreation, Public/Institutional, Residential, Commercial on upland areas when used in conjunction with the overall recreation function (e.g. ranger quarters, concessionaires, etc.), docks, piers, seawalls, groins, buoys, "eco-parks" and other similar uses, and public utilities." Table 3A sets forth the following development restriction: "Development is limited to that which supports conservation/recreation purposes." Table 3A lists density and intensity criteria as "not applicable" for the Conservation Recreation Zone. Section 704 lists all allowable and conditional uses in the Conservation Preservation Zone as allowable uses in the Conservation Recreation Zone. In addition, Section 704 lists the following as allowable uses in the Conservation Recreation Zone: Outdoor recreation uses including: parks, recreation areas, campgrounds, preserves, nature trails, historic sites, or other similar uses; hunting or gun clubs or lodges; canoe, kayak or other small boat rentals; fishing camps or lodges; horseback riding stables and trails; youth, institutional, or day camps or lodges; and, other similar outdoor recreation uses. Petitioners argue that the allowable uses listed in Table 3A, in conjunction with the lack of density and intensity criteria, establishes that only uses of limited impact are to be allowed in this area, with the standard for structural development limited to structures necessary to support the allowable recreational uses, such as ranger stations and concessionaires. "High density, high intensity" structures such as hunting, gun, fishing, youth, and recreational lodges are outside the conservation purposes of Table 3A and, are therefore, inconsistent with the Plan. Section 708 of the LDRs contains Table 7.1, the bulk regulations for all of the Conservation Zones described in Chapter 7. Table 7.1 requires a minimum lot area of 20 acres for construction in the Conservation Recreation Zone, with minimum front, rear, and side setbacks of 100 feet, maximum lot coverage of ten percent and a floor area ratio of 20 percent. A lodge constructed under these criteria would not constitute a "high density, high intensity" structure inconsistent with Table 3A of the Plan. Table 3A includes "designation criteria" for the Conservation Recreation Zone that expressly include the following: St. Andrews State Recreation Area and Aquatic Preserve, Pine Log State Forest, Econfina Creek Water Management Area, Shell Island, and Class III waters. Mr. Kampert, the County's planner, stated that the St. Andrews facility has camping sites for RVs and commercial uses such as a snorkel, dive shop, and camping shop. Pine Log State Forest includes RV camping sites with restroom facilities and showers. It is established that the state allows these types of uses in the management of its recreational areas and, therefore, that the Plan contemplates the same uses in the Conservation Recreation Zone. Petitioners, also, complain that Section 704.2.b lists "public/institutional uses" as allowed as accessory uses and structures, but does not provide examples of the type of development that would be allowed under this term. Petitioners cite no requirement that the County must publish a list of examples under each use category within the LDRs. Examples of Public/Institutional Uses are included in Table 3A of the FLUE under that land use category. In any event, such uses would be limited "to that which supports conservation/recreation purposes." Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 704 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 705 Section 705 lists the allowable and prohibited uses in the Conservation Habitation Zone. Included in the allowable uses under Section 705 are both bird sanctuaries and communications towers. Petitioners complain that communications towers present hazards to birds and that allowing such towers is inconsistent with Table 3A of the FLUE regarding Conservation areas. Petitioner's evidence regarding the dangers that cell phone towers present to migrating and local resident birds is credited, but not relevant to a determination whether the LDR is inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners contend that communications towers constitute a commercial/industrial use and, thus, are inconsistent with Table 3A's description of the Conservation FLUE category. However, Table 3A of the FLUE lists allowable uses in the Conservation category to include "public utilities, and other similar uses." It was not unreasonable for the County to determine that communications towers are more akin to public utilities than to commercial/industrial uses, and to allow their placement in the Conservation Habitation Zone.8 Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 705 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 706 Section 706 is titled "Innovative Development Techniques." Section 706 is intended to implement Objective 6.18 of the Conservation Element of the Plan. Objective 6.18 provides that its purpose is to "[p]rovide landowners with beneficial use of their property when environmental restrictions cause the loss of full development potential through use of innovative and flexible development strategies." Policy 6.18.1 of the Plan provides that owners or developers facing development restrictions due to the presence of locally significant environmental resources on their property may use the "innovative land development techniques" of clustering and mitigation. Petitioners contend that the first sentence of Section 706 is inconsistent with the standards set forth in Table 3A for Conservation Preservation and Conservation Recreation land use categories. The first sentence of Section 706 provides: "Conservation zones are intended to accommodate limited development while, also, conserving and protecting valuable natural resources." Petitioners argue that the Conservation Preservation and Conservation Recreation categories do not allow any development at all. Petitioner's contention would be correct only if Section 706 were read to negate or override Sections 703 and 704. Sections limit development in the Conservation Preservation and Conservation Recreation Zones, respectively, through the provision of limited allowable uses and prohibited uses. Nothing in Section 706's provision for innovative development techniques trumps the limited allowable uses of the Conservation Preservation or Conservation Recreation Zones. Petitioners, also, complain that Section 706 is inconsistent with Policy 6.18.1, which states in relevant part that "owners or developers may use, or be required to use, the following innovative land development techniques." (Emphasis added.) Petitioners emphasize the underscored language to argue that the County has retained the right to impose clustering on developers, whereas Section 706 merely "encourages" clustering. On this point, there is no inconsistency between the LDR and the Plan, because the latter does not require the County to impose mandatory clustering on owners or developers. Petitioners are probably correct that Section 706 would prove more effective if it required clustering, but Policy 6.18.1 of the Plan does not mandate that outcome. Section 706 allows the use of "density transfers," defined as "[t]he transfer of all or part of the allowable density on a lot or parcel of land to another lot or parcel of land." Petitioners argue that the LDR does not provide specific and detailed criteria for the application of density transfers, which renders it inconsistent with Policies 1.2.1.2, 1.2.1.4, 1.2.1.5, and where transfers impact existing residential areas, Objectives 8.5 and 8.9. The density transfers are contemplated only for conservation zones, not existing residential areas. The lack of specific criteria to implement the concept of density transfers does not render Section 706 in conflict with the cited Plan provisions. It is noted that the Plan is silent as to density transfers, but it is, also, found that density transfers are not in conflict with the Plan.9 Finally, Petitioners allege that allowing developers to deviate from the bulk requirements for Conservation zones in Table 7.1 of the LDRs may lead to development inconsistent with the Plan. The County contends that allowing deviations from the bulk requirements is not inconsistent with the Plan, because deviations are allowed only when it can be shown that they are "necessary and desirable to avoid or preserve natural resources." Petitioners respond that the terms "necessary" and "desirable" are so vague as to be meaningless in terms of establishing an objective standard for development review. However, Section 706 expressly provides that requests for the use of innovative development techniques in Conservation zones are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, indicating that the County intends for the common understanding of those terms to be elucidated and amplified through the permitting process. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 706 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 707 Section 707 contains nine special regulations that apply in the Conservation zones. Section 707.5 provides: Development will be under-taken [sic] so as to avoid activities that would destroy wetlands or the natural functions of wetlands except for activities authorized by permits issued by federal or state authorities. Petitioners allege that Section 707.5 is inconsistent with Objective 6.11 and Policies 6.7.4 and 6.18.1 of the Plan, because the intent of those Plan provisions is to preserve and protect wetlands. Petitioners, therefore, contend that Section 707.5 is less restrictive than the Plan, because it allows state and federal permits to trump the wetland protections set forth in the Plan. Objective 6.11 of the Plan is to "[p]rotect and conserve wetlands and the natural functions of wetlands." Policy 6.7.4 sets forth development standards applicable in designated Ecosystem Management Areas. Policy 6.7.4.5 provides that development will be undertaken "to avoid activities that would destroy wetlands or the natural functions of wetlands." Section 707.5 of the LDRs is taken verbatim from Policy 6.7.4.5 of the Plan, except for the addition of the phrase, "except for activities authorized by permits issued by federal or state authorities." Policy 6.18.1 is the "innovative development techniques" provision discussed in Section H, supra. The County points out that Objective 6.11 states that the County will "protect and conserve" wetlands, not "preserve" them from development altogether. Petitioners contend that nothing in the Plan distinguishes between "jurisdictional wetlands," those that by definition are regulated by state and federal permitting agencies, and "isolated wetlands" unregulated by state and federal agencies. However, Policy 6.11.1 adopts by reference the definition of "wetlands" as used by the Department of Environmental Protection and set forth in Subsection 373.019(25), Florida Statutes (2006).10 Objective 6.1 of the Plan calls for the elimination of "needless duplication of government and regulatory activities relative to protection of natural resources." Policy 6.1.1 goes on to say that the County "will, to the maximum extent practicable, rely upon state laws and regulations to meet the conservation goals and objectives of this Plan." Despite Petitioner's contentions, nothing in the Plan clearly indicates11 that isolated wetlands are to be afforded the same protections as jurisdictional wetlands. The Plan defines "wetlands" by reference to the Department of Environmental Protection's definition, a clear indication that the Plan is concerned only with jurisdictional wetlands. Section 707.5 defers to the federal and state wetlands permitting authorities in the same manner as the Plan itself. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 707 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 708 The bulk regulations for the Conservation zones are contained in Table 7.1 of Section 708 of the LDRs. A minimum lot area of 20 acres and a maximum building height of 50 feet are provided for the Conservation Recreation zone. Petitioners allege that that provision of a minimum lot area is inconsistent with the Conservation Recreation FLUE category contained in Table 3A of the Plan, because no minimum lot area is included therein. Petitioners claim that a minimum lot area precludes smaller parcels from being placed in the Conservation Recreation category, thereby decreasing opportunities for acquiring and conserving smaller areas of ecologically valuable resources. Petitioners, also, argue that allowing buildings up to 50 feet in height is inconsistent with the Conservation Recreation FLUE category, because such a building height is not necessary to accommodate the allowable uses. Contrary to Petitioner's allegation, the minimum lot area in Table 7.1 is not inconsistent with the Plan. Table 3A of the Plan does not set forth minimum lot areas as such for any land use category.12 Petitioner's policy argument regarding smaller parcels is logical, but unsupported by any specific Plan provision. Finally, the County demonstrated that a 50-foot building height is reasonable for uses such as fire towers in the Conservation Recreation zone. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that Section 708 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1805 Section 1805 lists all the information that must be included in a development permitting application. Section 1805.2.b sets forth the environmental information to be included in the applicant's site development information package. Petitioners allege that Section 1805.2.b is inconsistent with the Plan, because it does not require applicants to depict wetland buffers or the jurisdictional wetland line on their site plans. Policy 6.11.3.1 of the Plan provides: "Wetlands will be delineated and depicted on all site plans included in applications for development approval." The policy does not require the depiction of wetland buffers. Consistent with Policy 6.11.3.1 of the Plan, Section 1805.2.b of the LDRs requires the applicant's site plan to depict wetland areas. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that Section 1805 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1903 Section 1903 of the LDRs provides a list of what the County considers to be "significant natural resources." The list is identical to the list of "locally significant natural resources" contained in Policy 6.2.1 of the Plan, except that "shellfish beds" were added to the LDR list. Petitioners contend that Section 1903 should go beyond the list in Policy 6.2.1 and include all natural resources that are protected under the Plan. In particular, Petitioners claim that native aquatic flora and fauna, that help protect water quality and provide habitat, should be included in Section 1903, because their protection is a part of several Objectives in the Conservation Element of the Plan, including Objectives 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, and 6.22. Petitioners argue that nothing in the statutes or rules restrict the County from adopting LDRs that go beyond the specific language of the Plan, provided the additional language is consistent with and further the objectives of the Plan. Petitioners point to the addition of the language relating to shellfish beds as an example of acceptably expanding the list of significant natural resources contained in Policy 6.2.1. Petitioners are correct in noting that the County could, further, expand the list of significant natural resources in the LDRs. This is not to say, however, that the County is required to expand the list beyond the resources listed in the Plan, and Petitioners concede that Section 1903 contains all of the resources identified in Policy 6.2.1 of the Plan. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 1903 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1904 Section 1904 sets forth the environmental standards with which all development must be designed and constructed to comply. The stated purpose of the standards is "to protect and conserve significant natural resources," a reference to the list of resources provided in Section 1903. Petitioners contend that the expanded list of natural resources they sought to be included in Section 1903 should, also, be added to Section 1904. For the same reasons stated in Section M, supra, there is no requirement that the LDRs go beyond the Plan regarding the list of significant natural resources identified for protection. Section 1904.4 provides setbacks for development adjacent to any water body. All principal and accessory structures must be located no closer than 30 feet from the mean high water or ordinary high water line or within 30 feet of any Department of Environmental Protection jurisdictional line, whichever is more restrictive. Natural vegetation is to be preserved within the setback area. The stated purpose of the setback is to "provide a buffer between surface waters and development, preserve quality, limit sediment discharges, erosion, and uncontrolled stormwater discharges, and provide wildlife habitat." Petitioners allege that the 30-foot setback is insufficient to accomplish the stated purpose, because subsurface impacts can extend well beyond a 30-foot setback. Dr. Bacchus testified as to the extensive scientific documentation that coastal areas are eroding. This natural erosion, coupled with the rise in sea levels caused by global warming, means that a 30-foot setback, even if it were scientifically based at the time it was adopted, would no longer have a valid basis. The situation will be exacerbated by the continued increase in Bay County's population, meaning that more and more water will be withdrawn causing the land mass to compress and collapse. The sea level encroachment will, thus, be far greater than the sea level rise alone would predict. The County notes that the setback language of Section 1904.4 is substantively identical to Policy 6.7.4.6 of the Plan, which applies to Ecosystem Management Areas, areas where "extraordinary regulatory standards may be applied to protect natural resources." Though not all surface waters are necessarily included in the Ecosystem Management Area designation, Section 1904.4 provides the same buffer they would enjoy were they so designated. Petitioners point to no specific Plan provision with which Section 1904 conflicts. Dr. Bacchus credibly testified that a larger buffer area would provide greater protection to the surface waters encroached upon by adjacent development. However, the standard in this proceeding is not whether the LDRs could be improved upon, but whether they are inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that Section 1904 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1905 Section 1905 sets forth a list of development restrictions for those areas designated Ecosystem Management Areas by Policy 6.7.3: "Undeveloped, unplatted land in the Rural or Suburban Service Areas adjacent to Class II waters and Outstanding Florida waters, tributaries and headwaters thereto." Policy 6.7.4.5 of the Plan provides: "Development will be undertaken so as to avoid activities that would destroy wetlands or the natural functions of wetlands." Section 1905.4 of the LDRs provides: "Development will be undertaken so as to avoid activities that would destroy wetlands or the natural functions of wetlands except for activities or permits issued by state and federal agencies." Petitioners contend that Section 1905.4 is inconsistent with Policy 6.7.4.5, because it includes the quoted phrase deferring local jurisdiction to permits issued by state and federal authorities. This is the same argument raised by Petitioners regarding Section 707. See Section I, supra. Petitioners, also, contend that Section 1905.5, providing the same 30-foot setback as discussed in relation to Section 1904, is inadequate for the same reasons discussed in Section N, supra. Petitioners' chief concern is the protection of wetlands, and they argue with some force and no little persuasiveness that state and federal agencies do not adequately enforce wetlands regulations. However, it is not within the authority of this tribunal to substitute its judgment for the County's legislative determination to defer to the permitting authority of state and federal agencies. For the same reasons given in Sections I and N of this Order, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 1905 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1906 Section 1906 sets forth development restrictions in the Deer Point Reservoir Protection Zone, established to protect the water quality of the Deer Point Reservoir at or above the ambient levels at the time the County adopted Ordinance 94-12, which established the boundaries of the protection zone and provided standards for land uses in order to protect the water quality of the reservoir. The Deer Point Lake Reservoir is a Class I water that was created in 1961 through the construction of a dam across the northern portion of North Bay, and is the primary source of drinking water for most of the municipalities in the County. Petitioners complain that Section 1906.5 allows on- site sewage disposal systems within the Deer Point Reservoir Protection Zone, provided that the minimum setback for septic tanks and their drainfields is 100 feet from the mean high water or ordinary high water line. Dr. Bacchus credibly testified that allowing septic tanks to proliferate in the Deer Point Lake watershed will cause the water to become extremely eutrophic, due to the leaching of nutrients through the shallow surficial aquifer. There will be problems with aggressive alien species and fish kills, causing the recreational benefits of the area to plummet.13 Again, even if Dr. Bacchus' expert testimony is fully credited, it does not resolve the question whether Section 1906 is inconsistent with the Plan. Policy 6.6.1.5 of the Plan expressly provides that septic tanks are allowed near Class I waters, provided they are no closer than 100 feet from the shoreline. Policy 6.7.4.4 of the Plan provides that, in the Ecosystem Management Areas, septic tanks must be located at least 100 feet upland of the mean high water line, ordinary high water line, or DEP wetland jurisdiction line. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 1906 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1909 Section 1909 sets forth restrictions, constraints and requirements on development activities in wetlands. Petitioners argue nine points of alleged inconsistency. First, Petitioners contend that Section 1909's defining "wetlands" by reference to Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-340.200(19) is inconsistent with the Plan, because the Plan covers both jurisdictional and isolated wetlands. The cited rule provides: "Wetlands," as defined in subsection 373.019(25), F.S., means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface water or ground water at a frequency and a duration sufficient to support, and under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soils. Soils present in wetlands generally are classified as hydric or alluvial, or possess characteristics that are associated with reducing soil conditions. The prevalent vegetation in wetlands generally consists of facultative or obligate hydrophytic macrophytes that are typically adapted to areas having soil conditions described above. These species, due to morphological, physiological, or reproductive adaptations, have the ability to grow, reproduce or persist in aquatic environments or anaerobic soil conditions. Florida wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bayheads, bogs, cypress domes and strands, sloughs, wet prairies, riverine swamps and marshes, hydric seepage slopes, tidal marshes, mangrove swamps and other similar areas. Florida wetlands generally do not include longleaf or slash pine flatwoods with an understory dominated by saw palmetto. The rule's definition is virtually identical to that contained in Subsection 373.019(25), Florida Statutes. See footnote 10, supra. As noted in Section I, supra, Policy 6.11.1 of the Plan adopts by reference the definition of "wetlands" set forth in Subsection 373.019(25), Florida Statutes. For the reasons set forth in Section I, supra, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the intent of the Plan was to include any wetlands other than the jurisdictional wetlands defined by statute and the Department of Environmental Protection's rule. Petitioner's second point is that Section 1909.2 contains the same exception to the general avoidance of development impacts on wetlands as found in Sections 707.5 and 1905.4: "except for activities authorized by permits issued by federal or state authorities." For the reasons set forth in Sections I and O, supra, this language has not been shown to be inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioner's third point is that Section 1909.3 provides the same 30-foot wetland buffer set forth in Section 1904.4. For the reasons set forth in Section N, supra, the 30- foot buffer has not been shown to be inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioner's fourth point is that the last sentence of Section 1909.3.e is inconsistent with the Plan. This sentence states: "A variance may be granted to allow an accessory use to violate the setback requirement, but by no more than twenty (20) percent."14 Petitioners allege that this language is inconsistent with Objectives 6.11 and 6.18 and their implementing Policies, as well as Policy 6.7.4, because the Plan's provisions contain no express exemption that allows accessory structures to be placed in the wetland buffer. Petitioners, further, contend that the Section 1909.3.e provides no guidelines to ensure that a requested variance is only for a use required to provide the owner with a reasonable use of the property. Petitioners note that "accessory uses" listed in the Plan and LDRs include guesthouses, swimming pools, storage sheds/greenhouses, satellite dishes, jet ski rentals, beverage or food shops, and parking garages. Objective 1.8 in the Administrative Prccedures Element of the Plan is intended to "provide avenues of hardship relief from those aspects of the Plan that have the effect of regulating the use of land, consistent with the provisions of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes." Policy 1.8.1.1 describes the County's variance process, the purpose of which is described as follows: The Plan variance process is designed to provide relief from the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan in those cases where strict application of these requirements could result in an unconstitutional taking or unnecessary hardship prohibiting the use of land in a manner otherwise allowed under this Plan. Policy 1.8.1.1 sets forth nine standards with which an applicant must demonstrate compliance. The ninth standard requires the applicant to prove that the property "cannot be put to a reasonable use which fully complies with the requirements of this Plan unless the variance is granted." This limitation obviates Petitioner's concerns about the potential for granting variances for frivolous accessory uses. The fact that a requested accesory use must go through the variance process set forth in Policy 1.8.1.1 and elaborated in Section 208 of the LDRs ensures consistency.15 Petitioner's fifth point is that Section 1909.3.g is inconsistent with Objective 6.11 and Policies 6.7.4 and 6.18.2. Section 1909.3.g provides: "In situations where the width of the buffer area exceeds the width of the wetland, the buffer may be reduced to the same size as the width of the wetland. The quality of the wetland will determine this possibility." This subsection addresses situations in which the 30-foot buffer is wider than the wetland itself. Mr. Kampert testified that he was unaware that this situation had ever occurred in the County. Dr. Bacchus testified that she was unaware of any proven correlation between the width of the buffer and the width of the wetland in terms of protecting the wetland. She was unaware of any studies, research or other scientific documentation supporting the language regarding buffer reduction, and did not believe it would be possible to state a scientific basis for reducing the buffer to the width of the wetland. Policy 6.7.4.6 of the Plan states that the wetland buffer requirement, "including possible alternatives, may be further addressed in the Land Use Code."16 Allowing the width of the buffer to equal the width of the wetland when the wetland is less than 30 feet wide is an "alternative" that is not inconsistent with any specific provision of the Plan. The County is not required to demonstrate the scientific basis for the LDR. Petitioner's sixth point regards Section 1909.3.h, which provides: Alternative project design and construction may be allowed in lieu of the required buffer when it can be demonstrated that such alternative method provides protection to the wetland or its habitat value that is equal to or greater than the vegetated buffer. Petitioners contend that this provision is inconsistent with Objective 6.11 and Policies 6.11.3.2 and 6.7.4.5. Both policies state that development will be undertaken so as to avoid activities that would destroy wetlands or their natural functions. The County points again to the "possible alternatives" to wetland buffers contemplated by Policy 6.7.4.6 of the Plan, and argues that alternative project design and construction within the parameters outlined in Section 1909.3.h must certainly be considered a reasonable alternative within the meaning of Policy 6.7.4.6. The County, further, notes that any impact of alternative project design would be minimal, because Section 1909 does not apply to wetlands in conservation zones or Ecosystem Management Areas, which contain most of the large wetland systems in the County. These areas have their own sections of the LDRs. See Section 707 (special regulations applicable to conservation zones) and Section 1905 (development restrictions for Ecosystem Management Areas). Petitioner's seventh objection regards Section 1909.5, which provides: In the event a lot or parcel of property is rendered totally undevelopable by avoidance of wetlands the property may be developed when: 1) disturbance of wetlands is the minimum necessary to build an allowable use, and 2) mitigation is provided consistent with applicable law. Petitioners contend that Section 1909.5 is inconsistent with Objective 6.18 and with Plan provisions calling for the protection of wetlands and their natural functions. Petitioners argue that Objective 6.18 establishes the conditions for development of property that is rendered totally undevelopable, because of environmental restrictions such as wetlands avoidance. Section 1909.5 provides for an "allowable use," seemingly a more lenient standard than the "beneficial use" standard of Objective 6.18. Petitioners note that an "allowable use" would appear to be any use listed in the zoning criteria for a particular parcel, which would likely be more intensive than a "beneficial use" under the standard provided by Objective 6.18. In response, the County simply points out that the language of Section 1909.5 is taken verbatim from Policy 6.11.3.5 of the Plan and, therefore, is not inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioner's eighth point regards Section 1909.6, which provides: In order to adequately monitor the loss of wetlands within Bay County, all fill permits granted by an agency other than Bay County shall be reported to Bay County Planning and Zoning Division. This notification is the responsibility of the applicant, and shall be concurrent with the application for development order, where applicable. Before the issuance of the Development Order, the applicant shall file a verified copy of the permit(s). Petitioners first complain that Section 1909.6 deviates from the intent of the Plan by limiting data gathering to jurisdictional wetlands, a variation of the argument already disposed of in Section I, supra. Petitioners, further, argue that Section 1909.6 is insufficient, because it leaves permit reporting to the applicant and provide no enforcement provisions. The standard in this proceeding is not whether the LDR falls short of Petitioner's desires and expectations, but whether it is inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners have shown no inconsistency in Section 1909.6 Petitioner's ninth point regards Section 1909.7, which provides: Violations of this section, or noncompliance cases, may be required to implement appropriate corrective measures developed in consultation with the Planning Official and other appropriate agencies. In addition, triple application fees may apply, such as development order application fees, if this section is violated. Petitioners contend that this provision is inconsistent with the Plan's protection of natural resources, because the penalties are not mandatory, and in any event are not severe enough to deter intentional destruction of wetlands. However, Petitioners point to no particular Goal, Objective, or Policy of the Plan that sets forth enforcement criteria for the wetlands provisions. Again, Petitioners here urge the imposition of their policy preference on the County, rather than demonstrate that Section 1909.7 is inconsistent with the Plan. In summary, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 1909 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 1911 Objective 6.16 of the Plan is to "[p]rotect and conserve selected trees and important vegetative communities." Policy 6.16.1 provides that the County will maintain tree protection regulations as part of the LDRs, and that these regulations will include criteria for: the type and size of protected trees; exemptions; conditions for tree removal; replacement of removed trees; protection of trees during development; and preservation of certain large trees. In furtherance of Objective 6.16, the County adopted Section 1911, which provides lengthy and detailed provisions for tree protection and allowable removal of "protected" trees, defined as any hardwood tree or coniferous tree other than pine with a diameter at breast height of 18 inches or more. Section 1911.5 establishes standards for "historic," "specimen," "champion," and "heritage" trees. Petitioners claim that Section 1911.5 is inadequate, because it fails to establish how these trees are to be identified in order to qualify for protection. Section 1911.5 in fact states that historic and specimen trees are to be designated as such by the County Commission, after a public hearing on the designation "with due notice to the owner of the tree." Thus, it appears that any member of the public, not just the landowner, may bring a tree to the County's attention. A champion tree is one that has been designated by the Florida Division of Forestry as the largest of that species in the State of Florida or by American Forests (a nonprofit conservation organization that has maintained the "National Register of Big Trees" since 1940) as being the largest of that species in the United States. Anyone is eligible to nominate a tree as a "champion" tree. A heritage tree is defined as any tree with a diameter of at least 30 inches. Section 1911.5 does not include any means for official recognition of a heritage tree, though it is noted that a heritage tree would, also, meet the definition of a "protected" tree. As noted above, Section 1805 of the LDRs sets forth the information that a developer must include with his application and site plan. Section 1805.2.b sets forth the environmental information that must be included on the site plan. Section 1805.2.b.vi requires the inclusion of the "location and size of all protected trees." The County concedes that the LDR includes no procedure for the County itself to go out into the field and identify qualifying trees. Objective 6.16 does not require the County to proactively identify qualifying trees. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 1911 is inconsistent with the Plan. Section 2710 Section 2710 regulates the location and construction of communications towers. Section 2710.3 provides the following location standards for a "communications tower," defined as a structure greater than 35 feet in height that is designed to support communications transmission or receiving equipment: Except as provided in subsection 2,17 the following standards and criteria shall apply to the location of new or expanded communications towers: Communications towers may be allowed in all land use districts or zones when all of the following standards and criteria are met. The applicant shall make every effort to locate his communications tower in a non-residential land use district or zone. No other industrial or commerically zoned property is available to the applicant for this intended use. The proposed location will minimize the impact of the antenna structure due to the height, use or appearance of the adjacent structures or surrounding area. There are no existing building structures located within the area that are available to the applicant for this intended purpose. No other existing antenna structure located within the area is available for purposes of co-location. The antenna structure and its proposed height is the minimum necessary by the applicant to satisfy the applicant's communication system needs at this location. The applicant must provide a written, notarized statement to the Planning Division demonstrating compliance with (i) through (vi). Requests to locate communications towers in residential districts or zones can only be approved by the Planning Commission at a duly noticed public hearing by comptetent substantial evidence demonstrating compliance with (a) through (h) above18 and all other applicable provisions of this Chapter [27, dealing with guidelines and standards for the design, installation, construction and maintenance of utility facilities]. Petitioners allege that allowing communications towers in all land use districts or zones is inconsistent with Objectives 3.9, 8.5 and 8.9 and Policies 3.9.1 and 8.5.1 of the Plan, because communications towers are not compatible with and should not be placed in residential areas. The Plan lists public utilities as an allowable use in all FLUE categories, including the Conservation and Residential categories. The Plan does not define "public utility." The LDRs define a "public utility" as "[a] regulated utility provider with a franchise for providing to the public a utility service deemed necessary for the public health, safety, and welfare." The LDRs define "utility, public or private" as (1) Any agency that, under public franchise or ownership, or under certificate of convenience and necessity, or by grant of authority by a governmental agency, provides the public with electricity, gas, heat, steam, communication, transportation, water, sewage collection, or other similar service; (2) a closely regulated enterprise with a franchise for providing a needed service. Based on the above definitions, which Petitioners have not challenged, the County has reasonably concluded that telecommunications providers are public utilities and that their telecommunications towers may, therefore, be placed in residential areas, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 2710.3 Section 2710.3.a.i requires the applicant to make every effort to avoid locating a comunications tower in a residential area. Section 2710.3.a.ii requires the applicant to demonstrate the unavailability of any industrial or commercially zoned property for the tower. Section 2710.3 requires the five- member Planning Commission, the appointed local planning agency for the County pursuant to Section 163.3174, Florida Statutes,19 to approve all requests to locate communications towers in residential areas at a public hearing in which the applicant demonstrates compliance with the listed criteria. These are consistent, reasonable requirements for the placement of a public utility. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that Section 2710 is inconsistent with the Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that: The challenged land development regulations adopted by Bay County Ordinance No. 04-30 are determined to be in compliance. DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether the amendments to the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) and text of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the Collier County Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance No. 02-24 on May 14, 2002, which, among other plan amendments, created the "Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict" and applied it to one parcel within Collier County, are "in compliance" as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. (All references to Florida Statutes are to the 2001 version unless otherwise indicated.)
Findings Of Fact The Parties "Emerald Lakes of Naples" is a residential development in Collier County consisting of 147 single-family homes and 378 multi-family condominiums on 148.27 acres. Emerald Lakes is an organization that represents all persons who own property within the Emerald Lakes of Naples development. Emerald Lakes owns property within Collier County and specifically owns and maintains the streets in Emerald Lakes, including one street bordering the west property line of the Buckley site. A representative of Emerald Lakes made oral comments to the Collier County Board of County Commissioners at the public meeting at which the disputed comprehensive plan amendments were adopted. Collier County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Section 7.11, Florida Statutes. The County is the local government that adopted the comprehensive plan amendment that is the subject of this proceeding. The Department is the state land planning agency and has the authority to administer and enforce the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Buckley is the owner of the approximately 23-acre parcel (Buckley site or parcel) that is the subject of the challenged comprehensive plan amendments. (This parcel consists of two contiguous tracts.) The location of this site and surrounding development are discussed herein. See Findings of Fact 34-45. Buckley submitted comments to Collier County regarding the disputed comprehensive plan amendments between the time they were transmitted to the Department for the issuance of an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report, and the time the County adopted the Amendments. The Amendments In April 2001, Buckley submitted to Collier County an "Application for a Request to Amend the Collier County Growth Management Plan." This Application requested two types of amendments to the Collier County Growth Management Plan (collectively "Buckley Amendments"). The first of the requested amendments would add to the text of the FLUE a section for the "Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict" (Buckley Text Amendment), within the "Urban Mixed-Use District." This Subdistrict is a new land use category that would allow for "limited small-scale retail, office and residential uses while requiring that the project result in a true mixed-use development." This Subdistrict is added as a separate Subdistrict within the "Urban-Mixed Use District" in the FLUE. The second requested amendment would redesignate approximately 23 acres from "Urban-Mixed Use District/Urban Residential Subdistrict" to "Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict" on the Collier County FLUM (Buckley Map Amendment). (The "Urban Residential Subdistrict" is also within the "Urban Mixed Use District.") Under the current land use designation and without the Buckley Amendments, three dwelling units per acre may be permitted on the Buckley site. (The site has a base density of four dwelling units per acre, reduced by one because the site is located within the Traffic Congestion Area.) In addition, the site could be eligible for an additional eight dwelling units per acre under the Affordable Housing provision of the Density Rating System, more fully discussed herein at Findings of Fact 21-27. The Buckley site is currently zoned Agricultural and being utilized as a commercial plant nursery. The purpose and description of the Buckley Amendments is as follows: The intent of this amendment is to develop a small-scale mixed use development that encourages the principals [sic] of Traditional Neighborhood Districts at a small scale developing residential, retail and office on one site. The amendment establishes a mixed use, site specific subdistrict that creates a pedestrian friendly environment for small size retail and office uses with a residential component developed on one site. The amendment proposes to cap retail uses at 3250 square feet per acre and office uses at 4250 square feet per acre while ensuring mixed use development by requiring that a minimum of [40%] of the commercial [square footage] have a residential component within the same building. A minimum of 25% of the maximum residential density would have to be constructed prior to the development of 40,000 square feet of commercial space (86 dwelling units at 15 units per acre density). The entire site is 22.84 acres. If built out to maximum capacity the project site could be developed with 74,230 square feet of retail; 97,070 square feet of office; and 343 residential units. The proposed amendment permits C-1, C-2 and C-3 [commercial] uses, limits drive-thru establishments to banks with no more than 3 lanes and does not allow gasoline service stations. The proposed project also provides for architectural design standards beyond the County's current standards. All four sides of the building must be finished in a common architectural theme. Primary access to the buildings will be from the interior of the site and buildings fronting Airport Road will provide a secondary access facing the street. Additionally, pedestrian connections are encouraged to all perimeter properties; no building footprint will exceed 15,000 square feet; a 20-foot wide Type D landscape buffer is required along Airport-Pulling Road and a 20-foot wide Type C landscape buffer is required along all other perimeter property lines. Parking areas must be screened from Airport- Pulling Road and from any properties adjacent to the Buckley Subdistrict. Currently, the County's FLUE provides that "[t]he URBAN Future Land Use Designation shall include Future Land Use Districts and Subdistricts" for ten subdistricts within the "Urban-Mixed District. The Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict is added to this list. Another text change recognizes that commercial uses would now be authorized, subject to the criteria identified in the Urban-Mixed Use District, in the Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict. The FLUE text also provides that "[t]he Mixed-Use Activity Center concept is designed to concentrate almost all new commercial zoning in locations where traffic impacts can readily be accommodated, to avoid strip and disorganized patterns of commercial development, and to create focal points within the community." The text change allows "some commercial development" outside the Mixed Use Activity Centers in the Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict. The Density Rating System (System) under the FLUE is amended to provide that "[t]he Buckley Mixed-Use Subdistrict is subject to the Density Rating System, except for the densities established by this subdistrict for multi-family dwelling units." See Findings of Fact 21-27, for a more detailed analysis of the System. On April 18, 2002, the Collier County Planning Commission, by a five to two vote, recommended approval of the Buckley Amendments with two changes, i.e., that the Amendments be subject to the Density Rating System, except for density, see Findings of Fact 12 and 22, and that the development on the site be in the form of a Planned Unit Development. On May 14, 2002, the Collier County Board of County Commissioners adopted the Buckley Amendments by Ordinance No. 02-24. It appears the vote was four to one. Buckley Exhibit 10 at 181. The Department timely caused to be published on July 9, 2002, in the Naples Daily News, a Notice of Intent to find the Buckley Amendments "in compliance." On or about July 30, 2002, Emerald Lakes filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing regarding the Department's Notice of Intent. While Emerald Lakes raised numerous grounds on which the Buckley Amendments are alleged to be not "in compliance," Emerald Lakes' counsel represented in his opening statement that the issues had been narrowed to four. These issues, as well as the issues of "internal consistency" raised by Emerald Lakes' expert witness at the final hearing, are addressed below. Public Notice1 Emerald Lakes offered into evidence a number of notices Collier County published to advertise public meetings regarding the Buckley Amendments. There was no testimony during the final hearing regarding these notices.2 Three of the notices (Emerald Lakes' Exhibits 2a-2c) offer a map of what purports to be Collier County. With the aid of a magnifying glass, Airport (Pulling) Road, Pine Ridge Road, and U.S. Highway 41 (Tamiami Trail) are identified. It does not appear that the Buckley site is identified on the maps nor specifically mentioned in the notices, although the Buckley Amendments were approved in Ordinance No. 02-24 with other plan amendments. Emerald Lakes became aware of the Buckley Amendments in April 2002, and thereafter took an active role regarding this matter. Forest Wainscott, Emerald Lakes' vice-president, attended the hearing at which the Collier County Board of County Commissioners adopted the Buckley Amendments (Ordinance No. 02-24), and voiced to the Commissioners Emerald Lakes' concerns about the Buckley Amendments. After hearing these concerns, the Commission voted to adopt the Buckley Amendments. Emerald Lakes did not prove any prejudice arising from the lack of the placement of the Buckley site on the notice maps. Density Rating System The Collier County Comprehensive Plan's FLUE contains a Density Rating System. The System "is only applicable to areas designated Urban [or] Urban–Mixed Use District" and "only applies to residential units." For these lands, the System establishes a general base density of four dwelling units per acre. The System specifies how the base level of density may be adjusted. There are six criteria which allow consideration of an increase in density and one criterion which may be considered to adjust the density downward. For example, if a project is within the Traffic Congestion Area, as Buckley is, 1 dwelling unit per acre would be subtracted. Here, the Buckley has a base density of four dwelling units per acre and would have a net density of three units per acre. See Finding of Fact 7. The text amendments to the FLUE provide that the Buckley Subdistrict is subject to the System, "except for the densities established by this subdistrict for multi-family dwelling units." As noted, the System allows the base density to be decreased to an unspecified low, and increased to 16 units per acre, with an even greater potential if a "transfer of development rights" is employed. The Buckley Map Amendment would change the designation of the subject parcel from "Urban Residential Subdistrict" to "Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict," and assign a maximum density of 15 dwelling units per acre to the parcel. By the text change noted in Finding of Fact 22, the "densities" for the parcel would no longer qualify for the System. The increased density is not achieved by an application of the System, but is a result of the Buckley Amendments. Emerald Lakes argued that the parcel does not qualify for a density increase under the System, and, therefore, should not have been eligible for an increase under a separate comprehensive plan amendment. Stated otherwise, to the extent the Amendments authorize a maximum residential density of 15 units per acre, the Amendments are inconsistent with the System, and hence the Plan. This argument assumes that the System establishes the sole manner in which a parcel designated "Urban–Mixed Use" in Collier County may enjoy increased density, and also that these parcels are not eligible for FLUM amendments. Neither the Collier County Comprehensive Plan nor pertinent State law contains these blanket restrictions. A parcel designated "Urban–Mixed Use" is not prohibited from seeking a comprehensive plan amendment that would increase allowable density. Such an amendment, just as all comprehensive plan amendments, would have to be internally consistent with the Collier County Comprehensive Plan, would have to be supported by data and analysis, and would have to comply with the other applicable requirements in order to be "in compliance" as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. In sum, there is no requirement for the Buckley Amendments to demonstrate compliance with the Density Rating System or prove a special justification for seeking a density increase in light of the System. Need The term "need" as used in growth management refers to the amount of land required to accommodate anticipated growth. Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes. Local governments are required to analyze by acreage how much land within each land use category3 they need to accommodate projected growth through the planning timeframe, and then base their comprehensive plan on this estimate. Rule 9J- 5.006(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Collier County addressed the "need" issue for the Buckley Amendments in an October 8, 2001, staff memorandum to the Collier County Planning Commission. This memorandum notes that there is an excess allocation of approximately 298 acres of commercially zoned land in the "North Naples Planning Community."4 There is no competent record evidence to contradict this conclusion about the numerical allocation of commercial. There is, however, competent evidence that tempers the importance to be assigned to this numerical allocation. With its plan amendment application as revised and updated, Buckley provided Collier County with a discussion of a study prepared by Appraisal Research Corporation of Naples which, as characterized by the applicant, stated in part: While the areas east [sic] and South Naples have and [sic] excess of retail space available, the balance of the unincorporated portion of the county shows a vacancy rate of less than 3%, well below the state and national averages. The area of North Naples, which is the subject of this amendment, has an incredibly low vacancy rate in local centers of 1.18%. While additional commercial space is being constructed countywide, it is of the same power type centers that continues to keep small retailers and service related businesses paying power center prices that cost as much as $26.50 per square feet. Barbershops, salons, dry cleaners and the like are forced to absorb these high-priced rents with little of [sic] options. According to the report, the demand for retail space is strong even considering existing and future construction of new centers. Further, the staff memorandum provides a "commercial demand analysis" which concluded: While, based on the 1998 Commercial Inventory, there is sufficient commercial acreage in the North Naples Planning Community to exceed the County's projected demand up to the year 2005, this project would be one of the first of its kind to be developed in the County. A mix of uses to include a substantial residential component could set an example for development and redevelopment of this type, at a smaller scale, that provides opportunities for residents to live, work and shop within the same development and limit, to some degree, the impact on the existing roadway system. In light of the conditions of development contained in the Buckley Text Amendment, the subject parcel will serve this need. (Some of the conditions have been discussed. See Findings of Fact 8-9.) In or around May 2001, the Board of County Commissioners of Collier County adopted, by resolution, "The Community Character Plan for Collier County, Florida." This Plan made recommendations and, in part, "encouraged a mixed- use development." According to Amy Taylor, A.I.C.P, currently a long-range planner with the Collier County public school system, and formerly employed by the Collier County Planning Services Department for over six years and who reviewed the Buckley Amendments in this capacity, the County's mixed-use activity centers were not working because "they were not truly mixed-use. They were high-intensity, large-scale retail limited-office, in--in large centers, and because they were not mixed-use in--in terms of having a residential development, they were not functioning as--they had been intended." The Buckley Amendments propose a different use than the existing mixed-use activity centers and the type of development which has occurred. In fact, the Buckley Subdistrict is not a mixed-use activity center because it does not rise to the level of intensity and size of these centers. Also, unlike the mixed-use activity centers in Collier County, the Buckley Subdistrict involves a residential component. The County Commissioners directed staff to develop comprehensive plan amendments to implement the Community Character Plan. As a private plan amendment request, Ms. Taylor reviewed the Buckley Amendments and determined that they were consistent with the objectives and recommendations in the Community Character Plan, in part, because the Amendments "provide an opportunity also for internal capture and pedestrian interconnectivity." There is no persuasive evidence that would support a finding that any numerical over-allocation of commercial will exacerbate urban sprawl in the North Naples Planning Community or Collier County in general. Compatibility Emerald Lakes also contended that the Buckley Amendments will allow development that is incompatible with the adjacent Emerald Lakes of Naples development in violation of State law and Objective 5 and Policy 5.4 of the Collier County Comprehensive Plan's Future Land Use Element.5 Contrary to this contention, the limited type of mixed-use development mandated by the Buckley Amendments is consistent with surrounding uses, is compatible with Emerald Lakes, and is at least the subject of fair debate.6 The Buckley site proposed for re-designation is approximately 23 acres and located west and adjacent to Airport-Pulling Road, and specifically at approximately the northwest corner of Orange Blossom Drive and Airport Pulling Road, and south of the intersection of Airport Pulling Road and Vanderbilt Beach Road, which approximates the northern boundary. The Buckley site is currently operated as a commercial plant nursery. The Airport-Pulling Road corridor between Pine Ridge Road and Vanderbilt Road is anchored by two Activity Centers, one with approximately 143 acres permitted for 910,000 square feet of commercial and 450 hotel rooms, and the other with 347.50 acres permitted for 1,556,000 square feet of commercial. (Activity Centers allow up to 11 dwelling units per acre, but only on separate tracts for commercial.) The Naples Walk Shopping Center, which is part of the Vineyards development of regional impact, is located on the northeast corner of Airport-Pulling Road and Vanderbilt Beach Road. Lakeside of Naples, a residential community, is across Airport-Pulling Road from the Buckley site. Orange Blossom Mixed Use Subdistrict (Orange Blossom) is located south of Lakeside of Naples, also on the east side of Airport-Pulling Road. County staff analyzed Orange Blossom. The Buckley Subdistrict "is similar to and patterned after" Orange Blossom. Orange Blossom is 14.43 acres and 8.41 acres less than the Buckley site, "but allows 1860 more square feet of commercial than does that proposed for the Buckley Mixed Use Subdistrict at 22.84 acres," i.e., 173,160 versus 171,300 total maximum commercial square feet. Orange Blossom allows four dwelling units per acre versus 15 dwelling units per acre for the Buckley site. However, as noted by County staff, "[r]esidential density is higher for [Buckley] and, as proposed and designed, the commercial located on the [Buckley] site would more likely capture a significantly higher proportion of its business from residents on site than if the density was lower." In relative proximity to the Buckley site are commercial developments such as the Ritz-Carlton Golf Lodge, the Tiberon Golf Club, an Eckerd Drug Store, a Walgreens Drug Store, a "Picture Warehouse" under construction, and offices known as "The Galleria Shops." Claire Goff testified that Emerald Lakes is "[a]lmost totally surrounded by" commercial development and that existing adjacent commercial development is compatible with the Emerald Lakes development. To the immediate east of the Buckley site is Airport-Pulling Road, which is currently being widened to six lanes and runs north/south. To the south of the parcel is the recently-completed North Regional Collier County Public Library. To the immediate north of the parcel is the Brighton Gardens Assisted Living Facility, located on five acres, with a density of approximately 22 dwelling units per acre. The Emerald Lakes of Naples development, including single-family homes, lies to the immediate west of the Buckley parcel and are located around an approximately 47-acre lake. The multi-family component of this development lies to the north and surrounds a smaller lake, approximately 15 acres. Marker Lake Villas, a residential project, is located to the north. Venetian Plaza, a 90,000 square foot office community, is under construction and located immediately east of Marker Lake Villas and abuts the northern boundary of Emerald Lakes. Overall, that portion of Emerald Lakes that immediately adjoins the subject parcel on the west, consists of a gross density of approximately three and one-half dwelling units per acre. Emerald Lakes alleged that the 15 dwelling units per acre and the commercial and office development allowed under the Buckley Amendments are not compatible with these adjacent homes. This allegation is not supported in the record. As noted, Emerald Lakes is not exclusively single- family. To the north of the above-mentioned single-family homes within Emerald Lakes are multi-family condominiums. See Finding of Fact 41. These multi-family units surround a smaller lake. When this lake area is included with land actually developed with the condominiums, the gross residential density is approximately five units per acre. However, if the lake area is excluded and net residential density is calculated only on the land on which the condominiums are developed, this multi-family component of Emerald Lakes is approximately 15 dwelling units per acre. This multi-family portion of Emerald Lakes is within 100 feet of the single-family homes. The single-family homes surrounding the larger lake within Emerald Lakes are separated from the Buckley parcel by setbacks, a road, and a 20-foot required buffer, such that the distance from these homes to development on the Buckley parcel will range from approximately 85 feet to 125 feet from the property line. Based on these factors, the development allowed by the Buckley Amendments would be compatible with surrounding land uses and development, including Emerald Lakes. It is at least the subject of fair debate. Internal Consistency Emerald Lakes further alleged that the Buckley Amendments are internally inconsistent with various provisions of the Collier County Comprehensive Plan. Each provision is addressed below. Additionally, several consistency issues are discussed in previous findings relating to the System and compatibility. Policy 5.5 of the Collier County Comprehensive Plan's FLUE directs that the County shall "[e]ncourage the use of existing land zoned for urban intensity uses before permitting development of other areas." Emerald Lakes contended that the Buckley Amendments are inconsistent with this Policy because they are allegedly increasing the "inventory . . . of commercial square footage" before other areas are fully developed. However, the second sentence of Policy 5.5 provides: "This [encouraging the use of existing urban zoned land] shall occur by planning for the expansion of County owned and operated public facilities and services to existing zoned land before servicing other areas." Emerald Lakes offered no evidence that the Buckley Amendments required the County to provide unplanned services to inappropriately zoned or rezoned land. The record evidence persuasively demonstrates that the impacts of potential development under the Buckley Amendments (and without regard to actual site plans which are not the subject of this proceeding) are within the planned and adopted levels of service for all publicly owned and operated facilities and services, including but not limited to, traffic. (With the six-laning of Airport-Pulling Road, a level of service of C is reasonably expected.) Policy 5.7 provides that the County shall "[e]ncourage the recognition of identifiable communities within the urbanized area of western Collier County." This Policy further provides that the "[p]resentation of economic and demographic data shall be based on Planning Communities and commonly recognized neighborhoods." Emerald Lakes contended that the Buckley Amendments are inconsistent with this Policy because there was an insufficient submission of economic and demographic data. To the contrary, the Buckley Amendments are supported with extensive data regarding the North Naples Planning Community. Emerald Lakes did not present any persuasive data to prove otherwise. Emerald Lakes further asserted that the Buckley Amendments are inconsistent with the County Plan's criteria which govern the location of "Mixed Use Activity Centers." The plain language of the Buckley Amendments, as buttressed by the testimony of Collier County's comprehensive plan manager, William Litsinger, A.I.C.P., demonstrated that the Amendments do not seek a "Mixed Use Activity Center" designation and the criteria for that designation are, accordingly, inapplicable. See Finding of Fact 31. Emerald Lakes also strongly suggests that if Orange Blossom can operate as a mixed use subdistrict with a maximum of four dwelling units per acre and with a mix of commercial, so can Buckley and, therefore, there is no justification from departing from the Density Rating System and authorizing plan amendments which propose development similar to the Buckley Amendments. The County was presented with data and analysis which discussed various scenarios and configurations of mixed use development. As noted above, some of the similarities and distinguishing features of Orange Blossom were considered. See Finding of Fact 38. As part of their "findings and conclusions," County planning staff noted in a memorandum (see Finding of Fact 29) to the Collier County Planning Commission: "Opportunities with adjacent residential will be one of the major difficulties of new small-scale mixed use development in Collier County. The potential for increased internal capture by allowing higher densities on site will partially mitigate this issue. Market conditions and/or increased traffic congestion on major roadways may provide incentives for existing neighborhoods to seek interconnections in the future." As further noted by County staff: "This project would be one of the first of its kind to be developed in the County. A mix of uses to include a substantial residential component could set an example for development and redevelopment of this type, at a smaller scale, that provides opportunities for residents to live, work and shop within the same development and limit, to some degree, the impact on the existing roadway." Whether the Buckley Amendments are consistent with the County’s Comprehensive Plan is at least fairly debatable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Buckley Amendments adopted by Collier County in Ordinance No. 02-24 are "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the City of Gainesville comprehensive plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 4036 on October 24, 1994, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact have been determined: The Parties Respondent, City of Gainesville (City), is a local government subject to the comprehensive land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered and enforced by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments made thereto. Petitioners, Mark Barrow, Jane Myers, Wilse Barnard, Mary Webb, and Steven and Mary Reid, own property and reside within the City. Petitioners, Historic Gainesville, Inc. and Duckpond Neighborhood Association, Inc., are organizations made up of persons who reside, own property, or operate businesses within the City. By stipulation of the parties, petitioners are affected persons within the meaning of the law and have standing to bring this action. Intervenors, John and Denise Feiber and Katherine Bodine, are the owners of two parcels of property which are at issue in this case. Intervenors submitted oral and written comments during the plan amendment review and adoption proceeding and thus have standing as affected persons to participate in this proceeding. Background During 1993 and 1994, John Feiber unsuccessfully attempted to sell his 1,800 square foot single-family home for an asking price that was disproportionately high for residential property, and was more in keeping with a commercial asking price. Recognizing that the property would be far more valuable with a commercial classification than its current residential designation, on June 11, 1994, Feiber, his wife, and the owner of the property next door, Katherine Bodine, submitted an application for an amendment to the City's Future Land Use Map (FLUM) to convert a .57 acre parcel from Residential- low Density to Planned Use District (PUD) to change a single family home into a law office, potentially convert an adjacent structure into mixed office and residential uses, and possibly build a third office building. Although the City's Plan Board unanimously recommended that the application be denied, by a 4-1 vote the City approved the application on October 3, 1994. This approval was formally ratified through the adoption of Ordinance No. 4036 on October 24, 1994. After essentially deferring to the City's findings, on January 25, 1995, the DCA completed its review of the amendment and issued a Notice of Intent to find the amendment in compliance. On February 15, 1995, petitioners filed their petition for administrative hearing with the DCA generally contending the amendment was internally inconsistent and violated certain parts of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, the state comprehensive plan, and Chapter 9J- 5, Florida Administrative Code. In resolving these contentions, on which conflicting evidence was presented, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence. Finally, by order dated March 30, 1995, intervenors were authorized to participate in this proceeding in support of the amendment. The Affected Neighborhood The parcel in question consists of two lots, one owned by the Feibers, the other by Bodine. Both lots are located within, and on the edge of, the Northeast Gainesville Residential Historic District (Historic District), a 63- acre collection of properties, which by virtue of the historically significant structures and residential land use patterns, qualified for listing on the National Register of Historic Places in 1980. The dominant land use and character within the Historic District is residential, and has been since it was zoned residential in 1932. Land uses on Northeast First Street, which forms the western boundary of the District, were always institutional, but on the east side of Northeast Second Street eastward, the uses were always residential with the exception of the Thomas Center, a 1920's vintage building now serving as a City office building. The Historic District is located in downtown Gainesville, beginning just north of East University Avenue and continuing northward until Northeast Tenth Avenue. Within its boundaries on the FLUM are two distinct land use designations, Residential-Low Density and Office. Northeast Second Street serves as the land use boundary between the two, with residential uses permitted on the east side and nonresidential uses permitted on the west side of the street. There have been no encroachments across the residential land use line since 1976 when a nonconforming parking lot was approved by the City. When the City adopted its comprehensive plan in 1985, and revised it in 1991, it continued the same two land uses, thereby codifying existing residential land use patterns and the conversion of office uses that had already occurred along First Street Northeast in the early 1970s. The Amendment As noted above, the parcel in question consists of two legal lots, one owned by the Feibers, the other by Bodine. The amendment changes the FLUM portion of the City's 1991-2001 comprehensive plan to reflect a PUD overlay for the parcel. The land is presently designated as residential-low density, a category in which office uses are not permitted. According to policy 2.1.1 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), this land use category is appropriate "for single family development, particularly the conservation of existing traditional low-density neighborhoods, single-family attached and zero-lot line development, and small scale multi-family development." Conversely, the same policy provides that "office designations shall not encroach in viable residential areas nor expand strip development." By their application, John and Denise Feiber seek to convert their single-family home at 206 N. E. Third Street into a law office. An adjacent two-story structure located at 206 N. E. Second Avenue would possibly be converted to office uses on the first floor and residential uses on the second floor. That building is owned by Katherine Bodine, an absentee landlord who resides in Jacksonville, Florida. The amendment also permits, but does not require, future consideration of a third, multi-story structure to accommodate offices. After the amendment was approved by the City, Bodine immediately listed her parcel for sale, and its future development is uncertain at this time. FLUE policy 2.1.1 describes the PUD designation as follows: This category is an overlay land use district which may be applied on any specific property in the City. The land use regulations pertaining to this overlay district shall be adopted by ordinance in conjunction with an amendment to the Future Land Use Map of this comprehensive plan. The category is created to allow the consideration of unique, inno- vative or narrowly construed land use proposals that because of the specificity of the land use regulations can be found to be compatible with the character of the surrounding land uses and environmental conditions of the subject land. Each adopting PUD overlay land use designation shall address density and intensity, permitted uses, traffic access and trip generation, environmental features and buffering of adjacent uses. Planned Development zoning shall be required to implement any specific development plan. In the event that the overlay district has been applied to a site and no planned development zoning has found approval by action of the City Commission within one year of the land use designation, the overlay land use district shall be deemed null and void and the overlay land use category shall be removed from the Future Land Use Map, leaving the original and underlying land use in place. Therefore, any land use proposal under this category must be "compatible with the character of the surrounding land uses and environmental conditions" and address the "buffering of adjacent uses." It follows that a PUD may not be applied arbitrarily, but rather it must be appropriate for the area and specific site. The amendment applies the following land use regulations to both the Feiber and Bodine parcels: Residential use of up to ten (10) units per acre and all uses permitted by right and by special use permit within the RMF-5 zoning district is authorized; the maximum floor area of all buildings and structures is 7,185 square feet; the Historic Preservation/ Conservation District requirements of Section 30-79, Land Development Code of the City of Gainesville regulate and control the development and design of all buildings, structures, objects and related areas; in addition to the Landscape and Tree management requirements of the Land Development Code, the property is required to be planted and maintained with residential scale landscaping to conform to the surrounding residential neighborhood, as well as act as a buffer for the surrounding uses; the average weekday afternoon peak trip generation rate per 1,000 square feet of gross floor area in office use is not permitted to exceed 1.73; any application for development is required to meet concurrency requirements of Article III of the City of Gainesville Land Development Code for each phase of development; and off-street parking is required to be provided unless on- street parking is created, pursuant to a plan attached to the ordinance as Exhibit "D". The amendment also applies the following land use regulations specifically to the Feiber parcel: An additional land use, Legal Services, as defined in Major Group 81 of the Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1987 ed. is authorized; the maximum floor area authorized for such Legal Services is one thousand seven hundred eighty five (1,785) square feet; and, if on-street parking is not provided in accordance with the plan provided in Exhibit "D" of the ordinance, then off-street parking must be provided within 300 feet of the Feiber parcel. Finally, the amendment applies the following land use regulations to the Bodine parcel: Non-residential land uses are permitted as specified in Exhibit "E" of the ordinance; the maximum floor area authorized for non-residential uses is three thousand six hundred (3,600) square feet; the second story of the existing building is limited to residential use only; and on-site parking limitations are imposed. In accordance with policy 2.1.1, Planned Development (PD) zoning is required to implement the development plan and the uses permitted in the amendment. The underlying FLUM designation of Residential Low Density, which allows up to 12 units per acre, is neither abandoned nor repealed, but rather remains inapplicable, so long as the property is developed in accordance with a development plan to be approved when the implementing PD zoning is adopted, and such implementing zoning must be adopted within one year of the amendment becoming effective. Data and Analysis Data and Analysis Before the City Basically, the City concluded that the amendment could be justified on the theory that the conversion would provide commercial "infill" of an underutilized parcel with step-down transitions to the inner neighborhood. It further concluded that because of the small size of the parcel involved, the conversion would have a de minimis effect on the neighborhood. When the amendment was adopted, the City had before it the previously adopted comprehensive plan, including the original data and analysis to support that plan, and testimony and exhibits offered both for and against the amendment during a local government hearing conducted on October 4, 1994. Significantly, the City had no studies of any kind regarding marketability, neighborhood stability, availability of land for office and residential uses, or traffic. Indeed, in preparation for final hearing, its expert simply made a walking tour of the neighborhood. Data and Analysis Before the Department On October 28, 1994, the City transmitted the amendment to the DCA for review. The transmittal package contained the following items: The City's Final Order; Ordinance No. 4036, with Exhibits A-E; interoffice communication to the City Commission from the City Plan Board dated July 11, 1994; interoffice communication to the City Plan Board, Planning Division Staff dated June 16, 1994; attachment to Land Use Application (pages 1-5); and excerpts from the City Zoning and Future Land Use Maps showing the zoning and land uses assigned to adjacent properties. However, the transmittal package did not include transcripts of the City Plan Board hearing, the Commission Adoption hearing, or any part of the record of the quasi-judicial hearing of October 4, 1994. The DCA planning staff consulted data contained in the Department of Transportation's ITE Manual in analyzing the traffic and parking impacts of the adopted land use map amendment. It also contacted the Department of State, Division of Historic Resources (Division), for analysis of the amendment's impact on historic resources, and it received comments on the amendment from the the North Central Florida Regional Planning Council (NCFRPC). The DCA planning staff also analyzed the FLUM to determine compatibility of the amendment with surrounding uses. During this review, the DCA planning staff reviewed all pertinent portions of the City's Plan Goals, Objectives and Policies (GOPs) and data and analysis. This review was done in a cursory fashion, however, since the DCA viewed the application as being a very small project with no perceived impact. Given the lack of any studies concerning marketability, neighborhood stability, availability of land for office and residential uses, and traffic, all of which are pertinent to this amendment, it is found that the City and DCA did not use the best available data and analysis. Therefore, the amendment is inconsistent with the requirement in Rule 9J-5.005(2), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes, that the best available (and appropriate) data and analysis be used. Compatibility with Adjacent Uses To the south of the subject parcels is a four-lane loop road (Northeast Second Avenue) which now serves as a buffer from the adjacent uses. Across the street to the south is City Hall, which was constructed more than thirty years ago. To the west of the property is a commercial parking lot with an office building next door to that parking lot. On the east side of the property are multi-family dwellings. To the south and east from the parcels is a commercial lot. An area from the corner of Northeast Second Avenue and Northeast First Street, one block from the subject parcels, and proceeding north along Northeast First Street, contains many non- residential uses, including offices. Areas to the north are predominately multi-family and single-family uses. Transitional uses and buffering are professionally-acceptable planning tools. However, changing a single-family dwelling into an office does not enhance buffering for the residential properties further in the neighborhood because the Feiber house is currently a less intense use than office. Therefore, the amendment conflicts with the plan's requirement that a PUD provide buffering for adjacent uses. The concept of transitional uses entail the practice of providing for a gradation of uses from high-intensity to low-intensity uses. Insertion of another non-residential use at the Feiber property to achieve a chimerical "step-down transitional use" merely moves the "edge" another step inward. Nonresidential uses already exist just outside the Historic District neighborhood that would meet this "step-down" criteria. Retrofitting an existing neighborhood is not appropriate unless it is no longer viable, which is not the case here. Contrary to the proponents' assertion, the Feiber and Bodine parcels will not provide the transitional uses of office and multi-family uses between the high-intensity office (City Hall) uses and lower intensity, multi-family uses to the north of the subject parcels. The four-lane street between the City Hall and the subject property now serves as an adequate buffer. A major goal of the City's plan is to protect viable, stable neighborhoods, and the FLUM, with its residential land use category, provides that protection. This goal cannot be achieved by converting these parcels to office use. Another major goal of the plan is to protect and promote restoration and stablization of historic resources within the City. That goal cannot be achieved by converting these parcels to nonresidential uses. Yet another major goal of the plan is the prohibition of office uses intruding into residential neighborhoods. The amendment contravenes that requirement. Impact on Historic Resources As noted earlier, the Feiber and Bodine properties are located on the southern edge of the Historic District of the City, separated from the City Hall by a one-block long segment of a four-lane street plus the full half-block length of the City Hall parking lot. A major goal of the City's plan is the protection of historic architectural resources and historically significant housing within the City. This goal is found in FLUE objective 1.2, Historic Preservation Element goals 1 and 2, and Housing Element policy 3.1.3. This overall major goal, as embodied in the foregoing objective, policies and goal, cannot be furthered by the amendment. Conversions which intrude across stable boundaries, such as exist in this neighborhood, begin a pattern of disinvestment. As investment subsides, the physical, historic structures will be adversely affected. The conversion contemplated by the amendment would represent a small encroachment of office use into the neighborhood with a cumulative effect. There is nothing to preclude its precedential effect or encouragement of similar applications. Although the Division of Historic Resources stated that it had no objection to the amendment, its acquiesence to the amendment is not controlling. Rather, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the amendment will have an adverse impact on the Historic District and will not further applicable goals, policies and objectives. Local Comprehensive Plan Issues One criteria for evaluating a plan amendment is whether it would result in compatibility with adjacent land uses. The overriding goal in the area of compatibility analysis is the protection of viable, stable neighborhoods. There is nothing in the plan amendment itself which provides compatibility or buffering for the residential properties located to the north and east of the subject parcel. Indeed, office development of the land will increase the pressure to convert more structures. Objective 2.1 of the FLUE establishes an objective of providing sufficient acreage for residential, commercial, mixed use, office and professional uses and industrial uses at appropriate locations to meet the needs of the projected population. Those acreages are depicted on the FLUM. When reviewing a FLUM amendment, such as the subject of this proceeding, the City is required to make a need analysis. The amendment is not supported by any analysis of need. Prior to the amendment, the plan contained an overallocation of office space and a shortage of housing for Market Area 4, in which the subject parcel is located. The amendment does not increase available housing or alleviate the overallocation of office space in Market Area 4. Indeed, it has a contrary result. Adaptive reuse is not promoted by the City's plan. Rather, the Housing Element promotes restoration and conservation of historically or architecturally significant housing, which means returning to housing use, not adapting structures to some other use. In this respect, the amendment is contrary to the City's plan. Summary Because the plan amendment is internally inconsistent and not based on the best available data and analysis, it is found that the amendment is not in compliance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order finding the amendment to be not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0749GM Petitioners: Petitioners' proposed findings, while substantially modified and shortened, have been generally adopted in substance. Respondents/Intervenors: 1-8. Partially covered in findings of fact 10-16. 9-37. Partially covered in findings of fact 17-22. 38-53. Partially covered in findings of fact 23-30. 54-71. Partially covered in findings of fact 31-33. 72-106. Partially covered in findings of fact 31-38. Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, cumulative, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrice F. Boyes, Esquire W. David Jester, Esquire Post Office Box 1424 Gainesville, Florida 32602-1424 Richard R. Whiddon, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 1110 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Suzanne H. Schmith, Esquire 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 C. David Coffey, Esquire 105 S. E. First Avenue, Suite 1 Gainesville, Florida 32601-6215 James F. Murley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The issue is whether the City of Panama City's small scale development amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2055.1 on February 8, 2005, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Creekstone is a limited liability corporation and presumed to be the owner of a 3.212-acre tract of land at 305 East Beach Drive, Panama City.3 (The record does not show when or if Creekstone actually purchased the property; when the application for a land use change on the property was filed with the City, Creekstone was a contract purchaser. In its Proposed Recommended Order, however, the City states that Creekstone "recently acquired" the property.) The property lies at the northwest edge of a residential area known as The Cove and is just south of the central business district of the City. The Cove is separated from the business district by a small waterbody known as Massalina Bayou (Bayou), which is spanned by the Tarpon Bridge (Bridge) at one of the Bayou's most narrow points. The 225-foot Bridge provides the most direct and easiest access between the two areas of the City. For many years, and beginning before the City adopted its Plan, Tibbetts Boat Works, Inc. (Tibbets) occupied the site and was engaged in the boat repair business, consisting of hull repair, engine maintenance, other mechanical services, and boat bottom painting, a legal but nonconforming use under the City's land development code. Photographs of the area suggest that the business is no longer active, presumably because the property has been sold. On or about December 8, 2004, SFB Investment Company, LLLP (SFB), who then owned the property but had a contract to sell it to Creekstone, filed an application with the City Planning Board seeking a change in the land use and zoning on the property. At the Planning Board meeting on January 10, 2005, the staff noted that the proposed change would "allow an encroachment of commercial into a predominately residential area" and recommended denial of the application on the ground that the change "is inconsistent with the LDR and the Comp Plan."4 By a 3-1 vote, the City Planning Board rejected the staff recommendation and recommended that the application be approved. On February 8, 2005, by a 4-1 vote, the City accepted the recommendation of the City Planning Board and adopted Ordinance No. 2055.1, which amended the FLUM by reclassifying the land use designation on the property from MU to GC for the purpose of allowing the owner to "develop [a] multi-family project on [the] property." (Simultaneously with that change, the City also changed the zoning on the property from Mixed Use- 3 to General Commercial-2, which allows a wide range of activities, including residential, professional office and services, low-intensity commercial, public/institutional/ utilities, and high-intensity commercial.) The MU land use classification "is intended to provide areas for medium to high density residential development and low intensity commercial development," allows a density of "not more than twenty (20) dwelling units per acre," and an intensity of "[n]o more than 75% lot coverage as determined by the size of the lot compared to the amount of impervious roof and driveway/ parking lot surface." On the other hand, the GC district is "intended to provide areas for high intensity commercial development, including retail sales and services, wholesale sales, shopping centers, office complexes, and other similar land uses." There are no density restrictions, but intensity is limited to "[n]o more than 90% lot coverage." Thus, while the two land uses are similar in some respects, the highest and best use on the property will now be "high intensity commercial development," such as shopping centers and office complexes, a much more intensive use than is presently permitted under the MU land use category. To address this concern, witness Harper indicated that SFB has filed a restrictive covenant on the property which includes a shoreline buffer, as well as use, height, and setback restrictions. At the Planning Board meeting on January 10, 2005, however, the staff stated "that a covenant would not be enforceable." Under the existing land use (MU), the owner can construct up to 64 residential units on the property. That number is derived by multiplying the size of the property (3.212 acres) times the allowed density (20 units per acre). However, the current zoning on the property (which is apparently tied to the MU land use category) prohibits the construction of buildings which exceed 65 feet in height. Because of this height restriction, which limits the number of residential units that can be constructed on the property, the owner has requested a change in the land use (and zoning) so that it can develop a multi-family residential condominium project (nine stories in height) with approximately 77 units. On March 10, 2005, Mr. Cooper filed his Petition challenging the small-scale amendment. He later filed an Amended Petition on April 21, 2005. Mr. Cooper resides and owns property one-half block south of the subject property (in an area designated as a special historical zone of the City) and submitted objections to the amendment during the adoption process. As such, he is an affected person and has standing to file this challenge. Joint Exhibit 9 reflects that Creekstone is a "contract purchaser" of the subject property. It also reflects that it appeared through counsel at the adoption hearing on February 8, 2005, and offered comments in support of the plan amendment. As such, Creekstone is an affected person and has standing to participate in this case. In the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation, Mr. Cooper (through his former counsel) identified numerous issues, many of which were not raised in his Amended Petition. At hearing, however, he contended only that the GC land use is incompatible with the character of the surrounding area, and that the amendment is internally inconsistent with Objectives 1.1 and 1.4 and Policies 1.1.1, 1.2.1, and 1.4.1 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the Plan. All of the objectives and policies relate to the compatibility issue. In all other respects, Petitioner agrees that the plan amendment is in compliance. Because the City's action involves a small scale (as opposed to a large scale) development plan amendment, the Department of Community Affairs did not formally review the plan amendment for compliance. See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. The Subject Property West Beach Drive runs in a northwest-southeast direction through the downtown business portion of the City until a few blocks north of the Bridge, where it changes to East Beach Drive. The roadway continues south across the Bridge and in a southerly direction along the eastern edge of St. Andrews Bay, a much larger waterbody which lies between the City and Panama City Beach. Approximately one-half mile south of the Bridge, East Beach Drive takes a 90-degree turn to the east. Most, if not all, of the peninsula south of the Bayou and Bridge and continuing until East Beach Drive turns to the east is known as The Cove, a part of which has been designated by the City as a historic special treatment zone because of its historical significance. The predominate character of The Cove is older, single-family homes. As noted above, the Bayou separates The Cove from the central business district and serves as a natural barrier between the two areas. The property is an odd-shaped parcel which sits just east of the southern terminus of the Bridge and fronts on the Bayou. (The central business district lies directly across the Bayou to the north and northwest, is classified as General Commercial or Public/Institutional, and includes a wide array of offices, government buildings, restaurants, and other commercial and public uses.) The western side of the property faces East Beach Drive. Immediately across East Beach Drive to the west (and facing St. Andrews Bay) is the Cove Harbor Condominium, a nine-story, multi-family residential condominium which was apparently constructed under MU standards, which apply to that parcel. Immediately to the east of the property is a single- family residence and then a two-story townhouse complex. The southern boundary of the property (which appears to run approximately 325 feet or so) faces East Second Court, a local road which begins on East Beach Drive and runs eastward until Watson Bayou (perhaps a mile or so away). Although a map of the historical district was not introduced into evidence by the parties, the northern and western reaches of the special treatment zone appear to begin just east of the intersection of East Second Court and East Beach Drive since the homes at 114 and 122 East Second Court are designated as having historical significance. See Respondent's Exhibit 4. These two homes appear to lie directly across the street from the southern boundary of Creekstone's property. Except for a two-story, multi-family structure (Cedar Cove Townhouses) which sits across East Second Court facing the southwest corner of the subject property, the remainder of the southern boundary of Creekstone's property faces four single-family homes. Several other multi-family structures are scattered throughout the area to the south and east, while the remainder of the neighborhood extending for at least one-half mile to the south and all the way to Watson Bayou on the east is predominately single-family residences. Finally, a condominium is located about one-half mile south of the property on the waterfront where East Beach Drive makes a 90-degree turn to the east. Except for Tibbets' activities, there is no commercial encroachment (by non-conforming use or land use classification) in the immediate area south of the Bridge and Bayou. The current FLUM shows that, with three exceptions, the entire area south of the Bridge and the Bayou to the end of the peninsula, and extending east at least a mile to Watson Bayou, is either classified as Mixed Use or Residential Low Density. (Perhaps a mile or so to the southeast there is one parcel classified as Recreation, another as Public/Institutional (which is probably a school), and a smaller adjoining parcel classified as General Commercial.) Thus, if the change is approved, the subject property will be the only parcel south of the Bridge and Bayou (except for the above exceptions which lie around a mile away) which is classified as commercial; the remainder is either mixed use or residential. Over the years, Tibbets has been the subject of City code enforcement actions, investigations by City code enforcement personnel, and investigations by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). It has also caused chronic environmental problems in the area. On August 27, 2002, DEP and Tibbets executed a Consent Order to resolve certain violations. Also, on April 10, 2001, Mr. Paul L. Benfield, who apparently either owned Tibbets or was associated with it in some manner, entered into a Consent Order with DEP because of his unlawful filling of 0.114 acres of jurisdictional wetlands on the site. It is fair to describe the subject property as blighted, unsightly, and in disrepair. Photographs received in evidence suggest that the business is no longer active. The parcel is fenced on three sides, and, besides an older structure which apparently housed Tibbets' office, the property contains a mixture of empty storage crates, pilings, and various pieces of equipment that were once used in the boat repair business. There are also several docks or small piers extending into the Bayou from the northwestern corner of the site. Finally, it appears that much of the eastern half of the parcel contains wetlands and is largely undeveloped. Although the staff report dated December 31, 2004, recommended denial of the application, noting that it would allow "an encroachment of commercial into a predominately residential area," it acknowledged that "[a]llowing this request can make a case for helping to rid this area of a problematic non- conforming use." See Joint Exhibit 6, page 2. Petitioner's Objections As narrowed at hearing, Mr. Cooper contends only that the plan amendment is not compatible with the character of the adjoining land in The Cove and is thus internally inconsistent with Objectives 1.1 and 1.4 and Policies 1.1.1, 1.2.1, and 1.4.1 of the FLUE. He also relies upon Policy 2.5.5(6)(e) of the City's Land Development Code. However, plan amendments do not have to be consistent with land development regulations in order to be in compliance. See § 163.3184(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Objective 1.1 requires that the City maintain a FLUM "which coordinates future land uses with . . . [compatibility]5 of adjacent land uses." Policy 1.1.1, which furthers that objective, provides in part that the City will regulate land uses through the designation of land use districts on a FLUM, and that the "location and extent of development within the City" should be "consistent with . . . compatibility of adjacent land uses." Under this objective and policy, then, land use districts on the FLUM should be located in a manner which assures compatibility with adjacent land uses. Objective 1.4 provides that the City shall "maintain procedures for the elimination or reduction of land uses inconsistent with the character of the City and the future land uses designated in the Plan." In furtherance of that objective, Policy 1.4.1 requires that the City "restrict proposed development which is inconsistent with the character of the community." Taken literally, the objective encourages the City to reduce or eliminate land uses that are inconsistent with the character of the surrounding area or other land use districts. In the same fashion, the policy requires that the City prohibit development that is not consistent with the character of the adjoining area. Finally, among other things, Policy 1.2.1 requires that the City "administer land development regulations for implementation of the Comprehensive Plan" in such a manner as to "ensure the compatibility of adjacent land uses." (The City has adopted such regulations for this purpose.) Because the implementation of land development regulations is not in issue, the provision does not appear to be relevant. According to the City's Director of Public Works, The Cove, or at least that part which lies in the area around Creekstone's property, is considered to be a part of the central business district since the two areas are "contiguous," and therefore the extension of the commercial land use district across the Bayou would be consistent with the character of the immediate area. The same view was also expressed by witness Grey. However, the two areas are physically separated by a waterbody (the Bayou) and are connected only by a 225-foot bridge which spans the Bayou at one of its most narrow points. At the same time, the land uses in the two areas are distinctly different: the business district contains a wide array of commercial and public/institutional uses while the predominate character of The Cove is single-family residential, with a scattering of multi-family residential dwellings such as townhouses and a condominium. The fact that the City interprets its GC district (presumably through its zoning regulations) as allowing certain residential uses does not change this dichotomy in character. Therefore, it is inappropriate to consider The Cove and the central business district as being contiguous, or to base a finding of compatibility on the fact that commercial uses are now found across the Bayou in the business district. The commercial land use classification has never been extended into the residential neighborhood south of the Bayou. If the change becomes effective, the new land use would be incompatible with the Residential Low Density and Mixed Use land uses which now make up the entire neighborhood. It would also be incompatible with the historic special treatment zone, which lies directly across the street from Creekstone's property. Finally, the creation of a commercial district in this area of The Cove would change the character of the neighborhood, and it is fair to infer that, even if SFB's covenant is enforceable, it would still lead to, and justify, the reclassification of other nearby parcels into commercial uses. Given these considerations, the proposed land use is internally inconsistent with the City's objective and policy that there be "[compatibility] of adjacent land uses," see Objective 1.1 and Policy 1.1.1, and Plan provisions encouraging the elimination of land uses and associated development which are inconsistent with the "character of the community." See Objective 1.4 and Policy 1.4.1. The minutes of the two meetings which culminated in the adoption of Ordinance No. 2055.1 reflect that the City's (and Planning Board's) principal rationale for the reclassification of the property was to eliminate an unsightly nonconforming use (boat repair business) which occupied the site. While it is true that the City's Plan encourages the revitalization and redevelopment of blighted areas, and provides that developers should be given "flexibility" when seeking to revitalize blighted areas, see Objectives 1.3 and 1.15 of the FLUE, there is no evidence that these objectives are intended to override (and trump) the provisions of the Plan which require that adjacent land uses be compatible with one another and preserve the character of the neighborhood.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2055.1 is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Board enter an order finding that the 275 acre site itself proposed for Unit 3 is consistent and in conformity with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances; The Board find the railroad spur to be consistent with Polk County's zoning ordinance. The Board find that the proposed 46 mile associated transmission line is consistent and in conformity with existing land use and zoning ordinances with the exception of that portion of the line which traverses the Green Swamp area; and The Board hold the transmission line within the Green Swamp area not to be in conformance or compliance with the Green Swamp regulations, and that the applicant must apply for a variance from such regulations to Polk County officials before any further consideration of this certification by the Board. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September, 1978. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Petitioner, K. S. Ravines Corporation, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, K. S. Ravines Corporation, is the owner of real property located in Middleburg, Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property, known as the "The Ravines," is being developed as a 435-acre residential and golf course development. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied upon by Silver Sands. On or about June 1, 1990, the Applicant entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement agreeing to purchase The Ravines. Subsequent to the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Applicant pursued a due diligence effort. In particular, the Applicant contacted Clay County to confirm that The Ravines had been zoned as a Planned Unit Developed as represented by the seller of The Ravines. The Applicant also sought to confirm that the property possessed the development capabilities associated with the zoning. In response to the Applicant's inquiries, Keith I. Hadden, then Director of Development for Clay County, informed the Applicant of the following in a letter dated August 7, 1990: The property commonly known as The Ravines, as shown on that certain map of J. M. Ard & Associates, Inc., dated May 30, 1990, (Job No. 3751B), together with a parcel commonly referred to as the McCumber Contracting Parcel as shown on said map, and the access road from County Road 218 to the main property of The Ravines commonly known as Ravines Road (all hereinafter "The Ravines") is currently zoned "PUD" Planned Unit Development. . . . Mr. Hadden also confirmed that The Ravines was approved for development of 261 single family lots, 49 condominiums, 107 hotel units, and 60 patio homes; a total of 477 units. Silver Sands' Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Mr. Hadden's representations as Clay County Director of Planning, the Applicant purchased The Ravines for $10,709,423.00. At the time of the purchase the golf course was valued at $6,900,000.00. The Applicant purchased 168 single-family lots (44 developed and 124 undeveloped) and 60 undeveloped patio home lots. The undeveloped lots and the existing developed single- family lots purchased by the Applicant were valued at $3,943,000.00. The Applicant also spent $495,115.00 to make capital improvements to The Ravines after it purchased The Ravines. Rights that will be Destroyed. In January 1992 Clay County adopted a comprehensive plan pursuant to Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The Ravines was designated with a land use designation in the plan of "Rural Residential." The "Rural Residential" land use classification of the Clay County Comprehensive Plan allows development of one residential unit per one acre of land. As a result, The Ravines may be developed at a total of 435 units instead of the 477 units that Clay County informed the Applicant The Ravines could be developed for in the August 7, 1990, letter from Mr. Hadden. As a result of the "Rural Residential" land use classification, the total developable lots at The Ravines would be reduced from 228 lots to 186 lots, or a reduction of 42 lots. This reduction represents a reduction of 18.4% of the total lots purchased by the Applicant. It is possible that this reduction could result in an 18.4% loss of the $3,943,000.00 paid for the lots, or approximately $496,000.00. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
The Issue The issue is whether two map changes on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) adopted by Taylor County (County) by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 on December 15, 2009, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The Department is the state planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and approving amendments to comprehensive plans adopted by local governments. The County is a local government that administers a Plan. It adopted the two plan amendments that are the subject of this proceeding. It is considered a "rural" county with a current population of around 20,000 residents. Dr. Hutchins owns property in the County. Although his initial pleading alleges, and his Proposed Recommended Order states, that he "submitted oral comments regarding the subject amendments at transmittal and prior to adoption of the amendment," no evidence was presented at hearing that Dr. Hutchins did so during the adoption process. Ms. Redding and Mr. Wood are siblings and along with three other members of the Wood family jointly own property in the County. Like Dr. Hutchins, no evidence was presented at the hearing that either Intervenor submitted written or oral comments to the County during the adoption process. History Preceding the Amendments The process for adopting the County's first Plan, including the FLUM, began around 1988. For the purpose of drafting a FLUM, a Planning Board (Board) was created consisting of seven individuals, all of whom were volunteers with no formal planning experience. However, they received advice and assistance from two outside consultants, who also advised the County concerning the appropriate text to be used in the new Plan. Four members of the Board, including its former Chairman, testified at the final hearing. Over the next two years, the Board conducted meetings, spoke with numerous property owners, and collected information in order to assign each parcel an appropriate land use category. The collective efforts of the Board culminated in a large, hand- colored FLUM (consisting of numerous sections of aerial maps patched together) that was affixed to the wall of what is now the courtroom on the second floor in the County Courthouse. Testimony by former members of the Board established that the Hutchins parcel (then owned by Colin and Lucille Kelly) and the Bird Island parcel (owned by Wood, Redding, and other family members) were assigned a classification of Mixed Use-Urban Development. Because the County does not have a zoning code, the properties were never assigned a zoning classification consistent with that land use category. This classification was based upon the fact that at least two different businesses were being conducted on each parcel at the time, and the owners requested that they be given that classification. In the case of the Hutchins (then Kelly) property, it was being used to conduct a commercial fishing operation as well as a small construction company (with dump trucks, bulldozers, and front end loaders) that had a contract with Proctor & Gamble (now known as Buckeye Technologies, Inc.) to maintain roads. An office for the construction company was located in a separate mobile home placed on the property. Mr. Bird was a commercial fisherman and operated a wholesale fish business on Bird Island. Also, both he and his mother had separate homes on the property, another structure was used to store fish nets, and docking facilities for other commercial fisherman were maintained. Many of these structures were blown away during the so-called Storm of the Century on March 13, 1993, and never replaced. Except for property within the small communities of Keaton Beach, Dekle Beach, Denzel Beach, and Steinhatchee, and a few other small parcels, such as Dark Island, Cedar Island, and Intervenors' property, all of the remaining land along the coastline was placed in either Conservation or Agriculture. An unusual feature of the County is that it has one of the longest coastlines in the State (58 miles), stretching on the Gulf of Mexico from Jefferson County to Dixie County. Because around 88 percent of the coastline is owned by the State, very little waterfront land is left for development. In fact, Dr. Hutchins pointed out that except for his property and Bird Island, no other vacant, upland Gulf-front property within the County is in private ownership at this time. The FLUM, with the foregoing classifications, was adopted by the County by Ordinance No. 90-4 on June 19, 1990. Before it was submitted to the Department for its review, the County was advised by the Department that it would not accept the large, hand-colored FLUM in that format. Rather, the Department required that the map be reduced in size and digitized. To comply with this request, the original FLUM was dismantled into smaller sections and hand-carried to a firm in Crystal River that had the capability of reducing the large map into digital form. The original FLUM was then returned to the County Courthouse. When the larger map was reduced in size and converted to a digital format, it was not parcel-specific and failed to pick up the Hutchins parcel and Bird Island. Instead, except for larger tracts of land, especially in the small communities noted in Finding of Fact 8, the entire coastline was shown as being Conservation or Agriculture. This error was not detected by County officials or the affected property owners since they continued to rely upon the designations shown on the large, hand-colored FLUM in the Courthouse. The Department reviewed the FLUM, as digitized, assumed that the Hutchins and Bird Island property were Agriculture and Conservation, and found those parts of the FLUM to be in compliance. This agency action occurred on or about October 1, 1990. Thus, the Department never undertook a compliance review for either parcel with the intended higher density/intensity land use. In 1995, the room in which the original FLUM was mounted was taken over by another occupant of the Courthouse, and the original FLUM was moved to a different floor. During or after the moving process, it was lost or accidentally destroyed and its whereabouts have been unknown since that time. In 1993, Dr. Hutchins purchased his property from Colin and Lucille Kelly. Based on a conversation with a County employee, he purchased the property with the understanding that it was classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development. Although he had no specific plans to develop the property at that time, and still has none, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use category was the major inducement for him to purchase the property. In 2005, Dr. Hutchins was approached by an investor who wished to develop the property at a later time. When the investor contacted the County to confirm its land use designation, Dr. Hutchins learned for the first time that the digitized map approved by the Department reflected the property carried an Agriculture/Rural Residential land use. Because of this, the agreement with the potential investor was never consummated. In a similar vein, Mr. Wood, who served on the Board that assigned land use designations to property on the original FLUM, and knew that the Board had designated his property as Mixed Use-Urban Development, placed the Bird Island property on the market in 2005 representing that it was classified in that category. A prospective purchaser checked with the County to verify its land use and learned that it was Conservation. Mr. Wood was unaware of this error until that time. Because of this, the sale was never consummated. After 2005, the County and Department held numerous meetings in an attempt to resolve this dispute. The Department refused to allow the FLUM to be changed to reflect the original land use designations. This led to the County adopting the two challenged amendments to correct what it characterizes as a "scrivener's error." Besides the two parcels that are in dispute here, on an undisclosed date, two other parcels (in the interior part of the County) were discovered by the County to have the wrong land use category as a result of the digitizing process. Both should have been placed in the Industrial land use category, and after a review, the Department had no objection to those errors being corrected by an amendment. The Plan Amendments On December 15, 2009, the County adopted Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17, also known as CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3. The first amendment changed the land use on the 14-acre Hutchins parcel from Agriculture/Rural Residential to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The present land use allows one dwelling unit per 5 acres while the new land use designation allows up to 12 dwelling units per acre and a 60 percent impervious surface ratio for nonresidential development. See Department Exhibit 1, Future Land Use Policy I.3.2. Thus, up to 126 residential units and 96,476 square feet of non-residential development could be built on the Hutchins site. The second amendment changed the land use on the 3.36-acre Bird Island parcel from Agriculture-2 and Conservation to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The former land use allows one dwelling unit per 40 acres while the new land use would permit the same density/intensity as the Hutchins parcel. The new category would allow up to 30 residential units and 21,954 square feet of non-residential development. The amendments were transmitted by the County to the Department for its review in early April 2009. On June 5, 2009, the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations and Comments (ORC) report. The Department lodged objections to both amendments generally on the grounds the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; the amendments authorize an improper increase in density within the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA) without proper mitigation; the amendments failed to discourage urban sprawl; and they are internally inconsistent with existing provisions within the Plan. The ORC recommended that the County not adopt the amendments. Besides the Department, DEP and the Regional Planning Council also provided written comments on the amendments. By letter dated May 8, 2009, DEP generally noted that it had concerns regarding development adjacent to the Big Bend Seagrasses Aquatic Preserve (the Preserve) where the parcels are located, and that careful planning strategies should be used for any development on the land. See Department Exhibit 4. The Regional Planning Council issued a staff report on February 25, 2010, generally concluding that the amendments were consistent with the applicable Strategic Regional Policy Plan goals and objectives. See Department Exhibit 15; County Exhibit 1. The County did not respond in writing to the ORC. On December 15, 2009, it adopted the amendments without change. On March 10, 2010, the Department published its Notice of Intent to find the amendments not in compliance in the Taco Times. On March 16, 2010, the Department filed its Petition with DOAH raising the same grounds that are in its Notice of Intent. The Property The Hutchins parcel is located in the southwest part of the County, a few miles south of Keaton Beach, with around 500 to 600 feet fronting on the Gulf of Mexico. The 14 upland acres that are the subject of this case are a sub-site of a larger 25-acre parcel owned by Dr. Hutchins, with the remaining 11 acres being adjoining wetlands on the north and south sides. Dr. Hutchins has built a home on pilings on his property along with a smaller ancillary structure. Photographs indicate that except for trees, the remainder of the upland property is vacant. Bird Island also lies on the Gulf of Mexico just northwest of the Hutchins parcel and is surrounded by water on three sides. Photographs reflect one residence and a dock still on the property. The two parcels are separated by "marsh grass and a little water." Both parcels of property are easily accessible to, and just west of, County Road 361, a paved two- lane highway that begins south of the subject properties and runs adjacent to, or near, the coastline, eventually turning northeast and terminating on U.S. Highway 19 south of Perry. Both properties abut portions of the Gulf of Mexico that have been designated as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The waters are a part of the Preserve, which was established in 1985 and is managed by DEP. The Preserve has exceptional biological, aesthetic, and scientific value. The two parcels are located in the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA). That is to say, they are in "the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by a Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model." § 163.3178(2)(h), Fla. Stat. In order to increase density within the CHHA, the County must meet certain criteria set forth in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department's Objections As summarized in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department contends that the two plan amendments are not in compliance because the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; there is an improper increase in density within the CHHA without proper mitigation; and the amendments fail to discourage urban sprawl. Although the Notice of Intent also raised the issue of whether the amendments are internally inconsistent with other provisions in the County's existing Plan, the Proposed Recommended Order does not address any specific internal inconsistencies, and the evidence focuses on the first three concerns. Therefore, the undersigned has assumed that those objections have been withdrawn or abandoned. Environmental Suitability With the exception of an area in the middle part of the County's coastline (where the Fenholloway River flows into the Gulf), the Preserve extends along the County's entire coastline, including the area in which the two parcels are located. The Preserve, designated as an OFW, contains various types of seagrasses, whose function is to provide habitat for a number of species, improve water quality, and reduce currents or wave energy in the event of a storm. It is undisputed that the seagrass beds near the amendment sites are high-quality, healthy, and of high environmental value. Coastal marshes are prevalent in the area of the County where the amendment sites are located. They serve many functions, including cleaning water flowing into The Preserve, functioning as a habitat for a number of species, and acting as a coastal barrier against storm surge during large storm events. Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes, requires that local governments protect and conserve natural resources through the conservation element of the local plan. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(3)(b)4. A Department rule also requires local governments to limit the specific impacts and cumulative impacts of development or redevelopment upon water quality and living marine resources. See Rule 9J-5.012(3)(c)1. High-density development (up to 12 units per acre) on the parcels clearly has the potential to negatively impact coastal marshes and seagrasses adjacent to and near the subject sites. Although Dr. Hutchins indicated that he would develop his property only to the extent allowed by DEP so that the marshes and seagrasses would be safeguarded, the Department's practice for many years has been to assume that the property will be developed at its maximum allowable density and intensity. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Lee Cty, et al., Case No. 90- 7791 (DOAH Jan. 27, 1992; DCA June 28, 1993; Admin. Comm. Feb. 15, 1994)(compliance determination must be made based on maximum impacts authorized by the amendment terms, not speculation of a lesser impact). Mr. Wood's development intentions are not known. In any event, the two parcels potentially authorize 156 residential units and 113,430 square feet of non-residential uses adjacent to an OFW. Even so, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use designation may still be permissible if specific conditions limiting the density/intensity on the parcels are incorporated into the Plan by asterisk or text language in conjunction with a new amendment. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, this planning practice has been used in other cases. Without any limitations, though, the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the maximum allowable density/intensity contravenes the cited statute and rules. CHHA Both parcels are located within the CHHA of the County. Section 163.3178(2)(h), Florida Statutes, requires that the County establish mitigation criteria for plan amendments located in the CHHA. Probably because of its small size in terms of population, and the lack of development (or ability to do so) along the coastline, the County has no goals, objectives, or policies addressing criteria for mitigation. Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. requires that a plan "direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas." Also, Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)7. requires that a plan "maintain or reduce evacuation times." Prior to 2006, the Department would allow a local government to comply with the foregoing rules by allowing density increases in the CHHA if the local government decreased a similar type of density elsewhere. This practice was known as "offsets." In 2006, however, the Legislature amended the statute to include criteria for compliance with the two rules. Due to the change in the law, the Department no longer engages in the practice of offsets for land use changes in the CHHA. Instead, it requires a local government that proposes to increase density within the CHHA to meet the requirements of Section 163.3178(9)(a)1.-3., Florida Statutes. Under the statute, if the County can demonstrate a 16-hour out-of-county evacuation time for a category 5 storm event as measured on the Saffir-Simpson scale and a 12-hour evacuation time to shelter within the County for a category 5 storm event, an increase in density within the CHHA may be allowed. See § 163.3178(9)(a)1. and 2., Fla. Stat. Alternatively, the County may use one of the mitigation measures described in Section 163.3178(9)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Except for Coastal Element Objective IX-7 of the Plan, which provides that the County maintain a hurricane evacuation time of 9 hours for a category 1 storm, see County Exhibit 7, no data and analysis, such as a hurricane evacuation study for a category 5 storm event, was presented to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Dr. Hutchins' submission during the mediation process of an evacuation plan for a category 3 storm does not satisfy this criterion. Typically, a local government will have an adopted plan for a category 5 storm, as well as an evacuation model. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the mitigation measures in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes, have not been satisfied. At hearing, the County and Dr. Hutchins contended that offsets should still be used in this case to satisfy the mitigation requirements. They point out that the County has recently purchased property (totaling 51.7 acres) that is designated Mixed Use-Urban Development and more than compensates for any potential increase of residents needing to evacuate if the two amendments are found to be in compliance. As noted above, however, the practice of offsets was discontinued in 2006 with the passage of the new law. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, there was no legal requirement that the Department notify every affected local government and property owner that it was discontinuing that practice to comply with the new law.2 Urban Sprawl Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g)1.-13. identifies thirteen "primary" indicators of urban sprawl. The Department contends that eight indicators are "tripped" or "triggered" by the new amendments and collectively they indicate that the proliferation of urban sprawl is not discouraged. No evidence was presented regarding five indicators. According to the rule, "[t]he presence and potential effects of multiple indicators shall be considered to determine whether they collectively reflect a failure to discourage urban sprawl." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J- 5.006(5)(d). Indicator 1 is tripped if the amendments allow uses in excess of demonstrated need. In this case no need analysis for additional land in the Mixed Use-Urban Development category was submitted by the County. The absence of a study is sufficient to trigger this indicator. Indicator 2 is tripped if the amendments allow "significant" amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas. The only true existing "urban" area in the County, as that term is commonly understood, is the City of Perry. Other residential and some commercial development (but to a much lesser degree) is found mainly in a few small communities on the coastline such as Steinhatchee, an unincorporated community perhaps 15 miles south of the subject parcels with probably around 1,500 residents, and Keaton Beach and Dekle Beach, both having no more than a few hundred residents each. (Official recognition has been taken of the population data.) Keaton Beach is around 2 or 3 miles north of the subject property and has condominiums and other limited residential/commercial development. In addition, Dark Island is located a short distance north of Bird Island and is classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, which authorizes the higher density/intensity development. Given this lack of "urban areas" in the County, virtually any development outside of Perry could arguably be considered "urban development . . . in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(5)(g)2. Notwithstanding this unique (and perhaps unfair) situation, it is fair to characterize the potential addition of 12 units per acre as urban development and a total of around 150 residential units with associated commercial development as "substantial" when considering the County's size and existing development. Therefore, the second indicator has been triggered. Indicator 3 is triggered if the amendments allow urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development." Because urban development will occur in a rural, isolated area, this indicator is triggered. Indicator 4 is triggered if there is premature development of rural land that fails to adequately protect and conserve natural resources. The evidence supports a finding that this indicator is triggered. Indicators 6, 7, and 8 are related to the orderly and efficient provision of existing and future public services and facilities. The evidence shows that the area is not currently served by central sewer and is not near any fire or police stations. While no public facilities are planned for that area in the five year capital improvement schedule, at a meeting in March 2010 the Taylor County Coastal Water & Sewer District indicated that a request for partial federal funding to extend central sewer services to Fish Creek, which lies beyond and to the south of the subject parcels, would be placed on the April agenda. See County Exhibit 7. Whether a request was actually made at that meeting is not of record. In any event, Coastal Element Policy IX.6.5 provides that where central sewer is not available in an area classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, septic tanks may be used within the CHHA. See Department Exhibit 1. As to fire and law enforcement support, there is insufficient evidence to establish that these services cannot be provided in an efficient manner. Given these circumstances, there is less than a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding that indicators 6 through 8 are triggered. Indicator 9 is triggered if the plan amendments fail to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that this indicator is triggered. Collectively, the presence of four indicators is sufficient to support a finding that the County has failed to discourage urban sprawl. E. Scrivener's Error The County and Intervenors rely heavily upon the fact that the plan amendments are in compliance because the amendments simply correct an error that occurred when, at the Department's direction in 1990, the original FLUM was reduced in size and digitized. While at first blush this argument is appealing, it assumes that the Department would have approved the new land use classifications in 1990 when it performed a compliance review of the original FLUM. But this never occurred, and the new amendments give the Department its first opportunity to determine if the new land uses are in compliance. It is undisputed that on an undisclosed date the Department approved an amendment based on the same type of error. While the record is somewhat confusing, it appears that in that case, the two properties were Industrial, they were not located in the CHHA, and on-going business concerns were operating on the properties. Intervenor Hutchins also cited several instances where mapping errors were allowed to be corrected by subsequent plan amendments. Where final agency action in those matters is of record, however, it shows that approval was given only after a compliance review was made by the Department.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that Plan Amendments CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3 adopted by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 are not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the pleadings and evidence, including the stipulation by counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Marion County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive growth management plans and amendments thereto. In this case, the County has adopted an amendment to its comprehensive plan, which is the subject of the dispute. Petitioners, Henry and Betty Prominski, are residents of Marion County and own a 16.5 acre tract of land on the southeast bank of Lake Weir in the southeastern portion of the County. The property is more commonly known as Orangewood Shores Subdivision. Until April 1994, the land was classified in the urban expansion category, which allows up to four residential units per acre. The County adopted its comprehensive plan in January 1992. After the plan was determined by the DCA to be not in compliance, the County eventually adopted certain remedial amendments on April 7, 1994, one of which changed the land use designation on petitioners' property from urban expansion to urban reserve. Under the new classification, only one residential unit per ten acres is allowed. A cumulative notice of intent to find the plan and remedial amendments in compliance was issued by the DCA on May 30, 1994. During the foregoing process, petitioners timely submitted oral or written objections to the County concerning the plan amendment, and thus they are affected persons within the meaning of the law. On September 14, 1994, the County, through its Staff Vesting Committee, issued Vesting Order No. 94-14, which granted petitioners' application for vesting determination on Orangewood Shores Subdivision. Among other things, the order determined that "the applicant has vested rights to complete the development (known as Orangewood Shores Subdivision) without aggregation of lots providing the applicant continues development activity in good faith." In this regard, petitioners have represented that they intend to "continue development activity in good faith," and they do not intend to vacate their plat. They also recognize that their land is vested from the plan amendment. Despite the lack of any viable issues regarding the development of their property, for the sake of "principle" only, they still wish to contest the de facto reclassification of their property. The foregoing language in the Vesting Order means that petitioners have vested rights to complete the development of their land notwithstanding the change of land use designation from urban expansion to urban reserve. The parties also agree that the effect of the Vesting Order is to vest the property from the comprehensive plan and the restrictions of the urban reserve area. Therefore, within the narrow context of the petition, the thrust of which is that the plan amendment prevents the subdivision's development, the issues raised therein are no longer viable, and petitioners do not have a cognizable interest in the outcome of this proceeding. The controversy is accordingly deemed to be moot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition in this case on the ground the issues raised therein are moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry J. Prominski, Esquire Post Office Box 540 Weirsdale, Florida 32195-0540 Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Thomas D. MacNamara, Esquire 601 Southeast 25th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34471-2690 James F. Murley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Stephanie M. Gehres, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue Whether the subject activities of Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (CRL) constitute development within the meaning of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Whether the challenged after-the-fact building permit is contrary to the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan), and the Monroe County Land Development Regulations (LDRs). Whether the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is barred by the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel from challenging the after-the-fact permit issued by Monroe County. Whether the DCA and Curtis Kruer are barred by the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel from challenging the after-the-fact permit. Whether the action by the DCA is consistent with prior agency practice.
Findings Of Fact THE PARTIES Petitioner is the state land planning agency that administers the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Petitioner has the authority to appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission any development order issued in an area of critical state concern. The appeal in the instant proceeding was timely. Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and is responsible for issuing permits for construction in unincorporated Monroe County. Monroe County issued Permit 95100012145, the permit that is the subject of this appeal, on December 1, 1995. Monroe County did not actively participate at the formal hearing. Charles River Laboratories (CRL) is the applicant for the permit that is the subject of this appeal. Paul Schilling, D.V.M., has been the director of CRL's monkey breeding activities in the Keys since 1983 and signed the application for the permit on behalf of CRL. CRL applied to Monroe County for an after-the-fact building permit for certain work that had been completed on Raccoon Key and Key Lois. The building permit subsequently issued by Monroe County and challenged in this proceedings authorized certain work done on three feeding stations on Raccoon Key and certain work done on a field cage on Key Lois. The field cage is used as a breeding pen for monkeys. Michael C. Coppola signed the application as the general contractor of record. Mr. Coppola did not participate in this proceeding. Intervenor, Curtis Kruer, moved to the Florida Keys in 1977. He resides on Big Pine Key and maintains an office on Summerland Key. Mr. Kruer is a recreational fisherman and a licensed fishing guide and boat captain. He earns a portion of his livelihood as a fishing guide and has, in the past, chartered trips to the shallow waters surrounding Key Lois and Raccoon Key. In recent years, he has stopped fishing these areas because of what he perceives to be diminished fish population caused by degraded water quality and less seagrass extent and quality. Mr. Kruer is also of the opinion that there has been a diminution of the aesthetic character of the islands. Mr. Kruer attributes these negative impacts to CRL's use of the islands. In addition to commercial fishing activities, Mr. Kruer has fished the waters of both islands for recreation. He has reduced his recreational fishing around Key Lois because of the environmental degradation, but he continues to fish for recreation around Raccoon Key. Mr. Kruer has shown that he has been impacted by the activities of CRL on Key Lois and Raccoon Key and that he will be further impacted if those activities continue. He established that he has the requisite standing to intervene in this proceeding. AREA OF CRITICAL STATE CONCERN Most of Monroe County, including the subject property, is within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern, as designated under Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. These statutory provisions require that Monroe County adopt and implement a comprehensive plan and land development regulations consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development found at Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. THE MONROE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN The Monroe County Comprehensive Plan was adopted by the Monroe County Commission on February 28, 1986, and became effective on September 15, 1986 (Comprehensive Plan). The Comprehensive Plan complies with the Principles for Guiding Development and has been approved by the Petitioner and by the Administration Commission. The Monroe County Comprehensive Plan is implemented by and through its adopted land development regulations (LDRs), codified primarily in Chapter 9.5, Monroe County Code (M.C.C.). Although there have been subsequent amendments to the Comprehensive Plan, those amendments have not been shown to be relevant to this proceeding. CRL's use of these islands predated the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan. Prior to the adoption of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, all pertinent permitting agencies, including the Department of Community Affairs, were aware of CRL's activities on these two islands. In the 1980s Dr. Schilling met with representatives of the Department of Community Affairs and with Monroe County staff, including the Monroe County biologist. Dr. Schilling was not told during any of these meetings that the Department of Community Affairs objected to its operations on these two islands. The actual uses CRL was making of these two islands at the time the Comprehensive Plan was adopted was not incorporated into the Comprehensive Plan. In 1984, Jim Murley was employed by the Department of Community Affairs, but not as its director, the position he currently holds. Mr. Murley advised CRL's attorney in 1984 that CRL should insure its continued use of the two islands by writing itself into the comprehensive plan so that there is no conflict with its use of the two islands and the adopted plan. Despite that advice, CRL did not file anything with Monroe County in an effort to write its use of the two islands into the Comprehensive Plan. CRL's use of these islands has not been registered with Monroe County as nonconforming use. Although the Monroe County Code provides for such registration, the evidence established that Monroe County has never undertaken the task of registering nonconforming uses in the county. THE PROPERTY CRL owns Key Lois and Raccoon Key, two offshore islands in the general vicinity of Cudjoe Key and Summerland Key that are within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. Key Lois, formerly known as Loggerhead Key, is located within the Florida Keys Marine Sanctuary approximately two miles south of Cudjoe Key in Hawk's Channel, which is in the Atlantic Ocean. CRL owns approximately 57 acres on Key Lois above the mean high water line. Raccoon Key is located in the Great White Heron National Wildlife Refuge, which is also within the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and lies approximately three miles north of Cudjoe Key in the Gulf of Mexico. 1/ CRL owns approximately 100 acres on Raccoon Key that is above the mean high water line. CRL breeds reheus monkeys (Macaca mullata) on these two islands and also utilizes a land base on Summerland Key as part of its monkey farming operation. The monkeys that are bred on these two islands are either kept for future breeding or are sold for medical research related to human health. These monkeys are an important resource for medical research. The islands were selected, in part, because it would enable CRL to keep the monkeys isolated from diseases. Monkey breeding is properly considered a commercial activity as opposed to an agricultural activity. CRL began its monkey breeding operations on Key Lois in 1973 and on Raccoon Key in 1976. When they were first introduced to the Keys, the monkeys on both islands were not confined so that each monkey had free-range of its island. As a result of a dispute with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (FDER), CRL has agreed to a scheduled reduction of the monkeys' access to both islands. 2/ CRL has agreed to eliminate all free ranging monkeys from Key Lois by the year 2003 and to eliminate all free ranging monkeys from Raccoon Key by the year 2008. The monkey population reached its zenith in 1983 about the time Dr. Schilling assumed his responsibilities as the director of CRL's monkey breeding activities in the Keys. At that time the monkey population on Key Lois was approximately 2,000 and the monkey population on Key Raccoon was approximately 4,000. Since that time there has been a steady decline in the monkey population on both islands and, at the time of the formal hearing, there were approximately 200 monkeys on Key Lois and 1,000 monkeys on Raccoon Key. CRL supplies food and water to the monkeys on a daily basis. THE STRUCTURES The structure at issue on Key Lois is a field cage which was reconstructed from a former holding pen with solid walls to a structure whose sides and ceiling is chain link fencing. In the permit that is at issue in this proceeding, the structure is referred to as Field Cage 7. The structure was formerly referred to as Compound III. A permit for the former holding pen (then referred to as Compound III) was issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) on June 22, 1983. Compound III was described by that ACOE permit as follows: "96' x 48' x 12', galvanized sheet metal and chain link fencing with pipes set in concrete. Used for feeding, watering and trapping monkeys. Construction date 1972." The former pen was initially used as a temporary holding pen for newly acquired animals. CRL now uses this structure as a breeding pen. Glen Boe and Associates prepared the sketches that were attached to CRL's permit application to Monroe County. The sketch depicted the basic structure 3/ of Field Cage 7 as being 50 feet in width and 100 feet in length, which is slightly larger than the description on the ACOE permit. Despite those differences, the footprint of the basic structure has not been enlarged. The discrepancy between the ACOE permit and the Boe drawing is an error. In addition to the basic structure, the Boe drawings also depict two small holding pens on either end of the cage. These holding pens are approximately 10' x 15' on one end and 10' x 20' on the other end. These holding pens facilitate the handling of monkeys and were added to the structure, without a permit, in 1988. The floor of Field Cage 7 is sand. The walls and top are supported by galvanized pipe on ten foot centers. These pipes are sunk in concrete footers. The walls, gates, and top of the structure are constructed of the same materials that are used for a typical chain link fence, with galvanized pipe being used for the framework. The solid walls were removed because they were corroding, they were too hot, and they were not keeping the monkeys confined. The chain link material provides a more suitable cage for the monkeys and is less wind resistant than solid walls. During spring high tides, all of Key Lois is typically inundated with water except for a narrow sand berm. In some years, this sand berm has been partially inundated. The three feeding stations on Raccoon Key were designed to be a feeding station that could also be used to trap and confine adult monkeys. Each of these structures is an octagon that is 32 feet in length and 32 feet in width with an open top, gates, and chain link fencing at the bottom of the walls. The wall above the chain link portion is constructed of smooth sheet metal, which prevents the monkeys from climbing over the top of the structure when the doors are closed for the purpose of trapping and confining monkeys. The three feeding cages on Raccoon Key are located in areas that flood during spring tides Both Raccoon Key and Key Lois are vulnerable to hurricanes. These islands would likely be inundated and the structures obliterated if a major hurricane were to strike them. DEVELOPMENT The activity authorized by the building permit is "development" as defined in the Monroe County land development regulations and Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. The building permit is a "development order" within the meaning of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. See Section 9.5-4(D-8), Monroe County Code, and Section 380.04, Florida Statutes. 4/ CRL argues that these should be construed to be temporary structures and that the building activity associated with those temporary structures does not require a building permit. CRL did not establish that these structures, which are expected to remain in place for over a decade, are exempt from permitting requirements as temporary structures. THE SUBJECT PERMIT CRL has received permits from different permitting agencies for various structures, a marina, and a dock facility. It has also received letters advising that certain activities did not require a permit. There are structures on both islands that were constructed by CRL without the benefit of a building permit. CRL applied for the subject building permit after Curtis Kruer complained to Monroe County staff that there had been building activity on the two islands that had not been permitted. Thereafter, CRL was contacted by Monroe County staff. Dr. Schilling testified that CRL did not believe that a building permit was required since the structures have no roofs and were constructed either in the same footprint as prior structures or were moved at the direction of the FDER. Rather than argue with Monroe County's staff, Dr. Schilling caused an application to be filed that resulted in the challenged building permit. The application, filed October 11, 1995, was for permits for three feeding cages on Raccoon Key, a field cage (Field Cage 7) on Key Lois, and fencing. The permit application does not refer to any agency agreements, identify any other structures on the islands, indicate whether these structures replace or relocate other structures, or identify any habitat types or areas. The permit application contains drawings that reflect that the structures are more than fifty feet from the waters that surround the two islands. The permit that was subsequently issued was for the three feeding cages and the field cage only. The fencing was not permitted. This permit constitutes a development order. The Department of Community Affairs routinely reviews development orders issued in the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. The Department timely filed its appeal of this development order. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the Department's appeal of this development order was inconsistent with prior agency practice. Monroe County typically requires a habitat analysis and a computation reflecting that a project satisfies the open space requirements contained in LDRs. The county biologist usually conducts a site inspection. In this case, Monroe County did not require a habitat analysis, an open space computation, or a site visit by the county biologist because it viewed these structures as reducing a nonconforming use. The staff considered CRL's use of the entire islands to be the nonconforming use that was being reduced. Monroe County has adopted an official "existing conditions map" that should show the vegetation, natural features, and developed land in the county. 5/ If the existing conditions map does not show a habitat designation, the habitat should be determined by field verification. The existing conditions map reflects the habitat for Raccoon Key, but it does not designate the habitat of Key Lois. THE LAND USE DISTRICT Section 9.5-202 establishes the different land use districts for Monroe County 6/ , including a land use designated as "Offshore Island District (OS)", the designation in which Raccoon Key and Key Lois fall. Section 9.5-212 pertains to the purpose of the "Offshore Island District (OS)" designation and provides as follows: The purpose of the OS district is to establish areas that are not connected to U.S. 1 as protected areas, while permitting low intensity residential uses and campground spaces in upland areas that can be served by cisterns, generators and other self-contained facilities. Section 9.5-231 pertains in general to the permitted uses in the different land use districts and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: No structure or land in Monroe County shall hereafter be developed, used or occupied unless expressly authorized in a land use district in this division. . . . Section 9.5-241 lists the uses that are permitted as of right in the Offshore Island District and the uses that are permitted as major conditional uses. The use CRL makes of the two offshore islands involved in this proceeding is not included as an "of right use" or as a "major conditional use." The use CRL makes of these two islands is inconsistent with the OS designation. That use is of greater impact than those contemplated by the OS designation. NONCONFORMING USES AND NONCONFORMING STRUCTURES Prior to the building activity at issue in this proceeding, the Field Cage 7 on Key Lois and the three feeding stations on Raccoon Key were nonconforming structures. 7/ CRL's use of both islands are nonconforming uses. Article V of the LDRs pertains to nonconforming uses. Section 9.5-141 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The purpose of this article is to regulate and limit the continued existence of uses and structures established prior to the enactment of this chapter that do not conform to the provisions of this chapter. Many nonconformities may continue, but the provisions of this article are designed to curtail substantial investment in noncon- formities and to bring about their eventual elimination in order to preserve the integrity of this chapter. Section 9.5-143 pertains to "nonconforming uses" and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Authority to Continue: Nonconforming uses of land or structures may continue in accordance with the provisions of this section. Ordinary Repair and Maintenance: Normal maintenance and repair to permit continuation of registered nonconforming uses may be performed. Extensions: Nonconforming uses shall not be extended. This prohibition shall be construed so as to prevent: Enlargement of nonconforming uses by additions to the structure in which such nonconforming uses are located . . . Relocation: A structure in which a nonconforming use is located may not be moved unless the new use thereafter shall conform to other limitations of the land use district into which it is moved. Change in Use: A nonconforming use shall not be changed to any other use unless the new use conforms to the provisions of the land use district in which it is located. Section 9.5-144 pertains to "nonconforming structures" and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Authority To Continue: A nonconforming structure devoted to a use permitted in the land use district in which it is located may continue in accordance with the provisions of this section. Ordinary Repair and Maintenance: Normal maintenance and repair of registered nonconforming structures may be performed. Enlargements and Extensions: Noncon- forming structures which are used in a manner conforming to the provisions of this chapter may be enlarged or extended provided that the nonconformity is not further violated. Relocation: A nonconforming structure . . . shall not be moved unless it thereafter shall conform to the regulations of the land use district in which it is located. . . . ACTIVITY WAS NOT REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE The building activity on Raccoon Key involved new construction as opposed to repair and maintenance of existing nonconforming structures. These structures were abandoned or razed and the three new structures with a different design and constructed of different materials in a different footprint were built. The building activity on Key Lois was new construction as opposed to repair and maintenance of an existing nonconforming structure. The former structure, with the exception of the two holding pens that were added in 1988 without a permit, should be considered to be a nonconforming structure. The structure was dismantled to its foundation and a completely new structure was erected. With the exception of the holding pens on either end, the new structure was constructed in the footprint of the previous, nonconforming structure. A building permit from Monroe County was required for the building activity at issue in this proceeding. OPEN SPACE REQUIREMENTS An open space ratio is defined in Section 9.5-4(0-4) as ". the percentage of the total gross area of a parcel that is open space." There are two different open space ratios applicable to the subject permit. One is based on the land use district designation and the other is based on the type habitat on the property. In the instance where a land use district open space ratio and a habitat open space ratio are different, the higher open space ratio applies. The open space ratio requirement for the Offshore Island land use designation is found at Section 9.5-262, M.C.C., and requires that 95 percent of the area be left as open space. Section 9.5-343, M.C.C., contains the open space ratios designed to protect habitat. These open space ratios vary depending on the land type depicted on the Existing Conditions Map, which has been adopted and shows vegetation, natural features, and developed lands. On Raccoon Key, these three designations are depicted on the Existing Conditions Map: "fringing mangroves", "saltmarsh and buttonwood associations", and "speciality farms". Much of the island consists of fringing mangroves. A portion along the eastern shoreline is designated saltmarsh and buttonwood. Five areas in which CRL had placed structures are designated as speciality farms. The southernmost of the feeding stations on Raccoon Key at issue in this proceeding and Field Cage 7 on Key Lois are in fringing mangrove areas, a designation that has an open space requirement of 100 percent. Section 9.5- 345(m), M.C.C., authorizes the construction of piers, docks, utility pilings, and walkways in mangroves. The feeding station and the field cage are not the type structures that can be built in mangroves. The other two feeding stations on Raccoon Key at issue in this proceeding are in areas with 95 percent open space ratios. Dr. Schilling performed an open space analysis by which he concluded that all structures on both islands at issue in this proceeding met the applicable open space requirements. The southernmost feeding station on Raccoon Key and Field Cage 7. Key Lois do not comply with the open space ratio requirement. As to the other structures, the Department of Community Affairs established that Dr. Schilling's analysis was flawed. The evidence failed to establish whether the remaining structures meet the open space requirements. SETBACK REQUIREMENTS Section 9.5-286(b) pertains to shoreline setback requirements and provides as follows: (b) All buildings other than docks, utility pilings, walkways, nonenclosed gazebos and fences and similar structures shall be set back fifty (50) feet from natural water bodies with unaltered shorelines or unlawfully altered shorelines, measured from the landward limit of mangroves, if any, and where mangroves do not exist, from mean high tide line. The Monroe County staff relied on the drawings attached to the application in concluding that the structures comply with setback requirements. These drawings erroneously reflect that Field Cage 7 is more than 50 feet from the water and they do not reflect the landward extent of mangroves. The shoreline on Key Lois is unaltered. Field Cage 7 is obviously within 50' of the shoreline. Field Cage 7 does not comply with the setback requirement found in Section 9.5-286(b), M.C.C. The shoreline on Raccoon Key is unaltered. All three of the feed stations at issue in this proceeding are within 50' of the landward extent of mangroves. These three feed stations do not comply with the setback requirement found in Section 9.5-286(b), M.C.C. ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS Despite the food that is provided, the free roaming monkeys have destroyed mangroves on the two islands. In the process of pulling leaves off the mangroves, the monkeys strip bark and break branches from the mangroves. The adverse impact on the mangroves is evident, with dead mangroves being observed in large quantities on both islands. Because Key Lois is a sand key, the absence of mangroves to stabilize its shorelines and to break or absorb wave energy has contributed to erosion. Nutrients from fecal waste and food reach the nearshore waters of both islands. The excessive nutrient loading has contributed to algal blooms and the degradation of those nearshore waters. PRIOR DISPUTES In the 1980s, a dispute developed between CRL and the FDER regarding CRL's activities on these two islands. As a result of that dispute and after several years of negotiation, CRL and the FDER settled their dispute by the execution of two consent orders, one pertaining to Key Lois and the other pertaining to Raccoon Key. The Department of Community Affairs was not a party to that dispute and did not participate in the negotiations. In 1986, CRL filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida, against the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board of Trustees) to determine the mean high water line for the purposes of delineating the boundary between the lands owned by CRL and the sovereign submerged lands held in trust by the State of Florida. The case number assigned to that proceeding was 86-190-CA-13. That civil action was settled, with the consent agreements between CRL and FDER being incorporated by reference. The Department of Community Affairs was not a party to the suit between CRL and the Board of Trustees and did not participate in the negotiations that resulted in the settlement agreement. 8/ The settlement agreement between CRL and the Board of Trustees was approved by the circuit judge presiding over the civil action and was incorporated by reference in the court's "Consent Final Judgment" entered in Case No. 86-190-CA-13. The court's order provided in part, that the ". . .terms and conditions contained in [the Settlement Agreement] shall govern the parties' conduct and define their respective duties and obligations." By its settlement agreement with the Board of Trustees, CRL agreed to cease its operations on Key Lois and convey title to Key Lois to the State of Florida no later than December 31, 2012. It also agreed to cease its operations on Raccoon Key and quitclaim its ownership of Raccoon Key to the United States for inclusion in the National Wildlife Refuge System no later than December 31, 2024. The consent agreements with the FDER requires CRL to obtain all governmental permits that are necessary to effectuate the terms of the agreements. Those provisions require CRL to obtain any necessary building permits. The settlement agreement between CRL and the Board of Trustees also included the following: ". . . [H]usbandry practices will be changed to reduce the free-ranging population. Nonproductive animals will be intensely culled; selective breeders will be replaced and juveniles will be confined in corral gang-type caging similar to that used by many zoos." The provisions of the consent order between CRL and FDER for Key Lois included the scheduled reduction of the free-range population of animals, to culminate with the elimination of all free-ranging monkeys during the year 2003, and the restoration of the previously damaged mangrove areas on the island. "Holding Compound III," now referred to as Field Cage 7, was identified on a location map. The following comment reflected the future plans for this structure: "This compound will be renovated and turned into the first breeding corral." The provisions of the consent order between CRL and FDER for Raccoon Key also provided for the scheduled reduction of the free-range population of animals , to culminate with the elimination of all free-ranging monkeys during the year 2008, and the restoration of the previously damaged mangrove areas on the island. Five feeding stations were identified on the location map. The following comments reflected the future plans for these structures: "Three 48' x 24' wire structures are used to feed and trap the free ranging animals. FS I will be relocated to near (sic) Compound II. FS V will be dismantled and not replaced. FS II, III and IV will remain in use as long as free range animals are on the island." The structures referred to by the consent order as FS II, FS III, and FS IV are referred to by the development order issued by Monroe County as feeding stations 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These three feeding stations were moved short distances to less environmentally sensitive areas at the direction of FDER, but they remain in the approximate location as they were prior to the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan. The feed stations on Raccoon Key were also redesigned by CRL so that they could be better suited for trapping adult monkeys. In reliance on the consent orders with the FDER and with the settlement with the Board of Trustees, CRL has expended over $197,000 in lease fees and administrative fees to the FDER, spent some $120,000 on refoliation, $90,000 on fencing, $15,000 in feed stations, $125,000 in breeding and holding pens, and $200,000 for water treatment plants, for a total of $747,000. CRL contributes approximately one million dollars per year to the local economy in salaries and purchases. MODIFICATIONS There was no evidence of modifications to the structures that would render them consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. VARIANCES The Monroe County Code makes provision for the issuance of variances in appropriate circumstances. Section 9.5-523, M.C.C., pertains to variances and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Variances may be granted to the requirements contained in divisions 10, 9, 4, 11, and 14, article VII, pursuant to the standards and procedures set forth in subparagraph (e) of this section, but only if a variance is not otherwise available as part of the conditional use approval process. Variances may be granted from the open space ratio requirements of section 9.5-182 according to the standards and procedures set forth in subsection (e) of this section. However, no variance shall be granted under this section if such variance would result in an open space ratio less than that required by section 9.5-343. * * * An application for a variance shall be submitted to the development review coordinator in a form prescribed by the planning director. The development review coordinator shall schedule a hearing on the variance upon receipt of a completed application. The notice requirements shall be those described in section 9.5-45. All applications for variances under this section shall be heard and decided by the planning commission at a regularly scheduled public hearing. Appeals may be filed by an owner, applicant, adjacent property owner, any aggrieved or adversely affected person as defined by section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes; or any resident or real property owner may request an appeal of the planning commission's variance decision under the hearing officer appellate article of these regulations [Section 9.5-535, et seq.] by filing the notice required by that article within thirty (30) days of the date of the written variance decision of the planning commission. The planning commission, in granting or denying a variance under this section, shall consider whether the following conditions are met: A showing of good and sufficient cause; Failure to grant the variance would result in exceptional hardship to the applicant; A determination that the granting of the variance will not result in additional threats to public expense which would not otherwise occur; create a nuisance; or cause fraud or victimization of the public; Unique or peculiar circumstances or conditions which apply to the property but which do not apply to other properties in the same land district; The granting of the variance would not confer upon the applicant any special privilege denied by these regulations to other properties in the same land district. The planning commission, in determining whether the foregoing conditions for a variance are met, shall consider the following factors relevant: Physical characteristics of the proposed construction for which a variance is requested; Whether it is possible to use the property without the variance; The increased or decreased danger to life and property if the variance is or is not requested; The importance to the community of the services to be provided if the proposed variance is granted; The compatibility of the proposed variance in light of existing and permitted development in the immediate area; The safety of access to the property for ordinary and emergency vehicles if the variance is or is not granted; The additional or lessened costs of providing governmental services if the variance is or is not granted. The issues pertaining to the issuance of variances for these structures are not identical to the issues litigated in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FLAWAC enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that the final order find that the subject permit is inconsistent with the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations. It is further recommended that FLAWAC order that the structures can remain in place until CRL has had a reasonable opportunity to apply to Monroe County for variances for the subject structures and for an amendment to the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan. Should CRL not apply for variances or an amendment to the comprehension plan within a reasonable time established by FLAWAC, or should those applications be denied, the subject structures should be ordered removed. DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1996.
