The Issue Did Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, commit an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 35-year-old Black male. Prior to December 1986, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in an OPS position in "Central Files". His work performance in Central Files was both superior and exemplary, and he was offered a State Career Service position as a Senior Clerk within Respondent's "Complaint Section". Upon accepting the Career Service position, Petitioner entered into a mandatory six months' probationary period. In the Senior Clerk position, Petitioner's primary duties were to answer the phone a specific 4-hour daily shift; to assist or act as backup for phone answering during Senior Clerk Terri Jones' (Black female) 4-hour daily phone shift; to prepare and distribute Class II complaint cases to Respondent's "Legal Section"; and to distribute mail and other materials as assigned by his immediate supervisor, Louise Bull (white female). On January 5, 1987, Petitioner took 4 hours unauthorized leave without pay for which he received a written reprimand on January 6, 1987. He had previously been orally reprimanded for the same practice. It was established by competent substantial evidence that Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Louise Bull, had had a number of absences without leave, some of which occurred before Petitioner's termination and some of which occurred after his termination, and that she also received at least one written reprimand for these absences. For some of her absences, Ms. Bull was required to reimburse money to the State, however it was not clear whether the reimbursement was because she was absent when she falsely claimed to be present or was standard reimbursement procedure when the leave actually taken is not covered by accrued leave time. Either way, Ms. Bull was not in a probationary status at any material time and, clearly, as Petitioner's supervisor, hers was not a substantially similar position to that of Petitioner. Petitioner and Cindy Dexter testified that many permanent employees in addition to Ms. Bull were playing fast and loose with tardiness and absenteeism, but their evidence is very indefinite and the race and gender of the employees accused was not established. Ms. Dexter's testimony was vague and not credible on this point. Their testimony on this subject was not confirmed by other credible witnesses nor was it ever established that any of the permanent employees accused by Petitioner held positions substantially similar to his. From almost the beginning of his probationary period, Petitioner had difficulty adjusting to his new position. He evidenced difficulty accepting supervision from Ms. Bull. This disrupted standard office practice. Over the probationary term, Ms. Bull orally counselled Petitioner approximately seven times concerning his lack of acceptance of her supervision as well as excessive tardiness and excessive personal phone usage. Diane Orcutt, the regular Complaint Office Supervisor and Ms. Bull's superior, described Petitioner as avoiding Louise Bull and coming directly to her about problems he perceived in the office operation. Petitioner and Terri Jones, his female job counterpart who is also Black, had an early but undefined job- related dispute, after which he sent her flowers to "make-up". On one occasion, after a loud and disruptive argument arose between Petitioner and Ms. Bull in the general office area, Evelyn McNeely, who was acting supervisor to them both during Ms. Orcutt's vacation, required Ms. Bull to prepare a memorandum clarifying Petitioner's job duties because, in Ms. McNeely's view, the Petitioner did not seem to understand his duties. This was done on June 17, 1987. This memorandum, headed "Performance Evaluation" from Ms. Bull to Petitioner also warned Petitioner that Ms. Bull would recommend extension of his probationary period because he was falling short on acceptable performance in several areas. Louise Bull prepared, delivered, and discussed with Petitioner her performance evaluation, indicating, based upon her personal observations, his failure to satisfactorily perform in the following areas: repeatedly tardy over the last several weeks; failure to properly handle routine telephone duties; failure to comply with their section's procedures for routing of case files; and continued failure to accept supervision under their section's chain of command. Ms. Bull admitted that she suffered emotional problems while Petitioner worked for her and apparently thereafter. She had crying jags and consulted a psychologist. She also received a prescription from some source for the tranquilizer valium. Ms. Bull denied that she and the psychologist ever identified a reason for her emotional state. Melinda Wagoner testified that Ms. Bull related to her that her emotional problems stemmed from living in a Black neighborhood and fighting with Black children when she was a child. The foregoing hearsay is admissible as an admission of a party (DPR) through its supervising agent (Louise Bull), but even if fully credible, this evidence would be insufficient to establish a nexus between Bull's behavior and the reason for Petitioner's eventual termination, in light of the record as a whole. Terri Jones, the permanent employee most substantially similar to Petitioner, was also a Senior Clerk. She is also Black. Her job duties were identical to those of Petitioner, except that they had primary responsibility for phone calls during different parts of each day. Ms. Jones had no supervisory problems of her own with Louise Bull. Ms. Jones asserted that Petitioner had excellent telephone manners but confirmed that Petitioner's regularity in answering the phone either on his shift or as her backup was often insufficient. The Complaint Section's phone was often placed on "hold" with no one waiting on the other end. Although anyone in the office could place a call on "hold" and any caller could hang up before an employee returned to the phone, the inference from all witnesses' testimony as a whole was that this "hold" procedure was being done excessively by Petitioner. Diane Orcutt, regular Complaint Office Supervisor, reviewed Petitioner's phone logs prior to evaluating him at the six months' point. The representative phone logs of the two substantially similar employees, Petitioner and Terri Jones, show that Petitioner logged only 34 calls in the same period that Ms. Jones logged 359. This vast discrepancy can be interpreted in a number of ways: either Petitioner was not answering the phone as directed, or he was not logging all calls as directed, or he was not maintaining the logs as directed. By any interpretation of this empirical data, Petitioner was not fulfilling a prime requirement of his job. At the time of his six months' evaluation, on June 22, 1987, Diane Orcutt made a joint decision with Louise Bull to extend Petitioner's six months probationary period by four months. Ms. Orcutt did this for a number of reasons: his early absences without leave, oral complaints from lower echelon employees that Petitioner would frequently neglect his telephone duties in one way or another, and the disruptive nature of his failure to accept Ms. Bull's supervision. In requiring the additional probation, Ms. Orcutt gave greater weight to the administrative/managerial friction and less weight to Petitioner's reprimanded early absences; however, with regard to the complaints of other employees, she testified that she felt sure Petitioner could do the work because of his past excellent performance on OPS and because of her personal observation but that he needed more time to actually do the job instead of engaging in uncooperative disputes with Ms. Bull. Additionally, Ms. Orcutt was giving Petitioner the benefit of any doubt by taking additional time to sort out whether the disruption problem arose from Ms. Bull or from Petitioner, because at that point, Ms. Bull had no problems supervising other Black or white employees; no oral complaints had been made by other employees against Ms. Bull; and oral complaints against Petitioner confirming Ms. Bull's unrecorded observations of Petitioner had been received personally by Ms. Orcutt. When presented with Orcutt's Mid-Cycle Appraisal and the 4 months' additional probation plan on June 22, 1987, Petitioner was hostile, refused to sign the appraisal, and another disruptive scene arose among Petitioner, Ms. Bull and Ms. Orcutt. Petitioner spent all of the workday of June 23, 1987 in "Personnel" complaining that his evaluation and the 4 months' additional probation was unjust. On two of the remaining successive days of that work week, Petitioner accomplished some work. On one of the remaining successive days in that week, he took his "Personal Leave Day". A weekend intervened, and on Monday, June 28, 1987, Diane Orcutt reassessed the situation, determined that Petitioner was not intending to cooperate, and terminated him, as had always been her option during his probationary period.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Human Relations Commission dismissing the complaint and petition for relief filed by Robert Baucham. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0712 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact None filed Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent's proposals have been accepted in substance and modified to conform to the record. Where they have not been accepted, they are rejected as misleading as stated or not supported by the record as stated. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Baucham Hearings 1021 Idlewild Drive, P-161 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. Harper Field Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Norma J. Nolan, was discriminated against by Respondent, K.D.P., Inc. d/b/a Western Sizzlin Steak House, in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, on the basis of handicap, constituting an unlawful employment practice. Whether Petitioner has established a basis for, or entitlement to, an award of damages if, in fact, the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: K. D. P., Inc., operated a restaurant known as Western Sizzlin Steak House in Bradenton, Florida, which business was established prior to the alleged incident of July 1990. This business has continued in operation to the current time under the same management and with many of the same employees, although the restaurant has subsequently become known as Cattle Company Cafe. The Respondent, K. D. P., Inc., d/b/a Western Sizzlin Steak House, now known as Cattle Company Cafe (KDP), owned by Jack Parrish, has been managed by Kevin Wreford for approximately twelve years. Parrish relies on Wreford for the day-to-day operation of the business, hiring and firing decisions, and supervisory responsibility. The Petitioner was employed from December 1989 through February 1990 by Upjohn Health Care on a part-time basis as a respite worker. While she was physically able to do that job, Petitioner chose to leave that employment as it had little work available for her with that agency and Petitioner wished to work at a location closer to her home. Petitioner applied for employment with KDP by way of written application on August 2, 1990. Petitioner's employment application did not indicate any physical handicap, disability or limitation. Wreford interviewed Petitioner for the position of part-time cashier in early 1991. During the interview, Wreford discussed with the Petitioner the duties of the position for which she had applied. Those duties included taking payment from customers at the cashier's stand, overseeing the salad and sundae bar, checking the women's restroom, cleaning glass in the area of cashier's stand and watching for walkouts (walkouts being customers who walk out without paying for their meals). Petitioner advised Wreford that she was capable of performing these duties but was concerned about her lack of experience in working with cash and making change. Wreford hired Petitioner as a temporary, part-time cashier, and Petitioner began work in that capacity for Respondent on February 3, 1991. Petitioner continued in the employment of the Respondent in the capacity of part-time cashier through July 17, 1991. At the time Petitioner was hired by Respondent on February 3, 1991 there was a large wooden bar stool located behind the counter where the cashier took payments for meals. All cashiers working for the Respondent, including Petitioner, were allowed to sit on this stool at times when they were not waiting on customers (cashiers were required to stand while waiting on customers) or performing other assigned duties as set out in Finding of Fact 6. Sometime around July 1, 1991, Wreford discussed with the cashiers, including Petitioner, his concerns about the cashiers not performing their other assigned duties when they were not waiting on customers. Performing other assigned duties required the cashiers to be away from the cashier's area. At this time, Petitioner made Wreford aware of her knee problem and advised him that she may have difficulty standing for long periods of time. There had been no mention of this problem previously nor had Petitioner experienced any problem with her knee previously. Likewise, Petitioner did not experience any problems with her knee in carrying out her assigned duties during the next two weeks. In fact, both Wreford and Parrish were pleased with Petitioner's performance during this period. On or about July 12, 1991, Parrish's wife who had become involved in the management of the restaurant advised Parrish that the stool needed to be removed from the cashier area because: (a) the stool was showing its wear and tear and was aesthetically unpleasing; (b) the stool was taking up too much room resulting in the cashiers not being able to perform their duties properly, particularly looking for walkouts and; (c) to prevent a certain cashier (not Petitioner) from abusing the privilege of the stool by sitting on the stool for extended periods of time and not performing her other assigned duties. On or about July 12, 1991, Parrish removed the stool from the caahier's area and placed it in his office where it remains today because the stool has a sentimental value in that Parrish used the stool in his first restaurant. On or about July 13, 1991, when Petitioner arrived for work and noticed the stool had been removed she met with Parrish and Wreford and advised them that she could not work without the stool because of her knee. Parrish and Wreford offered to accommodate her problem by allowing Petitioner to sit at a table adjacent to the cashier area when she was not waiting on customers or performing her other assigned duties. Petitioner advised Parrish and Wreford that she could not work under those conditions but that she would stay on until a replacement was found. Parrish and Wreford accepted Petitioner's resignation but encouraged Petitioner to continue her employment until she could determine if the accommodation would be satisfactory. Petitioner continued to work for Respondent until July 17, 1991, and was able to function without any problems with her knee under the accommodations provided by Respondent. However, after Petitioner resigned she never asked to be reinstated even though she was able to function under the accommodations provided by Respondent. Although Petitioner alleged that she had a physical disability/handicap because of problems she had related to an alleged right knee replacement done some years earlier, there was no medical evidence or other documentation establishing any physical handicap or restrictions/limitations in her ability to work. There were other cashiers employed by Respondent who had conditions similar to Petitioner's conditions who were able to function with the same accommodation offered Petitioner. One of those was the person hired by Respondent to take Petitioner's position. Petitioner collected unemployment compensation after leaving Respondent's employment, as well as other forms of assistance, such as food stamps and housing assistance. Additionally, after leaving Respondent's employment Petitioner developed "female problems" and is not seeking employment even though she attended computer school. There was no evidence as to the amount of damages suffered by Petitioner. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of a handicap by Respondent or that any unlawful employment practice occurred. There is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons for the action taken by Respondent in removing the stool and providing other accommodations for the cashiers, including Petitioner. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that the Respondent's articulated reasons for its action were pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Norma J. Nolan, was not discharged due to her handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3903 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 13 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial or a restatement of testimony rather than presented as a finding of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 32 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial or a restatement of testimony rather than presented as a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Norma J. Nolan, Pro Se 1109 Harvard Avenue Bradenton, Florida 34207 Donna L. Derfoot, Esquire Post Office Box 3979 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahasse, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Miami-Dade County (County), discriminated on the basis of age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), when it did not hire Petitioner, Omar Garcia, Jr.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 54-year-old male who submitted over 300 job applications to the County from May 2018 to August 2019. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. It has approximately 25,000 full time employees and 3,000 part time employees. The County is an "employer" as defined by section 760.02(7). Between January 2018 and the date of the hearing, the County received over 820,000 applications for employment vacancies. Less than one percent of these applications resulted in an applicant being hired by the County. In other words, over 99 percent of the applications submitted to the County were rejected. Although Petitioner's resume and employment applications were not entered in evidence, Petitioner testified he holds a business administration degree from California State Polytechnic University Pomona. He also had 27 years of experience as a federal law enforcement officer, including with the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Petitioner resigned from DHS in lieu of termination after he was arrested on a domestic violence charge. That charge was eventually nolle prossed. He did not reveal to the County that he had resigned in lieu of termination from the DHS position, or that he had been arrested or charged with domestic violence. Again, because the applications were not in evidence it is unclear if Petitioner was required to disclose this information. Prior to resigning from DHS, Petitioner began applying for positions with the County in May 2018. Petitioner was not discerning in selecting the positions for which he applied. He submitted applications for a wide assortment of occupations including administrative, clerical, financial, law enforcement, and human resource positions. The specific positions included, but were not limited to, the following: Account Clerk, Administrative Secretary, Airport Operations Specialist, Aviation Property Manager, Bus Stock Clerk, Contracts Officer, Corrections Officer, Finance Collection Specialist, Fleet Management Specialist, Library Assistant, Fire Investigator, Paralegal, Real Estate Advisor, Risk Management Representative, Tax Records Specialist, Storekeeper, Victim Specialist, and Water and Sewer Compliance Specialist. Submitting an application is the initial step in the County's hiring process. Once the application is received, it is screened by a computer software system to determine whether the applicant meets the minimum eligibility requirements of the position. The County's Human Resources department forwards those applications deemed "eligible" to the County department hiring for the position. The hiring department then reviews the applications sent by Human Resources to determine if the applicant is "Qualified." To be "Qualified," an applicant must meet the minimum eligibility requirements, and then specific qualifying criteria imposed by the hiring department. For example, for a secretarial position the County may receive 500 eligible applications for one position, but cannot interview all 500 applicants. To whittle down the applicants, the hiring department may have additional requirements such as a certain number of years of secretarial experience, or experience in specific professional areas. The hiring department interviews those applicants with the best qualifications and/or most relevant experience. The unrebutted evidence established that an interview is required prior to selection for a position. Failure to attend an interview would ruin the applicant's chances to be hired. Out of the approximately 300 applications Petitioner submitted for various positions, he met the minimum eligibility requirements for 96.3 Out of the 96 applications forwarded by Human Resources, Petitioner was deemed by the hiring departments to be "Qualified" for 60 positions, and deemed "Not Qualified" for 36 positions. Of the 60 for which he was deemed "Qualified," he was offered interviews for two positions in law enforcement. Of the two interviews he was offered, he only attended one.4 There was no evidence that anyone in the County's hiring process knew Petitioner's age. The County established that it does not ask for applicants to reveal their age on the County job application, nor is the age or date of birth transmitted to the hiring department. There was also no evidence of the ages of the selected applicants who filled the specific positions for which Petitioner applied.5
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Omar Garcia's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Marlon D. Moffett, Esquire Miami-Dade County 27th Floor, Suite 2810 111 Northwest 1st Street Miami, Florida 33128 (eServed) Omar Garcia 4670 Salamander Street Saint Cloud, Florida 34772 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race, and if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation with its principal business location in Ormond Beach, Florida. Respondent operates a restaurant in Daytona Beach, Florida, known as IHOP 35. At all times material here, IHOP 35 had a racially-diverse workforce. Scott Studner is Respondent's President. Mr. Studner has direct supervisory authority over Respondent's management employees and ultimate supervisory authority over the non- management employees at IHOP 35. Mr. Studner is responsible for making all decisions relating to promotions and terminations of employees. Petitioner is a single African-American male with a minor son. Respondent hired him as a line cook in January 2007. At that time, Petitioner did not have any management experience. Petitioner worked as a cook on the day shift for approximately 15 months before Respondent terminated his employment. Petitioner began working 40-hour weeks for $9.00 per hour. He received at least five raises over a 12-month period, increasing his hourly wage to $10.00. Petitioner and all of the staff had to work some overtime during busy periods like "Race Week." Shortly after Petitioner began working, Mr. Studner asked Petitioner if he had any interest in a future management position. Mr. Studner routinely asks this question of all newly hired cooks. Mr. Studner told Petitioner about Chester Taylor, an African-American male, who began working for Mr. Studner as a dish washer and now owns and operates two IHOP restaurants of his own. Mr. Studner never made any representation or promise regarding Petitioner's potential advancement into a management position at IHOP 35. Shortly after he was hired, Petitioner began to demonstrate poor performance traits. He frequently arrived late to work. Occasionally Petitioner called to say that he could not work due to personal reasons. While working for Respondent, Petitioner reported several specific instances of racial hostility in the workplace to the general manager, Kathy, who tried to correct each problem as it arose. On one occasion, Petitioner discussed one incident with Mr. Studner, months after it occurred. In February 2007, Petitioner reported to Kathy that a white server named Sharon Blyler had made an inappropriate comment. Specifically, Petitioner accused Ms. Blyler of stating that she would get her orders out faster if she was black like a server named Angela. Kathy wrote Ms. Blyler up on a disciplinary form, advising her that comments about someone's race or color would not be tolerated. Mr. Studner was never informed about this incident. In April 2007, a white co-worker named Kevin called Petitioner a "monkey" several times. The name calling initially arose as a result of someone in the kitchen requesting a "monkey dish," which is a term commonly used in restaurants to describe a small round bowl for side items such as fruit. Petitioner reported Kevin's inappropriate comments to Kathy, who wrote Kevin up on a disciplinary form and suspended him for a week. Apparently, Kevin continued to work in one of Mr. Studner's restaurants but did not return to work at IHOP 35. Three or four months after Kevin was suspended, Mr. Studner asked Petitioner if Kevin could return to work at IHOP 35. When Petitioner objected, Mr. Studner said he would put Kevin on the night shift. During the conversation, Mr. Studner told Petitioner that he should have punched Kevin in the face for calling him a monkey. In the summer of 2007, there was an ordering mix-up involving a Caucasian server named Tiffany. When Tiffany became upset, Petitioner told her to calm down. Tiffany then called Petitioner a "fucking nigger." Kathy immediately had a talk with Tiffany, who then quit her job. Mr. Studner was never informed that Tiffany used a racial slur in reference to Petitioner. In August 2007, Petitioner received a formal verbal warning that was memorialized on a disciplinary form. The warning related to Petitioner's tardiness for work and for not maintaining his work area. When Kathy left her job as general manager of IHOP 35 in October 2007, there was no one person in charge of the kitchen. Petitioner and the other cooks continued to do their previously assigned jobs. On one occasion, Petitioner and another African- American male cook got into an argument. Someone at the restaurant called the police to intervene. Petitioner denies that he picked up a knife during the confrontation. At some point, Mr. Studner began working in the kitchen with Petitioner. Mr. Studner worked there for approximately five straight weeks. While Mr. Studner was working in the kitchen, he never saw any signs of racial hostility. However, Mr. Studner was aware that Petitioner could not get along with the rest of the staff. Mr. Studner realized that the staff resented Petitioner's habit of talking on his cell phone and leaving the line to take breaks during peak times. Respondent had an established and disseminated work policy that employees are not allowed to take or make cell phone or other telephone calls during work hours except in emergencies. Compliance with the policy is necessary because telephone calls to or from employees during paid working time disrupt the kitchen operation. Petitioner does not dispute that he made and received frequent calls on company time for personal reasons. Sometimes Mr. Studner would enter the restaurant and see Petitioner talking on the phone. Mr. Studner would reprimand Petitioner, reminding him that phone calls on company time were restricted to emergency calls only. Mr. Studner had video surveillance of the kitchen at IHOP 35 in his corporate office in Ormond Beach, Florida. Mr. Studner and his bookkeeper, Steven Skipper, observed Petitioner talking on his cell phone when Mr. Studner was not in the restaurant. Eventually, Mr. Studner decided to transfer Petitioner to another one of his restaurants to alleviate the tension caused by Petitioner at IHOP 35. After one day at the other restaurant, Mr. Studner reassigned Petitioner to IHOP 35 because he realized that Petitioner was unable to get along with the staff at the new location. Respondent never gave Petitioner any managerial responsibilities. Petitioner did not approach Mr. Studner or otherwise apply for the position of Kitchen Manager or any position other than cook. Respondent never denied Petitioner a promotion. In December or January 2007, Respondent hired Larry Delucia as the Kitchen Manger at IHOP 35. Mr. Delucia had not previously worked with Respondent, but he had extensive management experience at three different restaurants. When Mr. Delucia began working at IHOP 35, Petitioner and the other cooks were asked to help familiarize him with the menu and the set-up of the kitchen and coolers. They were not asked to train Mr. Delucia, whose job included scheduling and working on the computer, as well as supervising the kitchen. In February 2008, Petitioner told a white busboy named John to bring him some plates. John then told Petitioner that he was not John's boss and called Petitioner a "fucking nigger." The front-end manager, Pam Maxwell, immediately suspended John for a week but allowed him to return to work after two days. Mr. Studner was not aware of the incident involving John. Petitioner then asked Mr. Delucia and Ms. Maxwell for the telephone number of Bob Burns, the district manager for the International House of Pancakes, Inc. Mr. Studner was not aware of Petitioner's request for Mr. Burns' telephone number. Days later, Mr. Studner instructed Mr. Delucia to terminate Petitioner's employment. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Studner decided to terminate Petitioner solely because of his continued cell phone usage on company time as observed in person and on surveillance tapes. At first, Petitioner did not realize he had been permanently terminated. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he tried to return to work by talking to Mr. Delucia, who told him to call Mr. Studner. Mr. Studner did not return Petitioner's calls. For years, Mr. Studner has employed African-Americans to work as servers, cooks, hostesses, kitchen managers, front- end managers, and general managers. Mr. Studner owns five other restaurants, including two other IHOPs. Over the last two years, Mr. Studner has hired three African-American general managers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this <day> day of <month>, <year>. COPIES FURNISHED: Sebrina L. Wiggins, Esquire Landis, Graham French 145 East Rich Avenue, Suite C Deland, Florida 32721 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The stipulated issue1 is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race by denying Petitioner equal pay in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2007).2
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is an African- American female and filed a complaint of race discrimination, with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent is the Office of the Sheriff for Brevard County, Florida. The evidence, in its entirety, does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. Nor does the evidence prove that Petitioner received unequal pay. Respondent first employed Petitioner sometime in October 2002. Petitioner voluntarily resigned her position of employment with Respondent on May 30, 2008, for a higher-paying position with another employer.3 On July 29, 2006, Respondent transferred Petitioner from the position of payroll specialist, in the accounting department, to a position of personnel officer in the personnel department. The transfer was a promotion, and Petitioner received a 10 percent increase in pay. Ms. Bridget Bauer replaced Petitioner in the accounting department. The supervisor in the personnel office was Ms. Imogene Mullins. Ms. Mullins supported the transfer of Petitioner and considered Petitioner to be a valuable asset due to Petitioner's varied experience, including experience in human resources. On April 3, 2008, Ms. Bauer transferred from the accounting department to another position within Respondent's organization. Ms. Denise Postlethweight, the supervisor of the accounting department, asked Petitioner to temporarily assist the accounting department until the department could replace Ms. Bauer, to train the replacement for Ms. Bauer, and to assist in interviewing applicants to replace Ms. Bauer. Petitioner agreed to perform these temporary duties. Respondent, Ms. Postlethweight, and Ms. Mullins did not promise Petitioner she would receive additional compensation for performing these temporary duties in the accounting department until the accounting department replaced Ms. Bauer. Respondent's administrative policy does not authorize compensation for temporary duties. Ms. Mullins attempted to obtain authorization for increased compensation for the temporary duties performed by Petitioner without success. No pay increase was approved because Petitioner was performing equivalent supervisory duties in the accounting and personnel departments on a temporary basis. One alleged comparator relied on by Petitioner is not a comparator. Ms. Lisa Gillis performed equivalent supervisory duties as the special projects coordinator and sheriff's assistant. However, Ms. Gillis performed equivalent supervisory duties on a permanent basis rather than a temporary basis. Respondent's administrative policy authorizes additional compensation for dual duties performed on a permanent basis. Petitioner spent much of her time during the hearing attempting to show that Ms. Mullins promised additional compensation to Petitioner as an inducement for Petitioner's agreement to perform dual duties on a temporary basis. As previously found, the fact-finder does not find that evidence to be persuasive, and, if it were, the evidence does not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, evidence of an offer and acceptance of additional compensation between Ms. Mullins and Petitioner as an inducement for the performance of dual duties is relevant to an action for breach of contract rather than discrimination. Jurisdiction for an action for breach of contract is in circuit court rather than DOAH.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from his position with Respondent as a warehouse supervisor on or about August 9, 2002, on the basis of his race (African-American), in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following Findings of Fact are determined: Respondent, Heritage Paper Company, Inc. (Respondent), is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Respondent is a wholesale distributor of paper and plastic products. Petitioner, Alonzo C. Brown, is an African-American male and is a member of a protected class. Petitioner was employed in the warehouse at Respondent's Orlando facility from 1998 until he was terminated on or about August 9, 2002. Dan Patterson ("Patterson"), who was the general manager at the Orlando facility during the relevant time period, supervised Petitioner throughout his employment with Respondent. Patterson made the decision to hire Petitioner, made the decision to promote Petitioner to warehouse supervisor, and made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. In November 1999, Petitioner was officially promoted from warehouseman to warehouse supervisor. Petitioner's job duties as warehouse supervisor included supervising the drivers, receiving inventory, putting away inventory, pulling orders, and ensuring that the trucks were loaded. Petitioner was responsible for assigning work to his assistants, ensuring that the runs were pulled, and ensuring that the merchandise ordered by customers was actually on the trucks for delivery. He was also responsible for the overall condition of the warehouse. Petitioner's performance deteriorated during approximately the last five months of his employment. When Petitioner got behind in the warehouse, Patterson assisted him and even hired an assistant to help Petitioner in the warehouse with inventory control and other assistance, where necessary. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he was discriminated against based on his race in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and for disagreeing with his supervisor's instruction to put matches on a truck during a fire inspection. Petitioner was responsible for ensuring that the trucks left on time in the morning and for pulling the runs the previous afternoon. Even though an assistant was hired to help Petitioner in the warehouse at times, Petitioner refused to assign tasks to his assistant. Patterson wrote a note to Petitioner on May 1, 2002, telling Petitioner that he could not send items to the customer, NSC Northport, without matching up purchase order numbers. NCS Northport had very strict delivery requirements and would refuse delivery if Respondent did not comply with their delivery procedures. The evidence demonstrates that Patterson notified Petitioner on May 1, 2002, that Respondent's procedure with regard to NSC Northport was not followed. Although Petitioner introduced testimony that he did not write the information on the NSC Northport invoice, Patterson reasonably believed that it was Petitioner's handwriting and testified that Petitioner never informed him that he did not write the information on that invoice. Further, Marissa Moore, Petitioner's own witness, identified the handwriting as Petitioner's. When problems in the warehouse first arose, Patterson spoke with Petitioner regarding Respondent's policies and procedures for the warehouse. Patterson wrote another note to Petitioner on May 13, 2002, regarding excessive overtime and the importance of having runs pulled the previous afternoon to prevent overtime. Patterson wrote a third note to Petitioner and his assistant, Keynon Turner, on June 27, 2002, reiterating the importance of having the runs pulled in the afternoon and reminding them that the runs must be pulled by 4:00 p.m. Petitioner's explanation for the overall condition of the warehouse from May through August 2002 is not credible. Bob Purser, Sr., Respondent's chairman, CEO, and founder testified that in a conversation with Patterson, he told him that if Petitioner was unable to keep the warehouse organized, minimize the overtime, and get the trucks out on time, then they would have to get someone in the warehouse who would be able to do so. When Purser found out that incorrect merchandise was delivered to customers, he told Patterson to personally review the orders before the trucks were loaded. Purser visited the warehouse where Petitioner was employed prior to his termination and found that the warehouse was in disarray. He observed the aisles were blocked with merchandise and that the forklifts were unable to move up and down the aisles. Denis Nieves, the current warehouse supervisor for Respondent's Orlando facility, was hired on August 12, 2002, three days after Petitioner's employment was terminated. When he was hired, the warehouse was disorganized and cluttered, inventory blocked some of the aisles, the bay doors, and the exits and that it was sometimes difficult to locate inventory. It took him approximately six to eight weeks to reorganize the warehouse, unblock the aisles, put the inventory on racks, and unblock the bay doors and the exits. Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity policy states that Respondent will provide equal employment opportunity to all qualified employees and applicants for employment regardless of race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, handicap, marital status, and status as a disabled veteran or veterans of the Vietnam era. This policy was in effect when Petitioner was hired, and he received a copy of Respondent's employee handbook at the time of his hire, which contained the Equal Employment Opportunity policy prohibiting all types of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner knew of Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity policy. He was aware of the procedures for mailing a complaint about racial discrimination and/or harassment. Respondent also maintained an open-door policy where employees could speak with Purser regarding any perceived problems. Petitioner was aware of this open-door policy. Other employees took advantage of Respondent's open-door policy to address their concerns with Patterson and/or Purser. Petitioner never complained to Purser about Patterson's alleged discriminatory treatment. Purser confirmed that Petitioner never addressed any concerns about race discrimination or any retaliatory actions by Patterson with him. Petitioner testified that he did not feel that he was ever discriminated against at any time during his employment with Respondent, except when Patterson terminated his employment. Although Petitioner raised various instances of perceived unfairness throughout his employment with Respondent, such as being paged to the front office and having his uniform "stripped" from him, he testified that the only point he believed he was discriminated against because of his race was when Patterson terminated his employment. Petitioner's witnesses, Ralph McDaniel and Ricky Vaughn, admitted that they never noticed any discriminatory acts or racial inequalities against anyone while they were employed with Respondent. Moore testified that she never heard any discriminatory comments about Petitioner. Andrew Mitchell testified that he never noticed any discriminatory acts during his employment with Respondent. Petitioner's only other witness, Kenyon Turner, testified that the only perceived discriminatory actions he experienced while employed at Respondent was Patterson's "getting mad and cursing [him] out every once in a while." When asked if Patterson cursed at others as well, Turner answered affirmatively stating, "[o]f course he cursed out the other people that was there," meaning all employees, regardless of race. This does not constitute evidence of racial discrimination. Purser testified that his company does not discriminate against its employees on the basis of race and Patterson testified that he did not consider Petitioner's race in making the decision to terminate his employment. Through Mitchell's testimony, Petitioner attempted to establish that he was a "good employee" and that he was a "capable and knowledgeable" warehouse supervisor, but offered no additional evidence demonstrating that he was doing a good job. The greater weight of evidence supports the fact that Patterson made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment based on the continuing problems in the warehouse and a load factor decline of approximately 22 percent. The load factor is a percentage used to determine how many customer orders are being accurately filled. At the time of Petitioner's termination, he was earning $11.72 per hour. Petitioner testified that he did not begin looking for work until the first part of 2003. Petitioner worked sporadically for Florida Courier and that he earned approximately $11,000.00 in 2003. Petitioner did not work many hours and did not seek alternative employment during the summer months. Petitioner is also a full-time pastor, and his church pays his mortgage payment, which is approximately $1,000.00 per month. Petitioner testified that he has submitted "a couple of applications" to prospective employers, but has not really been interested in working for someone else.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alonzo C. Brown 7230 Plantain Drive Orlando, Florida 32818 Robert T. Devine, Esquire Alva L. Cross, Esquire Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A. Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in employment on the basis of age in violation of section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact Formed in 1976, Respondent is a small federally chartered savings bank, also known as a community bank, with its main office in Miami. At all material times, Respondent has maintained three or four branch offices in south Florida. Respondent has 73 fulltime and parttime employees in its main and branch offices and has, at all times, employed the jurisdictional minimum of employees to be covered by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Respondent is a minority-owned bank that specializes in service to the Hispanic community. Respondent's primary banking services are checking, savings, and mortgage lending for residential and commercial properties. Respondent suffered a decline in business during and after the 2008 recession. Even so, in one fiscal year ending between 2008 and 2012, Respondent had $1-$1.5 million in earnings. However, its revenues declined sharply in 2011 and 2012. For the fiscal year ending June 2012, Respondent reported $8.5 million in losses. In anticipation of future losses, Respondent transfered $6 million from capital to a loss-reserve fund. Due to Respondent's decline in business, as well as a decline in the value of Respondent's mortgage portfolio, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) conducted ongoing examinations from 2008 through 2012. Eventually, in September 2012, Respondent and OCC entered into a Consent Order, under which Respondent continues to operate. Among other things, the Consent Order has required Respondent to streamline its workforce in order to reduce expenses. Although the Consent Order had not been executed during the summer of 2012, Respondent's officers and directors were aware at that time that their bank would soon be under a consent order that would require significant restructuring of Respondent's workforce. Petitioner, who was born on January 27, 1941, started working at Respondent in the late 1980s. During the ensuing 26 years, she has always worked in the bookkeeping department, which is located in the main office. In 2012, Petitioner's primary duty was to process Automated Clearing House (ACH) returns on unsuccessful debit transactions. This job required an employee manually to enter a code for the reason for the return--e.g., insufficient funds or incorrect account number--and ensure that the proper account credit was entered. Although the components of this job have been progressively automated over the years, Petitioner testified that she was spending five to six hours daily on this work during mid-2012. In 2012, Petitioner also performed a couple of other jobs at the bank. She closed overdrawn customer accounts, which required four to five hours weekly. And she backed up for an employee who handled large checks--i.e., over $5000--to ensure that they were properly processed by the bank. Petitioner testified that no other employee was trained to perform the ACH returns. One or two other employees performed this assignment when Petitioner was not in the office, but Petitioner found their work to be substandard. In the first half of 2012, Petitioner's supervisor asked her to train another employee, Lisette Hadad, to handle the ACH returns. Petitioner did so, typically spending an hour or two at a time, over the course of three months. On July 12, 2012, when the training was substantially done, Respondent terminated Petitioner and turned her ACH duties over to Ms. Hadad. Ms. Hadad, who was 57 years old at the time, has been with the bank for 14 years. She started as a teller, but, after three years, was promoted to vault teller. After serving as vault teller, Ms. Hadad was promoted to assistant head teller. After two years in this position, Ms. Hadad was promoted to head teller. Ms. Hadad served as head teller until 2007 when Respondent created the wire transfer department and directed Ms. Hadad to handle all of the wire transfers for the bank. This is a position of high responsibility because the bank has many customers with multinational ties. As a result, Ms. Hadad daily handles wire transfers totalling millions of dollars and must ensure that each transfer complies with applicable federal laws. However, wire transfers did not fill Ms. Hadad's work day. She has assumed all of Petitioner's duties concerning ACH returns while continuing to perform the wire transfer duties. Several nondiscriminatory reasons explain Petitioner's termination. First, in the summer of 2012, the bookkeeping department consisted of three employees, and the other two employees had worked with the bank for about four years longer than Petitioner and performed work that Petitioner was not able to perform. At the same time, the bookkeeping department was slowly losing staff due to automation. Ms. Hadad did not transfer to the bookkeeping department after Petitioner was terminated. One of the other bookkeeping employees was transferred to an opening in customer services, so that, today, the bookkeeping department consists of a lone employee. Petitioner testified that the ACH return work resisted automation. However, over time, more parts of this job have been automated, according to Ms. Hadad. In the same vein, Petitioner's abilities were limited. While she was performing the ACH return work, external auditors routinely found the same errors, year after year. Since Ms. Hadad has assumed this responsibility, the external auditors have found the work to be much better--to the point that, last year, there was not a single repeated error. Nothing in the record supports an inference of age discrimination in the termination of Petitioner. Respondent had a pressing need to cut its workforce in response to reduced revenues in general and auditors' demands in particular. At the same time, Respondent maintains a remarkably mature workforce and does not appear to have used workforce reductions as a means to trim the age of its workforce. At the time of the hearing, four of Respondent's employees were in their 70s, 14 of its employees were in their 60s, and 23 of its employees were in their 50s-- with the average age of its employees being 50 years. Respondent added two employees in 2012; both were in their 70s. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that her allegation of the termination of another employee of advanced years was a mistake. The former employee testified that she chose to retire less than three months after Petitioner had been terminated. At the time of her retirement, at 72 years of age, this employee rejected an offer from the bank to continue to work part time. Respondent also maintains an unusually cohesive, loyal workforce. As noted above, Petitioner's coworkers in the bookkeeping department had each worked with the bank for 30 years. The 72-year-old employee mentioned in the preceding paragraph had worked with the bank for 33 years at the time of her retirement. The Chief Financial Office, Victor Fernandez, who informed Petitioner that she was being terminated, has worked at the bank for 20 years and, earlier in his career, regularly had lunch with Petitioner. From this personal relationship with Petitioner, Mr. Fernandez knew that she owned or leased an apartment at Hallandale Beach, and she intended to live in the apartment after she retired. For this reason, at the meeting at which Mr. Fernandez terminated Petitioner, he tried to make Petitioner feel better by mentioning how she could now live in her apartment at the beach. This comment was not an unguarded disclosure of an unlawful focus on Petitioner's age; rather it reflected Mr. Fernandez's concern for the feelings of Petitioner and his knowledge that, at some point, she wanted to retire to the apartment. Given the above-cited evidence clearly establishing nondiscriminatory reasons for Petitioner's termination, it hardly seems necessary to add that, in any event, Mr. Fernandez was only communicating to Petitioner a decision that had been made by others. As part of its streamlining efforts, Respondent had retained outside consultants to study Respondent's workforce for inefficiencies and redundancies. The consultants recommended workforce reductions, which were then considered and implemented by department managers in conjunction with human resources staff. Mr. Fernandez took no part in this process as it applied to Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on January 14, 2014. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jay J. Lorenzo, Esquire Lorenzo and Rodriguez-Rams 9192 Coral Way, Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33165 Eddy O. Marban, Esquire Law Offices of Eddy O. Marban 1600 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, Suite 902 Miami, Florida 33134 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his employment with the Respondent in the Hospitality Department at the Grand Floridian Hotel on or about March 18, 1993 on the basis of his national origin (Hispanic-Dominican Republic), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Grand Floridian Hotel as a valet/greeter/bellman in the Hospitality Department during the relevant period of time, including March of 1993. The Petitioner is of Hispanic origin from the Dominican Republic and is a member of a protected class. In approximately October of 1988, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent at the Contemporary Hotel as a valet/greeter. In April of 1989, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for not logging in a piece of luggage. The Petitioner did not grieve the April 1988 written reprimand. In May of 1989, the Petitioner transferred to the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel, where he was a valet/greeter/bellman. In February of 1990, the Petitioner received an oral reprimand for three separate incidents of improperly logging luggage. 9. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the February, 1990 oral reprimand. In August of 1990, the Petitioner again received an oral reprimand, this time for mixing up luggage while loading it into vehicles. The luggage had to be mailed to each rightful owner at the Respondent's expense and caused an inconvenience to the guests. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the August 1990 oral reprimand. In December of 1991, the Petitioner mishandled luggage by failing to tag all of a guest's bags. In May of 1992, the Respondent's management discussed with the Petitioner his failure to tag a piece of luggage. In July of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for failing to log in a guest's luggage. The Petitioner's verbal reprimand in July of 1992 was the result of a direct complaint by a guest, who was required to search for a piece of his own luggage in the Hotel's storage room. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the July 1992 verbal reprimand. In September of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for approaching a guest to discuss splitting a tip with a bellman, an impermissible practice. The Petitioner was not suspended for this incident. In December of 1992, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failing to follow proper procedures regarding a guest's luggage on two separate occasions. The Petitioner did not grieve the December 1992 written reprimand. The Respondent decided not to consider the two incidents in December of the Petitioner's luggage-mishandling as separate incidents for progressive discipline purposes, even though such action was permissible under the collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent's decision not to consider the two December 1992 incidents separately for progressive discipline purposes was based upon the Petitioner's length of service and his good performance in other areas. The Petitioner had a good attitude, had good people skills, and had received good guest comments during the course of his employment. In December of 1992, the Petitioner understood that he was in the progressive discipline process. In January of 1993, the Respondent met with the Petitioner and offered to remove him from the responsibility of handling luggage by putting him in a non-tipped, dispatcher position. Also, in January of 1993, the Respondent and the Petitioner's union representative were working together to preserve the Petitioner's job. The Petitioner was reminded by his union representative about his previous reprimands and that one more incident would cause his termination. The Petitioner was told by his union representative that the purpose of moving him to a dispatcher position was to get him away from the luggage-handling area. The Petitioner was told that if he remained free of similar reprimands for one year, he could return to the tipped position of valet/greeter with no loss of seniority. After initially refusing the dispatcher position, the Petitioner accepted. The Petitioner was given the shift that he requested when he was transferred to the dispatcher position. In February of 1993 while on duty as a dispatcher, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension, without pay, for using poor judgment. He interrupted a valet while the valet was servicing a guest. The Petitioner did not grieve the February 1993 suspension. The Petitioner's action as a dispatcher of interrupting a valet was grounds for the valet to grieve such actions to the union. The suspension in February of 1993 for the Petitioner's poor judgment as a dispatcher was not the basis for his termination. The Petitioner requested a reclassification back to valet/greeter/bellman position. The Petitioner understood that one more incident of any kind would result in his immediate termination. The Petitioner requested the change from dispatcher back to valet/greeter/bellman for personal financial reasons; and his union representative also advised him that if one more incident of any kind occurred, he would be terminated. On March 16, 1993, the Petitioner mishandled luggage. The Petitioner did not properly log in a guest's luggage (a garment bag). 35. The Petitioner was terminated on March 18, 1993 for poor job performance. The progressive discipline which the Petitioner received was consistent with the union contract. The contract provides that an employee can be terminated for the next offense following a single written reprimand. The Petitioner had the opportunity to grieve all of the reprimands he received, and his union representative was aware of the actions taken in connection with the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner grieved his termination, and that grievance was denied. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any similarly-situated employee who was not terminated for mishandling luggage on as many occasions as he had. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence regarding any discrimination against other Hispanic employees, other than his own belief, speculation or conjecture. The Petitioner understood that the Respondent's management was closely checking into everyone's performance. Management asked all of the employees at the Grand Floridian Hotel to help the Hotel earn a five-star rating. The Petitioner was never part of the Respondent's management and did not attend manager meetings. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was chosen to train other employees because he knew the proper procedures for his valet/bellman/greeter position. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for handling luggage received from guests. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for logging in and handling bags. The Petitioner received copies of the Respondent's policies and procedures for a valet/bellman, including luggage handling. The Petitioner did not report many of the alleged discriminatory actions of his co-workers to management. The Petitioner conceded that on those occasions when he did make reports to management, these alleged actions stopped. The Petitioner received the overtime and schedules which he requested because of his seniority. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Orlando, Florida, work site has increased from 1993 to 1996. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel has either remained the same or increased from 1992 to 1995. In January of 1993, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department was 14, of which 11 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. In February of 1996, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department (including valets, bellmen, greeters and dispatchers) was 16, of which 12 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of an overall plan by the Respondent's management to eliminate minorities, including Hispanics, from employment at the company. The Respondent allows employees to review their employment records at any time upon request. The Petitioner presented only his own beliefs, speculation or conjecture as a basis for his claims of national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3990 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20, 22-31, 33-39, 41-61. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 21, 32, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Jorge V. Jimenez 2716 FDC Grove Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Myrna L. Galligano, Esquire Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P.A. 731 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana C. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Did the Respondent, Placida SAS, LLC, d/b/a The Fishery Restaurant (Placida), unlawfully discriminate against Petitioner, Jon A. St. Laurent, in hiring because of his age?
Findings Of Fact Placida is a restaurant in Port Charlotte, Florida. In February 2015, it advertised on Craig’s List for a cook offering pay of $14.00 per hour and a $500.00 signing bonus. Placida operates seasonally. It closes May of each year. It re-hires when it re-opens in September. The evidence does not establish that employment with Placida continues season to season. Mr. St. Laurent responded to the advertisement. Mr. St. Laurent is qualified for the position. He is a former chef with years of experience. Mr. St. Laurent was 64 years old. He submitted an application. The then manager, Wendy Hummel, interviewed Mr. St. Laurent on February 24, 2015. Ms. Hummel asked questions that demonstrated she was weighing Mr. St. Laurent’s age against him. She asked him if at his age he was capable of standing on his feet for long hours. She also asked if at his age he was capable of working the kind of shifts that are required in a high-volume restaurant. Placida did not contact Mr. St. Laurent to advise him whether it had decided to hire him. He saw more advertisements for cooks by Placida on Craig’s List, also offering a $500.00 signing bonus. So Mr. St. Laurent emailed Ms. Hummel to remind her of his availability and qualifications and to inquire if Placida had decided whether to offer him a job. In emails, as early as March 7, 2015, Mr. St. Laurent reminded Ms. Hummel of his qualifications and of her comments about his age and its affect upon his ability to perform the job. After repeated emails from Mr. St. Laurent, Ms. Hummel replied saying that his skills did not meet the job requirements. Her email says the restaurant was looking for line cooks with experience in a large restaurant and his skills were more geared towards large event cooking. Ms. Hummel also testified, albeit unpersuasively, that Mr. St. Laurent’s experience was not well suited for Placida’s operation. She eventually, denied questioning Mr. St. Laurent’s ability to perform the job because of his age. But the majority of her testimony about the comments was along the lines of saying that she knows better than to make such comments. One example is: “That, that basically, I would be very hard pressed to believe I asked him anything about his age . . . .” (Tr. p. 32). This way of addressing the issue, Mr. St. Laurent’s testimony’s consistency with his early descriptions of the interview, and the undersigned’s observation of the witnesses results in a conclusion that Mr. St. Laurent’s testimony is more credible and persuasive. Placida did not hire Mr. St. Laurent solely because of his age. When Placida refused to hire Mr. St. Laurent and in the months following, Placida worked consistently and urgently to recruit and employ cooks, as shown by continuing advertisements and signing bonuses. Yet it refused to hire a qualified applicant, Mr. St. Laurent. The evidence proves that this was because of his age. If Placida had employed Mr. St. Laurent effective March 1, 2015, until closing for the season on May 1, 2015, he would have worked for eight weeks and three days. Paid $15.00 per hour for 40 hours a week, Mr. St. Laurent would have earned $4,816. In addition, Mr. St. Laurent would have been paid a $500.00 signing bonus. The total damages in lost wages or “back pay” to Mr. St. Laurent, caused by Placida’s discrimination against him because of his age, is $5,316.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order that: Holds that Respondent, Placida SAS, LLC, d/b/a The Fishery Restaurant, did not employ Petitioner, Jon A. St. Laurent, solely because of his age; Prohibits Respondent, Placida SAS, LLC d/b/a, The Fishery Restaurant, from discriminating on account of age in its hiring; and Awards Petitioner, Jon A. St. Laurent, back pay in the amount of $5,316.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner in her Employment Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") on May 3, 2016; and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the record as a whole and the evidence presented, the undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant facts: Petitioner started her employment in July 2002 with Events by Premier. The company provides exclusive catering services for the Jewish Center in Aventura, Florida.3/ Petitioner's employment in 2002 followed her marriage to Michael Pollak, a co-owner of Events by Premier. Petitioner became a full-time employee in 2013 and was assigned to the position of kitchen manager. At that point, her husband was the chef and supervised her work in the kitchen. Their work relationship continued in this manner until she was terminated from employment in late July 2015. Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and there was no evidence to suggest that she was unable to adequately perform her duties as kitchen manager. The evidence was largely undisputed that the position of kitchen manager was created specifically to accommodate Petitioner and her husband, a co-owner of the business. There had been no prior kitchen manager positions at Events by Premier, and the title and position were not needed to operate the business. Another owner of Events by Premier, and its president, was Steven Pollak. He is the brother of Michael Pollak and was Petitioner's brother-in-law. During the weeks leading up to her termination in July 2015, her relationship with her husband, Michael Pollak, became openly strained and tense due to marital problems. Steven Pollak described the work environment between Petitioner and her husband as not a good one, and it created, as he described, a "toxic" work environment. There was screaming, hollering, and profanity exchanged between Petitioner and her husband at work. It was decided that Petitioner needed to be terminated for the best interests of the company and also due to the unprofitability of the company in the first half of 2015.4/ As a result of the poor working environment existing between Petitioner and her husband, and Respondent's unprofitable performance in the first half of the year 2015, Steven Pollak informed Petitioner on July 26, 2015, that he was letting her go.5/ After she was fired, Petitioner filed a Complaint with FCHR. The basis of her Complaint was that she was terminated because of her "marital status." At the hearing, Petitioner explained her opinion regarding the basis for her termination. She felt that her termination occurred because the company feared that she knew things about the company, including improper unemployment claims and other financial information.6/ It was clear to the undersigned that Petitioner had serious emotional and relational issues with her husband that made it difficult, if not impossible, for her to work harmoniously with him. She testified at the hearing and characterized her relationship with her husband after her termination as "out of control." Based upon the evidence presented and the record as a whole, Petitioner was not terminated because of her "marital status." Rather, the evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate and non-discriminatory business reasons for terminating Petitioner. Similarly, her termination was based upon the hostile relationship which existed between Petitioner and her husband, Michael Pollak, in the weeks and months leading up to her filing a petition for divorce--not because of her marital status (e.g., not because she was married, separated, or divorced).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2017.
