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MAZHAR G. NAWAZ, M. D. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 03-001607MPI (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 01, 2003 Number: 03-001607MPI Latest Update: May 26, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments and, if so, the total amount of the overpayments. Petitioner agreed at the onset of the hearing not to contest the findings of the Agency that Petitioner received Medicaid monies to which he was not entitled. Therefore, the issue remaining for determination is: Whether Respondent calculated the overpayment amount of $52,850.82 using a valid statistical formula and a valid sample of recipients and claims during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002.

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence, official recognition granted, evidentiary rulings made, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are established. The Agency is charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Sections 409.907 and 409.913, Florida Statutes (2003). Among its administrative duties, the Agency operates a program to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid providers to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect occur to the minimum extent possible and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate. "Overpayment" is statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid Program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake." § 409.913(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2000). The FAAR, covering the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, together with the Agency's work papers, set out a Medicaid overpayment amount of $52,850.82 that the Agency seeks to recoup from Petitioner. Petitioner is a physician enrolled in the Medicaid program under provider number 0580091-00, who operated under his provider number during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, under the auspices of a standard Medicaid provider agreement. As a part of the Medicaid provider agreement, the provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, and statements of policy. Petitioner participated in the Medicaid program during the FAAR period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, and received payment for the services that the Agency now questions and are the subject of the audit. During the above audit period, the applicable statutes, rules, and Medicaid handbooks required Petitioner to retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Petitioner had to retain these records for at least five years from the date of services. The Florida Medicaid program prepares and furnishes handbooks to all enrolled Medicaid providers, including Petitioner. These handbooks set forth the Medicaid policies with regard to services rendered and billed by providers. Petitioner had a duty to make sure that each claim submitted was true and accurate and was for goods and services that were provided, by an enrolled Medicaid provider, in accordance with the requirements of Medicaid rules, handbooks, and policies, and in accordance with federal and state law. Medicaid providers who do not comply with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies hereinabove may be subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Mr. Hector Tapining (Mr. Tapining) and Phyllis Stiver (Nurse Stiver), registered nurse consultant for Medicaid Program Integrity, conducted an on-site visit to Petitioner's office and requested records. From the files of Petitioner, Mr. Tapining generated a random list of 30 Medicaid recipients (the cluster sample) who had received services by Petitioner during the two- year audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002. The Agency thereafter generated worksheets reflecting: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) total number of claims made by Petitioner, with dates of medical services provided; (3) the total amount of money paid Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Additional Agency-generated worksheets reflected: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) the total number of claims of Petitioner, with dates of service; (3) the total amount of money paid to Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to Nurse Stiver for her review of compliance with Medicaid enrollment and documentation. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to E. Rawson Griffin, III, M.D. (Dr. Griffin), the medical records consultant, for his review and evaluation of appropriate billing codes. The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. Dr. Griffin, after review of 30 patient records, concluded that Petitioner engaged in a general pattern of over coding at the highest level of code (99205) for services rendered that appeared to be rather straight-forward and simple for the medical services rendered at the time of each visit. Over coding is the term employed when supporting documentation for medical billing does not support the billing code chosen and assigned by the provider. In his review, Dr. Griffin saw no middle codes (99213s and/or 99214s) billed by Petitioner. Dr. Griffin opined that it was extraordinary that Petitioner would see and service 30 patients on their first visits, who at that time presented a complaint necessitating a medical necessity level code 99205, the highest level of Medicaid service. Continuing, Dr. Griffin explained that over coding is entering in the patient's billing statement a code higher than the patient's medical complaint and the Patient's recorded medical necessity warranted for the visit or visits (1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) on the date those services were provided by Petitioner. In Dr. Griffin's opinion, Medicaid billing codes are to be determined by consideration of the following medical factors: (1) the patient's particular medical complaint and the degree of complexity of that complaint at the time of the initial visit, (2) the type of and the complexity of medical examinations and the tests necessarily required to be administered based upon the type and complexity of the initial complaint, and (3) the resulting interpretations of the tests and the examinations administered for treatment of the complaint. It is only after completion of the above analysis and documentation in the patient's medical records, would a code 22915 billing be appropriate. Dr. Griffin's analysis of the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner resulted in his down coding Petitioner’s billing as shown below.2 I.D. Number Service Date Code Billed Adjustment B.K. 1 03-29-2000 215 (5) 214 B.K. 1 07-19-2000 214 213 1 08-17-2000 214 213 1 12-11-2000 215 214 1 02-22-2001 215 214 1 05-23-2001 214 213 1 06-24-2001 214 212 J.A.C. 4 No date 215 214 J.R. 5 10-02-2000 215 213 B.F. 6 07-25-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 04-10-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 05-04-2000 214 213 (2 visits) D.C. 9 01-23-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-07-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-28-2000 214 213 D.W. 13 01-12-2000 215 213 P.L. 14 01-10-2000 214 213 I.H. 15 12-18-2000 215 213 M.V. 17 04-10-2000 215 213 R.R. 21 04-17-2001 214 213 S.K. 25 11-20-2000 212 211 A.H. 26 12-19-2000 215 212 T.P. 27 02-20-2000 215 213 M.R. 28 11-14-2002 215 214 E.C. 29 04-28-2000 214 213 E.C. 07-03-2000 214 213 12-28-2000 214 212 01-02-2000 214 212 01-23-2000 214 212 02-06-2000 214 212 04-03-2000 214 212 (6 visits) R.S. 30 04-16-2001 215 213 Nurse Stiver reviewed the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner for compliance with Medicaid policy(s) to ensure that services billed are the services for which Medicaid pays and are services that meet all aspects of the Medicaid policy(s) as specified in the Medicaid Handbook. Medicaid policy, regarding provider enrollment, requires (all) providers who services Medicaid patients to be (individually) enrolled in the Medicaid program as providers before providing service and billing Medicaid for those services. The Agency verifies the education, credentials, and criminal background of each enrollee to ensure the safety of Medicaid recipients. The individual provider enrollment is required as a condition precedent for providers to bill Medicaid for services and to be paid by Medicaid for those services. The enrollment requirement includes PAs and ARNPs. Nurse Stiver's review of Petitioner's documents sought to ascertain whether each provider who actually rendered services had executed a voluntary enrollment contract agreement between the Agency and that provider. In these contract agreements, the provider agrees to comply with all laws and rules pertaining to the Medicaid program when furnishing a service or goods to a Medicaid recipient, and the Agency agrees to pay a sum, determined by a fee schedule, payment methodology, or other manner, for the service or goods provided to the Medicaid recipient. The Medicaid Handbook requires separate and/or individual enrollment of each and every entity that provides Medicaid service(s) to Medicaid recipients. The mandatory enrollment includes a provider(s) who makes written entries on and/or signs Medicaid documents. Should the medical service provider and the provider documenting the Medicaid recipient's medical files and the provider billing Medicaid for services rendered be different providers, each provider must be individually enrolled in the Medicaid program. Within a chain of provider entities, the failure of one provider entity to be enrolled entitles the Agency to full recoupment of all Medicaid payments made to the enrolled Provider. Nurse Stiver applied the above analysis to the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid recipients' records recovered from Petitioner's files and to the Agency's worksheets. Nurse Stiver's review and her investigation revealed specific instances in which the paid billing claims evidenced that Petitioner's non-enrolled PAs and/or Petitioner's non-enrolled ARNP either provided the medical services or documented the medical services provided to the Medicaid recipients as shown below: Patient Service Date(s) Services and/or documentation 1. B.K. Serviced 9 times Signature-not enrolled 2. E.J. 08-14-01 Records written and signed by PA not enrolled and (not countersigned by Petitioner) 3. E.T. Serviced 4 times Services provided not entitled to Medicaid payment (unauthorized) J.A. (stipulation) Stipulation3 B.F. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled M.R. 7 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled F.H. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled through 12. Stipulations 13. D.W. 2 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 14. through 17. Stipulations 18. L.A. 5 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 19. and 20. Stipulations 21. R.R. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 22. and 23. Stipulations 24. L.S. 1 visit-serviced Provider not enrolled 25. S.K. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 26. through 28. Stipulations 29. E.C. 12 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 30. Stipulation After the review and examination of the claims submitted within the cluster sample, Nurse Stiver concluded the above services billed to the Agency were not performed by Petitioner. She opined that either or both of Petitioner's employees, Justo Lugo and Phillip Nguyen (PAs) and/or Andrea McDonald (ARNP) provided or assisted in providing services. As non-enrolled providers in the Medicaid program, the PAs and the ARNP’s participation in providing services to Medicaid recipients and/or participation in assisting Petitioner in providing medical services and/or participation in Petitioner's billing Medicaid for medical services to Medicaid recipients violated Medicaid policy. Respondent established that the Medicaid program payments for services provided by an individual not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program are overpayments of which the Agency is entitled to full recoupment. After the reviews and the analysis by Nurse Stiver and Dr. Griffin, using the Agency's formula for calculating the extrapolated overpayments, the Agency determined overpayment in the amount of $64,453.74 to have occurred. Based upon these findings, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) letter setting out the overpayment amount of $64,453.74 and inviting Petitioner to submit additional documentation. Petitioner's additional documentation submittals were reviewed by the Agency. The post-PAAR review resulted in a reduction of overpayment to $52,850.82 as the total overpayment for all claims considered, and sought to be recovered from Petitioner by the Agency. The Agency's worksheets resulting in the $52,850.82 overpayment included: (1) the medical record review summary; (2) a spreadsheet setting out the names of the recipients, the dates of service, the procedure billed, the amount paid by the Agency, the amount allowed by the Agency, and the resulting overpayment; (3) the overpayment calculation using cluster sampling; (4) the patient worksheets, or claims; and (5) the procedure code summary of the claims in the universe, as defined in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2000). The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. The Agency's data and calculations were reviewed by Ian McKeague, Ph.D. (Dr. McKeague). He reproduced the calculations and concluded that $52,850.82 is the correct overpayment amount made by Medicaid to Petitioner. Petitioner produced neither written authority nor expert testimony contesting the validity of the statistical formula and Dr. McKeague's resulting calculation of overpayment. Nurse Stiver, with over 14 years employment with the Agency, worked with the Medicaid policies and handbooks. She worked with Mr. Tapining on the audit of Petitioner documents. Specifically, she reviewed Petitioner's records for compliance with Medicaid policy, to ensure that the services billed are the services Medicaid paid for and that those services met all aspects of Medicaid policy. Nurse Stiver's investigation and review revealed specific instances in which the paid claims show that the PAs and/or the ARNP, not Petitioner himself, provided the services to Medicaid patients. In each case where the Agency determined Petitioner was not entitled to payment, Nurse Stiver reviewed the medical records and determined that the ARNP or one of the PAs, who were not enrolled in the Medicaid program, actually rendered services to Medicaid recipients. Her determination was based upon her many years of nursing experience that the person rendering the services is the person who documents the services rendered. From her review, it appeared that the ARNP or a PA (not enrolled), not Petitioner, documented the service billed to and paid by Medicaid. Services rendered by an ARNP or a PA who is not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program cannot be compensated by the Medicaid program. Petitioner argued that he provided all Medicaid services billed to Medicaid and, on those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees (either the ARNP or the PAs), who by happenstance would be present in the treatment room, aided him by merely documenting services he himself rendered to the Medicaid patients. Petitioner presented an alternative argument that on other of those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees would be in the room when Petitioner actually provided services to Medicaid patients, and, while he was providing those services, he would simultaneously dictate to his employee who would transcribe his dictations on the Medicaid forms. Petitioner elected not to compel attendance by subpoena of his employees, even though the final hearing was continued to provide Petitioner an opportunity to do so. Petitioner's argument, that the proposed testimony by his employees would have been sufficient to challenge the Agency determination that Petitioner's billing was for services performed by a provider who was not enrolled in the Medicaid program, is without a foundation in fact and rejected. The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook provides, in part, that "Records must be retained for a period of at least five years from the date of service." The handbook goes on to provide in pertinent part: PAs must meet the general Medicaid provider enrollment that are contained in Chapter 2 of the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA-1500 and Child Health Check- Up 221. In addition, PAs must follow the specific enrollment requirements that are listed in this section. * * * PAs must meet the provider requirements and qualification and their practice must be fully operational before they can be enrolled as Medicaid providers. * * * If a PA is employed by or contracts with a physician who can enroll as a Medicaid provider, the physician must enroll as a group provider and the PA must enroll as a treating provider within the group. * * * Services provided by a PA under the direct supervision of a physician may be billed using the physician's provider number instead of the PA's provider number. Direct physician supervision means the physician: (*) Is on the premises when the services are rendered, and (**) reviews, signs, and dates the medical record. * * * Medical records must state the necessity for and the extent of services provided. The following minimum requirements may vary according to the services rendered: * * * Note: See the service-specific Coverage and Limitations Handbook for record keeping requirements that are specific to a particular service. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid Payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Note: See Chapter 5 in this handbook for information on administrative sanctions and Medicaid payment recoupment. Petitioner, by signing a Medicaid provider agreement, agreed that all submissions for payment of claims for services will constitute a certification that the services were provided in accordance with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules and regulations applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medical Provider Handbooks issued by the Agency.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Petitioner, Mazhar G. Nawaz, M.D., to repay Respondent the principal amount of $52,850.82 plus interest as provided in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2002). DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2004.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57409.907409.913409.9131
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COMPSCRIPT, INC., D/B/A COMPSCRIPT vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 03-003238MPI (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 10, 2003 Number: 03-003238MPI Latest Update: Jan. 18, 2006

The Issue Whether the Petitioner was overpaid for Medicaid prescriptions. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA, Agency or Respondent) asserts the Petitioner, Compscript, Inc., d/b/a Compscript (Petitioner or Compscript) failed to maintain proper records to support and document the Medicaid prescription claims paid by the Agency for the audit period. According to the Agency, the audit findings must be extrapolated to the universe of all claims for the audit period. If so, the Agency maintains the Petitioner should reimburse AHCA for a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $216,974.07 (this is the “recoupment” amount). The Petitioner denies it was overpaid any amount, asserts it kept records in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing pharmacy records, and maintains that the Agency may not apply the extrapolation accounting procedure in this case.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was a licensed pharmacy authorized to do business in the State of Florida; its pharmacy license number is PH0016271. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner’s Medicaid provider number is 106629300. The terms of the provider agreement govern the contractual relationship between this provider and the Agency. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement together with the pertinent laws or regulations controls the relationship between the provider and the Agency. The provider agreement pertinent to this case is a voluntary agreement between AHCA and the Petitioner. Pursuant to the provider agreement, the Petitioner was to “keep, maintain, and make available in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid-related records as AHCA requires for a period of at least five (5) years.” In addition to the foregoing, a Medicaid provider must maintain a patient record for each recipient for whom new or refill prescriptions are dispensed. Any Medicaid providers not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. A Medicaid provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. The records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. However, in order to qualify for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensive. Specific to the issues of this case, a Medicaid provider must also retain prescription records for five years. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority to administer the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to this authority AHCA conducts audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These “integrity” audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Medicaid program in Florida was governed by a “pay and chase” procedure. Under this procedure, the Agency paid Medicaid claims submitted by Medicaid providers and then, after-the-fact, audited such providers for accuracy and quality control. These “integrity” audits are to assure that the provider maintains records to support the paid claims. In this case, the audit period is May 28, 1999 through July 18, 2000. The pertinent audit has been designated AHCA audit no. 01-0514-000-3/H/KNH and was initiated on October 23, 2000. The Petitioner does not dispute the Agency’s authority to perform audits such as the one at issue. The Petitioner maintains its records are sufficient to support the paid claims and that the Agency has unreasonably imposed its interpretation of the requirements. The Medicaid provider agreement that governs this case required that the Petitioner comply with all Medicaid handbooks in effect during the audit period. Essentially, this standard dictates the records that must be kept for quality control so that the after-the-fact audit can verify the integrity of the Medicaid claims that were paid by the Agency. During the audit period the Petitioner sold or dispensed drugs to Medicaid recipients. Equally undisputed is the fact that Medicaid claims were paid by the Agency during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this cause was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the Petitioner’s provider agreement and the pertinent regulations. The Agency required that each and every claim submitted by the Petitioner during the audit period under the Medicaid program be filed electronically. Each claim submitted was filed electronically. Nevertheless, the Agency also required the Petitioner to retain records supporting the claim. Additionally, the Petitioner was to make such supporting records available to the Agency upon request. The Agency asked the Petitioner to present its records to support the claims for the audit period. The disclosure of the records proved difficult for this Medicaid provider because it does not operate in a conventional pharmacy setting. More specifically, it operates solely to serve a nursing home population. All of the patients whose prescriptions were filled were nursing home residents. Compscript maintains its manner of doing business is slightly different from the conventional pharmacy. Rather than the walk-in patient who presents a written prescription to be filled, this Petitioner receives its pharmacy orders by telephone or facsimile transmission from nursing homes. Typically, the staff at Compscript takes the call, writes down the pertinent information, enters the data into the pharmacy’s computer system, and the item is dispensed and routed to the nursing home via the delivery driver. All drugs are dispensed in sealed containers and are delivered with a manifest listing all the medications by name and patient. Given the volume of prescriptions being prepared and delivered, for the audit period at issue in this case, the Petitioner made 2-3 trips to the nursing home per day. Once the information for the prescription was entered into the Petitioner’s computer system, Compscript had little interest in maintaining the written telephone message or the facsimile sheet that generated the request. In some instances the Compscript employee did not make a written record of the prescription request. In those instances the employee entered the request directly into the Petitioner’s computer system and bypassed the written step altogether. The Compscript computer system tracks the initials of the pharmacist who entered the prescription information and cannot be altered without such alteration being tracked and noted. Since the pharmacy fills “over the counter” items, as well as controlled and non-controlled pharmacy products, the computer record denotes that information along with the patient information. When the Respondent’s audit agents went into the Compscript facility to audit the Medicaid claims, the Petitioner could not readily produce the written documentation to support the dispensed drugs. In fact, many of the records that verified the prescriptions dispensed were found on the nursing home records. The nursing home patient’s physician order sheet specified the item or items requested for the patient. This “physician order sheet” (POS) should theoretically always support the dispensing of the product from the Petitioner. In this case there were instances when the POS did not corroborate the claim. When the auditors from the Agency presented at Compscript, the Petitioner did not have the POS records to produce. Obviously, those records were maintained within the nursing home. Additionally, Compscript did not have the telephone notes or the facsimile transmission sheets to support items dispensed during the audit period. When the hearing in this cause proceeded it was also discovered that records that were generated daily by the Petitioner’s computer system that would have corroborated the claims (and which were allegedly maintained in storage) were not produced or available to support Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period. During the audit the Agency’s auditors requested records from a random sample of the claims submitted during the audit period. The results from that sample where then applied to the universe of claims for the audit period. When this mathematical calculation was performed the audit produced a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $1,341,466.27. Afterwards, when the Petitioner was able to locate additional records to correspond to and support the prescriptions dispensed, the amount of overpayment was reduced to $217,715.28 (the amount set forth in the parties’ Pre-hearing Stipulation). At hearing, the Agency maintained that the amount of overpayment was $216,974.07 for which the Petitioner could produce no adequate documentation. At hearing, the Petitioner continued to dispute the procedure of applying the audit sample overpayment to the population of claims to mathematically compute the overpayment for the audit period. This “extrapolation” process was admitted into evidence and has been fully considered in the findings reached in this case. The Petitioner was required to maintain Medicaid- related records for a period of 5 years. Thus, for the audit period in this case, any record supporting the claims should have been maintained and made available for the Agency. Such records would have been within the five-year period. The Agency designates Medicaid compliance to its office of Medicaid Program Integrity. In turn, that office contracted with Heritage Information Systems, Inc. (Heritage) to perform and report pharmacy audits of the numerous pharmacy providers within the state. Auditors from Heritage were assigned the Compscript audit. At the time of the audit the Heritage auditors were not privy to any of the POS documents later produced in the case. Ken Yon is the Agency’s administrator who was responsible for managing the instant case and who worked with the Heritage auditors to assure the policies and practices of the Agency were met. In this case, the Heritage auditors presented at Compscript unannounced on October 23, 2000, and sought 250 randomly selected claims for review. By limiting the number of claims, the auditors were not required to sift through the records of 46,000+ claims (the approximate number of claims that the Petitioner submitted during the audit period). For the universe of 46,000+ claims, 250 randomly selected claims is a reasonable sample to audit. The adequacy of the sample number as well as the manner in which it was generated is supported by the weight of credible evidence presented in this matter. Also, the results of a sample of 250 from the universe of 46,000+ would be statistically valid if randomly chosen as they were in this case. In this regard the testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson, an expert in statistical sampling and analysis, has been deemed credible and persuasive as to the issues of the appropriateness of the sample (as to size and how it was generated), the use of the sample overpayment to calculate an overall payment, and the statistical trustworthiness of the amounts claimed in this cause. If anything, as Dr. Johnson asserted, the actual overpayment would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. The Agency has used a statistical extrapolation method to compute overpayments for years. The statistical concept and process of applying a sample to a universe to mathematically compute an overpayment is not novel to this case. After the auditors completed their review of the records at the Compscript pharmacy, Kathryn Holland, a licensed pharmacist (who is also a consulting pharmacist) prepared the Respondent’s Final Agency Audit Report. Prior to completing the report, Ms. Holland received and reviewed the information provided by the Petitioner through the auditors. As a result of the review, a number of “can’t find” conclusions were reached. By “can’t find” the auditors and Ms. Holland meant that the original prescription or refill documentation could not be located for the paid Medicaid claim. These “can’t find” claims were reported to the Petitioner, who was given additional time to locate and produce documents to support the claims. In fact, the Agency continued to accept documentation for claims up through the time of hearing. Consequently, the amount sought for overpayment has been substantially reduced. Whether the Agency had the authority to accept documents outside the prescription records maintained by the pharmacy is not an issue. In fact, the Agency did reduce the overpayment amount when subsequent supporting documents were located. A second error in the documentation for the Petitioner’s prescriptions was noted as “no doctor’s address on the prescription.” That expression meant that pursuant to state and federal law the physician’s address is required for a controlled substance and when it was not provided the auditor deemed the documentation incomplete. Although the Petitioner maintained doctor addresses in its computer system, the records did not correspond to the specific prescriptions that were filled for the audited claims. In order to stand as a sufficient prescription form, a writing must be created contemporaneous to the order (phone requests that are transcribed are acceptable), must contain specific information (type of drug, strength, dose, patient, doctor, DEA number, refill, etc.), and it must be kept for the requisite time. It would be acceptable for the prescription to be computer generated so long as it was written contemporaneous to the order and preserved as required by law. In this case, at the conclusion of the audit, the Agency identified 194 discrepant claims within the random sample of 250. The vast majority of those discrepancies were noted as “can’t find.” Had the Agency not accepted other documentation to support the dispensing of the drugs, the calculated overpayment would have been $1,575,707.44. Applying a lower confidence limit of 95 percent to that amount generated the calculated overpayment of $1,341,466.27. The audit findings set forth in the Agency’s Final Agency Audit Report (dated April 6, 2001) is supported by the weight of credible evidence in this case. Nevertheless, the Agency did allow the provider here to supplement the documentation disclosed during the audit. And, to that end, the calculated overpayment was reduced to $216,974.07 (this amount is 95% of the calculated overpayment). In reality, the amount owed by this Petitioner for failure to maintain proper documentation for this audit would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. Had the Agency held the Petitioner to a standard of “no prescription, no payment” standard arguably 194 of the 250 audited claims could have been disallowed. That is not the standard applied by the Agency. A “patient record” may include information regarding the patient’s prescription history. The terms “patient record” and “prescription” are not synonymous. For example, while a prescription would contain information such as patient's name, doctor, DEA number, doctor's address, dosage, drug, and whether it may be refilled, it would be expected that the “patient record” would contain additional information not typically found on a prescription. For instance, a “patient record” might contain a historical track of past medications or known patient allergies. In this case, the computer records or “patient records” maintained by the Petitioner did not retain the prescriptions in the format dictated by rule. An electronic imaging recording system may be used when the system captures, stores, and can reproduce the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. An electronic system must be able to produce a daily hard-copy printout of all original prescriptions dispensed and refilled. If the Petitioner’s system could do that, it did not. An acceptable electronic system must generate the prescription contemporaneous to the dispensing order. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. The Agency has not alleged, and there is no evidence to suggest, fraud in the Petitioner’s failure to maintain its records. The Agency’s interpretation of the requirement that a prescription be reduced to writing is consistent with the rules and regulations in effect at the time of this audit. The last category of discrepant items was “UR” which stood for “unauthorized refills.” These were claims for refills on drugs for which the original prescription could not be located or documentation from the nursing home could not be found. Again, the Petitioner the maintained that within the nursing home setting a physician’s reorder for medications for the patient could be found on the POS. These refill requests were handled orally among the physician, the nursing home staff, and the pharmacy. Nevertheless, because they were not documented in writing the Agency disallowed this claims and included them among the discrepant list. If the Petitioner was able to produce a physician order to support the UR claims, it was removed from the recoupment list. In most instances, the Petitioner did not have the requisite paperwork to support the refill. Instead, the Petitioner relied on its computer records (again not kept in accordance with the applicable standards) to support the UR claims. The Agency has not claimed that the refills were not dispensed, merely that the paperwork to support the claim cannot be produced.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order that accepts an amended Final Agency Action Report to support an overpayment and recoupment against the Petitioner in the amount of $216,974.07. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center III 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kenneth W. Sukhia, Esquire Fowler, White, Boggs, Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1090 Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ralph E. Breitfeller, Esquire McGrath & Breitfeller, LLP 140 East Town Street, Suite 1070 Columbus, Ohio 43215

CFR (1) 42 CFR 433.312(a)(2) Florida Laws (8) 120.57409.902409.906409.907409.913465.015465.186465.188
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs RICARDO L. LLORENTE, M.D., 06-004290MPI (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 03, 2006 Number: 06-004290MPI Latest Update: Jul. 09, 2008

The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Respondent and, if so, what is the total amount of those overpayments. Whether, as a "sanction," Respondent should be directed to submit to a "comprehensive follow-up review in six months."

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings s of fact are made to supplement and clarify the factual stipulations set forth in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation and their January 26, 2007, pleading:4 Respondent and his Practice Respondent is a pediatric physician whose office is located in a poor neighborhood in Hialeah, Florida. He has a very busy practice, seeing approximately 50 to 60 patients each day the office is open. Respondent documents patient visits by making handwritten notations on printed "progress note" forms. Because of the fast-paced nature of his practice, he does not always "have time to write everything as [he] would like, because [there] is too much" for him to do. Respondent's Participation in the Medicaid Program During the Audit Period, Respondent was authorized to provide physician services to eligible Medicaid patients. Respondent provided such services pursuant to a valid Provider Agreement (Provider Agreement) with AHCA, which contained the following provisions, among others: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * Quality of Services. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods of not less than the scope and quality it provides to the general public. The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary, of a quality comparable to those furnished by the provider's peers, and within the parameters permitted by the provider's license or certification. The provider further agrees to bill only for the services performed within the specialty or specialties designated in the provider application on file with the Agency. The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. Term and signatures. The parties agree that this is a voluntary agreement between the Agency and the provider, in which the provider agrees to furnish services or goods to Medicaid recipients. . . . Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (including but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid- related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. * * * (f) Within 90 days of receipt, refund any moneys received in error or in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled from the Medicaid program. * * * (i) . . . . The provider shall be liable for all overpayments for any reason and pay to the Agency any fine or overpayment imposed by the Agency or a court of competent jurisdiction. Provider agrees to pay interest at 12% per annum on any fine or repayment amount that remains unpaid 30 days from the date of any final order requiring payment to the Agency. * * * Respondent's Medicaid provider number (under which he billed the Medicaid program for providing these services) was (and remains) 370947700. Handbook Provisions The handbooks with which Petitioner was required to comply in order to receive Medicaid payment for services rendered during the Audit Period included the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (MPR Handbook); Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (PCL Handbook); the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Coverage and Limitations Handbook (EPSDTCL Handbook); and the Child Health Check-up Coverage and Limitations Handbook (CHCUCL Handbook). Medical Necessity The PCL Handbook provided that the Medicaid program would reimburse physician providers for services "determined [to be] medically necessary" and not duplicative of another provider's service, and it went on to state as follows: In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient's needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a covered services. Note See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 and EPSDT 224, for the definition of medically necessary.[5] The EPSDTCL and CHCUCL Handbooks had similar provisions. Documentation Requirements The MPR Handbook required the provider to keep "accessible, legible and comprehensible" medical records that "state[d] the necessity for and the extent of services" billed the Medicaid program and that were "signed and dated at the time of service." The handbook further required, among other things, that the provider retain such records for "at least five years from the date of service" and "send, at his or her expense, legible copies of all Medicaid-related information to the authorized state and federal agencies and their authorized representatives." The MPR Handbook warned that providers "not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies [described therein] may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid payments" and that "Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped." EPSDT Screening/Child Health Check-Up The EPSDTCL Handbook provided: To be reimbursed by Medicaid, the provider must address and document in the recipient's medical record all the required components of an EPSDT screening. The following required components are listed in the order that they appear on the optional EPSDT screening form: Health and developmental history Nutritional assessment Developmental assessment Physical examination Dental screening Vision screening Hearing screening Laboratory tests Immunization Health education Diagnosis and treatment The CHCUCL Handbook, which replaced the EPSDTCL Handbook in or around May 2000, similarly provided as follows: To be reimbursed by Medicaid, the provider must assess and document in the child's medical record all the required components of a Child Health Check-Up. The required components are as follows: Comprehensive Health and Developmental History, including assessment of past medical history, developmental history and behavioral health status; Nutritional assessment; Developmental assessment; Comprehensive Unclothed Physical Examination Dental screening including dental referral, where required; Vision screening including objective testing, where required; Hearing screening including objective testing, where required; Laboratory tests including blood lead testing, where required; Appropriate immunizations; Health education, anticipatory guidance; Diagnosis and treatment; and Referral and follow-up, as appropriate. Coding Chapter 3 of the PCL Handbook "describe[d] the procedure codes for the services reimbursable by Medicaid that [had to be] used by physicians providing services to eligible recipients." As explained on the first page of this chapter of the handbook: The procedure codes listed in this chapter [were] Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) Levels 1, 2 and 3. These [were] based on the Physician[]s['] Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book. The Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book referred to in Chapter 3 of the PCL Handbook was a publication of the American Medical Association. It contained a listing of procedures and services performed by physicians in different settings, each identified by a "procedure code" consisting of five digits or a letter followed by four digits. For instance, there were various "procedure codes" for office visits. These "procedure codes" included the following, among others: New Patient * * * 99204 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. * * * Established Patient * * * 99213 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. * * * Fee Schedules In Appendix J of the PCL Handbook, there was a "fee schedule," which established the amount physicians would be paid by the Medicaid program for each reimbursable procedure and service (identified by "procedure code"). For both "new patient" office visits (99201-99205 "procedure code" series) and "established patient" office visits (99211-99215 "procedure code" series), the higher numbered the "procedure code" in the series, the more a physician would be reimbursed under the "fee schedule." The Audit and Aftermath Commencing in or around August 2002, AHCA conducted an audit of Respondent's Medicaid claims for services rendered during the Audit Period (Audit Period Claims).6 Respondent had submitted 18,102 such Audit Period Claims, for which he had received payments totaling $596,623.15. These Audit Period Claims involved 1,372 different Medicaid patients. From this group, AHCA randomly selected a "cluster sample" of 40 patients. Of the 18,102 Audit Period Claims, 713 had been for services that, according to the claims, had been provided to the 40 patients in the "cluster sample" (Sample Claims). Respondent had received a total of $23,263.18 for these 713 Sample Claims. During an August 28, 2002, visit to Respondent's office, AHCA personnel "explain[ed] to [Respondent] what the audit was about [and] why [AHCA] was doing it" and requested Respondent to provide AHCA with copies of the medical records Respondent had on file for the 40 patients in the "cluster sample" documenting the services provided to them during the Audit Period. The originals of these records were not inspected by AHCA personnel or agents during, or any time after, this August 28, 2002, site visit. Sometime within approximately 30 to 45 days of the August 28, 2002, site visit, Respondent, through his office staff, made the requested copies (First Set of Copies) and provided them to AHCA. There is nothing on the face of these documents to suggest that they were not true, accurate, and complete copies of the originals in Respondent's possession, as they existed at the time of copying (Copied Originals). They do not appear, upon visual examination, to be the product of "bad photocopying." While the handwritten entries and writing are oftentimes difficult (at least for the undersigned) to decipher, this is because of the poor legibility of the handwriting, not because the copies are faint or otherwise of poor quality. Each of the Sample Claims was reviewed to determine whether it was supported by information contained in the First Set of Copies. An initial review was conducted by AHCA Program Analyst Theresa Mock and AHCA Registered Nurse Consultant Blanca Notman. AHCA then contracted with Larry Deeb, M.D., to conduct an independent "peer review" in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. Since 1980, Dr. Deeb has been a Florida-licensed pediatric physician, certified by the American Board of Pediatrics, in active practice in Tallahassee. AHCA provided Dr. Deeb with the First Set of Copies, along with worksheets containing a "[l]isting of [a]ll claims in [the] sample" on which Ms. Notman had made handwritten notations indicating her preliminary determination as to each of the Sample Claims (Claims Worksheets). In conducting his "peer review," Dr. Deeb did not interview any of the 40 patients in the "cluster sample," nor did he take any other steps to supplement the information contained in the documents that he was provided. Dr. Deeb examined the First Set of Copies. He conveyed to AHCA his findings regarding the sufficiency of these documents to support the Sample Claims by making appropriate handwritten notations on the Claims Worksheets before returning them to AHCA. Based on Dr. Deeb's sufficiency findings, as well as Ms. Notman's "no documentation" determinations, AHCA "provisional[ly]" determined that Respondent had been overpaid a total $80,788.23 for the Audit Period Claims. By letter dated July 7, 2003 (Provisional Agency Audit Report), AHCA advised Petitioner of this "provisional" determination and invited Respondent to "submit further documentation in support of the claims identified as overpayment," adding that "[d]ocumentation that appear[ed] to be altered, or in any other way appear[ed] not to be authentic, [would] not serve to reduce the overpayment." Appended to the letter were "[t]he audit work papers [containing a] listing [of] the claims that [were] affected by this determination." In the Provisional Agency Audit Report, AHCA gave the following explanation as to how it arrived at its overpayment determination: REVIEW DETERMINATION(S) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some services for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payment made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. Medicaid policy addresses specific billing requirements and procedures. You billed Medicaid for Child Health Check Up (CHCUP) services and office visits for the same child on the same day. Child Health Check- Up Providers may only bill for one visit, a Child Health Check-Up or a sick visit. The difference between the amount you were paid and the appropriate fee is considered an overpayment. The overpayment was calculated as follows: A random sample of 40 recipients respecting whom you submitted 713 claims was reviewed. For those claims in the sample which have dates of service from January 01, 2000 through December 31, 2001 an overpayment of $4,168.00 or $5.84667601 per claim was found, as indicated on the accompanying schedule. Since you were paid for a total (population) of 18,102 claims for that period, the point estimate of the total overpayment is 18,102 x $5.84667601= $105,836.33. There is a 50 percent probability that the overpayment to you is that amount or more. There was then an explanation of the "statistical formula for cluster sampling" that AHCA used and how it "calculated that the overpayment to [Respondent was] $80,788.23 with a ninety-five percent (95%) probability that it [was] that amount or more." After receiving the Provisional Agency Audit Report, Respondent requested to meet with Dr. Deeb to discuss Dr. Deeb's sufficiency findings. The meeting was held on September 25, 2003, approximately six months after Dr. Deeb had reviewed the First Set of Copies and a year after AHCA had received the First Set of Copies from Respondent. At the meeting, Respondent presented to Dr. Deeb what Respondent represented was a better set of copies of the Copied Originals than the First Set of Copies (on which Dr. Deeb had based the sufficiency findings AHCA relied on in making its "provisional" overpayment determination). According to Respondent, the First Set of Copies "had not been properly Xeroxed." He stated that his office staff "had not copied the back section of the documentation and that was one of the major factors in the documentation not supporting the [claimed] level of service." The copies that Respondent produced at this meeting (Second Set of Copies) had additional handwritten entries and writing (both on the backs and fronts of pages) not found in the First Set of Copies: the backs of "progress note" pages that were completely blank in the First Set of Copies contained handwritten narratives, and there were handwritten entries and writing in numerous places on the fronts of these pages where, on the fronts of the corresponding pages in the First Set of Copies, just blank, printed lines appeared (with no other discernible markings). The Second Set of Copies was not appreciably clearer than the First Set of Copies. In the two hours that he had set aside to meet with Respondent, Dr. Deeb only had time to conduct a "quick[]," partial review of the Second Set of Copies. Based on this review (which involved looking at documents concerning approximately half of the 40 patients in the "cluster sample"), Dr. Deeb preliminarily determined to "allow" many of the Sample Claims relating to these patients that he had previously determined (based on his review of the First Set of Copies) were not supported by sufficient documentation. Following this September 25, 2003, meeting, after comparing the Second Set of Copies with the First Set of Copies and noting the differences between the two, AHCA "made the decision that [it] would not accept the [S]econd [S]et [of Copies]" because these documents contained entries and writing that appeared to have been made, not contemporaneously with the provision of the goods or services they purported to document (as required), but rather after the post-Audit Period preparation of the First Set of Copies. Instead, AHCA, reasonably, based its finalized overpayment determination on the First Set of Copies. Thereafter, AHCA prepared and sent to Respondent a Final Agency Audit Report, which was in the form of a letter dated June 29, 2004, advising Respondent that AHCA had finalized the "provisional" determination announced in the Provisional Agency Audit that he had been overpaid $80,788.23 for the Audit Period Claims (a determination that the preponderance of the record evidence in this case establishes is a correct one).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Respondent received $80,788.23 in Medicaid overpayments for the Audit Period Claims, and requiring Respondent to repay this amount to AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2007.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.5720.4223.21409.907409.913409.9131458.33190.408
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs SUN STATES SERVICES, INC., 12-002487MPI (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 17, 2012 Number: 12-002487MPI Latest Update: May 10, 2013

The Issue Whether Respondent, Sun States Services, Inc., a/k/a Always Care Nursing Service, received Medicaid overpayments that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is entitled to recoup, and whether a fine should be imposed against Respondent.

Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in Florida. The Medicaid program is a federal and state partnership to provide health care services to certain qualified individuals. From January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider operating under provider number 6815065-96. Beginning in 2003, the State of Florida accepted Lynk Services, Inc. (Lynk), as a waiver support coordinator for Medicaid. Lynk was, at all times material to this matter, an enrolled waiver support coordinator for Medicaid. In January 2004, there were discussions between Lynk and Respondent about the possibility of Respondent providing Medicaid services to a Medicaid recipient identified as B.L. B.L. required insulin injections. In a letter dated January 16, 2004, Lynk's waiver support coordinator supervisor, Thomas Engelke, wrote the following to Respondent (addressed to "To Whom It May Concern"): [B.L.] is authorized to receive nursing services from [Respondent] at an accelerated rate of $6.65 per quarter hour. He is to receive 9 quarter hours for a total of $59.85 per visit. The Department of Children and Families has approved this rate on December 22, 2003 by Cindy Totten and Linda Schneider department liaisons. Per the Service Authorization form that was sent to you on December 22, 2003,[8/] you [Respondent] are to provide service to [B.L.] for the duration of his current support plan year. Should you have any further concerns or questions please contact Julie Buckner [B.L.'s] support coordinator. . . . (emphasis added). Later on January 22, 2004, Lynk and Respondent exchanged emails. The first email is from Howard Gruensfelder, Respondent's "VP," to Mr. Engelke and Julie Buckner, support coordinator of Lynk. It reads: I have a concern that billing 9 units says that the nurse is there for a full hour and forty five minutes administering his injection, when the nurse is not there for a full hour and forty five minutes. I want to make sure that we are not committing any type of fraud by doing this. This message is to confirm that the negotiated price for LPN insulin injections for [B.L.] is $59.85 per injection under the Skilled Waiver program. To do this, administratively we must bill nine units to achieve this price for service. You have waved [sic] the normal definition of unit (one quarter hour) for us in this case in order to end up with the agreed upon rate. According to your instructions we are to bill for nine units for each injection regardless of how much or how little time is required to complete the nursing service visit. Please confirm our understanding by replying to this message with an affirmative answer. Less than an hour later, Lynne Ballou, Lynk's president, sent the following response to Mr. Gruensfelder: Per the Service Authorization[9/] we sent to you 1/5/04 you can bill 9 quarter hours each visit. The negotiated rate was approved by the Department of Children and Families liaison and liaison's supervisor. Your company stated they needed this amount to provide the service. The actual time spent with the individual is no where [sic] near the 2 hours and 15 minutes that is being charged but the only way you can bill in the system is using the quarter hour. By DCF approving the 9 quarter hours a visit they are waiving the time requirement to be able to have the service provided to the client. Shortly after the letter and emails, Respondent began to provide medical services to B.L. During the audit period, Respondent provided skilled nursing services to B.L., submitted claims to AHCA for services allegedly provided to B.L., and received payment from AHCA on those claims. The claims identified in AHCA's Exhibit 9 represent claims submitted by Respondent for services to B.L. and paid by AHCA. Respondent billed $59.85 "per visit," regardless of the actual time spent by Respondent's employees providing the services. In all but 12 of the claims identified in AHCA's Exhibit 9, Respondent billed AHCA for nine units of service ($59.85), each unit of service representing 15 minutes of time. In the other 12 claims identified in AHCA's Exhibit 9, Respondent billed AHCA for 18 units of service and received a higher reimbursement. The nursing notes, contained in AHCA's Exhibit 15, reflect that Respondent did not spend two hours and 15 minutes performing the services for which it billed nine units of service, nor did it spend four hours and 30 minutes performing the services for which it billed 18 units of service. No evidence was offered or received to define the term "current support plan year." However, common sense dictates that without any other definition, the entities operated on a calendar year of January 1 to December 31 of each year.10/ Thus, the letter itself (AHCA's Exhibit 10, page 347) reflects that the 2004 current support plan year would have ended on December 31, 2004, six months prior to the audit period. AHCA conducted an audit of the claims submitted by Respondent between July 1, 2005, and December 31, 2008.11/ AHCA determined that Respondent was overpaid $16,518.60, which figure was later reduced by AHCA based on further review of the claims at issue. All communications regarding services to be provided to B.L. were between Respondent and Lynk. Respondent relied on the January 16, 2004, letter and subsequent email exchange as authorization to bill "per visit," rather than on an hourly basis. However, it is undisputed that the audit period was between July 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008. AHCA is responsible for conducting investigations and audits to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, or neglect, and must report any findings of overpayment in audit reports. AHCA is not only authorized to conduct random audits; AHCA is required to conduct at least five percent of its audits on a random basis. In this instance, in February 2010, AHCA notified Respondent that it was in the process of reviewing claims billed to Medicaid between July 1, 2005, and December 31, 2008. The purpose of the audit was to verify that claims for which Respondent had already been paid by the Medicaid program were for services that were provided, billed, and documented in accordance with Medicaid statutes, rules, and provider handbooks. While Respondent certified with each claim submission that the claim was proper and that all records required to be maintained in support of each claim were in fact maintained, the audit goes behind that certification by actually reviewing those records. The medical records for B.L. were provided to AHCA for review. AHCA established the amount of overpayment for the claims. No evidence was offered of any additional "authorization letter" (to support a "flat fee" payment for services to B.L.) from AHCA, DCF, or Lynk for any period between July 1, 2005, and December 31, 2008. No credible evidence was offered that AHCA authorized that the Medicaid payment to Respondent would be by a flat "per visit" payment between July 1, 2005, and December 31, 2008.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Respondent, Sun States Services, Inc.: To repay the sum of $15,627.50 for overpayments on claims that did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; and To pay a fine of $1,000.00 for the violations of the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2012.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569409.913812.035
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs JESUS NEGRETTE, M.D., 06-002455MPI (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 13, 2006 Number: 06-002455MPI Latest Update: Mar. 22, 2007

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Medicaid program as set forth in Petitioner's Final Agency Audit Report dated June 12, 2006 for the period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004.

Findings Of Fact AHCA audited certain of Dr. Negrette's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2004, hereinafter the audit period. Dr. Negrette was an authorized Medicaid provider during the audit period. During the audit period, Dr. Negrette had been issued Medicaid provider number 061422000. No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Dr. Negrette had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. For services provided during the audit period, Dr. Negrette received in excess $79,523.70 in payments for services to Medicaid recipients. By a preliminary audit report dated August 25, 2005, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that a preliminary determination was made that he was overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $137,051.25. Subsequently, by a FAR dated June 12, 2006, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that, after a review of all documentation submitted, it determined that he had been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, thus, reducing the amount of the overpayment. The FAR further provided how the overpayment was calculated using a sample of the claims submitted during the audit period, including the statistical formula for cluster sampling; and indicated that the statistical formula was generally accepted and that the statistical formula showed an overpayment in the amount of $79,523.70, with a 95 percent probability of correctness. Dr. Negrette agrees that the mathematical computation of the audit is correct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Jesus Negrette, M.D., received overpayments from the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, during the audit period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004, and requiring Jesus Negrette, M.D., to repay the amount of overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2007.

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ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS/SUNBELT, INC., D/B/A FLORIDA HOSPITAL EAST vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 97-002931 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 24, 1997 Number: 97-002931 Latest Update: Oct. 21, 1999

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration is required by law and rule of the Agency to include the gain or loss on the sale of depreciable assets as the result of a sale or disposal, in the calculation of Medicaid allowable costs.

Findings Of Fact Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation which is incorporated in part herein as follows: Petitioner purchased Orlando General Hospital ("OGH"), Medicaid provider number 120065, on December 31, 1990. Upon its sale, OGH merged into and became part of Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., wherein after it was known as Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., d/b/a Florida Hospital East ("Florida Hospital East"). Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., d/b/a Florida Hospital East is a wholly owned subsidiary of Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation. Florida Hospital East assumed all of the assets and liabilities of OGH. OGH filed a terminating cost report for the fiscal period ending December 31, 1990. On December 31, 1990, the date of sale of OGH to Petitioner, OGH incurred a loss on the sale of the hospital, a depreciable asset. The loss on the sale of OGH was included on both OGH's Medicaid and Medicare terminating cost reports. A loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is the amount that the net book value of the asset sold exceeds the purchase price. A gain or loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is a capital cost. Due to the mechanism of the cost report, a loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is divided into "periods" based upon the time period to which the loss relates. The portion of the loss related to the fiscal year in which the asset is sold is referred to as a "current period" loss. The portion of the loss that relates to all fiscal years prior to the year in which the asset is sold is referred to as a "prior period" loss. Gains and losses related to the current period are included on Worksheet A of the Medicare and Medicaid cost report. Current period capital costs flow to Worksheet B-II Part and B Part III [sic] of the Medicaid cost report. Gains and losses related to the prior period are included on Worksheet E of the Medicare and Medicaid cost reports. OGH's current period is the fiscal year ending 12/31/90. OGH's prior periods in which it participated in the Medicaid Program are 10/24/84 through 12/31/89. OGH's audited Medicaid cost report included in allowable Medicaid costs a loss on the sale of OGH related to the current period. OGH's audited Medicaid cost report did not include in allowable Medicaid costs a loss on the sale of OGH related to the prior periods. The loss on the sale of OGH related to the current period was included in Worksheet A of OGH's audited Medicaid cost report. These costs, including the loss on the sale of OGH, flowed to Worksheet B Part II. OGH's audited Medicare cost report included as allowable Medicare costs the loss on the sale of OGH related to both the current and prior periods in the amount of $9,874,047. The loss from the sale of OGH related to the current period was included on Worksheet A of OGH's audited Medicare cost report. The costs from Worksheet A of OGH's audited Medicare cost report flowed to Worksheet B Part II of OGH's audited Medicare cost report. The loss related to the prior period was included on Worksheet E Part B of OGH's audited Medicaid cost report. The Agency utilizes costs included on Worksheet A of the Medicaid cost report to calculate Medicaid allowable costs. The Agency utilizes the capital costs included on Worksheet B Part II and/or B Part III to calculate allowable Medicaid fixed costs. The Agency does not utilize costs included on Worksheet E Part III to calculate Medicaid allowable costs. The Agency reimburses providers based upon Medicaid allowable costs. aa. The Agency did not include the portion of the loss on the sale of OGH related to the prior periods in the calculation of the OGH's Medicaid allowable costs. bb. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (Intermediary), contracted with the Agency to perform all audits of Medicaid cost reports. Agency reimbursement to Medicaid providers is governed by Florida's Title XIX Inpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan (Plan), which has been incorporated in Rule 59G-6.020, Florida Administrative Code. The Plan provides that Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient services shall be based upon a prospectively determined per diem. The payment is based upon the facility's allowable Medicaid costs which include both variable costs and fixed costs. Fixed costs include capital costs and allowable depreciation costs. The per diem payment is calculated by the Agency based upon each facility's allowable Medicaid costs which must be taken by the agency from the facility's cost report. Capital costs, such as depreciation, are found on Worksheet B, Part II and Part III. The Plan requires all facilities participating in the Medicaid program to submit an annual cost report to the Agency. The report is to be in detail, listing their "costs for their entire reporting year making appropriate adjustment as required by the plan for the determination of allowable costs." The cost report must be prepared in accordance with the Medicare method of reimbursement and cost finding, except as modified by the Plan. The cost reports relied upon by the Agency to set rates are audited by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. which has been directed by the Agency to follow Medicare principles of reimbursement in its audit of cost reports. Prior to January 11, 1995, the Plan did not expressly state whether capital gains or losses relating to a change of facility ownership were allowable costs. The 1995 amendment to the Plan contained language expressly providing "[f]or the purposes of this plan, gains or losses resulting from a change of ownership will not be included in the determination of allowable cost for Medicaid reimbursement." No change was made by the amendment to the Medicare principles of reimbursement regarding the treatment of gains and losses on the sale of depreciable assets. The Medicare principles of reimbursement provides that gains and losses from the disposition of depreciable assets are includable in computing allowable costs. The Provider Reimbursement Manual (HIM-15)(PRM), identifies the methods of disposal for assets that are recognized. They include a bona fide sale of depreciable assets, but do not mention a change of ownership. PRM Section 132 treats a loss on a sale of a depreciable asset as an adjustment to depreciation for both the current and periods. Depreciable assets with an expected life of more than two years may not be expensed in the year in which they are put into service. They must be capitalized and a proportionate share of the cost expensed as depreciation over the life of the property. To do so, the provider must estimate the useful life of the property based upon the guidelines of the American Hospital Association, and divide the cost by the number of years of estimated life. It is this yearly depreciation figure which is claimed on the cost report and which is reimbursed. When a depreciable asset is sold for less than book value (net undepreciated value), the provider suffers a loss. Petitioner claims that Medicare holds that in such a case it must be concluded that the estimated depreciation was erroneous and the provider did not receive adequate reimbursement during the years the asset was in service. Medicare accounting procedures do not distinguish between the treatment of a loss on the sale of depreciable assets as related to current and prior periods. PIM Section 132 requires that Medicare recognize the entire loss as an allowable cost for both the current and prior periods, and Medicare treated Petitioner's loss from the sale of its facility as an allowable cost for Medicare reimbursement under both current and prior periods. With the adoption of the January 1995 amendment, however, the wording of the state plan was changed to specifically prohibit gains or losses from a change of ownership from being included in allowable costs for Medicaid reimbursement. This was the first time the state plan addressed gains and losses on the disposal of depreciable assets resulting from a change of ownership. The Agency contends, however, that it has never reimbursed for losses on disposal of property due to a change of ownership, and that the inclusion of the new language was to clarify a pre-existing policy which was being followed at the time of the 1995 amendment, and which goes back to the late 1970s. It would appear, however, that the policy was never written down; was never conveyed to Blue Cross/Blue shield; was never formally conveyed to Medicaid providers; and was never conveyed to the community at large. When pressed, the Agency could not identify any specific case where the policy was followed by the Agency. While admitting that it is Agency practice not to treat losses from the sale of depreciable assets in prior periods as an allowable cost, Petitioner contends that it has been the Agency's practice to treat the loss on the sale of depreciable assets relating to the current period as an allowable cost, and cited several instances where this appears to have been done. The Agency contends that any current period losses paid were paid without knowledge of the Agency, in error, and in violation of the plan. On October 25, 1996, the Agency entered a Final Order in a case involving Florida Hospital/Waterman, Inc., as Petitioner, and the Agency as Respondent. This case was filed by the Petitioner to challenge the Agency's treatment of the loss on the sale of Waterman Medical Center, Inc., another of Adventist Health Systems/Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation, and the Final Order in issue incorporated a stipulation into which the parties had entered and which addressed the issue in question here. The stipulation included certain position statements including: A loss on the sale of depreciable assets is an allowable cost under the Medicare Principles of Reimbursement. The State Plan does not specify that the loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is to be treated in a manner different than under the Medicare Principles of Reimbursement. Thus the loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is an allowable cost under the State Plan. The Agency agrees, in accordance with the Medicare Principles of Reimbursement, that under the terms of the State Plan, prior period losses for Waterman will be allocated to prior periods and included in the calculation of the per diem and per visit rates. According to William G. Nutt, Petitioner's director of reimbursement, the only difference between the facts of the Waterman case and the instant case is that they relate to the sale of different facilities. The treatment of loss on the sale of depreciable assets as outlined in the Waterman stipulation is in conflict with the amended Plan and with the unwritten and unuttered Agency policy as urged by the Agency in this case. The Agency agreed in one case to a treatment of loss which it now rejects in the instant case. Petitioner urges that subsequent to the settlement of the Waterman case, but before the instant case was set for hearing, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations during which, according to counsel for the Agency, they made "significant" progress toward applying the settlement in the Waterman case to the current case. In a motion filed to delay the setting of this case for hearing, counsel for the Agency indicated the parties were "finalizing" settlement to resolve the case without resorting to a final hearing, and in a follow-up agreed motion for continuance, advised that the "parties [had] finalized a settlement document [which they were] in the process of executing. The settlement agreement reached by the parties was signed by a representative of the Petitioner and then forwarded to the Agency for signature. The document was not signed by the Agency, and when Petitioner sought enforcement of the "settlement" by an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, the request was denied as being outside the jurisdiction of the judge, and the matter was set for hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order including the loss on the sale of Orlando General Hospital as an allowable cost for determining Petitioner's entitlement to Medicaid reimbursement for both current and prior years. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Joanne B. Erde, Esquire Broad and Cassel Miami Center Suite 3000 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Jonathan E. Sjostrom, Esquire Steel Hector & Davis LLP 215 South Monroe Street Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Mark S. Thomas, Esquire Madeline McGuckin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Julie Gallagher General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59G-6.020
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WESTCHESTER PHARMACY vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-007004 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 21, 1989 Number: 89-007004 Latest Update: Jan. 18, 1991

Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program, which includes pharmacies that participate in the program. The Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity is responsible for insuring that the goods and services billed to the Medicaid program are those that are actually provided to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid is a joint program, funded by the federal government and by the State of Florida, and is administered pursuant to both state and federal statutes and rules. All services or goods billed to the program must be necessary, Medicaid compensable, and must also have actually been provided to eligible recipients by providers prior to submitting claims. Any payment made by the Medicaid program for goods or services not actually provided to an eligible recipient is subject to recoupment by the Petitioner, and the provider is also subject to the imposition of administrative fines and exclusion from the program for a specified period of time. The Respondent is a community pharmacy located in a hispanic section of Miami, Florida, which has been owned and operated for the past six years by Frances Larin, a licensed pharmacist, who makes all drug purchases and does all Medicaid billings at the pharmacy herself. Most of Respondent's customers have limited financial resources and are Medicaid recipients. The Respondent has participated in the Medicaid program for approximately eight years, and has not previously been charged with overbilling the Medicaid program. The Respondent has cooperated fully with the Petitioner throughout these proceedings. Prior Review From February to April 1988, the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity had a review performed of the Respondent's billings to Medicaid from March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. This review was conducted for the Petitioner by the Foundation for Health Care, Inc. (Foundation), contract auditors, and resulted in the determination that the Respondent had overbilled the Medicaid program for prescription drugs dispensed to program recipients during the review period. In performing this review, the Foundation used an across-the-board Medicaid percentage of 54% in determining the available units of the various drugs on hand for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. Based upon the Foundation's review, the Petitioner sought recoupment for overpayments in the amount of $28,649.99 by letter to the Respondent dated July 20, 1988, as well as an administrative fine of $7,162.49, and a three month suspension from the program. The Respondent timely sought a formal administrative hearing in which it disputed the results of the Foundation review. However, after the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner withdrew its notice of overpayment and imposition of administrative sanctions, and thus, without a determination on the merits, the Division of Administrative Hearings file was closed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Petitioner entered a Final Order which provided that the Respondent would be re-audited. The Respondent timely sought judicial review of this Final Order in which it challenged that Petitioner's right to conduct a further review of the period March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. However, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, dismissed the Respondent's appeal, and the Petitioner proceeded with a further review. The KPMG Review (a) For purposes of its further review, the Petitioner employed the public accounting and management consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick which designed a statistically valid sampling methodology to determine the Respondent's Medicaid percentage for each drug, and also to perform a management review of the Respondent. It was established by competent substantial evidence in the record, and in particular by the expert testimony in statistics from Dr. Robert Ladner and Robert Peirce, that the KPMG methodology was statistically valid. The KPMG review was conducted during the latter half of 1989, and included developing a Medicaid percentage for individual drugs based upon an analysis of prescriptions for all drugs in question to determine the portion of each drug's total sales that went to Medicaid recipients, calculating the total units claimed for each drug for which the Respondent sought reimbursement during the audit period, and calculating the total units purchased by the Respondent for each drug claimed for reimbursement during the audit period. The Medicaid percentage of each drug was then applied to total purchases for each specific drug to determine the amount of each drug that was on hand at the Respondent's pharmacy for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. This number of available units was then compared with the total units claimed for reimbursement. Where the units claimed exceeded the units available for dispensing, a positive variance was noted, and this number of excess units claimed was then multiplied by the per unit reimbursement amount for that particular drug in order to obtain the amount of the apparent overbilling for that particular drug. Where the total units available for dispensing exceeded the total units claimed for a particular drug, a negative variance was noted. It was stipulated by the parties that negative variances did not indicate underpayments, and the evidence, including specifically the testimony and report of Dr. Victor Pestien, an expert in statistics, does not establish that such negative variances should be offset against the positive variances or that they in any way reduce the positive variances. This is the first instance in which this methodology has been utilized by the Petitioner in seeking a recoupment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment from a pharmacy, and this methodology was not set forth in any rule or regulation of the Petitioner that had been adopted at any time material hereto. Previous audits used an overall Medicaid percentage to calculate the portion of a pharmacy's business that was comprised of Medicaid recipients, and the quantity of drugs that were available to them. Using a drug specific Medicaid percentage, however, is a more accurate and conservative approach to determining overpayments than using a fixed percentage. Based upon the consideration of all evidence in the record, it is specifically found that the greater weight of evidence establishes that the methodology used by KPMG in this review for calculating Medicaid percentages was sound and reasonable, and in no way precluded the Respondent from presenting additional competent substantial evidence to the Petitioner, or at hearing, which would have established different Medicaid percentages for particular drugs. (a) The type of review conducted by KPMG is known as an aggregate analysis, a generally accepted type of statistical analysis, in which drugs that have been billed to and paid for by the Medicaid program are reviewed to determine whether the pharmacy under review purchased or otherwise acquired a sufficient quantity of drugs to justify its billings to Medicaid. Interchangeable brand-name drugs and generic equivalents were grouped together so that in conducting this review, whole equivalent groups of drugs were considered as one type of drug, regardless of differences in individual product names. To obtain a statistically random sample, prescriptions were put in numerical order and every fourth prescription for the review period was examined, and since prescriptions may be refilled for up to a year after they are originally filled, reviewers also examined every prescription for the year prior to the review period. Competent substantial evidence establishes that KPMG performed an appropriate and valid statistical analysis, and that they used an acceptable sampling methodology which produced a truly random result. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that before a drug can be claimed to have been dispensed and billed to Medicaid, the pharmacy under review must have that drug in its possession. (b) The approach taken by KPMG and the Petitioner was to be as conservative as possible in resolving all uncertainties and questions which arose during the course of this review in favor of the Respondent. KPMG did not conduct a financial audit of the Respondent, but did prepare a management report based upon its review of Respondent's operations during the audit period. Data used by KPMG in its methodology in calculating the amount paid by Medicaid to the Respondent, the unit price of drugs dispensed, and the quantity claimed by Respondent for payment by Medicaid, was derived from computer based information provided by the Petitioner's fiscal agent. During the period of time being reviewed in this case, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was the Petitioner's fiscal agent, while Consultec was the Petitioner's fiscal agent during the period when the KPMG review was actually being performed. When Consultec was selected as the Petitioner's fiscal agent and replaced EDS on January 1, 1989, EDS turned over its computer records to the new agent by copying all of its magnetic, computer files, along with supporting microfiche documentation, which it then provided to Consultec under the supervision of the Petitioner. Upon receipt of these magnetic tapes, Consultec placed them in a controlled environment vault, and then later converted the information on these tapes to a new format used by Consultec. It was established by competent substantial evidence that in this process, no data was added, deleted or changed in any manner. The "units claimed" data was subsequently provided by computer download from the Consultec claims data base directly to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity. It was established by competent substantial evidence that data regarding claims which originated with EDS passed through Consultec to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity unchanged. Specific information regarding Respondent, including the claimed quantity of drugs dispensed and amounts paid, was accessed by staff in the Office of Program Integrity, randomly verified, and then made available to KPMG. Both Consultec and EDS are nationally recognized data processing and management companies. Competent substantial evidence established that the claims processing function utilized by the Petitioner in the Medicaid program during the period at issue was subject to several quality control checks to insure that claims were properly processed and appropriate payments were made. On occasion claim adjustments were made, but these were reasonable and for good cause, such as a substantiated underpayment. The computer hardware utilized in this process was reliable and properly maintained. In order to verify the data used by KPMG concerning the dollar amount of claims paid and the quantity of units of medication claimed, an "audit trail" was performed using 140 randomly selected sample claims by tracing each claim from its claim reference number to its associated remittance voucher and cancelled checks, where available. This audit trail verified that the data used as the basis for quantity claimed and total dollars paid was valid and reliable. The KPMG review was not limited to the top 100 drugs, by volume claimed, during the audit period, but included each drug dispensed by the Respondent to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. In its report dated November 20, 1989, KPMG calculated a total Medicaid overpayment to Respondent of $30,452.59, and based thereon, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that it was seeking recoupment of this amount, as well as an administrative fine of $2,000 and termination from the Medicaid program for at least two years. Subsequently, however, the Petitioner and KPMG reviewed and considered additional invoices documenting additional purchases of drugs in question by the Respondent during the audit period, and prepared a revised report dated August 30, 1990. Based upon this revised report, the Petitioner sought recoupment of a revised, reduced overpayment calculated to be $21,939.93, as well as a $2,000 administrative fine and a minimum two year termination from the program, and it was on this basis that this matter proceeded to final hearing. The Top 100 Drugs Subsequent to the final hearing, the Petitioner issued an amended recoupment letter dated October 17, 1990, which limited the recoupment it is seeking in this matter to the top 100 drugs, by dollar volume of claims, plus their generic equivalents. This resulted in the elimination of many individual drugs with relatively small overpayments from the list of overpayments, and left only five instances among these top 100 drugs where the difference between the quantity available, adjusted for standard error, and the quantity claimed is less than 100 units. In many instances the difference is well in excess of 1,000 units. The sanctions being sought in this amended recoupment letter further reduced the recoupment being sought to $12,643.11, reduced the administrative fine to $1,400, and reduced the period of exclusion from the program that is being sought to 16 months. However, due to an error in calculating the top 100 drugs and equivalents, the Petitioner issued a second amended recoupment letter dated October 26, 1990, further reducing the administrative fine sought to $1,200 and reducing the period of exclusion to 14 months. Inventory Analysis In performing its review, KPMG obtained information concerning the quantities of drugs purchased during the review period by the Respondent directly from the pharmacy's wholesalers and from a review of invoices retained by the Respondent for a period that included one month prior to the review period through one month after the review period (February 1, 1987, to January 31, 1988). The effect of seasonal variations in pharmacy sales and ordering patterns was also taken into account, and balanced, by extending this period to a full twelve months. All documentation concerning drug acquisitions was requested from Respondent, and the information received and considered by KPMG and the Petitioner was checked for reasonableness by a consultant pharmacist and cross validated by two reviewers. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent's main wholesaler, Gulf Distribution, Inc., had and maintained accurate information and records regarding its sales to the Respondent, and that it properly transferred that information to computer disks which were provided to KPMG. Subsequent thereto, additional invoices were discovered and were also made available to KPMG. The Petitioner stipulated that these additional invoices from Gulf did not reduce the number of drug units purchased by, and invoiced to, Respondent. Pharmacies in Florida which choose to participate in the Medicaid program are required to maintain complete and accurate patient and fiscal records which fully substantiate the extent of services rendered and billings made for a period of five years from the date of billing or service, and are also required to retain all invoices from wholesalers, or from the transfer or receipt of drugs through barter or exchange, for a period of five years. (a) Actual beginning and ending inventories of the top 100 drugs reviewed by KPMG for which the Petitioner now seeks recoupment in the amount of $12,643.11 were not determined. Rather, an estimate of inventory on hand was derived by counting invoices of all drug acquisitions through purchase, transfer or exchange made by the Respondent during the review period, as well as invoices of acquisitions made one month prior to and one month after the review period. Additionally, all documentation provided by the Respondent of bulk, or large, acquisitions made during or prior to the review period was also considered and included in the Petitioner's estimate of inventory. It was established by competent substantial evidence that pharmacies generally keep a drug inventory consisting of a two to two-and-a-half week supply on hand, and acquire drugs in anticipation of future sales rather than as a replacement of inventory depletion from past sales. Therefore, a basic assumption of the KPMG methodology, relied upon and accepted by the Petitioner, that Respondent had only those drugs available for dispensing which were obtained by invoiced purchase from wholesalers, or through transfer or exchange, between February 1, 1987 and January 31, 1988, as well as documented invoiced bulk purchases prior to this time period, is reasonable. At hearing, the Respondent established that a significant quantity of nine specific drugs were purchased during the review period from suppliers other than Gulf that were not considered by KPMG. These drugs include Xanax (.5 mg.), Inderal (10 mg.), Tagamet (300 mg.), Nitrostat (.4 mg.), Trental (400 mg.), Motrin (400 mg.), Motrin (600 mg.), Quinamm (260 mg.), and Quinidine Sulfate (200 mg.). It is, therefore, found that the overpayment of $2,902.19 calculated by KPMG and relied upon by the Petitioner for these particular drugs has not been supported by competent substantial evidence. Frances Larin, Respondent's owner and operator, testified that she did not follow the generally accepted practice of retaining only a two to two-and-a- half week supply of drugs on hand. Rather, she testified that for a significant number of the top 100 drugs at issue in this proceeding, she would purchase large quantites in bulk, and was thus able to draw down on these inventories without making additional purchases of particular drugs for over a year. The Respondent sought to establish that due to very large beginning inventories of particular drugs at issue, it was able to legitimately dispense more units during the review period than it purchased during the same time. However, the Respondent did not produce evidence in support of its position, such as invoices for bulk purchases which KPMG or the Petitioner did not consider, or complete records of bartering or transfers which had not been considered, and which would have supported its claim of a significantly larger beginning inventory for these particular drugs than would be the generally accepted practice. To the contrary, competent substantial evidence in the record, as well as the demeanor of Larin while testifying, establishes that Respondent's claim is unreasonable and lacks credibility. The deposition testimony of JoAnn Padell is outweighed by the testimony of Deborah Launer, Susan McCleod, and Robert Peirce. A review of the Respondent's purchasing patterns clearly shows that Respondent generally and routinely kept low inventories of drugs on hand, placing daily orders with Gulf to obtain drugs on an as-needed basis. Recoupment Based upon the foregoing, it is found that competent substantial evidence establishes that the Respondent overbilled the Medicaid program during the review period at issue in this case in the amount of $9,740.92 ($12,643.11 claimed in the second amended recoupment letter minus the $2,902.19 claim associated with the nine specific drugs for which significant purchases were omitted from the KPMG review, as found above at Finding 13). Petitioner is authorized to recoup the established overpayment of $9,740.92 from the Respondent. Sanctions (a) In determining the sanctions stated in the second amended recoupment letter which Petitioner seeks to impose upon the Respondent, the Petitioner considered the provisions of Section 409.266(13), Florida Statutes, as well as the impact which sanctioning this Medicaid provider would have upon Medicaid recipients. Competent substantial evidence establishes that there are eight pharmacies which accept Medicaid within a one mile radius from the Respondent's location, and twenty-six such pharmacies within a two mile radius. Medicaid recipients are issued new cards each month and may transfer pharmacies at the beginning of each month. Therefore, it is found that Medicaid recipients would not be substantially affected by the imposition of sanctions upon the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the sanction matrix set forth in Rule10C- 7.063, Florida Administrative Code, was not applied by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case because it was not in effect at the time of this review. The sanctions which the Petitioner seeks to impose against the Respondent, therefore, are based upon non-rule policy which must be explicated in this proceeding. In seeking to explicate its non-rule policy upon which the sanctions set forth in the second amended recoupment letter are based, the Petitioner established that it was concerned that sanctions imposed in prior cases, as well as in the original recoupment letter which had been sent to the Respondent in this case, had been too lenient in view of the seriousness of Medicaid violations. The Petitioner developed its non-rule sanctions policy after the KPMG review had been completed, and based its proposal upon the maximum sanctions set forth in state and federal statutes and rules. Specifically, Section 409.266(12), Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fine of $10,000; the maximum exclusion period applied in previous cases by the Office of Program Integrity is ten years, and the minimum exclusionary period imposed by the federal government has been five years for the failure to supply payment information. At hearing, the Petitioner explained that it first determined the percent of Respondent's total Medicaid payments that the overpayment represented, and then applied that percentage to these maximum sanctions allowed under law and existing policy. The overpayment of $12,643.11 claimed by the Petitioner in its second amended letter of recoupment is 12% of the total payment of $100,397.88 made by the Petitioner to Respondent for the review period, and 12% of the maximum fine and exclusion period is $1,200 and 14 months, respectively. While the Petitioner explained the manner by which this exclusionary period and fine were calculated, it did not explicate its non-rule policy by establishing a reasonable, rational basis for applying the percentage of Medicaid overbillings to the maximum fine and exclusionary period. Certainly, the arithmetic calculation used to arrive at these proposed sanctions is clear, but there was no explication through competent substantial evidence which would establish that there is a basis in fact or logic for this calculation. Therefore, it is found that the Petitioner's non-rule policy used to propose these sanctions is arbitrary and capricious. Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in the record which would support the imposition of the sanctions of an administrative fine or a period of exclusion from the Medicaid program, the Petitioner is not authorized to impose sanctions on the Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which requires that Respondent to repay the Petitioner for Medicaid overbillings in the amount of $9,704.92, but which does not impose sanctions consisting of either an administrative fine or period of exclusion. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. 7-10. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 11-17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-20. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7. 21-24. Adopted in Finding 12. 25. Adopted in Finding 2. 26-28. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 29-30. Adopted in Finding 8. 31-32. Adopted in Findings 7 and 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 35-39. Adopted in Finding 7. 40-47. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 48. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 49-51. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54-63. Adopted in Finding 12, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9. 66-67. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 9. 70-78. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 8. 83-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-93. Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 94-97. Adopted in Finding 14, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 98-103. Adopted in Finding 14. 104-105 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 106-107 Adopted in Finding 12. 108. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 109-112 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 113-115 Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. Adopted in Finding 11. 118-119 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 120-122 Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. 125-128 Rejected as unnecessary. 129. Adopted in Finding 6. 130-132 Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 11. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 135-147 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 148. Adopted in Finding 11. 149-150 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 151-152 Rejected as unnecessary. 153. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 4. 2-3. Adopted in Finding 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 6 and 7. 6-7. Adopted in Finding 10, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 11. 10-11. Adopted in Finding 3, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 14-15. Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as immaterial. Adopted in Finding 13, but Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding 14, as immaterial, speculative, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 6, as immaterial, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 22-23. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14. 26-30. Rejected as a statement of the Respondent's position and not a proposed finding, as speculative and contrary to competent substantial evidence, and as totally without citation to authority in the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. 31-35. Rejected in Finding 6, and as not based on competent substantial evidence and as unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 39-41. Adopted in Finding 8. 42. Rejected as immaterial. 43-44. Rejected in Finding 9. 45. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a proposed finding. 46-48. Rejected in Finding 9, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. 49-50. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 51. Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 16. 56-57. Adopted in Finding 16. 58-61. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 62. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 15. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Building Six, Room 233 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 James J. Breen, Esquire Michael P. Scian, Esquire 900 Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, Acting General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert B. Williams, Acting Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57902.19
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MARIA LOURDES BURGOS, M.D. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 04-004645MPI (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Dec. 06, 2004 Number: 04-004645MPI Latest Update: May 25, 2006

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent Agency must be reimbursed by the Petition for purported overpayments regarding Medicaid claims, as delineated in the Respondent's Final Agency Audit Report of December 12, 2003, related to the audit period of July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002.

Findings Of Fact The Agency is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. The Agency is thus charged with a duty to recover overpayments to medical service providers enrolled in that program. The term "overpayment" means any amount not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate reporting or improper reporting of costs, improper claims, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or by mistake. See § 409.913.(1).(d), Fla. Stat. The Petitioner, Maria Lourdes Burgos, M.D., is a pediatrician duly licensed in the State of Florida, practicing as an authorized Medicaid provider for purposes of the relevant portions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, at times pertinent hereto. During the period July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002, (the audit period) the Petitioner had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with the Respondent Agency. During the period of the audit the Petitioner provided services to Medicaid recipients or patients and submitted claims for those services and was compensated for those services. This case is a result of the Agency's attempt to recover purported overpayments from Dr. Burgos. In choosing to become a Medicaid provider, a physician such as Dr. Burgos must assume the responsibilities enumerated in Section 409.913(7), Florida Statutes (2004), which provided generally that such a provider had an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of such services and be responsible for the preparation and submission of claims. The claims are required to be true and accurate, the services are required to actually have been furnished to the recipient by the provider submitting the claim; the services are required to be medically necessary, of a comparable quality to those furnished to the general public by the provider's peers; and to have been provided in accordance with all applicable provisions of Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies. They must be in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Additionally, the provision of medical services are required to be documented by records made contemporaneously with the provision of the services, demonstrating the medical necessity for them and the medical basis and specific need for them must be properly documented in the recipient's medical record. The "audit period" involved in this proceeding is July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002. The Medicaid program reimbursed Dr. Burgos in excess of $43,238.57 in payments pursuant to the Medicaid program during that audit period. The Final Agency Audit Report is in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit One and the calculations pertaining to the overpayment amount are included in that report as part of Respondent's Exhibit One in evidence. The Agency contends that $43,238.57 is an overpayment and subject to recoupment because of Medicaid policy, as alleged in the Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). Medical records reveal that some services billed, and for which payment was received, were not documented and that documentation provided supported a lower level of office visits than the one for which the Medicaid program was billed and for which payment was received by the Petitioner; and, because payments can be made only for those services listed in the provider handbook, that the Petitioner billed and received payments for services not covered by Medicaid as overpayments. The Agency furnishes all authorized Medicaid providers a manual entitled The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook). The Handbook contains the requirements demanded of Medicaid providers and it and the procedure code manual (CPT) manual that was in effect during the audit period is in evidence in this proceeding. The handbook has been incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.230. This handbook sets forth Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.230 and sets forth pertinent applicable Medicaid policies and claims processing requirements applicable to this proceeding. Upon convening of the audit procedure, the Agency requested certain records from the Petitioner and the Petitioner fully complied with the relevant requirements of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, submitting copies of all records dealing with the recipients who where the subject of the audit. See Exhibit Eight in evidence. The Petitioner, in effect, does not dispute the statistical methodology employed by the agency, but does dispute the manner in which it was applied to certain procedure codes (CPT codes) and the result of the overpayment calculations. Additionally, for every office visit that the Petitioner had with Medicaid patients, she personally made an individual judgment about the level of service that she provided and accordingly billed for that level of care and treatment provided. She was consistent in this in her billing practices as to both Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In some instances, regarding the audited Medicaid patient/recipient records, it was demonstrated by the Petitioner that the patient presented with somewhat more complexity as to medical condition that the CPT code, postulated by the Agency as applicable, represented that thus she billed for the higher code (as for instance a "99215" instead of a "99213) or "99214"). Some of these medical judgment calls made by the Petitioner were shown to be appropriate and justified and some where shown by the Respondent's evidence, chiefly the testimony of Dr. Larry Deeb, the Respondent's expert, to be not really appropriate and that they should have been coded and therefore billed at a lower level. In any event, based upon the testimony of Dr. Larry Deeb, as well as the Petitioner's testimony, the submission of both a "well child" checkup billing and a "sick office visit" billing was appropriate and consistent with good medical practice under the circumstances demonstrated by the Petitioner's testimony and her records. Thus it was inappropriate for the Agency to automatically claim an overpayment due for those billings, based upon only its policy interpretation. Additionally, based upon Ms. Mocks testimony, it is apparently an Agency policy or practice in conducting audits, and in recouping overpayments, that when errors are discovered in the audit or in the billing records which happen to be in favor of the practitioner (the Petitioner) that the Agency does not provide a credit applied to any alleged overpayment. It would seem that fundamental fairness dictates that both credits and overpayments be weighed against each other in calculating the ultimate amount of any overpayment, if one exists. In any event, based upon Dr. Deeb's testimony and the Petitioner's testimony, with regard to the random sample of patients and their medical records submitted, reviewed and involved in this dispute, the evidence demonstrates that the Petitioner was not overpaid as to the following amounts and patients/recipients: Recipient Date of CPT Disallowed/ Number Service Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 1 12/05/00 99215 $37.59 09/05/01 99215 $60.95 2 03/05/01 99214 $15.11 3 09/19/00 99215 $13.01 4 04/04/01 99215 $60.95 5 09/15/00 99214 $15.11 05/10/01 W9881 $22.70 6 01/14/02 99215 $14.52 8 11/08/01 99214 $15.11 9 05/03/01 99205 $87.24 10 05/03/01 99205 $87.241/ 11 04/04/02 90669 $ 0.002/ 04/04/01 W9881 $37.81 04/04/01 99214 $46.42 12 10/18/01 99214 $15.11 01/18/02 99215 $29.63 01/30/02 99215 $14.52 05/20/02 99214 $15.11 13 08/14/00 99215 $13.01 14 01/31/01 99214 $15.11 08/27/01 99214 $15.11 05/13/02 99214 $24.58 15 10/17/00 99356 $50.94 Recipient Date of CPT Disallowed/ Number Service Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 10/19/00 99233 $12.53 16 10/13/00 99215 $57.14 17 05/10/01 99215 $60.95 12/11/01 W9881 $37.81 12/11/01 99214 $46.42 20 12/22/00 99205 $17.02 22 11/19/01 99223 $42.04 11/20/00 99239 $11.53 23 03/27/02 W1998 $ 0.003/ 04/03/02 99356 $49.72 04/22/02 99215 $ 0.004/ 04/29/02 99214 $13.86 05/10/02 99215 $ 0.005/ 24 08/12/01 99356 $ 0.006/ 08/15/01 99239 $12.06 25 09/30/01 99223 $22.71 10/01/01 99233 $12.66 26 12/03/01 99356 $49.257/ 12/06/01 99239 $12.06 12/14/01 99205 $18.12 01/16/02 99215 $29.63 01/23/02 99215 $29.638/ 28 10/13/01 99431 $ 0.009/ Recipient Number Date of Service CPT Disallowed/ Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 10/14/02 99233 $12.66 10/15/01 99239 $12.06 29 02/28/02 99356 $ 5.4210/ 03/01/02 99233 $13.80 03/02/02 99239 $13.66 03/06/02 99205 $18.67 29 03/13/02 99215 $14.52 11. The Petitioner in its Proposed Recommended Order has agreed that other than the above (Proposed Recommended Order paragraph 10 patients and amounts) that the Petitioner agrees with the Agency's review and the overpayment calculations on a per office visit basis. Additionally, however, as referenced above, there were additional health insurance claim forms which were, or should have been, submitted to the Agency, representing claims for payment for dates of service that clearly fall within the relevant audit period, that were never compensated by the Agency's contracted agent. The alternative is that the claim forms for some reason were not actually submitted. Unfortunately, neither the Petitioner's records and testimony nor the Agency records can clearly show whether the claim forms were actually submitted or not. It is apparently not possible to retrieve that information from the Agency's claim filling and payment-related computer programming system, for reasons not understood by either party or the judge. There is thus no clear explanation of record concerning why these claims were not paid earlier, even though they fall within the audited period. It is clear, however, that the additional claims referenced in the Petitioner's Exhibit Seven, admitted as a late exhibit herein, do relate to that audit period and represent medical services provided by the Petitioner within that audit period. Since that audit period and the claims referenced in evidence are the subject of a "proceeding" and are pending a "court or hearing decision . . ." or, alternatively and admittedly somewhat speculatively, could be subject of a "system error on claim that was originally filed within (12) months from date of service," it appears patently apparent that fundamental fairness dictates that these health insurance claim forms related to the same audit period should be considered and a determination made as to whether and how much of those claims should be reimbursed to the Petitioner for the medical services they represent. Thus, especially as to exception (2) to the twelve- month filing requirement listed in the above-reference handbook, Exhibit Seven has been admitted into evidence and the claim forms represented therein should be considered and the amounts payable to the Petitioner should be credited against the resultant overpayment amounts calculated as a result of these Findings of Fact.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, re-calculate the amount of overpayment in a manner consistent with the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, excluding from the amount of overpayment those amounts determined above to have not constituted overpayments. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Respondent calculate the amount of reimbursement not provided pursuant to the recently submitted or re-submitted (but never paid) Exhibit Seven health insurance claim forms, and as for the reasons indicted in the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and credit that additional amount of reimbursement against the overpayment calculation amount in arriving at the new overpayment due from the Petitioner to the Respondent. The Petitioner shall repay the Respondent the re-calculated monetary amount of overpayment within a reasonable period of time and by reasonable installment payments, agreed to by both parties, but shall not be obligated to pay other costs or fees related to this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57409.913
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CHRISTOPHER SCIESINSKI vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, AND SUNSHINE HEALTH PLANS, INC., 20-003573MTR (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 12, 2020 Number: 20-003573MTR Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2025

The Issue What amount from Petitioner’s settlement proceeds should be paid to satisfy Respondents’ Medicaid liens under section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2020)?1

Findings Of Fact On January 28, 2018, Mr. Sciesinski[,] who was then 43 years old, was admitted to the Hospital with an epidural abscess and a[n] oral abscess. He was treated with antibiotics and had his oral abscess lysed and molars removed. In February 2018[,] he presented to the Hospital with shaking, chills, fevers[,] and malaise. His antibiotics were changed and he was discharged home. On May 30, 2018[,] Mr. Sciesinski again presented to the [H]ospital with increasing neck pain. He was diagnosed with a retropharyngeal abscess and underwent surgery. During surgery[,] Mr. Sciesinski suffered a spinal cord injury permanently rendering Mr. Sciesinski a quadriplegic. Mr. Sciesinski is now unable to stand, walk, ambulate, eat, toilet, or care for himself in any manner. Mr. Sciesinski’s medical care related to the injury was paid by Medicaid. AHCA through the Medicaid program provided $56,838.94 in Medicaid benefits related to the injury and Sunshine through the Medicaid program provided $78,957.18 in Medicaid benefits related to the injuries. The sum of these benefits, $135,796.12, constituted Mr. Sciesinski’s claim for past medical expenses. Mr. Sciesinski pursued a medical malpractice action against the parties allegedly liable for his injuries (Defendants) to recover all his damages associated with his injuries. Mr. Sciesinski’s medical malpractice action was settled through a series of confidential settlements in a lump-sum unallocated amount of $1,725,000. During the pendency of Mr. Sciesinski’s medical malpractice action, AHCA and Sunshine were notified of the action. AHCA asserted a $56,838.94 Medicaid lien and Sunshine asserted a $78,957.18 lien against Mr. Sciesinski’s cause of action and settlement of that action. AHCA and Sunshine did not commence a civil action to enforce [their] rights under [section] 409.910 or intervene or join in Mr. Sciesinski’s action against the Defendants. By letter, AHCA and Sunshine were notified of Mr. Sciesinski’s settlement. AHCA and Sunshine have not filed a motion to set-aside, void[,] or otherwise dispute Mr. Sciesinski’s settlement. The Medicaid program through AHCA and AHCA’s contractor[,] Sunshine[,] spent $135,796.12 on behalf of Mr. Sciesinski, all of which represents expenditures paid for Mr. Sciesinski’s past medical expenses. Mr. Sciesinski’s taxable costs incurred in securing the settlement totaled $48,943.00. Application of the formula at [section] 409.910(11)(f) to Mr. Sciesinski’s $1,725,000 settlement requires full payment of AHCA’s $56,838.94 Medicaid lien and Sunshine’s $78,957.18 Medicaid lien. The Petitioner has deposited the Medicaid lien amount in an interest- bearing account for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA’s rights, and this constitutes “final agency action” for purposes of chapter 120[,][Florida Statutes], pursuant to [section] 409.910(17). Sunshine is under contract with AHCA to provide Medicaid benefits to Medicaid beneficiaries. Pursuant to AHCA’s contract with Sunshine, AHCA’s Medicaid lien takes priority and must be paid first from the amount of the settlement allocated to past medical expenses. As previously noted, Petitioner presented testimony from Scott Borders, Esquire, and Karen Gievers, Esquire. Mr. Borders represented Petitioner in his personal injury claim against the tortfeasors, and Ms. Gievers and Mr. Borders both offered opinion testimony regarding the value of Petitioner’s underlying personal injury claim(s). Mr. Borders has been a trial attorney for 32 years, and he practices exclusively in the area of medical malpractice law. Mr. Borders has been Florida Bar Board Certified in the area of “civil trial” since 1997. Mr. Borders credibly testified that based on his professional training and experience, Petitioner’s claim(s) were valued at between $27 and $41 million. Ms. Gievers has been a member of The Florida Bar since 1978, and has been Florida Bar Board Certified in the area of “civil trial” since 1985. From 1978 until 2010, Ms. Gievers practiced in the area of personal injury law. In 2010 she was elected Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit for the State of Florida. As a Circuit Judge, Ms. Gievers presided over all manner of civil matters, including personal injury lawsuits. Ms. Gievers retired from the bench in April 2019, and has returned to the practice of law. Ms. Gievers credibly testified that based on her professional training and experience, Petitioner’s claim(s) had a value of at least $25 million, and that this amount is “very conservative.” Using the pro rata allocation methodology, Ms. Gievers and Mr. Borders testified that $9,369.93 of the $1,725,000 settlement proceeds should be allocated to past medical expenses because the personal injury claims were settled for 6.9 percent of its conservative value. The testimony of Ms. Gievers and Mr. Borders was credible, persuasive, and uncontradicted by Respondents.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.68409.902409.910 DOAH Case (2) 17-4556MTR20-3573MTR
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FOREST HILL COUNSELING CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 95-005786 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Nov. 29, 1995 Number: 95-005786 Latest Update: Jul. 12, 1996

The Issue Whether Petitioner's Medicaid provider number should be cancelled for the reason stated in Respondent's October 1, 1995, letter to Petitioner?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a provider of community mental health services. It provides these services to residents of Palm Beach County and the surrounding areas. Some of the services it provides are unique to the area it serves. Petitioner provides services to Medicaid recipients pursuant to a Medicaid provider agreement dated September 6, 1994, paragraphs 8 and 9 of which provide as follows: The provider and the Department agree to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. The agreement may be terminated upon thirty days written notice by either party. The Depart- ment may terminate this agreement in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has attempted to enter into a contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health office (hereinafter referred to as "ADM"), but to date has been unable to do so because ADM has not had the money to fund such a contract.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered terminating Petitioner's provider agreement and cancelling its provider number on the grounds that it "does not have a contract with the [Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services] ADM [Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health] office." DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene Silvernail, Esquire Forest Hill Counseling Center 2624 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Gordon B. Scott, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Fort Knox Number 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Fort Knox Number 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Fort Knox Number 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (2) 409.906409.907
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