The Issue The issue is whether Rule 5J-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Sections 559.801(2) and 559.813(2), Florida Statutes, Respondent has exclusive administrative jurisdiction over the Sale of Business Opportunities Act, Chapter 559, Part VIII, Florida Statutes, and shares judicial enforcement over the Act with the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the applicable office of the state attorney. (Unless stated otherwise, all references to "Sections" shall be to Florida Statutes, all references to the "Act" shall be to the Sale of Business Opportunities Act, and all references to "Rules" shall be to the Florida Administrative Code.) The Act governs the sale or lease of certain business opportunities in Florida. Sections 559.803 and 559.804 respectively require sellers of covered business opportunities to provide timely disclosures to prospective purchasers and to file annual disclosure statements with Respondent prior to advertising or offering covered business opportunities for sale. More relevant to this case, Section 559.801 sets forth the definitions that establish the coverage of the Act: 559.801 Definitions.--For the purpose of ss. 559.80-559.815, the term: (1)(a) "Business opportunity" means the sale or lease of any products, equipment, supplies, or services which are sold or leased to a purchaser to enable the purchaser to start a business for which the purchaser is required to pay an initial fee or sum of money which exceeds $500 to the seller, and in which the seller represents: That the seller or person or entity affiliated with or referred by the seller will provide locations or assist the purchaser in finding locations for the use or operation of vending machines, racks, display cases, currency or card operated equipment, or other similar devices or currency-operated amusement machines or devices on premises neither owned nor leased by the purchaser or seller; That the seller will purchase any or all products made, produced, fabricated, grown, bred, or modified by the purchaser using in whole or in part the supplies, services, or chattels sold to the purchaser; That the seller guarantees that the purchaser will derive income from the business opportunity which exceeds the price paid or rent charged for the business opportunity or that the seller will refund all or part of the price paid or rent charged for the business opportunity, or will repurchase any of the products, equipment, supplies, or chattels supplied by the seller, if the purchaser is unsatisfied with the business opportunity; or That the seller will provide a sales program or marketing program that will enable the purchaser to derive income from the business opportunity, except that this paragraph does not apply to the sale of a sales program or marketing program made in conjunction with the licensing of a trademark or service mark that is registered under the laws of any state or of the United States if the seller requires use of the trademark or service mark in the sales agreement. For the purpose of subparagraph 1., the term "assist the purchaser in finding locations" means, but is not limited to, supplying the purchaser with names of locator companies, contracting with the purchaser to provide assistance or supply names, or collecting a fee on behalf of or for a locator company. "Business opportunity" does not include: The sale of ongoing businesses when the owner of those businesses sells and intends to sell only those business opportunities so long as those business opportunities to be sold are no more than five in number; The not-for-profit sale of sales demonstration equipment, materials, or samples for a price that does not exceed $500 or any sales training course offered by the seller the cost of which does not exceed $500; or The sale or lease of laundry and drycleaning equipment. "Department" means the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. "Purchaser" includes a lessee. "Seller" includes a lessor. An important question in this case is the extent to which the Act addresses affiliates of a seller. In fact, the Act does so only once. In describing the various disclosure requirements imposed upon a "seller," Section 559.803 mentions an affiliate in Section 559.803(1), which requires the disclosure of "the name of any parent or affiliated company that will engage in business transactions with the purchasers or who takes responsibility for statements made by the seller." In describing the annual filings, Section 559.805 does not mention "affiliates." Nor do the main enforcement provisions of the Act mention "affiliates." Section 559.809 prohibits 14 specified acts by "sellers". Section 559.813(2)(a) specifies five violations by "a seller or any of the seller's principal officers or agents" that may result in the penalties set forth in Section 559.813(2)(b). In connection with the sale or lease of business opportunities, Respondent has adopted three rules at Chapter 5J-10, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners have challenged, in its entirety, Rule 5J-10.001, which supplies several definitions. Rule 5J-10.001 states: 5J-10.001 Definitions. The definitions contained in Section 559.801, Florida Statutes, and the following apply: “Initial Fee or sum of money,” as used in Section 559.801(1)(a), F.S., shall include the total funds paid by the purchaser to the seller, including all monies paid for deposits, down payments, prepaid rents, equipment costs, materials, samples, products, training, services or inventory purchases. “Material change” shall include any fact, circumstance, or set of conditions which has a substantial likelihood of influencing a purchaser or a reasonable prospective purchaser in the making of a significant decision relating to a named business opportunity or which has any significant financial impact on a purchaser or prospective purchaser. “Sales program or marketing program” means: A written or oral procedure or plan provided by the seller to a purchaser of a business opportunity concerning products, equipment, supplies, services or training that the seller represents will be provided on how to sell or market the product or service; or Where the seller provides to the purchaser the following devices, techniques, training or materials which will assist the purchaser in deriving income from the business opportunity: Sales or display equipment or merchandising devices; Specific sales or marketing techniques; or Sales, marketing or advertising materials which are intended for use by the purchaser to influence a consumer to purchase a product or service. “Seller” includes any person who has an ownership interest of 10% or greater in an entity which sells or leases business opportunities. Specific Authority 570.07(23) FS. Law Implemented 559.801, 559.803, 559.805 FS. History–New 11-15-94, Amended 6-4-95. Respondent adopted Rule 5J-10.001 effective November 15, 1994, and amended it effective June 4, 1995. The specific authority cited for the rule, Section 570.07(23), provides only that Respondent "shall have and exercise the following functions, powers, and duties: To adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement provisions of law conferring duties upon it." However, in 1997, the Legislature adopted Section 559.813(8), which broadens Respondent's rulemaking authority under the Act by providing: "The department has the authority to adopt rules pursuant to chapter 120 to implement this part." In defining "seller" in Rule 5J-10.001(4), Respondent relied on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations at 16 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 436 (collectively, the "Franchise Rule"). In particular, Respondent relied on 16 CFR 436.2, explaining in a response to an interrogatory that Rule 5J-10.001(4) "was intended to clarify the identity of persons sufficiently affiliated with the sale of a business opportunity by virtue of their share ownership (16 C.F.R. 436.2) upon whom a duty should be imposed to make the required statutory disclosures in the sale of a business opportunity." In 16 CFR Sections 436.2(a)(1)(i) and (ii), the FTC identifies two types of franchises covered under the FTC Act: the package and product franchise and the business opportunity. As the name implies, the business opportunity described in 16 CFR Section 436.2(a)(1)(ii) bears the closer resemblance to the Act. Under 16 CFR Section 436.2(a), both types of franchises require an arrangement and, more importantly, "any continuing commercial relationship." For the business opportunity, 16 CFR Section 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(A) requires that a franchisee offer, sell, or distribute to a person other than the franchisor goods or services that are supplied by the franchisor, supplied by a third person with whom the franchisor requires the franchisee to do business, or supplied by an affiliate of the franchisor with whom the franchisee is advised by the franchisor to do business. In addition, for the business opportunity, 16 CFR Section 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(B) requires that the franchisor secure for the franchisee retail outlets or accounts, locations or sites for product sales displays (such as vending machines or rack displays), or the services of a person to secure these retail outlets, accounts, locations or sites. Also, 16 CFR Section 436.2(i) defines an "affiliated person" as a person that "directly or indirectly controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, a franchisor"; that "directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of a franchisor"; or that "has, in common with a franchisor, one or more partners, officers, directors, trustees, branch managers, or other persons occupying similar status or performing similar functions." However, the definitions in 16 CFR Section 436.2 apply only to terms "used in this part," and 16 CFR Part 436 does not cover enforcement and liability issues--only disclosures and definitions, including coverage definitions. In fact, the sole purpose of the affiliate definition in 16 CFR Section 436.2 is to explain the disclosure requirements set forth in 16 CFR Sections 436.1(a)(7) (total funds required to be paid to franchisor or its affiliates), 436.1(a)(8) (recurring funds required to be paid to franchisor or its affiliates), 436.1(a)(9) (names of affiliates with which franchisee is required or advised to do business), 436.1(a)(11) (basis for calculating actual revenue to be received by franchisor or its affiliates), 436.1(a)(12) (financing conditions offered by franchisor or its affiliates), and 436.1(a)(14) (extent to which franchisee--or, if a corporate, franchisee's affiliates--to participate directly in the franchised operation). Nowhere in the Franchise Rule does the affiliate definition broaden the scope of the persons liable for violations of the federal law. On July 26, 2002, Respondent filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioners and three allegedly related corporations and transmitted the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for a formal hearing. This proceeding was designated DOAH Case No. 02-3374. At the same time, Respondent imposed an Immediate Final Cease and Desist Order ordering that Petitioners and three allegedly related corporations discontinue the sale of business opportunities in Florida. (The First District Court of Appeal later stayed the enforcement of this order.) On October 11, 2002, Respondent served an Amended Administrative Complaint. The undersigned Administrative Law Judge completed the hearing in DOAH Case No. 02-3374 on November 25, 2002. As of the date of this final order, the parties have not yet filed their proposed recommended orders. In the Administrative Complaint, Amended Administrative Complaint, and Immediate Final Cease and Desist Order, Respondent relies on Rules 5J-10.001(3) and (4), but not Rules 5J-10.001(1) and (2). With respect to Rule 5J-10.001(3) ("Sales or Marketing Program Rule"), Respondent alleges that the business opportunities are covered by the Act because of the presence of a "sales program or marketing program." With respect to Rule 5J-10.001(4) ("Seller Rule"), Respondent alleges that Petitioners are liable as owners of one or more named corporations that are "sellers" who have violated the Act. With respect to Rules 5J-10.001(1) and (2), respectively, the regulatory definitions of an "initial fee or sum of money" or "material change" play no significant role in DOAH Case No. 02-3374. For this reason, Petitioners are not substantially affected by these rules, and the Conclusions of Law below determine that Petitioners lack standing to challenge Rules 5J-10.001(1) and (2), which are not further discussed in this final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I hereby recommend that the Petitioner's challenge to the Department's determination of sales taxes due herein pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, be denied and that the revised assessment notices be upheld as issued. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Davis, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert F. Nunez, Esquire Post Office Box 12726 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Mercer Farrington, Esquire Post Office Box 1548 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this case are: Did the Respondent, Alix Aldonis (Mr. Aldonis), commit fraud; misrepresentation; concealment; false promises; false pretense; dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence; or breach of trust in a business transaction by: (a) misrepresenting the sales price of real estate in a sale and purchase contract, (b) misrepresenting a commission amount in a sales and purchase contract, and (c) misrepresenting receipt by an escrow agent of a $5,000 deposit? Did Mr. Aldonis fail to obtain and retain written confirmation from the escrow agent of delivery of the Buyer's funds for purchase of the property?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the real estate industry in the State of Florida, under the authority of section 20.165, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2010). At all times material to this proceeding, the Department licensed Mr. Aldonis as a State of Florida real estate sales associate. He holds License Number SL-3117116, which is in effect until March 31, 2011. At all times material to this proceeding, Total Stop, Inc., d/b/a Total Stop Real Estate (Total Stop Real Estate), contracted with Mr. Aldonis to affiliate with it as a sales associate. At all times material to this proceeding, Lawrence Ligonde, of Total Stop Real Estate, was the licensed real estate broker with whom Mr. Aldonis was affiliated. Mr. Ligonde did not employ Mr. Aldonis. Currently, Mr. Aldonis is affiliated with Tropical Springs Realty, Inc. The agreement between Mr. Aldonis and Total Stop Real Estate did not provide for Total Stop Real Estate or Mr. Ligonde's receiving a percentage commission based on the price of sales that Mr. Aldonis made. Mr. Aldonis paid a flat fee of $495 to be affiliated with Mr. Ligonde. In 2006, Joseph Phen and Cheryl Phen listed a home that they owned, located at 3500 S.W. Viceroy Street, Port St. Lucie, Florida, for sale. They listed the property for $330,000. Ms. Phen was a real estate sales broker. She was the listing agent for the property. Mr. Aldonis represented a buyer in the sale of the Viceroy Street property. The buyer, Manuela Celestin, signed a Residential Sale and Purchase Contract for the property on August 2, 2006. Mr. and Ms. Phen signed the contract on August 3, 2006. They also initialed each page. The contract set forth a purchase price of $272,000. The contract also indicated that the buyer was providing a $5,000 deposit. Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of the contract and a copy of a deposit check by facsimile transmission. The record does not reveal the sequence of contract signing, contract transmission, check transmission, the date of the check transmission, or whether the contract was transmitted more than once to Ms. Phen. Due to conversations with Ms. Augustine at Premier Choice Title & Escrow, the escrow agent identified in the contract, Ms. Phen grew concerned about whether the deposit had been placed in escrow. She spoke to Ms. Augustine about her concerns. Ms. Phen also told Mr. Aldonis she was concerned that the deposit check may not have been deposited in an escrow account. After the conversation, Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of a check payable to Total Stop Real Estate from Charassard & Associates, P.A., for $5,000. "Phen/Celestin" is written in the "Memo" section of the check. The check bears the date August 6, 2006. Persuasive evidence does not establish if this was a copy of a second check or another copy of the check Mr. Aldonis transmitted earlier. Ms. Phen requested and received a copy of the Residential Sale and Purchase contract from the title company. The first page of this copy listed the sale price as $330,000. Although Ms. Phen testified about two HUD closing statements, the Department did not offer a copy of a HUD closing statement into evidence. The sale of the property occurred. The closing sale price was $272,000. The Department entered a second copy of the contract signed by the Phens and Ms. Celestin into evidence. The first page of the second contract reflected a sales price of $330,000. The initials at the bottom of the first page are not the initials of the Phens. The rest of the contract is identical to the contract signed by the Phens on August 3, 2006. Nothing in either contract provides for a four percent commission to be paid to any person or entity. There is no persuasive evidence indicating who created the second contract or how the title company obtained it. Mr. Ligonde testified that the contract with the higher purchase price "looks like" the one Mr. Aldonis provided him. The contracts "look" the same. Only a very close examination would identify the differences in the initials on the first page. The difference in amounts is more obvious, but it still requires a reading of the contract, not just looking at it, to note the different amount. Mr. Ligonde did not testify that the second contract entered into evidence came from his files. He also did not provide any information about how files are maintained at his business or who has access to them. He did not know when the contract arrived at his office or how. In addition, Mr. Ligonde's statement that a document "looks like" one provided him by Mr. Aldonis does not equate to testimony that the document is in fact the document Mr. Aldonis provided. At some point in the transaction, the employees of Mr. Ligonde's office, the employees of a title insurance company, and the employees of a mortgage broker had possession and control of the sales contract or a copy of it. The Department did not present credible, persuasive evidence that ruled out any of those individuals having created the new page one with the $330,000 sales price.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S John D. C. Newton, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2011.
Findings Of Fact K & B Enterprises, Respondent, purchased plants from Roy Amerson, Inc., Petitioner, and they were delivered to Respondent on February 19, 1980. Respondent had ordered Bottlebrush and Cuban laurel (Ficus Nitida) packaged in wire baskets to protect root ball in shipment. Upon arrival Respondent noted that the wires were mangled and some root balls appeared separated from the roots. Before the trees were unloaded Mrs. Benway telephoned the salesman for Petitioner and told him about the condition of the trees. The salesman advised her to accept the trees, water them, and they (Amerson) would make an allowance for the damage. This, he said, would be better and cause less damage to the trees than if they were sent back on the truck that brought them. The driver was requested by Mr. Benway to note the condition of the trees on the invoice accompanying the shipment (Exhibit 1). No such notation was made. The driver did note the date of delivery. Respondent Benway acknowledged receipt of the merchandise by signing Exhibit 1 below the following statement printed near the bottom of Exhibit 1: STOCK MAY BE REFUSED AT TIME OF DELIVERY FOR A DEFINITE REASON, BUT ONCE SIGNED FOR CUSTOMER ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOTAL AMOUNT OF INVOICE. OPEN ACCOUNTS PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF THE MONTH. 1 1/2 PERCENT CHARGE ADDED IF NOT PAID BY THE 25TH WHICH IS ANNUAL RATE OF 18 PERCENT. Respondent is a plant retailer and landscape contractor. After accepting the February 19, 1980 delivery the Cuban laurel was planted as were the other plants. Attempts to settle the dispute with Petitioner's salesman were unsuccessful. Nine of the Bottlebrush died but all of the Cuban laurel have survived. At the instruction of the salesman these plants were watered but not trimmed or fertilized. Respondent paid for the other plants received on this invoice and for the damaged plants as they have been sold. As of the date of the hearing the balance owed on the stock delivered on Exhibit 1 was $1,494.90.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Lawrence P. Weiner, was a registered Florida real estate salesman employed by Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Continental Marketing Services, Inc. solicited real property listings from property owners in the State of Florida by means of postal cards inquiring of those property owners whether they would like to sell their Florida real property. Interested owners were requested to fill out a card with their address and telephone number, and to forward that card to Continental Marketing Services, Inc. which would then contact the property openers by telephone, Respondent, as a real estate salesman in the employ of Continental Marketing Services, Inc., would then contact responding property owners from a list furnished him by his employer. Respondent would obtain information by telephone from property owners such as initial purchase price, size and location of the property. Both Respondent and his employer represented to property owners that, should they list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., the property would be advertised in foreign countries where investors existed who were interested in purchasing Florida real estate. In order to list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., property owners were required to pay an "advance fee" for these listings, usually $350, which amount they were told would be used to defray the cost of initial preparation of a directory listing those properties in Florida which were for sale. After obtaining initial background information, Respondent would submit the information to his employer, which, though unclear from the record, would analyze these facts and return to Respondent for transmission to the property owner a suggested sales price. This suggested sales price was usually several times the initial purchase price for the property. For example, one witness at the hearing testified that a lot purchased on April 27, 1967 for $2,640 was ultimately listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. at Respondent's suggestion, at a sales price of $7,600. Testimony at the hearing indicated that comparable lots in the same area are presently selling for $4,700. Another witness testified that two lots purchased in 1965 for $2,390, were discussed in 1977 with Respondent who suggested that they be listed at a suggested sales price of $16,600. Finally, still another witness testified that he listed property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. as a result of his contacts with the Respondent at a purchase price of $5,000 per acre in 1976 for property that he had purchased for $500 an acre in 1964. Those property owners testifying at the hearing who listed their property for sale with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., indicated that they had no further contact with either Respondent or Continental Marketing Services, Inc. after having paid their $350 listing fee. None of these property owners received any offers to purchase their property as a result of its listing with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., and, as of the date of the final hearing in this cause, the property remained unsold. The Respondent testified that his only responsibilities with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. involved contacting those persons on the lists furnished to him, and obtaining their agreement to listing their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Suggested sale prices for particular pieces of property were furnished to Respondent by other employees of Continental Marketing Service, Inc. Respondent further testified that placing of advertisements for properties listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. was accomplished by other employees of the company. Respondent testified that he "understood" that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had sold properties and that some of these sales were to foreign investors, although he did not know the identity of the foreign investors, or the number of parcels sold by the company. Respondent denied that he had represented to property owners that the sale of their property would be accomplished in sixty to ninety days. This contention is borne out by the testimony of two of the property owners testifying in this proceeding, one of whom testified that Respondent indicated that her property could "probably be sold within sixty to ninety days", and another property owner testified that Respondent made no representation to him concerning the length of time necessary to effect a sale of his property. There is no evidence in the record to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. failed to advertise property listed for sale as promised in the Listing Brokerage Agreement with those property owners testifying in this proceeding. There is no evidence in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc., in fact, knew of no foreign investors interested in purchasing property in the United States. Further, there is no testimony in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had never sold property for other property owners in either the United states or the State of Florida. Finally, although property belonging to three of the witnesses testifying in this proceeding was listed at several times its initial purchase price, there is no indication in the record that Respondent played any part in setting the suggested listing prices.
Findings Of Fact On September 19, 1974 Eleanor Van Treese, as agent for Futrell Company, obtained a listing on a residence located at 12250 S. W. 67th Avenue in Miami, Florida from Newton J. Mulford and Elizabeth N. Mulford, the record owners of said property. A copy of this sales management agreement was admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 1. Thereon was shown one existing mortgage with Coral Gables Federal, with a balance of approximately $47,500. At the time the Mulfords executed Exhibit number 1, a second mortgage in the amount of some $25,000 was also recorded against this property and foreclosure proceedings had been instituted. The holder of the second mortgage was James V. O'Connor. George Bender, a Miami attorney, was aware that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against this property prior to the time that Futrell obtained the listing agreement. He called Mulford to inquire about purchasing the property, but apparently his offer was not high enough to interest Mulford. After the Futrell sign was placed in front of the house, Mrs. Capps met Mrs. George Bender at a social affair. When Mrs. Bender learned that Mrs. Capps was a real estate salesperson working for Futrell Company, she asked if she would show her the Mulford house. In late November or early December Mrs. Bender was shown the house and thereafter her husband also was shown the premises. On January 2, 1975 a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial District of Florida. Therein the court found that James V. O'Connor was the holder of a second mortgage on the premises in the principal sum of $25,000 together with interest accrued thereon from August 15, 1970 in the amount of $12,976.34. The court also awarded O'Connor $500 as a reasonable attorney's fee. The judgment further provided that the defendant, O'Connor, or any of the parties to the suit, may become bidders for purchase of the premises at the forthcoming sale thereof; and that the court would retain jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of entertaining a Motion for Deficiency Judgment and "settle all other questions under the proceedings not settled by this order." O'Connor thereafter called Eleanor Van Treese to advise her that he had obtained the foreclosure order and that he would bid on the property when the judicial sale was held on the 15th of January. He further advised that he was anxious to turn over the property and get his money out of it. Mrs. Van Treese telephoned Mary Capps on January 10, 1975 to advise her of the information she had received from O'Connor. Not understanding the legal implication thereof Mrs. Capps decided that she should come to Mrs. Van Treese's house and the two of them talk to O'Connor regarding the property. This was done; and, with the two salespersons on the telephone with O'Connor, he read to them the judgment that he had obtained; advised them that he would be bidding on the property on January 15th and expected to purchase same; and that he would consider offers to purchase the property from him. Mrs. Capps, that same evening, called Mrs. Bender to advise that O'Connor was going to bid on the property on January 15th and was interested in selling the property. When Mr. Bender came home, Mrs. Bender and he discussed the purchase of the property and decided to submit an offer. Mrs. Bender so advised Mrs. Capps. The following morning, on Saturday, January 11th, Mr. and Mrs. Bender sent to the Futrell Company office and Mrs. Capps typed an offer to Purchase the property which the Benders executed. This was the deposit receipt and sales purchase agreement dated January 11, 1975 admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 2. While at the office Mr. Bender called another attorney, William A. Friedlander, who he considered to be more knowledgeable in real estate transactions than himself, for legal advice in the premises. Friedlander advised him that it was proper to submit an offer to O'Connor although O'Connor did not have present title and was therefore unable to execute a valid deed for the property until after he purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Friedlander considered the contract would be based upon a condition subsequent, viz: the acquisition of title by O'Connor, and such contract would be enforceable. Friedlander was also aware that several judgments had been entered against Mulford and that Mulford would be unable to execute a contract and deliver clear title at the amount Bender was offering. This was so because the sum of first mortgage, second mortgage, real estate commission, and other judgments that had been entered against Mulford exceeded the amount Bender was offering to pay for the residence. He advised Bender that, if the foreclosure suit had joined all necessary parties, the deed obtained by O'Connor at the foreclosure sale would be good and O'Connor would be able to give a good and merchantable title. He further advised Bender that a contract with Mulford would have been futile due to the amount of the offer and unworkable due to the short period of time before the foreclosure sale in which to obtain the cash necessary to provide Mulford sufficient funds to pay off all his creditors and the mortgages. At the time the Benders executed the contract for the purchase of the residence in question it was their intention that the offer be presented only to O'Connor. Mary Capps presented this offer by the Benders (Exhibit 2) to O'Connor who accepted same on January 11, 1975. The $6,000 earnest money deposit was delivered by Mrs. Capps to the Secretary of the Futrell Company for deposit in the Futrell Escrow Account. No evidence was presented that the earnest money deposit has ever been refunded to the Benders or that they have requested this earnest money deposit to be refunded. Mr. and Mrs. Mulford were not advised of the existence of the offer to purchase dated January 11, 1975 until long after O'Connor purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.
The Issue Whether Respondents' alcoholic beverage license should be disciplined for the reasons stated in Petitioner's Notice to Show Cause dated September 14, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the following facts are determined: The Long Branch was operating under DABT License No. 74-878 in License Series 4-COP-SRX. This type of license requires food and nonalcoholic beverage sales to constitute at least 51 percent of all sales. Audit of the Long Branch's records, which were examined on a month-by- month breakdown of the sales for the period July 1 1981, to July 1, 1982, showed food and non- alcoholic beverage sales at 7.7 percent and alcoholic beverage sales at 92.3 percent of total sales. For the period July 1 through July 27, 1982, the ratio was 4.3 percent to 95.7 percent. At no time during the more than one year period audited did the food sales reach the required 51 percent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondents' License No. 74-878 be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas M. and Sandra J. Spera Long Branch 600 South Yonge Street Ormond Beach, Florida Mr, Howard M. Rasmussen Director, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr Gary R. Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner because of her sex and/or age, and/or by retaliating against her for engaging in a protected activity.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a female, is a former employee of Respondent. At the time her employment with Respondent was terminated on December 31, 2015, she was 60 years old. Petitioner was a salesperson for Respondent, a company that sells specialty medical devices to medical providers and facilities. Petitioner’s background gave her technical knowledge regarding the cardiac-related product line, as she had obtained a certification as a perfusionist in 1978. A perfusionist operates the heart-lung bypass machine during open-heart surgery. By 1985, Petitioner moved into sales and has focused on cardiac products because of her background. Petitioner began her employment with Arrow, Teleflex’s predecessor, as a salesperson for the cardiac unit in August 2003. At some point, Arrow was acquired by Teleflex; the record is unclear as to exactly when this occurred, but it may have been sometime in late 2007. Petitioner testified that the product line has changed over the years, as there used to be artificial heart-related products, which were her “great loves” (R. Exh. 28 at 44), and why she started working there, but the company got rid of those programs. Under Teleflex, the main big-ticket piece of capital equipment sold by salespersons in the cardiac unit is the intra-aortic balloon pump. In addition, salespersons sell disposable products, such as catheters and cannulas used with the pump, in cardiac surgeries, and catheterization lab procedures. The organization and composition of the cardiac unit’s sales territories and the salespersons assigned to them were subject to change and did change throughout Petitioner’s time with Arrow and then Teleflex. Likewise, the organization and composition of sales divisions/regions and the managers assigned to be in charge of them were subject to change and did change throughout Petitioner’s employment. Sales divisions and sales territories within divisions were created, combined, split up, and reconfigured, and both salespersons and managers were added, eliminated, and reassigned. Petitioner attempted to recount the history of changes in sales territories that affected her during her years at Arrow and then Teleflex.1/ When Petitioner started in 2003, her sales territory was most of the state of Florida up to Tallahassee, and all of the cardiac unit’s sales representatives were under the supervision of a single manager. At some point, separate sales divisions were created, and a new manager was assigned to supervise Petitioner and others in her division. At another point, when a sales associate was let go, Petitioner’s sales territory was expanded to add the Florida panhandle and part of Alabama (to Mobile). At another point, separate sales territories were combined, and the sales associate who covered sales in Georgia and Alabama was let go. At the request of her new manager, Petitioner helped train a new sales associate to cover Georgia and Alabama. Petitioner was successful in sales for Arrow, and received several honors and awards for her achievements. At the end of her first year of employment in 2004, she was honored as “rookie of the year.” She received the chairman’s club award twice, in 2005 and 2007, for ranking in the top 10 percent of sales company-wide. Finally, she received the circle of excellence award in 2007, for having achieved her sales quota numbers three years in a row. Petitioner was promoted to executive sales representative, although she cannot remember exactly when that was. Her sales role was not changed, but she got a pay increase and some increased duties in the area of training new sales associates. When Teleflex acquired Arrow, the sales associate trained by Petitioner for the Georgia-Alabama sales territory was let go. Both Georgia and Alabama were added to Petitioner’s territory. From her home base in Florida (she lived in Spring Hill), she covered the three-state sales territory of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Another change affecting Petitioner occurred when the state of Georgia was reassigned to a salesman in North Carolina and Petitioner’s territory was reduced to Alabama and Florida. Later, that salesman was promoted to manager for the eastern division, and Georgia was added back to Petitioner’s sales territory. It is unknown when these changes occurred, but from that point until early 2014, Petitioner’s sales territory remained the three-state area of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Somewhere along the line, Petitioner experienced another changeover in management, with Christine Mazurk assuming the position of eastern regional manager. Ms. Mazurk supervised Petitioner from approximately 2010 to 2013. Petitioner was evaluated annually using a standardized format called the performance management process (PMP). The most heavily weighted area in the PMP is the annual formulation of business objectives and target goals, expressed in terms of sales revenue dollars by product line. In addition to business objectives, other categories evaluated include competencies and development. The objectives and target goals are established annually in the first quarter of the calendar year. The process begins with the employee who creates and submits the objectives and goals to his or her manager, who must accept them. At the end of the year, the employee performs a self-evaluation, rating each category as 1 (does not meet), 2 (partially meets), 3 (fully meets), or 4 (exceeds), while the manager similarly rates the employee in each category. The manager’s ratings are used to calculate an overall “final rating.” The final rating scale is as follows: between 1 and 1.4 means “does not meet”; between 1.5 and 2.4 means “partially meets”; between 2.5 and 3.4 means “fully meets”; and between 3.5 and 4 means “exceeds.” In 2011, Petitioner rated herself at 2 for business objectives, which she believed were partially met. She rated her overall performance at 3.0. In contrast, from her manager’s perspective, Petitioner did not meet her business (sales revenue) objectives, achieving only 73 percent of her revenue target for 2011. The manager gave Petitioner the lowest rating of 1 in business objectives, and an overall final rating of 2.4, partially meeting performance expectations. Petitioner added the comment in her PMP that the economy really hurt sales in 2011. Petitioner’s performance was worse in 2012, according to the PMP that she and her manager, Ms. Mazurk, completed. Once again, Petitioner’s self-evaluation was higher than her manager’s. Petitioner’s overall rating for herself was 2.9, but her manager’s overall rating and the final rating on her PMP was 2.0, a little lower than in the prior year in the range of only partially meeting her performance expectations. In this PMP, Petitioner offered the following comment: “Really feel the baseline numbers were off.” At some point in 2012, a business profile of Petitioner was prepared. Although the source of this profile was not entirely clear, Petitioner said that she thought it had been prepared by her manager (who, at the time, was Ms. Mazurk) in connection with a promotion that Petitioner was seeking. The profile reported that Petitioner had been employed at the company for nine years, and gave her sales performance in relation to her target goals for 2008 through 2011. The profile also identified Petitioner’s “developmental needs” in the following three areas: Communication skills (email and verbal with support team) Emotions run high Sales Training Petitioner did not receive the promotion, and continued as an executive sales representative in the sales territory of Florida, Alabama, and Georgia, under Ms. Mazurk’s management. In 2013, Petitioner’s PMP was not completed, apparently because Petitioner was out for two weeks with an injury, and then later in the year was out for two months for a surgical procedure and recovery. In the nine and one-half months that she worked (almost 80 percent of the year), she reportedly achieved sales revenues of 54 percent of her target revenue goal for that year. A reorganization at the end of 2013 resulted in a new manager for Petitioner, James Phillips. Mr. Phillips was the manager for the western North America sales region, but served temporarily as Petitioner’s manager, from January to May 2014, while the company was looking to bring in someone new to manage the eastern region. Mr. Phillips met with Petitioner in the beginning of 2014 to inform her of another realignment of sales territories, which would go into effect in March 2014. Insofar as the changes affected Petitioner, a new sales territory was being created, called the “south Florida” territory, and the company’s plan was to hire a new salesperson for the new territory. More accurately, the newly created sales territory covered more than just south Florida; it included all of the east coast from Jacksonville south, the west coast up to Tampa-Saint Petersburg, and part of central Florida, including Orlando. At the same time, the state of South Carolina would be added to Petitioner’s reconfigured sales territory. The impetus for creating the new south Florida territory was evidence showing that this highly populated market had been underpenetrated. In other words, Petitioner, who had been the area’s sole sales representative for more than 10 years, was not accomplishing the level of sales expected for this market. Accordingly, the business judgment was that splitting up the state and assigning the underpenetrated south Florida market to a new salesperson would promote increased market penetration by making that market the sole focus of the new salesperson.2/ Petitioner disagreed with splitting the state into two territories, but said that she could understand why the company wanted to create a new south Florida sales territory; as she stated, that market is very different from north Florida. However, solely from the perspective of the lost sales opportunities for herself, she voiced her disagreement with the line-drawing for the new territory. In a letter she sent to her new manager, as well as to three members of upper management, she requested that management reconsider how to split the territory within the state of Florida, and asked that she be allowed to retain the Orlando market. Petitioner’s letter also reported that she was “very excited” about the addition of South Carolina to her sales territory. Petitioner’s letter did not result in a reconsideration of the March 2014 territory realignment. Therefore, beginning in March 2014, Petitioner’s sales territory included the Florida west coast, central Florida north of Tampa/St. Petersburg from Ocala north to the state line, and the Florida panhandle, plus all of the states of Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. When the decision was made to create a new south Florida territory, a specific salesperson had not been identified for that new territory. Petitioner claims that she asked to be assigned to the new territory, but was refused. No evidence was presented to substantiate her claim; instead, the letter she wrote to her superiors about the realignment only asked that the territories be redrawn so that she could retain the Orlando market, while expressing her enthusiasm about acquiring the state of South Carolina. In May 2014, John Bowman was brought on board for the position of eastern regional manager, covering eastern United States and Canada. He was hired by the president of the company because the eastern region was underperforming. Mr. Bowman was charged with improving the business performance of the sales team so that sales would reach and sustain expected goals, which Mr. Bowman said is his forte. Mr. Bowman is very direct with the sales representatives under his charge. He is results-oriented and does not mince words when it comes to identifying deficient performance and making corrective “suggestions” that may sound more like demands. Thereafter, if he observes a continuation of the performance deficiency he has tried to correct, he is quick to point that out. That is his management style, and why he believes he has been effective in achieving results: “In sales you’re constantly measured by your results. You’re paid on your results. You’re measured on your results. You’re ranked on your results. I am as well and so is my president. And I make that very clear with sale individuals and always have.” (Tr. 138). As part of the management transition, Mr. Phillips provided Mr. Bowman with his assessment of Petitioner as a salesperson. Mr. Phillips had not served as Petitioner’s manager long enough to conduct a formal year-end PMP evaluation, and so the assessment was characterized as a “personal assessment” and was not placed in Petitioner’s personnel file.3/ While both positive and negative qualities were described in the assessment, there was more bad than good; however, Mr. Bowman set the assessment aside so that he could form his own opinions. He considered the points raised by Mr. Phillips as simply identifying some issues that he should look out for. Mr. Bowman was not based in the same city or even the same state as Petitioner. He did not meet with her until after he had been employed as her manager for just over one month. As Petitioner acknowledged, he had much ground to cover, as his region included all of North America east of the Mississippi from Florida up into Canada, and as she put it, “he tried to be fair with everyone.” (Tr. 100). Before Mr. Bowman ever met Petitioner, he fielded complaints from two different customers who called the Teleflex toll-free number to track down Petitioner’s manager. Both complaints were perceived by Mr. Bowman to be communication problems, i.e., the issues would not have arisen if Petitioner had communicated better with the customers. One of the customers complained to Mr. Bowman that Petitioner was “useless in giving us the information we needed.” (R. Exh. 10). Petitioner’s attempted explanation of the two incidents tended to lend credence to Mr. Bowman’s assessment and the customer’s comment. Ultimately, she sought to minimize their significance by characterizing them as only two isolated incidents during her long tenure. However, from Mr. Bowman’s perspective, these were two customer complaints that he had to field in his first month as Petitioner’s manager, unlike what he faced with any other sales representative there. When Mr. Bowman met with Petitioner on July 1, 2014, he talked with her generally about her background and abilities, which he complimented, and he addressed the concerns he had from the two customer complaints. He also identified two other areas where he thought her performance required improvement. In an email sent the following week, he summarized their discussion (including the compliments) and the three areas where he wanted to see her improve. These were: her interaction and communication with customers, evidenced by the two recent incidents requiring him to intercede; her communications with internal Teleflex personnel, where her failure to provide clear, complete, and precise information resulted in “elongated email strings” and confusion; and her too-frequent requests to him for low pricing approval. Petitioner was taken aback by these criticisms, which she took as demeaning and condescending, because she viewed herself as a proven performer who was highly respected. She did not react well to the email summary of these points, which she viewed as a paper trail intended to bring her down.4/ Nonetheless, Mr. Bowman’s points were shown to be valid, and, indeed, consistent with similar comments made by prior managers, including the manager who noted in Petitioner’s profile in 2012 that Petitioner needed to work on her verbal and e-mail communication skills. Mr. Bowman was clear in his meeting with Petitioner, in the e-mail summary of that meeting, in subsequent discussions, and in his testimony at hearing that he fully expected Petitioner to learn from his constructive criticisms and improve her performance. Moreover, he did not view her performance deficiencies as extreme enough to warrant formal action, such as placing her on a performance improvement plan. Instead, he quickly and consistently pointed out to Petitioner each time he saw a continuation of the behavior he had criticized, and he repeated the criticism while noting that he was repeating prior criticism, as was his way. Mr. Bowman testified credibly that he treated all of the sales representatives under his charge the same way, and was consistent in the way he communicated both positive capabilities and performance issues requiring improvement. Petitioner offered no evidence to prove that Mr. Bowman treated her any differently from the way he treated other sales representatives. One of Mr. Bowman’s first tasks as the new eastern region manager was to participate in interviews for a new salesperson to be assigned to the new south Florida territory. After interviews by Mr. Bowman, the president of the company, the director of finance, the director of marketing, and another manager, and after a third-party psychological exam, Eric Patton was hired in August 2014 as a sales representative for the new south Florida territory. At the time he was hired, he was approximately 34 years old. Although the territory changes went into effect in March 2014, Petitioner continued to cover sales in the new south Florida territory, for which she was compensated, until September 2014 when Mr. Patton assumed coverage of the territory. Petitioner was asked to provide Mr. Patton with information on her contacts in the new territory, and she did so. Petitioner also spent several hours with Mr. Patton at her home to demonstrate how she made her sales pitches, and she also gave him a script. Thereafter, she took a couple of day trips with him to introduce him to some customer contact persons in his new territory. These were meet-and-greet sessions only, not extended visits involving actual sales presentations. Petitioner’s view is that it was not fair that she lost the pipeline of sales opportunities in the south Florida territory to Mr. Patton. When it came to losing this, or any, sales territory, Petitioner complained that she was losing out on the “pipeline” of sales opportunities that she had cultivated but not yet closed. However, when Petitioner gained sales territory, she complained about the disadvantage of starting out from scratch in a new area. Neither viewpoint appears to comport with the reality that every time sales territories are changed, the new salesperson has some head start by virtue of the work of the predecessor salesperson. But there was no basis shown for Petitioner’s sense of “entitlement” to the benefits of a sales territory after the territory is assigned to someone else. That is particularly true here, where Petitioner did not refute the legitimate business purpose of an underpenetrated market that led to the territory reconfiguration. The company compensation system for sales representatives was based on revenue recognized from sales, not on unrealized “pipelines” for future business. Petitioner claimed that in one instance, she believes that Mr. Patton was treated more favorably than her while they were both working in sales in their respective territories. Petitioner and several other salespersons (both male and female) had closed some pump sales with contingency clauses written in the contracts whereby the customer would be allowed to return the pump and upgrade to a new model at no additional cost if a new model became available within 18 months after the sale. The company determined that under federal law, the revenue from those sales could not be recognized, but rather, had to be held in escrow until the contingency period had passed. Since sales commissions were paid on the basis of sales revenue recognized by the company, sales commissions were deferred as well. Mr. Bowman explained credibly that these deferred compensation sales had been allowed under a policy in place before he was employed, but that Petitioner’s deferred sale was the last of several allowed before the policy was discontinued. Petitioner testified that Mr. Patton told her that one year after her deferred compensation sale, he made a sale in which he was allowed to offer verbal, but not written, assurance that an upgrade to a new model would be allowed, and his commission was paid on the sale. However, Petitioner offered no non-hearsay evidence to substantiate her description of what she was told, and her description was refuted by Mr. Bowman’s credible testimony. In any event, Petitioner’s unsupported description did not establish two sales that would be considered the same so as to require the same treatment regarding payment of commissions. No finding can be made that Mr. Patton was treated more favorably than Petitioner in this regard, as claimed. Petitioner and Mr. Bowman completed Petitioner’s PMP evaluation for calendar year 2014. The evaluation was similar to those for Petitioner in 2011 and 2012. Petitioner rated her performance either the same or more favorably than her manager did, with the result that her overall final rating was 2.2, compared with her self-evaluation of 2.4. In mid-2015, the company lost a large contract with HPG, which is a large group purchasing organization (GPO)-- probably the largest in the country, according to Petitioner. Instead of contracting again with Teleflex, HPG entered into a sole source contract with Teleflex’s competitor. As Petitioner acknowledged, the recent advent of GPOs had dramatically changed the sales business, because the GPOs control access to potential purchasers. Purchasers using the GPOs are no longer free game for salespersons to explore new sales opportunities. For Teleflex, this meant that as of mid-2015, its salespersons could not solicit new sales from potential purchasers using HPG, because HPG would direct those purchasers to Teleflex’s competitor pursuant to the new sole source contract. As Petitioner acknowledged, the loss of the HPG contract was a substantial loss for Respondent, with the significant impact coming in the loss of growth opportunity to develop new business. In June 2015, the president of the company raised the possibility of a reorganization to consolidate the north Florida and south Florida territories, in light of the loss of the HPG contract. Mr. Bowman began discussions with senior management about possible changes to the sales territories. In late September 2015, Mr. Bowman provided senior management with a Power Point presentation that set forth a proposed reorganization of the southeast. His proposal was to reconfigure the two existing territories, to create a single Florida territory and a separate “Tidewater” territory covering Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. As he proposed the reorganization, the two sales representatives--Petitioner and Eric Patton--would cover the two reorganized territories. Meanwhile, Mr. Bowman continued to critique Petitioner’s performance in some fairly strident emails and conversations. In an incident on September 30, 2015, Petitioner submitted a quote request for a new pump for one Baycare hospital, while another Baycare hospital was also considering a new pump. According to Petitioner, the issue was not the price to quote for the new pumps, as she stated that the price had been set and was “already on a contract.” (R. Exh. 28 at 154). Instead, Petitioner said that the issue was whether the hospitals would get a credit for the cost of unusual repairs being made to their existing pumps. In contrast, according to Mr. Bowman, the company had already agreed that the repair costs would be applied to the purchase price, but the issue was what price should be quoted for the new pump, which he said had not been set by any contract. Mr. Bowman found the price requested by Petitioner to be too low, and instead of approving her price request, he sent her an email at 5:35 p.m. on September 30, 2015, questioning her price approval request, while noting the same price would have to be given to both Baycare hospitals. He ended the email as follows: “Call me tomorrow to discuss.” (R. Exh. 14 at 1). Instead of acknowledging Mr. Bowman’s email and waiting to talk to him first, Petitioner sent an email to the customer, with a copy to Mr. Bowman, the next morning. The email apologized for “not getting you the outright purchase quote yesterday,” explaining that the delay was because “[t]he outright quote required management approval[.]” (R. Exh. 14 at 2). After reading his copy of the email, Mr. Bowman called Petitioner and reacted harshly, telling Petitioner that she threw him under the bus by sending the email to the customer without discussing it with him first, and that she had committed a fire- able offense. While harsh, Mr. Bowman’s reaction was not off- base. Petitioner’s email tends to undermine her testimony that the issue was not the purchase price which she claimed was fixed by contract. And while Petitioner testified that she tried to call Mr. Bowman that afternoon or evening before she sent the email the next morning, Petitioner did not mention the email from Mr. Bowman. Surely, when waiting to hear from her manager, she would have read his incoming email before sending the email to the customer. Petitioner failed to explain why she did not follow her manager’s instruction to discuss the matter with him.5/ Following their telephone conversation, Petitioner called the human resources department and spoke with the manager, Jennifer Robichaud, to complain about Mr. Bowman. The essence of her complaint was that at 60 years old and close to retirement, she felt that Mr. Bowman was gunning for her and trying to push her out.6/ She complained about the March 2014 territory realignment, which she though was unfair because a large part of her territory was given to the new sales representative, “a young guy.” She told Ms. Robichaud that she has always been a top performer, and although she recently had not been closing sales on pumps, that was because she was starting from scratch in a new territory. She said that until Mr. Bowman came on board, she never had any issues with her past managers. Although she acknowledged that she and Mr. Bowman have very different styles, she felt that Mr. Bowman did not accept her for who she is. Ms. Robichaud assured Petitioner she would investigate. They spoke on a Thursday; Ms. Robichaud was able to discuss the matter with Mr. Bowman the following Tuesday, October 6, 2015. She relayed Petitioner’s complaints that she felt that Mr. Bowman was trying to push her out, and her feeling that it was unfair to give her pipeline to Mr. Patton. Mr. Bowman denied that he was trying to push Petitioner out of the company, and said, instead, he wants her to succeed. With regard to her perception about pipeline fairness, Mr. Bowman responded that all sales representatives are expected to have a pipeline of business opportunities, but that it is closing the business that matters. In the days thereafter, he sent Ms. Robichaud information pertinent to the investigation, including email communications with Petitioner, the assessment from Petitioner’s prior manager, and information about the customer complaints. Ms. Robichaud also investigated Petitioner’s annual PMP ratings and her performance through September 2015. She also sought and later received the data supporting the decision to realign the Florida territory in 2014. As before, Mr. Bowman continued his practice of addressing Petitioner’s performance on issues that had previously surfaced, which he had previously addressed with Petitioner. Thus, on October 9, 2015, Mr. Bowman criticized Petitioner for her email communications with customer service in which she asked for free replacements of medical supplies to be sent to her home for a customer, without giving sufficient information. The response from the customer service representative stated he was “a bit confused” by the request, and asked for more information: “Donna, your input is appreciated here.” The representative had to ask questions to get the information necessary to handle the request appropriately, such as whether the supplies were being provided for free to respond to a complaint. Mr. Bowman’s criticism was that Petitioner’s email request to customer service was “an example of a lack of professionalism and clarity in your communications. I have addressed this issue with you multiple times over the past year and unfortunately, you have not demonstrated improvement.” (R. Exh. 15). On Monday, October 12, 2015, Petitioner forwarded Mr. Bowman’s email criticism to Ms. Robichaud and asked her to call. They spoke Tuesday morning. Ms. Robichaud told Petitioner that she had been looking into Petitioner’s concerns and had spoken with Mr. Bowman. Ms. Robichaud told Petitioner that Mr. Bowman was not trying to push Petitioner out of the company, but was looking for performance results, and Ms. Robichaud did not find any reason to believe Petitioner was being treated unfairly. Ms. Robichaud said that Petitioner and Mr. Bowman needed to talk, because in Ms. Robichaud’s opinion, the problem appeared to be a clash of styles, which is not uncommon with a change in managers, and that they needed to learn to adapt. Ms. Robichaud talked to Mr. Bowman afterwards. She encouraged him to reach out to Petitioner, hear her concerns, and try to understand her perspective. She reminded him that he has acknowledged that he is very direct, and “perhaps a few small changes in how he communicates with her can have a positive impact.” (R. Exh. 18 at 2). Mr. Bowman contacted Petitioner, and they agreed to meet in person. The meeting took place on October 16, 2015, in Tampa. Before the meeting, Petitioner requested a copy of her personnel file from Ms. Robichaud. Petitioner testified that at the meeting, Mr. Bowman was very civil and respectful to her. He said that he thrives on diversity and enjoys the challenge of working with different kinds of people. He assured her that any decisions that are made are always going to be about performance. Petitioner reacted curiously to this: she testified that she realized that nothing was going to change, while admitting that Mr. Bowman was acting completely differently than he had before. Petitioner said that he was “extremely scripted,” and probably had been coached on what to say by the human resources manager. Yet she also complained, inconsistently, that the human resources department did nothing to help her or to facilitate a meeting with Mr. Bowman. According to Mr. Bowman, Petitioner said that she did not think she would be able to meet the objectives set for her. According to Petitioner, she said that he should just stop (being civil to her), that she knew what he was doing, and knew that he wanted her to go away. Regardless of which lead-in is accurate, Petitioner went on to offer that she would resign her employment at the end of the year if the company paid her the deferred commissions, and her salary and benefits for six months. Mr. Bowman was genuinely surprised by Petitioner’s offer. Shortly after Mr. Bowman’s meeting with Petitioner, Mr. Bowman was informed by his superiors that his proposal to retain but reconfigure two sales territories with two sales representatives in the southeast had been reviewed, but was rejected because it would not be a viable solution to address the loss of the HPG contract. Instead, the decision was made to consolidate the southeastern states--Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina--into a single sales territory, covered by one salesperson. Mr. Bowman was told to extract metrics for the time period that Petitioner and Mr. Patton were both working sales in their respective territories, including their recognized sales revenues compared to their quotas, pump sales, and 2014 PMP rating. He was also told to add non-metric qualitative considerations regarding any business practice and customer interaction issues. Mr. Bowman pulled the data, and on October 23, 2015, he provided his superiors with his performance comparison of Mr. Patton and Petitioner. For the period of September through December 2014, Mr. Patton’s first quarter with the company, the quantitative metrics were mixed. Mr. Patton’s overall PMP performance rating of 2.7 was better, falling within the “fully meets expectations” range, whereas Petitioner’s overall rating of 2.2 only partially met her performance expectations. Mr. Patton sold one balloon pump during his first few months with the company. Petitioner was credited with zero sales of balloon pumps during this time, although she noted that she had at least one deferred sale that was not counted during this time. Petitioner achieved 104 percent of her overall sales quota from September to December 2014, although the revenue recognized was from disposables and not pump sales. Mr. Patton achieved 73 percent of his sales quota in his first few months with the company, but that included recognized revenue from a pump sale. For the first three quarters of 2015 (Mr. Bowman was able to extract data through the end of September 2015), the quantitative metrics were decidedly in Mr. Patton’s favor. During this period, Petitioner had zero pump sales, while Mr. Patton had seven pump sales, and Petitioner achieved 83 percent of her sales quota through sales of disposables, whereas Mr. Patton achieved 112 percent of his sales quota, largely from pump sales. On the qualitative considerations, Mr. Bowman summarized the issues he had been addressing with Petitioner in an attempt to bring about improvements, including communication issues with customers and internal personnel, as well as his concerns about her frequent requests for low pricing approval. He also noted a recent situation where Petitioner lost a pump sale to a hospital in Alabama. When he had asked Petitioner why she thought she did not get the sale, she explained to Mr. Bowman that the chief of perfusion “may have felt I was too aggressive,” that Petitioner “felt there was tension between he and I,” and “obviously something happened here.” (R. Exh. 22, last page). Petitioner acknowledged in her deposition that what Mr. Bowman said was true, but that the tension was due to extenuating circumstances. In contrast, for Mr. Patton, Mr. Bowman reported no issues of concern in just over one year of managing him. As Mr. Bowman testified at hearing, Mr. Patton was an excellent sales representative and Mr. Bowman found no performance deficiency issues to address with him. Petitioner offered no evidence to the contrary, stating that she had no knowledge of Mr. Patton’s performance or the quality of his salesmanship. Based on the performance comparison, Mr. Bowman recommended that Mr. Patton should be retained as the salesperson to cover the consolidated southeastern sales territory. Mr. Bowman’s recommendation was reasonable. Mr. Bowman’s recommendation was accepted and the decision made by senior management was to retain Mr. Patton as the salesperson for the consolidated sales territory and to terminate Petitioner’s employment due to elimination of her sales position. Petitioner presented no evidence to refute the reasonableness of Respondent’s business judgment to consolidate sales territories and reduce one sales position after the loss of the HPG contract. Instead, Petitioner only pointed to the suspicious timing of the decision in relation to her complaint to the human resources department about Mr. Bowman.7/ Petitioner does not contend that anyone other than Mr. Bowman himself discriminated against her or retaliated against her. The evidence does not support Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Bowman discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age or her sex, nor does the evidence support Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Bowman retaliated against Petitioner because she complained about him to the human resources department. Instead, the evidence established that when Respondent’s diminished business growth prospects caused it to make the reasonable business decision to reduce its sales positions in the southeast states, Petitioner lost out in a fair comparison on the merits of her performance compared to the other salesperson’s performance. Petitioner’s flagging job performance evident from 2011 forward, while not bad enough to warrant immediate action to terminate her, was not good enough to withstand comparative assessment with Mr. Patton. Petitioner’s view that the choice to retain Mr. Patton must have been a pretext for discrimination or retaliation is in keeping with Petitioner’s inflated view of her own performance. At the same time, Petitioner’s view is also an unfair discredit to Mr. Patton, when the unrebutted evidence was that he was an excellent sales representative. Petitioner admitted that she knows nothing about the quality of his sales work or the quantitative achievements he garnered in just over one year with the company. Although findings on the subject of damages are unnecessary in light of the above findings, even if Respondent had been found guilty of unlawful employment practices, the undersigned would have to find that Petitioner failed to prove her actual economic damages that would have been caused by those employment practices. Petitioner did not present proof of her earnings, and offered only limited evidence of her attempts to mitigate damages with other income and efforts to look for a comparable job. Indeed, in Petitioner’s PRO, this shortcoming appears to be admitted because Petitioner requested an opportunity to submit support for damages. Petitioner’s opportunity to present evidence to support her case was at the final hearing before the evidentiary record closed. There was no request for a bifurcated hearing to address liability, followed by a separate evidentiary hearing on damages if needed. Thus, Petitioner had her opportunity, and failed to prove damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief by Petitioner, Donna Earley, against Respondent, Teleflex, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2017.
