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CAROLYN SIMMONS vs INVERNESS INN, AND MR. CRETKO BLAZEVSKI, 93-002349 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Inverness, Florida Apr. 28, 1993 Number: 93-002349 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1993

The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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DOSWELL BROWN vs FLORIDA TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, 05-002600 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jul. 20, 2005 Number: 05-002600 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 2006

The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment action as alleged by Petitioner and, if so, what relief should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male. He identifies himself variously as a "Caribbean black," "Jamaican," and "Rastafarian." Respondent conducts its business at Port Everglades, a major Florida seaport (Port Everglades or the Port). Respondent's business is to service passenger and commercial shipping by transporting and loading cargo in and about Port Everglades. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the applicable statutory provisions. Petitioner was employed by Respondent from August 13, 2002, until October 29, 2003, when he was terminated. At all relevant times, Lizabeth Divers (Divers) has been Respondent's Director of Human Resources. In that capacity she was responsible for Respondent's personnel matters as well as its compliance with the FCRA. Her job includes, at all relevant times, hiring and firing; employee discipline; implementing company polices; and receiving and investigating complaints lodged verbally or in writing by employees about any matters affecting their employment.1 At all times material to this case, Petitioner was aware of his right to lodge complaints verbally or in writing with Divers with respect to any matter affecting his employment, including any alleged unlawful employment practice. At no time prior to his termination did Petitioner do so. The record contains no persuasive evidence concerning the composition of Respondent's workforce by race, national origin, religion, or any other classification relevant to Petitioner's claim against Respondent under the FCRA. As previously noted, Petitioner was employed by Respondent from August 13, 2002, until October 29, 2003, when his employment was terminated by Divers for violating a company policy prohibiting possession of firearms or other weapons on Port property (the weapons policy). All of Respondent's employees, including Petitioner at all times material to this case, gain access to Port Everglades only by passing a security checkpoint. A security guard thereupon confirms that the individual has current port identification and parking decal. Once cleared to enter the Port, Respondent's employees have access to the entire Port, and are generally not under direct supervision as they perform their jobs. Respondent's weapons policy is grounded in reasons that were obvious to any employee, and which had to have been obvious to Petitioner. The need for such a policy is self-evident. There is no evidence that any other person employed by Respondent has ever violated the weapons policy. At relevant times Petitioner was licensed by the state to carry a concealed weapon. State licensure does not constitute authorization for Petitioner to ignore Respondent's weapons policy. Petitioner had no job-related reason to carry a gun. Petitioner's job was to drive a truck known to seaport workers as a "mule." Mules are used to transport cargo from one location to another. Petitioner's basic job duty was to drive box loads of material from one location to another at Port Everglades. Petitioner was qualified to do his job and performed his duties adequately with no prior disciplinary record. Divers was unaware of Petitioner's alleged violation of the weapons policy until the start of the business day on Monday, October 29, 2003. At that time, it was brought to her attention that one or more of Petitioner's co-workers had confronted him over the weekend regarding a bulge at his waist, and that Petitioner had confirmed that the bulge was a gun. Divers felt this alleged violation of the weapons policy was a serious accusation which, if true, would warrant immediate termination. She also felt that it posed a potentially life-threatening situation. Divers determined that Petitioner was scheduled to work that day. Divers immediately left her office and proceeded to the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BCSO) Port Everglades precinct to advise of the potential security threat. Divers sought BCSO's assistance in addressing this unprecedented and potentially dangerous situation. BCSO immediately provided assistance in the form of three armed deputies. Each officer drove his police vehicle to intercept Petitioner on Port grounds. The officers interviewed Petitioner in the presence of Divers. Petitioner freely admitted that he regularly concealed his gun in his vehicle. Petitioner had access to his vehicle throughout his shift. The officers verified Petitioner's concealed weapons permit. Divers informed Petitioner and the officers that she was terminating Petitioner's employment. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner protested this action or complained that it was motivated by race, national origin, or religion. Instead, the evidence established that Divers made a decision she was authorized to make, i.e., to terminate Petitioner for his admitted violation of the weapons policy. The officers disassembled Petitioner's gun, placed it in the trunk of Petitioner's vehicle, and escorted Petitioner off the Port property. There is no evidence regarding who, if anyone, was hired to replace Petitioner following his termination. Petitioner has failed to show that any other similarly situated employee who violated the weapons policy was treated differently from Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and denying all relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2005.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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HUGH F. BROCKINGTON, II vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 01-003338 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Aug. 23, 2001 Number: 01-003338 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 2002

The Issue Did Petitioner suffer an adverse employment action as a result of an unlawful discrimination by the Department of Corrections (Department) in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. At times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed at Brevard Correctional Institution and was considered by the Department to be qualified for the position for which he was employed. Petitioner is a male, African-American. On October 24 1994, Petitioner received a Written Reprimand for the abuse of the Department's sick leave policy, which had occurred on October 21, 1994, in that Petitioner, while on authorized sick leave on October 21, 1994, attended the Dorothy Lewis trial, without authorization from the Department. Petitioner presented no evidence to show that the Written Reprimand issued on October 24, 1994, was issued because of Petitioner's race or gender; rather it was issued based on a reasonable belief that Petitioner had abused the Department's sick leave policy by attending the Dorothy Lewis trial while out on official sick leave. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the remaining allegations contained in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in this matter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh F. Brockington, II 19715 Eagles View Circle Umatilla, Florida 32784 Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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PHILOMENE AUGUSTIN vs MARRIOTT FORUM AT DEERCREEK, 02-004049 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 18, 2002 Number: 02-004049 Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice (Petition for Relief) filed against Respondent should be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission).

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent operated Marriott Forum at Deercreek (hereinafter referred to as the "Facility"), a "senior living community, nursing home." Petitioner was employed as a Certified Nursing Assistant (hereinafter referred to as "CNA") at the Facility from 1992 or 1993, until July of 1998, when she was terminated. Petitioner is black. At the time of Petitioner's termination, all of the CNAs, and all but one of the nurses, at the Facility were black. At the time of Petitioner's termination, the chain of command leading down to Petitioner was as follows: the General Manager, Joanna Littlefield; the Health Care Administrator, Sheila Wiggins, and the Interim Director of Nursing, Michelle Borland. The Director of Human Resources was Meg McKaon. Ms. Littlefield had the ultimate authority to terminate employees working at the Facility. Ms. Wiggins, Ms. Borland, and Ms. McKaon had the authority to make termination recommendations to Ms. Littlefield, but not to take such action themselves. In July of 1998, F. S., an elderly woman in, or approaching, her 90's, was a resident at the Facility. On or about July 9, 1998, Petitioner was involved in a scuffle with F. S. while giving F. S. a shower. Joyce Montero, a social worker at the Facility, was nearby in the hallway and heard the "commotion." When F. S. came out of the shower, Ms. Montero spoke to her. F. S. appeared to be "very upset." She was screaming to Ms. Montero, "Get her away from me; she hit me," referring to Petitioner. Ms. Montero noticed that F. S. "had blood [streaming] from her nostril to at least the top of her lip." The nursing staff then "took over" and "cleaned up [F. S.'s] blood" with a towel. Ms. McKaon was contacted and informed that there was a CNA who had "had an altercation with a resident." Ms. McKaon went to the scene "right away" to investigate. When Ms. McKaon arrived, F. S. was still "visibly shaken and upset." Ms. McKaon saw the "bloody towel" that had been used to clean F. S.'s face "there next to [F. S.]." F. S. told Ms. McKaon that she was "afraid [of Petitioner] and that she [had been] punched in the nose" by Petitioner. In accordance with Facility policy, Petitioner was suspended for three days pending the completion of an investigation of F. S.'s allegation that Petitioner had "punched" her. Ms. Wiggins and Ms. McKaon presented Petitioner with a written notice of her suspension, which read as follows: Description of employee's behavior . . . . On July 9, 1998, one of our residents [F. S.] was being given a shower by [Petitioner]. [F. S.] stated that [Petitioner] punched her in the nose. (She was crying and bleeding: witnessed by Joyce Montero). Suspension For Investigation To provide time for a thorough investigation of all the facts before a final determination is made, you are being suspended for a period of 3 days. Guarantee Of Fair Treatment Acknowledgement I understand that my manager has recommended the termination of my employment for the reasons described above and that I have been suspended for 3 days while a decision regarding my employment status is made. I understand that the final decision regarding my employment status will be made by the General Manager. The suspension period will provide time for an investigation of all facts that led to this recommendation. I understand that the General Manager will be conducting this investigation. I further understand that if I feel I have information which will influence the decision, I have a right to and should discuss it with the General Manager. I am to report to my manager on July 13, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. Petitioner was asked to sign the foregoing notice, but refused to do so. Ms. McKaon conducted a thorough investigation into the incident. Following her investigation, she came to the conclusion that there was "enough evidence to terminate" Petitioner. As a result, she recommended that Ms. Littlefield take such action, the same recommendation made by Ms. Wiggins. After receiving Ms. McKaon's and Ms. Wiggins' recommendations, Ms. Littlefield decided to terminate Petitioner's employment. The termination action was taken on or about July 23, 1998. At this time, the Facility was on "moratorium" status (that is, "not allowed to accept any more patients") as a result of action taken against it by the Agency for Health Care Administration because of the "many" complaints of mistreatment that had been made by residents of the Facility. Ms. Wiggins was given the responsibility of personally informing Petitioner of Ms. Littlefield's decision. After telling Petitioner that her employment at the Facility had been terminated, Ms. Wiggins escorted Petitioner out of the building and to the parking lot. In the parking lot, Ms. Wiggins said to Petitioner something to the effect that, she, Ms. Wiggins, was "going to take all of the black nurses in the Facility." (What Ms. Wiggins meant is not at all clear from the evidentiary record.) Following Petitioner's termination, the racial composition of the CNA staff at the Facility remained the same: all-black, as a black CNA filled Petitioner's position. There has been no persuasive showing made that Petitioner's race played any role in Ms. Littlefield's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Respondent is not guilty of the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2003.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 20 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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JACQUELINE A. IRBY vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, 89-000874 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000874 Latest Update: May 24, 1989

Findings Of Fact Jacqueline A. Irby was employed as an Allstate Insurance Agent from April 25, 1983 until her dismissal July 17, 1987. Respondent has a company policy prohibiting employees from bringing firearms into company offices or carrying them while on company business. Violation of this policy can result in termination. (Exhibit 6). Petitioner was aware of this policy when employed in 1983 (Exhibit 1). She was unsure the policy applied to her office which she rented in the building not otherwise used by Respondent. On April 14, 1987, Petitioner wrote a memo to her supervising sales manager, Randy Rouse, stating that she had witnessed Judith Gill walk into her office with a handgun and point it directly at Petitioner's client. Both Gill and Petitioner were Allstate Agents sharing office spaces if not actually partners. During the subsequent investigation of this incident, Petitioner acknowledged to Rouse that she kept a .357 Magnum in her office for her protection when she worked late at night. Both Gill and Petitioner were fired by Respondent as Allstate Agents on or about July 17, 1987. Petitioner presented Exhibits 2 through 5 representing disciplinary action taken by Respondent against male Allstate Agents. Although the maximum penalty authorized by Respondent's Policy Statements Manual (Exhibit 6) for their offenses was dismissal, each of these Agents received a lesser punishment. None of the offenses noted in Exhibits 2 through 5 involved a firearm violation. No evidence was presented regarding the Agent hired to replace Petitioner, if any, or the sex of such replacement.

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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DORETHA PEARSON vs MRMC - MUNROE REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., 12-001702 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida May 15, 2012 Number: 12-001702 Latest Update: May 08, 2013

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who was employed by Respondent from October 16, 2000, until her termination on January 4, 2011. When she began her employment with Respondent, she was hired as a Food Service Specialist. Respondent, MRMC-Munroe Regional Health Systems, Inc. (Munroe or Respondent), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Munroe is a not-for-profit hospital located in Ocala, Florida, and comprises numerous departments, including the Nutritional Services Department. Petitioner worked for this department the entirety of her employment with Respondent. On or about October 23, 2000, Petitioner received a copy of Munroe's Employee handbook. The Employee Handbook includes an Equal Opportunity policy, an anti-harassment policy, a complaint procedure, and an open door policy. Petitioner was aware from the beginning of her employment that Respondent had written policies prohibiting unlawful discrimination and that there were procedures in place to report work-related problems, in particular unlawful discrimination. Petitioner acknowledged in October 2000, that she received copies of these policies. She also signed an acknowledgment that she was an "at-will" employee, meaning that either the employee or Munroe has the right to terminate the employment relationship at any time with or without notice or reason. As early as 2000, Petitioner was aware that one way to report unlawful discrimination was to contact the Human Resources Department. In early 2004, Petitioner sought a promotion to the position of Team Leader. Melinda Monteith was one of Petitioner's immediate supervisors at that time. Ms. Monteith recommended Petitioner for the promotion to Team Leader. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Team Leader in February 2004, and received a pay raise commensurate with that position. Ms. Monteith continued to be Petitioner's immediate supervisor until January 4, 2011, when Petitioner was discharged. Petitioner received pay increases every year from 2004 through 2010. Petitioner's former husband, Michael Pearson, believes that Petitioner's supervisor is racist because he claims she once called him a "thug" and saw her look at another black male "like she don't like black folks."1/ Mr. Pearson has never worked for Respondent and bases his personal belief that Petitioner's supervisor is racist on interactions he had with Petitioner's supervisor(s) at holiday parties. On February 6, 2009, Petitioner was disciplined in the form of a written Counseling Agreement for conduct which Respondent considered "workplace bullying." Petitioner, along with other team leaders, was asked to learn to use a computer system referred to as the C-Board System, in order to fill in when necessary for employees whose assigned duties were to use that system to correctly prepare patient meals. Petitioner was never able to operate the C-Board system. She was never disciplined by Respondent for her inability to use the C-Board system. During the time that Petitioner held the position of Team Leader, some employees complained to Ms. Monteith about the way Petitioner interacted with them. On December 20, 2010, Stephanie Smith, another Team Leader, told Ms. Monteith that Petitioner was not speaking to people and being very "sharp" with them. The next morning, Ms. Monteith asked to speak with Petitioner about what Ms. Smith had told her about Petitioner's behavior the previous day. When Petitioner responded curtly, "Is it business?," Ms. Monteith decided to speak with her later. Later that morning, Ms. Monteith was approached by Pam Knight, one of Petitioner's subordinates, who was in tears regarding Petitioner's behavior and the resulting tense atmosphere. Ms. Knight was particularly concerned with the way Petitioner was treating Ms. Smith. Ms. Monteith and Clinical Nutrition Manager Betsy DeMatto met with Ms. Knight and confirmed what Ms. Knight had told Ms. Monteith earlier regarding Petitioner's behavior: that Petitioner was not speaking to Ms. Knight or Ms. Smith at all, and that she was not responding to work-related questions. Ms. Monteith and Ms. DeMatto decided that Petitioner should be counseled in writing for her unprofessional behavior toward coworkers. On December 21, 2010, Petitioner was disciplined, again in the form of a written Counseling Agreement, for "behaving in an unprofessional manner [which] creates an environment of tension and discomfort." When presented with the counseling agreement, Petitioner became very angry, remarked that everything she was accused of were lies, and refused to sign the counseling agreement. Later that day, Ms. Monteith was approached by Ms. Smith who was "very pale" and who advised that Petitioner spoke with her (Ms. Smith) following the counseling meeting, and appeared to be angry. Ms. Smith informed Ms. Monteith that Petitioner stated that she was "going postal" and that if she was "going out" she was taking Ms. Monteith with her. Ms. Monteith believed what Ms. Smith told her, and relayed it to Ms. DeMatto. Ms. Monteith and Ms. DeMatto decided to report this to Human Resources (HR) Manager Vicky Nelson. Ms. Nelson has been employed by Respondent for 33 years, five of which as HR Manager. In her capacity as HR Manager, Ms. Nelson has conducted approximately 300 investigations into workplace issues, including allegations of unlawful discrimination, harassment, threatening behavior, workplace violence, and bullying. These investigations included reviewing applicable policies and procedures, referring to any prior events of a similar nature, interviewing the complaining employee and the individual against whom the complaint has been made, and reviewing the personnel files of the individual making the complaint and the individual who is accused of inappropriate behavior. In some cases, a decision is made to remove the accused from the workplace during the pendency of the investigation. Ms. Nelson interviewed Ms. Monteith and Ms. DeMatto in her office. She observed that Ms. Monteith appeared to be "visibly shaken." On the afternoon of December 21, 2010, Petitioner was called into the office of Ms. Nelson to discuss the allegations that Petitioner made this threatening comment regarding Ms. Monteith. During the December 21, 2012, meeting, Petitioner initially denied making the statement about going postal and taking Ms. Monteith with her. She later admitted that she used the word "postal," but was just joking and was not serious. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she used the word "postal," but in the context that they had her in the office "trying to make me postal" and reiterated that she was just kidding in using that word. Petitioner believes that she was being accused of acting "crazy." While there is some dispute as to the context of Petitioner's use of the word "postal," it is not disputed that she did use the word "postal" in the workplace, and that employees of Respondent were extremely concerned because of it. At the conclusion of the December 21, 2010, meeting, Ms. Nelson told Petitioner not to return to work until after she (Ms. Nelson) had finished the investigation if this matter. Ms. Nelson also asked Petitioner to submit a written statement setting forth her position as to the events of December 21, 2010. Petitioner did not submit a written statement at that time, but said she would do so later. On December 22, 2010, Ms. Nelson interviewed Ms. Smith and Ms. Knight, each of whom confirmed what Ms. Monteith previously told Ms. Nelson. Based on the information available to her, Ms. Nelson determined that Petitioner's employment should be terminated. Whether or not Petitioner was just joking when she used the word "postal," it was taken seriously by her employer. Ms. Nelson based the termination decision on Petitioner's use of the word "postal" and considered it inflammatory in nature. She based her decision in part on the comment itself; the credibility of Ms. Smith, Ms. Knight, Ms. DeMatto, and Ms. Monteith; her personal observations of Petitioner's behavior and demeanor in the December 21, 2010, meeting; and the context in which the comment was made, i.e., the information she received regarding Petitioner's interaction with co-workers on December 20 and 21, and her angry reaction to being presented with the counseling agreement on December 20. Ms. Nelson contacted Petitioner on January 3, 2011, and asked to meet with her the following day. On January 4, 2011, Ms. Nelson informed Petitioner of the results of her investigation and of the decision to terminate her employment, effective that day. At the January 4, 2011, meeting, Ms. Nelson again asked Petitioner for a written statement. Petitioner did not give one to her. On January 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a written request, pursuant to Respondent's Conflict Management Program, for peer review of the circumstances surrounding her termination from Munroe. The Panel Review Request Form lists several factors for the employee making the request to "check off" as to the nature of the dispute. Petitioner checked the boxes for "race" and for "retaliation, but did not check the box for "disability." At no time during the December 21 meeting with Ms. Nelson or the time between that meeting and the January 4, 2011, meeting, did Petitioner advise Ms. Nelson that she believed that she was being discriminated against on the basis of race, color, or disability. On February 23, 2011, the Peer Review Panel recommended that Petitioner's termination be upheld and that she not be eligible for rehire.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2012.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 12102 CFR (1) 29 CFR 1630(2)(i) Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.10760.11
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LYNE RICHARD vs PRINCE-BUSH INVESTMENTS HOLLYWOOD-H, LLP, D/B/A HOLIDAY INN FORT LAUDERDALE AIRPORT, 06-001158 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Apr. 03, 2006 Number: 06-001158 Latest Update: Jan. 18, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent at various times beginning in February 1999 and ending in her termination effective September 30, 2004. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. At all relevant times, Respondent is in the hotel business. Respondent provides related services and amenities to its guests and to the general public, including a restaurant and bar on the hotel premises. Petitioner commenced her employment with Respondent as a waitress and was eventually promoted to bartender. At all relevant times, she worked under the supervision of Kurt Pfister (Pfister). At no time prior to the commencement of her employment, nor at any time during her employment, did Petitioner advise Respondent that she was disabled in any way, or that she required any type of accommodation(s) for any medical condition or disability in order to perform her job. Likewise, Petitioner never advised Respondent that she had ever been diagnosed, treated, or hospitalized for any medical condition or disability. In fact, as Petitioner herself admits, she first claimed to be disabled approximately two weeks after she was terminated. Petitioner, as well as all of Respondent's employees, were trained in and required at all times to follow all of Respondent's policies and procedures generally applicable in its workplace. Additionally, every employee was trained in and expected to comply at all times with all policies and procedures applicable to his or her particular job. Violation of any of Respondent's policies or procedures subjected an employee to disciplinary action ranging from counseling to termination. As a bartender, Petitioner was trained and responsible for taking food and beverage orders; to present patrons with their bill(s); and to collect an approved form of payment, including cash. With regard to cash, Petitioner was trained in Respondent's policies and procedures known as "cash control policies." Cash control policies included a specific process for reconciliation of cash and tips at the end of each shift and a process for making cash drops and filling out deposit logs. Petitioner and all similarly situated employees were required to comply with cash control policies and were subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination if they failed to do so. Petitioner was qualified for her bartending position, and from the beginning of her employment through September 16, 2004, Respondent was well satisfied with Petitioner's work. Petitioner was often called upon to train new bartenders with regard to Respondent's policies, including cash control policies. She did so very well. For her efforts, Petitioner achieved the status of Respondent's most senior bartender, and as a reward was given the best shifts. Respondent enforced a policy against smoking on its grounds, except that smoking was permitted in a small, outside area at the south end of the premises. Petitioner was well familiar with the smoking policy and to Respondent's knowledge, complied with it until September 16, 2004. On that date, Petitioner was discovered smoking in a liquor storage room located inside the hotel building. She was given a written reprimand. Apart from the smoking infraction, Petitioner's September 16, 2004, shift was uneventful. She gave no indication to her customers or supervisors that she was in distress or could not perform her duties on account of disability or any other reason, nor that she required any type of accommodation(s) to perform her job. Yet, on that night, Petitioner failed to follow cash control policies at the end of her shift. Of most concern to Respondent was that Petitioner left work with her cash sales short for the evening in the amount of $97.64. On September 17, 2006, Pfister learned of the policy violations and the attendant cash shortage; he thereupon contacted Petitioner by telephone. Petitioner again did not indicate to Respondent that she could not perform her duties on account of disability or any other reason, nor that she required any type of accommodation(s) to perform her job and to comply with cash control policies. Petitioner conversed normally with Pfister and acknowledged that she had the $97.64 belonging to Respondent. Although she was not scheduled to work again until September 21st, she agreed to meet with Pfister and to return the money on September 19, 2004. Petitioner did not show up for the meeting. Neither did she return the money, or contact Pfister to advise when, or if, she would return the money. Respondent was entitled, at that point, to treat the matter as a theft; to terminate Petitioner's employment; and to seek law enforcement's assistance in recovering its money. Instead, Respondent exercised forbearance and gave Petitioner an indefinite suspension to afford her additional time to return the money and to explain to Pfister her reason(s) for failing to follow cash control policies on September 16, 2004. Respondent enforced a policy it called the no-call, no-show rule. Under the rule, employees are required to provide Respondent with four hours’ notice if for any reason they are unable to report on time for a scheduled shift. Absent extraordinary circumstances, which do not exist here, failure to provide the required notice is ground for disciplinary action. On September 21, 2004, and again the next day, Petitioner failed to report for her scheduled shift(s). She also failed to fulfill the four-hour notice requirement of the no call, no-show rule. For these two violations of the no-call, no-show policy, Petitioner was given a written warning. On September 23, 2004, Petitioner telephoned Pfister from an undisclosed location and advised she could not work previously scheduled shifts for the balance of the week. At first, Petitioner claimed she wanted time off on account of her “health.” Pfister offered her the opportunity to submit medical documentation in support of her request. At that point Petitioner stated that she was not seeing a doctor(s), and further stated that she was out of the state with her boyfriend. Petitioner added that she did not care about the hotel; that she was going to take care of herself first. Pfister responded that Petitioner should call him upon her return to town because the issue concerning the $97.64 could not remain unresolved. In the course of this conversation, Petitioner did not advise Respondent that she was disabled in any way, or that she required any type of accommodation(s) for any medical condition or disability in order to perform her job. Petitioner's next contact with Respondent was on September 29, 2004, when Petitioner called Pfister and said she was back in town and wanted to meet with him. It was agreed the meeting would take place the following day at 1:00 p.m. and would also be attended by Rick Reilly (Reilly), Respondent’s senior vice president. Petitioner did not arrive at the appointed time and did not call to explain her absence. Instead, she arrived at 2:10 P.M. Petitioner smelled of alcohol; she swayed, staggered, and slurred her speech. She was profane and belligerent. Petitioner again failed and refused to return Respondent's money or to explain why she took the money. As previously and repeatedly noted, Petitioner did not take this opportunity to advise Respondent that she was disabled in any way, or required any type of accommodation(s) for any medical condition or disability in order to perform her job. She did, however, state that she was "not coming back" and demanded a paycheck and vacation pay. Reilly asked her if she was resigning and she replied, "I guess so." Fearing that Petitioner would attempt to deny or to retract her ambiguous resignation when she sobered up, Pfister and Reilly made a reasonable determination, based upon legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons, to terminate her employment effective September 30, 2006. The termination was not pretextual. There was no evidence regarding who, if anyone, replaced Petitioner. There was no evidence Petitioner was, at any time, treated less favorably than any similarly situated co- worker on account of her membership in any protected class, or for any other reason. Petitioner did not dispute that Respondent had no reason, at any relevant time, to believe she needed accommodations of any sort to perform her job. On October 15, 2004, Pfister received a fax from Petitioner requesting a "leave of absence, medical reason." In apparent support thereof, Pfister also receive a fax purporting to be from a doctor and further purporting to provide a medical explanation for Petitioner's request for "leave of absence, medical reason." In the latter fax, a representation was made that Petitioner was presently hospitalized for "an undetermined amount of time" due to "depression symptoms for the last several month (sic) in context of stressors related to her job and impending hurricanes." This information, such as it was, was untimely and was insufficient to cast doubt upon the bona fides of Petitioner's termination. On November 1, 2004, Petitioner came to Pfister's office to pick up her check(s) and, at last, to return Respondent's money. She made no comment or complaint regarding any alleged disability; neither did she indicate in any way that she believed herself to be a victim of discrimination. In sum, Petitioner could have been terminated as early as September 16, 2004, for legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons. There is no persuasive evidence that disability played any role in Petitioner's termination. Indeed, there was no persuasive evidence that Petitioner was, at any time, disabled within the meaning of the Act, or within the meaning of any other state or federal law. There was no evidence that Petitioner was replaced by a non-disabled individual, nor that she was, at any time, treated less favorably than any similarly situated co-worker.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2006.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 1210142 U.S.C 12102 Florida Laws (4) 120.577.64760.02760.10
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MARY J. HALL vs SUNSHINE CLEANING SYSTEMS, INC., 01-003353 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 24, 2001 Number: 01-003353 Latest Update: Oct. 09, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner was unlawfully terminated from her position with Respondent because of her race (Caucasian), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (hereinafter "FCRA"), Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant facts are determined: Respondent is a corporation, licensed to do business in Florida, that provides cleaning services to business clients; and is an employer, as that term is defined, under the FCRA. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent on January 1, 1997. Petitioner was hired as a restroom cleaner, and remained in that position until her termination from employment with Respondent on August 6, 1998. Throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner's supervisors were: Cecilia Haimes ("Haimes"), a Caucasian female; Danna Hewett ("Hewett"), a Caucasian Female; and Carlos Ramirez ("Ramirez"), an Hispanic male. Additionally, throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was assigned to work at the Orange County Convention Center ("OCCC"). Hewett began her employment with Respondent as a restroom cleaner. Shortly thereafter, she was promoted by Ramirez to the position of lead restroom cleaner. Shortly after that, she was once again promoted by Ramirez, to the position of supervisor. As a supervisor, Hewett supervised Petitioner. Hewett became Petitioner's supervisor in or around August 1997. In her capacity as supervisor, Hewett was informed by other employees at OCCC that Petitioner was spreading rumors and gossiping about alleged affairs between certain employees and/or supervisors. Hewett and Ramirez discussed Petitioner's behavior, and they concluded that such behavior was extremely disruptive to the work environment. Specifically, such behavior by Petitioner affected employee morale and employees' respect for their supervisors. Based on these allegations, Ramirez contacted Ronald Jirik ("Jirik"), the Central Florida Regional Manager, to inform him of Petitioner's behavior. Upon meeting with Hewett and Ramirez, Jirik informed Ramirez to meet with Petitioner to try to get her to stop spreading such rumors. Ramirez met with Petitioner shortly thereafter. He attempted to resolve the problem and instructed her not to gossip or spread rumors. However, the problem persisted. Jirik contacted Ramirez to follow up on whether or not Ramirez was able to resolve the problem. Ramirez informed Jirik that he was unable to stop the rumors, and that he believed that Petitioner was continuing this improper behavior. Jirik then informed Ramirez that it would probably be best if Petitioner was transferred from the OCCC, and be given the option to transfer to another facility that was of equal distance from her home. Jirik is Caucasian. Jirik suggested that Petitioner be transferred to the Orlando Sentinel building due to the fact that, based on the information in Petitioner's personnel file, this location would have been of equal distance from her home. Additionally, such a transfer would not have changed any of the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment, including but not limited to, pay, benefits, responsibilities, or shifts. Based on the foregoing, Ramirez met with Petitioner and she was offered a transfer to the Orlando Sentinel building location. However, Petitioner refused to accept the transfer. Thereafter, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated on August 6, 1998. The evidence proved that Ramirez reprimanded Spanish- speaking and Caucasian employees in the same manner. Additionally, there was no credible evidence to show that Ramirez gave any form of favoritism to Spanish-speaking employees. Respondent's reason for terminating Petitioner was based on Respondent's perception that her conduct was disruptive to the work force. The allegation that Petitioner was terminated based on a discriminatory animus is unsubstantiated by the testimony and other evidence. There is no evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on her race (Caucasian).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Attas-Kaplan, Esquire Fisher & Phillips, LLP 450 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 800 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mary J. Hall 1821 Ernest Street Maitland, Florida 32794 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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LEE DELL KENNEDY vs TRAWICK CONSTRUCTION, 07-004366 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 20, 2007 Number: 07-004366 Latest Update: Jul. 10, 2008

The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Findings Of Fact Mr. Kennedy is of the Mormon faith. Mr. Kennedy had worked for Trawick in the past. He renewed his employment with Trawick in September 2005. He was a laborer. Sometime around the middle of September 2005, Mr. Kennedy was assigned to a work crew, whose foreman was Andrew Cooper. Trawick Construction is involved in laying and maintaining communication cable. Trawick has a work yard in Chipley, Florida. In accomplishing its work Trawick erects poles, and strings and lays wires, including fiber-optic cable. The work crew in which Mr. Kennedy worked used a five-ton truck and a trencher. Shovels are also used. Mr. Cooper had worked with Mr. Kennedy when both were laborers for Trawick in 1998. Mr. Cooper advanced to the position of foreman, but Mr. Kennedy remained a laborer and sometime after 1998 left the employ of Trawick. Mr. Kennedy asserted that during working hours on September 26 and 27, 2007, Mr. Cooper talked roughly to him and was "bossy." During that time, the Lord came in a vision to Mr. Kennedy and told him that he needed to pray for Mr. Cooper, so that Mr. Cooper might become a more accommodating and gracious supervisor. Mr. Kennedy revealed to Mr. Cooper that he was praying for him, although Mr. Cooper did not recall hearing any prayers. On September 27, 2007, the crew was working at a site near Enterprise, Alabama. On that day Mr. Kennedy worked slowly and was insubordinate toward Mr. Cooper. When he was told to accomplish designated tasks, Mr. Kennedy informed Mr. Cooper as to whether he would, or would not do as instructed. Mr. Kennedy was disrespectful and insubordinate to Mr. Cooper, who found this behavior to be unacceptable. Mr. Cooper and his crew were late getting back to Chipley because of Mr. Kennedy's failure to participate in the crew's assigned work. On the return trip, apparently having given up on the efficacy of prayer, Mr. Kennedy instead cursed and ranted in the presence of Mr. Cooper. After their return to Chipley, Mr. Cooper prepared a disciplinary report in response to Mr. Kennedy's behavior. The report was presented to Mr. Kennedy and he was asked to sign it. He refused to sign the document Mr. Cooper prepared. Instead he said, "I quit." The next morning, Wednesday, September 28, 2007, Mr. Kennedy put his gear in the five ton truck as if his employment continued, but Mr. Cooper told him to remove it and reminded Mr. Kennedy that he had been fired. Mr. Cooper called Carlton Wells, a supervisor, who eventually arrived at the Trawick facility in Chipley. Mr. Wells could have reversed the termination. However, by the time he arrived, Mr. Kennedy had departed the Chipley work yard. Mr. Wells, by doing nothing, ratified the action of Mr. Cooper. Neither Mr. Cooper nor Mr. Wells was aware of Mr. Kennedy's religious affiliation. No one in the Trawick organization harassed Mr. Kennedy because he was a Mormon, because no one knew he was a Mormon. Accordingly, whatever the hostility of the work situation, it was not in any manner related to religion. The timesheet maintained by Mr. Cooper reflects that Mr. Kennedy was fired on Wednesday, September 28, 2005. It is found as a fact that Mr. Kennedy was fired on September 28, 2005. Trawick has quarterly "safety" meetings. Despite the nomenclature, Trawick uses these "safety" meetings to educate its workers on many subjects, including the company policy forbidding discrimination. Mr. Cooper has attended these meetings when Trawick's policy as to nondiscrimination was taught. As a result, Mr. Cooper is quite aware that Trawick does not tolerate discrimination based on sex, race, color, or religion. He understands that a failure to conform to Trawick's policy with regard to discrimination could result in his demotion. Religion was not a factor in Mr. Cooper's decision to terminate Mr. Kennedy. No one retaliated against Mr. Kennedy because he complained of discrimination based on his religion. In fact, the first complaint of discrimination made by Mr. Kennedy was when he complained to the Commission and by that time he was no longer employed by Trawick. Mr. Kennedy provided no evidence of harm, monetary or otherwise, during the hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the complaint of Lee Dell Kennedy. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Levine Levine & Associates, P.C. 4747 Bellaire Boulevard, Suite 500 Bellaire, Texas 77401 David Britain, Jr., Esquire Trawick Construction 1360 Post Oak Boulevard, Suite 2100 Houston, Texas 77056 Lee Dell Kennedy 747 Pecan Street Chipley, Florida 32428 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Lester McFatter, Esquire Carr Allison 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jason C. Taylor, Esquire Carr Allison 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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ROSA PEARL MCDONALD vs WALTON COUNTY COUNCIL ON AGING, 08-002936 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Defuniak Springs, Florida Jun. 19, 2008 Number: 08-002936 Latest Update: Jun. 04, 2009

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of an unlawful employment practice, by allegedly being subjected to discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, based on her race.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Rosa Pearl McDonald is an African- American female. She was employed at times pertinent to this dispute as a driver, delivering meals to elderly clients of the Walton County Council on Aging. The Petitioner is also a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN). The Respondent, Walton County Council on Aging is a charitable social services agency, domiciled in Walton County. As pertinent to this case, it delivers and serves meals to elderly clients throughout the county, through the use of hired and volunteer drivers. The Petitioner was a recently-hired driver, of less than 30 days' employment, when the operative facts occurred. The Petitioner was still in probationary employment status. The Petitioner contends, in effect, that she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment due to her race. She states she was the only black driver and that her supervisor, Kay Brady, is white. The Petitioner noticed after hiring, that the food delivery boxes had the assigned drivers' names on them. The box she was assigned had only the route name. She states she had asked Ms. Brady to place her name on the box, but the route name was placed on the box instead. The Petitioner acknowledged, upon cross-examination, that she did not know who placed the route label on the food box. She was still a probationary employee at this time. The probationary period was 90 days, and the Petitioner resigned only 30 days or less, after her hiring. Inferentially, it may be that the probationary status was the reason her name was not used, or it may have been an oversight. There is no evidence other than the Petitioner's stated opinion, that the labeling situation was due to racial animus. In fact, the Petitioner had been hired, and fired, by the Respondent twice in the past, and yet it still re-hired her shortly before the subject situation arose. Moreover, Ms. Brady gave the Petitioner extra hours of work when she requested them. These facts tend to negate the existence of racial bias in the imposition of any term or conditions of the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner also contends that she was treated disparately, compared to other drivers. She maintains that a white driver, "Margaret," on occasion had guests ride along with her on her deliveries. The Petitioner states that she asked twice to be allowed to have friends ride with her on deliveries, but Ms. Brady would not allow it. Ms. Kay Brady was the Petitioner's supervisor. She established with her testimony, that the Respondent has a regularly-adopted policy of allowing no riders to accompany route drivers, other than trained volunteers or office personnel, who occasionally go along on deliveries to ascertain that client services are being provided appropriately. Occasionally spouses of regular drivers make deliveries when the driver is ill or must miss work for any reason. The Respondent also uses volunteer drivers, as well. In both situations, however, the spouses or volunteers are given training before being allowed to make deliveries to clients, chiefly because of the privacy requirements of the "Hippa Privacy Law" and the Respondent's client confidentiality policy. The point is, the Petitioner sought to have friends ride with her on deliveries (for reasons which are unclear) and her friends were not trained and oriented to the Respondent's job requirements. The Respondent had a policy of not allowing friends or family to simply accompany drivers without such training, and for reasons which did not relate to job requirements, except in unusual circumstances. One such circumstance involved a driver who needed to be allowed to take her grandchildren with her on a delivery or deliveries, when she was unable to engage a baby sitter. This was an isolated and unusual occurrence, during a time when the children were out of school for Christmas break. On such rare occasions, the Respondent has allowed children to accompany drivers on short trips, on routes near their homes and where children can safely remain in vehicles during deliveries. The above circumstance was probably the one involving driver "Margaret" which the Petitioner described in her testimony. In any event, however, the Respondent had a regular written policy regarding requirements and qualification for persons making deliveries to clients and it followed it, with the above rare exceptions. The employee handbook, Council on Aging Handbook and the Employee Handbook receipt, in evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 5, 6, and 4, respectively, show this policy and the fact that the Petitioner was informed of it. The Petitioner's friends, whom she sought to have accompany her, were not shown to be qualified under the Respondent's requirements. Because the reasons for requesting the accompaniment of proposed "riders" were different for employees other than the Petitioner, referenced in the above examples of policy exceptions, these other drivers were not shown to be similarly-situated exemplar employees, who received more favorable treatment. In fact, the Petitioner was favored in a different way. The Respondent was able to give the Petitioner extra hours of work "sitting" with elderly clients when their caregivers were absent. The Respondent and Ms. Brady would learn about such needs through its normal service contacts with clients and their families. Because the Petitioner is an LPN, the Respondent would refer her for extra work, to her benefit. In summary, the preponderant evidence and above facts show that no adverse employment action occurred. There were no verbal or other acts or adverse employment directives toward the Petitioner at all, much less any that evidence racial animus, by supervisors or employees. Therefore, there was no racially hostile environment, so there could not be one in which her terms and conditions of employment were altered. Moreover, since there were no disciplinary actions toward the Petitioner, nor adverse employment directives or conditions (in fact she was favored with extra hours), there could be no constructive termination. There certainly was no actual termination. The Petitioner, in fact, resigned her position, telling both Ms. Brady and Mr. Moore that it was for health reasons. She admitted as much in her testimony.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the Petitioner's Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosa Pearl McDonald 1961 McLeod Road DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Kay Brady Walton County Council on Aging Post Office Box 648 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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