The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Hospital Orlando (Respondent or FHO), was overpaid by Medicaid for care provided to the patient, L.D., in the amount of $52,606.04, as alleged by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or AHCA); or, whether, as Respondent maintains, such care was medically necessary and supported by the record presented in this cause. Petitioner also maintains an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 is warranted in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. Petitioner, through MPI, audited FHO for the dates of service from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2008 (the audit period). At all times material to the audit period, FHO was enrolled as a Medicaid provider, governed by a Medicaid provider agreement, and subject to all pertinent Medicaid rules and regulations related to the provision of Medicaid services to Medicaid recipients/patients. Respondent's Medicaid Provider No. was 0010129001. All services provided to Medicaid patients are billed and identified by patient name, date of service, and provider. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of patients are redacted in MPI proceedings. Although this case began with a number of patients being identified as part of the audit dispute, only one patient, L.D., and the services provided to her remain at issue. Before a Medicaid provider is authorized to bill Medicaid for medical services rendered to a patient, several checks are considered. First, the patient must be Medicaid-eligible. There is no dispute that L.D. was Medicaid-eligible. Second, before an inpatient stay is reimbursable, a Medicaid provider must seek prior authorization. To do so, at all times material to this case, AHCA enlisted the assistance of, and contracted with, KePro South (KePro) to perform utilization management for inpatient hospital services for Medicaid recipients. This meant the Medicaid provider contacted KePro by email through a system known as "I-Exchange." In this case, FHO followed the protocol and requested prior approval for patient L.D. KePro approved the inpatient stay for L.D. All patient records for L.D. have been revisited in the course of this case and have been thoroughly debated by doctors for both parties. In summary, AHCA's expert, Dr. Walter, opined that the records for L.D. do not support the "medical necessity" for the extended inpatient stay that was provided for her care. In contrast, Dr. Busowski, opined that L.D. required the inpatient stay based upon the medical conditions she and her babies presented. The events leading up to the instant dispute, set in chronological context, are as follows: FHO provided medical services to a patient, L.D.; those services were billed to and paid by Medicaid; AHCA conducted its audit of FHO for the audit period prior to August 12, 2008; on that date, AHCA issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR); the PAR claimed a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $359,107.65 (overpaid claims for the full audit period); in response, FHO set about to furnish additional documentation to support its Medicaid billings; such documentation was reviewed by Petitioner and its medical consultants before the Final Audit Report (FAR) was entered; then, the FAR reduced the amount claimed as overpayment, gave Respondent the opportunity to challenge the FAR, and forwarded the case to DOAH. Respondent continued to provide additional information to AHCA throughout the pre-hearing and post-hearing times. Subsequent to discovery in this case, AHCA considered information from FHO and, ultimately, the overpayment claim was reduced to $52,606.04 as noted above. Prior to entering the FAR, Petitioner did not have the benefit of testimony from Dr. Busowski or Dr. Fuentes. Additionally, Dr. Walter, AHCA's consultant, did not have the benefit of reviewing the records from Dr. Busowski's point of reference. It is undisputed that FHO billed Medicaid and was paid $52,606.04 for patient L.D. Dr. Busowski is a board-certified physician whose specialty is OB/GYN and whose subspecialty is Maternal Fetal Medicine, also described as "perinatologist" in this record. L.D. presented to a clinic staffed by Dr. Busowski and his former associate, Dr. Fuentes. Both doctors have privileges at FHO and took turns monitoring patients admitted to the hospital. In examining L.D., it was discovered that her cervix had shrunk from 2.6 to 1.2 centimeters. As L.D. was pregnant with twins, the patient was admitted to FHO as a "high risk" pregnancy. Simply stated, the medical concern for L.D. was that she would deliver her children prematurely and, thereby, cause additional medical issues for herself, as well as her babies. L.D. was only 26 weeks, two days along at the time, and it would be very difficult for the twins to be delivered at that time. Further, L.D. had had two prior deliveries by C-section, so it was anticipated that her twins would also be delivered in that fashion. Finally, the twins were locked with one in a breached position so that if the children had prematurely delivered vaginally, other complications would have been likely. L.D. remained at FHO until she was discharged at 35 weeks, six days. During her stay at FHO, doctors were able to monitor contractions, make sure her C-section scar did not dehisce, and chart the growth, well-being, and viability of the children. Some patients, such as L.D., may be monitored in a home setting with "take home" equipment. That device is not covered by Medicaid and was, therefore, not an option for L.D. It may have provided a less expensive treatment option had it been available to L.D. and had her home environment been suitable for its use. It is unknown whether L.D. and her home environment would have been conducive to the home monitoring some patients can use. Another consideration in keeping L.D. hospitalized was the well-being of the unborn twins. Medical costs for premature babies are higher than full-term children. Had L.D. delivered prematurely, there would have been three Medicaid patients with serious medical needs rather than one. Dr. Busowski candidly admitted that all considerations in keeping L.D. hospitalized were not listed in the patient's chart. As a specialist, Dr. Busowski did not think it was necessary to have certain facts documented. It is not Dr. Busowski's policy to keep any mother hospitalized unnecessarily. It was not Dr. Busowski's practice to write "a whole bunch because nothing has changed." L.D.'s chart contained daily notes from an attending OB/GYN or resident, but orders were not written for medication unless it changed or was new. For example, if an order for prenatal vitamins were written, it would naturally continue throughout the patient's stay without additional orders. In this case, L.D. was on the medication Procardia. It was used to stop pre-term contractions. When L.D. was discharged and the babies were not in danger, presumably, Procardia was not necessary. Until she was stabilized during her hospitalization, it was necessary. Thus, the length of stay ultimately is the issue of this proceeding. Not that L.D. was admitted inappropriately or without medical basis, but that she was kept as an inpatient longer than medically necessary. Since L.D. was admitted at 26 weeks, two days and discharged at 35 weeks, six days, the question then essentially is: When in the interim should she have been discharged because her continued inpatient care was not necessary? Arguably she could have taken the medication to stop contractions at home, monitored herself somehow, and rushed to the emergency room (ER) if delivery was imminent. Delivery of the twins short of a prescribed gestation period would have placed the children at risk. Who would have borne the medical responsibility for pre-term twins born under ER conditions when it was avoidable and was, in fact, avoided in this case? Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims as submitted by providers. Audits performed by the Agency then, after-the-fact, reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines and pertinent rules. The Medicaid provider agreement executed between the parties governs the contractual relationship between FHO and AHCA. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement of the claim that remains at issue. The amount, if any, that was overpaid related solely to the period of inpatient treatment that L.D. received from week 27 of her pregnancy until her discharge. Dr. Walter conceded perhaps a week would be required to stabilize the patient under her presenting conditions. The provider agreement pertinent to this case was voluntarily entered into by the parties. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. Petitioner administers the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to its authority, AHCA conducts audits to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. The audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. Audits are to ensure that the provider bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's authority to perform audits. Respondent does, however, dispute that a recoupment is appropriate, because FHO sought and was given prior approval for the inpatient stay for L.D. through the KePro system. If the inpatient length of stay was medically necessary for L.D., Petitioner does not dispute the amount billed as accurately reflecting the services provided to L.D. during that stay. There is no question that L.D. stayed in the hospital for the length of stay noted in the record. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that L.D.'s length of stay until week 35 of her pregnancy was medically appropriate and necessary to protect the medical health and well-being of L.D. and her unborn children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the case, with each party bearing its own costs and expenses of the litigation. Further, to the extent that Petitioner may have already sought recoupment against Respondent for the alleged overpayment, it is recommended that those funds be credited back to FHO. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Arnold, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 14079 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues presented are whether Petitioner is responsible for reimbursing the Agency for Health Care Administration for an overpayment for Medicaid services and, if so, whether administrative sanctions should be applied.
Findings Of Fact From April 19, 1995, through October 30, 1996, Petitioner was a pharmacy licensed to do business in the State of Florida. From April 15, 1995, through October 30, 1996, Petitioner was a Medicaid provider in good standing, pursuant to a Medicaid contract with the Agency. In 1996 Kathryn Holland, an agency employee, conducted an audit of Petitioner's records, using a method which the Agency calls an aggregate analysis. This analysis focuses on the inventory of a Medicaid provider and analyzes invoices and other documentation to determine if the provider had available during the audit period sufficient quantities of goods or products to support the quantity of goods or products billed to Medicaid. Holland analyzed the Agency's records to ascertain the claims filed by Petitioner and the amounts paid to Petitioner. She compiled a list of those drugs most frequently billed to the Agency's Medicaid program by Petitioner and selected 23 medications. She selected April 1, 1995, through October 30, 1996, as the audit period. She contacted Petitioner and requested records showing Petitioner's purchases of the medications on that list. She also contacted Mason Distributors, Inc., and H. I. Moore, Inc., two of Petitioner's primary suppliers, and requested copies of their invoices for medications purchased by Petitioner between May 1, 1995, and October 28, 1996. She prepared charts of the invoices and other documents received as a result of her requests. She reduced the number of audited drugs to 20 based upon adequate documentation provided to her for three of the listed medications. She prepared a preliminary report, which she sent to Petitioner with a request that Petitioner supply her with any additional records to show that additional supplies of the listed medication were available to Petitioner during the audit period. Petitioner responded to that request by providing additional documentation. Holland did not credit Petitioner with additional supplies based upon the additional documentation because the invoices appeared to be for a different pharmacy or appeared to reflect purchases outside the audit period. Further, the cancelled checks were payable to cash, had no notation as to the purpose of the checks, had a notation reflecting only a "business expense," had a notation for medication not on Holland's list, or reflected purchases outside the audit period. Petitioner was unable to document sufficient inventory during the audit period to justify the amount of medication billed to, and paid for by, the Agency. The Agency overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $12,529.11 for the 20 listed medications during the audit period and is entitled to reimbursement by Petitioner in that amount.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that Petitioner is responsible to repay the Agency in the amount of $12,529.11 by a date certain, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000, and terminating Petitioner from the Medicaid program for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Mark Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Highpoint Center, Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent has been the state agency charged with responsibility for overseeing the Florida Medicaid Program, including the recovery of overpayments to Medicaid providers pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider, having been issued provider number 377290000. Petitioner had valid Medicaid Provider Agreements with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) during the Audit Period, which began on January 1, 1996, and ended on May 10, 1999. Petitioner graduated from the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine in 1987, did an internship at Tulane University, did a residency in internal medicine at Eastern Virginia Graduate Medical School, and did a fellowship in hematology at Washington Hospital Center. He served as Chief of Hematology for Kessler Medical Center in Biloxi, Mississippi, while serving in the United States Air Force (with the rank of major). At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in Florida, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was employed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as a Medical Officer, Health Scientist Administrator. Petitioner served as an advisor to the director of the NIH on issues related to HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). Petitioner’s specialty is internal medicine with a sub- specialty in hematology. Petitioner has extensive experience treating persons suffering with HIV and AIDS dating back to 1987. Pursuant to his Medicaid Provider Agreements, Petitioner agreed to: (1) retain for five years complete and accurate medical records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program; (2) bill Medicaid only for services or goods that are medically necessary; and (3) abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. Respondent audited Petitioner’s Medicaid claims during the Audit Period and conducted a peer review of Petitioner’s billings and medical records of 25 of Petitioner’s patients as part of that audit.2 Joseph W. Shands, M.D., conducted the peer review of the documentation provided by Petitioner for purposes of the audit conducted by AHCA. Dr. Shands first reviewed documentation provided by Petitioner in 1999. He had no further participation in the audit until he reviewed information in preparation for his deposition in this proceeding. Dr. Shands graduated from medical school in 1956, trained in internal medicine, and worked as a microbiologist for approximately 15 years. He served as Chief of Infectious Diseases at the University of Florida for 23 years and also treated patients through the Alachua County Public Health Department and Shands Hospital at the University of Florida. Dr. Shands' practice was devoted almost entirely to the treatment of patients diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Dr. Shands retired from the practice of medicine in May 2002. For three years prior to his retirement, Dr. Shands practiced medicine part-time. Petitioner was sent a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated May 25, 1999, that found an overpayment in the amount of $862,576.72. In response to that PAAR, Petitioner had the attorney representing him at that time respond to AHCA in writing. The letter from the attorney, dated June 2, 1999, requested a copy of AHCA’s supporting materials and clarification of certain matters. AHCA did not respond. AHCA issued its FAAR on January 22, 2004, asserting that Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program in the total amount of $261,336.14 for services that in whole or in part were not covered by Medicaid. There was no plausible explanation why the FAAR was not issued until 2004, whereas the audit period ended in 1999. The difference between the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the PAAR and the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the FAAR is attributable to the use of different methodologies in calculating the amounts overpaid. The FAAR used the correct methodology that was not challenged by Petitioner. The FAAR sets forth five categories of alleged overpayments. Each category accurately describes an overpayment based on applicable Medicaid billing criteria. The five categories are as follows: Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some service for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payments made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category I.) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category II.) Medicaid policy addresses the type of pathology services covered by Medicaid. You billed and received payment for laboratory tests that were performed outside your facility by an independent laboratory. Payments made to you in these instances are considered overpayments. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category III.) Medicaid policy requires the Medicaid services be provided by or under the personal supervision of a physician. Personal supervision is defined as the physician being in the building when the services are rendered and signing and dating the medical records within twenty-four hours of service delivery. You billed and received payment for services which your medical records reflect you neither personally provided nor supervised. Payment made to you for all or a part of those services is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category IV.) Medicaid policy requires services performed be medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness. You billed and received payments for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. The claims which were considered medically unnecessary were disallowed and the money you were paid for these procedures is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category V.) CATEGORY I CLAIMS The disputed Category I claims can be separated into two subcategories: services performed while an employee of a corporate employer and services performed while a recipient was hospitalized. As to both subcategories Petitioner argues that he has been prejudiced by Respondent’s delay in issuing the FAAR because Medicaid requires providers to retain medical records only for five years from the date of service.3 Although Respondent was dilatory in prosecuting this matter, Petitioner’s argument that Respondent should be barred (presumably on equitable grounds such as the doctrine of laches) should be rejected. Petitioner has cited no case law in support of his contention, and it is clear that any equitable relief to which Petitioner may be entitled should come from a court of competent jurisdiction, not from this forum or from an administrative agency. All billings for which there are no medical records justifying the services rendered should be denied. CATEGORY II CLAIMS The following findings as to the Category II claims are based on the testimony of the witnesses and on the information contained in the exhibits.4 Although nothing in the record prior to the final hearing reflects that position, Petitioner did not dispute most of the down-codings at the final hearing. Office visits, whether supported by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note, for the sole purpose of administering IVIG treatment, will be discussed in the section of this Recommended Order dealing with Category V claims. The office visits, which were for the purpose of intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) treatment and for other reimbursable medical services, are set forth as part of the Category II disputes. The following findings resolve the Category II disputes. The date listed is the date the service was rendered. The billing code following the date is the billing code that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Recipient 1:5 01-20-98 99213 Recipient 2 09-27-96 99214 10-10-96 99213 11-13-96 99214 12-23-96 99212 02-24-97 99214 04-21-97 99213 04-28-97 99214 05-21-97 99213 06-02-97 99213 07-09-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 08-06-97 99213 08-11-97 99212 10-01-97 99213 10-10-97 99213 10-15-97 99214 10-21-97 99214 11-10-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 12-17-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-21-98 99213 Recipient 3 10-21-97 99213 11-04-97 99213 11-25-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-27-98 99214 02-26-98 99214 Recipient 4 01-03-98 99254 01-04-98 99261 01-05-98 99261 Recipient 5 09-29-97 99204 Recipient 6 11-11-97 99204 11-18-97 99213 Recipient 7 01-26-98 99204 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 8 09-26-96 99214 09-30-96 99213 10-03-96 99213 10-10-96 99212 10-25-96 99214 11-29-96 99213 12-04-96 99213 12-30-96 99213 01-22-97 99214 01-31-97 99211 02-14-97 99212 03-17-97 99214 04-04-97 99213 04-25-97 99212 05-30-97 99211 07-11-97 99213 08-08-97 99213 08-22-97 99213 09-05-97 99212 09-19-97 99214 10-31-97 99214 11-24-97 99214 12-03-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-09-98 99214 01-16-98 99213 01-30-98 99214 02-13-98 99214 Recipient 9 11-24-97 99203 Recipient 10 10-14-96 99205 11-04-96 99213 11-11-96 99213 11-25-96 99214 12-30-96 99213 01-27-97 99214 02-24-97 99214 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 04-07-97 99213 04-21-97 99214 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 05-21-97 Deny 06-09-97 99213 07-07-97 99212 08-04-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 09-24-97 992136 10-06-97 99213 10-10-97 99214 10-27-97 99213 11-10-97 99213 11-19-97 99214 11-24-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 02-02-98 99213 Recipient 11 06-30-97 99204 11-06-97 Recipient 12 Deny due to lack of documentation. 10-14-97 99213 11-06-97 99204 11-20-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-06-98 99213 Recipient 13 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 14 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 15 09-16-97 992157 Recipient 16 02-19-98 99212 Recipient 17 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 18 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 19 09-27-96 99212 10-01-96 99213 10-10-96 99213 10-23-96 99213 11-06-96 99213 11-20-96 99213 12-18-96 99211 12-30-96 Deny due to lack of 01-09-97 documentation. Deny due to lack of 01-22-97 documentation. 99211 02-05-97 99214 03-05-97 99214 03-19-97 99211 03-24-97 99214 03-26-97 04-02-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 04-21-97 99213 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 06-02-97 99212 06-30-97 99213 07-07-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 07-28-97 99212 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-08-97 99213 09-15-97 99214 09-22-97 99213 10-28-97 99214 11-04-97 11-07-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 11-24-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-12-98 99213 01-26-98 99213 02-19-98 99214 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 20 12-04-96 99204 12-13-96 99213 01-03-97 99213 01-17-97 99213 01-27-97 99213 02-07-97 99214 02-21-97 99213 03-07-97 99214 03-21-97 99212 04-04-97 99214 04-21-97 99212 05-06-97 99213 06-04-97 99213 06-13-97 99213 06-30-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 08-04-97 99213 01-19-98 99213 Recipient 21 04-29-97 99204 05-13-97 99214 05-16-97 99213 05-23-97 99212 06-09-97 99212 06-23-97 99212 07-11-97 99211 07-25-97 99213 08-11-97 99213 09-10-97 99213 11-05-97 99214 11-19-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 01-07-98 99214 01-21-98 99213 02-04-98 99213 Recipient 22 02-16-98 99205 02-20-98 99213 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 23 06-23-97 99215 10-02-97 992138 Recipient 24 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 25 01-24-97 99213 02-07-97 99213 02-24-97 99212 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99212 06-02-97 99212 06-16-97 99212 07-14-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 07-28-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-15-97 99213 10-01-97 99213 10-13-97 99213 10-27-97 99214 12-08-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-13-98 99212 01-19-98 99214 02-02-98 99212 CATEGORY III As set forth in the Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook (Respondent’s Exhibit 6), Petitioner is not entitled to billings for laboratory tests that were performed outside his facility by an independent laboratory. The only billing arguably in Category III is the billing for Recipient 1 on February 19, 1998. That billing should have been approved because it was for a urinalysis by dip stick or tablet that was administered and analyzed by Petitioner. It was not analyzed by an independent laboratory. CATEGORY IV All Category IV billings pertained to Petitioner’s supervision of his staff while patients were receiving treatments of IVIG. Those billings will be subsumed in the Category V billings discussion. CATEGORY V The alleged Category V overpayments relate to Petitioner’s IVIG treatment of Patients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25, each of whom was an adult diagnosed with AIDS. In many of these cases a nurse administered the IVIG treatment. A dispute as to whether Petitioner properly supervised the nurse while he or she administered the IVIG treatment is moot because of the findings pertaining to the IVIG treatments set forth in Paragraphs 20 and 21. The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook requires that rendered services be medically necessary, as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary and do not duplicate another provider’s service. In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient’s needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient’s caretaker, or the provider. The use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). The use of a drug for a purpose other than the uses approved by the FDA is referred to as an “off-label” use. The off-label use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not effective either from a medical standpoint or from an economic standpoint. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions other than AIDS that would justify the IVIG treatment administered by Petitioner. The following finding resolves that conflict. Utilizing applicable Medicaid billing criteria, the medical records produced by Petitioner fail to document that any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions that warranted treatment with IVIG.9 All of Petitioner’s billings for IVIG treatments for Recipients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25 were properly denied under the rationale of the FAAR’s Category V. Included in the billings that were properly denied were billings for office visits (whether documented by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note) when the sole purpose of the office visit was the administration of an IVIG treatment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that Petitioner repay the sum of the overpayment as determined by Respondent’s staff based on the Findings of Fact set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2005.
The Issue Is proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2.c. an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons described in the respective petitions that formed the basis of this dispute? See Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The party Florida Medical Association, Inc., a not for profit corporation is organized and maintained for the benefit of approximately 17,000 licensed physicians who are its members. It represents the common interests of those members. Some of its members provide services under the terms contemplated by proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2.c. Likewise, Robert Anthony Savona, D.O.; John F. Hull, D.O.; and Robert Kagan, M.D., as licensed physicians, provide services contemplated by a proposed rule 59G- 3.010(4)(b)2.c. Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state Medicaid Program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 et seq. and Section 409.901, et seq. Florida Statutes. This responsibility includes reimbursement of Medicaid providers. Respondent offered the proposed rule for adoption. The services contemplated by proposed rule 59G- 3.010(4)(b)2.c., in which the rule describes a payment mechanism, are in association with patients who are Medicare and Medicaid eligible. The arrangement contemplated by the proposed rule is in relation to Medicaid reimbursable services which complement Medicare. Under the proposed rule, Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B) is paid for the deductible and coinsurance for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipients by the Medicaid fiscal agent, in accordance with a rate identified in the proposed rule. The recipients of the services from physicians under the proposed rule, eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid benefits, are also referred to as Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs). QMBs are described as poor, elderly and disabled persons. In pertinent part the proposed rule states: 59G-3.010 Medicaid Services Complementing Medicare. * * * (4) Medicaid Reimbursable Services which Complement Medicare. * * * (b) Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B). * * * 2. The Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance is paid for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipient by the Medicaid fiscal agent at the following rates: * * * c. Physician services, including doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathy, and providers of chiropractic and podiatric services are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance only to the extent that the total payment received does not exceed the Medicaid fee for the service provided. If there is no comparable Medicaid fee for the service, the Medicaid fee is calculated to be 50 percent of the Medicare approved charge for the service provided. In these situations, whether the physician did or did not receive a payment from Medicaid, by billing Medicaid he is bound to the Medicaid payment schedule as payment in full. Other parts of proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2. at a., b., d., and e. address Medicare Part B deductibles and coinsurance for other providers as follows: Part B patient hospital services are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and coinsurance. Rural health centers, federally qualified health centers and county health departments are reimbursed their encounter rate minus the amount of Medicare's payment. * * * Pharmacy providers are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance only to the extent that the total payment does not exceed the Medicaid fee for the service provided. Other Part B suppliers are reimbursed 100 percent of the coinsurance and 100 percent of deductible. Under Medicare Part B, 80 percent of reasonable costs or charges for the delivery of health care to Medicare eligible patient is paid through the Medicare program as a premium. That program is administered by the federal government under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 1395 et seq. That payment is a form of insurance. The remaining 20 percent is anticipated to be paid by the patient as copayments or coinsurance, in addition to an annual deductible. The proposed rule in relation to physician services addresses the manner in which some portion of the 20 percent is "crossed-over" to be paid for potential payment through the Medicaid program administered by Respondent using federal and state funding, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 1396 et seq. and Section 409.901 et seq., Florida Statutes. Payment to the physicians for their services in relation to the deductible and coinsurance depends upon the application of the formula in the proposed rule. The formula contemplates reimbursement to the physicians at less than 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance because the Medicaid fee schedule is generally lower than the federal Medicare fee schedule for the same services. In fact, in most cases the physicians will receive no payment for the deductible or coinsurance above the 80 percent payment under the Medicare fee structure in relation to the basic Medicare premium. By comparison to other health care and service providers discussed in the proposed rule, some other individuals and entities are reimbursed at 100 percent of the deductible and coinsurance and others are not guaranteed reimbursement at 100 percent. The formulas for reimbursement for services provided under the proposed rule related to Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance are influenced by the results of quarterly estimating conferences held between legislative and executive branch staff. Those estimators, within respective categories of services, examine the performance of the various categories of services concerning fiscal impact through a comparison of available revenues against expenditures. This assists in the preparation of future budgets upon the recommendation of the governor to be passed by the legislature. Respondent assists in preparation of budget requests, to include recommendation for policy changes related to the amount of expenditures for the various services performed for the benefit of Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipients, QMBs, who are entitled to the payment of their deductible and coinsurance under Medicare Part B. However, the impetus for the reimbursement formula for physician services described in the proposed rule has a more precise origin, for reasons now explained. A prior version of Rule 59G-3.010(4), Florida Administrative Code in effect on April 8, 1996, was challenged in an administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That version limited the amount of reimbursement for physician services associated with Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance in a different manner than the proposed rule. In the decision of Reynolds v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 18 F.A.L.R. 3474 (Fla. DOAH 1996) the rule was held invalid. Among the cases cited for this decision was Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994) and Haynes Ambulance Service, Inc. v. State of Alabama, 36 F.3d 1974 (11th Cir. 1994). The federal court cases refer to the recipients of cost reimbursement for deductibles and coinsurance as QMBs. Essentially, they are the same persons who are described in the proposed rule as Medicare and Medicaid eligible. Although the rule had been declared invalid, Respondent continued to exercise the policy of denying payment of Medicare deductibles and coinsurance on physician crossover claims at 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance as contemplated by the federal court cases. Following Respondent's return to the policy of not paying the deductible and coinsurance at 100 percent for physician services, Petitioner's Savona, Hull, and Kagan brought a lawsuit in federal count to compel payment for physician services to QMBs at the Medicare rate. On March 3, 1997, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted a final injunction that required Respondents to pay the physician class in the lawsuit at the Medicare rate for services provided to QMBs. See Savona v. Cook, Case No. 4:96CV14-WS (N.D. Fla. 1997). After the decision in Savona, Respondent pursued a policy of paying the deductible and coinsurance at 100 percent of the Medicare rate. This policy lasted from March 3, 1997 until October 1, 1997. To facilitate the payment for physician services at 100 percent of the Medicare rate for the crossover claims related to the deductible and coinsurance, Respondent amended its state Medicaid plan, with the federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). In addition, Respondent sought an appropriation through the legislature to fund the increase in copayments to assure that physician services were reimbursed at 100 percent of the Medicare rate for the deductible and coinsurance. This led to the passage of Chapter 97-152, Laws of Florida, Item 248, the 1997-98 General Appropriations Act, which set aside monies from the General Revenue Fund and from the Medical Care Trust Fund, totaling $87 million for Medicare Part B copayment for reimbursement of physician services for the dually eligible recipients. This refers to recipients eligible for services under Medicare and Medicaid. The 1997-98 fiscal year for that appropriation began July 1, 1997, and continues until June 30, 1998. The amount appropriated has proven more than adequate to meet the copayment for physician services at the 100 percent Medicare rate. Another document, prepared by persons unknown, was associated with the appropriations process for 1997-98. That document is referred to as Respondent's Ex No. 1 and is entitled 1997-98 General Appropriations and Summary Statement of Intent. It sets out the exact language in Chapter 97-152, Laws of Florida, Item 248, related to the $87 million for full Medicare Part B copayment for physician services. It also sets out a summary statement of intent that is not found within the General Appropriations Act. The language in that summary statement of intent is as follows: It is the intent of the Legislature that the funds in Specific Appropriation 248 which are provided to pay the full Medicare part B co- payment for physician services to clients who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, be expended only to the extent currently required by federal law. In the event that changes in federal law relating to reimbursement for these services occurs, the Agency for Health Care Administration shall directly submit to the federal Health Care Financing Administration any amendments to the state Medicaid Plan which are necessary to realize cost savings options permitted by and in compliance with federal law. As anticipated by the summary statement of intent, federal law relating to reimbursement for physician services did change in August of 1997 when Congress enacted the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Section 4714. In pertinent part it stated: * * * (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a State is not required to provide any payment for any expenses incurred relating to payment for deductibles, coinsurance or copayments for medicare cost-sharing to extent that payment under title XVIII for the service would exceed the payment amount that otherwise would be made under the State plan under this title for such service if provided to an eligible recipient other than a medicare beneficiary. That law became effective October 1, 1997. By its terms it created the option for states to reduce payments on crossover claims to the state Medicaid rate, although it did not mandate that outcome. The payment option created by the congressional enactment had application to all categories of providers. In view of the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Respondent decided to change its payment policy to disallow payment for physician services at the 100 percent Medicare rate in all instances for physician services related to the deductible and coinsurance for dually eligible recipients. The effective date of the change in policy was October 1, 1997, coinciding with the effective date of the Congressional Budget Act. Respondent implemented its policy change without the benefit of rule adoption. The failure to implement the payment policy by rule adoption was challenged in the case of Savona v. Agency for Health Care Administration, DOAH Case No. 97-5909RU (Fla. DOAH 1998). On January 16, 1998, Respondent gave notice of rule development, to include the preliminary text of the rule. For this reason, the February 12, 1998, order entered in DOAH Case No. 97-5909RU denied the petition for determination of invalidity of the non-rule policy brought in accordance with Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. Consistent with its notice of rule development, Respondent published notice of proposed rulemaking pertaining to the rule under challenge here. That publication was made on February 13, 1998, through the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 24, No. 7. The specific authority for rule promulgation was Section 409.919, Florida Statutes, and the law to be implemented was Section 409.908, Florida Statutes. No mention was made of the summary statement of intent associated with the 1997-98 General Appropriations Act in Florida and the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The testimony of Richard T. Lutz, Director of the Division of State Health Purchasing, Agency for Health Care Administration, at hearing established his reliance upon those latter two items as authority for promulgating the proposed rule in relation to the copayment for physician services under Medicare Part B, for the deductible and coinsurance. Mr. Lutz was principally responsible for the promulgation of the rule as policymaker for the Respondent. In addressing the difference in the reimbursement policies for physician services, contrasted with other services detailed in the proposed rule, Mr. Lutz indicated that changes in relation to reimbursement policies, other than for physicians, would be the product of an estimating conference showing the financial impact of the changes, followed by a budget item to effect the changes. In the absence of that impetus, Mr. Lutz described that he had been instructed that the methodologies that were in place for various services under Medicare Part B utilizing established methodologies for the reimbursement practices would remain in effect. Unlike the circumstances existing in the proposed rule, for classes of providers other than physicians, Mr. Lutz in behalf of Respondent took the initiative in dealing with reimbursement for physicians care under Medicare Part B when promulgating the proposed rule. He concluded that the terms of the federal court order in Savona were subject to the language in the summary statement of intent, and with the advent of the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997 Respondent was at liberty to change its reimbursement scheme for physician services effective October 1, 1997. In making the policy choice to promulgate the proposed rule, Mr. Lutz recognized the option which Florida had to either limit copayments or continue copayments at the Medicare rate for physician services under Medicare Part B. In promulgating the proposed rule Mr. Lutz identified that the Agency did not consider language in Section 409.908(13), Florida Statutes. He did indicate in his testimony the belief that the preamble to Section 409.908, Florida Statutes, creates authority for promulgation of the proposed rule in its comment about the Respondent's ability to make payments in accordance with methodologies that are set forth in its rules, manuals, and handbooks, consistent with limitations placed in the General Appropriations Act and any statement of legislative intent. Mr. Lutz in promulgating the proposed rule recognized that the physician services under Medicare Part B copayment for deductible and coinsurance would eventuate in no payment beyond the 80 percent premium in many instances. Although Mr. Lutz expresses the opinion that the proposed rule for payment of physician services under Medicare Part B has retroactive application to October 1, 1997, he acknowledges that the language in the proposed rule makes no reference to its retroactivity to that date.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments and, if so, the total amount of the overpayments. Petitioner agreed at the onset of the hearing not to contest the findings of the Agency that Petitioner received Medicaid monies to which he was not entitled. Therefore, the issue remaining for determination is: Whether Respondent calculated the overpayment amount of $52,850.82 using a valid statistical formula and a valid sample of recipients and claims during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence, official recognition granted, evidentiary rulings made, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are established. The Agency is charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Sections 409.907 and 409.913, Florida Statutes (2003). Among its administrative duties, the Agency operates a program to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid providers to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect occur to the minimum extent possible and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate. "Overpayment" is statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid Program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake." § 409.913(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2000). The FAAR, covering the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, together with the Agency's work papers, set out a Medicaid overpayment amount of $52,850.82 that the Agency seeks to recoup from Petitioner. Petitioner is a physician enrolled in the Medicaid program under provider number 0580091-00, who operated under his provider number during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, under the auspices of a standard Medicaid provider agreement. As a part of the Medicaid provider agreement, the provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, and statements of policy. Petitioner participated in the Medicaid program during the FAAR period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, and received payment for the services that the Agency now questions and are the subject of the audit. During the above audit period, the applicable statutes, rules, and Medicaid handbooks required Petitioner to retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Petitioner had to retain these records for at least five years from the date of services. The Florida Medicaid program prepares and furnishes handbooks to all enrolled Medicaid providers, including Petitioner. These handbooks set forth the Medicaid policies with regard to services rendered and billed by providers. Petitioner had a duty to make sure that each claim submitted was true and accurate and was for goods and services that were provided, by an enrolled Medicaid provider, in accordance with the requirements of Medicaid rules, handbooks, and policies, and in accordance with federal and state law. Medicaid providers who do not comply with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies hereinabove may be subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Mr. Hector Tapining (Mr. Tapining) and Phyllis Stiver (Nurse Stiver), registered nurse consultant for Medicaid Program Integrity, conducted an on-site visit to Petitioner's office and requested records. From the files of Petitioner, Mr. Tapining generated a random list of 30 Medicaid recipients (the cluster sample) who had received services by Petitioner during the two- year audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002. The Agency thereafter generated worksheets reflecting: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) total number of claims made by Petitioner, with dates of medical services provided; (3) the total amount of money paid Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Additional Agency-generated worksheets reflected: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) the total number of claims of Petitioner, with dates of service; (3) the total amount of money paid to Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to Nurse Stiver for her review of compliance with Medicaid enrollment and documentation. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to E. Rawson Griffin, III, M.D. (Dr. Griffin), the medical records consultant, for his review and evaluation of appropriate billing codes. The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. Dr. Griffin, after review of 30 patient records, concluded that Petitioner engaged in a general pattern of over coding at the highest level of code (99205) for services rendered that appeared to be rather straight-forward and simple for the medical services rendered at the time of each visit. Over coding is the term employed when supporting documentation for medical billing does not support the billing code chosen and assigned by the provider. In his review, Dr. Griffin saw no middle codes (99213s and/or 99214s) billed by Petitioner. Dr. Griffin opined that it was extraordinary that Petitioner would see and service 30 patients on their first visits, who at that time presented a complaint necessitating a medical necessity level code 99205, the highest level of Medicaid service. Continuing, Dr. Griffin explained that over coding is entering in the patient's billing statement a code higher than the patient's medical complaint and the Patient's recorded medical necessity warranted for the visit or visits (1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) on the date those services were provided by Petitioner. In Dr. Griffin's opinion, Medicaid billing codes are to be determined by consideration of the following medical factors: (1) the patient's particular medical complaint and the degree of complexity of that complaint at the time of the initial visit, (2) the type of and the complexity of medical examinations and the tests necessarily required to be administered based upon the type and complexity of the initial complaint, and (3) the resulting interpretations of the tests and the examinations administered for treatment of the complaint. It is only after completion of the above analysis and documentation in the patient's medical records, would a code 22915 billing be appropriate. Dr. Griffin's analysis of the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner resulted in his down coding Petitioner’s billing as shown below.2 I.D. Number Service Date Code Billed Adjustment B.K. 1 03-29-2000 215 (5) 214 B.K. 1 07-19-2000 214 213 1 08-17-2000 214 213 1 12-11-2000 215 214 1 02-22-2001 215 214 1 05-23-2001 214 213 1 06-24-2001 214 212 J.A.C. 4 No date 215 214 J.R. 5 10-02-2000 215 213 B.F. 6 07-25-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 04-10-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 05-04-2000 214 213 (2 visits) D.C. 9 01-23-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-07-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-28-2000 214 213 D.W. 13 01-12-2000 215 213 P.L. 14 01-10-2000 214 213 I.H. 15 12-18-2000 215 213 M.V. 17 04-10-2000 215 213 R.R. 21 04-17-2001 214 213 S.K. 25 11-20-2000 212 211 A.H. 26 12-19-2000 215 212 T.P. 27 02-20-2000 215 213 M.R. 28 11-14-2002 215 214 E.C. 29 04-28-2000 214 213 E.C. 07-03-2000 214 213 12-28-2000 214 212 01-02-2000 214 212 01-23-2000 214 212 02-06-2000 214 212 04-03-2000 214 212 (6 visits) R.S. 30 04-16-2001 215 213 Nurse Stiver reviewed the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner for compliance with Medicaid policy(s) to ensure that services billed are the services for which Medicaid pays and are services that meet all aspects of the Medicaid policy(s) as specified in the Medicaid Handbook. Medicaid policy, regarding provider enrollment, requires (all) providers who services Medicaid patients to be (individually) enrolled in the Medicaid program as providers before providing service and billing Medicaid for those services. The Agency verifies the education, credentials, and criminal background of each enrollee to ensure the safety of Medicaid recipients. The individual provider enrollment is required as a condition precedent for providers to bill Medicaid for services and to be paid by Medicaid for those services. The enrollment requirement includes PAs and ARNPs. Nurse Stiver's review of Petitioner's documents sought to ascertain whether each provider who actually rendered services had executed a voluntary enrollment contract agreement between the Agency and that provider. In these contract agreements, the provider agrees to comply with all laws and rules pertaining to the Medicaid program when furnishing a service or goods to a Medicaid recipient, and the Agency agrees to pay a sum, determined by a fee schedule, payment methodology, or other manner, for the service or goods provided to the Medicaid recipient. The Medicaid Handbook requires separate and/or individual enrollment of each and every entity that provides Medicaid service(s) to Medicaid recipients. The mandatory enrollment includes a provider(s) who makes written entries on and/or signs Medicaid documents. Should the medical service provider and the provider documenting the Medicaid recipient's medical files and the provider billing Medicaid for services rendered be different providers, each provider must be individually enrolled in the Medicaid program. Within a chain of provider entities, the failure of one provider entity to be enrolled entitles the Agency to full recoupment of all Medicaid payments made to the enrolled Provider. Nurse Stiver applied the above analysis to the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid recipients' records recovered from Petitioner's files and to the Agency's worksheets. Nurse Stiver's review and her investigation revealed specific instances in which the paid billing claims evidenced that Petitioner's non-enrolled PAs and/or Petitioner's non-enrolled ARNP either provided the medical services or documented the medical services provided to the Medicaid recipients as shown below: Patient Service Date(s) Services and/or documentation 1. B.K. Serviced 9 times Signature-not enrolled 2. E.J. 08-14-01 Records written and signed by PA not enrolled and (not countersigned by Petitioner) 3. E.T. Serviced 4 times Services provided not entitled to Medicaid payment (unauthorized) J.A. (stipulation) Stipulation3 B.F. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled M.R. 7 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled F.H. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled through 12. Stipulations 13. D.W. 2 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 14. through 17. Stipulations 18. L.A. 5 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 19. and 20. Stipulations 21. R.R. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 22. and 23. Stipulations 24. L.S. 1 visit-serviced Provider not enrolled 25. S.K. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 26. through 28. Stipulations 29. E.C. 12 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 30. Stipulation After the review and examination of the claims submitted within the cluster sample, Nurse Stiver concluded the above services billed to the Agency were not performed by Petitioner. She opined that either or both of Petitioner's employees, Justo Lugo and Phillip Nguyen (PAs) and/or Andrea McDonald (ARNP) provided or assisted in providing services. As non-enrolled providers in the Medicaid program, the PAs and the ARNP’s participation in providing services to Medicaid recipients and/or participation in assisting Petitioner in providing medical services and/or participation in Petitioner's billing Medicaid for medical services to Medicaid recipients violated Medicaid policy. Respondent established that the Medicaid program payments for services provided by an individual not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program are overpayments of which the Agency is entitled to full recoupment. After the reviews and the analysis by Nurse Stiver and Dr. Griffin, using the Agency's formula for calculating the extrapolated overpayments, the Agency determined overpayment in the amount of $64,453.74 to have occurred. Based upon these findings, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) letter setting out the overpayment amount of $64,453.74 and inviting Petitioner to submit additional documentation. Petitioner's additional documentation submittals were reviewed by the Agency. The post-PAAR review resulted in a reduction of overpayment to $52,850.82 as the total overpayment for all claims considered, and sought to be recovered from Petitioner by the Agency. The Agency's worksheets resulting in the $52,850.82 overpayment included: (1) the medical record review summary; (2) a spreadsheet setting out the names of the recipients, the dates of service, the procedure billed, the amount paid by the Agency, the amount allowed by the Agency, and the resulting overpayment; (3) the overpayment calculation using cluster sampling; (4) the patient worksheets, or claims; and (5) the procedure code summary of the claims in the universe, as defined in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2000). The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. The Agency's data and calculations were reviewed by Ian McKeague, Ph.D. (Dr. McKeague). He reproduced the calculations and concluded that $52,850.82 is the correct overpayment amount made by Medicaid to Petitioner. Petitioner produced neither written authority nor expert testimony contesting the validity of the statistical formula and Dr. McKeague's resulting calculation of overpayment. Nurse Stiver, with over 14 years employment with the Agency, worked with the Medicaid policies and handbooks. She worked with Mr. Tapining on the audit of Petitioner documents. Specifically, she reviewed Petitioner's records for compliance with Medicaid policy, to ensure that the services billed are the services Medicaid paid for and that those services met all aspects of Medicaid policy. Nurse Stiver's investigation and review revealed specific instances in which the paid claims show that the PAs and/or the ARNP, not Petitioner himself, provided the services to Medicaid patients. In each case where the Agency determined Petitioner was not entitled to payment, Nurse Stiver reviewed the medical records and determined that the ARNP or one of the PAs, who were not enrolled in the Medicaid program, actually rendered services to Medicaid recipients. Her determination was based upon her many years of nursing experience that the person rendering the services is the person who documents the services rendered. From her review, it appeared that the ARNP or a PA (not enrolled), not Petitioner, documented the service billed to and paid by Medicaid. Services rendered by an ARNP or a PA who is not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program cannot be compensated by the Medicaid program. Petitioner argued that he provided all Medicaid services billed to Medicaid and, on those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees (either the ARNP or the PAs), who by happenstance would be present in the treatment room, aided him by merely documenting services he himself rendered to the Medicaid patients. Petitioner presented an alternative argument that on other of those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees would be in the room when Petitioner actually provided services to Medicaid patients, and, while he was providing those services, he would simultaneously dictate to his employee who would transcribe his dictations on the Medicaid forms. Petitioner elected not to compel attendance by subpoena of his employees, even though the final hearing was continued to provide Petitioner an opportunity to do so. Petitioner's argument, that the proposed testimony by his employees would have been sufficient to challenge the Agency determination that Petitioner's billing was for services performed by a provider who was not enrolled in the Medicaid program, is without a foundation in fact and rejected. The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook provides, in part, that "Records must be retained for a period of at least five years from the date of service." The handbook goes on to provide in pertinent part: PAs must meet the general Medicaid provider enrollment that are contained in Chapter 2 of the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA-1500 and Child Health Check- Up 221. In addition, PAs must follow the specific enrollment requirements that are listed in this section. * * * PAs must meet the provider requirements and qualification and their practice must be fully operational before they can be enrolled as Medicaid providers. * * * If a PA is employed by or contracts with a physician who can enroll as a Medicaid provider, the physician must enroll as a group provider and the PA must enroll as a treating provider within the group. * * * Services provided by a PA under the direct supervision of a physician may be billed using the physician's provider number instead of the PA's provider number. Direct physician supervision means the physician: (*) Is on the premises when the services are rendered, and (**) reviews, signs, and dates the medical record. * * * Medical records must state the necessity for and the extent of services provided. The following minimum requirements may vary according to the services rendered: * * * Note: See the service-specific Coverage and Limitations Handbook for record keeping requirements that are specific to a particular service. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid Payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Note: See Chapter 5 in this handbook for information on administrative sanctions and Medicaid payment recoupment. Petitioner, by signing a Medicaid provider agreement, agreed that all submissions for payment of claims for services will constitute a certification that the services were provided in accordance with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules and regulations applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medical Provider Handbooks issued by the Agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Petitioner, Mazhar G. Nawaz, M.D., to repay Respondent the principal amount of $52,850.82 plus interest as provided in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2002). DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2004.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was overpaid for Medicaid prescriptions. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA, Agency or Respondent) asserts the Petitioner, Compscript, Inc., d/b/a Compscript (Petitioner or Compscript) failed to maintain proper records to support and document the Medicaid prescription claims paid by the Agency for the audit period. According to the Agency, the audit findings must be extrapolated to the universe of all claims for the audit period. If so, the Agency maintains the Petitioner should reimburse AHCA for a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $216,974.07 (this is the “recoupment” amount). The Petitioner denies it was overpaid any amount, asserts it kept records in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing pharmacy records, and maintains that the Agency may not apply the extrapolation accounting procedure in this case.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was a licensed pharmacy authorized to do business in the State of Florida; its pharmacy license number is PH0016271. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner’s Medicaid provider number is 106629300. The terms of the provider agreement govern the contractual relationship between this provider and the Agency. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement together with the pertinent laws or regulations controls the relationship between the provider and the Agency. The provider agreement pertinent to this case is a voluntary agreement between AHCA and the Petitioner. Pursuant to the provider agreement, the Petitioner was to “keep, maintain, and make available in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid-related records as AHCA requires for a period of at least five (5) years.” In addition to the foregoing, a Medicaid provider must maintain a patient record for each recipient for whom new or refill prescriptions are dispensed. Any Medicaid providers not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. A Medicaid provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. The records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. However, in order to qualify for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensive. Specific to the issues of this case, a Medicaid provider must also retain prescription records for five years. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority to administer the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to this authority AHCA conducts audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These “integrity” audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Medicaid program in Florida was governed by a “pay and chase” procedure. Under this procedure, the Agency paid Medicaid claims submitted by Medicaid providers and then, after-the-fact, audited such providers for accuracy and quality control. These “integrity” audits are to assure that the provider maintains records to support the paid claims. In this case, the audit period is May 28, 1999 through July 18, 2000. The pertinent audit has been designated AHCA audit no. 01-0514-000-3/H/KNH and was initiated on October 23, 2000. The Petitioner does not dispute the Agency’s authority to perform audits such as the one at issue. The Petitioner maintains its records are sufficient to support the paid claims and that the Agency has unreasonably imposed its interpretation of the requirements. The Medicaid provider agreement that governs this case required that the Petitioner comply with all Medicaid handbooks in effect during the audit period. Essentially, this standard dictates the records that must be kept for quality control so that the after-the-fact audit can verify the integrity of the Medicaid claims that were paid by the Agency. During the audit period the Petitioner sold or dispensed drugs to Medicaid recipients. Equally undisputed is the fact that Medicaid claims were paid by the Agency during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this cause was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the Petitioner’s provider agreement and the pertinent regulations. The Agency required that each and every claim submitted by the Petitioner during the audit period under the Medicaid program be filed electronically. Each claim submitted was filed electronically. Nevertheless, the Agency also required the Petitioner to retain records supporting the claim. Additionally, the Petitioner was to make such supporting records available to the Agency upon request. The Agency asked the Petitioner to present its records to support the claims for the audit period. The disclosure of the records proved difficult for this Medicaid provider because it does not operate in a conventional pharmacy setting. More specifically, it operates solely to serve a nursing home population. All of the patients whose prescriptions were filled were nursing home residents. Compscript maintains its manner of doing business is slightly different from the conventional pharmacy. Rather than the walk-in patient who presents a written prescription to be filled, this Petitioner receives its pharmacy orders by telephone or facsimile transmission from nursing homes. Typically, the staff at Compscript takes the call, writes down the pertinent information, enters the data into the pharmacy’s computer system, and the item is dispensed and routed to the nursing home via the delivery driver. All drugs are dispensed in sealed containers and are delivered with a manifest listing all the medications by name and patient. Given the volume of prescriptions being prepared and delivered, for the audit period at issue in this case, the Petitioner made 2-3 trips to the nursing home per day. Once the information for the prescription was entered into the Petitioner’s computer system, Compscript had little interest in maintaining the written telephone message or the facsimile sheet that generated the request. In some instances the Compscript employee did not make a written record of the prescription request. In those instances the employee entered the request directly into the Petitioner’s computer system and bypassed the written step altogether. The Compscript computer system tracks the initials of the pharmacist who entered the prescription information and cannot be altered without such alteration being tracked and noted. Since the pharmacy fills “over the counter” items, as well as controlled and non-controlled pharmacy products, the computer record denotes that information along with the patient information. When the Respondent’s audit agents went into the Compscript facility to audit the Medicaid claims, the Petitioner could not readily produce the written documentation to support the dispensed drugs. In fact, many of the records that verified the prescriptions dispensed were found on the nursing home records. The nursing home patient’s physician order sheet specified the item or items requested for the patient. This “physician order sheet” (POS) should theoretically always support the dispensing of the product from the Petitioner. In this case there were instances when the POS did not corroborate the claim. When the auditors from the Agency presented at Compscript, the Petitioner did not have the POS records to produce. Obviously, those records were maintained within the nursing home. Additionally, Compscript did not have the telephone notes or the facsimile transmission sheets to support items dispensed during the audit period. When the hearing in this cause proceeded it was also discovered that records that were generated daily by the Petitioner’s computer system that would have corroborated the claims (and which were allegedly maintained in storage) were not produced or available to support Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period. During the audit the Agency’s auditors requested records from a random sample of the claims submitted during the audit period. The results from that sample where then applied to the universe of claims for the audit period. When this mathematical calculation was performed the audit produced a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $1,341,466.27. Afterwards, when the Petitioner was able to locate additional records to correspond to and support the prescriptions dispensed, the amount of overpayment was reduced to $217,715.28 (the amount set forth in the parties’ Pre-hearing Stipulation). At hearing, the Agency maintained that the amount of overpayment was $216,974.07 for which the Petitioner could produce no adequate documentation. At hearing, the Petitioner continued to dispute the procedure of applying the audit sample overpayment to the population of claims to mathematically compute the overpayment for the audit period. This “extrapolation” process was admitted into evidence and has been fully considered in the findings reached in this case. The Petitioner was required to maintain Medicaid- related records for a period of 5 years. Thus, for the audit period in this case, any record supporting the claims should have been maintained and made available for the Agency. Such records would have been within the five-year period. The Agency designates Medicaid compliance to its office of Medicaid Program Integrity. In turn, that office contracted with Heritage Information Systems, Inc. (Heritage) to perform and report pharmacy audits of the numerous pharmacy providers within the state. Auditors from Heritage were assigned the Compscript audit. At the time of the audit the Heritage auditors were not privy to any of the POS documents later produced in the case. Ken Yon is the Agency’s administrator who was responsible for managing the instant case and who worked with the Heritage auditors to assure the policies and practices of the Agency were met. In this case, the Heritage auditors presented at Compscript unannounced on October 23, 2000, and sought 250 randomly selected claims for review. By limiting the number of claims, the auditors were not required to sift through the records of 46,000+ claims (the approximate number of claims that the Petitioner submitted during the audit period). For the universe of 46,000+ claims, 250 randomly selected claims is a reasonable sample to audit. The adequacy of the sample number as well as the manner in which it was generated is supported by the weight of credible evidence presented in this matter. Also, the results of a sample of 250 from the universe of 46,000+ would be statistically valid if randomly chosen as they were in this case. In this regard the testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson, an expert in statistical sampling and analysis, has been deemed credible and persuasive as to the issues of the appropriateness of the sample (as to size and how it was generated), the use of the sample overpayment to calculate an overall payment, and the statistical trustworthiness of the amounts claimed in this cause. If anything, as Dr. Johnson asserted, the actual overpayment would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. The Agency has used a statistical extrapolation method to compute overpayments for years. The statistical concept and process of applying a sample to a universe to mathematically compute an overpayment is not novel to this case. After the auditors completed their review of the records at the Compscript pharmacy, Kathryn Holland, a licensed pharmacist (who is also a consulting pharmacist) prepared the Respondent’s Final Agency Audit Report. Prior to completing the report, Ms. Holland received and reviewed the information provided by the Petitioner through the auditors. As a result of the review, a number of “can’t find” conclusions were reached. By “can’t find” the auditors and Ms. Holland meant that the original prescription or refill documentation could not be located for the paid Medicaid claim. These “can’t find” claims were reported to the Petitioner, who was given additional time to locate and produce documents to support the claims. In fact, the Agency continued to accept documentation for claims up through the time of hearing. Consequently, the amount sought for overpayment has been substantially reduced. Whether the Agency had the authority to accept documents outside the prescription records maintained by the pharmacy is not an issue. In fact, the Agency did reduce the overpayment amount when subsequent supporting documents were located. A second error in the documentation for the Petitioner’s prescriptions was noted as “no doctor’s address on the prescription.” That expression meant that pursuant to state and federal law the physician’s address is required for a controlled substance and when it was not provided the auditor deemed the documentation incomplete. Although the Petitioner maintained doctor addresses in its computer system, the records did not correspond to the specific prescriptions that were filled for the audited claims. In order to stand as a sufficient prescription form, a writing must be created contemporaneous to the order (phone requests that are transcribed are acceptable), must contain specific information (type of drug, strength, dose, patient, doctor, DEA number, refill, etc.), and it must be kept for the requisite time. It would be acceptable for the prescription to be computer generated so long as it was written contemporaneous to the order and preserved as required by law. In this case, at the conclusion of the audit, the Agency identified 194 discrepant claims within the random sample of 250. The vast majority of those discrepancies were noted as “can’t find.” Had the Agency not accepted other documentation to support the dispensing of the drugs, the calculated overpayment would have been $1,575,707.44. Applying a lower confidence limit of 95 percent to that amount generated the calculated overpayment of $1,341,466.27. The audit findings set forth in the Agency’s Final Agency Audit Report (dated April 6, 2001) is supported by the weight of credible evidence in this case. Nevertheless, the Agency did allow the provider here to supplement the documentation disclosed during the audit. And, to that end, the calculated overpayment was reduced to $216,974.07 (this amount is 95% of the calculated overpayment). In reality, the amount owed by this Petitioner for failure to maintain proper documentation for this audit would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. Had the Agency held the Petitioner to a standard of “no prescription, no payment” standard arguably 194 of the 250 audited claims could have been disallowed. That is not the standard applied by the Agency. A “patient record” may include information regarding the patient’s prescription history. The terms “patient record” and “prescription” are not synonymous. For example, while a prescription would contain information such as patient's name, doctor, DEA number, doctor's address, dosage, drug, and whether it may be refilled, it would be expected that the “patient record” would contain additional information not typically found on a prescription. For instance, a “patient record” might contain a historical track of past medications or known patient allergies. In this case, the computer records or “patient records” maintained by the Petitioner did not retain the prescriptions in the format dictated by rule. An electronic imaging recording system may be used when the system captures, stores, and can reproduce the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. An electronic system must be able to produce a daily hard-copy printout of all original prescriptions dispensed and refilled. If the Petitioner’s system could do that, it did not. An acceptable electronic system must generate the prescription contemporaneous to the dispensing order. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. The Agency has not alleged, and there is no evidence to suggest, fraud in the Petitioner’s failure to maintain its records. The Agency’s interpretation of the requirement that a prescription be reduced to writing is consistent with the rules and regulations in effect at the time of this audit. The last category of discrepant items was “UR” which stood for “unauthorized refills.” These were claims for refills on drugs for which the original prescription could not be located or documentation from the nursing home could not be found. Again, the Petitioner the maintained that within the nursing home setting a physician’s reorder for medications for the patient could be found on the POS. These refill requests were handled orally among the physician, the nursing home staff, and the pharmacy. Nevertheless, because they were not documented in writing the Agency disallowed this claims and included them among the discrepant list. If the Petitioner was able to produce a physician order to support the UR claims, it was removed from the recoupment list. In most instances, the Petitioner did not have the requisite paperwork to support the refill. Instead, the Petitioner relied on its computer records (again not kept in accordance with the applicable standards) to support the UR claims. The Agency has not claimed that the refills were not dispensed, merely that the paperwork to support the claim cannot be produced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order that accepts an amended Final Agency Action Report to support an overpayment and recoupment against the Petitioner in the amount of $216,974.07. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center III 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kenneth W. Sukhia, Esquire Fowler, White, Boggs, Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1090 Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ralph E. Breitfeller, Esquire McGrath & Breitfeller, LLP 140 East Town Street, Suite 1070 Columbus, Ohio 43215
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for payments totaling $1,140,763.88 that Petitioner received from the Medicaid Program in compensation for the provision of prescription drugs between late-August and November of 1998. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to retain the payments in question because Petitioner allegedly has failed to demonstrate that it had available during the pertinent period a sufficient quantity of the prescription drugs in question.
Findings Of Fact The parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts and the evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties The Agency for Health Care Administration (the “Agency”) is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As one of its duties, the Agency must recover "overpayments . . . as appropriate," the term "overpayment" being statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake." See Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Palm Beach Pharmacy, Inc. (“PBPI”), d/b/a Eddie’s Drug (“Eddie’s”) was, at all times material hereto, a duly contracted Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency and been assigned a Medicaid Provider Number: 106343000. Eddie’s is a Florida licensed pharmacy.1 As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Eddie’s is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients. In return, Eddie’s has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including those policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (the “Handbook”). The Agency, which prepared the Handbook and furnishes it to Medicaid providers, has incorporated the Handbook by reference into Rule 59G-4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. PBPI, which owned and operated a number of pharmacies (including Eddie’s), maintained its corporate headquarters in West Palm Beach, Florida. Eddie’s was located in Miami, Florida. On July 1, 1998, PBPI acquired a drug store known as Jay’s Drugs (“Jay’s”). Jay’s was located in Miami, Florida, across the street from Eddie’s. Thus, before both stores came under common ownership, they had been competitors. This case arises out of the Agency's attempt to recover alleged overpayments on Medicaid claims for which Eddie’s was paid several years ago. The "audit period" that is the subject of the Agency's recoupment effort is April 1, 1998 to July 31, 1999, although the actual period in controversy is much shorter. From July 1, 1998, until the end of the audit period, PBPI owned and operated both Eddie’s and Jay’s. The Underlying Facts The transactions at the heart of this case occurred between late-August and November of 1998, during which period (the “Focal Period”) Medicaid reimbursed Eddie’s more than $1 million for prescription drugs including Neupogen and Epogen/Procrit (collectively, the “Drugs”). The Drugs are used to treat AIDS patients and persons infected with HIV. Prior to the Focal Period, Eddie’s had not dispensed $1 million worth of the Drugs——or any figure approaching that amount——in three or four months’ time. The reason for the dramatic spike in Eddie’s business is that Eddie’s was dispensing the Drugs to customers of Jay’s pursuant to an arrangement designed to manipulate PBPI’s contractual obligations to the former owner of Jay’s under the purchase and sale agreement by which PBPI had acquired Jay’s. Essentially, the arrangement was this. Jay’s was dispensing the Drugs to a large number (approximately 150) of Medicaid beneficiaries who were receiving treatment at a nearby clinic. Because the Drugs were administered to the patients via intravenous infusion, the clinic typically obtained the Drugs from Jay’s in bulk. To fill these prescriptions, Jay’s ordered the Drugs from a wholesale supplier, which usually delivered the Drugs to Jay’s the next day. At some point before the Focal Period, arrangements were made to have the clinic present its prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s rather than Jay’s.2 The evidence does not show, exactly, how this was accomplished, but whatever the means, the clinic abruptly began bringing prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s.3 This diversion of Jay’s’ business to Eddie’s was intended to deprive Jay’s of Medicaid reimbursements to which Jay’s’ former owner had access as a source of funds for paying down a note that PBPI had given for the purchase of Jay’s. By having Eddie’s dispense the Drugs and submit the Medicaid claims, Medicaid money flowed into Eddie’s’ bank account (rather than Jay’s’ bank account) and hence was not immediately available to the former owner of Jay’s to reduce PBPI’s debt. During the Focal Period, Eddie’s did not purchase the Drugs from a wholesaler but instead acquired them from Jay’s. The process by which this was accomplished involved a pharmacy technician named Wright, who was employed at Eddie’s, and a pharmacist named Shafor, who worked at Jay’s. Wright (at Eddie’s) accepted the prescriptions for the Drugs as the clinic brought them in Then, she called Shafor (at Jay’s) and told him the quantities needed to fill the prescriptions. Shafor ordered the Drugs from a wholesaler, which delivered them in bulk to Jay’s, usually the next day. Upon receiving the Drugs, Shafor personally delivered them to Wright, who, recall, was across the street at Eddie’s. Wright labeled and dispensed the Drugs. Eddie’s submitted a claim for the Drugs to Medicaid, and Medicaid paid Eddie’s. PBPI maintained separate accounting ledgers for Eddie’s and Jay’s, respectively. The company’s accountants recorded the subject transactions in these ledgers so that Jay’s——not Eddie’s——would “recognize” the sales of the Drugs. In a nutshell, this was done through “inter-company” transfers whereby all of the money that Eddie’s received from Medicaid for the Drugs was moved, on the books, into an account of Jay’s. In this way, any profit from the sales of the Drugs (the difference between the wholesale cost of the Drugs and the Medicaid reimbursement therefor, less overhead) was realized on Jay’s’ books.4 The Medicaid payments to Eddie’s that the Agency seeks to recoup were included in four remittance vouchers dated September 2, 1998; September 30, 1998; October 28, 1998; and November 25, 1998, respectively. The September 2 payment to Eddie’s totaled $287,205.52. Of this amount, $276,033.23 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of September 30, 1998, the sum of $276,033.23 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The September 30 payment to Eddie’s totaled $439,175.77, of which $432,700.36 was paid in consideration of the Drugs. The October 28 Medicaid payment was $431,753.82, of which total the Drugs accounted for $424,202.76. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of October 31, 1998, the sum of $870,929.59 (439,175.77 + 431,753.82) had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The November 25 payment to Eddie’s totaled $407,088.00. Of this amount, $393,063.00 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of November 30, 1998, the sum of $407,088.00 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The Agency’s Allegations On October 31, 2000, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (“Audit”) in which Eddie’s was alleged to have received $1,143,612.68 in overpayments relating to the Drugs. In the Audit, the Agency spelled out its theory of the case; indeed, the Audit is the only document in the record that does so. The Agency cited several statutory provisions. First, Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes, was referenced. This section states: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * (e) Are provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes. The Agency did not allege (or prove), however, that Eddie’s had violated Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes.5 Put another way, the Agency did not plead or prove lack of supervision, submission of a false claim, or that the Drugs were not provided in accordance with applicable law. Next, the Agency cited Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: A Medicaid provider shall retain medical, professional, financial, and business records pertaining to services and goods furnished to a Medicaid recipient and billed to Medicaid for a period of 5 years after the date of furnishing such services or goods. The agency may investigate, review, or analyze such records, which must be made available during normal business hours. However, 24-hour notice must be provided if patient treatment would be disrupted. The provider is responsible for furnishing to the agency, and keeping the agency informed of the location of, the provider's Medicaid- related records. The authority of the agency to obtain Medicaid-related records from a provider is neither curtailed nor limited during a period of litigation between the agency and the provider. The Agency further alleged, as fact, that Eddie’s had failed, upon request, “to submit invoices from [its] suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that [were] billed to Medicaid” and thus had not “fully substantiated such availability.” The Agency, however, did not invoke any of the available remedial provisions as authority to impose a sanction for this alleged failure to turn over Medicaid-related records. See, e.g., Sections 409.913(14)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes. The Agency cited Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Agency to “require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services from the person furnishing them, the person under whose supervision they were furnished, or the person causing them to be furnished.” There was no allegation (or proof), however, that the Drugs which Eddie’s had purported to dispense (i.e. the Drugs for which it had submitted Medicaid claims) were “inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive.” Thus, Eddie’s was not alleged (or shown) to have violated Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes. Finally, the Agency relied upon Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes, which is the basis of the Agency’s legal theory. This section provides: The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including, but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsections (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program[.] The Agency contended, additionally, that “[b]illing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of the Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that [Eddie’s] ha[s] been overpaid by the Medicaid program.” (Emphasis added). The Agency explained, “Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid.” Thus, the Agency’s theory of recovery is that Eddie’s must forfeit “overpayments” arising from its failure to demonstrate the availability, in inventory, of a sufficient quantity of the Drugs for which claims were submitted, as required by Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes. After the Audit was issued, the Agency accepted a handwritten note regarding the transfer of a small quantity of Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s as sufficient to demonstrate the availability of such amount. This resulted in a slight reduction of the amount of the alleged overpayment, to $1,140,763.88. The Separate Audit of Jay’s The Agency conducted a separate audit of Jay’s, concerning which some evidence was introduced at hearing. Without getting into unnecessary detail, the audit of Jay’s revealed that Jay’s had purchased, during and around the Focal Period, a quantity of the Drugs that exceeded the number of units that Jay’s had billed to Medicaid. It was Eddie’s theory that this “excess inventory” of Jay’s matched, more or less, the alleged inventory shortfall at Eddie’s, thereby corroborating the testimony concerning the transfer of these Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s for dispensation. At hearing, the parties sharply disputed whether, in fact, Jay’s had transferred the Drugs to Eddie’s. The Agency, of course, maintained that such transfers were not properly documented; Eddie’s argued that the documents and other evidence, including testimony about the transactions in question, adequately demonstrated that the transfers had, in fact, occurred. There was no dispute, however, that if it were found that such transfers had occurred, and if, further, the documents (and other evidence) pertaining to the inventory of Jay’s were accepted as proof of the quantities of Drugs so transferred, then all but $176,078.30 worth of the Drugs could be accounted for. Thus, as counsel for Eddie’s conceded at hearing, the Agency is entitled to recoup some sum of money. The question is whether that sum is $1,140,763.88 or $176,078.30. Ultimate Factual Determination Based on all of the evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony received through the parties’ joint stipulation, it is determined that, more likely than not, Eddie’s had available during the Focal Period a sufficient quantity of the Drugs to support all but $176,078.30 worth of the claims in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Eddie’s to repay the Agency the principal amount of $176,078.30. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2002.
