Findings Of Fact 1. On September 15, 2009, the staff of the Commission issued a Staff Recommendation, recommending to the Commission that there was probable cause to believe that The Florida Election Code was violated. 2. On December 4, 2009, the Commission entered an Order of Probable Cause finding that there was probable cause to charge the Respondent with the following violations: Count 1: On January 19, 2008, Respondent violated Section 106.09(1), Florida Statutes, by accepting a contribution in cash in excess of $50, when the Respondent accepted a cash contribution for $250 from Joe Blanco on January 19, 2008. 3. On December 8, 2009, the Respondent was served by certified mail with a copy of the Order of Probable Cause. 4. The case was transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings on January C_0 045 (12/08) 1 8, 2010, however, the Respondent wishes to resolve the case by Consent Order. 5. The Respondent and the staff stipulate to the following facts: A. Respondent, Susan Valdes, was re-elected to the Hillsborough County School Board, District 1, on August 26, 2008. Respondent was first elected to the school board on November 2, 2004. B. Respondent reported receiving a $250 cash contribution from Joe Blanco on her 2008 Q1 report. : C. Effective January 1, 2008, Section, 106.09(1), Florida Statutes, prohibited cash contributions in excess of $50. D. The $250 was an excessive cash contribution to Respondent’s campaign.
The Issue What is the appropriate fine for Respondent's 17 violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (1999)?
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Respondent is an elected public official, a State of Florida State Senator; violations of the Florida Elections Law during his election to that high office triggered this case. He has been a state legislator for more than a decade. The Third District Court of Appeal remanded the original case for reconsideration of the penalty after affirming Respondent's 17 violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (1999). The 17 violations affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal are: two violations of Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (1999), for certifying as correct, an incorrect campaign treasurer's report; four violations of Subsection 106.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, for failing to report four personal loans (contributions) to his campaign; five violations of Subsection 106.143(1), Florida Statutes, for advertisements without disclaimers; five violations of Subsection 106.132(2), Florida Statutes, for advertisements that did not contain a party affiliation; one violation of Subsection 106.143(4)(a), Florida Statutes, for failure to state that the candidate approved the campaign advertisement. Respondent's current employment is that of a Florida state senator. His direct income from that employment is $29,916. He receives additional payments from the State of Florida in the form of reimbursements for travel, per diem, and other approved expenses related to his official position. Respondent enjoys a remarkable lifestyle. He owns two homes, one in Miami and the other in Tallahassee. Recently married, the Tallahassee home is jointly-owned with his wife and was purchased for $795,000. While the Miami home was owned by Respondent, individually, prior to the marriage, it is now jointly-owned. The change in title to the Miami home may be the result of refinancing subsequent to his marriage. Respondent leases a Lexus automobile; the monthly lease cost is $755. Respondent maintains a Schwab investment account to which he contributes $150 monthly. In August 2005, the account had a value of approximately $7,200. Respondent maintains an American Express credit card account, jointly with his wife, that had a balance due of $61,000 during the time of the hearings. In September 2004, Respondent loaned his legislative aide $15,000, which at the time of the hearings remained un- repaid. In May 2005, Respondent refinanced his Miami home, which he valued at $210,000 on his 2004 Form 6, for $384,300. At the time of the hearings, Respondent had funds on deposit in Sunshine State Credit Union and Washington Mutual Bank of approximately $3,800. Respondent's personal living expenses exceed his stated income. No reasonable explanation has been offered for his ability to maintain his lifestyle. Respondent's net worth will allow him to pay any fine appropriate for the 17 violations of law affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal. Respondent had previously violated Subsection 106.57(5), Florida Statutes (1999).
Conclusions For Petitioner: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 For Respondent: Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Benedict P. Kuehne, Esquire Sale & Kuehne, P.A. BankAmerica Tower, Suite 3550 100 Southeast Second Street Miami, Florida 33131-2154
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Election Commission impose a penalty of $8,750 on Respondent, Senator Alex Diaz de la Portilla. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Benedict P. Kuehne, Esquire Sale & Kuehne, P.A. BankAmerica Tower, Suite 3550 100 Southeast Second Street Miami, Florida 33131-2154 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, as campaign treasurer, signed two checks drawn on the candidate's primary campaign account when such account lacked sufficient funds to cover the checks and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a certified public accountant since 1996. Since 2000, Respondent has been employed with a Hollywood, Florida accounting firm, where he is now a partner. Respondent has been licensed since 1996 to practice accounting in Florida. Sometime prior to June 2005, a friend of Respondent told him that a candidate for office in Miami needed help with his campaign. Respondent agreed to meet with the candidate, Richard Dunn, who was running for the District 5 seat on the City of Miami Commission. At the meeting, Respondent became acquainted with Mr. Dunn, who is a minister and an experienced candidate for public office. During the meeting, Mr. Dunn asked Respondent to serve as his campaign treasurer. Mr. Dunn explained that his main duty would be to maintain the campaign checkbook and make deposits of campaign contributions. Respondent also understood that he would have to attend some fundraising events. Respondent had never previously served as a campaign treasurer, but the parties agreed upon a satisfactory payment, and Respondent assumed his duties as campaign treasurer in July 2005. When Respondent started as treasurer, Mr. Dunn's campaign staff gave him checkbooks and deposit slips. At no time did Respondent ever investigate whether the election laws imposed upon him any special requirements. No one on Mr. Dunn's campaign staff gave Respondent a copy of the explanatory campaign materials provided each campaign by the Clerk's Office of the City of Miami. These materials include all relevant campaign finance laws. Respondent's lack of familiarity with the duties of a campaign treasurer emerged early. He learned that he had to file campaign treasurer reports when campaign staff informed him of this responsibility. At the same time, Respondent learned that campaign staff, including Mr. Dunn, were not careful in the management of the campaign's finances. In trying to prepare his first report, Respondent had problems obtaining all of the necessary information, such as all of the checks that had been written. Despite his lack of familiarity with campaign finance laws, Respondent knew that he could not write a check if an account had insufficient funds. Respondent assumed (wrongly, as noted below in the Conclusions of Law) that he could sign a check, even if the account lacked funds to cover it, as long as sufficient funds would be deposited before the check was presented for payment at the payor's bank. Respondent was not the first campaign treasurer for this campaign. However, the existence of a prior treasurer did not make it any easier for Respondent to assemble the necessary documents, such as copies of bank statements, so that he could do his job. Also, 30-45 days after taking over as treasurer, Respondent learned that the campaign maintained at least one other checking account. In short order, Respondent learned that the bank mailed the statements to Mr. Dunn, not the treasurer. Respondent suggested to Mr. Dunn that the bank issue a copy to Respondent. Mr. Dunn agreed with this proposal, but the bank, Wachovia Bank, said that it could not do so. Respondent never suggested to Mr. Dunn that he direct the bank to mail the statements to Respondent, who would then send a copy to Mr. Dunn. Quickly, Respondent also learned that Mr. Dunn was writing most of the checks, including counter checks. Respondent repeatedly impressed upon Mr. Dunn the importance of keeping Respondent informed about these checks, but Mr. Dunn and his campaign staff did not routinely do so. After failing to convince Mr. Dunn to restrict check- issuing privileges to Respondent, Respondent prepared a check authorization form that Mr. Dunn and his campaign staff could use each time that they issued checks. However, despite all of these efforts, consisting of five to ten telephone calls and meetings, Respondent never succeeded in obtaining Mr. Dunn's cooperation for very long. On the 10-15 occasions that Respondent wrote and signed campaign checks, he often, but not invariably, contacted the bank and asked it to fax transaction reports or partial statements to cover a specific date range. On those 10-15 occasions, Respondent often, but not invariably, called Mr. Dunn for confirmation of deposits before writing. If Respondent ever attempted to obtain this information by online banking, he never so indicated during the hearing. Although Respondent did something to update himself on current activity in the checking account each time that he had to write and sign a check, his information was necessarily incomplete. Overall, Respondent admits that he never was able to get the accounting problem within the campaign under control. Although Respondent wrote and signed relatively few checks, he wrote and signed the two checks at issue in this case many months after discovering the problems described above. On October 27, 2005, Respondent signed a check to The Miami Times for $3625.63 and drawn on the campaign account. Account balances were $542.34, $792.34, and $1892.34 on October 26, 27, and 28, 2005, respectively. Clearly, Respondent signed this check at a time that the account lacked sufficient funds to cover it. Respondent delivered the $3625.63 check to a member of the Dunn campaign and instructed her to ensure that the account had sufficient money before giving it to the payee. He added that she should deliver the check only to Mr. Dunn. On the same day, Mr. Dunn signed a check drawn on the same account in the amount of $500 and payable to the prior campaign treasurer, Johnny Studstill. Although the October bank records reveal no insufficient funds fees, the November bank records reveal seven instances of insufficient funds: November 10, 21, 22, and 30 (four times). Respondent explained that the bank imposed these fees because deposits had not yet cleared, but the imposition of these fees was sufficient to alert Respondent to mounting problems, and two of these instances had arisen prior to the date on which he signed the November 22 check, which is the second check at issue in this case. On November 22, 2005, Respondent signed a check to radio station WMBM for $2000 and drawn on the campaign account. Account balances were $694.25, $2909.25, and $6091.84, on November 21, 22, and 23, 2005, respectively. The relevant day is November 22, so it would appear that the bank balance was sufficient to cover this check. However, on the same day, Respondent signed checks in the amounts of $1065 and $1492.65 and payable to ASAP Mailing Service and Dodd Printing, although the latter check was marked void shortly after Respondent signed it. Thus, the total of the $2000 check to WMBM and $1065 check to ASAP (counsel for Petitioner conceding at the hearing that a voided check should not count) exceeded the account balance of $2909.25. On the same day, Mr. Dunn signed three checks drawn on the same account. One was in the amount of $850 and payable to radio station WEDR, one was in the amount of $185 and payable to Isaiah Walker, and the third was in the amount of $2000 and payable to radio station WHQT. About three weeks prior to the end of the campaign, Respondent realized that the situation was unworkable, even though his administrative assistant at the accounting firm was devoting 20 hours weekly to campaign-related bookkeeping work. Respondent remained with the campaign only to avoid the negative appearance that would be created by his leaving his post in the days running up to the election. Respondent asked Mr. Dunn not to leave him "high and dry," but Respondent was never paid for his services to the campaign, beyond a single $1000 check to cover costs. When signing the October 27 check, Respondent knew that, due to the campaign's poor financial management practices, he lacked even the information to determine whether the account balance would be sufficient when the check was presented to Wachovia. He did not consider whether the account balance was sufficient when he signed the check because he was not aware of this requirement of law. Respondent's violation of law was willful when signing the October 27 check. By this time, Respondent had been serving as campaign treasurer for nearly four months. He was increasingly aware that he did not have the full cooperation of the candidate. Although he did not know the relevant requirement of law, Respondent recklessly disregarded this requirement because he had never made any effort--let alone a reasonable effort--to inform himself of this legal requirement. The circumstances likewise establish recklessness in the signing of the November 22 check. Factually, Respondent's acts and omissions on November 22 were less defensible because the account had twice incurred insufficient-funds fees in the two weeks preceding the signing of the November 22 check, and he had another month to see that Mr. Dunn and the campaign staff would not agree to reasonable financial-management controls. Legally, Respondent's ongoing failure to inform himself of the applicable legal requirements imposed upon him as a campaign treasurer remained entirely unreasonable, with the passing of another month, the incurring of insufficient-funds fees, and the repeated confirming that Respondent would not have any significant cooperation from Mr. Dunn as his campaign approached its completion. The key factual determination in this case is that Respondent willfully violated the legal requirement that sufficient funds be in the account when the checks were signed. Respondent was understandably unfamiliar with this requirement, which is different from the more common requirement, with which he was familiar, that sufficient funds must be available when a check is presented to the issuing bank for payment. The requisite finding of Respondent's recklessness in failing to exercise any apparent effort to inform himself of this requirement of law is facilitated by the manner in which he handled the more common responsibilities of bookkeeping. Respondent proceeded recklessly in this area, as well. Respondent knew that the probability of bounced checks elevated considerably, the longer that more than one person wrote checks and the campaign staff was so lax in getting him the information on their activity in the account. Reckless disregard for the proper discharge of basic bookkeeping responsibilities is evidence of Respondent's overall state of mind at the relevant time. If Respondent did not initially realize his ignorance of campaign finance laws, he had to understand the limits of his knowledge when campaign staff told him he had to file campaign treasurer reports. By not informing himself of Section 106.11(4), Florida Statutes, by the time that he signed the two checks that are the subject of this case, Respondent displayed reckless disregard of his legal obligations. Under the law set forth below, Respondent's reckless disregard of the law constitutes a willful violation of the law. Here, Respondent, an accountant, has wholly disregarded Section 106.11(4), Florida Statutes, without making any reasonable inquiry into the limitations on check signing in a campaign.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of two counts of violating Section 106.11(4), Florida Statutes, and imposing a civil penalty of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent accepted campaign contributions and made expenditures before designating a campaign treasurer and campaign depository, signed a check without sufficient funds written on a campaign account with insufficient funds to cover the check, and accepted a campaign contribution in excess of the legal limit in violation of Subsections 106.021(1)(a), 106.11(4), and 106.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the campaign laws of the state. During 2006, Respondent attempted, unsuccessfully, to qualify as a candidate for the United States Congress and then campaigned for election to the state Legislature. Sometime in 2006, Respondent attempted to qualify as a candidate for the United States House of Representatives, District 12. On May 15, 2006, Respondent accepted two checks from Mr. Kent Lilly, an attorney in Bartow, Florida. One check was a campaign contribution of $500.00. Mr. Lilly intended the other check to be a loan of $5,000.00. Although the loan from Mr. Lilly satisfied the definition of a campaign contribution in Subsection 106.011(3)(a), Mr. Lilly and Respondent understood that Respondent was to repay the loan from subsequent campaign contributions. Respondent learned by letter dated May 18, 2006, that he did not qualify as a candidate for federal office because the qualifying papers he filed did not contain an original signature. Respondent decided to campaign as a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives, District 63. Respondent retained the campaign funds contributed by Mr. Lilly in a bank account divided into two sub-accounts. The two sub-accounts are identified in the record as the Sub 1 and Sub 2 accounts. The Sub 1 account contained funds collected for the Congressional campaign, and the Sub 2 account contained funds collected for the state legislative campaign. Respondent did not designate a campaign treasurer and depository for the state legislative campaign until July 19, 2006. Respondent signed the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Candidates (the DS-DE 9) form on July 5, 2006. The DS-DE 9 form designated Ms. Shirley Goodwine as the campaign treasurer. Respondent filed the DS-DE 9 form with the state’s Division of Elections on July 13, 2006. The original DS-DE 9 form was insufficient. The original form did not include the name of the political office sought and the date of Ms. Goodwine’s signature. Respondent filed an amended DS-DE 9 form on July 19, 2006. The amended form corrected the errors in the original form and was sufficient to designate a campaign treasurer and depository for state office. On July 6, 2006, Respondent accepted a contribution to his Sub 2 account before designating a campaign treasurer and depository. Respondent transferred $2,000.00 from the Sub 1 account to his Sub 2 account. The funds came from the loan from Mr. Lilly. The $2,000.00 contribution was excessive, within the meaning of Subsection 106.19(1)(a). It exceeded the maximum allowable contribution of $500.00 by $1,500.00. On July 12, 2006, Respondent expended $16.80 from his Sub 2 account before designating a campaign treasurer and depository. The charge to his account in the amount $16.80 was for checks to be used on the account. On July 18, 2006, Respondent signed a check in the amount of $1,859.76, which was drawn on the Sub 2 account. Insufficient funds were available to cover the check. The check was payable to the state Division of Elections and was intended to pay the qualifying fee to run for state office. On July 22, 2006, Respondent signed a check drawn on the Sub 2 account without sufficient funds. The check was payable to Publix Supermarket for $100.00. Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. Petitioner previously fined Respondent for filing campaign treasurer reports late. Respondent has not paid the previous fines. Respondent reports his net worth to be $103,000.00. Respondent has not repaid the loan from Mr. Lilly. Respondent submitted no evidence of mitigating factors that may have reduced the fine proposed by Petitioner. Respondent committed the foregoing acts willfully within the meaning of former Section 106.37, which was in effect at the time Respondent committed the acts. Respondent committed the acts with reckless disregard for whether the acts were prohibited by relevant campaign laws of the state.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Angela Williams (Petitioner or Ms. Williams), was properly enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan upon the expiration of her election period after she was employed by the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in March 2019.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Petitioner was employed by the Seminole State College of Florida, in an FRS-eligible position, from 1990 through 1998. At that time, the Pension Plan was the only retirement program available for eligible employees. In 2002, the Investment Plan became available for employees participating in the FRS. Petitioner was not employed in an FRS-eligible position at that time. Petitioner began employment with DOC, an FRS-participating employer, in March of 2019. Following her return to FRS-eligible employment, Petitioner was provided an initial choice period with a deadline of December 31, 2019, by 4:00 p.m., Eastern Time, to elect the Pension Plan or the Investment Plan. Since the Plan Choice Administrator received no election from Petitioner by the December 31, 2019, deadline and Petitioner was not employed in a Special Risk Class position, Petitioner was enrolled in the Investment Plan. Respondent has no record of Petitioner utilizing an election during her initial choice period. On or about January 24, 2020, Petitioner submitted a Request for Intervention (“RFI”) asserting that she had been “erroneously enrolled in the Investment Plan” and requesting that she be “placed back into the Pension Plan, along with any choices associated with that plan.” Petitioner asserted she thought she should have defaulted into the Pension Plan, since she had been previously enrolled in that plan during her 1990-1998 employment. Petitioner’s RFI was denied. On February 24, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Hearing disputing that “it was compulsory to make an election” and that the default into the Investment Plan was “erroneously done.” She alleged that “Florida Statutes 121.4501(4)(b) and 121.4501(4)(f) [we]re incorrectly quoted” in the response to her RFI, and that her “login and activity are not being correctly recorded.” An informal proceeding pursuant to section 120.57(2) followed. At the informal hearing, Petitioner stated that, “on May 27th [2019], the website [MyFRS.com] indicated that I was in the Pension Plan and if I wanted to stay in the Pension Plan, that I should not have to make an election.” On December 14, 2020, the Hearing Officer issued an Order of Transfer to DOAH, citing Petitioner’s statements at the hearing, such as quoted in the preceding paragraph, as raising a disputed issue of material fact. This proceeding thus ensued. Facts Adduced at Hearing Ms. Williams testified that upon her employment with DOC, she received a letter by U.S. Mail at her listed address with a PIN to establish an online FRS account. She then logged onto MyFRS.com on or about May 27, 2019. She testified that she also logged into her MyFRS.com account in the fall of 2019. She stated that during both logins, she was presented with a screen that informed her that she was enrolled in the Pension Plan. She also testified that the login screen included a statement that if she intended to remain in the Pension Plan, she did not need to do anything further. However, there was no screenshot or extrinsic evidence offered in evidence to corroborate that testimony. Ms. Williams’s testimony alone is insufficient to support a finding of fact as to the substance of any logged-in online activities. Furthermore, Ms. Olson testified credibly that a screen providing information as described by Ms. Williams does not exist in the SBA system. Ms. Williams further testified that the next communication she received from SBA by U.S. Mail came in January 2020, informing her that she was enrolled in the Investment Plan. Ms. Williams called the number provided in the mailed notice on January 13, 2020, and spoke with Graham, an FRS plan administrator. Ms. Williams advised Graham of her belief that she was erroneously enrolled in the Investment Plan. By that time, the election period had passed. Graham indicated that he would investigate the matter. On January 22, 2020, Ms. Williams received a message to call Graham. She did so, but the call was “dropped.” She called back and spoke with Carrie. That call was transcribed and is in the record of this proceeding. The transcript of that call reveals that none of the parties to the call had a precise explanation of or answer for the events. It would not be inaccurate to say that Carrie and the MyFRS.com financial guidance representative who joined the call were uncertain about the circumstances of Ms. Williams's account. However, there was no statement made by either of the FRS representatives that could be construed as being contrary to the position SBA has taken in this case. More to the point, since the call was placed on January 22, 2020, after the election period had expired, the discussion between Ms. Williams and the persons on the call could not have formed the basis for any reliance or change in position detrimental to Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams believed that certain of her keystrokes while on her two visits to the MyFRS.com website were not recorded by the transaction server, which she surmised was the result of errors in the system. She testified to her belief that “Alight [the SBA contractor] has a -- quite a serious issue with communication -- with communication defaults, with losing communication between MyFRS.com website and the transaction server. It’s happened to me, you know, several times. So, I -- I don’t believe that you can trust what is being printed by Alight as being accurate.” However, there was no testimony or evidence of such beyond Ms. Williams’s speculation. Evidence was received of five emails sent from the SBA contractor to Ms. Williams between July 22, 2019, and December 30, 2019, advising her of the deadline for making an election. The emails were sent to an email address that Ms. Williams acknowledged she used. The documentary evidence included read-receipts of Ms. Williams having opened only one of the emails during the election period. Ms. Williams went through each of the emails, explaining why she could not have opened those emails at the times indicated. However, her testimony for three of the emails was intended to show that she could not have opened the emails at the times indicated, though the times indicated were the “sent” times, not the “opened” times. Thus, her testimony that she did not open those emails is credited, though for the reason that she simply did not open them rather than that the time shown for her having opened them was incorrect. The only email for which there is evidence of its having been opened within the election period was sent on October 7, 2019, at 8:03 a.m., and first opened that same date at 7:56 p.m. Ms. Williams had no recollection of reading that email. She testified that the recorded time of her opening it again -- Saturday, October 12, 2019, at 9:27 a.m. -- was unlikely because she “was actually getting a fridge delivered that day. So, I would not have been on the internet reading my e-mail while my fridge was being delivered.” It seems a stretch that anyone would forego checking emails for a full weekend day for a refrigerator delivery. That a read-receipt record would be randomly generated without a document having been opened is implausible. The read-receipt record indicated that the October 7, 2019, email was last opened on January 22, 2020, at 5:16 p.m. Another indicated that an August 15, 2019, email was first opened on January 22, 2020, at 5:21 p.m., minutes before Ms. Williams returned Graham’s call. Ms. Williams indicated that reading the email at that time did not make sense to her, stating “if I had that e-mail and I was going to log -- and I was going to read it, I would have done it after the first phone call on the 13th, not right before I dialed in to talk to Graham.” To the contrary, it seems quite normal for one to review emails from SBA prior to discussing a retirement plan election with an SBA representative investigating the election. The email records are, themselves, hearsay.2 However, they are not accepted by the undersigned for the truth of the matters set forth, i.e., the dates and times that they were sent to and opened by Ms. Williams, but rather for the more general purpose of showing that she had been provided with notice of issues regarding her retirement plan that required attention. Thus, they are accepted and given weight for that purpose. Several notices were also sent to Ms. Williams by U.S. Mail at her correct address. She acknowledged receipt of the letter containing her PIN in May 2019, and the letter informing her that she was enrolled in the Investment Plan in January 2020, but denied having received any of the others. There was simply no credible explanation why notices, mailed in the normal course of SBA’s duties to an address of record, would not have been delivered by the U.S. Postal Service. Regardless of whether emails were or were not read, the enrollment of Ms. Williams in the Investment Plan is controlled by application of section 121.4501, Florida Statutes. Ms. Williams addressed what she believed to be the ambiguity of section 121.4501, particularly subsections (4)(b)1. and (3)(a), which she believed to be “open to an interpretation.” That issue will be addressed in the Conclusions of Law that follow.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order upholding the decision to enroll Petitioner, Angela Williams, in the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan pursuant to section 121.4501(4)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruth E. Vafek, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela Atkinson Williams 4237 Trout Avenue Milton, Florida 32583 Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue Whether the Respondents willfully violated Subsections 106.071(1), 106.143(4)(b), and 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, (2003)1 as charged in Counts 5 through 12 of the Florida Elections Commission's Order of Probable Cause.
Findings Of Fact Respondents are Douglas Guetzloe (Guetzloe), an Orlando-based political consultant, and Guetzloe Communications Group Inc., d/b/a, Advantage Consultants, a Florida Corporation (GCG). Guetzloe is president and principal of the firm. Douglas M. Guetzloe has been a political consultant since 1984. GCG has, also, been in existence since 1984. Approximately ten to 20 percent of GCG's business is political consulting. Guetzloe and his wife own 100 percent of the stock in the company. Guetzloe works with all of the clients, and Guetzloe makes 100 percent of the decisions for the business. On or about May 28, 2004, the Commission entered an Order of Probable Cause, in two cases, charging Respondents with four counts of violating Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, for failing to include a proper disclaimer on an independent expenditure; three counts of violating Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, for failing to file independent expenditure reports; four violations of Subsection 106.143(4)(b), Florida Statutes, for failure to include a proper disclaimer on a political advertisement; and one count of violating Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for deliberately failing to report or falsely reporting information required by Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Respondents denied the allegations and requested a formal hearing. Respondents were denied a formal hearing, but were granted an informal hearing. On December 3, 2004, after an informal hearing, the Commission entered a Final Order finding that Respondents committed the violations alleged in the twelve counts listed in the Order of Probable Cause and imposed a civil penalty of $12,000. Guetzloe appealed the Final Order to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. In its opinion in Guetzloe et. al. v. Florida Elections Commission, 927 So. 2d 942, (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) rev. den. Florida Elections Commission v. Guetzloe, 939 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2006), the Fifth District Court of Appeal found the following facts: In 2003, Guetzloe and GCG paid for political advertisements directed against Darlene Yordan ("Yordan"), a candidate for city commissioner in Daytona Beach. Each of the advertisements contained the words, "Paid political advertisement," and one contained the words, "Pd. Pol. Adv. Paid for personally by Doug Guetzloe, Chairman of Ax the Tax. Ax the Tax is an issues-only political committee and does not make political endorsements." Guetzloe, also, bought air time for two radio advertisements, which urged people to vote against Yordon. Both advertisements provided that they were paid for by "Douglas Guetzloe, Chairman of Ax the Tax," and one stated that Guetzloe had approved the advertisement. Guetzloe failed to provide a written statement informing the radio stations that advertisements had not been approved by any candidate. He also mailed a flyer that supported a number of candidates for public office, including the City Commission, which contained the words "Paid political advertisement, paid for by Doug Guetzloe, independent of any candidate or campaign." Guetzloe did not file an expenditure report with the Daytona Beach City Clerk, but did file a memorandum with the Clerk that listed expenditures of $4,476.80 for radio advertisements, printing, postage, and telephone calls. However, the actual expenditures totaled $9,790.84. Yordan filed multiple complaints claiming that Guetzloe and GCG violated numerous campaign finance laws. Following an investigation, the Commission found probable cause to conclude that Guetzloe and GCG violated section 106.071(1), Florida Statutes (2003) by failing to include disclaimer/disclosure language in the advertisements. Guetzloe requested a formal hearing, but the Commission denied the request after finding that he had failed to identify the facts in dispute. Instead, the Commission set an informal hearing and subsequently entered a final order finding that Guetzloe and GCG violated: Section 106.071(1) by failing to include the proper disclaimer on political advertisements paid for by independent expenditures; Section 106.071(1) by failing to timely file periodic reports of independent expenditures of $100 or more, on three separate occasions; Section 106.143(4)(b) by making independent expenditures for political advertisements submitted to radio stations for distribution and by failing to provide the station with a written statement that no candidate approved of the advertisements; and Section 106.19(1)(c) by writing a memorandum to the clerk reporting expenditures totaling $4,476.80 and by failing to file any report of the actual expenditures of $9,790.84. Id. at 943-944. In its opinion in Guetzloe, supra, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the holding of Petitioner in its Final Order as to the disclaimer language required in Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes. It held that the holdings of the Florida Supreme Court in Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1998) and the U.S. Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) applied to this case. Doe struck the language in the prior version of Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, that required advertisements to display the name and address of the person who paid for the advertisements, save for the words "Paid political advertisement." It held that any provision, which required further identification of the person placing the advertisement was an unconstitutional infringement on free speech. Guetzloe, supra, at 944-45. The Fifth District declined to extend the holding in Doe to include the provisions of Subsection 106.143(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Guetzloe, supra at 945. This resulted in the dismissal of Counts 1 through 4 of the Orders of Probable Cause, which related to the required disclaimer language contained in the last sentence of paragraph one of the statute. When this matter was referred to DOAH, it proceeded on Counts 5 through 12 of the Orders of Probable Cause, specifically on the issue of "willfulness." Guetzloe is a very experienced political consultant. He has run for public office three times. In 1986, Guetzloe was a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives. In 1990, Guetzloe was a candidate for the Florida Senate from District 14. When Guetzloe qualified as a candidate for the Florida Senate in 1986 and 1990, he received a copy of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Guetzloe is also chairman and treasurer of Ax the Tax, a Florida-registered political committee. Ax the Tax first registered as a local political committee in 1982. It registered again in 1986 and it has been, more or less, active ever since. Guetzloe is the only officer of Ax the Tax, and Guetzloe makes 100 percent of the decisions for Ax the Tax. Guetzloe did not recall what was required to become a political committee at the time he re-registered Ax the Tax as a political committee in 1986. Guetzloe testified he probably checked with the Orange County Supervisor of Elections (SOE), where he filed his paperwork. Guetzloe re-registered Ax the Tax in 2002 with the Orange County SOE. He did not recall receiving any resource materials at that time. He does not recall whether he received a copy of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, or whether he received a copy of the Handbook for Committees, although he may have last received the Candidate Handbook in 2002. Guetzloe received the Department of State Handbook for Committees (Handbook) through the years in connection with Ax the Tax. The Handbook contained information concerning independent expenditures. Guetzloe testified that when he received updates to the handbooks, from time to time, he possibly reviewed them. Guetzloe has never read through the statutes to familiarize himself with the requirements imposed upon candidates for public office or on committees. Guetzloe is aware that the election laws have changed dramatically through the years. Guetzloe has generally kept up with changes in the law relating to political disclaimers through notices sent by the Division of Elections. However, unless there was a notice specifically outlining changes, Guetzloe generally assumed that the law that had been in effect is still in effect. Guetzloe relies on receiving notice in the mail from the Division of Elections to determine if there were any changes to the election laws. Unless he receives such a notice, Guetzloe presumes that there are no changes. Guetzloe does not take affirmative steps on his own to determine if and how Florida's election laws may change from year to year. Over the years, Guetzloe did not contact any of the County SOE's, or local filing officers, to ask if there had been changes in the law, nor did he review the statutes for changes. However, if a question arose that he wanted answered, the Supervisor or the local filing officers would be Guetzloe's point of reference. He availed himself of those resources many times over the years. Guetzloe was involved in the 2003 City of Daytona Beach City Commission race. He made independent expenditures in excess of $100 in a Daytona Beach City Commission race in which Darlene Yordan was a candidate for re-election. Expenditures were paid for by withdrawing funds from GCG's bank account. Other than the City Clerk's Office, Guetzloe did not consult with anyone about these expenditures prior to making them. The decision of where and when to make expenditures was his alone. Guetzloe and GCG did not file an independent expenditure report with the Daytona Beach City Clerk, but did file a memorandum with the Clerk on October 24, 2003, that listed expenditures of $4,476.80. The actual expenditures totaled $9,780.84. Respondents were required to file independent expenditure reports, on forms available from the Division of Elections, with the Daytona Beach City Clerk on October 17, 31, 2003, and a final report was due on February 2, 2004. No report was filed. Guetzloe did not recall how he learned about independent expenditures in Florida. He does not recall whether he knew what an independent expenditure was before he became involved in the 2003 City of Daytona Beach, City Commission election. Guetzloe could not recall, specifically, what was allowed under the statute, only that he had to file a report, if more that $100 was spent for an independent expenditure. He believes he learned this information from the City Clerk's Office. Respondent sent a Fax Memo, on GCG letterhead, to the City Clerk of Daytona Beach, dated October 24, 2003, which stated in pertinent part: To: City Clerk of Daytona Beach From: Doug Guetzloe President Date: October 24, 2003 Subject: Independent expenditures for Daytona Beach Mayor and City Commission Please be advised that in accordance with Section 106.071 Florida Statutes that The Guetzloe Communications Group, Inc., d/b/a Advantage Consultants, 3101 Maguire Blvd., Suite 161, Orlando, Florida 32803 has made an independent expenditure on behalf of various candidates for Daytona Beach Mayor and City commission. These expenditures were made independent of the candidates and without their knowledge, consultation or approval of any candidate or candidate committee. All expenditures were made on or after October 3, 2003 and therefore will be disclosed on the next reporting period with your office. The Guetzloe Communication Group, Inc d/b/a Advantage Consultants has produced two (2) mailings that included printing and postage. In addition, radio advertising has been purchased to support and oppose candidates for Mayor and City Commission. * * * Please advise me if you need any additional information or require any additional forms to be completed. When questioned specifically about the language he used in the memo, Guetzloe opined that the language in the first paragraph of the Fax Memo was provided to him by the City Clerk's Office prior to his sending the Fax Memo to the Daytona Beach City Clerk's Office. Guetzloe did not recall why he used a specific statute number or what he relied upon to determine that he was not required to use some type of form for the statement. Guetzloe never reviewed or looked at the specific language of Section 106.071, Florida Statutes. He relied on the instructions that he stated were provided by the City Clerk's Office. As stated in his October 24, 2003, Fax Memo filed with the City Clerk, Guetzloe knew he made additional independent expenditures, which had not yet been reported. Respondent could not satisfactorily explain why he did not file additional report(s) disclosing expenditures made after submitting his October 24, 2003, Fax Memo other than the fact that he was waiting on the City Clerk's Office to tell him that he was required to do so. Jennifer L. Thomas is the City Clerk of Daytona Beach. Her responsibilities include running the City of Daytona Beach elections. More specifically, she qualifies persons running for office and is the person with whom a candidate would interact when running for public office. Thomas is also the person in the Clerk's Office that registers committees, answers questions about committees, and fields any question regarding independent expenditures from the public. Prior to January 11, 2007, Thomas had never met Guetzloe. Thomas denies having a conversation with Guetzloe during the 2003 election cycle. No one else in the clerk's Office could or would have answered an election-related question from Guetzloe during that time. Independent expenditure report forms were available through the City Clerk's Office and are also available through the Florida Division of Elections website. But for the Fax Memo, Thomas did not receive any type of expenditure or contribution report from Guetzloe during the 2003 election cycle. On or about October 2, 2003, Respondents made political expenditures for political advertisements submitted to several radio stations (four counts) for distribution and broadcast. Respondents failed to provide to radio stations or any of them, a written statement that no candidate approved of the advertisements, although the advertisements did identify Guetzloe personally as the person paying for the ad. Guetzloe claimed that he did not willfully fail to provide documents to radio stations stating that no candidate approved his radio spot advertisements. He did claim to have sent a fax memo to the stations, which contained the required language. However, this claim is not credible. Guetzloe made no efforts to read or study the Florida Election Code, specifically related to independent expenditures, campaign financing reporting or disclosure statements, at any time during the 2003 election cycle. It is a candidate's or committee's responsibility to educate themselves about the requirements of the law. Reminder cards or personal contacts from the SOE and/or the City Clerk's Office, regarding reports being due, are done as a service of the office. It is not a statutory or other legal requirement. It is Guetzloe's responsibility to prepare and submit the proper paper work as it is related to his independent expenditures. Guetzloe, also, failed to disclose information about independent expenditures he made through his company, GCG. Guetzloe failed to make any reasonable effort to comply with the election laws by submitting a proper report disclosing the expenditures or a follow up report, as required by law. The evidence is clear and convincing that Guetzloe's actions in this matter, in regard to his obligation to file independent expenditure reports properly, timely, and accurately, were "willful" as that term is defined by Section 106.37, Florida Statutes. Guetzloe showed reckless disregard in failing to comply with requirements of the law. Although, Respondent could give no credible explanation as to why he failed to provide the radio stations with a proper disclaimer statement, it is not clear and convincing that Guetzloe's failure to provide the radio statements with a written disclaimer was "willful." It appears to have been negligent. In determining the appropriate amount of civil penalty the Commission may impose, the following is considered: In case number FEC 93-66, the Commission imposed a civil penalty against Guetzloe in the amount of $3,000 for violations of Subsections 106.07(5), 106.19(1)(b), and 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's Final Order. The Commission sought to enforce its Final Order in case number FEC 93-66 in Leon County Circuit Court. On September 3, 1996, the Leon County Circuit Court entered a Final Judgment against Mr. Guetzloe in the amount of $4,478.50. The Final Judgment has not been satisfied. Respondent has indicated that he does not intend to satisfy the judgment. Guetzloe estimates his 2004 salary from Guetzloe Communications, Inc., d/b/a, Advantage Consulting to be between $100,000 and $150,000. Guetzloe estimates his 2005 and 2006 annual salary to be in the $150,000 range. Guetzloe estimates the value of his home to be $575,000, and he has approximately $175,000 equity in the property. He has a small retirement fund. Guetzloe Communications pays Guetzloe's wife a $50,000 annual salary. Therefore, Respondent is capable of paying a civil penalty. Respondents provided no mitigating circumstance for their actions. Guetzloe's failure to file complete and accurate independent expenditure reports is severe. Florida's public policy, as reflected through its elections statutory scheme, is for complete financial disclosure of all finances in Florida elections. However, Guetzloe could not provide a credible explanation why he failed to include complete information regarding expenditures listed on his Fax Memo, or why he failed to file complete, accurate, and timely reports.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that: The Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding as follows: Finding Respondents violated Subsection 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, on three occasions, for failing to file a timely periodic report of the independent expenditures of $100 or more (Counts 5, 6, and 7) and imposing a fine of $1,000 for each of the counts for a total of $3,000; Finding Respondents did not violate Subsection 106.143(4)(b), Florida Statutes, on four occasions, and dismissing Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11. 3 Finding Respondents violated Subsection 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for failing to file any report of their actual expenditures of $9,790.84 and imposing a $1,000 fine for this count. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Respondent David A. Siegel (Siegel) formed a wholly owned corporation known as Central Florida Investments, Inc., (CFI) in approximately 1970. Thereafter, CFI acquired Investment Industries of Florida, Inc., (IIF) in approximately 1980. Siegel is President of both CFI and IIF and owns one-hundred percent of the stock in both corporations. On or about September 8, 1980, IIF purchased property in Lake County which was divided into Tract A and Tract B. Tract A consisted of approximately 120 acres, was subdivided into 49 lots, and was sold to individual purchasers by Paul W. Cotton and Paul A. Buzzella; real estate salesmen working for Siegel and IIF. Sales in Tract A occurred in 1980 and 1981 to approximately forty purchasers, and only one lot in Tract A was sold after December 1, 1981. The last sale in Tract A took place in February, 1983, was a referral, and did not involve Cotton or Buzzella. Paul W. Cotton formed First Orlando Properties (FOP) on or about September 17, 1981. On or about December 1, 1981 Cotton purchased six lots from IIF and Siegel in Tract B for the purpose of resale to individual purchasers. Tract B consisted of approximately 200 acres, subdivided into 48 lots. Based on the testimony of Cotton and Siegel, it is evident that Siegel had agreed to sell all of Tract B to Cotton in eight, six lot installments. This arrangement was for the financial convenience of Cotton, but an inference is drawn that Respondents benefited from Cotton's sales activity in Tract B through the periodic execution of each additional installment. After his purchase of the first installment consisting of six lots on or about December 1, 1981, Cotton sold no more lots in Tract A. Cotton admits that he "pre-sold" several lots in Tract B prior to FOP acquiring its interest in these lots on December 1, 1981 and while he was still selling lots in Tract A for Siegel and IIF. The Agreement of Purchase and Sale for six lots in Tract B which Cotton received on or about December 1, 1981 incorrectly indicates that CFI was the property owner and seller. Siegel executed the Agreement on behalf of CFI. This was an error which Siegel admits since Tract B was actually owned by his other company, IIF. The same error as to the seller was made in the Agreements for each additional six lot installment executed on or about February 1, 1982, April 1, 1982, August 15, 1982, September 1, 1982, October 6, 1982, December 1, 1982, and April 1, 1983. Siegel has agreed to take whatever action is necessary to correct any title problems which purchasers in Tract B may have as a result of this error. Respondents did not register the land in question located in Lake County with Petitioner at any time material hereto, nor is there evidence that purchasers were afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine a public offering statement concerning such land prior to its sale. There were less than fifty (50) lots each in Tracts A and B at all times material hereto, and these tracts are contiguous. Cotton sold lots in both tracts, and pre-sold approximately thirty-six lots in Tract B while he was selling lots in Tract A and before he acquired any interest in Tract B. There were also several purchasers in common in both tracts. There were less than forty-five (45) purchasers each in Tracts A and B, but combining the purchasers in each tract there were more than forty-five (45) purchasers of the land in question in this case located in Lake County.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which: Dismisses all charges in Case No. 85-0008 against Respondent Central Florida Investments, Inc. Imposes an administrative fine of $5000 each against Respondents Investment Industries of Florida, Inc. and David A. Siegel in Case Nos. 85-0009 and 85-0010 for a total fine of S10, 000. Requires Respondents to correct, within ninety (90) days, any title problems which purchasers in Tract B may have as a result of the matters set forth in Finding of Fact 5. Requires Respondents to cease and desist from offering or disposing of any interest in subdivided land which is subject to this proceeding until a valid order of registration is obtained. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Klein, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Leonard Lubart, Esquire Michael Marder, Esquire 12000 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 204 North Miami, Florida 33181 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Although the evidence is consistent with this proposed finding, it is not adopted since it is unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2, 3. Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 2, and adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3, 4, but rejected in part in Finding of Fact 7 and as otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant, not based on competent substantial evidence, and as a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3, 7, 8. Rulings on Respondents' Proposed Finding of Fact: (Respondent has not numbered its proposed findings of fact, and therefore in order to make a ruling on proposed findings of fact paragraphs on pages 3 through 20 under the heading Findings of Fact have been consecutively numbered.) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as a conclusion of law Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 7, but otherwise rejected as simply a statement of position. 8, 9. Rejected as simply a summary of testimony. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but rejected in part in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as simply a statement of position Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 14, 15. Adopted in part and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 3. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2, 3. 17-30. Rejected as simply the party's summation of testimony and evidence, as conclusions of law and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 8. 33, 34. Rejected as simply an excerpt of testimony. Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 8 Rejected as not a proposed finding of fact.
