The Issue Whether Respondent, John R. Blum (Mr. Blum), violated the re-employment provisions set forth in section 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2013), and, therefore, must repay his Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) distribution and subsequent monthly retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Blum was employed as a highway patrol officer with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). He made the decision to enter DROP, and, for the last five years of his employment with DHSMV, he participated in DROP. Prior to ending his DROP participation, Mr. Blum completed a Deferred Retirement Option Program Termination Notification, confirming he would terminate employment on May 31, 2013. The notification was also signed by the retirement coordinator for DHSMV confirming Mr. Blum’s employment termination date, and reads in pertinent part: In order to satisfy your employment termination requirement, you must terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after your DROP termination date. Termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become employed with any FRS covered employer in a position covered or non-covered by retirement for the first 6 calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching, adjunct professor or non-Division approved contractual services. * * * If you fail to meet the termination requirement, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation and you must repay all retirement benefits received (including accumulated DROP benefits). The form has been incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-11.004(9). Mr. Blum terminated his employment with DHSMV on the agreed termination date of May 31, 2013. In July 2013, Mr. Blum began to work once again with DHSMV. He had applied and was hired to return as a reserve officer to work security at Florida turnpike stations. The Florida Highway Patrol provided Mr. Blum with access to the online system for payroll, and he was paid for his work through direct deposit from DHSMV, an FRS employer. Mr. Blum was under the mistaken impression that, when he worked the security for the turnpike stations, he was working for a private vendor. He had no intention of violating the termination of employment provisions. In September 2013, after working for almost three months, Mr. Blum was notified that he had violated the termination of employment provisions of DROP, and he ceased working as a reserve officer. On May 8, 2014, the Division sent a letter to Mr. Blum, notifying him that his DROP participation and retirement had been voided and that he must repay all retirement benefits, including his DROP accumulation. The total amount paid is $227,755.51, which the Division seeks to recover. He was also informed that his retirement account would be credited to reflect membership from March 2009 through May 2013. Mr. Blum has returned to work as a highway patrol officer, and his DROP application has been approved effective May 1, 2014.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order finding that Mr. Blum violated the re-employment provisions of section 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes, and, therefore, must repay retirement payments in the amount of $227,755.51 to the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Blum 5050 Southwest Eleventh Place Margate, Florida 33068-4060 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Bruce Conroy, Interim General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is now, and has been since December 19, 1974, an employee of the State of Florida. By virtue of her employment with the State of Florida, Petitioner is an active, regular class member of the FRS. Petitioner was considered “vested” for purposes of the FRS when she completed 10 years of creditable service with the State of Florida. The “normal retirement date,” for regular class members, is defined, in pertinent part, as the first day of the month following the date on which the member attains 62 years of age, with six or more years of creditable service,1/ or the date on which the member reaches 30 years of creditable service, regardless of age. § 121.021(29)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner was born on June 6, 1944 and reached the age of 62 on June 6, 2006. She reached 30 years of creditable service in November 2004. Petitioner’s “normal retirement date” for purposes of the FRS was established as December 1, 2004, by virtue of reaching 30 years of creditable service in November 2004. Petitioner was aware that her “normal retirement date” had been established as December 1, 2004. An active member becomes eligible to enter the DROP upon reaching his or her “normal retirement date.” A member must elect to participate in the DROP within 12 months of the date on which he or she first attains his or her normal retirement date. A member who fails to make an election within such 12-month limitation period forfeits all rights to participate in the DROP. § 121.091(13)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner’s period of eligibility to enter the DROP began on December 1, 2004 and ended on November 30, 2005. Petitioner requested DROP retirement benefit estimates from the Division on three separate occasions. On November 25, 2003, Petitioner asked Respondent to send her the first DROP retirement benefit estimate. On December 2, 2003, Respondent sent Petitioner the first DROP retirement benefit estimate. The Comments section of the document advised that the estimate was based on the assumption that Petitioner would enter the DROP effective 12/1/2004. Accordingly, the DROP Estimated Benefit Accrual Calculation section provided for a 12/2004 “DROP Begin Date,” an 11/2009 “DROP End Date,” and 60 “Months in DROP.” The first DROP retirement benefit estimate makes no reference to Petitioner’s normal retirement date. On December 1, 2004, Petitioner asked Respondent to send her a second DROP retirement benefit estimate. On December 1, 2004, Respondent sent Petitioner the second DROP retirement benefit estimate. The Comments section of the document advised that in order for Ms. Campbell to retain a 12/2004 DROP retirement date, she must complete and return the enclosed DROP application materials within 30 days of the date the second estimate was mailed. Again, the DROP Estimated Benefit Accrual Calculation section provided for a 12/2004 “DROP Begin Date,” an 11/2009 “DROP End Date,” and 60 “Months in DROP.” The second DROP retirement benefit estimate makes no reference to Petitioner’s normal retirement date. On October 24, 2005, Petitioner asked Respondent to send her a third DROP retirement benefit estimate. On October 25, 2005, Respondent sent Petitioner the third DROP retirement benefit estimate. Again, she was advised in that mailing that in order for Petitioner to retain a 10/2005 DROP retirement date, she must complete and return the enclosed DROP application materials within 30 days of the date the third estimate was mailed. The Comments section also advised that Petitioner’s 50 months of DROP participation would be from 10/01/2005 to 11/30/2009. Accordingly, the DROP Estimated Benefit Accrual Calculation section was changed to provide for a 10/2005 “DROP Begin Date,” an 11/2009 “DROP End Date,” and 50 “Months in DROP.” The third DROP retirement benefit estimate makes no reference to Respondent’s normal retirement date. Petitioner alleged at final hearing that she was confused by the language Respondent used in the third DROP retirement benefit estimate. Petitioner presumed that Respondent had changed her normal retirement date to 10/2005, and therefore she believed she had an additional 12 months to elect to participate in the DROP. There is no indication in Respondent’s records that Petitioner ever contacted Respondent’s personnel to express confusion about or to ask questions about any of the DROP retirement benefit estimates provided to her. Respondent’s standard practice is to enclose an informational brochure, entitled “Deferred Retirement Option Program,” when it sends DROP retirement benefit estimates. Petitioner also testified at final hearing that she was confused by certain language Respondent used in the DROP Brochure to her to explain when a member could begin the DROP, specifically: The earliest you may begin participation in DROP is the month you reach your normal retirement date based upon your age, or the month after the month you reach your normal retirement date based upon your years of service. Petitioner claim of confusion is not credible in view of the fact that the above language is followed by an example designed to help those members who may have difficulty understanding the meaning of the language: If you are vested (have at least 6 years but less than 30 years of service credit), and attain age 62 on May 22nd; your normal retirement date would be May 1st. Or, if you will complete 30 years of service in May, your normal retirement date is June 1st. (Exhibit R-10). Finally, the DROP Brochure was intended to put statutory language into laymen’s terms for the FRS membership. The DROP Brochure includes a disclaimer on the first page after the cover page which states: If questions of interpretation arise as a result of the attempt to make these retirement provisions easy to understand, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, Chapter 60S, Florida Administrative Code, and the Internal Revenue Code shall remain the final authorities. There is no indication in Respondent’s records that Petitioner ever contacted Respondent’s personnel to express her confusion about the wording of the DROP Brochure or to ask questions about when she could begin DROP or her DROP participation eligibility. Petitioner possesses both Bachelor’s and Master’s Degrees in Education. In addition, she formerly possessed a Florida Teaching Certificate. On the basis of her educational achievements and teaching certification, Petitioner is a well- educated individual. Petitioner’s former employer, the Division of State Group Insurance, was in the process of privatizing during 2005, and was therefore laying off some of its employees. Petitioner also feared lay-off and decided to delay filing her application materials for the DROP. Respondent received Petitioner’s Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (Form DP-11) on January 5, 2006. Petitioner signed the Form DP- 11 on December 22, 2005. Petitioner’s employer certified the Form DP-11 on December 29, 2005. Petitioner’s Form DP-11 also included the following acknowledgement: I . . . elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.). My DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I first reach my normal retirement date as determined by the Division of Retirement. (Exhibit R-5). On January 5, 2006, Respondent also received Petitioner’s Notice of Election to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment (Form DP-ELE). Petitioner signed the Form DP-ELE on December 22, 2005. Petitioner’s employer certified the Form DP- ELE on December 29, 2005. Petitioner’s Form DP-ELE also included the following acknowledgement: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below. . . . I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, . . . . (Exhibit R-6). On January 11, 2006, Respondent issued an initial agency action letter which advised Petitioner as follows: To participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), you were required to submit a Form DP-ELE (Notice of Election to Participate in the DROP and Resignation of Employment) within twelve months of the date you first became eligible to participate in the DROP. If the Form DP-ELE is not received within this twelve month period, the right to participate in DROP is forfeited. Your dates of eligibility to elect participation in the DROP was [sic] from 12/01/2004 to 11/30/2005. We received your Form DP-ELE and Form DP-11, Application for Service Retirement and DROP, in our office on 01/05/2006. Because the Division received the DP-ELE after the ending eligibility date, you are not eligible to participate in the DROP. The DP-ELE and DP- 11 forms are considered null and void. (Exhibit R-7). On March 6, 2006, Respondent issued a final agency action letter which advised Petitioner as follows: Section 121.091(13)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, gives all active Florida Retirement System (FRS) members the right to elect participation in the DROP provided that: “Election to participate is made within 12 months immediately following the date on which the member first reaches normal retirement date. . . A member who fails to make an elections [sic] within such 12-month limitation period shall forfeit all rights to participate in the DROP “ (emphasis added). You first became eligible to participate in the DROP on 12/01/2004, after earning 30 years of service credit in 11/2004. Therefore, your Form DP-ELE, Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment and Form DP-11, Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) must have been received no later than 11/30/2005 for you to be eligible to participate in the DROP. Your Forms DP-ELE and DP-11 were received in the Division of Retirement on 01/05/2006. Since the Forms DP-ELE and DP-11 were not submitted and received by the Division within the 12-month limitation period, you have forfeited your right to participate in the DROP. The Forms DP-ELE and DP-11 you submitted are null and void. It is unfortunate that your eligibility period to begin participation in DROP has expired, however because the 12-month eligibility period stated above is a statutory requirement and we have no authority to waive the law, we must deny your request for DROP participation. (Exhibit R-8)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order denying Petitioner’s application to participate in the DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2006.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Barbara L. Hughes, who was reemployed as a "media specialist," but who also taught a class, violated the provisions of Section 121.091, Florida Statutes (2006).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Barbara L. Hughes, is a member of FRS. She terminated DROP and retired effective June 30, 2007. Petitioner returned to work on August 14, 2007. Petitioner was paid retirement benefits and health insurance subsidy payments for August 2007. The retirement benefit for August was $1,640.23. The health insurance subsidy payment for August was $150.00. The total amount for retirement benefits and health insurance benefits was $1,790.23. To avoid a threatened penalty, she voluntarily repaid these benefits subject to her belief that she was legally entitled to them. Petitioner's retirement benefits have been inactivated since September 2007. Petitioner is currently employed and has been employed for more than 32 years as a media specialist for the Glades County School Board, teaching at Moore Haven Junior-Senior High School. The school's student population is approximately 350. Although her position title is "media specialist," her present instructional activities are mixed, i.e., she is a media specialist 71 percent of the workday and a classroom teacher 29 percent of the workday. In July 1999, Petitioner enrolled in the Florida Retirement System DROP plan. The Florida Retirement System DROP plan allows a member of the FRS to retire and accrue retirement benefits while the member continues employment. Since the member does not accrue further service credit while in DROP, the FRS considers the member retired. Petitioner terminated her DROP and retired, effective June 30, 2007. As a retired member of FRS, Petitioner is subject to the reemployment limitations in Section 121.091, Florida Statutes. Petitioner returned to employment with an annual contract with a position title, media specialist, in August 2007. This was the same position that she had been employed in when she entered and terminated DROP.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Barbara L. Hughes, meets the definition of "classroom teacher" in Subsection 1012.01(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and that she is eligible for retirement payments from August 2007 to present. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Barbara L. Hughes c/o Norman L. Hughes Education Center of Southwest Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 183 LaBelle, Florida 33975 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner showed by the preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to receive Mr. Carl Kemper's retirement benefits. The specific factual issue for resolution is whether Petitioner brought forward evidence showing that Mr. Carl Kemper had selected Florida Retirement System Option 2 of Form FRS-11o, which would allow her to receive the monthly benefits, as opposed to Respondent's records, which show that Mr. Carl Kemper selected Option 1 of Form FRS-11o, which does not allow for continued benefit payments after his death.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Judith E. Mills', petition to receive Mr. Kemper's retirement benefits be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2011.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioners are entitled to Option 2 continuing retirement benefits following the death of Linda Prince, a Florida Retirement System member.
Findings Of Fact Linda J. Prince was employed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (hereinafter "FDLE") and was a vested, regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter "FRS"). After she was diagnosed with a serious health condition, she was able to continue as a full-time employee by participating in the Department's sick leave pool. By November 2008 her family understood that she was terminally ill. About that time, she began alternating staying at the home of her son Brian Prince and at the home of her daughter and son-in- law Wendy and Harrison T. Rivers. During the first week of November 2008, her son, daughter, and son-in-law began discussing whether she should retire rather than remaining in full-pay status. Harrison T. Rivers asked his father Harrison W. Rivers for advice since his father was a retired member of FRS. His father told him that Linda Prince should retire right away under Option 2 since that would guarantee a 10-year payout. One of the persons that Harrison T. Rivers contacted for advice referred him to Annie Lamb, a Personnel Services Specialist at FDLE. He remembers asking her about Option 2 and understood her to tell him that Option 2 required having a spouse or other dependents. She does not recall the conversation. When Harrison T. Rivers conveyed his understanding to Brian Prince, Brian requested that a meeting be set up at FDLE's Personnel Office. The two men met with Samantha Andrews, a different FDLE Personnel Services Specialist, near the end of 2008. All three persons attending the meeting recall that they discussed the sick leave pool, and the two men were assured that there were enough donations to the sick leave pool to cover Linda Prince's continuing need. The attendees at the meeting have different recollections of the other matters discussed. The two men believe they discussed Option 2 and that Samantha Andrews called across the hall to Annie Lamb who confirmed that Option 2 required a spouse. Lamb recalls Andrews asking her a question but does not remember what the question was. Andrews does not recall asking Lamb a question and further does not recall discussing the retirement options at the meeting. At the final hearing, Andrews admitted that she did not understand the differences among the four retirement options until after Linda Prince's death and that before then she thought that one had to be a spouse or a dependent child to be a beneficiary. Andrews' impression of the meeting is that Linda Prince's children wanted to be sure she remained in full- pay status through the sick leave pool to increase her income and keep her benefits available and at a reasonable cost. After this meeting, Linda Prince remained on full-pay employment status. As a result, she received (1) her full salary rather than a reduced retirement amount, (2) health insurance at a cost of $25 bi-weekly, and (3) a $44,000 life insurance policy at the cost of $2 bi-weekly. If she had retired, she would have had to pay nearly $500 a month for the health insurance and would have lost her $44,000 life insurance policy. Instead, she would have had the option of purchasing either a $10,000 or $2,500 life insurance policy for $29.65 or $7.41 a pay period, respectively. On January 10, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers was visiting at his son's home while Linda Prince was staying there. In a conversation with her, he was surprised to learn that she had not retired as he had strongly advised two months earlier. When he later questioned his son as to why she had not retired, his son told him because she did not have a spouse. Harrison W. Rivers told his son that that information was not correct. On January 20, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers met with his own financial advisor David A. Wengert and relayed the information his son had given him. Wengert agreed with Rivers that the information about a spouse or dependent child was not correct but checked with a contact he had at the Department of Corrections. That person confirmed that the spouse or dependent child requirement did not apply to Option 2 and faxed the necessary forms for retiring under Option 2 to Wengert who gave them to Rivers. Harrison W. Rivers gave the folder from Wengert containing the correct information and required forms to his son and told his son to retire Linda Prince immediately. His son subsequently called Brian Prince, gave him the correct information, and told him that Linda Prince should retire. Brian Prince agreed but was out of town at the time. On February 11, 2009, Harrison T. Rivers drove Annie Lamb from FDLE to where Linda Prince was staying. The forms were completed and signed, and Lamb notarized Linda Prince's signature. The forms provided for Linda Prince to take early retirement under Option 2 with Brian Prince and Wendy Rivers as her equal beneficiaries. The forms were filed with Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, the same day. The forms she signed selected February 28, 2009, as Linda Prince's termination of employment date. A termination date of February 28, 2009, resulted in a March 1, 2009, retirement date. Linda Prince died on February 14, 2009. On that date, she was still in full-pay status since she had not terminated her employment and retired. Option 2 under the FRS system provides a reduced monthly benefit payable for the member's lifetime, but if the member dies within ten years after his or her retirement date, the designated beneficiary receives a monthly benefit in the same amount for the balance of the ten-year period, and then no further benefits are payable. Option 1 provides for monthly payments for the member's lifetime, and upon the member's death, no further monthly benefits are payable. It, therefore, pays no continuing benefits to a beneficiary. Options 3 and 4 provide for joint annuitants and reduced monthly benefits. Under Option 3, upon the member's death, the joint annuitant, who must be a spouse or a financial dependent, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount, but there are limitations on the amount and length of those payments for a joint annuitant under 25 who is not a spouse. Option 4 provides an adjusted monthly benefit while the member and the joint annuitant are living, a further reduced monthly benefit after the death of either the member or the joint annuitant, with adjustments if the joint annuitant is under the age of 25 and not a spouse. No benefits are payable after both the member and the joint annuitant are deceased. Thus, only Options 3 and 4 require a spouse or financial dependent in order for continuing benefits to be paid after the member's death. Upon learning of her death, the Division of Retirement researched whether any benefits were due to Linda Prince or her beneficiaries. Since she had paid nothing into the FRS, there were no contributions to refund. Further, since she had not retired, no retirement benefits were payable to her or her beneficiaries. The Division also looked at the dates of birth of her beneficiaries to determine if a beneficiary would qualify as a joint annuitant, but both of her beneficiaries were over the age of 25. The only time that Linda Prince contacted the Division of Retirement was in 2002 when she sent an e-mail asking that her benefits be calculated as to what she would receive if she retired at age 62. The Division performed the calculations and sent her the information as to what her benefits would be under Options 1 and 2. Her file contains her e-mail, the benefits estimates sent to her, and a copy of an informational retirement brochure. Information on the FRS, including descriptions of the Options, has been available on the Division's website, in employee handbooks available from the Division, and was available in written form in FDLE's Personnel Office on the day that Brian Prince and Harrison T. Rivers met with Samantha Andrews. During that meeting, neither Brian Prince nor Harrison T. Rivers requested a copy of the employee handbook or any written materials describing the Options for retirement. Because of Petitioners' estoppel argument, the chronology in this case must be closely reviewed. At least until early November 2008, Linda Prince had made her decision to stay on full-pay status to receive her full salary and benefits rather than take early retirement. In early November, her son, daughter, and son-in-law became involved in that decision. In early November, her son-in-law understood an FDLE employee to say that Linda Prince needed a spouse or financial dependent to qualify for continuing retirement benefits, but his father, who was a retired member of FRS, told him that information was wrong and that Option 2 would provide a ten-year continuing benefit for her beneficiaries. No contact was made on her behalf with the Division of Retirement to ascertain which information was correct. On January 10, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers, upon learning that Linda Prince was still not retired, again told his son that she should be retired under Option 2 and that his son's understanding that she needed a spouse or financial dependent was wrong. Again, no contact was made with the Division of Retirement. On January 20, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers obtained the written information and required forms. Within a few days he gave the information and forms to his son and told him again to see to it that Linda Prince was retired immediately. Yet, the forms were not executed and filed with the Division of Retirement until February 11, 2009. Had Linda Prince or anyone on her behalf contacted the Division of Retirement to clarify which information was correct once they had conflicting information the first week of November 2008, she could have retired starting December 1. Had Linda Prince or anyone on her behalf submitted her application for retirement when Harrison W. Rivers provided the correct information and forms to use in January 2009, she could have retired then with a February 1 retirement date. Even though Petitioners offered evidence to show that they relied upon erroneous information conveyed by Harrison T. Rivers and even though they offered evidence that they received erroneous information from Samantha Andrews, it would have been clear to a reasonable person that such information conflicted with the information given by Harrison W. Rivers, who had gone through the process. Further, in January when Rivers gave them the correct written information and the forms to use, there was no basis for relying upon the erroneous information. If Petitioners had acted to clarify the previous conflicting information or had not delayed in having Linda Prince execute the forms when Rivers provided them, they would have retired her before her death and would have been entitled to continuing benefits. Whatever circumstances caused the further delay in the filing of Linda Prince's application for retirement and supporting documentation, the delay was not caused by the information, erroneous or not, provided by the FDLE employees. Accordingly, Linda Prince was still a full-time employee at the time of her death not as a result of erroneous information provided by FDLE employees as alleged by Petitioners, but as a result of delay in obtaining the easily- accessible correct information from the Division of Retirement and as a result of delay in acting on the correct information when it was provided to them. There are over 960 agencies, including state departments and local governments and school boards, which participate in the FRS. The employer and employee handbooks distributed to those agencies and their employees by the Division of Retirement clearly state that representatives of participating agencies are not the agents of the Division of Retirement but rather only act as a link between employees and the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Petitioners ineligible for an Option 2 benefit from the FRS retirement account of Linda Prince. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian Prince 1063 Walden Road Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Harrison Rivers 4211 Camden Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner Deborah Barrington, the surviving spouse of Ronald Mitchell Barrington, is entitled to a monthly benefit from Mr. Barrington’s Florida Retirement System (FRS) pension plan.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with administering the FRS. In 1986, Mr. Barrington began employment with the Department of Revenue (DOR). Mr. Barrington was a member of the FRS pension plan based on his employment with DOR. Ms. Barrington was the spouse of Mr. Barrington. Ms. Barrington testified that she was married to Mr. Barrington for 43 years. On June 6, 2007, Mr. Barrington contacted Respondent, via email, to inquire as to when he could enter the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) administered by Respondent. Respondent requested some additional information from Mr. Barrington, which he provided, including the identity of his spouse, Ms. Barrington. Respondent received, on January 11, 2011, a form entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment,” from Mr. Barrington. This form shows that Mr. Barrington intended to enter the DROP program on April 1, 2011, and that his termination and resignation date would be March 31, 2016. Mr. Barrington also completed a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP)” form, which Respondent also received on January 11, 2011. This form, similar to the form described in paragraph 5 above, listed Mr. Barrington’s intended dates to enter the DROP program, and his intended termination and resignation dates, but also listed Ms. Barrington as his primary beneficiary. Respondent also received Form FRS-11o, entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Option Selection for FRS Members” (Option Selection Form), on January 14, 2011 (according to the facsimile header on this form). The Option Selection Form required Mr. Barrington to select one of four retirement benefit payment options. The Option Selection Form provided an explanation for each of the four options. The Option Selection Form reflects that Mr. Barrington initially selected to receive an Option 3 retirement benefit by checking the line next to the Option 3 benefit payment option. However, the Option Selection Form also reflects that Mr. Barrington struck through the checkmark next to the Option 3 benefit payment option, wrote his initials “RB,” and then checked the line next to the Option 1 benefit payment option, indicating he selected to receive the Option 1 retirement benefit. A significant difference exists between Options 1 and 3: Option 3 provides for a “reduced monthly benefit” during the member’s lifetime, and after death, the member’s joint annuitant would receive a lifetime monthly benefit in that same amount; while under Option 1, the member would receive the maximum benefit for the member’s life, with no continuing benefit to a joint annuitant after the member’s death. The Option Selection Form reflects that Deborah Holley notarized the signature of Mr. Barrington. Along with the Option Selection Form, Respondent received a form entitled “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Spousal Acknowledgement Form,” (Spousal Acknowledgment Form) on January 14, 2011 (according to the facsimile header on this form). The Spousal Acknowledgment Form provides that if the member is married and has selected Option 1 or 2 on the Option Selection Form, the member’s spouse must complete “Box 2” on the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. The Spousal Acknowledgment Form reflects that Ms. Barrington completed “Box 2,” but in the portion that states that she “acknowledge[s] that the member has selected Option 1 or 2[,]” the Spousal Acknowledgment Form reflects that “1 or 2” is stricken through, and instead, the number “3” is hand written nearby. The Spousal Acknowledgment Form further reflects the signature of Ms. Barrington, dated September 10, 2010, and that Deborah Holley notarized the signatures of both Mr. and Ms. Barrington. Respondent introduced into evidence Ms. Holley’s public commission as a notary in the State of Florida, indicating that Ms. Holley was a duly licensed notary, and which was effective when Mr. and Ms. Barrington executed the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. On February 1, 2011, Respondent mailed Mr. Barrington an “Acknowledgment of DROP Application,” acknowledging: (a) receipt of Mr. Barrington’s Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP); (b) his selection of Option 1 as the benefit payment option; and (c) his DROP begin date of April 1, 2011, and this DROP end date of March 31, 2016. The Acknowledgment of DROP application expressly states, in bold, all-caps letters, the following: AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION (OR 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS LETTER IS MAILED, IF LATER) RETIREMENT IS FINAL. YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. On May 10, 2011, Respondent mailed Mr. Barrington a “Final Notice of DROP Benefit,” which included his final benefit accrual calculation based on Option 1. Respondent received (according to the facsimile header on this form) on December 14, 2015, a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) Termination Notification,” from Mr. Barrington, which reflected that he would terminate his employment with an FRS employer on March 31, 2016. On January 11, 2017, Mr. Barrington passed away. On February 23, 2017, Respondent sent a survivor letter to Ms. Barrington informing her that “[t]he option selected by the member does not provide a continuing benefit beyond the month of death.” After Ms. Barrington contacted Respondent to inquire about receiving a monthly benefit, Respondent sent Ms. Barrington a letter, dated November 30, 2020, which constituted final agency action, and which informed Ms. Barrington that Respondent paid Mr. Barrington’s retirement benefits according to his retirement option selection—Option 1—and that denied Ms. Barrington’s request to receive a monthly benefit. Testimony of Ms. Barrington and Mr. Halley Ms. Barrington testified that she never signed the Spousal Acknowledgment Form, that Mr. Barrington mistakenly selected Option 1 on the Option Selection Form, and that Ms. Holley failed to properly notarize these documents. Ms. Barrington further testified that Mr. Barrington was ill and, according to her, must have been confused when he selected Option 1. Ms. Barrington testified that she was not with Mr. Barrington when he completed the Option Selection Form. Ms. Barrington did not present any medical or other evidence to establish that Mr. Barrington lacked mental capacity at the time he executed the Option Selection Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. Ms. Barrington did not present any additional evidence, other than her own testimony, to establish that Ms. Holley failed to properly notarize the Option Selection Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form. Mr. Halley testified that when Respondent receives the forms for processing a FRS member’s application to enter the DROP program, it reviews the forms “to make sure they are not blank or any information that is necessary is not omitted[,]” and “for any irregularities on the forms and things of that nature[.]” He testified that at any given time, there are more than one million members in FRS. He testified that it is an “impossibility” for Respondent to reach out to each FRS member to confirm that their signature is authentic, or to call and confirm with each FRS member that they intended the particular option that they selected. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at the final hearing, Ms. Barrington failed to establish that Mr. Barrington lacked the mental capacity to select a retirement option at the time he completed the Option Selection Form. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at the final hearing, Ms. Barrington failed to establish that Ms. Holley improperly notarized the Option Section Form or the Spousal Acknowledgment Form.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for a continuing monthly benefit from Mr. Barrington’s FRS pension plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2021. Deborah Barrington 44 Parkside Circle Crawfordville, Florida 32327-7413 William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retain retirement benefits received by him during the time periods May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985 through June 30, 1985.
Findings Of Fact On June 26 and 27, 1990, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to the Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is hereby rejected as an ultimate finding of fact in that it a recitation of isolated bits and pieces of testimony of witnesses, and it is not proper as an ultimate finding of fact. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is hereby rejected upon the authority of Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla.), in that it is based upon statements of the parties as to the working relationship, which under the Cantor case is not competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reason stated in Paragraph No. 3. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is accepted to the extent that on November 1, 1984, the Petitioner was an employee of the Union County School Board, and continued as such through June 30, 1987, but the remainder of that proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is hereby rejected in that it is based on the statements and arrangements of the parties, which, based upon the Cantor case do not constitute competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11, are hereby rejected in that each of them is ambiguous, irrelevant, not based upon any competent substantial evidence in the record, and do not serve to either prove or disapprove any of the issues in this cause. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, is hereby rejected in that is erroneous as to the dates in question and as to the number of hours in the School Board workweek. The dates in 1983, 1984, and 1985, during which the Petitioner's retirement benefits had been suspended because of exceeding the 780-hour work limitation were as follows: May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985, through June 30, 1985. The Respondent's proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 1 through 8 are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was overpaid retirement benefits for the time periods of May 25, 1985 through June 30, 1985, in the amount of $3024.66. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1990.
