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ST. JOSEPH`S HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A ST. JOSEPH`S HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 05-002754CON (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 28, 2005 Number: 05-002754CON Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2008

The Issue The Petitioner, St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., d/b/a St. Joseph's Hospital (Petitioner, Applicant, or St. Joseph's) filed Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9833 with the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or AHCA). The application seeks authority to establish a 90-bed acute care satellite hospital in southeastern Hillsborough County, Florida. St. Joseph's intends to transfer 90 acute care beds from its existing location in Tampa to the new facility. The issue in this case is whether the Agency should approve the CON application.

Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the CON program for the state of Florida. The Agency serves as the state heath planning entity. See § 408.034, Fla. Stat. (2007). As such, it was charged to review the CON application at issue in this proceeding. AHCA has preliminarily denied St. Joseph's CON application No. 9833. The Petitioner is the applicant for the CON in this case. The Petitioner is a not-for-profit organization licensed to operate St. Joseph's Hospital, a general acute care facility located in the urban center of Tampa, Florida. It was originally founded by a religious order and has grown from approximately 40 beds to a licensed bed capacity of 883 beds. St. Joseph's provides quality care in a comprehensive range of services. Those services include tertiary and Level II trauma services. St. Joseph's provides services to all patients regardless of their ability to pay. To meet its perception of the growing healthcare needs of the greater Hillsborough County residents, St. Joseph's has proposed to construct a satellite hospital on a site it purchased in the mid-1980s. According to St. Joseph's, the satellite hospital, together with its main campus, would better address the growing community needs for acute care hospital services. To that end, St. Joseph's filed CON application No. 9833 and seeks approval of its satellite facility. It proposes to transfer 90 of its acute care beds from its current hospital site to the new satellite facility. The main hospital will offer support services as may be necessary to the satellite facility. Tampa General is an 877-bed acute care hospital located on Davis Island in urban Tampa, Florida. Prior to 1997, it was a public hospital operated by the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority but has since been operated and managed by a non- profit corporation, Florida Health Sciences, Inc. Tampa General provides quality care in a wide range of services that include tertiary and Level I trauma. Tampa General addresses the medical needs of its patients without consideration of their ability to pay. It is a "safety net" provider and is the largest provider of services to Medicaid and charity patients in the AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1. Medicaid has designated Tampa General a "disproportionate share" provider. Tampa General is also a teaching hospital affiliated with the University of South Florida's College of Medicine. Recently, Tampa General has undergone a major construction project that brings on line a new emergency trauma center as well as additional acute care beds, a women's center, a cardiovascular center and a digestive diagnostic and treatment center. Tampa General opposes the CON request at issue. South Bay and Brandon also oppose St. Joseph's CON application. South Bay is a 112-bed community acute care hospital located in Sun City Center, Florida. South Bay has served the community for about 25 years and offers quality care but does not provide obstetrical services primarily because its closest population and patient base is a retirement community restricted to persons over 55 years of age. In contrast, Brandon is an acute care hospital with 367 beds located to South Bay's north in Brandon, Florida. Brandon provides quality care with a full range of hospital services including obstetrics, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery. Brandon also has neonatal intensive care (NICU) beds to serve Level II and Level III needs. It is expected that Brandon could easily add beds to its facility as it has empty "shelled-in" floors that could readily be converted to add 80 more acute care beds. Both Brandon and South Bay are owned or controlled by Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) and are part of its West Florida Division. The Proposal St. Joseph's has a wide variety of physicians on its medical staff. Those physicians currently offer an array of general acute care services as well as medical and surgical specialties. St. Joseph's provides Levels II and III NICU, open heart surgery, interventional radiology, primary stroke services, oncology, orthopedic, gynecological oncology, and pediatric surgical. Based upon its size, reputation for quality care, and ability to offer this wide array of services, St. Joseph's has enjoyed a well-deserved respect in its community. To expand its ties within AHCA's District 6/Subdistrict 1 healthcare community, St. Joseph's affiliated with South Florida Baptist Hospital a 147-bed community hospital located in Plant City, Florida. This location is east of the main St. Joseph Hospital site. Further, recognizing that the growth of greater Hillsborough County, Florida, has significantly increased the population of areas previously limited to agricultural or mining ventures, St. Joseph's now seeks to construct a community satellite hospital located in the unincorporated area of southeastern Hillsborough County known as Riverview. The Petitioner owns approximately 50 acres of land at the intersection of Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop Road. This parcel is approximately one mile east of the I-75 corridor that runs north-south through the county. In relation to the other parties, the proposed site is north and east of South Bay, south of Brandon, and east and south of Tampa General. South Florida Baptist Hospital, not a party, is located to the north and farther east of the proposed site. The size of the parcel is adequate to construct the proposed satellite as well as other ancillary structures that might compliment the hospital (such as medical offices). If approved, the Petitioner's proposal will provide 66 medical-surgical beds, 14 beds within an intensive care unit, and 10 labor and delivery beds. All 90 beds will be "state-of- the-art" private rooms along with a full-service emergency department. The hospital will be fully digital, use an electronic medical record and picture archiving system, and specialists at the main St. Joseph's hospital will be able to access images and data at the satellite site in real time. A consultation would be, theoretically, as close as a computer. In reaching its decision to seek the satellite hospital, St. Joseph's considered input from many sources; among them: HealthPoint Medical Group (HealthPoint) and BayCare Health System, Inc. (BayCare). HealthPoint is a physician group owned by an affiliate of St. Joseph's. HealthPoint has approximately 80 physicians who operate 21 offices throughout Hillsborough County. All of the HealthPoint physicians are board certified. At least five of the HealthPoint offices would have quicker access to the proposed satellite hospital than to the main St. Joseph's Hospital site. The HealthPoint physicians support the proposal so that their patients will have access to, and the option of choosing, a St. Joseph facility in the southeastern part of the county. BayCare is an organization governed by a cooperative agreement among nonprofit hospitals. Its purpose is to assist its member hospitals to centralize and coordinate hospital functions such as purchasing, staffing, managed care contracting, billing, and information technology. By cooperatively working together, its members are able to enjoy a cost efficiency that individually they did not enjoy. The "synergy" of their effort results in enhanced quality of care, efficient practices, and a financial savings to their operations. The proposed St. Joseph's satellite would also share in this economy of efforts. Understandably, BayCare supports the proposal. Review Criteria Every new hospital project in Florida must be reviewed pursuant to the statutory criteria set forth in Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2007). Accordingly, the ten subparts of that provision must be weighed to determine whether or not a proposal meets the requisite criteria. Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes (2007) requires that the need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed be considered. In the context of this case, "need" will not be addressed in terms of its historical meaning. The Agency no longer calculates "need" pursuant to a need methodology. Therefore, looking to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008, requires consideration of the following pertinent provisions: ...If an agency need methodology does not exist for the proposed project: The agency will provide to the applicant, if one exists, any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service. The applicant is not precluded from using other methodologies to compare and contrast with the agency policy. If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and, Market conditions. The existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area. According to St. Joseph's, "need" is evidenced by a large and growing population in the proposed service area (PSA), sustained population growth that exceeds the District and state average, highly occupied and seasonally over capacity acute care beds at the existing providers, highly occupied and sustained increases in demand for hospital services, a scarcity of emergency medical service resources within the PSA compounded by budget cuts, increases in traffic congestion and travel times to the existing hospitals, the lack of a nonprofit community hospital near the proposed site, and the lack of local obstetrical services. In this case the Petitioner has identified the PSA as a 10 zip code area with 7 being designated the "primary" area of service (PSA) and 3 zip codes to the north being identified as the "secondary" area of service (SSA). The population of this PSA is projected to reach 322,913 by the year 2011 (from its current 274,696). All parties used Claritas data to estimate population, the PSA growth, and various projections. Claritas is a conservative estimator in the sense that it relies on the most recent U. S. census reports that may or may not track the most recent growth indicators such as building starts or new home sales. Nevertheless, if accurate, the estimated 17.5 percent population growth expected in the new satellite hospital's PSA exceeds the rate of growth estimated for AHCA District 6 as well as the projected State of Florida growth rate. From the 7 primary zip codes within the PSA alone the area immediately adjacent to the subject site is estimated to grow by 14,900 residents between 2006 and 2011. Over the last 20 years the PSA has developed from rural farming and mining expanses with scattered housing and trailer parks to an area characterized by modern shopping centers, apartment complexes, housing subdivisions, churches, libraries, and new schools. Physicians in the area now see as many as 60 patients per day and during the winter peak months may admit up to 20 patients per week to hospitals. Travel times from the southern portion of the PSA to St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa General, or Brandon, can easily exceed 30 minutes. Travel times to the same providers during "rush" or high traffic times can be longer. All of the opponent providers have high occupancy rates and experience seasonal over capacity. During the winter months visitors from the north and seasonal residents add significant numbers to the population in Hillsborough County. These "snow birds" drive the utilization of all District 6/Subdistrict 1 hospitals up. Further, increased population tends to slow and congest traffic adding to travel times within AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1. Both Brandon and Tampa General have recently added beds to address the concerns of increased utilization. Additionally, Tampa General has expanded its emergency department to provide more beds. South Bay has elected to not increase its bed size or emergency department. South Bay has experienced difficulty staffing its emergency department. When faced with capacity problems, South Bay "diverts" admissions to other hospitals. When the emergency rooms of the Opponent providers are unable to accommodate additional patients, the county emergency transport is diverted to other facilities so that patients have access to emergency services. During the winter season and peak flu periods this diversion is more likely to occur. Another hospital in the southeastern portion of the county, within St. Joseph's satellite PSA, would alleviate some of the crowding. More specifically, South Bay's annual occupancy rate in 2006 was 80.1 percent. For the first seven months of 2007, South Bay's average occupancy rate was 88.4 percent. These rates indicate that South Bay is operating at a high occupancy. Operating at or near capacity is not recommended for any hospital facility. Long term operation at or near occupancy proves to be detrimental to hospital efficiencies. Similarly, Brandon operates at 70 percent of its bed capacity. Even though it has recently added beds it intends to add more beds to address continuing increases in admissions. Brandon's emergency room is also experiencing overcrowded conditions. When Brandon's emergency room diverts patients their best option may be to leave District 6/Subdistrict 1 for care. Tampa General is a large complex and its emergency department has been expanded to attempt to address an obvious need for more services. It is unknown whether the new emergency department will adequately cure the high rates of diversion Tampa General experienced in 2007. New beds were added and an improved emergency department was designed and constructed with the expectation that Tampa General's patients would be better served. Based upon Tampa General's expansion and its projected growth, Tampa General could experience an occupancy rate over 75 percent by 2011. If so, Tampa General could easily return to the utilization problems previously experienced. There are no obstetrical services offered south of Brandon in AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1. The proposed St. Joseph's satellite hospital would offer obstetrics and has designated a 10-bed unit to accommodate those patients. There are no nonprofit hospitals south of Brandon in AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1. The proposed St. Joseph's satellite hospital would offer patients in the PSA with the option of using such a hospital. Section 408.035(2), Florida Statutes (2007), requires the consideration of the availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. As previously stated, all of the parties provide quality care to their patients. Although delays in emergency departments may inconvenience patients, the quality of the medical care they receive is excellent. Similarly, hospital services are available and can be accessed in AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1. The parties provide a full range of healthcare service options that address the medical and surgical needs of the residents of AHCA District 6 Subdistrict 1. An additional hospital would afford patients with another choice of provider in the southeastern portion of the county. The St. Joseph satellite hospital would afford such patients with a hospital option within 30 minutes of the areas within the PSA. This access would promote shorter wait times and less crowded facilities. Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes (2007), mandates review of CON applications in light of the ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care. As previously stated St. Joseph's has a well-deserved reputation for providing quality care within a wide range of hospital services to its patients. It is reasonable to expect the satellite hospital would continue in the provision of such care. The management team and affiliations established by St. Joseph's will continue to pursue quality care to all its patients regardless of their ability to pay. Section 408.035(4), Florida Statutes (2007), considers the availability of resources for project accomplishment and operation. Resources that must be considered include healthcare personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures. St. Joseph's has the resources to accomplish and operate the satellite hospital proposed. St. Joseph's has a successful history of recruiting and retaining healthcare personnel and management personnel. The estimates set forth in its CON application for these persons were reasonable and conservative. Salaries and benefits for healthcare personnel and management personnel should be within the estimated provisions set forth in the application. Although there is a nationwide shortage of nursing personnel and physicians in certain specialties, St. Joseph's has demonstrated it has a track record of staffing its facility to meet appropriate standards and provide quality care. There is no reason to presume it will not be similarly successful at the satellite facility. St. Joseph's has also demonstrated it has the financial ability to construct and operate the proposed satellite hospital. The occupancy rates projected for the new hospital will produce a revenue adequate to make the hospital financially feasible. Further, if patients who reside closer to the satellite facility use it instead of the main St. Joseph Hospital, a lower census at the main hospital will not adversely impact the financial strength of the organization. There will be adequate growth in the healthcare market for this PSA to support the new facility as well as the existing providers. It must be noted, however, that construction costs for the satellite hospital will exceed the amounts disclosed by the CON application. Some of the increases in cost are significant. For example, the estimate for the earthwork necessary for site preparation has risen from $417,440 to $1,159,296. Additionally, most of the unit prices for construction have gone up dramatically in the past couple of years. Hurricanes and the resulting increased standards for building codes have also driven construction costs higher. More stringent storm water provisions have resulted in higher construction costs. For this project it is estimated the storm water expense will be $500,000 instead of the original $287,000 proposed by the CON application. In total these increases are remarkable. They may also signal why development in AHCA's District 6/Subdistrict 1 has slowed since the CON application was filed. Regardless, St. Joseph's should have the financial strength to construct and operate the project. Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes (2007), specifies that the Agency must evaluate the extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. In the findings reached in this regard, the criteria set forth in Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030(2) have been fully considered. Those provisions are: (2) Health Care Access Criteria. The need that the population served or to be served has for the health or hospice services proposed to be offered or changed, and the extent to which all residents of the district, and in particular low income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons, other underserved groups and the elderly, are likely to have access to those services. The extent to which that need will be met adequately under a proposed reduction, elimination or relocation of a service, under a proposed substantial change in admissions policies or practices, or by alternative arrangements, and the effect of the proposed change on the ability of members of medically underserved groups which have traditionally experienced difficulties in obtaining equal access to health services to obtain needed health care. The contribution of the proposed service in meeting the health needs of members of such medically underserved groups, particularly those needs identified in the applicable local health plan and State health plan as deserving of priority. In determining the extent to which a proposed service will be accessible, the following will be considered: The extent to which medically underserved individuals currently use the applicant’s services, as a proportion of the medically underserved population in the applicant’s proposed service area(s), and the extent to which medically underserved individuals are expected to use the proposed services, if approved; The performance of the applicant in meeting any applicable Federal regulations requiring uncompensated care, community service, or access by minorities and handicapped persons to programs receiving Federal financial assistance, including the existence of any civil rights access complaints against the applicant; The extent to which Medicare, Medicaid and medically indigent patients are served by the applicant; and The extent to which the applicant offers a range of means by which a person will have access to its services. In any case where it is determined that an approved project does not satisfy the criteria specified in paragraphs (a) through (d), the agency may, if it approves the application, impose the condition that the applicant must take affirmative steps to meet those criteria. In evaluating the accessibility of a proposed project, the accessibility of the current facility as a whole must be taken into consideration. If the proposed project is disapproved because it fails to meet the need and access criteria specified herein, the Department will so state in its written findings. AHCA does not require a CON applicant to demonstrate that the existing acute care providers within the PSA are failing in order to approve a satellite hospital. Also, AHCA does not have a travel time standard with respect to the provision of acute care hospital services. In other words, there is no set geographical distance or travel time that dictates when a satellite hospital would be appropriate or inappropriate. In fact, AHCA has approved satellite hospitals when residents of the PSA live within 20 minutes of an existing hospital. As a practical matter this means that travel time or distance do not dictate whether a satellite should be approved based upon access. With regard to access to emergency services, however, AHCA does consider patient convenience. In this case the proposed satellite hospital will provide a convenience to residents of southeastern Hillsborough County in terms of access to an additional emergency department. Further, physicians serving the growing population will have the convenience of admitting patients closer to their residences. Medical and surgical opportunities at closer locations is also a convenience to the families of patients because they do not have to travel farther distances to visit the patient. Patients and the families of patients seeking obstetrical services will also have the convenience of the satellite hospital. Patients who would not benefit from the convenience of the proposed satellite hospital would be those requiring tertiary health services. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.002(41) defines such services as: (41) Tertiary health service means a health service which, due to its high level of intensity, complexity, specialized or limited applicability, and cost, should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost effectiveness of such service. Examples of such service include, but are not limited to, organ transplantation, specialty burn units, neonatal intensive care units, comprehensive rehabilitation, and medical or surgical services which are experimental or developmental in nature to the extent that the provision of such services is not yet contemplated within the commonly accepted course of diagnosis or treatment for the condition addressed by a given service. In terms of tertiary health services, residents of AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1 will continue to use the existing providers who offer those services. The approval of the St. Joseph satellite will not adversely affect the tertiary providers in AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1 in terms of their ability to continue to provide those services. The new satellite will not compete for those services. Tampa General has a unique opportunity to provide tertiary services and will continue to be a strong candidate for any patient in the PSA requiring such services. As a teaching hospital and major NICU and trauma center, Tampa General offers specialties that will not be available at the satellite hospital. If non-tertiary patients elect to use the satellite hospital, Tampa General should not be adversely affected. Tampa General has performed well financially of late and its revenues have exceeded its past projections. With the added conveniences of its expanded and improved facilities it will continue to play a significant roll in the delivery of quality health care to the residents of the greater Tampa area. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes (2007) provides that the financial feasibility of the proposal both in the immediate and long-term be assessed in order to approve a CON application. In this case, as previously indicated, the utilizations expected for the new satellite hospital should adequately assure the financial feasibility of the project both in the immediate and long-term time frames. Population growth, a growing older population, and technologies that improve the delivery of healthcare will contribute to make the project successful. The satellite hospital will afford PSA residents a meaningful option in choosing healthcare and will not give any one provider an unreasonable or dominant position in the market. Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes (2007) specifies that the extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness must be addressed. AHCA's District 6/Subdistrict 1 enjoys a varied range of healthcare providers. From the teaching hospital at Tampa General to the community hospital at South Bay, all demonstrate strong financial stability and utilization. A new satellite hospital will promote continued quality and cost-effectiveness. As a member of the BayCare group the satellite will benefit from the economies of its group and provide the residents of its PSA with quality care. Physicians will have another option for admissions and convenience. Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes (2007), notes that the costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction should be reviewed. The methodology used to compute the construction costs associated with this project were reasonable and accurate at the time prepared. The costs, however, are not accurate in that most have gone up appreciably since the filing of the CON application. No more effective method of construction has been proposed but the financial soundness of the proposal should cover the increased costs associated with the construction of the project. The delays in resolving this case have worked to disadvantage the Applicant in this regard. Unforeseeable acts of nature, limitations of building supplies, and increases inherent with the passage of time will make this project more costly than St. Joseph's envisioned when it filed the CON application. Further, it would be imprudent to disregard the common knowledge that oil prices have escalated while interest rates have dropped. These factors may also impact the project's cost. Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent should be weighed in consideration of the proposal. St. Joseph's has a track record of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent without consideration of any patient's ability to pay. The satellite hospital would be expected to continue this tradition. Moreover, as a provision of its CON application, St. Joseph's has represented it will provide 12.5 percent of its patient days to Medicaid/Medicaid HMO/Charity/Indigent patients. 57 Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, relates to nursing home beds and is not at issue in this proceeding. The Opposition The SAAR set forth the Agency's rationale for the proposed denial of the CON application. The SAAR acknowledged that the proposal had received 633 letters of support (80 from physicians, 365 from St. Joseph employees, and 191 from members of the community); that funding for the project would be available; that the short-term position, long-term position, capital requirements, and staffing for the proposal were adequate; that the project was financially feasible if the Applicant meets its projected occupancy levels; that the project would have a marginally positive effect on competition to promote quality and cost-effectiveness; and that the construction schedule "seems to be reasonable" for the project. Notably in opposition to the CON application, the SAAR represented that: It is not clear that projected population growth for this area will outpace the ability of subdistrict facilities to add beds to accommodate population growth. The subdistrict's most recent average utilization rate was 63.40 percent, and an additional facility has already been approved for this applicant in this county for the purpose of handling forecasted growth. Growth projected for females aged 15-44 is not significantly higher for the county than for the district or state, and it is not demonstrated that need exists for obstetric services in the subdistrict. The foregoing analysis did not credit the projected population growth for the PSA applicable to this proposal heavily. The population growth expected for the PSA will support the utilization necessary for the proposed project. Applying the Agency's assessment, all existing hospital providers could add beds to meet "need" for a Subdistrict and thereby eliminate the approval of any satellite community facility that would address local concerns. Also, South Bay has conceded it will not add beds at its location. Additionally, the SAAR stated: While both South Bay Hospital and Brandon Regional Hospital have occupancy rates such that the introduction of a competing facility would not likely inhibit their abilities to maintain operations, the same cannot be stated for Tampa General Hospital, the only designated Disproportionate Share Hospital in this subdistrict. Any impact on Tampa General Hospital as a result of the proposed project would likely be negative, limiting Tampa General's ability to offset its Medicaid and charity care services. The applicant facility does not currently have a significant presence in the proposed market, and would have to gain market share in this PSA in order to meet its projected occupancy levels. Much of the market share gained by the applicant with the proposed facility would likely be at the expense of existing facilities in this area, most notably Tampa General due to its lower occupancy level and higher Medicaid and charity care provisions. In reaching its decision, the Agency has elected to protect Tampa General from any negative impact that the proposed satellite hospital might inflict. Tampa General has invested $300 million in improvements. It is a stand-alone, single venue hospital that has not joined any group or integrated system. It relies on its utilization levels, management skill and economies of practice to remain solvent. Tampa General considers itself a unique provider that should be protected from the financial risks inherent in increased competition. It is the largest provider of services to indigent patients in AHCA District 6/Subdistrict. Brandon opposes the proposed satellite hospital in part because it, too, has expanded its facility and does not believe additional beds are needed in AHCA District 6/Subdistrict 1. Nevertheless when a related facility sought to establish a satellite near the St. Joseph's site, Brandon supported the project. Brandon provides excellent quality of care and has a strong physician supported system. It will not be adversely affected in the long run by the addition of a satellite hospital in St. Joseph's PSA. Similarly, South Bay opposes the project. South Bay will not expand and does not provide obstetric services. It has had difficulty staffing its facility and believes the addition of another competitor will exacerbate the problem. Nevertheless, South Bay has a strong utilization level, a track record of financial strength, and will not likely be adversely impacted by the St. Joseph satellite. The opponents maintain that enhanced access for residents of the PSA does not justify the establishment of a new satellite hospital since the residents there already have good access to acute care services.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration that approves CON Application No. 9833 with the conditions noted. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P. A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elizabeth McArthur, Esquire Jeffrey L. Frehn, Esquire Radey, Thomas, Yon & Clark, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 10967 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Karin M. Byrne, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57408.034408.035408.037408.039 Florida Administrative Code (4) 59C-1.00259C-1.00859C-1.01059C-1.030
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DAYTONA BEACH GENERAL HOSPITAL AND SAXON GENERA vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 83-000160CON (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000160CON Latest Update: Aug. 27, 1984

The Issue The issue in these proceedings is whether HRS should grant petitioners' application for a certificate of need to build a 100-bed general acute care hospital in Deltona, Florida. The parties have stipulated to the applicants' ability to staff the proposed facility and that no issue remains as to the criteria set forth in Section 381.494(6)(c)(3), (5), (6), (7), (10), (11), and , Florida Statutes (1983).

Findings Of Fact Petitioners propose to "transfer" 100 beds from Daytona Beach General Hospital (DBGH) in Subdistrict 4 of District 4 to Deltona, which lies in Subdistrict 5 of District 4; and have agreed to "delicensure" of an additional 50 beds at DBGH (for a total of 150) if their application for a certificate of need (CON) to build in Deltona is granted. Saxon General Hospital, Inc. (Saxon) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc., which operates DBGH. HCA's Central Florida Regional Hospital (CFRH), is located outside of District 4 altogether in Sanford, which is in Seminole County. Baker, Clay, Duval, Flagler, Nassau, St. Johns and Volusia Counties make up HRS District 4, the domain of the Health Planning Council of Northeast Florida, Inc. District 4 as a whole has more hospital beds than it needs. The present controversy concerns medical/surgical hospital beds in the two southern subdistricts of District 4, Subdistricts 4 and 5. Flagler County and Volusia County east of Little Haw Creek and Deep Creek comprise Subdistrict 4 of District 4. Deland, Deltona, Orange City and DeBary are in Subdistrict 5 of District 4, which is congruent with Volusia County west of Little Haw Creek and Deep Creek. See Appendix. THE DISTRICT PLAN The Health Planning Council of Northeast, Florida, Inc. has adopted a district health plan, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, but the plan has not been promulgated as a rule. HRS, but not CFRH, has admitted that petitioners' proposal is consistent with the district health plan. Among the policies stated in the plan is the following: If the district as a whole has a surplus of acute care hospital beds but the subdistrict has a substantial shortage, or if beds are not available or accessible within 30 minutes travel time in an urban county or 45 minutes travel time in a rural county to at least 90 percent of the county's residents, the state should consider the need for more beds on a subdistrict basis. (Reference: Chapter 10-5.11(23)(i) of the Florida Administrative Code.) Given the provisions as outlined above and so long as there is an overall surplus of hospital beds in the district, it is the policy of the Health Planning Council not to support approval of additional beds within a subdistrict until it can be clearly demonstrated by the circumstances that the number of beds needed in the subdistrict is substantial. With respect to subdistrict five, the plan makes the following recommendation: Within the framework of the most appropriate planning for the entire West Volusia-East Seminole County area, the State Office of Community Medical Facilities could give consideration to the transfer of acute care beds from within the district to the Deltona area--so long as the total number of licensed beds in the district does not increase. Any applicant to open hospital beds and other hospital services in Deltona should take into consideration the general needs of the Deltona area population. The Health Planning Council of Northeast Florida, Inc. adopted this recommendation with the specific purpose of declaring itself neutral as between then competing applications to build a hospital in Deltona. BED NEED BY RULE HRS has by rule specified a need for 195 medical/surgical, 18 intensive and cardiac care, ten obstetric and eight pediatric beds in Subdistrict 4 for the year 1988. Rule 10-16.005(1)(b) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 37, codified as Rule 10-17.005(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. This represents 23 fewer medical/surgical beds than are presently licensed or authorized, but three more medical/surgical beds than are presently available in fact; the same number of intensive and coronary care beds as are presently available; two fewer obstetric and three fewer pediatric beds than are presently available in Subdistrict 5. Excess capacity in Subdistrict 4 is even more pronounced, according to Rule 10-17.005(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. This HRS rule specifies a need for 911 medical/surgical, 122 intensive and coronary care, 26 obstetric and 33 pediatric beds in Subdistrict 4 for the year 1988. These figures represent a projected excess of 254 medical/surgical, 14 intensive and cardiac care, four obstetric and 35 pediatric, licensed or approved beds for Subdistrict 4 in 1988, assuming no more beds are licensed, approved, delicensed or disapproved, in the interim. BEDS IN PLACE In District 4's Subdistrict 4, there are seven general acute care hospitals. Bunnell Community Hospital, with 81 licensed or approved beds, is the only hospital in Flagler County. The other six are clustered along the coast between Ormond Beach and New Smyrna Beach. Licensed and approved beds aggregate 1,165 medical/surgical, 136 intensive and cardiac care, 30 obstetric and 68 pediatric for Subdistrict4. Not all of these beds are actually available for occupancy, however. DBGH, for example, is licensed at 297 beds but had only 115 beds available for use on average between October 1, 1980, and September 30, 1981. (At the time of hearing, its average daily census was 50 patients.) There are only two existing hospitals in District 4's Subdistrict 5, Fish Memorial Hospital (Fish) and West Volusia Memorial Hospital (West Volusia), both of which are located in or near Deland, an older population center in western Volusia County to the north of Deltona. West Volusia, which is further than Fish from the emerging Deltona-DeBary-Orange City population center in the southwestern part of the county, has 162 beds, of which 128 are medical/surgical; eleven are intensive or cardiac care; twelve are obstetric and eleven are pediatric. West Volusia had a 1983 average occupancy rate, based on 139 medical/surgical and intensive and coronary care beds, of 67 percent. During fiscal year 1981, most of West Volusia's admissions were of persons from Deland, but 22.34 percent of the total came from DeBary, Deltona and Orange City. Fish has 97 licensed beds, but only 71 are available for use. Of these, 64 are medical/surgical, and the remaining seven beds are devoted to cardiac and intensive care. Fish's physical plant is older and in need of replacement or rehabilitation. The Fish Memorial Hospital physical plant is a composite structure which is the result of three decades of renovation and add-on construction. * * * As a result, much of the facility does not comply with current building codes, the recommendations of the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or current patient care management practices. An internal survey was begun to identify and quantify the extent of work necessary to bring the entire physical plant into compliance with all applicable codes or standards. The survey included all major components of the physical plant or hospital-wide systems that will have to be replaced or repaired within the next three year period just to maintain the current facility operations as a comparison to the replacement cost. The survey identified over thirty projects, ranging between $4,000 and $1,500,000 each. Furthermore, these direct costs do not account for interruption of medical services to the community residents, nonproductive staff time due to phasing of renovation, and patient inconveniences during construction. Intervenor's Exhibit No. 1., p.1. Rehabilitation would involve direct costs of some $4,500,000.00. In July, August and September of 1980, Fish had 105 admissions of persons residing in the Deltona and DeBary-Orange City census division, or 22.9 percent of its total admissions. In the same months the year before 87 admissions or 23 percent of the total was attributable to the Deltona and DeBary-Orange City census divisions. The great majority of Fish's patients came from the Deland census division during both periods. Fish's 1983 average occupancy rate was 46.7 percent, but, at time of hearing, occupancy was at 80 percent. Licensed at 226 beds, CFRH had about 200 beds staffed at the time of the hearing, including ten pediatric and nine obstetrical beds. (T. 592) CFRH's average occupancy was 72 percent for January and February of 1984, down from 76.9 percent for the same period last year. During the two months preceding the hearing, CFRH was on "red flag" status. No admissions were allowed, unless approved by the chief of staff; but no true emergencies were turned away. Some 34.8 percent of CFRH's admissions are of people who reside in the Deltona- DeBary-Orange City area or elsewhere in Volusia County. CFRH meets most of the need for medical/surgical beds attributable to the population in southwestern Volusia County. (Testimony of Scott) Most people living in the Deltona-DeBary- Orange City area who need hospitalization leave the county, in order to be admitted at intervenor CFRH. ACCESSIBILITY The evidence did not establish what proportion of the population of Subdistrict 5, if any, is further than 30 minutes' driving time from the nearest hospital at present, or what proportion would be in the future. Petitioners' expert measured travel times from central points in DeBary, Orange City, Sanford and Deland to area hospitals and to the site proposed for a new hospital, with the following results: West Volusia Fish Memorial Central Florida Proposed Memorial Hospital Regional Daytona Beach TO: Hospital (Central (West Sanford) General (North Deland) (Saxon Blvd. Deland) at 1-4) (A) (B) (C) (D) DeBary 32.2 26.4 18.2 14.9 Orange 28.6 22.8 26.3 17.7 City Deltona 36.8 31.0 24.6 11.5 Sanford 51.6 44.9 17.1 33.7 Deland 20.7 14.9 41.7 32.6 In computing these averages, peak travel times were weighted equally with other travel times measured in December of 1983, and January and February of 1984. One route to Sanford and CFRH from Deltona entails crossing a drawbridge. It takes Beverly Spitz "20 minutes just to get out of Deltona," with its winding roads and abundance of elderly drivers. Mary Lou Foster takes 29 to 45 minutes to drive from her Deltona home to CFRH. John Schmeltz can do it in "about 25 minutes." In February of 1982, When Mrs. Schmeltz passed out, the ambulance he summoned took 22 minutes to arrive. John Mosley made the drive from his Deltona home to CFRH in 25 minutes, but that was the night he thought his wife had had a heart attack and he "averaged over 100 miles an hour." (T. 204) "[A]t night . . . you realize just how far it is." (T. 211) Clyde Mann's testimony to the effect that the remoteness of existing hospitals had cost lives went unchallenged. Mary Meade, a registered nurse, reported that the Deltona area "ha[s] lost several patients, several people" (T. 216) in the time it takes to get to a hospital. Bernie Levine, a public witness, testified that there were "constant people dying. They didn't make it to the hospital." (T. 210) A hospital in Deltona would significantly improve access for the people of Deltona, and would also improve access for residents of Orange City and DeBary, albeit less dramatically. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY The parties stipulated that land is available for the project, and that projected construction costs are reasonable. Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc. (DBGH, Inc.) plans to lend its subsidiary Saxon General Hospital, Inc. $4,159,700; and petitioners plan to borrow the remaining $12,569,000 necessary to build the hospital, at 13 percent, repayable over a 25 year period, with the new hospital serving as collateral. DBGH, Inc. had "[a]pproximately one-million-three, one-million-four" (T. 245) on hand which could be devoted to construction of a new hospital in Deltona, at the time of hearing. The remaining "equity," $2,900,000 or so, is to be raised by sales of DBGH, Inc.'s common stock. Of the 2,000,000 shares of common stock authorized, Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc. has issued 600,000. The hope is that additional shares can be issued and sold at $15 a share, which is about five times as much as the stock is currently trading for over the counter. John E. Kaye and Jackson B. Bragg, the osteopaths who between them own 405,000 shares of DBGH, Inc. common, each plan to guarantee purchase of another $1,400,000 worth of DBGH, Inc. common stock, when it is issued. The net worth statements of each man came in as exhibits at hearing, for the purpose of showing their supposed ability to honor such a guarantee. Aside from the DBGH, Inc. stock, however, neither man had sufficient net assets, and this assumes the accuracy of their financial statements, which listed as assets $253,000 in unsecured receivables of unstated age. Cars and boats were valued at cost, as was a pick-up truck ($3,000) while real estate was apparently valued at somebody's idea of market. Between them, the two doctors purport to have $150,000 worth of household furniture. For obvious reasons, no accountant's name appeared on these documents. The doctors have an agreement between them to the effect that neither sells DBGH, Inc. stock unless the other also sells. Their unaudited statements put the value of DBGH, Inc. stock at $20 a share. A few days after the Daytona Beach News Journal reported that "HCA had lost the right to purchase Fish," (T. 264) Robert E. Hardison, Jr. of HCA spoke to Drs. Kaye and Bragg and told them "he realized it was futile to try to continue seeking a CON for Deltona adding new beds unless he could get some existing beds from [DBGH] and move them to Deltona." (T. 266) Mr. Hardison asked Drs. Bragg and Kaye what they would be willing to sell their stock for but did not offer to buy it. Shortly before the hearing they were offered $25 a share for all their holdings on condition the prospective buyer could arrange financing, and on condition that Saxon receive a certificate of need. This price is almost certainly higher than could be gotten in the market for shares which would not give the buyer a controlling interest in DBGH, Inc. One Milton W. Pepper appeared at hearing and testified without contradiction that, in the event a certificate of need issued, he was willing and able to invest approximately $1,500,000 "in the beginning. . . and make arrangements for the additional $5,000,000 if necessary." Drs. Kaye and Bragg may lose control of the corporate petitioners in the process, but there is every reason to believe that money to build a hospital would be available. After raising a quarter of the project cost, DBGH, Inc. proposes to lend that sum to Saxon, at one percent above prime. Although this arrangement would mean that the money was "debt" as between the subsidiary and its parent, outside financers would apparently treat the money as equity. Loy D. Deloney, an underwriter for Stephens, Inc., "the ninth-ranking investment banking firm in the country in terms of equity," knows "of at least 10 major financial institutions that would be interested in" providing long-term financing, if the CON issues. The future holds many uncertainties for hospitals, but whether this money could be repaid and whether a new hospital would be otherwise feasible financially depends finally on how many patients it would serve. POPULATION GROWTH FORECAST The population of census tracts 908, 909, 910.02, 910.03 and 910.04, in which Deltona, Orange City and DeBary are located, is projected to increase by some 11,000 persons between 1984 and 1989, when the population in this part of southwestern Volusia County is expected to be 48,789. Of the projected 1989 population of census tracts 908, 909, 910.02, 910.03, 910.04, eleven thousand one hundred twenty-four persons are expected to be over 65 and eleven thousand one hundred twenty-four persons are expected to be less than 65 but older than Some three fifths of Deltona's present population (about 26,000) is over 55 years old. EFFICIENT UTILIZATION LIKELY IN SUBDISTRICT Even without the lure of a hospital, physicians have opened offices in southwest Volusia County. Seven specialists on the medical staff at CFRH have part-time practices in the Deltona-DeBary-Orange City area. A half dozen family practice physicians practice in the area full-time. They admit to hospital an average of 50 patients daily, 80 percent of them to CFRH. Before HCA abandoned its application for a certificate of need to "transfer Fish's beds" and build a new 97-bed hospital in Deltona, it caused a health service study to be done by John Short & Associates. CFRH offered the study as evidence at hearing. Intervenor's Exhibit No. 1. The CFRH study looked at the western area of Volusia County, as a whole, including Deland, and concluded that 1987 would see 12,686 medical/surgical discharges of residents of western Volusia County. The CFRH study calculated the average length of a patient's stay in hospital at 7.03 days. CFRH's own evidence shows, therefore, that 89,183 medical/surgical patient days attributable to the population of the DeBary-Orange City, Deland and Deltona census districts can be expected in 1987. CFRH's administrator, James D. Tesar, predicted that CFRH "could lose 80 percent of its admissions from the area including Deltona, Geneva, DeBary, Osteen, and Orange City," if Saxon built a new hospital in Deltona. In 1983, CFRH admissions from these Volusia County communities totalled 3,150. If a new hospital in Deltona did indeed change patient flow to the extent Mr. Tesar warns is possible, there would still be 630 admissions annually to CFRH of residents leaving southwest Volusia County for hospitalization. If west Volusia Countians' admissions drop to 630 at CFRH, CFRH will be supplying only 4,429 patient days (630 X 7.03) to residents of West Volusia County. In that case, some 84,754 medical/surgical patient days will have to be accommodated in 1987 by hospitals within Subdistrict Five (or outside the subdistrict at hospitals other than CFRH). In 1987, to the extent patient days attributable to southwest Volusia County residents admitted to pediatric or obstetric beds at CFRH exceed patient days at CFRH attributable to Subdistrict Five residents living outside Deltona, Geneva, DeBary, Osteen and Orange City, 84,754 would be an understatement. Dividing patient days by the number of days in a year (84,754/365) yields an average daily medical/surgical census of 232. Medical/surgical beds are put to good use when they are full 80 percent of the time, almost all health planners agree. In order to accommodate an average daily census of 232 at an 80 percent average occupancy rate, 290 medical/surgical beds will be needed as early as 1987. Only 192 medical/surgical beds are now open in Subdistrict Five. Chances are good that 292 hospital beds in Subdistrict Five could be used efficiently long before the spring of 1989. IMPACT OUTSIDE SUBDISTRICT A new 100-bed hospital in Deltona could operate consistently with efficient utilization of the medical/surgical beds already open in Subdistrict Five, even if the new hospital achieved 80 percent average occupancy as early as 1987 but only by diverting patients from CFRH. The effect on CFRH would be significant, but temporary, since population growth would ensure its efficient utilization once again within two to four years of the 1986 opening of a 100-bed hospital in Deltona. All along, CFRH's loss of patients to a new Deltona hospital would be offset to some extent by ongoing population growth in Seminole County where CFRH is located. CFRH's own application for a certificate of need was granted on the theory that a new hospital of CFRH's size was needed just to serve the population of Seminole County. Petitioners' expert concluded that CFRH, Fish and West Volusia had had only 1,139 more medical/surgical patient days to split among themselves in 1983 than they could be expected to have in 1988, with a 100-bed hospital in its second year of operation in Deltona. DBGH's surrender of the right to open 150 additional beds would have no immediate economic impact; the effect would be to reduce excess capacity in Subdistrict Four, but on paper only. No beds would be closed, no staff dismissed, no expenses pared. But, if petitioners' efforts to obtain a CON for a new hospital in Deltona fail, they intend to expend $10,000,000 for renovation of DBGH, a project for which they already have a CON. This would inevitably mean recovering additional costs from payers for hospital care in Subdistrict Four. Like the Deltona proposal, the renovation proposal contemplates some reduction in beds in Subdistrict Four, although fewer: "50-some-odd." (T. 293) The 150 bed reduction in approved beds in Subdistrict Four contemplated by the pending application would mean that, if and when new hospital beds are needed in Subdistrict Four, they could be added wherever they are needed rather than being added at DBGH whenever management decrees.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That HRS grant petitioners' application for a certificate of need to construct a 100-bed acute care general hospital in Deltona. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1984. APPENDIX * * NOTE: APPENDIX to this Recommended Order is a map which is available for review in the Division's Clerk's Office. COPIES FURNISHED: F. Philip Blank, Esquire 241 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald L. Book, Esquire Sparber, Shevin, Shapo & Heilbroner 30th Floor AmeriFirst Building One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 James M. Barclay, Esquire 1317 Winewood Blvd. Building 2, Suite 256 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Sheehan, III, Esquire Jon C. Moyle, Esquire Donna Stinson, Esquire, and Thomas M. Beason, Esquire, of Moyle, Jones & Flanigan Post Office Box 3888 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 David Pingree, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 7.03910.02910.04
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MORTON PLANT HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, INC., D/B/A NORTH BAY HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND NEW PORT RICHEY HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF NEW PORT RICHEY, 02-003515CON (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 10, 2002 Number: 02-003515CON Latest Update: May 17, 2004

The Issue Whether the certificate of need (CON) applications filed by New Port Richey Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Community Hospital of New Port Richey (Community Hospital) (CON No. 9539), and Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc., d/b/a North Bay Hospital (North Bay) (CON No. 9538), each seeking to replace and relocate their respective general acute care hospital, satisfy, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria.

Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA AHCA is the single state agency responsible for the administration of the CON program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes (2000). The agency separately reviewed and preliminarily approved both applications. Community Hospital Community Hospital is a 300,000 square feet, accredited hospital with 345 licensed acute care beds and 56 licensed adult psychiatric beds, located in southern New Port Richey, Florida, within Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital is seeking to construct a replacement facility approximately five miles to the southeast within a rapidly developing suburb known as "Trinity." Community Hospital currently provides a wide array of comprehensive inpatient and outpatient services and is the only provider of obstetrical and adult psychiatric services in Sub-District 5-1. It is the largest provider of emergency services in Pasco County with approximately 35,000 visits annually. It is also the largest provider of Medicaid and indigent patient days in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital was originally built in 1969 and is an aging facility. Although it has been renovated over time, the hospital is in poor condition. Community Hospital's average daily census is below 50 percent. North Bay North Bay is a 122-bed facility containing 102 licensed acute care beds and 20 licensed comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds, located approximately one mile north of Community Hospital in Sub-District 5-1. It serves a large elderly population and does not provide pediatric or obstetrical care. North Bay is also an aging facility and proposes to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Notably, however, North Bay has spent approximately 12 million dollars over the past three years for physical improvements and is in reasonable physical condition. Helen Ellis Helen Ellis is an accredited hospital with 150 licensed acute care beds and 18 licensed skilled nursing unit beds. It is located in northern Pinellas County, approximately eight miles south of Community Hospital and nine miles south of North Bay. Helen Ellis provides a full array of acute care services including obstetrics and cardiac catheterization. Its daily census average has fluctuated over the years but is approximately 45 percent. Mease Mease operates two acute care hospitals in Pinellas County including Mease Dunedin Hospital, located approximately 18 to 20 miles south of the applicants and Mease Countryside Hospital, located approximately 16 to 18 miles south of Community and North Bay. Each hospital operates 189 licensed beds. The Mease hospitals are located in the adjacent acute care sub-district but compete with the applicants. The Health Planning District AHCA's Health Planning District 5 consists of Pinellas and Pasco Counties. U.S. Highway 41 runs north and south through the District and splits Pasco County into Sub- District 5-1 and Sub-District 5-2. Sub-District 5-1, where Community Hospital and North Bay are located, extends from U.S. 41 west to the Gulf Coast. Sub-District 5-2 extends from U.S. 41 to the eastern edge of Pasco County. Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida and steadily grows at 5.52 percent per year. On the other hand, its neighbor to the north, Pasco County, has been experiencing over 15 percent annual growth in population. The evidence demonstrates that the area known as Trinity, located four to five miles southeast of New Port Richey, is largely responsible for the growth. With its large, single- owner land tracts, Trinity has become the area's fuel for growth, while New Port Richey, the older coastal anchor which houses the applicants' facilities, remains static. In addition to the available land in Trinity, roadway development in the southwest section of Pasco County is further fueling growth. For example, the Suncoast Highway, a major highway, was recently extended north from Hillsborough County through Sub-District 5-1, west of U.S. 41. It intersects with several large east-west thoroughfares including State Road 54, providing easy highway access to the Tampa area. The General Proposals Community Hospital's Proposal Community Hospital's CON application proposes to replace its existing, 401-bed hospital with a 376-bed state- of-the-art facility and relocate it approximately five miles to the southeast in the Trinity area. Community Hospital intends to construct a large medical office adjacent to its new facility and provide all of its current services including obstetrical care. It does not intend to change its primary service area. North Bay's Proposal North Bay's CON application proposes to replace its existing hospital with a 122-bed state-of-the-art facility and also plans to relocate it approximately eight miles to the southeast in the Trinity area of southwestern Pasco County. North Bay intends to provide the same array of services it currently offers its patients and will not provide pediatric and obstetrical care in the proposed facility. The proposed relocation site is adjacent to the Trinity Outpatient Center which is owned by North Bay's parent company, Morton Plant. The Outpatient Center offers a full range of diagnostic imaging services including nuclear medicine, cardiac nuclear stress testing, bone density scanning, CAT scanning, mammography, ultrasound, as well as many others. It also offers general and specialty ambulatory surgical services including urology; ear, nose and throat; ophthalmology; gastroenterology; endoscopy; and pain management. Approximately 14 physician offices are currently located at the Trinity Outpatient Center. The Condition of Community Hospital Facility Community Hospital's core facilities were constructed between 1969 and 1971. Additions to the hospital were made in 1973, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1992, and 1999. With an area of approximately 294,000 square feet and 401 licensed beds, or 733 square feet per bed, Community Hospital's gross area-to-bed ratio is approximately half of current hospital planning standards of 1,600 square feet per bed. With the exception of the "E" wing which was completed in 1999, all of the clinical and support departments are undersized. Medical-Surgical Beds And Intensive Care Units Community Hospital's "D" wing, constructed in 1975, is made up of two general medical-surgical unit floors which are grossly undersized. Each floor operates 47 general medical-surgical beds, 24 of which are in three-bed wards and 23 in semi-private rooms. None of the patient rooms in the "D" wing have showers or tubs so the patients bathe in a single facility located at the center of the wing on each floor. Community Hospital's "A" wing, added in 1973, is situated at the west end of the second floor and is also undersized. It too has a combination of semi-private rooms and three-bed wards without showers or tubs. Community Hospital's "F" wing, added in 1979, includes a medical-surgical unit on the second and third floor, each with semi-private and private rooms. The second floor unit is centrally located between a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit and the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU) which creates security and privacy issues. The third floor unit is adjacent to the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU) which must be accessed through the medical-surgical unit. Neither intensive care unit (ICU) possesses an isolation area. Although the three-bed wards are generally restricted to in-season use, and not always full, they pose significant privacy, security, safety, and health concerns. They fail to meet minimum space requirements and are a serious health risk. The evidence demonstrates that reconfiguring the wards would be extremely costly and impractical due to code compliance issues. The wards hinder the hospital's acute care utilization, and impair its ability to effectively compete with other hospitals. Surgical Department and Recovery Community Hospital's surgical department is separated into two locations including the main surgical suite on the second floor and the Endoscopy/Pain Management unit located on the first floor of "C" wing. Consequently, the department cannot share support staff and space such as preparation and recovery. The main surgical suite, adjacent recovery room, and central sterile processing are 25 years old. This unit's operating rooms, cystoscopy rooms, storage areas, work- stations, central sterile, and recovery rooms are undersized and antiquated. The 12-bay Recovery Room has no patient toilet and is lacking storage. The soiled utility room is deficient. In addition, the patient bays are extremely narrow and separated by curtains. There is no direct connection to the sterile corridor, and staff must break the sterile field to transport patients from surgery to recovery. Moreover, surgery outpatients must pass through a major public lobby going to and returning from surgery. The Emergency Department Community Hospital's existing emergency department was constructed in 1992 and is the largest provider of hospital emergency services in Pasco County, handling approximately 35,000 visits per year. The hospital is also designated a "Baker Act" receiving facility under Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, and utilizes two secure examination rooms for emergent psychiatric patients. At less than 8,000 total square feet, the emergency department is severely undersized to meet the needs of its patients. The emergency department is currently undergoing renovation which will connect the triage area to the main emergency department. The renovation will not enlarge the entrance, waiting area, storage, nursing station, nor add privacy to the patient care areas in the emergency department. The renovation will not increase the total size of the emergency department, but in fact, the department's total bed availability will decrease by five beds. Similar to other departments, a more meaningful renovation cannot occur within the emergency department without triggering costly building code compliance measures. In addition to its space limitations, the emergency department is awkwardly located. In 1992, the emergency department was relocated to the front of the hospital and is completely separated from the diagnostic imaging department which remained in the original 1971 building. Consequently, emergency patients are routinely transported across the hospital for imaging and CT scans. Issues Relating to Replacement of Community Hospital Although physically possible, renovating and expanding Community Hospital's existing facility is unreasonable. First, it is cost prohibitive. Any significant renovation to the 1971, 1975, 1977, and 1979 structures would require asbestos abatement prior to construction, at an estimated cost of $1,000,000. In addition, as previously noted, the hospital will be saddled with the major expense of complying with all current building code requirements in the 40-year-old facility. Merely installing showers in patient rooms would immediately trigger a host of expensive, albeit necessary, code requirements involving access, wiring, square footage, fireproofing columns and beams, as well as floor/ceiling and roof/ceiling assemblies. Concurrent with the significant demolition and construction costs, the hospital will experience the incalculable expense and loss of revenue related to closing major portions, if not all, of the hospital. Second, renovation and expansion to the existing facility is an unreasonable option due to its physical restrictions. The 12'4" height of the hospital's first floor limits its ability to accommodate HVAC ductwork large enough to meet current ventilation requirements. In addition, there is inadequate space to expand any department within the confines of the existing hospital without cannibalizing adjacent areas, and vertical expansion is not an option. Community Hospital's application includes a lengthy Facility Condition Assessment which factually details the architectural, mechanical, and electrical deficiencies of the hospital's existing physical plant. The assessment is accurate and reasonable. Community Hospital's Proposed Replacement Community Hospital proposes to construct a six- story, 320 licensed beds, acute care replacement facility. The hospital will consist of 548,995 gross square feet and include a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit connected by a hallway to the first floor of the main hospital building. The proposal also includes the construction of an adjacent medical office building to centralize the outpatient offices and staff physicians. The evidence establishes that the deficiencies inherent in Community Hospital's existing hospital will be cured by its replacement hospital. All patients will be provided large private rooms. The emergency department will double in size, and contain private examination rooms. All building code requirements will be met or exceeded. Patients and staff will have separate elevators from the public. In addition, the surgical department will have large operating rooms, and adequate storage. The MICU and SICU will be adjacent to each other on the second floor to avoid unnecessary traffic within the hospital. Surgical patients will be transported to the ICU via a private elevator dedicated to that purpose. Medical-surgical patient rooms will be efficiently located on the third through sixth floors, in "double-T" configuration. Community Hospital's Existing and Proposed Sites Community Hospital is currently located on a 23-acre site inside the southern boundary of New Port Richey. Single- family homes and offices occupy the two-lane residential streets that surround the site on all sides. The hospital buildings are situated on the northern half of the site, with the main parking lot located to the south, in front of the main entrance to the hospital. Marine Parkway cuts through the southern half of the site from the west, and enters the main parking lot. A private medical mall sits immediately to the west of the main parking lot and a one-acre storm-water retention pond sits to the west of the mall. A private medical office building occupies the south end of the main parking lot and a four-acre drainage easement is located in the southwest corner of the site. Community Hospital's administration has actively analyzed its existing site, aging facility, and adjacent areas. It has commissioned studies by civil engineers, health care consultants, and architects. The collective evidence demonstrates that, although on-site relocation is potentially an option, on balance, it is not a reasonable option. Replacing Community Hospital on its existing site is not practical for several reasons. First, the hospital will experience significant disruption and may be required to completely close down for a period of time. Second, the site's southwestern large four-acre parcel is necessary for storm-water retention and is unavailable for expansion. Third, a reliable cost differential is unknown given Community Hospital's inability to successfully negotiate with the city and owners of the adjacent medical office complexes to acquire additional parcels. Fourth, acquiring other adjacent properties is not a viable option since they consist of individually owned residential lots. In addition to the site's physical restrictions, the site is hindered by its location. The hospital is situated in a neighborhood between small streets and a local school. From the north and south, motorists utilize either U.S. 19, a congested corridor that accommodates approximately 50,000 vehicles per day, or Grand and Madison Streets, two-lane streets within a school zone. From the east and west, motorists utilize similar two-lane neighborhood streets including Marine Parkway, which often floods in heavy rains. Community Hospital's proposed site, on the other hand, is a 53-acre tract positioned five miles from its current facility, at the intersection of two major thoroughfares in southwestern Pasco County. The proposed site offers ample space for all facilities, parking, outpatient care, and future expansion. In addition, Community Hospital's proposed site provides reasonable access to all patients within its existing primary service area made up of zip codes 34652, 34653, 34668, 34655, 34690, and 34691. For example, the average drive times from the population centers of each zip code to the existing site of the hospital and the proposed site are as follows: Zip code Difference Existing site Proposed site 34652 3 minutes 14 minutes 11 minutes 34653 8 minutes 11 minutes 3 minutes 34668 15 minutes 21 minutes 6 minutes 34655 11 minutes 4 minutes -7 minutes 34690 11 minutes 13 minutes 2 minutes 34691 11 minutes 17 minutes 6 minutes While the average drive time from the population centroids of zip codes 34653, 34668, 34690, and 34691 to the proposed site slightly increases, it decreases from the Trinity area, where population growth has been most significant in southwestern Pasco County. In addition, a motorist's average drive time from Community Hospital's existing location to its proposed site is only 10 to 11 minutes, and patients utilizing public transportation will be able to access the new hospital via a bus stop located adjacent to the proposed site. The Condition of North Bay Facility North Bay Hospital is also an aging facility. Its original structure and portions of its physical plant are approximately 30 years old. Portions of its major mechanical systems will soon require replacement including its boilers, air handlers, and chillers. In addition, the hospital is undersized and awkwardly configured. Despite its shortcomings, however, North Bay is generally in good condition. The hospital has been consistently renovated and updated over time and is aesthetically pleasing. Moreover, its second and third floors were added in 1986, are in good shape, and structurally capable of vertical expansion. Medical Surgical Beds and ICU Units By-in-large, North Bay is comprised of undersized, semi-private rooms containing toilet and shower facilities. The hospital does not have any three-bed wards. North Bay's first floor houses all ancillary and support services including lab, radiology, pharmacy, surgery, pre-op, post-anesthesia recovery, central sterile processing and supply, kitchen and cafeteria, housekeeping and administration, as well as the mechanical, electrical, and facilities maintenance and engineering. The first floor also contains a 20-bed CMR unit and a 15-bed acute care unit. North Bay's second and third floors are mostly comprised of semi-private rooms and supporting nursing stations. Although the rooms and stations are not ideally sized, they are in relatively good shape. North Bay utilizes a single ICU with ten critical care beds. The ICU rooms and nursing stations are also undersized. A four-bed ICU ward and former nursery are routinely used to serve overflow patients. Surgery Department and Recovery North Bay utilizes a single pre-operative surgical room for all of its surgery patients. The room accommodates up to five patient beds, but has limited space for storage and pre-operative procedures. Its operating rooms are sufficiently sized. While carts and large equipment are routinely stored in hallways throughout the surgical suite, North Bay has converted the former obstetrics recovery room to surgical storage and has made efficient use of other available space. North Bay operates a small six-bed Post Anesthesia Care Unit. Nurses routinely prepare patient medications in the unit which is often crowded with staff and patients. The Emergency Department North Bay has recently expanded its emergency department. The evidence demonstrates that this department is sufficient and meets current and future expected patient volumes. Replacement Issues Relating to North Bay While it is clear that areas of North Bay's physical plant are aging, the facility is in relatively good condition. It is apparent that North Bay must soon replace significant equipment, including cast-iron sewer pipes, plumbing, boilers, and chillers which will cause some interruption to hospital operations. However, North Bay's four-page written assessment of the facility and its argument citing the need for total replacement is, on balance, not persuasive. North Bay's Proposed Replacement North Bay proposes to construct a new, state-of-the- art, hospital approximately eight miles southeast of its existing facility and intends to offer the identical array of services the hospital currently provides. North Bay's Existing and Proposed Sites North Bay's existing hospital is located on an eight-acre site with limited storm-water drainage capacity. Consequently, much of its parking area is covered by deep, porous, gravel instead of asphalt. North Bay's existing site is generally surrounded by residential properties. While the city has committed, in writing, it willingness to assist both applicants with on-site expansion, it is unknown whether North Bay can acquire additional adjacent property. North Bay's proposed site is located at the intersection of Trinity Oaks Boulevard and Mitchell Boulevard, south of Community Hospital's proposed site, and is quite spacious. It contains sufficient land for the facilities, parking, and future growth, and has all necessary infrastructure in place, including utility systems, storm- water structures, and roadways. Currently however, there is no public transportation service available to North Bay's proposed site. Projected Utilization by Applicants The evidence presented at hearing indicates that, statewide, replacement hospitals often increase a provider's acute care bed utilization. For example, Bartow Memorial Hospital, Heart of Florida Regional Medical Center, Lake City Medical Center, Florida Hospital Heartland Medical Center, South Lake Hospital, and Florida Hospital-Fish Memorial each experienced significant increases in utilization following the opening of their new hospital. The applicants in this case each project an increase in utilization following the construction of their new facility. Specifically, Community Hospital's application projects 82,685 total hospital patient days (64,427 acute care patient days) in year one (2006) of the operation of its proposed replacement facility, and 86,201 total hospital patient days (67,648 acute care patient days) in year two (2007). Using projected 2006 and 2007 population estimates, applying 2002 acute care hospital use rates which are below 50 percent, and keeping Community Hospital's acute care market share constant at its 2002 level, it is reasonably estimated that Community Hospital's existing hospital will experience 52,623 acute care patient days in 2006, and 53,451 acute care patient days in 2007. Consequently, Community Hospital's proposed facility must attain 11,804 additional acute care patient days in 2006, and 14,197 more acute care patient days in 2007, in order to achieve its projected acute care utilization. Although Community Hospital lost eight percent of the acute care market in its service area between 1995 and 2002, two-thirds of that loss was due to residents of Sub- District 5-1 acquiring services in another area. While Community Hospital experienced 78,444 acute care patient days in 1995, it projects only 64,427 acute care patient days in year one. Given the new facility and population factors, it is reasonable that the hospital will recapture half of its lost acute care market share and achieve its projections. With respect to its psychiatric unit, Community Hospital projects 16,615 adult psychiatric inpatient days in year one (2006) and 17,069 adult inpatient days in year two (2007) of the proposed replacement hospital. The evidence indicates that these projections are reasonable. Similarly, North Bay's acute care utilization rate has been consistently below 50 percent. Since 1999, the hospital has experienced declining utilization. In its application, North Bay states that it achieved total actual acute care patient days of 21,925 in 2000 and 19,824 in 2001 and the evidence at hearing indicates that North Bay experienced 17,693 total acute care patient days in 2002. North Bay projects 25,909 acute care patient days in the first year of operation of its proposed replacement hospital, and 27,334 acute care patient days in the second year of operation. Despite each applicant's current facility utilization rate, Community Hospital must increase its current acute care patient days by 20 percent to reach its projected utilization, and North Bay must increase its patient days by at least 50 percent. Given the population trends, service mix and existing competition, the evidence demonstrates that it is not possible for both applicants to simultaneously achieve their projections. In fact, it is strongly noted that the applicants' own projections are predicated upon only one applicant being approved and cannot be supported with the approval of two facilities. Local Health Plan Preferences In its local health plan for District 5, the Suncoast Health Council, Inc., adopted acute care preferences in October, 2000. The replacement of an existing hospital is not specifically addressed by any of the preferences. However, certain acute care preferences and specialty care preferences are applicable. The first applicable preference provides that preference "shall be given to an applicant who proposes to locate a new facility in an area that will improve access for Medicaid and indigent patients." It is clear that the majority of Medicaid and indigent patients live closer to the existing hospitals. However, Community Hospital proposes to move 5.5 miles from its current location, whereas North Bay proposes to move eight miles from its current location. While the short distances alone are less than significant, North Bay's proposed location is further removed from New Port Richey, is not located on a major highway or bus-route, and would therefore be less accessible to the medically indigent residents. Community Hospital's proposed site will be accessible using public transportation. Furthermore, Community Hospital has consistently provided excellent service to the medically indigent and its proposal would better serve that population. In 2000, Community Hospital provided 7.4 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.8 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. Community Hospital provided the highest percentage and greatest number of Medicaid patient days in Sub-District 5-1. By comparison, North Bay provided 5.8 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.9 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. In 2002, North Bay's Medicaid patients days declined to 3.56 percent. Finally, given the closeness and available bed space of the existing providers and the increasing population in the Trinity area, access will be improved by Community Hospital's relocation. The second local health plan preference provides that "[i]n cases where an applicant is a corporation with previously awarded certificates of need, preference shall be given to those which follow through in a timely manner to construct and operate the additional facilities or beds and do not use them for later negotiations with other organizations seeking to enter or expand the number of beds they own or control." Both applicants meet this preference. The third local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that provide AHCA with documentation that they provide, or propose to provide, the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in the sub-district." Community Hospital provides the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in Sub-District 5-1, and therefore meets this preference. The fourth local health plan preference applies to "Certificate of Need applications that demonstrate intent to serve HIV/AIDS infected persons." Both applicants accept and treat HIV/AIDS infected persons, and would continue to do so in their proposed replacement hospitals. The fifth local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that commit to provide a full array of acute care services including medical-surgical, intensive care, pediatric, and obstetrical services within the sub-district for which they are applying." Community Hospital qualifies since it will continue to provide its current services, including obstetrical care and psychiatric care, in its proposed replacement hospital. North Bay discontinued its pediatric and obstetrical programs in 2001, does not intend to provide them in its proposed replacement hospital, and will not provide psychiatric care. Agency Rule Preferences Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.038(6) provides an applicable preference to a facility proposing "new acute care services and capital expenditures" that has "a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so." As the largest Medicaid provider in Sub-District 5-1, Community Hospital meets this preference better than does North Bay. North Bay's history demonstrates a declining rate of service to the medically indigent. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed in relation to the applicable district health plan District 5 includes Pasco and Pinellas County. Pasco County is rapidly developing, whereas Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida. Given the population trends, service mix, and utilization rates of the existing providers, on balance, there is a need for a replacement hospital in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(2), Florida Statutes: The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant Community Hospital and North Bay are both located in Sub-District 5-1. Each proposes to relocate to an area of southwestern Pasco County which is experiencing explosive population growth. The other general acute care hospital located in Sub-District 5-1 is Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point, which is located further north, in the Hudson area of western Pasco County. The only other acute care hospitals in Pasco County are East Pasco Medical Center, in Zephyrhills, and Pasco Community Hospital, in Dade City. Those hospitals are located in Sub-District 5-2, east Pasco County, far from the area proposed to be served by either Community Hospital or North Bay. District 5 includes Pinellas County as well as Pasco County. Helen Ellis and Mease are existing hospital providers located in Pinellas County. Helen Ellis has 168 licensed beds, consisting of 150 acute care beds and an 18-bed skilled nursing unit, and is located 7.9 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 10.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. Access to Helen Ellis for patients originating from southwestern Pasco County requires those patients to travel congested U.S. 19 south to Tarpon Springs. As a result, the average drive time from Community Hospital's existing and proposed site to Helen Ellis is approximately 22 minutes. Helen Ellis is not a reasonable alternative to Community Hospital's proposal. The applicants' proposals are specifically designed for the current and future health care needs of southwestern Pasco County. Given its financial history, it is unknown whether Helen Ellis will be financially capable of providing the necessary care to the residents of southwestern Pasco. Mease Countryside Hospital has 189 licensed acute care beds. It is located 16.0 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 13.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. The average drive time to Mease Countryside is 32 minutes from Community Hospital's existing site and 24 minutes from its proposed site. In addition, Mease Countryside Hospital has experienced extremely high utilization over the past several years, in excess of 90 percent for calendar years 2000 and 2001. Utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital has remained over 80 percent despite the addition of 45 acute care beds in April 2002. Given the growth and demand, it is unknown whether Mease can accommodate the residents in southwest Pasco County. Mease Dunedin Hospital has 189 licensed beds, consisting of 149 acute care beds, a 30-bed skilled nursing unit, five Level 2 neonatal intensive care beds, and five Level 3 neonatal intensive care beds. Its former 15-bed adult psychiatric unit has been converted into acute care beds. It is transferring its entire obstetrics program at Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease Dunedin Hospital is located approximately 18 to 20 miles from the applicants' existing and proposed locations with an average drive time of 35-38 minutes. With their remote location, and the exceedingly high utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital, neither of the two Mease hospitals is a viable alternative to the applicants' proposals. In addition, the construction of a replacement hospital would positively impact economic development and further attract medical professionals to Sub-District 5-1. On balance, given the proximity, utilization, service array, and accessibility of the existing providers, including the applicants, the relocation of Community Hospital will enhance access to health care to the residents. Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes: The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care As stipulated, both applicants provide excellent quality of care. However, Community Hospital's proposal will better enhance its ability to provide quality care. Community is currently undersized, non-compliant with today's standards, and located on a site that does not allow for reasonable expansion. Its emergency department is inadequate for patient volume, and the configuration of the first floor leads to inefficiencies in the diagnosis and treatment of emergency patients. Again, most inpatients are placed in semi-private rooms and three-bed wards, with no showers or tubs, little privacy, and an increased risk of infection. The hospital's waiting areas for families of patients are antiquated and undersized, its nursing stations are small and cramped and the operating rooms and storage facilities are undersized. Community Hospital's deficiencies will be effectively eliminated by its proposed replacement hospital. As a result, patients will experience qualitatively better care by the staff who serve them. Conversely, North Bay is in better physical condition and not in need of replacement. It has more reasonable options to expand or relocate its facility on site. Quality of care at North Bay will not be markedly enhanced by the construction of a new hospital. Sections 408.035(4)and(5), Florida Statutes, have been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes: The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds available for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that both Community Hospital and North Bay have available health personnel and management personnel for project accomplishment and operation. In addition, the evidence proves that both applicants have sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures. Community Hospital proposes to rely on its parent company to finance the project. Keith Giger, Vice-President of Finance for HCA, Inc., Community Hospital's parent organization, provided credible deposition testimony that HCA, Inc., will finance 100 percent of the total project cost by an inter-company loan at eight percent interest. Moreover, it is noted that the amount to be financed is actually $20 million less than the $196,849,328 stated in the CON Application, since Community Hospital previously purchased the proposed site in June 2003 with existing funds and does not need to finance the land acquisition. Community Hospital has sufficient working capital for operating expenditures of the proposed replacement hospital. North Bay, on the other hand, proposes to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group which includes Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc.; Mease; and several other hospital entities. Its proposal, while feasible, is less certain since member hospitals must approve the indebtedness, thereby providing Mease with the ability to derail North Bay's proposed bond financing. Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The evidence proves that either proposal will enhance geographical access to the growing population in the service district. However, with its provision of obstetrical services, Community Hospital is better suited to address the needs of the younger community. With respect to financial access, both proposed relocation sites are slightly farther away from the higher elderly and indigent population centers. Since the evidence demonstrates that it is unreasonable to relocate both facilities away from the down-town area, Community Hospital's proposal, on balance, provides better access to poor patients. First, public transportation will be available to Community Hospital's site. Second, Community Hospital has an excellent record of providing care to the poor and indigent and has accepted the agency's condition to provide ten percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid recipients To the contrary, North Bay's site will not be accessible by public transportation. In addition, North Bay has a less impressive record of providing care to the poor and indigent. Although AHCA conditioned North Bay's approval upon it providing 9.7 percent of total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients, instead of the 9.7 percent of gross annual revenue proposed in its application, North Bay has consistently provided Medicaid and charity patients less than seven percent of its total annual patient days. Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes: The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate financial feasibility refers to the availability of funds to capitalize and operate the proposal. See Memorial Healthcare Group, Ltd. d/b/a Memorial Hospital Jacksonville vs. AHCA et al., Case No. 02-0447 et seq. Community Hospital has acquired reliable financing for the project and has sufficiently demonstrated that its project is immediately financially feasible. North Bay's short-term financial proposal is less secure. As noted, North Bay intends to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group. As a member of the group, Mease, the parent company of two hospitals that oppose North Bay's application, must approve the plan. Long-term financial feasibility is the ability of the project to reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable achievable point in the future. Big Bend Hospice, Inc. vs. AHCA and Covenant Hospice, Inc., Case No. 02-0455. Although CON pro forma financial schedules typically show profitability within two to three years of operation, it is not a requirement. In fact, in some circumstances, such as the case of a replacement hospital, it may be unrealistic for the proposal to project profitability before the third or fourth year of operation. In this case, Community Hospital's utilization projections, gross and net revenues, and expense figures are reasonable. The evidence reliably demonstrates that its replacement hospital will be profitable by the fourth year of operation. The hospital's financial projections are further supported by credible evidence, including the fact that the hospital experienced financial improvement in 2002 despite its poor physical condition, declining utilization, and lost market share to providers outside of its district. In addition, the development and population trends in the Trinity area support the need for a replacement hospital in the area. Also, Community Hospital has benefited from increases in its Medicaid per diem and renegotiated managed care contracts. North Bay's long-term financial feasibility of its proposal is less certain. In calendar year 2001, North Bay incurred an operating loss of $306,000. In calendar year 2002, it incurred a loss of $1,160,000. In its CON application, however, North Bay projects operating income of $1,538,827 in 2007, yet omitted the ongoing expenses of interest ($1,600,000) and depreciation ($3,000,000) from its existing facility that North Bay intends to continue operating. Since North Bay's proposal does not project beyond year two, it is less certain whether it is financially feasible in the third or fourth year. In addition to the interest and depreciation issues, North Bay's utilization projections are less reasonable than Community Hospital's proposal. While possible, North Bay will have a difficult task achieving its projected 55 percent increase in acute care patient days in its second year of operation given its declining utilization, loss of obstetric/pediatric services and termination of two exclusive managed care contracts. Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness Both applicants have substantial unused capacity. However, Community Hospital's existing facility is at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the market place. In fact, from 1994 to 1998, Community Hospital's overall market share in its service area declined from 40.3 percent to 35.3 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' overall market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 7.2 percent to 9.2 percent. From 1995 to the 12-month period ending June 30, 2002, Community Hospital's acute care market share in its service area declined from 34.0 percent to 25.9 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' acute care market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 11.7 percent to 12.0 percent. In addition, acute care average occupancy rates at Mease Dunedin Hospital increased each year from 1999 through 2002. Acute care average occupancy at Mease Countryside Hospital exceeded 90 percent in 2000 and 2001, and was approximately 85 percent for the period ending June 30, 2002. Some of the loss in Community Hospital's market share is due to an out-migration of patients from its service area to hospitals in northern Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties. Market share in Community's service area by out-of- market providers increased from 33 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2002. Community Hospital's outdated hospital has hampered its ability to compete for patients in its service area. Mease is increasing its efforts to attract patients and currently completing a $92 million expansion of Mease Countryside Hospital. The project includes the development of 1,134 parking spaces on 30 acres of raw land north of the Mease Countryside Hospital campus and the addition of two floors to the hospital. It also involves the relocation of 51 acute care beds, the obstetrics program and the Neonatal Intensive Care Units from Mease Dunedin Hosptial to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease is also seeking to more than double the size of the Countryside emergency department to handle its 62,000 emergency visits. With the transfer of licensed beds from Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital, Mease will also convert formerly semi-private patient rooms to private rooms at Mease Dunedin Hospital. The approval of Community Hospital's relocated facility will enable it to better compete with the hospitals in the area and promote quality and cost- effectiveness. North Bay, on the other hand, is not operating at a distinct disadvantage, yet is still experiencing declining utilization. North Bay is the only community-owned, not-for- profit provider in western Pasco County and is a valuable asset to the city. Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes: The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods or energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the project costs in both applications are reasonable to construct the replacement hospitals. Community Hospital's proposed construction cost per square foot is $175, and slightly less than North Bay's $178 proposal. The costs and methods of proposed construction for each proposal is reasonable. Given Community Hospital's severe site and facility problems, the evidence demonstrates that there is no reasonable, less costly, or more effective methods of construction available for its proposed replacement hospital. Additional "band-aide" approaches are not financially reasonable and will not enable Community Hospital to effectively compete. The facility is currently licensed for 401 beds, operates approximately 311 beds and is still undersized. The proposed replacement hospital will meet the standards in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-3.081, and will meet current building codes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Guidelines for Design and Construction of Hospitals and Health Care Facilities, developed by the American Institute of Architects. The opponents' argue that Community Hospital will not utilize the 320 acute care beds proposed in its CON application, and therefore, a smaller facility is a less- costly alternative. In addition, Helen Ellis' architectural expert witness provided schematic design alternatives for Community Hospital to be expanded and replaced on-site, without providing a detailed and credible cost accounting of the alternatives. Given the evidence and the law, their arguments are not persuasive. While North Bay's replacement cost figures are reasonable, given the aforementioned reasons, including the fact that the facility is in reasonably good condition and can expand vertically, on balance, it is unreasonable for North Bay to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes: The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Community Hospital has consistently provided the most health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital agreed to provide at least ten percent of its patient days to Medicaid recipients. Similarly, North Bay agreed to provide 9.7 percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients combined. North Bay, by contrast, provided only 3.56 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients in 2002, and would have to significantly reverse a declining trend in its Medicaid provision to comply with the imposed condition. Community Hospital better satisfies the criterion. Section 408.035(12) has been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Adverse Impact on Existing Providers Historical figures demonstrate that hospital market shares are not static, but fluctuate with competition. No hospital is entitled to a specific or historic market share free from competition. While the applicants are located in health planning Sub-District 5-1 and Helen Ellis and the two Mease hospitals are located in health planning Sub-District 5- 2, they compete for business. None of the opponents is a disproportionate share, safety net, Medicaid provider. As a result, AHCA gives less consideration to any potential adverse financial impact upon them resulting from the approval of either application as a low priority. The opponents, however, argue that the approval of either replacement hospital would severely affect each of them. While the precise distance from the existing facilities to the relocation sites is relevant, it is clear that neither applicants' proposed site is unreasonably close to any of the existing providers. In fact, Community Hospital intends to locate its replacement facility three miles farther away from Helen Ellis and 1.5 miles farther away from Mease Dunedin Hospital. While Helen Ellis' primary service area is seemingly fluid, as noted by its chief operating officer's hearing and deposition testimony, and the Mease hospitals are located 15 to 20 miles south, they overlap parts of the applicants' primary service areas. Accordingly, each applicant concedes that the proposed increase in their patient volume would be derived from the growing population as well as existing providers. Although it is clear that the existing providers may be more affected by the approval of Community Hosptial's proposal, the exact degree to which they will be adversely impacted by either applicant is unknown. All parties agree, however, that the existing providers will experience less adverse affects by the approval of only one applicant, as opposed to two. Furthermore, Mease concedes that its hospitals will continue to aggressively compete and will remain profitable. In fact, Mease's adverse impact analysis does not show any credible reduction in loss of acute care admissions at Mease Countryside Hospital or Mease Dunedin Hospital until 2010. Even then, the reliable evidence demonstrates that the impact is negligible. Helen Ellis, on the other hand, will likely experience a greater loss of patient volume. To achieve its utilization projections, Community Hospital will aggressively compete for and increase market share in Pinellas County zip code 34689, which borders Pasco County. While that increase does not facially prove that Helen Ellis will be materially affected by Community Hospital's replacement hospital, Helen Ellis will confront targeted competition. To minimize the potential adverse affect, Helen Ellis will aggressively compete to expand its market share in the Pinellas County zip codes south of 34689, which is experiencing population growth. In addition, Helen Ellis is targeting broader service markets, and has filed an application to establish an open- heart surgery program. While Helen Ellis will experience greater competition and financial loss, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it will experience material financial adverse impact as a result of Community Hospital's proposed relocation. In fact, Helen Ellis' impact analysis is less than reliable. In its contribution-margin analysis, Helen Ellis utilized its actual hospital financial data as filed with AHCA for the fiscal year October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2002. The analysis included total inpatient and total outpatient service revenues found in the filed financial data, including ambulatory services and ancillary services, yet it did not include the expenses incurred in generating ambulatory or ancillary services revenue. As a result, the overstated net revenue per patient day was applied to its speculative lost number of patient days which resulted in an inflated loss of net patient service revenue. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Helen Ellis' analysis incorrectly included operational revenue and excluded expenses related to its 18-bed skilled nursing unit since neither applicant intends to operate a skilled nursing unit. While including the skilled nursing unit revenues, the analysis failed to include the sub-acute inpatient days that produced those revenues, and thereby over inflated the projected total lost net patient service revenue by over one million dollars.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Community Hospital's CON Application No. 9539, to establish a 376-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub- District 5-1, be granted; and North Bay's CON Application No. 9538, to establish a 122-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub-District 5- 1, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Hauser, Esquire R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Metz, Hauser & Husband, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Richard J. Saliba, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Darrell White, Esquire William B. Wiley, Esquire McFarlain & Cassedy, P.A. 305 South Gadsden Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (3) 120.569408.035408.039
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TENET ST. MARY'S, INC., D/B/A ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND HEALTHSOUTH REHABILITATION HOSPITAL OF MARTIN COUNTY, LLC, 11-003635CON (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 22, 2011 Number: 11-003635CON Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2011

Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (the "Agency") regarding Certificate of Need ("CON") CON Application No. 10117. This matter concerned the establishment of a 24-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation program for which the Agency issued a notice of preliminary intent to deny. This matter also concerned Application No. 10118, which proposed the establishment of a 34-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation hospital which the Agency had preliminarily approved as submitted by Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Martin County, LLC. On July 22, 2011, JFK Medical Center Limited Partnership d/b/a JFK Medical Center (“JFK”) filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding to contest the noticed preliminary intent to deny its CON Application No. 10117 and to contest the preliminary approval of HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Martin County, LLC of CON 10118, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (‘DOAH”) and assigned DOAH Case No. 11-3638CON. On July 22, 2011, TENET ST. MARY'S, INC. D/B/A ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER (“Tenet St. Mary”) filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to contest the Agency’s preliminary approval of CON 10118 to HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital, which was forwarded to DOAH and assigned DOAH Case No. 11-3635CON. On September 2, 2011, JFK filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. On September 6, 2011, DOAH entered an Order Severing Cases DOAH Case Nos. 11-3638CON and 11-3848CON from 11-3635CON so that an Order Closing File could be entered in DOAH Case No. 11-3638CON and as to Case No: 11-3648CON which the ALJ determined was rendered moot by the voluntary dismissal. On September 6, 2011, Tenet St. Mary filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal dismissing its Petition (DOAH Case No. 11-3635CON). On September 7, 2011, DOAH entered an Order Closing File in DOAH Case No. 11-3635CON. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 1. The voluntary dismissals of JFK and St. Mary and the Order Closing File by DOAH are hereby acknowledged and accepted. 2. The Petitions filed by Tenet St. Mary and JFK are hereby dismissed. 3. Each party shail be solely responsible for its respective costs and attorney’s fees. 4. The Agency action regarding CON 10118, awarding the establishment of a 34-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation hospital to Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Martin County, LLC is upheld. 5. The above-styled cases is hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this 271 day of _Seplember 2011, in Tallahassee, Florida. Elizabeth Dudek, Sécfetary AGENCY FOR HEAL{H CAR

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COLUMBIA/JFK MEDICAL CENTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A JFK MEDICAL CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A WEST BOYNTON COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, 03-002829CON (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 31, 2003 Number: 03-002829CON Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether the Agency should approve the Certificate of Need applications filed by Bethesda and/or JFK, each of which proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of Acute Care Subdistrict 9-5.

Findings Of Fact The Parties (1) Bethesda Bethesda operates Bethesda Memorial, which is a 362-bed not-for-profit hospital in Boynton Beach. Bethesda also operates Bethesda Health City, which is a “medical mall” located in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County. As a not-for-profit community-based health care organization, Bethesda’s mission is to provide quality health care services to the residents of South Palm Beach County that it serves regardless of their ability to pay. Bethesda Memorial opened in 1959 as a public hospital under the ownership of Palm Beach County’s former hospital taxing district. Bethesda Memorial was reorganized in 1984 as a private not-for-profit hospital owned by Bethesda. Bethesda Memorial provides tertiary-level care. Bethesda Memorial’s 362 licensed beds include 347 general medical-surgical (med-surg) acute care beds and a 15-bed Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). A 28-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR) unit will open at Bethesda Memorial in 2005, increasing the hospital’s licensed capacity to 390 beds. Not all of Bethesda Memorial’s licensed beds are available for general patient use; 14 of the beds are leased to a hospice program and 14 of the beds are operated under contract as a special care unit (SCU). The hospice lease and the SCU contract run through 2005. Even though the hospice lease and SCU contract have been profitable ventures for Bethesda, several Bethesda witnesses testified that those agreements would not be renewed if Bethesda Memorial needs those 28 beds to accommodate its general patients after its capacity is reduced through the transfer of 80 beds to its proposed satellite hospital; however, as of the date of the hearing, Bethesda had not taken any formal steps to terminate those agreements. It is unclear how the patients that are currently being served in the hospice unit and SCU would be served in the community if Bethesda terminates the agreements. Bethesda Memorial also has a 10-bed “VIP” unit that is generally available only to patients that have contributed at least $50,000 to Bethesda’s charitable foundation and are willing to pay an up-front $750.00 per day charge for the room; however, the beds in the VIP unit can be and have been utilized by other patients when all of the other beds in the hospital are full. Bethesda Memorial has a high-volume obstetrics (OB) program and an active emergency department (ED). Bethesda Memorial also offers a number of specialized programs including a comprehensive cancer program, a pediatrics program, a diagnostic cardiac catheterization program, and a wide variety of outpatient services. Bethesda Memorial is a well-utilized facility; its overall occupancy rate was 73.25 percent from July 2001 though June 2002. Bethesda Memorial does not currently offer interventional cardiology services or open heart surgery, but it has been attempting to get CON or legislative approval to offer those services for the past several years because of their profitable nature. Bethesda Memorial has designated, shelled-in space in its hospital for those services if it ever gets the necessary approvals. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at Bethesda Memorial or that would make such expansions cost-prohibitive. Bethesda recently purchased property adjacent to Bethesda Memorial and was able to get that property rezoned from residential to hospital use. It is unclear how large that property is and what use, if any, Bethesda has planned for that property. Bethesda also owns 1.4 acres of vacant property that is several blocks from Bethesda Memorial. The property is not currently zoned for hospital use, and because it is somewhat isolated from Bethesda Memorial, Bethesda intends to sell the property rather than develop it. Bethesda Memorial is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Bethesda Health City is a 135,000 square foot “medical mall” or “hospital without beds” that opened in 1995. The facility is located in the West Boynton area at the intersection of Hagan Ranch Road and Boynton Beach Boulevard, just east of the Florida Turnpike. Bethesda Health City offers services such as diagnostic imaging, outpatient rehabilitation, radiation therapy, and a woman’s center. The facility has offices for approximately 20 physician groups, and it also provides community outreach services targeted to the large senior population in the West Boynton area. Bethesda Health City was established to help Bethesda Memorial capture patients from the growing West Boynton area, and it has done so. There is capacity to add an additional 30,000 to 40,000 square feet of space to Bethesda Health City, and Bethesda intends to expand the facility whether or not its proposed satellite hospital is approved. Bethesda Health City provides Bethesda a significant physical presence in the West Boynton area. The facility has contributed to Bethesda Memorial’s significant and stable market share in the West Boynton area. In addition to Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda Health City, Bethesda administers a charitable foundation whose primary purpose is to fund Bethesda Memorial’s capital acquisitions and improvements. The foundation has considerable assets and is in the midst of a $100 million capital campaign through which it has already raised approximately $37 million. Bethesda Memorial experienced considerable and constant growth in its admissions and patient days between 1997 and 2003; its admissions grew by 45 percent and its patients days grew by 44 percent over that period. Bethesda Memorial is financially sound. It has substantial cash reserves and it is well-rated by the financial markets. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s current or long-term financial situation is distressed. Unlike other not-for-profit hospitals in District 9, Bethesda Memorial is a profitable hospital. Between 1997 and 2002, Bethesda Memorial’s operating income averaged approximately $5.5 million and in 2003, its operating income was approximately $7 million. In each of those years, the hospital also had significant non-operating revenues such that its total revenues over expenses during that period averaged approximately $10 million. The Bethesda system as a whole is also profitable. It had operating income of $2.4 million in 2002 and $2.1 million in 2001. Bethesda Memorial and the Bethesda system did not perform as well financially as JFK, Delray, or Wellington between 1997 and 2002; each of those hospitals had higher returns on assets, returns on equity, and total margin over that period than did Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda, and JFK and Delray had considerably more operating income over that period than did Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda Memorial’s CMR unit is projected to have a positive financial impact on Bethesda starting in 2005, and if approved, Bethesda Memorial’s open heart surgery program is also projected to have a positive impact on Bethesda’s long-term financial condition. (2) JFK JFK is owned by HCA, Inc. (HCA). HCA is nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. JFK is a 424-bed for-profit hospital in Atlantis, which is a small municipality in the Lake Worth area. JFK provides tertiary-level care. JFK is the most highly utilized hospital in District 9, and one of the most highly utilized hospitals in the state. JFK’s annual occupancy rate was 89.96 percent between July 2001 and June 2002, JFK is one of thee HCA hospitals in Palm Beach County. The others are Columbia and Palms West, both of which are in North Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-4. JFK operated as a not-for-profit hospital for approximately 30 years until it was purchased by HCA in 1996. Approximately $120 million of the purchase price paid by HCA was used to establish a charitable foundation, the Quantum Foundation, which funds a variety of health-related projects in the South Palm Beach County area. The services provided at JFK include orthopedics, cancer services, interventional cardiology and open heart surgery, neurologic services, and internal medicine. JFK does not offer pediatric or OB services. HCA has made significant capital improvements at JFK since it acquired the hospital. The community image of the hospital and the morale of its employees has significantly improved since the acquisition by HCA. JFK is accredited by JCAHO. JFK recently received a CON to add 36 beds, which will increase its licensed capacity to 460 beds. The beds will be located in shelled-in space on the fifth floor of JFK’s south tower, but they have not yet been brought on-line. JFK’s recently-constructed northwest tower was engineered so that an additional two floors can be added to that tower in the future, which would allow JFK to add 36 more beds. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at JFK beyond the 72 beds identified above. JFK is attempting to acquire a long-term lease for 19 acres across the street from its hospital that would be used for parking and medical office buildings. If that property is leased and developed, JFK may be able to free-up additional space for future bed expansions; however, the record does not establish the likelihood of the lease being consummated, the amount of space that might be freed-up if that property was developed, or any of the costs associated therewith. JFK recently constructed a medical office building in the West Boynton area that includes a wound care center and a diabetes center. That facility is on Jog Road, north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. Aside from the medical office building, JFK had not formally targeted the West Boynton area for expansion; its most recent strategic plan did not mention the prospect of locating a satellite hospital in that area. (3) Delray Delray is owned by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet). Tenet is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Tenet operates four hospitals in Palm Beach County in addition to Delray, including West Boca Medical Center (West Boca) in South Palm Beach County, and Good Samaritan, St. Mary’s, and Palm Beach Gardens in North Palm Beach County. Delray is a 372-bed for-profit hospital in Delray Beach. Delray is located approximately 2.5 miles south of Atlantic Boulevard. Delray is in zip code 33484, but it is near the eastern boundary of zip code 33446. Delray opened in 1982, and is accredited by JACHO. Delray provides tertiary-level care. Delray is located on a “campus” that includes the hospital building, a 53-bed in-patient psychiatric facility known as Fair Oaks Pavillion (Fair Oaks), and a 90-bed CMR facility known as Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital. There is a separately-licensed 120-bed nursing home located adjacent to the campus. Delray’s 372 licensed beds include the 53 in-patient psychiatric beds at Fair Oaks, which is approximately 200 yards from Delray’s main hospital. Delray has added 108 beds to its hospital since 1996. Even with those bed additions, Delray remains a very highly utilized facility; its annual occupancy rate between July 2001 and June 2002 was 82.32 percent. Delray shelled-in space for an additional 31 beds as part of a recent expansion of its ED and ambulatory care unit. Delray intends to put those beds into service as soon as it can. Delray has the ability to further expand its hospital beyond the 31 beds planned for the shelled-in space. It already has local government approval for a total of 616 beds on its campus. The services provided at Delray include general medical and surgery services, trauma, interventional cardiology, open heart surgery, in-patient psychiatric services, orthopedics, and neurosurgery, with a special focus on chronically-ill elderly patients. Delray does not provide OB services. Delray has been the only provider of in-patient psychiatric services in South Palm Beach County since October 2001 when Bethesda Memorial discontinued its program. Delray has been a state-designated Level II trauma center since 1991, which requires it to have a neurosurgeon, trauma surgeon, and other specialists and specialized equipment available at all times. Delray receives funding from the local health district to help offset a large portion of the costs associated with providing its trauma services. Delray leases space in a medical office building in the West Boynton area where it provides diagnostic imaging, mammography, and laboratory services. Delray’s service area includes zip codes 33437, 33446, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Delray is currently, and historically has been a very profitable hospital. It reported a “total margin” of approximately $32.9 million on its May 2002 “Prior Year Report” filed with the Agency,4 and it reported operating income of $40.5 million in its audited financial statements for fiscal year 2003. (4) Wellington Wellington is owned by Universal Health System (Universal). Universal is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Wellington is a 121-bed for-profit hospital in the northwestern portion of South Palm Beach County. Wellington is located in zip code 33414, approximately 2.5 miles south of Southern Boulevard at the intersection of State Road 7 (also known as U.S. Highway 441) and Forest Hill Boulevard. Wellington opened in 1986 as an osteopathic hospital, and approximately 25 percent of its current medical staff is osteopathic physicians. Wellington is accredited by JCAHO and the American Osteopathic Association. Wellington provides tertiary-level care. Wellington is easily accessible from Forest Hill Boulevard and State Road 7, and the hospital is served by the Palm Beach County bus system, which has a stop in Wellington’s parking lot. Wellington has made substantial capital improvements to its hospital over the past five years. Those improvements were designed to enhance the hospital’s efficiency in serving its current patients and also to anticipate future patient demand. Wellington owns 29 acres of property adjacent to the 26-acre site on which the hospital is located. The adjacent property is currently undeveloped and it is available for future expansions of Wellington. Wellington’s chief executive officer (CEO) testified that Wellington has a site plan approved for its undeveloped property and that it has “vested concurrency” for the future development of that property; however, that testimony was not corroborated (as was the case with Delray’s approved master plan) and therefore is not persuasive. The services at Wellington include an ED, an OB program, general medical and surgical care, an orthopedic unit, a comprehensive cancer center, a wound care center, a cardiology program with a dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit, and an outpatient diagnostic center. Wellington’s OB program includes 18 labor rooms, 19 post-partum rooms and a 10-bed Level II NICU. Wellington delivers approximately six babies per day and has the capacity to deliver up to 15 babies per day. Wellington’s utilization has steadily grown over the years, but it is still one of the lowest utilized facilities in South Palm Beach County; its annual occupancy rate was 64.27 percent between July 2001 and June 2002. Wellington derives approximately 90 percent of its patients from a geographic area bounded by Military Trail on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge on the west, Okeechobee Boulevard to the north, and Boynton Beach Boulevard to the south. That area includes zip codes 33414, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Wellington has teaching and training programs for physician assistants and certified nurse anesthetists under contracts with Florida International University and Florida Atlantic University. Wellington also has a family practice residency/internship teaching program for osteopathic doctors that is affiliated with Lake Erie School of Osteopathic Medicine, and a three-year dermatology teaching program. When Wellington was established in 1986, there was very little population in the western portion of South Palm Beach County to support the hospital. As a result, the hospital was unprofitable in its early years, and by 2000, it had accumulated a deficit of $22 million. Wellington’s financial performance has improved significantly in the past several years, but it still has a large accumulated deficit. Wellington is relying on its ability to retain or increase its market share in the growing West Boynton area in order to remain profitable and eliminate its accumulated deficit. (5) Agency The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON program and licensing hospitals and other health care facilities. Application Submittal and Review and Preliminary Agency Action Bethesda and JFK each filed CON applications with the Agency in the first “hospital beds and facilities” batching cycle of 2003. Each application sought to establish a new 80- bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-5. The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The letters of intent and CON applications filed by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were timely filed and complied with all of the technical submittal requirements in the governing statutes and rules. JFK’s letter of intent was filed within the “grace period” (see Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(1)(d)2.) in direct response to Bethesda’s earlier-filed letter of intent. There is nothing inherently improper about a “grace period” letter of intent, and very little significance has been given to the responsive nature of JFK’s proposal in the comparative evaluation of the CON applications. A public hearing was held on the applications by the local health council on April 24, 2003.5 Presentations were made at the public hearing in support of and in opposition to the applications. The opposition came primarily from a representative of Delray; the support came from representatives of Bethesda and JFK and several residents of the West Boynton area. The reasons offered by the speakers for their opposition or support of the applications were essentially the same as those presented at the hearing, and no independent significance has been given to the testimony and “evidence” presented at the public hearing. Bethesda’s and JFK’s applications were comparatively reviewed by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s rules and standard procedures. On June 13, 2003, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR) based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended approval of Bethesda’s application and denial of JFK’s application. The Agency’s published notice of intent to approve Bethesda’s application and to deny JFK’s application in the June 27, 2003, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly as required by statute and Agency rule. The Agency reaffirmed its preliminary decisions on the applications through the hearing testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief of the Agency’s CON program. The petitions for administrative hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary decisions on the CON applications at issue in this proceeding were all timely filed. Acute Care Subdistricts 9-4 and 9-5 The Agency calculates the inventory of acute care beds on a subdistrict basis, and it considers CON applications for additional acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Palm Beach County is in District 9, which is divided into five subdistricts. Only two of the subdistricts, 9-4 and 9-5, are relevant in this case. Subdistrict 9-4 is North Palm Beach County, and Subdistrict 9-5 is South Palm Beach County. The dividing line between the two subdistricts is Southern Boulevard. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5: Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Raton Community Hospital (Boca Community). Boca Community and Bethesda are the only not-for- profit hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5; the others are for-profit hospitals. The service area of Palms West, which is located on Southern Boulevard in Subdistrict 9-4, includes portions of Subdistrict 9-5 and the West Boynton area. The utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9- 5 has historically been higher than the utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9-4. In calendar year 2002, for example, the average occupancy rate of the Subdistrict 9-5 hospitals was 78.2 percent as compared to 55.6 percent for the Subdistrict 9-4 hospitals; and during the “peak season” of January through March 2002, the average occupancy rates were 88.4 percent in Subdistrict 9-5 and 62 percent in Subdistrict 9-4. The West Boynton Area The West Boynton area is an unincorporated area of South Palm Beach County. Its approximate boundaries are Congress avenue on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Reserve on the west, the L-30 canal (which is several miles north of Atlantic Avenue) on the south, and Hypoluxo Road on the north. The West Boynton area roughly corresponds to the geographic area that is included in zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467. The Florida Turnpike, which runs north-south, roughly bisects the West Boynton area. The Turnpike is not a geographic barrier between the east and west portions of the West Boynton area, but it served as the de facto boundary of the urban service area until approximately 10 years ago when significant amounts of development began to “jump” the Turnpike. Boynton Beach Boulevard is the primary east-west road in the West Boynton area, although there are several other east- west arterial roads within the area including Lantana Road and Hypoluxo Road. Other major east-west roads in close proximity to the West Boynton area are Forest Hill Boulevard, Lake Worth Road, and Atlantic Avenue. There are several major north-south roads in the West Boynton area in addition to the Turnpike, including Jog Road, Hagen Ranch Road, and State Road 7. State Road 7 is the westernmost major north-south road in South Palm Beach County. As a result of local zoning restrictions, very little development in the West Boynton area is or will be west of State Road 7. The 2002 population of the West Boynton area, as defined by the four zip codes identified above, was approximately 156,000. There are seasonal variations in the population, but they are not as significant as the seasonal variations in the population of the more easterly portions of Palm Beach County. The population of the West Boynton area is projected to grow to approximately 181,000 by 2007, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of approximately 3.1 percent per year. That growth rate is higher than the annual growth rate projected over that period for the state as a whole (1.6 percent), Palm Beach County (two percent), and District 9 (1.9 percent). Approximately 89 percent of the 2003 population of the West Boynton area was located to the east of the Turnpike. The portion of the West Boynton area to the west of the Turnpike is projected to grow at a considerably faster rate through 2008 than the area to the east of the Turnpike, which is consistent with the extensive amount of residential development that is underway or approved in the West Boynton area west of the Turnpike. In 2002, approximately 28.6 percent of the residents of the West Boynton area were in the age 65 and older (“65+”) age cohort. That percentage is higher than the percentages in that age cohort for the state as a whole (17.5 percent), Palm Beach County (22.5 percent), or District 9 (22.5 percent). The 65+ age cohort is projected to remain the largest segment of the West Boynton area population through 2008. A large number of the existing residential communities and the communities under development in the West Boynton area are retirement communities that are deed-restricted to persons over the age of 55, which contributes to the higher percentage of the population in the 65+ age cohort currently and projected in the future. The West Boynton area is more affluent than and offers a better payer-mix than the existing service areas of Bethesda Memorial and JFK. As compared to the existing service areas of those hospitals, the West Boynton area has a lower percentage of uninsured residents, a higher percentage of Medicare and insured residents, a lower percentage of households with annual incomes below $20,000, and a higher percentage of households with annual incomes above $60,000. There is currently healthy competition in the West Boynton area for acute care services. That competition includes each of the four hospital parties in this case as well as several other hospitals. JFK, Bethesda, Wellington, and Delray, collectively accounted for approximately 72 percent of the discharges from the West Boynton area in calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The percentage of the West Boynton area discharges attributable to each of those hospitals or, stated another way, the hospitals' market shares in the West Boynton area over that period are as follows6: JFK Bethesda Delray Wellington 2000 31.7% 23.2% 10.6% 6.1% 2001 30.1% 24.0% 11.2% 6.9% 2002 28.8% 23.9% 11.4% 7.7% There is no credible evidence that there will be any significant changes in those relative market shares over the five-year planning horizon applicable to the applications at issue in this case if a new hospital is not approved in the West Boynton area. Stated another way, the competitive balance that currently exists in the West Boynton market is expected to continue unless something disrupts that balance, such as the approval of a new hospital in the area. As discussed below, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals are approved, the market share of the approved hospital will increase to the detriment of the other hospitals. There is considerable community support for a new hospital in the West Boynton area from the residents of that area, as reflected in the letters of support included in the CON applications, the testimony at the local public hearing on the applications, and the deposition testimony from area residents and the related exhibits introduced at the hearing. The community support is not, on balance, directed to the approval of Bethesda's proposed satellite hospital over JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, or vice versa; it is simply for the expeditious approval of a hospital. Need for OB Services in the South Palm Beach County and/or the West Boynton Area There are currently four OB programs in Subdistrict 9-5. The programs are at Bethesda Memorial, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Community. The evidence is not persuasive that an additional OB program is needed in Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, Dr. Samuel Kaufman, an OB/GYN who has practiced in the area for many years, testified credibly that the four existing OB programs in the subdistrict are just now beginning to do enough deliveries to be efficient. There was no persuasive evidence that there are accessibility problems at the existing OB programs because of their utilization rates. Indeed, the OB unit at Wellington has the capacity to handle up to an additional nine deliveries per day. Each of the existing OB programs offers Level II and/or Level III NICU services, which is typically referred to as “NICU backup.” It is not feasible to provide NICU backup at a low-volume OB program such as the 10-bed OB unit proposed in JFK’s satellite hospital. It is important to have NICU backup because it is not uncommon for high-risk OB patients to unexpectedly present to the hospital and, in such circumstances, it is better for the child to have NICU services at the hospital where he or she is delivered rather than having to be transferred to another hospital. The standard of care in South Palm Beach County requires NICU backup and, based upon malpractice liability concerns, some OB/GYNs will not deliver babies at a hospital that does not have NICU backup. OB is among the top ten discharges in the proposed service area of JFK’s satellite hospital, which is not uncommon around the state; however, because of the lower average length of stay (ALOS) associated with an OB admission, the high number of discharges does not correlate to a large number of patient days in the service area. The population group that is most likely to utilize OB services is females between the ages of 15 and 44 (hereafter “the Female 15-44 age cohort”). Only 16 percent of the 2002 population of the West Boynton area was in the Female 15-44 age cohort, and that cohort is projected to grow at a slower annual rate (2.3 percent) than the population of the West Boynton area as a whole (3.1 percent) through 2007.7 The relatively small portion of the population in the Female 15-44 age cohort is consistent with the data showing the highest percentage of the population in the West Boynton area in the 65+ age cohort. It is also consistent with the testimony and evidence regarding the number of existing and planned deed- restricted retirement communities in the West Boynton area. The logic of including an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital is undercut by the recent closure of the OB unit at Columbia. According to Columbia’s CEO, Columbia’s OB unit was closed in 2002 because it “was a small unit” with a low volume, because the service area from which Columbia was drawing its patients was predominately elderly, and because there were several other hospitals within close proximity to Columbia that had larger OB units with NICU backup. Based upon those factors, Columbia’s CEO concluded that “there was no real community need to do OB” and that “it just didn’t make sense” to do OB. The same factors exist in the West Boynton area and, as a result, the comments of Columbia’s CEO are equally applicable to the inclusion of an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The Proposed Satellite Hospitals (1) Bethesda West Bethesda’s application, CON 9659, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de-licensing 80 beds at Bethesda Memorial and then transferring those beds to the proposed satellite hospital. The transfer of beds proposed in Bethesda’s application will not increase the inventory of acute care beds in either District 9 or Subdistrict 9-5. The 80-bed increase at Bethesda West will be offset by the 80-bed decrease at Bethesda Memorial, both of which are in Subdistrict 9-5. The beds transferred to Bethesda West will come from double-occupancy rooms, thereby allowing Bethesda Memorial to convert those rooms to private rooms. The conversion to private rooms will create efficiencies at Bethesda Memorial by eliminating gender-based or disease-based conflicts between patients that often arise with double-occupancy rooms. The transfer of 80 beds to Bethesda West will reduce Bethesda Memorial’s licensed capacity to 282 beds. That figure includes the 15 NICU beds, the 14 hospice beds, and the 14-bed SCU; therefore, after the bed transfer, Bethesda Memorial will have only 239 beds available for general patient use. Bethesda Memorial is projected to have 80,630 patient days (excluding NICU and CMR patient days) in Bethesda West’s second year of operation.8 That equates to an ADC of 221 patients and an occupancy rate of 92.4 percent for the 239 beds available for general patient use. If the hospice lease and the SCU contract are not renewed in 2005, then Bethesda Memorial would have 267 beds available for general patient use and its occupancy rate would be 82.7 percent. The non-renewal of the hospice lease and the SCU contract would not add new acute care beds to Subdistrict 9- 5 because those beds are still considered to be acute care beds for purposes of the Agency's bed inventory for the subdistrict, even though they are currently designated for specific purposes. With an annual occupancy rate of 92.4 percent or even 82.7 percent, there would likely be days on which Bethesda Memorial’s occupancy rate would exceed 100 percent. This is not an uncommon occurrence at the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, particularly during the “peak season” of January through March. Bethesda Memorial could operate efficiently and provide high quality care with an occupancy rate of 82.7 percent or 92.4 percent without adding new beds. Indeed, JFK and Delray each have similar occupancy rates (and even higher occupancy rates during the “peak season”), and it is undisputed that they provide high quality care. Because the addition of new acute care beds at an existing hospital is no longer linked to the hospital’s occupancy rate, Bethesda Memorial (like any other existing hospital) is free to add new acute care beds whenever it chooses to do so; however, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda will, in fact, add new beds at Bethesda Memorial after the bed transfer to Bethesda West notwithstanding the resulting high utilization rate at Bethesda Memorial.9 Bethesda West will include 68 general med-surg beds, 12 critical care beds, a full service ED, and related ambulatory and outpatient services. All of the beds at Bethesda West will be in private rooms. Bethesda West will not offer OB services or dedicated pediatric services, and it will not include a cardiac catheterization lab. Bethesda West will be in a new 190,130 square foot building. The space plan for Bethesda West is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of Bethesda West is also reasonable. Bethesda West will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7, which is approximately two miles west of the Turnpike. That location is three miles from Bethesda Health City, eight to nine miles from Wellington, and ten to 11 miles from Delray, JFK, and Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda West could not be collocated with Bethesda Health City because there is not enough property at that location to construct a satellite hospital with the necessary parking facilities. Bethesda has contracted to purchase 54 acres of property at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7 known as the “Amestoy Property.” The purchase price of the Amestoy Property was $110,000 per acre. Bethesda intends to develop Bethesda West on approximately 30 acres of the Amestoy Property and then lease or sell the remainder of the property for the development of medical office buildings. A 30-acre site is adequate for the proposed 80-bed satellite hospital, although it may inhibit future expansion. Bethesda West intends to utilize the same medical staff as Bethesda Memorial; however, Bethesda has not discussed the issue with its medical staff as a whole10 nor has it developed specific plans to implement its dual-staffing approach. Bethesda West will share management and administrative support services with Bethesda Memorial rather than duplicating those services. The total cost of Bethesda West is $73.8 million. The primary service area (PSA) for Bethesda West consists of zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which roughly correspond to the boundaries of the West Boynton area. The hospital’s secondary service area (SSA) includes zip codes 33414 and 33446. There is significant overlap in the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the current service area of Bethesda Memorial; four of the six zip codes in Bethesda West’s service area are in Bethesda Memorial’s service area. There is also significant overlap between the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the service areas of Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in Bethesda West’s proposed service area is also within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Bethesda West is projected to have 10,430 patient days in its first year of operation and 14,570 patient days in its second year of operation. Those patient days equate to ADCs of 29 and 40, and occupancy rates of 35.7 percent and 49.9 percent in the first and second years of operations. By the fourth year of operation, Bethesda West is projected to have an ADC of 56, which equates to an occupancy rate of 65.2 percent. These occupancy rates are reasonable, as is the “ramp up” concept on which they are based. The projected utilization at Bethesda West is based upon an ALOS of 4.6 days. That ALOS was derived from information in the Agency’s in-patient database for residents of the West Boynton area who received in-patient services of the kind that would be offered at Bethesda West. It is a reasonable ALOS.11 The projected utilization assumes that Bethesda West will have an overall market share of 7.5 percent in its service area in the first year of operation, and that Bethesda West’s overall market share will increase to 13.5 percent by its fourth year of operation. Bethesda West is not projected to have a market share of greater than 15 percent in any individual zip code until its third year of operation. The utilization and market shares projected for Bethesda West are reasonable and attainable based upon the demographics and projected population growth in the West Boynton area. Bethesda West is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda's application projects that 3,040 patients from Bethesda Memorial will be “redistributed” to, or “cannibalized” by Bethesda West in Bethesda West’s first year of operation and that the number will increase to 4,530 patients in Bethesda West's second year of operation. The remainder of Bethesda West’s projected patient days – 7,390 in its first year of operation and 10,040 in its second year of operation – will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to these projected in-patient admissions, Bethesda West is projected to have outpatient registrations ranging from 22,440 (first year of operation) to 46,310 (fourth year of operation) and ED visits ranging from 8,990 (first year of operation) to 19,720 (fourth year of operation). The projected outpatient registrations and ED visits are reasonable and attainable. Some of the outpatient registrations at Bethesda West will come at the expense of Bethesda Health City because it is currently providing some of the same outpatient services that are proposed for Bethesda West. There is no persuasive evidence quantifying the number of Bethesda West’s outpatient registrations that would have otherwise gone to Bethesda Health City, nor is there any persuasive evidence quantifying the financial impact of the redistribution of those outpatients. (2) Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital JFK’s application, CON 9660, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de- licensing 80 beds at Columbia and then transferring those beds to the proposed JFK satellite hospital. Columbia is located in Subdistrict 9-4 and, like JFK, it is an HCA hospital. The bed transfer proposed by JFK will increase the inventory of acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5 by 80 beds, but the bed inventory in District 9 will remain the same; the 80-bed increase in Subdistrict 9-5 at JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be offset by an 80-bed decrease in Subdistrict 9-4 at Columbia. Columbia has 250 licensed beds, of which 150 are acute care beds, 12 are skilled nursing beds, and 88 are psychiatric beds. Columbia’s acute care beds include a 20-bed intensive care unit/critical care unit (ICU/CCU), but only 10 of those beds are currently being used. The 12-bed skilled nursing unit is not currently being used. The acute care beds at Columbia are not well- utilized. In calendar year 2002, the utilization rate for Columbia’s 150 acute care beds was only 40 percent and during the “peak season” in 2002, the utilization rate of those beds was only 47.6 percent. The proposed bed transfer would enable Columbia to convert its existing semi-private rooms to private rooms, but according to Columbia’s CEO, to do so Columbia would also need to convert its 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds. JFK’s CON application did not make reference to that necessary bed conversion. The conversion of the 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds may require Agency approval, which Columbia had not requested as of the date of the hearing. If the bed conversions described by Columbia’s CEO did not occur, the utilization rate of the 70 remaining acute care beds at Columbia after the transfer will likely exceed 80 percent on an annual basis and, during the “peak season,” the occupancy rate will likely exceed 100 percent. Indeed, applying the number of patient days at Columbia in calendar year 2002 to 70 beds results in an annual occupancy rate of 85.7 percent and an occupancy rate of 102 percent in the “peak season.” Under the pre-2004 law, those occupancy rates would allow Columbia to add beds without CON review, and Columbia’s CEO testified that she would take steps to add beds at Columbia if necessary based upon the facility’s occupancy rates after the bed transfer. There is no credible evidence that JFK planned to construct a satellite hospital in the West Boynton area prior to February 2003. The proposal was not included in any of JFK’s strategic or business plans prior to that date. There is also no credible evidence that the Columbia planned to de-license any beds at its facility prior to the CON application at issue in this proceeding; Columbia’s long-term business plan includes the beds that are being transferred to JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. The decision to de-license and transfer 80 beds from Columbia was made by HCA officials, not Columbia’s management team. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will include 60 general med-surg beds, a 10-bed OB unit, a 10-bed ICU/CCU, a full-service ED, and surgical suites. The hospital will provide radiation oncology services, diagnostic cardiac catheterization services, and outpatient psychiatric services, and all of its beds will be in private rooms. In addition to the 80 beds described above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 12 “observation” beds in private rooms. The observation beds will be sized and equipped in the same manner as the general med-surg beds. As a result, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will effectively have 92 beds even though it will only be licensed for 80 beds. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be in a new 195,195 square foot building. The space plan for the hospital is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of the hospital is also reasonable. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and the Turnpike on a 50-plus acre site known as the “Mazzoni Property.” That location is eight to nine miles from Delray and Bethesda Memorial, and 11 to 12 miles from Wellington and JFK. JFK has offered to purchase the Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre, but as of the date of the hearing, it had not entered into a contract to purchase the property. Bethesda had been in negotiations for the purchase of the Mazzoni Property at a similar price before it settled on, and entered into a contract to purchase the Amestoy Property. Like Bethesda, JFK intends to develop medical office buildings on its site in addition to the proposed satellite hospital. The size of the Mazzoni Property is adequate for those purposes. JFK intends to utilize its medical staff to cover the proposed satellite hospital; however, there is no credible evidence in the record detailing how the dual-staffing would work. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will share some of its management and administrative support services with JFK, but not to the same extent as those services are shared between Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial. Indeed, the proposed JFK satellite hospital was planned and staffed as a “stand alone economic entity.” The total cost of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is approximately $109.8 million. The service area of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital is considerably larger than the service are of Bethesda West. The PSA consists of zip codes 33437, 33467, 33446, and 33484; the SSA consists of zip codes 33436, 33463, 33414, 33413, 33445, 33496, and 33498. There is significant overlap between the service area of the proposed JFK satellite hospital and the existing service areas of Bethesda, Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in the proposed service area is within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Zip codes 33437 and 33467 are expected to generate over 92 percent of the patients for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The inordinately high number of patients that these two zip codes are expected to generate calls into question the reasonableness of service area defined by JFK, or at least the relevance of the SSA. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have 20,851 patient days in its first year of operation and 21,576 patient days in its second year of operation, which equate to ADCs of 57 and 59 and occupancy rates of 71.4 percent and 73.7 percent. By the fifth year of operation, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an occupancy rate of percent. The projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital was based on an ALOS of 3.9 days. That figure is reasonable. See Endnote 11. To achieve the projected utilization, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have to immediately achieve inordinately high market shares in its two primary zip codes, 33437 and 33467. Indeed, the CON application projects that the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 27 percent market share in zip code 33437 and a 24 percent market share in zip code 33467. It is unreasonable to expect that a new, start-up hospital will be able achieve the market share or utilization rates projected by JFK for its proposed satellite hospital even though it will be affiliated with JFK, which has an established market reputation in the area. Instead, similar to other new hospitals, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will likely have a “ramp up” period before it achieves its target market penetration and/or utilization. The 10-bed OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an ADC of 6 in each of the first two years of operation, and approximately one half of the admissions are projected to come from zip code 33467. That zip code has fewer residents in the Female 15-44 age cohort than does zip code 33463, which is in the West Boynton area but is in the SSA of the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The utilization of the OB unit assumes market shares of 65 percent in zip code 33437, which is the zip code where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located (i.e., its “home zip code”), and 60 percent in the adjacent zip code 33467. Those market shares are not inherently unreasonable for OB services since OB patients are more likely to utilize a facility closer to their home; however, the market shares are materially higher than the market shares that the established programs at Palms West (45 percent) and Wellington (41 percent) have in their home zip codes. The market shares proposed for the other zip codes in the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s service area are also somewhat higher than would be expected, particularly for a start-up OB program, but they are not inherently unreasonable. Even though the OB market shares assumed by JFK are not inherently unreasonable, they are unrealistic under the circumstances of this case because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, which is the standard of care in South Palm Beach County, and it is unlikely that obstetricians will refer their patients to the proposed satellite hospital when other hospitals with NICU backup (e.g., Wellington and Bethesda Memorial) are available in close proximity to the West Boynton area. The patient days for the OB unit were projected based upon a population-based use rate rather than based upon a fertility rate applied to the Female 15-44 age cohort. Because the Female 15-44 age cohort is growing at a slower rate than the population as a whole, JFK’s methodology had the effect of overstating the OB patient days and the ADC of the OB unit. The fertility rate methodology is a more reasonable approach under the circumstances of this case. That methodology results in an ADC of only two to four patients in the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a more reasonable projection and is more consistent with the largely elderly demographic of the West Boynton area. In sum, the projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is overstated, particularly in the first two years of operation, as a result of the unrealistic market shares projected for the hospital’s two primary zip codes and the overstated projection of OB patient days in the West Boynton area. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including JFK. JFK projects that approximately 40 percent of its patients will be “cannibalized” by the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a materially higher percentage than that projected for Bethesda West in its first (29.1 percent) and second (31.1 percent) years of operation. The remainder of the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s admissions will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to the projected in-patient admissions discussed above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is expected to have outpatient registrations and ED visits; however, the number of registrations and visits is not expressly projected in the application. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether those projections are reasonable or not.12 Institution-specific Justifications for the Proposed Satellite Hospitals Other than the prospect of enhancing access to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area (see Part I(1)(b) below), the primary justifications offered by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were institution-specific. The primary justification offered by Bethesda for the establishment of Bethesda West was its need to maintain or increase its market share of the favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area in order to ensure its long-term financial viability. Although the evidence establishes that the West Boynton area has a more favorable payer-mix than Bethesda Memorial’s current service area, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s long-term financial viability is at risk or that it is at risk of losing market share in the West Boynton area if it is not allowed to construct Bethesda West. Bethesda also presented evidence regarding its inability to add new beds at Bethesda Memorial because of physical and/or cost constraints, but that evidence was not persuasive. The primary justification offered by JFK for the establishment of its proposed satellite hospital was its inability to expand its current facility to accommodate patients coming from the West Boynton area or elsewhere; however, the preponderance of the evidence fails to support that claim because, as of the date of the hearing, JFK still had the ability to add at least 72 more beds to its existing facility, including 36 beds without any additional construction. Impact of the Proposed Satellite Hospitals on the Existing Hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West or the proposed JFK satellite hospital can achieve their in-patient utilization projections through population growth in their projected service areas alone. Instead, the evidence establishes that the proposed satellite hospitals will achieve their projected utilization primarily by taking patients who are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. Bethesda West and the proposed JFK satellite hospital are each projected to “cannibalize” patients from Bethesda Memorial and JFK, respectively; however, they will also take patients “out of the hide” of Delray, Wellington, and each other. The projected growth in the West Boynton area will result in the existing hospitals having more patient days in the future than they currently have, whether or not either of the satellite hospitals is approved; however, the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals will result in the existing hospitals losing some of the growth-related admissions that they would have otherwise captured. It is appropriate to consider the loss of those growth-related admissions as part of the impact analysis because the market shares in the West Boynton area and the service areas of the proposed satellite hospitals have been relatively stable over the past several years, and it is reasonable to expect that absent a significant change of circumstances (such as the approval of a satellite hospital in the area) the existing hospitals would continue to maintain their respective market shares into the future.13 The most persuasive analysis of the impact on the existing providers of the approval of the proposed satellite hospitals is that prepared by Wellington’s health planner, Thomas Davidson (Exhibit W-4). Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of admissions that the existing providers would lose because of Bethesda West in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 377 512 Wellington 138 187 JFK 554 752 Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of patient days that the existing providers would lose because of the proposed JFK satellite hospital in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 1,035 663 Wellington 735 615 Bethesda 1,638 1,178 These lost admissions and patient days constitute a substantial adverse impact on the existing hospitals, as does the loss of income resulting from the lost admissions and patient days. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a slightly greater adverse financial impact on Wellington than will Bethesda West, primarily because of the OB program and larger service proposed for the JFK satellite hospital; the proposed JFK satellite hospital and Bethesda West will have materially similar adverse financial impacts on Delray. The overall effect of the lost admissions, patient days, and the resulting loss of income is greater on Wellington than it is on any of the other hospitals because Wellington has historically been less profitable than the other hospitals. There are other adverse impacts on the existing providers, including the increases in costs and/or potential impacts to quality of care resulting from the exacerbation of the emergency room (ER) call shortage of specialty physicians discussed below; however, there is no persuasive evidence quantifying those impacts. Comparative Evaluation of the CON Applications Based Upon the Applicable Statutory and Rule Criteria There is no credible evidence to justify the approval of two 80-bed hospitals in the West Boynton area. As a result, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals is to be approved, it should be the one that best satisfies the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Statutory Criteria – Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2003)14 Subsection (1): Need in Relation to the District Health Plan15 The applicable provisions of the Local Health Plan for District 9 are as follows: Priority shall be given to area hospitals, which can show a commitment to, or historical record of service to Medicaid/indigent, handicapped and underserved population groups. Priority shall be given to applicants who can document cost containment practices in their facilities. Cost containment practices, such as sharing services with other area hospitals, enhances efficient resource utilization and assists in avoiding duplication of services. Priority shall be given to an applicant who proposes to use existing space rather than new construction, including space created by previous voluntary de- licensure of underutilized or unused beds and/or through transfer of beds within a subdistrict. As more fully discussed below in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, the first preference weighs in favor of Bethesda based upon its historical record of service to Medicaid and charity patients, which is marginally better than JFK’s record, and its commitment to provide five percent of the patient days at Bethesda West to Medicaid and charity patients, which is more realistic than JFK’s 10 percent commitment; however, the weight associated with this preference is minimal in light of the demographics of the West Boynton area, which is generally more wealthy and, hence, less likely to generate significant Medicaid or charity care patient days. As to the second preference, the record does not “document” any material cost containment practices at JFK or Bethesda Memorial. JFK and Bethesda each intend to use their existing medical staffs to cover their proposed satellite hospitals as a cost-containment effort; however, Bethesda has proposed a greater degree of integration (and, hence, less duplication) in the administrative functions at Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial than did JFK at is proposed satellite hospital. Thus, the second preference also marginally weighs in favor of Bethesda. As to the third preference, both applicants are proposing new construction rather than the use of existing space. Although JFK is proposing the de-licensure of underutilized beds at Columbia, it is not using the space created by those beds for its proposed satellite hospital as the rule preference contemplates. The beds that Bethesda is transferring to Bethesda West are not underutilized and they are being transferred to a new to-be-constructed facility rather than to existing space. In sum, the local health plan preferences marginally weigh in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsections (2) and (7): Availability, Quality of Care, etc. of Existing Facilities and Enhancing Access The primary justification offered by the applicants for their respective proposed satellite hospitals (other than the hospital-specific issues discussed above) is that the facility will "enhance access" to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area. More specifically, the applicants contend that the establishment of a new hospital in the West Boynton area will address an “access” problem that exists or soon will exist in the area. As discussed below, this contention is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. In the CON context, “access” is typically evaluated from the vantage points of programmatic, financial, cultural, and geographic access. “Programmatic access” refers to the adequacy of the programs and services provided at existing facilities in relation to the specific health care needs of the persons served by those facilities. Programmatic access concerns arise when specific programs or services are not available for patients that need them, or when the quality of care provided in the existing programs is inadequate. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any programmatic access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 and, in any event, neither of the proposed satellite hospitals would enhance programmatic access in the subdistrict because they will not offer any programs or services that are not already offered at one or more of the tertiary hospitals in the subdistrict that currently serve the West Boynton area. Indeed, the proposed satellite hospitals will offer a more narrow range of services than the existing tertiary hospitals presently serving the area. This is significant because the elderly, who make of a large portion of the West Boynton area and who are more likely to have co-morbidities or more complex medical needs, are generally better served in a hospital offering tertiary services and more complete care. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that many physicians will continue to admit their patients to the larger tertiary hospitals rather than shifting those patients to a satellite hospital that provides a more narrow range of services. “Financial access” refers to the extent to which persons have access to health care services without regard to their ability to pay. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any financial access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 or the West Boynton area that the proposed satellite hospitals will address. None of the existing hospitals that serve the West Boynton area have policies or practices that discourage indigent patients from seeking care at their facilities and, in any event, the low- income population makes up a relatively small portion of the West Boynton area. Cultural access” refers to the extent to which certain persons cannot or do not access the existing facilities due to cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, and national origin. Cultural access was not advanced by Bethesda or JFK as a basis for the approval or their respective applications. “Geographic access” refers to the physical accessibility of the existing facilities or services in a subdistrict taking into account population density, distance and time of travel, and geographic barriers or other impediments to access. Geographic access has been referred to as a “foundation of health planning.” Bethesda and JFK focus primarily on the projected growth of the West Boynton area and the road congestion that comes with that growth as the basis for their contention that there is, or soon will be a access problem for residents of the West Boynton area; Bethesda states in its PRO (at page 29) that "[g]eographic access is at the heart of [its] proposal." A reasonable geographic access standard for persons living in an urban area is a drive time of 30 to 40 minutes to an acute care hospital. Under that standard, there is currently no geographic access problem for residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are as many as 12 hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area, and a “fair number” of residents have access to four hospitals -– Bethesda, JFK, Wellington, and Delray -- within a 15 to 20-minute drive time.16 All of the hospitals within the 30-minute drive time offer tertiary-level care, and a number of them offer OB services. There are no physical geographic barriers that limit access to the existing hospitals by residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are a number of different major north-south and east-west roads that residents have to chose from when accessing the existing hospitals, and most of those roads have at least four lanes. The major roads in the West Boynton area have expanded along with growth of the population in the area, and they are expected to continue to do so. The infrastructure plan adopted by Palm Beach County includes continued road expansions and improvements over the planning horizon applicable to this case, and developers are often required to widen or otherwise improve the roads as a condition of the approval of new development. There is insufficient evidence that the current travel times are significantly different for the elderly population in the area. The anecdotal testimony offered by various Bethesda witnesses was not persuasive. The evidence was not persuasive that the travel times will be materially higher over the applicable five-year planning horizon. The analysis and opinion presented by Bethesda’s traffic engineer on this issue was not persuasive.17 The concurrency analysis performed by Bethesda’s traffic engineer only assessed Boynton Beach Boulevard; it did not assess any of the other major roads between the West Boynton area and the existing hospitals. Moreover, the analysis focused on the level of service (LOS) on various segments of Boynton Beach Boulevard, as measured by the projected number of trips on those segments in 2007; it did not quantify the increase in travel time along that road, if any, resulting from the reduction in the LOS which the analysis showed. The hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 are some of the most highly-utilized hospitals in the state; however, the evidence was not persuasive that the high utilization at these hospitals has caused any access problems for residents of the West Boynton area, either for general acute care services or for OB services. The existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 have been able to meet the needs of the subdistrict by incrementally expanding their facilities when the need arises. An additional 67 beds can be added to the bed inventory of Subdistrict 9-5 without any additional construction; JFK has shelled-in space for 36 new beds and Delray has shelled-in space for 31 new beds. Additionally, Delray has a master plan that has been approved by Palm Beach County that will allow it to add as many as 123 more beds on its current campus as needed, and Wellington also has plenty of space on the undeveloped property adjacent to its hospital to add more beds as needed. Having a hospital in the West Boynton area might be more convenient for residents of that area west of the Turnpike, at least in those instances where the patient is able to receive all of the necessary care at that hospital; however, convenience alone is not valid basis for the approval of a new hospital, particularly where there are as many as 12 tertiary-level hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area. In sum and on balance, the criteria in Subsections 408.035(2) and (7), Florida Statutes, weigh strongly against approval of either application. Indeed, despite the relatively high utilization rates at the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that there currently are, or that over the applicable planning horizon there will be any material deficiencies in the availability, quality of care, or accessibility of the existing hospitals in the subdistrict that would warrant the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area at this time. Subsection (3): Ability of Applicant to Provide Quality of Care The parties do not dispute the quality of care provided at any of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, and the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that a high quality of care is currently provided at Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, and Wellington. Bethesda and JFK each intend to rely on their existing medical staff, at least in part, to staff their respective satellite hospitals. As a result, the quality of care provided at the satellite hospitals will also be good, but it will be less than ideal in several respects. First, neither satellite hospital will offer interventional cardiology services, which is, or is becoming the standard of care for treating heart attack patients that present to the hospital’s ED. Second, JFK’s proposed satellite will offer OB services without NICU backup, which is below the standard of care in South Palm Beach County. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application. Subsection (4): Special Health Care Services The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable, and in any event, the criterion was deleted by Chapter 2004-383, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2004. Subsection (5): Educational Facilities and Training Programs18 Neither JFK nor Bethesda Memorial is a teaching hospital, and neither is proposing educational or training programs at its proposed satellite hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Wellington’s teaching programs will be adversely affected by the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals. The criterion in Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes, does not materially weigh in favor of or against the approval of either of the applications. Subsection (6): Availability of Resources and Personnel for Operations The parties stipulated that Bethesda and JFK each have the ability to fund the capital and operating expenditures for their proposed satellite hospitals. The reasonableness of the financing-related costs proposed by Bethesda and JFK in their respective applications is also not in dispute. Delray and Wellington argue that neither Bethesda nor JFK will be able to adequately staff their proposed satellite hospitals due to physician and nurse shortages in South Palm Beach County and/or that the staffing of the proposed satellite hospitals will make it more difficult and costly for the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 to staff certain programs. Bethesda and JFK challenge the adequacy of each other’s staffing projections. As more fully discussed below, the evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projected for either of the proposed satellite programs is inadequate; however, the evidence establishes that the approval of either program would exacerbate physician shortages in Subdistrict 9-5 in certain specialties. Bethesda West’s staffing projections include 242.8 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the first year of operation and 294.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital include FTEs in the first year of operation and 448.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The disparity in the staffing levels primarily results from the higher occupancy rate projected at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is projected to be 71.4 percent in the first year of operation. By contrast, the occupancy rate at Bethesda West is projected be 35.7 percent in the first year of operation and then “ramp up” to approximately 69 percent by the fourth year of operation. The staffing levels at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable based upon the ADCs projected and the services to be provided at each hospital. Indeed, the staffing levels are comparable when viewed as a ratio of staff to projected ADC; the ratios at Bethesda West are 8.37 and 7.36 in the first two years of operation, and the ratios at the proposed JFK satellite hospital for its first two years of operation are 7.74 and 7.60. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West’s staffing projections are understated or that they fail to include nursing and other positions necessary to ensure high quality care is provided. Nor is the evidence persuasive that the salaries projected for Bethesda West’s staff are understated. The evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are inherently unreliable based upon the manner in which they were prepared or as a result of the proxy that was used as a basis of the projections. There is a nursing shortage statewide and in South Palm Beach County, but it is not as severe as it has been in the past. Indeed, it is significant that despite the large number of beds added over the past five years at the various hospitals in South Palm Beach County, those beds have been adequately staffed with nurses and ancillary clinical personnel. JFK and Bethesda Memorial have each been successful in recruiting nursing staff despite the nursing shortage. They each have implemented innovative programs to aid in their recruiting efforts and to reduce their turnover and vacancy rates, and those programs are expected to be utilized at the proposed satellite hospitals. JFK and Bethesda Memorial each use “traveler” and per-diem nurses to supplement their full time nursing staffs, which is not uncommon in South Palm Beach County. Typically, a physician who has privileges at a hospital is required to be on ER call on a rotational basis. Many physicians have privileges at more than one hospital in South Palm Beach County, which means that they are responsible for providing ER call coverage at more than one hospital. Because of malpractice and other concerns, it is becoming increasingly difficult for hospitals to attract physicians who are willing to take ER calls. The Palm Beach County Medical Society and the CEOs of the existing hospitals in the county met as recently as December 2003 to discuss the problems related to ER call coverage; however, as of the date of the hearing, the problem still existed and was severe. It is possible for a physician to be providing ER calls to more than one hospital at the same time. This can become a serious problem if the physician is attending to a patient at one hospital when he or she is called to the ER at another hospital. The problem of ER call coverage is most significant in specialties such as neurosurgery, hand surgery, urology, OB, and ear/nose/throat. Several of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County, including Wellington and Delray, have begun to pay physicians, and particularly specialty physicians to take ER call. Adding a new hospital in South Palm Beach County will exacerbate this problem in several respects. First, it will add another hospital to the ER call rotations of the physicians who chose to obtain privileges at the satellite hospitals, thereby increasing the prospect of a physician being on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Second, it will make it even more difficult or costly for existing hospitals to obtain call coverage by the specialty physicians that are already in short supply. It is unlikely that OB/GYNs will admit their patients to the small OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital. OB/GYNs typically try to keep all of their patients in one hospital because it makes it easier on them to do rounds and to respond quickly to emergency situations, and because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, it is unlikely that many OB/GYNs will choose that hospital as the one where they admit the bulk of their patients. In sum, the staffing levels for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable and appropriate for the services being offered at the hospitals, the projected staffing costs at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are also reasonable and appropriate, and JFK and Bethesda will be able to staff their respective satellite hospitals at the levels projected; however, the proposed satellite hospitals will exacerbate the shortage of specialty physicians in South Palm Beach County and will make it more difficult for the existing hospitals to get specialty physicians for ER call coverage. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application, and between the competing applications, this criterion does not materially weigh in favor of either application over the other. Subsection (8): Financial Feasibility The parties did not seriously contest the short-term financial feasibility of either of the proposed satellite hospitals, and the preponderance of the evidence establishes that both of the proposed satellite hospitals are financially feasible in the short-term; both applicants have the ability to fund the construction and initial capital needs of their respective projects in conjunction with the other capital projects listed on Schedule 2 of their respective CON applications. The long-term financial feasibility of each of the proposed satellite hospitals is in dispute. The general rule for assessing the long-term financial feasibility of a CON project is if the project will at least break even by the end of the second year of operation, then the project is financially feasible in the long-term; if, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operations and it is not demonstrated that the project will reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time, then the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. As more fully discussed below, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term, but the proposed JFK satellite hospital is not. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Bethesda West Schedule 8A of Bethesda's application projects that Bethesda West will generate a net loss of $3.7 million in its first year of operation and a net profit of $1.7 million in its second year of operation. The financial projections for Bethesda West were based upon conservative utilization projections, which leads a reasonable projection of operating income. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon an overstatement of the “other operating revenue” or an understatement of the depreciation expense projected by Bethesda. The testimony of Bethesda’s expert financial witnesses is accepted over the testimony of the other financial experts on these issues. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon understatements in land costs, construction costs, equipment costs of staffing projections. The testimony of Bethesda’s experts related to these issues is accepted over the testimony of the other experts. As discussed above, Bethesda West will “cannibalize” 3,040 and 4,530 patient days from Bethesda Memorial in its first and second years of operation. The financial impact of this “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is a loss of $1.4 million and $2.1 million in the first and second years of Bethesda West’s operation. The income loss from “cannibalization” is not accounted for on Schedule 8A. Although the patient days used to calculate the “per patient day” figures in the middle two columns of that schedule take into account the “cannibalized” patient days, the dollar amounts shown in those columns do not. On this issue, the testimony of Delray’s financial expert is more logical and persuasive than the testimony of Bethesda’s financial expert. When the losses from “cannibalization” are taken into account, the approval of Bethesda West will have a negative impact on the Bethesda system of $5.1 million in its first year of operation and $400,000 in its second year of operation, which are consistent with the figures shown in Exhibit B-2 (pages 48 and 54). Even so, the system will show a net income of $300,000 and $5.6 million in the first two years of Bethesda West’s operation. The impact of the “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is projected to decrease as Bethesda West becomes more established. At the same time, the profitability of Bethesda West is projected to increase as its census grows. Thus, by the third year of its operation, Bethesda West is projected to have a positive impact on the Bethesda system of $2.2 million (i.e., $4.1 million in net income at Bethesda West less $1.9 million in “cannibalization” from Bethesda Memorial). Bethesda West will not have a negative impact on Bethesda’s cash flow after its first year of operation. On this issue, the testimony of Bethesda’s expert is more persuasive than the testimony of the other financial experts. Accordingly, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term. Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital Schedule 8A of JFK's application projects that its proposed satellite hospital would generate a net loss of $1.2 million in its first year of operation and a net loss of $392,000 in its second year of operation. Over the next three years, however, JFK projects its satellite hospital to generate net income from operations of $509,000, $1.5 million, and $2.5 million. The financial projections in JFK’s application were based upon overly-aggressive occupancy rates, both in the facility as a whole and in the small OB unit without NICU backup. As a result, the resulting financial projections are not reasonable. JFK’s application does not include any analysis of the financial impact on Columbia of the transfer of 80 beds to the satellite hospital, nor does it include any analysis of the impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days that would necessarily occur if JFK’s proposed satellite was approved. As a result, the financial impact of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, in the words of one of JFK’s financial experts, is “probably incomplete.” As a result of the unreasonable utilization projections and the incomplete presentation of the financial impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days, JFK failed to establish that its proposed satellite hospital is financially feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9): Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-effectiveness Neither of the proposed satellite hospitals will foster competition that proposes cost-effectiveness. The West Boynton market currently has healthy competition for the acute services proposed for the satellite hospitals, and there is no dominant provider of those services. Locating a new hospital in the West Boynton area will have the long-term effect of increasing the market share of the provider that operates the new hospital to the detriment of the other providers that are currently competing in that market. In this regard, the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area would adversely affect the competitive balance that currently exists in that area and which is projected to continue over the planning horizon. The approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals would also adversely affect cost-effectiveness by exacerbating the shortage of specialty physicians and other qualified staff in the subdistrict, which in turn would require existing hospitals to raise salaries, benefits and other expenses in order to remain competitive. The approval of Bethesda West would have less of an adverse impact on competition and cost-effectiveness than would the approval of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital for several reasons. First, Bethesda West does not duplicate as many administrative services as does JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. Second, JFK currently has a higher market share in the West Boynton area than does Bethesda or any other hospital, which means that the competitive balance would be tipped to a greater extent if JFK’s satellite hospital was approved. Third, the approval of the JFK satellite would give HCA four hospitals in Palm Beach County and increase its leverage in physician and staff recruitment and the negotiation of HMO contracts. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, weights against the approval of either application; however, on balance between the two applications, this criterion favor’s Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsection (10): Costs and Methods of Construction The costs and methods of energy provision at the proposed satellite hospitals is not in dispute. Although the proposed satellite hospitals are similar in size, the total project costs included in the CON applications are significantly different. The $73.8 million total project cost for Bethesda West equates to a cost of $922,700 per bed. The $109.8 million total project cost for JFK’s proposed satellite hospital equates to a cost of $1.37 million per bed. The portion of the total project costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals attributable directly to “construction” is materially similar. Bethesda West’s construction costs are approximately $34.2 million, or $180 per square foot; the construction costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are $40.9 million, or $210 per square foot. The estimated construction costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are within the range of reasonableness that can be gleaned from the testimony of the various hospital construction experts. JFK’s cost is towards the higher end of the range, and Bethesda’s cost is towards the lower end of the range. The primary differences in the total project costs are in the land purchase prices, the site preparation costs, and the equipment costs. The land purchase price included in Bethesda’s application was $4.2 million, which was based upon a 30 to 40- acre site. The land purchase price included in JFK’s application was $8 million, which was based upon a 50-acre site. Bethesda acquired the 54-acre Amestoy Property for $110,000 per acre. At $110,000 per acre, the $4.2 million attributed by Bethesda to land purchase price would be sufficient to acquire 38.2 acres, which is more than adequate for the 80-bed Bethesda West facility. Consistent with the estimate in the CON application, JFK has made an offer to purchase the 50-plus acre Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre. The total land purchase price in each application, and the actual cost-per-acre of the Amestoy and Mazzoni Properties are reasonable. The site development costs included in Bethesda’s application were $3.75 million, or $125,000 per acre for the 30 acres on which Bethesda West will be located. The site development costs included in JFK’s application were $6.5 million, or $150,000 per acre for the 50 acres on which JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be located. The site development costs for each project include on-site and off-site utility (e.g., water and sewer) and roadway work, geotechnical and environmental remediation costs, stormwater retention, landscaping, and concurrency impact fees. Each of the proposed sites is relatively flat and was formerly agricultural property and, as a result, there are not expected to be any unusual costs associated with the development of either site. Bethesda West will be located further west than the proposed JFK satellite hospital and, as a result, its “radius of influence” includes fewer congested roadway links than does the proposed JFK satellite hospital; but, the Amestoy Property where Bethesda West will be located is farther away from the existing utility lines than the Mazzoni Property where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located. Thus, even though the cost of running utilities to Bethesda West will likely be higher than the cost of running utilities to the proposed JFK satellite hospital, the currency impact fees for Bethesda West will likely be lower than the currency impact fees for the proposed JFK satellite hospital; and, on balance, the overall per-acre and total site development costs included in each of the applications are reasonable. Bethesda’s application included equipment costs of approximately $16 million, all of which was attributable to movable equipment. The cost of fixed equipment was included in the estimated construction costs as part of the building contract. JFK’s application included total equipment costs of approximately $34.2 million. That amount was broken into fixed equipment not in the building contract ($13.9 million), movable equipment ($17.8 million), and information systems ($2.4 million). Some, but not all of the difference between the equipment cost estimates are attributable to the additional services –- e.g., OB and diagnostic cardiac catheterization –- that will be provided at the proposed JFK satellite hospital but not at Bethesda West. Additionally, some of the difference are attributable to the 12 "observation" rooms at the proposed JFK satellite hospital that are being equipped in the same manner as the hospital’s general med-surg beds. When compared on an “apples to apples” basis, the total equipment costs for Bethesda West are not materially different than the total equipment costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. JFK is proposing to provide more specialized equipment than Bethesda in areas such as the surgical suites and the ICU/CCU and more information technology (IT) equipment; however, the evidence is not persuasive that such specialized equipment or the IT equipment is necessary to provide high quality care or that the absence of such equipment will adversely affect the quality of care at Bethesda West. The $16 million in equipment costs at Bethesda West, which equates to approximately $200,700 per bed, is reasonable for the level and type of services that will be provided at Bethesda West. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda’s equipment costs are understated even though its costs are considerably less than the equipment costs proposed by JFK. If anything, JFK has over-equipped its proposed satellite hospital with specialized equipment resulting in the higher equipment costs included in JFK’s CON application.19 Although the more expensive proposed JFK satellite hospital offers some benefits, such as a larger site to facilitate future expansions and more specialized equipment in some areas, those benefits are outweighed by the additional $35 million costs associated with that facility as compared to Bethesda West. This cost saving is particularly significant since each of the proposed facilities is supposed to be a satellite of a larger, tertiary hospital rather than a stand- alone community hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda Memorial and JFK have physical constraints that will limit their ability to add beds at their existing facilities in a cost- efficient manner. Even if the construction of a satellite hospital were the most cost-efficient way for Bethesda Memorial and JFK to add beds, the evidence was not persuasive that it is the most cost-efficient way to add beds from the perspective of the entire health care system of Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, there are less costly methods of adding new beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new 80-bed hospital for $73.8 million or $109.8 million. For example, 36 additional beds can be added at JFK and 31 additional beds can be added at Delray in shelled-in space that has already been constructed. The incremental cost of constructing space for additional bed expansions at Delray and Wellington would also be less than the construction costs of the proposed satellite hospitals. In sum, because there are less costly ways to add beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new hospital, the criterion in Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application; however, between the two applications, this criterion weighs in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application since its proposed satellite hospital will cost approximately $35 million less and will provide effectively the same services in similar physical space. Subsection (11): Medicaid and Indigent Care Bethesda characterizes itself as a “safety net” hospital because its Medicaid and charity care percentages typically exceed the averages for Subdistrict 9-5 and District 9 as a whole, and because Bethesda Memorial provides the largest percentage of the Medicaid and charity care provided by all of the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. There is no statutory or rule provision that would support Bethesda’s designation of itself as a “safety net” provider. Moreover, the significance of Bethesda’s characterization of itself as a “safety net” hospital is diminished by the fact that the Palm Beach County Health Care District (District) reimburses all hospitals in the county through an indigent care subsidy for care provided to patients that meet the District’s indigency standards. The subsidy helps to ensure that indigent patients are able to receive medical care from any hospital in the county and, to that end, provides a county-wide “safety net” for such patients. The subsidies paid by the District do not cover the full cost of indigent care provided by the hospital, nor does the total amount of subsidies received by a hospital directly correlate to the total amount of indigent care provided by the hospital. Thus, it is not dispositive that JFK received the largest amount of subsidies from the District over the past several years or that JFK received approximately $1.6 million more in subsidies from the District in 2003 than did Bethesda. JFK recently qualified as a “disproportionate share provider,” which means that at least 15 percent of its patient days are attributed to Medicaid or supplemental security income patients. As a disproportionate share provider, JFK receives incrementally larger reimbursements from Medicaid for the provision of indigent care. Bethesda is not currently a disproportionate share provider although it has been in the past. None of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County have policies or practices that discourage Medicaid or uninsured patients. Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Wellington, and Delray each accept patients without regard to their ability to pay. Bethesda and JFK conditioned the approval of their respective CON applications on the provision of a specified percentage of patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. The percentage committed to by JFK (10 percent) is higher than the percentage committed to by Bethesda (five percent). The percentages of Medicaid and charity care committed to by the applicants may be difficult to achieve as a result of the demographics of the West Boynton area. Indeed, the more favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area was a significant factor, and in Bethesda’s case it was the primary motivating factor for the establishment a new hospital in that area. Bethesda Memorial and JFK each have a history of providing significant levels of Medicaid and charity care at their existing hospitals. The hospitals are each located in areas with large indigent populations, which significantly contribute to the high level of indigent care that they provide. Bethesda Memorial has historically provided a larger amount of Medicaid care than has JFK in terms of a percentage of patient days, e.g., 16.1 percent verses 7.3 percent in 2001. Those percentages each exceed the Subdistrict 9-5 average of 6.3 percent. Bethesda Memorial has also historically provided a larger amount of charity care than has JFK in terms of dollars (e.g., $16.2 million verses $5.2 million in 2002) and in terms of a percentage of charges (e.g., 3.7 percent verses 0.4 percent in 2001 and 2.9 percent verses 0.6 percent in 2002). The Subdistrict 9-5 average for 2001 was 1.4 percent. These comparisons are somewhat skewed because a large portion of Bethesda’s indigent care is attributable to Bethesda Memorial’s high-volume, well-established OB and neonatal programs which tend to be “magnets” for uninsured patients. When only like-services are considered, the utilization of JFK and Bethesda Memorial by Medicaid and indigent patients is similar. JFK provides a significant amount of care to “self- pay” patients (e.g., $43.5 million in 2002), which JFK attempted to equate to charity care. Although there is often overlap between self-pay and charity care patients, the evidence was not persuasive that there is a direct correlation urged by JFK in this case. For example, JFK’s internal definitions of self-pay and charity care patients are markedly different and considerably more liberal than the Agency’s definition of charity care patients for reporting purposes. Bethesda makes a $1 million per year “contribution” to the District to help fund the District’s indigent care program. That contribution was required as part of the settlement of litigation arising out of Bethesda’s conversion from a public hospital to a private not-for-profit hospital and, as a result, it cannot be fairly characterized as additional evidence of Bethesda’s commitment to serving indigent patients. Even though both applicants demonstrated a history of and commitment to serving Medicaid and indigent patients, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of Bethesda because the level of Medicaid and charity care historically provided by Bethesda Memorial is higher than that provided by JFK. On balance with the other statutory and rule criteria, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, is not given significant weight because Bethesda has committed to providing a lower percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days at Bethesda West than JFK committed to at its proposed satellite hospital, and because the demographics of the West Boynton area make it unlikely that a significant level of indigent care will be provided at either of the proposed satellite hospitals. Subsection (12): Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable because neither applicant is proposing additional nursing home beds. (2) Rule Criteria – Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038(6) The criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.030(2) are subsumed in the statutory criteria discussed above related to the accessibility (or not) of existing acute care services in Subdistrict 9-5 and the need (or not) for new acute care beds in the West Boynton area. For the same reasons that the CON applications do not satisfy those statutory criteria, they do not satisfy the related criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030(2). Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(a), priority is given to applicants with “a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so.” This priority weighs in favor of Bethesda for the reasons discussed above in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(b), priority is given to applications that “meet the need for additional acute care beds in a particular service through the conversion of existing underutilized beds.” This priority does not materially weigh in favor either application over the other; the underutilized beds at Columbia that JFK proposes to transfer to its satellite hospital are in a different subdistrict, and the beds that Bethesda proposes to transfer from Bethesda Memorial to its proposed satellite hospital are not underutilized beds in light of the historical occupancy rate at Bethesda Memorial.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Bethesda’s CON application No. 9659 and also denying JFK’s CON application No. 9660. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5717.001408.035408.0361408.0397.367.60
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HCA WEST FLORIDA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-001983 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001983 Latest Update: Mar. 30, 1989

Findings Of Fact The Application West Florida Regional Medical Center is a 400-bed acute care hospital in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The hospital is located in a subdistrict which has the greatest population aged 65 and over who are living in poverty. That group constitutes the population qualified for Medicare. Some 17 percent of Escambia County's population falls into the medicare category. Prior to October, 1987, HRS had determined that there was a fixed pool need in the Escambia County area for 120 nursing home or extended care beds. Several hospitals in the Escambia County area applied for the 120 nursing home beds. Those beds were granted to Advocare (60 beds) and Baptist Manor (60 beds). The award of the 120 beds to Baptist Manor and Advocare is not being challenged in this action. West Florida, likewise, filed an application for an award of nursing home beds in the same batch as Advocare and Baptist Manor. However, Petitioner's application sought to convert 8 acute care beds to nursing home or extended care beds. West Florida's claim to these beds was not based on the 120 bed need established under the fixed need pool formula. West Florida's application was based on the unavailability of appropriately designated bed space for patients who no longer required acute care, but who continued to require a high skill level of care and/or medicare patients. The whole purpose behind West Florida's CON application stems from the fact that the federal Medicare system will not reimburse a hospital beyond the amount established for acute care needs as long as that bed space is designated as acute care. However, if the patient no longer requires acute care the patient may be re-designated to a skilled care category which includes nursing home or extended care beds. If the patient is appropriately reclassified to a skilled care category, the hospital can receive additional reimbursement from Medicare above its acute care reimbursement as long as a designated ECF bed is available for the patient. Designation or re-designation of beds in a facility requires a Certificate of Need. Petitioner's application for the 8 beds was denied. When the application at issue in this proceeding was filed Petitioner's 13-bed ECF unit had been approved but not yet opened. At the time the State Agency Action Report was written, the unit had just opened. Therefore, historical data on the 13 bed unit was not available at the time the application was filed. Reasons given for denying West Florida's application was that there was low occupancy at Baptist Hospital's ECF unit, that Sacred Heart Hospital had 10 approved ECF beds and that there was no historical utilization of West Florida 13 beds. At the hearing the HRS witness, Elizabeth Dudek stated that it was assumed that Baptist Hospital and Sacred Heart Hospital beds were available for West Florida patients. In 1985 West Florida applied for a CON to establish a 21-bed ECF unit. HRS granted West Florida 13 of those 21 beds. The 8 beds being sought by West Florida in CON 5319 are the remaining beds which were not granted to West Florida in its 1985 CON application. In order to support its 1985 CON application the hospital conducted a survey of its patient records to determine an estimate of the number of patients and patient days which were non acute but still occupied acute care beds. The hospital utilized its regularly kept records of Medicare patients whose length of stay or charges exceeded the Medicare averages by at least two standard deviations for reimbursement and records of Medicare patients whose charges exceed Medicare reimbursement by at least $5,000. These excess days or charges are known as cost outliers and, if the charge exceeds the Medicare reimbursement by $5000 or more, the excess charge is additionally known as a contractual adjustment. The survey conducted by the hospital consisted of the above records for the calendar year 1986. The hospital assumed that if the charges or length of stay for patients were excessive, then there was a probability that the patient was difficult to place. The above inference is reasonable since, under the Medicare system, a hospital's records are regularly reviewed by the Professional Review Organization to determine if appropriate care is rendered. If a patient does not meet criteria for acute care, but remains in the hospital, the hospital is required to document efforts to place the patient in a nursing home. Sanctions are imposed if a hospital misuses resources by keeping patients who did not need acute care in acute care bed spaces even if the amount of reimbursement is not at issue. The hospital, therefore goes to extraordinary lengths to place patients in nursing home facilities outside the hospital. Additionally, the inference is reasonable since the review of hospital records did not capture all non-acute patient days. Only Medicare records were used. Medicare only constitutes about half of all of West Florida's admissions. Therefore, it is likely that the number of excess patient days or charges was underestimated in 1986 for the 1985 CON application. The review of the hospital's records was completed in March, 1987, and showed that 485 patients experienced an average of 10.8 excess non-acute days at the hospital for a total of 5,259 patient days. The hospital was not receiving reimbursement from Medicare for those excess days. West Florida maintained that the above numbers demonstrated a "not normal need" for 21 additional ECF beds at West Florida. However as indicated earlier, HRS agreed to certify only 13 of those beds. The 13 beds were certified in 1987. The 13-bed unit opened in February, 1988. Since West Florida had planned for 21 beds, all renovations necessary to obtain the 8-bed certification were accomplished when the 13- bed unit was certified in 1987. Therefore, no capital expenditures will be required for the additional 8 beds under review here. The space and beds are already available. The same study was submitted with the application for the additional eight beds at issue in these proceedings. In the present application it was assumed that the average length of stay in the extended care unit would be 14 days. However, since the 13 bed unit opened, the average length of stay experienced by the 13-bed unit has been approximately 15 days and corroborates the data found in the earlier records survey. Such corroboration would indicate that the study's data and assumptions are still valid in reference to the problem placements. However, the 15- day figure reflects only those patients who were appropriately placed in West Florida's ECF unit. The 15-day figure does not shed any light on those patients who have not been appropriately placed and remain in acute care beds. That light comes from two additional factors: The problems West Florida experiences in placing sub-acute, high skill, medicare patients; and the fact that West Florida continues to have a waiting list for its 13 bed unit. Problem Placements Problem placements particularly occur with Medicare patients who require a high skill level of care but who no longer require an acute level of care. The problem is created by the fact that Medicare does not reimburse medical facilities based on the costs of a particular patients level of care. Generally, the higher the level of care a patient requires the more costs a facility will incur on behalf of that patient. The higher costs in and of themselves limit some facilities in the services that facility can or is willing to offer from a profitability standpoint. Medicare exacerbates the problem since its reimbursement does not cover the cost of care. The profitability of a facility is even more affected by the number of high skill Medicare patients resident at the facility. Therefore, availability of particular services at a facility and patient mix of Medicare to other private payors becomes important considerations on whether other facilities will accept West Florida' s patients. As indicated earlier, the hospital goes to extraordinary lengths to place non- acute patients in area nursing homes, including providing nurses and covering costs at area nursing homes. Discharge planning is thorough at West Florida and begins when the patient is admitted. Only area nursing homes are used as referrals. West Florida's has attempted to place patients at Bluff's and Bay Breeze nursing homes operated by Advocare. Patients have regularly been refused admission to those facilities due to acuity level or patient mix. West Florida also has attempted to place patients at Baptist Manor and Baptist Specialty Care operated by Baptist Hospital. Patients have also been refused admission to those facilities due to acuity level and patient mix. 16 The beds originally rented to Sacred Heart Hospital have been relinquished by that hospital and apparently will not come on line. Moreover the evidence showed that these screening practices would continue into the future in regard to the 120 beds granted to Advocare and Baptist Manor. The president of Advocare testified that his new facility would accept some acute patients. However, his policies on screening would not change. Moreover, Advocare's CON proposes an 85 percent medicaid level which will not allow for reimbursement of much skilled care. The staffing ratio and charges proposed by Advocare are not at levels at which more severe sub-acute care can be provided. Baptist Manor likewise screens for acuity and does not provide treatment for extensive decubitus ulcers, or new tracheostomies, or IV feeding or therapy seven days a week. Its policies would not change with the possible exception of ventilated patients, but then, only if additional funding can be obtained. There is no requirement imposed by HRS that these applicants accept the sub-acute-patients which West Florida is unable to place. These efforts have continued subsequent to the 13-bed unit's opening. However, the evidence showed that certain types of patients could not be placed in area nursing homes. The difficulty was with those who need central lines (subclavian) for hyperalimentation; whirlpool therapy such as a Hubbard tank; physical therapy dither twice a day or seven days a week; respiratory or ventilator care; frequent suctioning for a recent tracheostomy; skeletal traction; or a Clinitron bed, either due to severe dicubiti or a recent skin graft. The 13-bed unit was used only when a patient could not be placed outside the hospital. The skill or care level in the unit at West Florida is considerably higher than that found at a nursing home. This is reflected in the staffing level and cost of operating the unit. Finally, both Advocare and Baptist Manor involve new construction and will take approximately two years to open. West Florida's special need is current and will carry into the future. The Waiting List Because of such placement problems, West Florida currently has a waiting list of approximately five patients, who are no longer acute care but who cannot be placed in a community nursing home. The 13-bed unit has operated at full occupancy for the last several months and is the placement of last resort. The evidence showed that the patients on the waiting list are actually subacute patients awaiting an ECF bed. The historical screening for acuity and patient mix along with the waiting list demonstrates that currently at least five patients currently have needs which are unmet by other facilities even though those facilities may have empty beds. West Florida has therefore demonstrated a special unmet need for five ECF beds. Moreover, the appropriate designation and placement of patients as to care level is considered by HRS to be a desirable goal when considering CON applications because the level of care provided in an ECF unit is less intense than the level of care required in an acute care unit. Thus, theoretically, better skill level placement results in more efficient bed use which results in greater cost savings to the hospital. In this case, Petitioner offers a multi-disciplinary approach to care in its ECF unit. The approach concentrates on rehabilitation and independence which is more appropriate for patients at a sub-acute level of care. For the patients on the awaiting proper placement on the waiting list quality of care would be improved by the expansion of the ECF unit by five beds. Finally, there are no capital costs associated with the conversion of these five beds and no increase in licensed bed capacity. There are approximately five patients on any given day who could be better served in an ECF unit, but who are forced to remain in an acute care unit because no space is available for them. This misallocation of resources will cost nothing to correct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a CON to Petitioner for five ECF beds. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX The facts contained in paragraph 1-29 of Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31 and 33 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The first sentence of paragraph 7 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was not shown to be the evidence. Strict compliance with the local health plan was not shown to be an absolute requirement for CON certification. The remainder of paragraph 7 is subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 30 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The first part of the first sentence of paragraph 13 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact before the semicolon is adopted. The remainder of the sentence and paragraph is rejected. The first sentence of paragraph 14 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was not shown by the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 17, 26 and 32 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The acts contained in paragraph 18 are rejected as supportive of the conclusion contained therein. The first (4) sentences of paragraph 19 are subordinate. The remainder of the paragraph was not shown by the evidence. The first (2) sentences of paragraph 21 are adopted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected. The facts contained in paragraph 22 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 23 is adopted. The remainder of paragraph 23 is subordinate. The first sentence of paragraph 24 is rejected. The second, third, and fourth sentences are subordinate. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected. The first sentence of paragraph 25 is subordinate. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire MOYLE, FLANIGAN, KATZ, FITZGERALD & SHEEHAN, P.A. The Perkins House - Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.5790.956
# 8
DELRAY MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A WEST BOYNTON COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, 03-002827CON (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 31, 2003 Number: 03-002827CON Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether the Agency should approve the Certificate of Need applications filed by Bethesda and/or JFK, each of which proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of Acute Care Subdistrict 9-5.

Findings Of Fact The Parties (1) Bethesda Bethesda operates Bethesda Memorial, which is a 362-bed not-for-profit hospital in Boynton Beach. Bethesda also operates Bethesda Health City, which is a “medical mall” located in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County. As a not-for-profit community-based health care organization, Bethesda’s mission is to provide quality health care services to the residents of South Palm Beach County that it serves regardless of their ability to pay. Bethesda Memorial opened in 1959 as a public hospital under the ownership of Palm Beach County’s former hospital taxing district. Bethesda Memorial was reorganized in 1984 as a private not-for-profit hospital owned by Bethesda. Bethesda Memorial provides tertiary-level care. Bethesda Memorial’s 362 licensed beds include 347 general medical-surgical (med-surg) acute care beds and a 15-bed Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). A 28-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR) unit will open at Bethesda Memorial in 2005, increasing the hospital’s licensed capacity to 390 beds. Not all of Bethesda Memorial’s licensed beds are available for general patient use; 14 of the beds are leased to a hospice program and 14 of the beds are operated under contract as a special care unit (SCU). The hospice lease and the SCU contract run through 2005. Even though the hospice lease and SCU contract have been profitable ventures for Bethesda, several Bethesda witnesses testified that those agreements would not be renewed if Bethesda Memorial needs those 28 beds to accommodate its general patients after its capacity is reduced through the transfer of 80 beds to its proposed satellite hospital; however, as of the date of the hearing, Bethesda had not taken any formal steps to terminate those agreements. It is unclear how the patients that are currently being served in the hospice unit and SCU would be served in the community if Bethesda terminates the agreements. Bethesda Memorial also has a 10-bed “VIP” unit that is generally available only to patients that have contributed at least $50,000 to Bethesda’s charitable foundation and are willing to pay an up-front $750.00 per day charge for the room; however, the beds in the VIP unit can be and have been utilized by other patients when all of the other beds in the hospital are full. Bethesda Memorial has a high-volume obstetrics (OB) program and an active emergency department (ED). Bethesda Memorial also offers a number of specialized programs including a comprehensive cancer program, a pediatrics program, a diagnostic cardiac catheterization program, and a wide variety of outpatient services. Bethesda Memorial is a well-utilized facility; its overall occupancy rate was 73.25 percent from July 2001 though June 2002. Bethesda Memorial does not currently offer interventional cardiology services or open heart surgery, but it has been attempting to get CON or legislative approval to offer those services for the past several years because of their profitable nature. Bethesda Memorial has designated, shelled-in space in its hospital for those services if it ever gets the necessary approvals. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at Bethesda Memorial or that would make such expansions cost-prohibitive. Bethesda recently purchased property adjacent to Bethesda Memorial and was able to get that property rezoned from residential to hospital use. It is unclear how large that property is and what use, if any, Bethesda has planned for that property. Bethesda also owns 1.4 acres of vacant property that is several blocks from Bethesda Memorial. The property is not currently zoned for hospital use, and because it is somewhat isolated from Bethesda Memorial, Bethesda intends to sell the property rather than develop it. Bethesda Memorial is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Bethesda Health City is a 135,000 square foot “medical mall” or “hospital without beds” that opened in 1995. The facility is located in the West Boynton area at the intersection of Hagan Ranch Road and Boynton Beach Boulevard, just east of the Florida Turnpike. Bethesda Health City offers services such as diagnostic imaging, outpatient rehabilitation, radiation therapy, and a woman’s center. The facility has offices for approximately 20 physician groups, and it also provides community outreach services targeted to the large senior population in the West Boynton area. Bethesda Health City was established to help Bethesda Memorial capture patients from the growing West Boynton area, and it has done so. There is capacity to add an additional 30,000 to 40,000 square feet of space to Bethesda Health City, and Bethesda intends to expand the facility whether or not its proposed satellite hospital is approved. Bethesda Health City provides Bethesda a significant physical presence in the West Boynton area. The facility has contributed to Bethesda Memorial’s significant and stable market share in the West Boynton area. In addition to Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda Health City, Bethesda administers a charitable foundation whose primary purpose is to fund Bethesda Memorial’s capital acquisitions and improvements. The foundation has considerable assets and is in the midst of a $100 million capital campaign through which it has already raised approximately $37 million. Bethesda Memorial experienced considerable and constant growth in its admissions and patient days between 1997 and 2003; its admissions grew by 45 percent and its patients days grew by 44 percent over that period. Bethesda Memorial is financially sound. It has substantial cash reserves and it is well-rated by the financial markets. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s current or long-term financial situation is distressed. Unlike other not-for-profit hospitals in District 9, Bethesda Memorial is a profitable hospital. Between 1997 and 2002, Bethesda Memorial’s operating income averaged approximately $5.5 million and in 2003, its operating income was approximately $7 million. In each of those years, the hospital also had significant non-operating revenues such that its total revenues over expenses during that period averaged approximately $10 million. The Bethesda system as a whole is also profitable. It had operating income of $2.4 million in 2002 and $2.1 million in 2001. Bethesda Memorial and the Bethesda system did not perform as well financially as JFK, Delray, or Wellington between 1997 and 2002; each of those hospitals had higher returns on assets, returns on equity, and total margin over that period than did Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda, and JFK and Delray had considerably more operating income over that period than did Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda Memorial’s CMR unit is projected to have a positive financial impact on Bethesda starting in 2005, and if approved, Bethesda Memorial’s open heart surgery program is also projected to have a positive impact on Bethesda’s long-term financial condition. (2) JFK JFK is owned by HCA, Inc. (HCA). HCA is nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. JFK is a 424-bed for-profit hospital in Atlantis, which is a small municipality in the Lake Worth area. JFK provides tertiary-level care. JFK is the most highly utilized hospital in District 9, and one of the most highly utilized hospitals in the state. JFK’s annual occupancy rate was 89.96 percent between July 2001 and June 2002, JFK is one of thee HCA hospitals in Palm Beach County. The others are Columbia and Palms West, both of which are in North Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-4. JFK operated as a not-for-profit hospital for approximately 30 years until it was purchased by HCA in 1996. Approximately $120 million of the purchase price paid by HCA was used to establish a charitable foundation, the Quantum Foundation, which funds a variety of health-related projects in the South Palm Beach County area. The services provided at JFK include orthopedics, cancer services, interventional cardiology and open heart surgery, neurologic services, and internal medicine. JFK does not offer pediatric or OB services. HCA has made significant capital improvements at JFK since it acquired the hospital. The community image of the hospital and the morale of its employees has significantly improved since the acquisition by HCA. JFK is accredited by JCAHO. JFK recently received a CON to add 36 beds, which will increase its licensed capacity to 460 beds. The beds will be located in shelled-in space on the fifth floor of JFK’s south tower, but they have not yet been brought on-line. JFK’s recently-constructed northwest tower was engineered so that an additional two floors can be added to that tower in the future, which would allow JFK to add 36 more beds. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at JFK beyond the 72 beds identified above. JFK is attempting to acquire a long-term lease for 19 acres across the street from its hospital that would be used for parking and medical office buildings. If that property is leased and developed, JFK may be able to free-up additional space for future bed expansions; however, the record does not establish the likelihood of the lease being consummated, the amount of space that might be freed-up if that property was developed, or any of the costs associated therewith. JFK recently constructed a medical office building in the West Boynton area that includes a wound care center and a diabetes center. That facility is on Jog Road, north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. Aside from the medical office building, JFK had not formally targeted the West Boynton area for expansion; its most recent strategic plan did not mention the prospect of locating a satellite hospital in that area. (3) Delray Delray is owned by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet). Tenet is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Tenet operates four hospitals in Palm Beach County in addition to Delray, including West Boca Medical Center (West Boca) in South Palm Beach County, and Good Samaritan, St. Mary’s, and Palm Beach Gardens in North Palm Beach County. Delray is a 372-bed for-profit hospital in Delray Beach. Delray is located approximately 2.5 miles south of Atlantic Boulevard. Delray is in zip code 33484, but it is near the eastern boundary of zip code 33446. Delray opened in 1982, and is accredited by JACHO. Delray provides tertiary-level care. Delray is located on a “campus” that includes the hospital building, a 53-bed in-patient psychiatric facility known as Fair Oaks Pavillion (Fair Oaks), and a 90-bed CMR facility known as Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital. There is a separately-licensed 120-bed nursing home located adjacent to the campus. Delray’s 372 licensed beds include the 53 in-patient psychiatric beds at Fair Oaks, which is approximately 200 yards from Delray’s main hospital. Delray has added 108 beds to its hospital since 1996. Even with those bed additions, Delray remains a very highly utilized facility; its annual occupancy rate between July 2001 and June 2002 was 82.32 percent. Delray shelled-in space for an additional 31 beds as part of a recent expansion of its ED and ambulatory care unit. Delray intends to put those beds into service as soon as it can. Delray has the ability to further expand its hospital beyond the 31 beds planned for the shelled-in space. It already has local government approval for a total of 616 beds on its campus. The services provided at Delray include general medical and surgery services, trauma, interventional cardiology, open heart surgery, in-patient psychiatric services, orthopedics, and neurosurgery, with a special focus on chronically-ill elderly patients. Delray does not provide OB services. Delray has been the only provider of in-patient psychiatric services in South Palm Beach County since October 2001 when Bethesda Memorial discontinued its program. Delray has been a state-designated Level II trauma center since 1991, which requires it to have a neurosurgeon, trauma surgeon, and other specialists and specialized equipment available at all times. Delray receives funding from the local health district to help offset a large portion of the costs associated with providing its trauma services. Delray leases space in a medical office building in the West Boynton area where it provides diagnostic imaging, mammography, and laboratory services. Delray’s service area includes zip codes 33437, 33446, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Delray is currently, and historically has been a very profitable hospital. It reported a “total margin” of approximately $32.9 million on its May 2002 “Prior Year Report” filed with the Agency,4 and it reported operating income of $40.5 million in its audited financial statements for fiscal year 2003. (4) Wellington Wellington is owned by Universal Health System (Universal). Universal is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Wellington is a 121-bed for-profit hospital in the northwestern portion of South Palm Beach County. Wellington is located in zip code 33414, approximately 2.5 miles south of Southern Boulevard at the intersection of State Road 7 (also known as U.S. Highway 441) and Forest Hill Boulevard. Wellington opened in 1986 as an osteopathic hospital, and approximately 25 percent of its current medical staff is osteopathic physicians. Wellington is accredited by JCAHO and the American Osteopathic Association. Wellington provides tertiary-level care. Wellington is easily accessible from Forest Hill Boulevard and State Road 7, and the hospital is served by the Palm Beach County bus system, which has a stop in Wellington’s parking lot. Wellington has made substantial capital improvements to its hospital over the past five years. Those improvements were designed to enhance the hospital’s efficiency in serving its current patients and also to anticipate future patient demand. Wellington owns 29 acres of property adjacent to the 26-acre site on which the hospital is located. The adjacent property is currently undeveloped and it is available for future expansions of Wellington. Wellington’s chief executive officer (CEO) testified that Wellington has a site plan approved for its undeveloped property and that it has “vested concurrency” for the future development of that property; however, that testimony was not corroborated (as was the case with Delray’s approved master plan) and therefore is not persuasive. The services at Wellington include an ED, an OB program, general medical and surgical care, an orthopedic unit, a comprehensive cancer center, a wound care center, a cardiology program with a dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit, and an outpatient diagnostic center. Wellington’s OB program includes 18 labor rooms, 19 post-partum rooms and a 10-bed Level II NICU. Wellington delivers approximately six babies per day and has the capacity to deliver up to 15 babies per day. Wellington’s utilization has steadily grown over the years, but it is still one of the lowest utilized facilities in South Palm Beach County; its annual occupancy rate was 64.27 percent between July 2001 and June 2002. Wellington derives approximately 90 percent of its patients from a geographic area bounded by Military Trail on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge on the west, Okeechobee Boulevard to the north, and Boynton Beach Boulevard to the south. That area includes zip codes 33414, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Wellington has teaching and training programs for physician assistants and certified nurse anesthetists under contracts with Florida International University and Florida Atlantic University. Wellington also has a family practice residency/internship teaching program for osteopathic doctors that is affiliated with Lake Erie School of Osteopathic Medicine, and a three-year dermatology teaching program. When Wellington was established in 1986, there was very little population in the western portion of South Palm Beach County to support the hospital. As a result, the hospital was unprofitable in its early years, and by 2000, it had accumulated a deficit of $22 million. Wellington’s financial performance has improved significantly in the past several years, but it still has a large accumulated deficit. Wellington is relying on its ability to retain or increase its market share in the growing West Boynton area in order to remain profitable and eliminate its accumulated deficit. (5) Agency The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON program and licensing hospitals and other health care facilities. Application Submittal and Review and Preliminary Agency Action Bethesda and JFK each filed CON applications with the Agency in the first “hospital beds and facilities” batching cycle of 2003. Each application sought to establish a new 80- bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-5. The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The letters of intent and CON applications filed by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were timely filed and complied with all of the technical submittal requirements in the governing statutes and rules. JFK’s letter of intent was filed within the “grace period” (see Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(1)(d)2.) in direct response to Bethesda’s earlier-filed letter of intent. There is nothing inherently improper about a “grace period” letter of intent, and very little significance has been given to the responsive nature of JFK’s proposal in the comparative evaluation of the CON applications. A public hearing was held on the applications by the local health council on April 24, 2003.5 Presentations were made at the public hearing in support of and in opposition to the applications. The opposition came primarily from a representative of Delray; the support came from representatives of Bethesda and JFK and several residents of the West Boynton area. The reasons offered by the speakers for their opposition or support of the applications were essentially the same as those presented at the hearing, and no independent significance has been given to the testimony and “evidence” presented at the public hearing. Bethesda’s and JFK’s applications were comparatively reviewed by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s rules and standard procedures. On June 13, 2003, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR) based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended approval of Bethesda’s application and denial of JFK’s application. The Agency’s published notice of intent to approve Bethesda’s application and to deny JFK’s application in the June 27, 2003, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly as required by statute and Agency rule. The Agency reaffirmed its preliminary decisions on the applications through the hearing testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief of the Agency’s CON program. The petitions for administrative hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary decisions on the CON applications at issue in this proceeding were all timely filed. Acute Care Subdistricts 9-4 and 9-5 The Agency calculates the inventory of acute care beds on a subdistrict basis, and it considers CON applications for additional acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Palm Beach County is in District 9, which is divided into five subdistricts. Only two of the subdistricts, 9-4 and 9-5, are relevant in this case. Subdistrict 9-4 is North Palm Beach County, and Subdistrict 9-5 is South Palm Beach County. The dividing line between the two subdistricts is Southern Boulevard. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5: Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Raton Community Hospital (Boca Community). Boca Community and Bethesda are the only not-for- profit hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5; the others are for-profit hospitals. The service area of Palms West, which is located on Southern Boulevard in Subdistrict 9-4, includes portions of Subdistrict 9-5 and the West Boynton area. The utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9- 5 has historically been higher than the utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9-4. In calendar year 2002, for example, the average occupancy rate of the Subdistrict 9-5 hospitals was 78.2 percent as compared to 55.6 percent for the Subdistrict 9-4 hospitals; and during the “peak season” of January through March 2002, the average occupancy rates were 88.4 percent in Subdistrict 9-5 and 62 percent in Subdistrict 9-4. The West Boynton Area The West Boynton area is an unincorporated area of South Palm Beach County. Its approximate boundaries are Congress avenue on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Reserve on the west, the L-30 canal (which is several miles north of Atlantic Avenue) on the south, and Hypoluxo Road on the north. The West Boynton area roughly corresponds to the geographic area that is included in zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467. The Florida Turnpike, which runs north-south, roughly bisects the West Boynton area. The Turnpike is not a geographic barrier between the east and west portions of the West Boynton area, but it served as the de facto boundary of the urban service area until approximately 10 years ago when significant amounts of development began to “jump” the Turnpike. Boynton Beach Boulevard is the primary east-west road in the West Boynton area, although there are several other east- west arterial roads within the area including Lantana Road and Hypoluxo Road. Other major east-west roads in close proximity to the West Boynton area are Forest Hill Boulevard, Lake Worth Road, and Atlantic Avenue. There are several major north-south roads in the West Boynton area in addition to the Turnpike, including Jog Road, Hagen Ranch Road, and State Road 7. State Road 7 is the westernmost major north-south road in South Palm Beach County. As a result of local zoning restrictions, very little development in the West Boynton area is or will be west of State Road 7. The 2002 population of the West Boynton area, as defined by the four zip codes identified above, was approximately 156,000. There are seasonal variations in the population, but they are not as significant as the seasonal variations in the population of the more easterly portions of Palm Beach County. The population of the West Boynton area is projected to grow to approximately 181,000 by 2007, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of approximately 3.1 percent per year. That growth rate is higher than the annual growth rate projected over that period for the state as a whole (1.6 percent), Palm Beach County (two percent), and District 9 (1.9 percent). Approximately 89 percent of the 2003 population of the West Boynton area was located to the east of the Turnpike. The portion of the West Boynton area to the west of the Turnpike is projected to grow at a considerably faster rate through 2008 than the area to the east of the Turnpike, which is consistent with the extensive amount of residential development that is underway or approved in the West Boynton area west of the Turnpike. In 2002, approximately 28.6 percent of the residents of the West Boynton area were in the age 65 and older (“65+”) age cohort. That percentage is higher than the percentages in that age cohort for the state as a whole (17.5 percent), Palm Beach County (22.5 percent), or District 9 (22.5 percent). The 65+ age cohort is projected to remain the largest segment of the West Boynton area population through 2008. A large number of the existing residential communities and the communities under development in the West Boynton area are retirement communities that are deed-restricted to persons over the age of 55, which contributes to the higher percentage of the population in the 65+ age cohort currently and projected in the future. The West Boynton area is more affluent than and offers a better payer-mix than the existing service areas of Bethesda Memorial and JFK. As compared to the existing service areas of those hospitals, the West Boynton area has a lower percentage of uninsured residents, a higher percentage of Medicare and insured residents, a lower percentage of households with annual incomes below $20,000, and a higher percentage of households with annual incomes above $60,000. There is currently healthy competition in the West Boynton area for acute care services. That competition includes each of the four hospital parties in this case as well as several other hospitals. JFK, Bethesda, Wellington, and Delray, collectively accounted for approximately 72 percent of the discharges from the West Boynton area in calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The percentage of the West Boynton area discharges attributable to each of those hospitals or, stated another way, the hospitals' market shares in the West Boynton area over that period are as follows6: JFK Bethesda Delray Wellington 2000 31.7% 23.2% 10.6% 6.1% 2001 30.1% 24.0% 11.2% 6.9% 2002 28.8% 23.9% 11.4% 7.7% There is no credible evidence that there will be any significant changes in those relative market shares over the five-year planning horizon applicable to the applications at issue in this case if a new hospital is not approved in the West Boynton area. Stated another way, the competitive balance that currently exists in the West Boynton market is expected to continue unless something disrupts that balance, such as the approval of a new hospital in the area. As discussed below, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals are approved, the market share of the approved hospital will increase to the detriment of the other hospitals. There is considerable community support for a new hospital in the West Boynton area from the residents of that area, as reflected in the letters of support included in the CON applications, the testimony at the local public hearing on the applications, and the deposition testimony from area residents and the related exhibits introduced at the hearing. The community support is not, on balance, directed to the approval of Bethesda's proposed satellite hospital over JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, or vice versa; it is simply for the expeditious approval of a hospital. Need for OB Services in the South Palm Beach County and/or the West Boynton Area There are currently four OB programs in Subdistrict 9-5. The programs are at Bethesda Memorial, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Community. The evidence is not persuasive that an additional OB program is needed in Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, Dr. Samuel Kaufman, an OB/GYN who has practiced in the area for many years, testified credibly that the four existing OB programs in the subdistrict are just now beginning to do enough deliveries to be efficient. There was no persuasive evidence that there are accessibility problems at the existing OB programs because of their utilization rates. Indeed, the OB unit at Wellington has the capacity to handle up to an additional nine deliveries per day. Each of the existing OB programs offers Level II and/or Level III NICU services, which is typically referred to as “NICU backup.” It is not feasible to provide NICU backup at a low-volume OB program such as the 10-bed OB unit proposed in JFK’s satellite hospital. It is important to have NICU backup because it is not uncommon for high-risk OB patients to unexpectedly present to the hospital and, in such circumstances, it is better for the child to have NICU services at the hospital where he or she is delivered rather than having to be transferred to another hospital. The standard of care in South Palm Beach County requires NICU backup and, based upon malpractice liability concerns, some OB/GYNs will not deliver babies at a hospital that does not have NICU backup. OB is among the top ten discharges in the proposed service area of JFK’s satellite hospital, which is not uncommon around the state; however, because of the lower average length of stay (ALOS) associated with an OB admission, the high number of discharges does not correlate to a large number of patient days in the service area. The population group that is most likely to utilize OB services is females between the ages of 15 and 44 (hereafter “the Female 15-44 age cohort”). Only 16 percent of the 2002 population of the West Boynton area was in the Female 15-44 age cohort, and that cohort is projected to grow at a slower annual rate (2.3 percent) than the population of the West Boynton area as a whole (3.1 percent) through 2007.7 The relatively small portion of the population in the Female 15-44 age cohort is consistent with the data showing the highest percentage of the population in the West Boynton area in the 65+ age cohort. It is also consistent with the testimony and evidence regarding the number of existing and planned deed- restricted retirement communities in the West Boynton area. The logic of including an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital is undercut by the recent closure of the OB unit at Columbia. According to Columbia’s CEO, Columbia’s OB unit was closed in 2002 because it “was a small unit” with a low volume, because the service area from which Columbia was drawing its patients was predominately elderly, and because there were several other hospitals within close proximity to Columbia that had larger OB units with NICU backup. Based upon those factors, Columbia’s CEO concluded that “there was no real community need to do OB” and that “it just didn’t make sense” to do OB. The same factors exist in the West Boynton area and, as a result, the comments of Columbia’s CEO are equally applicable to the inclusion of an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The Proposed Satellite Hospitals (1) Bethesda West Bethesda’s application, CON 9659, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de-licensing 80 beds at Bethesda Memorial and then transferring those beds to the proposed satellite hospital. The transfer of beds proposed in Bethesda’s application will not increase the inventory of acute care beds in either District 9 or Subdistrict 9-5. The 80-bed increase at Bethesda West will be offset by the 80-bed decrease at Bethesda Memorial, both of which are in Subdistrict 9-5. The beds transferred to Bethesda West will come from double-occupancy rooms, thereby allowing Bethesda Memorial to convert those rooms to private rooms. The conversion to private rooms will create efficiencies at Bethesda Memorial by eliminating gender-based or disease-based conflicts between patients that often arise with double-occupancy rooms. The transfer of 80 beds to Bethesda West will reduce Bethesda Memorial’s licensed capacity to 282 beds. That figure includes the 15 NICU beds, the 14 hospice beds, and the 14-bed SCU; therefore, after the bed transfer, Bethesda Memorial will have only 239 beds available for general patient use. Bethesda Memorial is projected to have 80,630 patient days (excluding NICU and CMR patient days) in Bethesda West’s second year of operation.8 That equates to an ADC of 221 patients and an occupancy rate of 92.4 percent for the 239 beds available for general patient use. If the hospice lease and the SCU contract are not renewed in 2005, then Bethesda Memorial would have 267 beds available for general patient use and its occupancy rate would be 82.7 percent. The non-renewal of the hospice lease and the SCU contract would not add new acute care beds to Subdistrict 9- 5 because those beds are still considered to be acute care beds for purposes of the Agency's bed inventory for the subdistrict, even though they are currently designated for specific purposes. With an annual occupancy rate of 92.4 percent or even 82.7 percent, there would likely be days on which Bethesda Memorial’s occupancy rate would exceed 100 percent. This is not an uncommon occurrence at the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, particularly during the “peak season” of January through March. Bethesda Memorial could operate efficiently and provide high quality care with an occupancy rate of 82.7 percent or 92.4 percent without adding new beds. Indeed, JFK and Delray each have similar occupancy rates (and even higher occupancy rates during the “peak season”), and it is undisputed that they provide high quality care. Because the addition of new acute care beds at an existing hospital is no longer linked to the hospital’s occupancy rate, Bethesda Memorial (like any other existing hospital) is free to add new acute care beds whenever it chooses to do so; however, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda will, in fact, add new beds at Bethesda Memorial after the bed transfer to Bethesda West notwithstanding the resulting high utilization rate at Bethesda Memorial.9 Bethesda West will include 68 general med-surg beds, 12 critical care beds, a full service ED, and related ambulatory and outpatient services. All of the beds at Bethesda West will be in private rooms. Bethesda West will not offer OB services or dedicated pediatric services, and it will not include a cardiac catheterization lab. Bethesda West will be in a new 190,130 square foot building. The space plan for Bethesda West is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of Bethesda West is also reasonable. Bethesda West will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7, which is approximately two miles west of the Turnpike. That location is three miles from Bethesda Health City, eight to nine miles from Wellington, and ten to 11 miles from Delray, JFK, and Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda West could not be collocated with Bethesda Health City because there is not enough property at that location to construct a satellite hospital with the necessary parking facilities. Bethesda has contracted to purchase 54 acres of property at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7 known as the “Amestoy Property.” The purchase price of the Amestoy Property was $110,000 per acre. Bethesda intends to develop Bethesda West on approximately 30 acres of the Amestoy Property and then lease or sell the remainder of the property for the development of medical office buildings. A 30-acre site is adequate for the proposed 80-bed satellite hospital, although it may inhibit future expansion. Bethesda West intends to utilize the same medical staff as Bethesda Memorial; however, Bethesda has not discussed the issue with its medical staff as a whole10 nor has it developed specific plans to implement its dual-staffing approach. Bethesda West will share management and administrative support services with Bethesda Memorial rather than duplicating those services. The total cost of Bethesda West is $73.8 million. The primary service area (PSA) for Bethesda West consists of zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which roughly correspond to the boundaries of the West Boynton area. The hospital’s secondary service area (SSA) includes zip codes 33414 and 33446. There is significant overlap in the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the current service area of Bethesda Memorial; four of the six zip codes in Bethesda West’s service area are in Bethesda Memorial’s service area. There is also significant overlap between the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the service areas of Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in Bethesda West’s proposed service area is also within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Bethesda West is projected to have 10,430 patient days in its first year of operation and 14,570 patient days in its second year of operation. Those patient days equate to ADCs of 29 and 40, and occupancy rates of 35.7 percent and 49.9 percent in the first and second years of operations. By the fourth year of operation, Bethesda West is projected to have an ADC of 56, which equates to an occupancy rate of 65.2 percent. These occupancy rates are reasonable, as is the “ramp up” concept on which they are based. The projected utilization at Bethesda West is based upon an ALOS of 4.6 days. That ALOS was derived from information in the Agency’s in-patient database for residents of the West Boynton area who received in-patient services of the kind that would be offered at Bethesda West. It is a reasonable ALOS.11 The projected utilization assumes that Bethesda West will have an overall market share of 7.5 percent in its service area in the first year of operation, and that Bethesda West’s overall market share will increase to 13.5 percent by its fourth year of operation. Bethesda West is not projected to have a market share of greater than 15 percent in any individual zip code until its third year of operation. The utilization and market shares projected for Bethesda West are reasonable and attainable based upon the demographics and projected population growth in the West Boynton area. Bethesda West is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda's application projects that 3,040 patients from Bethesda Memorial will be “redistributed” to, or “cannibalized” by Bethesda West in Bethesda West’s first year of operation and that the number will increase to 4,530 patients in Bethesda West's second year of operation. The remainder of Bethesda West’s projected patient days – 7,390 in its first year of operation and 10,040 in its second year of operation – will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to these projected in-patient admissions, Bethesda West is projected to have outpatient registrations ranging from 22,440 (first year of operation) to 46,310 (fourth year of operation) and ED visits ranging from 8,990 (first year of operation) to 19,720 (fourth year of operation). The projected outpatient registrations and ED visits are reasonable and attainable. Some of the outpatient registrations at Bethesda West will come at the expense of Bethesda Health City because it is currently providing some of the same outpatient services that are proposed for Bethesda West. There is no persuasive evidence quantifying the number of Bethesda West’s outpatient registrations that would have otherwise gone to Bethesda Health City, nor is there any persuasive evidence quantifying the financial impact of the redistribution of those outpatients. (2) Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital JFK’s application, CON 9660, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de- licensing 80 beds at Columbia and then transferring those beds to the proposed JFK satellite hospital. Columbia is located in Subdistrict 9-4 and, like JFK, it is an HCA hospital. The bed transfer proposed by JFK will increase the inventory of acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5 by 80 beds, but the bed inventory in District 9 will remain the same; the 80-bed increase in Subdistrict 9-5 at JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be offset by an 80-bed decrease in Subdistrict 9-4 at Columbia. Columbia has 250 licensed beds, of which 150 are acute care beds, 12 are skilled nursing beds, and 88 are psychiatric beds. Columbia’s acute care beds include a 20-bed intensive care unit/critical care unit (ICU/CCU), but only 10 of those beds are currently being used. The 12-bed skilled nursing unit is not currently being used. The acute care beds at Columbia are not well- utilized. In calendar year 2002, the utilization rate for Columbia’s 150 acute care beds was only 40 percent and during the “peak season” in 2002, the utilization rate of those beds was only 47.6 percent. The proposed bed transfer would enable Columbia to convert its existing semi-private rooms to private rooms, but according to Columbia’s CEO, to do so Columbia would also need to convert its 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds. JFK’s CON application did not make reference to that necessary bed conversion. The conversion of the 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds may require Agency approval, which Columbia had not requested as of the date of the hearing. If the bed conversions described by Columbia’s CEO did not occur, the utilization rate of the 70 remaining acute care beds at Columbia after the transfer will likely exceed 80 percent on an annual basis and, during the “peak season,” the occupancy rate will likely exceed 100 percent. Indeed, applying the number of patient days at Columbia in calendar year 2002 to 70 beds results in an annual occupancy rate of 85.7 percent and an occupancy rate of 102 percent in the “peak season.” Under the pre-2004 law, those occupancy rates would allow Columbia to add beds without CON review, and Columbia’s CEO testified that she would take steps to add beds at Columbia if necessary based upon the facility’s occupancy rates after the bed transfer. There is no credible evidence that JFK planned to construct a satellite hospital in the West Boynton area prior to February 2003. The proposal was not included in any of JFK’s strategic or business plans prior to that date. There is also no credible evidence that the Columbia planned to de-license any beds at its facility prior to the CON application at issue in this proceeding; Columbia’s long-term business plan includes the beds that are being transferred to JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. The decision to de-license and transfer 80 beds from Columbia was made by HCA officials, not Columbia’s management team. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will include 60 general med-surg beds, a 10-bed OB unit, a 10-bed ICU/CCU, a full-service ED, and surgical suites. The hospital will provide radiation oncology services, diagnostic cardiac catheterization services, and outpatient psychiatric services, and all of its beds will be in private rooms. In addition to the 80 beds described above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 12 “observation” beds in private rooms. The observation beds will be sized and equipped in the same manner as the general med-surg beds. As a result, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will effectively have 92 beds even though it will only be licensed for 80 beds. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be in a new 195,195 square foot building. The space plan for the hospital is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of the hospital is also reasonable. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and the Turnpike on a 50-plus acre site known as the “Mazzoni Property.” That location is eight to nine miles from Delray and Bethesda Memorial, and 11 to 12 miles from Wellington and JFK. JFK has offered to purchase the Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre, but as of the date of the hearing, it had not entered into a contract to purchase the property. Bethesda had been in negotiations for the purchase of the Mazzoni Property at a similar price before it settled on, and entered into a contract to purchase the Amestoy Property. Like Bethesda, JFK intends to develop medical office buildings on its site in addition to the proposed satellite hospital. The size of the Mazzoni Property is adequate for those purposes. JFK intends to utilize its medical staff to cover the proposed satellite hospital; however, there is no credible evidence in the record detailing how the dual-staffing would work. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will share some of its management and administrative support services with JFK, but not to the same extent as those services are shared between Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial. Indeed, the proposed JFK satellite hospital was planned and staffed as a “stand alone economic entity.” The total cost of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is approximately $109.8 million. The service area of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital is considerably larger than the service are of Bethesda West. The PSA consists of zip codes 33437, 33467, 33446, and 33484; the SSA consists of zip codes 33436, 33463, 33414, 33413, 33445, 33496, and 33498. There is significant overlap between the service area of the proposed JFK satellite hospital and the existing service areas of Bethesda, Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in the proposed service area is within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Zip codes 33437 and 33467 are expected to generate over 92 percent of the patients for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The inordinately high number of patients that these two zip codes are expected to generate calls into question the reasonableness of service area defined by JFK, or at least the relevance of the SSA. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have 20,851 patient days in its first year of operation and 21,576 patient days in its second year of operation, which equate to ADCs of 57 and 59 and occupancy rates of 71.4 percent and 73.7 percent. By the fifth year of operation, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an occupancy rate of percent. The projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital was based on an ALOS of 3.9 days. That figure is reasonable. See Endnote 11. To achieve the projected utilization, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have to immediately achieve inordinately high market shares in its two primary zip codes, 33437 and 33467. Indeed, the CON application projects that the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 27 percent market share in zip code 33437 and a 24 percent market share in zip code 33467. It is unreasonable to expect that a new, start-up hospital will be able achieve the market share or utilization rates projected by JFK for its proposed satellite hospital even though it will be affiliated with JFK, which has an established market reputation in the area. Instead, similar to other new hospitals, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will likely have a “ramp up” period before it achieves its target market penetration and/or utilization. The 10-bed OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an ADC of 6 in each of the first two years of operation, and approximately one half of the admissions are projected to come from zip code 33467. That zip code has fewer residents in the Female 15-44 age cohort than does zip code 33463, which is in the West Boynton area but is in the SSA of the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The utilization of the OB unit assumes market shares of 65 percent in zip code 33437, which is the zip code where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located (i.e., its “home zip code”), and 60 percent in the adjacent zip code 33467. Those market shares are not inherently unreasonable for OB services since OB patients are more likely to utilize a facility closer to their home; however, the market shares are materially higher than the market shares that the established programs at Palms West (45 percent) and Wellington (41 percent) have in their home zip codes. The market shares proposed for the other zip codes in the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s service area are also somewhat higher than would be expected, particularly for a start-up OB program, but they are not inherently unreasonable. Even though the OB market shares assumed by JFK are not inherently unreasonable, they are unrealistic under the circumstances of this case because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, which is the standard of care in South Palm Beach County, and it is unlikely that obstetricians will refer their patients to the proposed satellite hospital when other hospitals with NICU backup (e.g., Wellington and Bethesda Memorial) are available in close proximity to the West Boynton area. The patient days for the OB unit were projected based upon a population-based use rate rather than based upon a fertility rate applied to the Female 15-44 age cohort. Because the Female 15-44 age cohort is growing at a slower rate than the population as a whole, JFK’s methodology had the effect of overstating the OB patient days and the ADC of the OB unit. The fertility rate methodology is a more reasonable approach under the circumstances of this case. That methodology results in an ADC of only two to four patients in the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a more reasonable projection and is more consistent with the largely elderly demographic of the West Boynton area. In sum, the projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is overstated, particularly in the first two years of operation, as a result of the unrealistic market shares projected for the hospital’s two primary zip codes and the overstated projection of OB patient days in the West Boynton area. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including JFK. JFK projects that approximately 40 percent of its patients will be “cannibalized” by the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a materially higher percentage than that projected for Bethesda West in its first (29.1 percent) and second (31.1 percent) years of operation. The remainder of the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s admissions will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to the projected in-patient admissions discussed above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is expected to have outpatient registrations and ED visits; however, the number of registrations and visits is not expressly projected in the application. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether those projections are reasonable or not.12 Institution-specific Justifications for the Proposed Satellite Hospitals Other than the prospect of enhancing access to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area (see Part I(1)(b) below), the primary justifications offered by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were institution-specific. The primary justification offered by Bethesda for the establishment of Bethesda West was its need to maintain or increase its market share of the favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area in order to ensure its long-term financial viability. Although the evidence establishes that the West Boynton area has a more favorable payer-mix than Bethesda Memorial’s current service area, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s long-term financial viability is at risk or that it is at risk of losing market share in the West Boynton area if it is not allowed to construct Bethesda West. Bethesda also presented evidence regarding its inability to add new beds at Bethesda Memorial because of physical and/or cost constraints, but that evidence was not persuasive. The primary justification offered by JFK for the establishment of its proposed satellite hospital was its inability to expand its current facility to accommodate patients coming from the West Boynton area or elsewhere; however, the preponderance of the evidence fails to support that claim because, as of the date of the hearing, JFK still had the ability to add at least 72 more beds to its existing facility, including 36 beds without any additional construction. Impact of the Proposed Satellite Hospitals on the Existing Hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West or the proposed JFK satellite hospital can achieve their in-patient utilization projections through population growth in their projected service areas alone. Instead, the evidence establishes that the proposed satellite hospitals will achieve their projected utilization primarily by taking patients who are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. Bethesda West and the proposed JFK satellite hospital are each projected to “cannibalize” patients from Bethesda Memorial and JFK, respectively; however, they will also take patients “out of the hide” of Delray, Wellington, and each other. The projected growth in the West Boynton area will result in the existing hospitals having more patient days in the future than they currently have, whether or not either of the satellite hospitals is approved; however, the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals will result in the existing hospitals losing some of the growth-related admissions that they would have otherwise captured. It is appropriate to consider the loss of those growth-related admissions as part of the impact analysis because the market shares in the West Boynton area and the service areas of the proposed satellite hospitals have been relatively stable over the past several years, and it is reasonable to expect that absent a significant change of circumstances (such as the approval of a satellite hospital in the area) the existing hospitals would continue to maintain their respective market shares into the future.13 The most persuasive analysis of the impact on the existing providers of the approval of the proposed satellite hospitals is that prepared by Wellington’s health planner, Thomas Davidson (Exhibit W-4). Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of admissions that the existing providers would lose because of Bethesda West in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 377 512 Wellington 138 187 JFK 554 752 Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of patient days that the existing providers would lose because of the proposed JFK satellite hospital in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 1,035 663 Wellington 735 615 Bethesda 1,638 1,178 These lost admissions and patient days constitute a substantial adverse impact on the existing hospitals, as does the loss of income resulting from the lost admissions and patient days. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a slightly greater adverse financial impact on Wellington than will Bethesda West, primarily because of the OB program and larger service proposed for the JFK satellite hospital; the proposed JFK satellite hospital and Bethesda West will have materially similar adverse financial impacts on Delray. The overall effect of the lost admissions, patient days, and the resulting loss of income is greater on Wellington than it is on any of the other hospitals because Wellington has historically been less profitable than the other hospitals. There are other adverse impacts on the existing providers, including the increases in costs and/or potential impacts to quality of care resulting from the exacerbation of the emergency room (ER) call shortage of specialty physicians discussed below; however, there is no persuasive evidence quantifying those impacts. Comparative Evaluation of the CON Applications Based Upon the Applicable Statutory and Rule Criteria There is no credible evidence to justify the approval of two 80-bed hospitals in the West Boynton area. As a result, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals is to be approved, it should be the one that best satisfies the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Statutory Criteria – Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2003)14 Subsection (1): Need in Relation to the District Health Plan15 The applicable provisions of the Local Health Plan for District 9 are as follows: Priority shall be given to area hospitals, which can show a commitment to, or historical record of service to Medicaid/indigent, handicapped and underserved population groups. Priority shall be given to applicants who can document cost containment practices in their facilities. Cost containment practices, such as sharing services with other area hospitals, enhances efficient resource utilization and assists in avoiding duplication of services. Priority shall be given to an applicant who proposes to use existing space rather than new construction, including space created by previous voluntary de- licensure of underutilized or unused beds and/or through transfer of beds within a subdistrict. As more fully discussed below in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, the first preference weighs in favor of Bethesda based upon its historical record of service to Medicaid and charity patients, which is marginally better than JFK’s record, and its commitment to provide five percent of the patient days at Bethesda West to Medicaid and charity patients, which is more realistic than JFK’s 10 percent commitment; however, the weight associated with this preference is minimal in light of the demographics of the West Boynton area, which is generally more wealthy and, hence, less likely to generate significant Medicaid or charity care patient days. As to the second preference, the record does not “document” any material cost containment practices at JFK or Bethesda Memorial. JFK and Bethesda each intend to use their existing medical staffs to cover their proposed satellite hospitals as a cost-containment effort; however, Bethesda has proposed a greater degree of integration (and, hence, less duplication) in the administrative functions at Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial than did JFK at is proposed satellite hospital. Thus, the second preference also marginally weighs in favor of Bethesda. As to the third preference, both applicants are proposing new construction rather than the use of existing space. Although JFK is proposing the de-licensure of underutilized beds at Columbia, it is not using the space created by those beds for its proposed satellite hospital as the rule preference contemplates. The beds that Bethesda is transferring to Bethesda West are not underutilized and they are being transferred to a new to-be-constructed facility rather than to existing space. In sum, the local health plan preferences marginally weigh in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsections (2) and (7): Availability, Quality of Care, etc. of Existing Facilities and Enhancing Access The primary justification offered by the applicants for their respective proposed satellite hospitals (other than the hospital-specific issues discussed above) is that the facility will "enhance access" to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area. More specifically, the applicants contend that the establishment of a new hospital in the West Boynton area will address an “access” problem that exists or soon will exist in the area. As discussed below, this contention is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. In the CON context, “access” is typically evaluated from the vantage points of programmatic, financial, cultural, and geographic access. “Programmatic access” refers to the adequacy of the programs and services provided at existing facilities in relation to the specific health care needs of the persons served by those facilities. Programmatic access concerns arise when specific programs or services are not available for patients that need them, or when the quality of care provided in the existing programs is inadequate. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any programmatic access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 and, in any event, neither of the proposed satellite hospitals would enhance programmatic access in the subdistrict because they will not offer any programs or services that are not already offered at one or more of the tertiary hospitals in the subdistrict that currently serve the West Boynton area. Indeed, the proposed satellite hospitals will offer a more narrow range of services than the existing tertiary hospitals presently serving the area. This is significant because the elderly, who make of a large portion of the West Boynton area and who are more likely to have co-morbidities or more complex medical needs, are generally better served in a hospital offering tertiary services and more complete care. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that many physicians will continue to admit their patients to the larger tertiary hospitals rather than shifting those patients to a satellite hospital that provides a more narrow range of services. “Financial access” refers to the extent to which persons have access to health care services without regard to their ability to pay. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any financial access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 or the West Boynton area that the proposed satellite hospitals will address. None of the existing hospitals that serve the West Boynton area have policies or practices that discourage indigent patients from seeking care at their facilities and, in any event, the low- income population makes up a relatively small portion of the West Boynton area. Cultural access” refers to the extent to which certain persons cannot or do not access the existing facilities due to cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, and national origin. Cultural access was not advanced by Bethesda or JFK as a basis for the approval or their respective applications. “Geographic access” refers to the physical accessibility of the existing facilities or services in a subdistrict taking into account population density, distance and time of travel, and geographic barriers or other impediments to access. Geographic access has been referred to as a “foundation of health planning.” Bethesda and JFK focus primarily on the projected growth of the West Boynton area and the road congestion that comes with that growth as the basis for their contention that there is, or soon will be a access problem for residents of the West Boynton area; Bethesda states in its PRO (at page 29) that "[g]eographic access is at the heart of [its] proposal." A reasonable geographic access standard for persons living in an urban area is a drive time of 30 to 40 minutes to an acute care hospital. Under that standard, there is currently no geographic access problem for residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are as many as 12 hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area, and a “fair number” of residents have access to four hospitals -– Bethesda, JFK, Wellington, and Delray -- within a 15 to 20-minute drive time.16 All of the hospitals within the 30-minute drive time offer tertiary-level care, and a number of them offer OB services. There are no physical geographic barriers that limit access to the existing hospitals by residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are a number of different major north-south and east-west roads that residents have to chose from when accessing the existing hospitals, and most of those roads have at least four lanes. The major roads in the West Boynton area have expanded along with growth of the population in the area, and they are expected to continue to do so. The infrastructure plan adopted by Palm Beach County includes continued road expansions and improvements over the planning horizon applicable to this case, and developers are often required to widen or otherwise improve the roads as a condition of the approval of new development. There is insufficient evidence that the current travel times are significantly different for the elderly population in the area. The anecdotal testimony offered by various Bethesda witnesses was not persuasive. The evidence was not persuasive that the travel times will be materially higher over the applicable five-year planning horizon. The analysis and opinion presented by Bethesda’s traffic engineer on this issue was not persuasive.17 The concurrency analysis performed by Bethesda’s traffic engineer only assessed Boynton Beach Boulevard; it did not assess any of the other major roads between the West Boynton area and the existing hospitals. Moreover, the analysis focused on the level of service (LOS) on various segments of Boynton Beach Boulevard, as measured by the projected number of trips on those segments in 2007; it did not quantify the increase in travel time along that road, if any, resulting from the reduction in the LOS which the analysis showed. The hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 are some of the most highly-utilized hospitals in the state; however, the evidence was not persuasive that the high utilization at these hospitals has caused any access problems for residents of the West Boynton area, either for general acute care services or for OB services. The existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 have been able to meet the needs of the subdistrict by incrementally expanding their facilities when the need arises. An additional 67 beds can be added to the bed inventory of Subdistrict 9-5 without any additional construction; JFK has shelled-in space for 36 new beds and Delray has shelled-in space for 31 new beds. Additionally, Delray has a master plan that has been approved by Palm Beach County that will allow it to add as many as 123 more beds on its current campus as needed, and Wellington also has plenty of space on the undeveloped property adjacent to its hospital to add more beds as needed. Having a hospital in the West Boynton area might be more convenient for residents of that area west of the Turnpike, at least in those instances where the patient is able to receive all of the necessary care at that hospital; however, convenience alone is not valid basis for the approval of a new hospital, particularly where there are as many as 12 tertiary-level hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area. In sum and on balance, the criteria in Subsections 408.035(2) and (7), Florida Statutes, weigh strongly against approval of either application. Indeed, despite the relatively high utilization rates at the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that there currently are, or that over the applicable planning horizon there will be any material deficiencies in the availability, quality of care, or accessibility of the existing hospitals in the subdistrict that would warrant the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area at this time. Subsection (3): Ability of Applicant to Provide Quality of Care The parties do not dispute the quality of care provided at any of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, and the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that a high quality of care is currently provided at Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, and Wellington. Bethesda and JFK each intend to rely on their existing medical staff, at least in part, to staff their respective satellite hospitals. As a result, the quality of care provided at the satellite hospitals will also be good, but it will be less than ideal in several respects. First, neither satellite hospital will offer interventional cardiology services, which is, or is becoming the standard of care for treating heart attack patients that present to the hospital’s ED. Second, JFK’s proposed satellite will offer OB services without NICU backup, which is below the standard of care in South Palm Beach County. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application. Subsection (4): Special Health Care Services The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable, and in any event, the criterion was deleted by Chapter 2004-383, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2004. Subsection (5): Educational Facilities and Training Programs18 Neither JFK nor Bethesda Memorial is a teaching hospital, and neither is proposing educational or training programs at its proposed satellite hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Wellington’s teaching programs will be adversely affected by the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals. The criterion in Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes, does not materially weigh in favor of or against the approval of either of the applications. Subsection (6): Availability of Resources and Personnel for Operations The parties stipulated that Bethesda and JFK each have the ability to fund the capital and operating expenditures for their proposed satellite hospitals. The reasonableness of the financing-related costs proposed by Bethesda and JFK in their respective applications is also not in dispute. Delray and Wellington argue that neither Bethesda nor JFK will be able to adequately staff their proposed satellite hospitals due to physician and nurse shortages in South Palm Beach County and/or that the staffing of the proposed satellite hospitals will make it more difficult and costly for the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 to staff certain programs. Bethesda and JFK challenge the adequacy of each other’s staffing projections. As more fully discussed below, the evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projected for either of the proposed satellite programs is inadequate; however, the evidence establishes that the approval of either program would exacerbate physician shortages in Subdistrict 9-5 in certain specialties. Bethesda West’s staffing projections include 242.8 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the first year of operation and 294.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital include FTEs in the first year of operation and 448.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The disparity in the staffing levels primarily results from the higher occupancy rate projected at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is projected to be 71.4 percent in the first year of operation. By contrast, the occupancy rate at Bethesda West is projected be 35.7 percent in the first year of operation and then “ramp up” to approximately 69 percent by the fourth year of operation. The staffing levels at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable based upon the ADCs projected and the services to be provided at each hospital. Indeed, the staffing levels are comparable when viewed as a ratio of staff to projected ADC; the ratios at Bethesda West are 8.37 and 7.36 in the first two years of operation, and the ratios at the proposed JFK satellite hospital for its first two years of operation are 7.74 and 7.60. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West’s staffing projections are understated or that they fail to include nursing and other positions necessary to ensure high quality care is provided. Nor is the evidence persuasive that the salaries projected for Bethesda West’s staff are understated. The evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are inherently unreliable based upon the manner in which they were prepared or as a result of the proxy that was used as a basis of the projections. There is a nursing shortage statewide and in South Palm Beach County, but it is not as severe as it has been in the past. Indeed, it is significant that despite the large number of beds added over the past five years at the various hospitals in South Palm Beach County, those beds have been adequately staffed with nurses and ancillary clinical personnel. JFK and Bethesda Memorial have each been successful in recruiting nursing staff despite the nursing shortage. They each have implemented innovative programs to aid in their recruiting efforts and to reduce their turnover and vacancy rates, and those programs are expected to be utilized at the proposed satellite hospitals. JFK and Bethesda Memorial each use “traveler” and per-diem nurses to supplement their full time nursing staffs, which is not uncommon in South Palm Beach County. Typically, a physician who has privileges at a hospital is required to be on ER call on a rotational basis. Many physicians have privileges at more than one hospital in South Palm Beach County, which means that they are responsible for providing ER call coverage at more than one hospital. Because of malpractice and other concerns, it is becoming increasingly difficult for hospitals to attract physicians who are willing to take ER calls. The Palm Beach County Medical Society and the CEOs of the existing hospitals in the county met as recently as December 2003 to discuss the problems related to ER call coverage; however, as of the date of the hearing, the problem still existed and was severe. It is possible for a physician to be providing ER calls to more than one hospital at the same time. This can become a serious problem if the physician is attending to a patient at one hospital when he or she is called to the ER at another hospital. The problem of ER call coverage is most significant in specialties such as neurosurgery, hand surgery, urology, OB, and ear/nose/throat. Several of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County, including Wellington and Delray, have begun to pay physicians, and particularly specialty physicians to take ER call. Adding a new hospital in South Palm Beach County will exacerbate this problem in several respects. First, it will add another hospital to the ER call rotations of the physicians who chose to obtain privileges at the satellite hospitals, thereby increasing the prospect of a physician being on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Second, it will make it even more difficult or costly for existing hospitals to obtain call coverage by the specialty physicians that are already in short supply. It is unlikely that OB/GYNs will admit their patients to the small OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital. OB/GYNs typically try to keep all of their patients in one hospital because it makes it easier on them to do rounds and to respond quickly to emergency situations, and because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, it is unlikely that many OB/GYNs will choose that hospital as the one where they admit the bulk of their patients. In sum, the staffing levels for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable and appropriate for the services being offered at the hospitals, the projected staffing costs at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are also reasonable and appropriate, and JFK and Bethesda will be able to staff their respective satellite hospitals at the levels projected; however, the proposed satellite hospitals will exacerbate the shortage of specialty physicians in South Palm Beach County and will make it more difficult for the existing hospitals to get specialty physicians for ER call coverage. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application, and between the competing applications, this criterion does not materially weigh in favor of either application over the other. Subsection (8): Financial Feasibility The parties did not seriously contest the short-term financial feasibility of either of the proposed satellite hospitals, and the preponderance of the evidence establishes that both of the proposed satellite hospitals are financially feasible in the short-term; both applicants have the ability to fund the construction and initial capital needs of their respective projects in conjunction with the other capital projects listed on Schedule 2 of their respective CON applications. The long-term financial feasibility of each of the proposed satellite hospitals is in dispute. The general rule for assessing the long-term financial feasibility of a CON project is if the project will at least break even by the end of the second year of operation, then the project is financially feasible in the long-term; if, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operations and it is not demonstrated that the project will reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time, then the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. As more fully discussed below, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term, but the proposed JFK satellite hospital is not. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Bethesda West Schedule 8A of Bethesda's application projects that Bethesda West will generate a net loss of $3.7 million in its first year of operation and a net profit of $1.7 million in its second year of operation. The financial projections for Bethesda West were based upon conservative utilization projections, which leads a reasonable projection of operating income. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon an overstatement of the “other operating revenue” or an understatement of the depreciation expense projected by Bethesda. The testimony of Bethesda’s expert financial witnesses is accepted over the testimony of the other financial experts on these issues. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon understatements in land costs, construction costs, equipment costs of staffing projections. The testimony of Bethesda’s experts related to these issues is accepted over the testimony of the other experts. As discussed above, Bethesda West will “cannibalize” 3,040 and 4,530 patient days from Bethesda Memorial in its first and second years of operation. The financial impact of this “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is a loss of $1.4 million and $2.1 million in the first and second years of Bethesda West’s operation. The income loss from “cannibalization” is not accounted for on Schedule 8A. Although the patient days used to calculate the “per patient day” figures in the middle two columns of that schedule take into account the “cannibalized” patient days, the dollar amounts shown in those columns do not. On this issue, the testimony of Delray’s financial expert is more logical and persuasive than the testimony of Bethesda’s financial expert. When the losses from “cannibalization” are taken into account, the approval of Bethesda West will have a negative impact on the Bethesda system of $5.1 million in its first year of operation and $400,000 in its second year of operation, which are consistent with the figures shown in Exhibit B-2 (pages 48 and 54). Even so, the system will show a net income of $300,000 and $5.6 million in the first two years of Bethesda West’s operation. The impact of the “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is projected to decrease as Bethesda West becomes more established. At the same time, the profitability of Bethesda West is projected to increase as its census grows. Thus, by the third year of its operation, Bethesda West is projected to have a positive impact on the Bethesda system of $2.2 million (i.e., $4.1 million in net income at Bethesda West less $1.9 million in “cannibalization” from Bethesda Memorial). Bethesda West will not have a negative impact on Bethesda’s cash flow after its first year of operation. On this issue, the testimony of Bethesda’s expert is more persuasive than the testimony of the other financial experts. Accordingly, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term. Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital Schedule 8A of JFK's application projects that its proposed satellite hospital would generate a net loss of $1.2 million in its first year of operation and a net loss of $392,000 in its second year of operation. Over the next three years, however, JFK projects its satellite hospital to generate net income from operations of $509,000, $1.5 million, and $2.5 million. The financial projections in JFK’s application were based upon overly-aggressive occupancy rates, both in the facility as a whole and in the small OB unit without NICU backup. As a result, the resulting financial projections are not reasonable. JFK’s application does not include any analysis of the financial impact on Columbia of the transfer of 80 beds to the satellite hospital, nor does it include any analysis of the impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days that would necessarily occur if JFK’s proposed satellite was approved. As a result, the financial impact of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, in the words of one of JFK’s financial experts, is “probably incomplete.” As a result of the unreasonable utilization projections and the incomplete presentation of the financial impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days, JFK failed to establish that its proposed satellite hospital is financially feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9): Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-effectiveness Neither of the proposed satellite hospitals will foster competition that proposes cost-effectiveness. The West Boynton market currently has healthy competition for the acute services proposed for the satellite hospitals, and there is no dominant provider of those services. Locating a new hospital in the West Boynton area will have the long-term effect of increasing the market share of the provider that operates the new hospital to the detriment of the other providers that are currently competing in that market. In this regard, the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area would adversely affect the competitive balance that currently exists in that area and which is projected to continue over the planning horizon. The approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals would also adversely affect cost-effectiveness by exacerbating the shortage of specialty physicians and other qualified staff in the subdistrict, which in turn would require existing hospitals to raise salaries, benefits and other expenses in order to remain competitive. The approval of Bethesda West would have less of an adverse impact on competition and cost-effectiveness than would the approval of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital for several reasons. First, Bethesda West does not duplicate as many administrative services as does JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. Second, JFK currently has a higher market share in the West Boynton area than does Bethesda or any other hospital, which means that the competitive balance would be tipped to a greater extent if JFK’s satellite hospital was approved. Third, the approval of the JFK satellite would give HCA four hospitals in Palm Beach County and increase its leverage in physician and staff recruitment and the negotiation of HMO contracts. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, weights against the approval of either application; however, on balance between the two applications, this criterion favor’s Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsection (10): Costs and Methods of Construction The costs and methods of energy provision at the proposed satellite hospitals is not in dispute. Although the proposed satellite hospitals are similar in size, the total project costs included in the CON applications are significantly different. The $73.8 million total project cost for Bethesda West equates to a cost of $922,700 per bed. The $109.8 million total project cost for JFK’s proposed satellite hospital equates to a cost of $1.37 million per bed. The portion of the total project costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals attributable directly to “construction” is materially similar. Bethesda West’s construction costs are approximately $34.2 million, or $180 per square foot; the construction costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are $40.9 million, or $210 per square foot. The estimated construction costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are within the range of reasonableness that can be gleaned from the testimony of the various hospital construction experts. JFK’s cost is towards the higher end of the range, and Bethesda’s cost is towards the lower end of the range. The primary differences in the total project costs are in the land purchase prices, the site preparation costs, and the equipment costs. The land purchase price included in Bethesda’s application was $4.2 million, which was based upon a 30 to 40- acre site. The land purchase price included in JFK’s application was $8 million, which was based upon a 50-acre site. Bethesda acquired the 54-acre Amestoy Property for $110,000 per acre. At $110,000 per acre, the $4.2 million attributed by Bethesda to land purchase price would be sufficient to acquire 38.2 acres, which is more than adequate for the 80-bed Bethesda West facility. Consistent with the estimate in the CON application, JFK has made an offer to purchase the 50-plus acre Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre. The total land purchase price in each application, and the actual cost-per-acre of the Amestoy and Mazzoni Properties are reasonable. The site development costs included in Bethesda’s application were $3.75 million, or $125,000 per acre for the 30 acres on which Bethesda West will be located. The site development costs included in JFK’s application were $6.5 million, or $150,000 per acre for the 50 acres on which JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be located. The site development costs for each project include on-site and off-site utility (e.g., water and sewer) and roadway work, geotechnical and environmental remediation costs, stormwater retention, landscaping, and concurrency impact fees. Each of the proposed sites is relatively flat and was formerly agricultural property and, as a result, there are not expected to be any unusual costs associated with the development of either site. Bethesda West will be located further west than the proposed JFK satellite hospital and, as a result, its “radius of influence” includes fewer congested roadway links than does the proposed JFK satellite hospital; but, the Amestoy Property where Bethesda West will be located is farther away from the existing utility lines than the Mazzoni Property where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located. Thus, even though the cost of running utilities to Bethesda West will likely be higher than the cost of running utilities to the proposed JFK satellite hospital, the currency impact fees for Bethesda West will likely be lower than the currency impact fees for the proposed JFK satellite hospital; and, on balance, the overall per-acre and total site development costs included in each of the applications are reasonable. Bethesda’s application included equipment costs of approximately $16 million, all of which was attributable to movable equipment. The cost of fixed equipment was included in the estimated construction costs as part of the building contract. JFK’s application included total equipment costs of approximately $34.2 million. That amount was broken into fixed equipment not in the building contract ($13.9 million), movable equipment ($17.8 million), and information systems ($2.4 million). Some, but not all of the difference between the equipment cost estimates are attributable to the additional services –- e.g., OB and diagnostic cardiac catheterization –- that will be provided at the proposed JFK satellite hospital but not at Bethesda West. Additionally, some of the difference are attributable to the 12 "observation" rooms at the proposed JFK satellite hospital that are being equipped in the same manner as the hospital’s general med-surg beds. When compared on an “apples to apples” basis, the total equipment costs for Bethesda West are not materially different than the total equipment costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. JFK is proposing to provide more specialized equipment than Bethesda in areas such as the surgical suites and the ICU/CCU and more information technology (IT) equipment; however, the evidence is not persuasive that such specialized equipment or the IT equipment is necessary to provide high quality care or that the absence of such equipment will adversely affect the quality of care at Bethesda West. The $16 million in equipment costs at Bethesda West, which equates to approximately $200,700 per bed, is reasonable for the level and type of services that will be provided at Bethesda West. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda’s equipment costs are understated even though its costs are considerably less than the equipment costs proposed by JFK. If anything, JFK has over-equipped its proposed satellite hospital with specialized equipment resulting in the higher equipment costs included in JFK’s CON application.19 Although the more expensive proposed JFK satellite hospital offers some benefits, such as a larger site to facilitate future expansions and more specialized equipment in some areas, those benefits are outweighed by the additional $35 million costs associated with that facility as compared to Bethesda West. This cost saving is particularly significant since each of the proposed facilities is supposed to be a satellite of a larger, tertiary hospital rather than a stand- alone community hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda Memorial and JFK have physical constraints that will limit their ability to add beds at their existing facilities in a cost- efficient manner. Even if the construction of a satellite hospital were the most cost-efficient way for Bethesda Memorial and JFK to add beds, the evidence was not persuasive that it is the most cost-efficient way to add beds from the perspective of the entire health care system of Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, there are less costly methods of adding new beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new 80-bed hospital for $73.8 million or $109.8 million. For example, 36 additional beds can be added at JFK and 31 additional beds can be added at Delray in shelled-in space that has already been constructed. The incremental cost of constructing space for additional bed expansions at Delray and Wellington would also be less than the construction costs of the proposed satellite hospitals. In sum, because there are less costly ways to add beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new hospital, the criterion in Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application; however, between the two applications, this criterion weighs in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application since its proposed satellite hospital will cost approximately $35 million less and will provide effectively the same services in similar physical space. Subsection (11): Medicaid and Indigent Care Bethesda characterizes itself as a “safety net” hospital because its Medicaid and charity care percentages typically exceed the averages for Subdistrict 9-5 and District 9 as a whole, and because Bethesda Memorial provides the largest percentage of the Medicaid and charity care provided by all of the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. There is no statutory or rule provision that would support Bethesda’s designation of itself as a “safety net” provider. Moreover, the significance of Bethesda’s characterization of itself as a “safety net” hospital is diminished by the fact that the Palm Beach County Health Care District (District) reimburses all hospitals in the county through an indigent care subsidy for care provided to patients that meet the District’s indigency standards. The subsidy helps to ensure that indigent patients are able to receive medical care from any hospital in the county and, to that end, provides a county-wide “safety net” for such patients. The subsidies paid by the District do not cover the full cost of indigent care provided by the hospital, nor does the total amount of subsidies received by a hospital directly correlate to the total amount of indigent care provided by the hospital. Thus, it is not dispositive that JFK received the largest amount of subsidies from the District over the past several years or that JFK received approximately $1.6 million more in subsidies from the District in 2003 than did Bethesda. JFK recently qualified as a “disproportionate share provider,” which means that at least 15 percent of its patient days are attributed to Medicaid or supplemental security income patients. As a disproportionate share provider, JFK receives incrementally larger reimbursements from Medicaid for the provision of indigent care. Bethesda is not currently a disproportionate share provider although it has been in the past. None of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County have policies or practices that discourage Medicaid or uninsured patients. Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Wellington, and Delray each accept patients without regard to their ability to pay. Bethesda and JFK conditioned the approval of their respective CON applications on the provision of a specified percentage of patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. The percentage committed to by JFK (10 percent) is higher than the percentage committed to by Bethesda (five percent). The percentages of Medicaid and charity care committed to by the applicants may be difficult to achieve as a result of the demographics of the West Boynton area. Indeed, the more favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area was a significant factor, and in Bethesda’s case it was the primary motivating factor for the establishment a new hospital in that area. Bethesda Memorial and JFK each have a history of providing significant levels of Medicaid and charity care at their existing hospitals. The hospitals are each located in areas with large indigent populations, which significantly contribute to the high level of indigent care that they provide. Bethesda Memorial has historically provided a larger amount of Medicaid care than has JFK in terms of a percentage of patient days, e.g., 16.1 percent verses 7.3 percent in 2001. Those percentages each exceed the Subdistrict 9-5 average of 6.3 percent. Bethesda Memorial has also historically provided a larger amount of charity care than has JFK in terms of dollars (e.g., $16.2 million verses $5.2 million in 2002) and in terms of a percentage of charges (e.g., 3.7 percent verses 0.4 percent in 2001 and 2.9 percent verses 0.6 percent in 2002). The Subdistrict 9-5 average for 2001 was 1.4 percent. These comparisons are somewhat skewed because a large portion of Bethesda’s indigent care is attributable to Bethesda Memorial’s high-volume, well-established OB and neonatal programs which tend to be “magnets” for uninsured patients. When only like-services are considered, the utilization of JFK and Bethesda Memorial by Medicaid and indigent patients is similar. JFK provides a significant amount of care to “self- pay” patients (e.g., $43.5 million in 2002), which JFK attempted to equate to charity care. Although there is often overlap between self-pay and charity care patients, the evidence was not persuasive that there is a direct correlation urged by JFK in this case. For example, JFK’s internal definitions of self-pay and charity care patients are markedly different and considerably more liberal than the Agency’s definition of charity care patients for reporting purposes. Bethesda makes a $1 million per year “contribution” to the District to help fund the District’s indigent care program. That contribution was required as part of the settlement of litigation arising out of Bethesda’s conversion from a public hospital to a private not-for-profit hospital and, as a result, it cannot be fairly characterized as additional evidence of Bethesda’s commitment to serving indigent patients. Even though both applicants demonstrated a history of and commitment to serving Medicaid and indigent patients, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of Bethesda because the level of Medicaid and charity care historically provided by Bethesda Memorial is higher than that provided by JFK. On balance with the other statutory and rule criteria, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, is not given significant weight because Bethesda has committed to providing a lower percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days at Bethesda West than JFK committed to at its proposed satellite hospital, and because the demographics of the West Boynton area make it unlikely that a significant level of indigent care will be provided at either of the proposed satellite hospitals. Subsection (12): Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable because neither applicant is proposing additional nursing home beds. (2) Rule Criteria – Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038(6) The criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.030(2) are subsumed in the statutory criteria discussed above related to the accessibility (or not) of existing acute care services in Subdistrict 9-5 and the need (or not) for new acute care beds in the West Boynton area. For the same reasons that the CON applications do not satisfy those statutory criteria, they do not satisfy the related criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030(2). Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(a), priority is given to applicants with “a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so.” This priority weighs in favor of Bethesda for the reasons discussed above in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(b), priority is given to applications that “meet the need for additional acute care beds in a particular service through the conversion of existing underutilized beds.” This priority does not materially weigh in favor either application over the other; the underutilized beds at Columbia that JFK proposes to transfer to its satellite hospital are in a different subdistrict, and the beds that Bethesda proposes to transfer from Bethesda Memorial to its proposed satellite hospital are not underutilized beds in light of the historical occupancy rate at Bethesda Memorial.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Bethesda’s CON application No. 9659 and also denying JFK’s CON application No. 9660. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5717.001408.035408.0361408.0397.367.60
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TCC PARTNERS, INC., D/B/A CLEVELAND CLINIC HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 01-002892CON (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 23, 2001 Number: 01-002892CON Latest Update: Oct. 13, 2004

The Issue Whether the Certificate of Need application of the South Broward Hospital District (CON 9459) to establish a 100-bed hospital in Health Planning District 10, Broward County, should be granted by the Agency for Health Care Administration?

Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA The Agency for Health Care Administration is the state agency with the authority to review and issue Certificates of Need in Florida. SBHD, the Applicant The applicant in this proceeding is South Broward Hospital District ("SBHD" or the "District"). Created by the Legislature in 1947 "at the request of voters to meet the healthcare needs of the South Broward community" (District No. 2, Vol. 1, pg. 7), SBHD is a special taxing district. The District receives tax revenues in order to support SBHD as the health care provider of last resort in South Broward County with a long demonstrated history of serving medically indigent patients. Id. From its inception in 1947 to today with the support of local tax revenue, the mission of SBHD has remained unchanged: to provide health care to all residents of the community regardless of ability to pay. There are three acute care hospitals in the "Memorial Health Care System" operated by SBHD: Memorial Regional, Memorial Pembroke Pines and Memorial West. These three hospitals make the District the dominant provider of health services in south Broward County. The District's market share of admissions to hospitals located in south Broward County is 85%. The other 15% of hospital admissions are to Hollywood Medical Center. (These percentages do not account for admissions of South Broward County residents to hospitals outside of the borders of SBHD.) Memorial Regional Hospital, a Medicaid disproportionate provider, is located 13.6 miles from the proposed Miramar hospital site. Without question, the predominant provider of care to indigent patients in south Broward County, Memorial Regional is licensed for 489 acute care beds. Memorial Regional had an acute care occupancy rate of 76.5% in 2000. From time-to-time in recent years, it has experienced unacceptably high occupancies particularly within individual units. It presently has patient care units that often operate above capacity, resulting in patient flow problems within the hospital. Memorial West Hospital, located 5.7 miles from the proposed Miramar site, is currently licensed for 164 acute care beds. It had an acute care occupancy rate of 88.9% in 2000. Memorial West currently operates 14 "labor-delivery- recovery" observation beds ("LDR" beds) that are not among the hospital's licensed beds. The hospital has recently received a CON for 36 additional beds to be utilized for acute care and further authorization via a CON exemption to add another 16 beds licensed for acute care provided certain occupancy levels are achieved. These additional 52 licensed beds are projected to become operational in 2002. Furthermore, Memorial West is adding 36 additional LDR beds and 20 acute care observation beds and doubling the size of its emergency room. When the expansion is complete, Memorial West will have 216 acute care beds, 20 acute care observation beds and 50 LDR beds. As matters stood at the time of hearing, peak occupancies in some departments at Memorial West such as obstetrics, routinely exceeded 100%. With the additional beds slated for opening in 2002, demand for acute care services in southwest Broward County will continue to produce high occupancy rates at Memorial West. It is reasonably projected that the growth in demand for acute care services in southwest Broward County with the additional beds will cause Memorial West to operate at 87% occupancy in 2005 and 99% occupancy in 2010 unless the hospital proposed by SBHD for Miramar is built. Memorial West opened in 1992 as a 100-bed hospital, in part fulfilling SBHD's vision to expand services into what was then projected to be a rapidly growing southwest part of the county, a suburban area more affluent than the District as a whole. Approved by AHCA's predecessor, SBHD's strategy in opening Memorial West was to gain access to this more affluent suburban market in order to help off-set the rising care of indigent care. The strategy has worked. Memorial West has made a profound contribution to the financial success and viability of the District. In 2001, Memorial Hospital West accounted for almost half of the District's bottom line profit. The profitability of Memorial West has allowed the District to continue to provide growing levels of indigent care, while at the same time decreasing tax millage rates. In fact, the millage rates levied by the District have decreased three times since Memorial West opened. During this same period of decreasing millage rates, the District has been able to increase its ratio of uncompensated care to tax revenues from 3-1 to 5-1. The District's third hospital, Memorial Hospital Pembroke was leased by the District for the first time in 1995. Now leased until June 2005 from HCA, Inc., HCA announced its intention at hearing to re-take the facility so that the District will lose Memorial Pembroke as one of its hospitals at the expiration of the lease. Licensed for 301 beds, Memorial Pembroke is located 10.6 miles from the proposed Miramar site. Memorial Pembroke's occupancy rate from July 1999 to June 2000 was 26.2%. This low rate of occupancy is due, at least in part, to significant physical plant constraints and deficiencies. Although licensed for 301 beds, the physical plant can only reasonably support 149 beds. When its daily census reaches 140 patients, the hospital's operational and support systems begin to fail. Prior to 1995, Memorial Pembroke was operated by a series of for-profit owners. Just as it does now, Memorial Pembroke suffered from chronically low utilization under all prior management. Before the District leased the facility from Columbia-HCA, the hospital had become stigmatized in the community; many patients and physicians were reluctant to use it. Due to a number of factors (some tangible, such as an out-of-date physical plant - others intangible) that stigma continues today. The District has invested considerable management and financial resources to improve the quality of care, the condition of the facility and the community reputation of Memorial Hospital Pembroke. Because the hospital serves as a "safety valve" for the high utilization at the District's other hospitals, especially Memorial West, Memorial Pembroke's census between 1995 and 2000 has been on the rise. Nonetheless, the facility continues to be regarded as a "second tier" hospital and to suffer a stigma within the community. Whatever the source of the stigma afflicting Memorial Pembroke, it is unlikely that occupancy rates at Memorial Pembroke will dramatically improve unless significant and substantial investment is made in the hospital. It does not make sense for SBHD to make such an investment since it will lose the facility in three years. Whether HCA will make the investment required to cure the facilities utilization woes remains an open question. (See paragraphs 103 and 104, below.) Through the three hospitals in the Memorial Healthcare system, Regional, West and Pembroke, and a number of clinics that are off-campus, the District provides a full range of health care services to residents of south Broward County. These include: general acute care; tertiary care; adult and pediatric trauma care under trauma center designation; a specialty children's hospital designated by the state as a Children's Medical Services provider for children with special needs for cardiac care, hematology and oncology, and craniofacial services; outpatient services; and primary care services. The District is the only provider, moreover, of many health care services within the boundaries of the South Broward Hospital District, all of Broward County south of SW 36th Street. (The North Broward Hospital District includes all of Broward County north of SW 36th Street.) These services include obstetrics, pediatrics, neonatal intensive care, adult and pediatric trauma at a Level I trauma center, and teen pregnancy prevention and education. Consistent with its mission, the District also operates the only system of primary care clinics for the indigent in the South Broward Hospital District. The District is clearly the safety net provider of acute care hospital and other services for south Broward residents. In 1999, the District provided 5.9% of its total revenue or approximately $63 million in charity care and 5.4% or approximately $58 million to Medicaid recipients. During the same time period, Cleveland Clinic in terms of total revenue provided 1% charity care and 1.8% to Medicaid recipients while Westside provided 0.6% charity and 2.3% Medicaid. In dollars worth of care devoted to indigent and Medicaid patients, SBHD provides over ten times more Medicaid and indigent care than Cleveland Clinic and Westside combined. Tax revenues, although supportive of the District's ability to maintain its mission, do not come close to compensating the District in full for the care it provides to charity and indigent patients. In fact, the District expends five dollars in uncompensated care for every dollar of tax revenue it receives. Still, as a significant source of income to the District, these tax dollars contribute to SBHD's robust financial health. Cleveland Clinic Cleveland Clinic Hospital is owned by TCC Partners, a partnership between the Cleveland Clinic Foundation and Tenet Healthcare Systems. Originally located in northeast Broward County in Pompano Beach, Cleveland Clinic obtained approval in 1997 to relocate its 150 beds to Weston near the intersection of I-75 and Arvida Parkway. Operation at the site of the relocation began in July of 2001. The new site is within one of the ten-zip codes SBHD has chosen as the proposed primary service area for its new hospital in Miramar, but it is outside the South Broward Hospital District. The new site of Cleveland Clinic is in the North Broward Hospital District, 1.5 miles to the north of the boundary line between the two hospital districts that divides Broward County into two distinct health care markets. Cleveland Clinic has an established history as a regional and national tertiary referral center. It is also an advanced research and education facility that benefits from the outstanding reputation of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation and the hospitals under its umbrella. Cleveland Clinic is not a typical community hospital. It follows a distinctive model of medicine based on a multi- disciplinary approach and a closed medical specialty staff. The medical staff is open to community primary care physicians but not to community specialists or sub-specialists. All of the specialists on its staff are salaried employees of the Cleveland Clinic. This means that physician specialists who are not employees of the Clinic do not have privileges to admit or treat patients at the Cleveland Clinic Hospital. The Cleveland Clinic offers tertiary acute care services, such as kidney transplantation and open-heart surgery. It also provides specialty services in colorectal surgery, voiding dysfunction and limb reattachment. Among its specialty programs are an adult spine program, an acute stroke program, an epilepsy clinic, and an orthopedic center of excellence in sports medicine. At the time of hearing and since opening, Cleveland Clinic's average daily census has been approximately 44 patients. Westside Founded 26 or so years ago in what was then considered western Broward Count from the standpoint of population (hence its name), Westside is a 204-bed acute care hospital. Slightly less than nineteen miles from the proposed Miramar site, the site of the hospital is "now somewhat central [to Broward County]" (Westside No. 39, p. 8), given the location of the population today and the growth that has occurred to the west of Westside. Westside, like Cleveland Clinic, is in the North Broward Hospital District. It is located in the City of Plantation on West Broward Boulevard. Among the variety of acute care services offered by Westside is open heart surgery ("OHS"). The OHS program, implemented two years ago has increased the hospital's occupancy rate to a near 70%. (In 2000, the hospital had an acute care occupancy rate of 69.3%). The occupancy rate is expected to increase as the open heart surgery program expands and matures. Recent capacity constraints in the ICU, for example, led to a capital project to expand the unit "about a year and a half ago." (Id. at 13). With regard to questions about whether the hospital had experienced capacity constraints or "bottlenecks" in units, Michael Joseph, the chief executive officer of Westside, answered this way: We did in tele, and that's when we did the overflow on the fifth floor. So at this time we are -- in the peak season of March, from time to time, sure. But on the annualized basis, we are in the 75 percent occupancy level. And sometimes there [are other issues] that all hospitals go through. (Id., at 14). At the time of Mr. Joseph's deposition, October 23, 2001, for the most recent year the average daily census has been "in the 175 range." (Id.) At present, therefore, Westside's occupancy is close to ideal. Westside is financially strong. It had strong financial performance in 2000 and at the time of hearing was expected to perform strongly in 2001. Replication of West Faced with both the potential loss in 2005 of Memorial Pembroke and the high occupancies at Memorial Regional and Memorial West, SBHD began investigating the opportunity to replicate the Memorial West model of success. During the investigation, the District came to believe what it suspected from obvious signs: there is a large and growing population to be served in the Miramar area. Although land was limited, the District was able to purchase within the City of Miramar a 138-acre parcel. The parcel is the site of the subject under consideration in this proceeding as detailed in CON Application 9459: SBHD's proposed project. SBHD's Proposed Project The District proposes to construct a 100-bed acute care hospital at the intersection of SW 172nd Avenue and Pembroke Road. The site is a large one. It has sufficient land available to serve ultimately as a "health park" with medical office buildings, outpatient facilities, and additional health care related facilities typical of a modern medical campus. If, on the other hand, the District decides it is in its best interest to "sell off balances" (tr. 486) of the property, it retains that option. The hospital will provide basic acute care services and be composed of 80 adult medical/surgical, 8 pediatric, and 12 obstetric beds. On the third floor, the hospital will have 28 observation status beds, in addition to its 100 licensed beds. The design of the hospital is cost efficient. It meets all license and life safety code requirements. All patient rooms are private and meet the square footage requirements of AHCA's license standards. The hospital design, costs, and methods of construction are reasonable. The project has several goals. First, it is intended to provide increased access to affordable and quality health care for the residents of southwestern Broward County. Second, the project will allow Memorial Regional and Memorial West the opportunity to decompress and operate at reasonable and efficient occupancies into the foreseeable future without the operational problems caused by the current over-utilization. Third, the project will replace the loss of Memorial Pembroke. Finally, the project will give the District a second financial "engine that drives the train" (tr. 141) in the manner of Memorial West. The project will enable the District to maintain its financial strength and viability and continue to serve so effectively as the safety net provider for the indigent in South Broward County. Stipulated Facts In their prehearing stipulation, filed on October 31, 2001, the parties stipulated to the following: On January 26, 2001, AHCA published a fixed need pool for zero additional acute care beds in District 10, Broward County, for the January 2001 batching cycle. The South Broward Hospital District ("SBHD" or "District") timely and properly filed a Letter of Intent, initial CON Application, and Omissions Response in the batching cycle. On May 16, 2001, AHCA filed a Notice of Intent to issue the CON together with a State Agency Action Report ("SAAR") recommending approval of the CON for the proposed hospital. AHCA's Notice of Intent to approve the CON for the proposed hospital was challenged by Cleveland Clinic and Westside. Hollywood Medical Center ("HMC") also filed a petition challenging the preliminary approval but later withdrew as a party from these proceedings. Broward County has been divided by the Florida Legislature into two hospital taxing districts. The SBHD includes all areas of the county south of SW 36th Street, and the North Broward Hospital District ("NBHD") includes all areas north of the demarcation line. SBHD, Cleveland Clinic, and Westside each have a history of providing high quality of care. All of SBHD's hospital facilities are JCAHO accredited. Accordingly, the quality of care provided by these parties is not at issue in this proceeding except as it may be impacted by staffing issues. The proposed staffing and salary projections included on Schedule 6 of CON Application No. 9459 are reasonable and are not in dispute, although the parties specifically preserved the right to present evidence concerning the SBHD's ability to recruit the staff projected, and whether the projected salaries will cause or accelerate the loss of staff at existing hospitals. The parties agree that the SBHD has available management personnel and funds for capital and operating expenditures. However, Petitioners assert that the District's use of such resources for this project is neither wise nor prudent and is not in keeping with appropriate health planning principles. The parties agree that the SBHD has a history of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. (Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes.) However, Petitioners do not agree that proposed Miramar Hospital can meet the levels of charity care proposed in the application for the Miramar Hospital. With regard to Schedule 1 of the Application, the parties stipulate that the Land Costs (lines 1-11) are reasonable and are not disputed; and the Project Development Costs (lines 26-31) are reasonable and not disputed. The parties agree that Schedule 3 of the Application (sources of funds) is reasonable and not disputed. The SBHD does not contest Petitioners standing in this proceeding. At hearing, the parties stipulated that SBHD has the ability to recruit and retain the staff needed for the proposed hospital. The parties also stipulated that the SBHD has in place the staff recruitment and retention programs described at pages 132-139 of the CON application. The stipulation at hearing did not preclude either Westside or Cleveland Clinic from presenting evidence with respect to the impact of the SBHD's recruitment on other programs and other hospitals. No Numeric Need As indicated by the AHCA Bed Utilization Data for CY 2000, the occupancy rate in Broward County was 48.42%. There is, moreover, a surplus of 1,786 beds. This surplus has been increasing over time and has grown by nearly 60 beds between the January 2001 and July 2001 planning horizons. The hospitals within the District's proposed primary service area had an occupancy rate of 53% in the July 2001 planning horizon and a surplus of 456 beds, a number "somewhat proportionate to the distribution of patient days as well as licensed beds within the district." (Tr. 1639.) If the 152 non- functional beds at Memorial Pembroke are deducted from the surplus then the surplus is 304 beds. Not surprisingly therefore, the Agency's fixed need formula for acute care beds produced a fixed need of zero beds in Health Planning District 10 for the January 2001 batching cycle. (Broward County composes all of Health Planning District 10). The fixed need pool of zero was published by the Agency in January of 2001. Again in July 2001, AHCA published a fixed need for zero acute care beds in Health Planning District 10. In light of the zero fixed need pool, SBHD bases its application for the proposed Memorial Hospital Miramar on "not normal circumstances." Not Normal Circumstances "Not normal circumstances" are not defined or limited by statute or rule. Nonetheless, a number of "not normal" circumstances have been recognized repeatedly by AHCA . These recognized "not normal circumstances" are generally grouped into categories of access, quality and cost-effectiveness. None of them are present in this case. "There [are] no financial access, geographic access or clinical access circumstances [in this case] that rise to the level of not-normal circumstances." (Tr. 1633). Nor are there any quality or cost-effectiveness deficiencies claimed by the District in its application. The District bases its claim of "normal circumstances" on eight factors. They are: 1) explosive population growth; 2) a mal-distribution of beds within the health planning district; the effects of not having a hospital facility in the area proposed; 4) continued and projected high occupancies at nearby hospitals; 5) inability to expand inpatient capacity at the nearby hospitals with high occupancy rates; 6) the limited functionality and uncertain future of one of the hospitals that might serve the area where the new hospital is proposed to be located; 7) the increasing retraction of access for residents to other hospitals; and, 8) the need to assure that the applicant will remain a strong competitor able to fulfill its unique role and mission that would be served by granting the application. Population Growth Broward County is one of the fastest growing counties in the United States. "According to the census 2000 data, [over the last decade] it was the fastest growing county in all of the United States based on total population gain . . . ." (Tr. 617.) The population growth was spurred in the latter part of the previous decade by the devastation wreaked by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The hurricane's south Dade County victims used insurance proceeds to move to southwest Broward County. This migration helped to produce growth in southwest Broward County at a faster rate than the county as whole in the decade of the nineties. Growth in pockets of southwest Broward during this period of time has been phenomenal. For example, Pembroke Pines population increased 109 percent between 1990 and 2000. For the same time period, the population of Miramar (now the second fastest growing municipality in Florida) increased 78 percent. This growth was more than just steady during the 10 years before 2000; as the decade proceeded, the growth rate accelerated. In short, it is not a misnomer to describe the population increase in southwest Broward County and the Miramar area during the last decade as "explosive." (Tr. 626) With its attendant residential and commercial development, it has transformed southwest Broward County from a rural community into a suburban one. Population growth in southwest Broward County is expected to continue into the future. Substantial land in the area is under development or is available for residential development. By 2006, the population is projected to grow to 337,000, from the 2000 population of 289,000. This rate, while not comparable to the explosive rate in some pockets of the county in the last decade, is not insignificant. By way of contrast, the projected growth rate of 16.7% over the next five years in southwest Broward compares to a projected rate for the county as a whole of 8.4% and for Florida of 7.1%. In and of itself, the projected population growth in southwest Broward County is not a "not normal" circumstance. However one might characterize the projected growth rate in southwest Broward County, moreover, the acute care hospital bed need rule takes population into account in its calculations and projections. But, the bed need formula does not take into account the significant number of beds at Memorial Pembroke that are not functional. Nor does it take into account that Cleveland Clinic is not a typical community hospital. Nor does it take into account other factors such as that Memorial West and Memorial Regional are experiencing capacity problems or the division of the health planning district into two hospital taxing districts recognized as distinct medical markets, a recognition out of the ordinary for health planning districts in Florida. A geographical fact pertinent to arguments made by Cleveland Clinic and Westside with regard to the location of the population is that Memorial Miramar's proposed primary service area is divided by Interstate 75, a north-south primary travel corridor. On a percentage basis, there is faster population growth projected for areas west of I-75. But for the foreseeable future, the actual number of people populating the area west of I-75 will remain less than the number east of I-75. The area west of I-75, with the exception of one zip code in which a retirement center has been built, has a younger projected population that should produce lower use rates and average lengths of stay in hospitals than the area east of I-75. The support these facts lend to the District's opponent's arguments that bed need is greater east of I-75 than west is diminished by the absence of any hospitals west of I-75 in the South Broward Hospital District and the presence of four hospitals in the hospital district east of the interstate. Distribution of Beds Consistent with the recognition by the Legislature, AHCA, and its predecessor state agency, north and south Broward County are two distinct medical markets demarcated by the division of the county into two hospital districts. There are 3.52 beds per 1000 population in the North Broward Hospital District, 2.35 in the south. A greater number of under-utilized acute care beds are located in the northern half; a greater percentage of highly utilized hospitals are located in the southern half. Of the four hospitals located in south Broward County, both Memorial Regional and Memorial West had average annual occupancies in excess of 80% in the calendar year 2000. By contrast, of the 13 hospitals located in the northern half of the County, none had occupancy in excess of 80%, and only one had an average annual occupancy in excess of 70%. These statistics point toward an over-distribution within the health planning district of beds in the north and an under-distribution in the south. At the same time, beds are distributed between the two hospital districts in approximate proportion to the number of patient days experienced by each. In 2000, NBHD had 71% of the patient days for District 10 and 73% of the acute care beds. As one might expect, therefore, the relationship between patient days and acute care beds during the same period was similar for the SBHD: 28.9% of the patient days for District 10 and 27% of the beds. An analysis of bed to population ratio is only meaningful when occupancy rates are also considered. Occupancy rates are mixed in the south part of the county: very high for some, especially Memorial West, and very low for Memorial Pembroke. This breadth of this disparity is unusual. Effects of No Hospital in Miramar Thirty to 60 minutes to reach an acute care hospital is a reasonable driving time in an urban area. There are five existing acute care facilities within 30 minutes of southwest Broward County. In fact, most of the residents in Memorial Miramar's proposed service area are within 15 minutes or less of an existing acute care facility. Nonetheless, without a hospital in Miramar, residents must leave their immediate community to gain access to acute care services. As a matter of sound health planning, "[n]ot every city, town or hamlet can or should have its 'own' hospital." So correctly posit Cleveland Clinic and Westside. See pgs. 13-14, Cleveland Clinic and Westside PRO. But as the City Manager of Miramar wrote, "[t]he addition of a new hospital is one of the last missing links in the City [of Miramar]'s master plan . . . The city is looking to build the best possible future for its residents." District Ex. 2, Attachment G. A new hospital in Miramar would not only be a featured complement of the City of Miramar's plans for the future, it would also enhance access to acute care services and address access concerns caused by skewed utilization among the SBHD hospitals due to the unusual state of affairs at Memorial Pembroke and the high demand at West. Of great concern is that residents of southwest Broward County in need of emergency services are sometimes not able to gain access to those services at Memorial West, the closest available hospital. Memorial West operates the third busiest Emergency Department in Broward County with 65,000 visits in 2001. In Calendar Year 2000, Memorial West's emergency room went on diversion 123 times, averaging 7.7 hours per diversion. In the first months of 2001, the hospital went on diversion 89 times, with an average diversion time of 16.3 hours. These diversions have a dual effect. They mean that patients wait longer for beds. They also mean that providers of emergency medical services in ambulances are forced out of the community for extended periods of time unable to render services within the community that may be needed during that time. Diversions at Memorial West are becoming more and more problematic. Wait times are getting longer; the total time on diversion is growing. At first blush, the problems appear to be less significant at Memorial West than they might be elsewhere in District 10 because of its low "emergency room visits to hospital admissions" ratio. The Health Planning District average shows that about 20% of emergency room patients are admitted to the hospital. At Memorial West, the ratio is 8.7%, the lowest in the County. While normally this might reflect that patients visiting Memorial West have a lower acuity than patients visiting emergency rooms district-wide, the lower ratio for Memorial West is due, at least in part, to the high volume of pediatric patients seen at West who are transferred to Joe DiMaggio's Children's Hospital. The pediatric transfers, in the words of Frederick Michael Keroff, M.D., a Board-certified emergency physician who has worked in hospital emergency departments in South Florida for 24 years, create a false sense of what is actually being seen on the adult side of the emergency room department. On the adult side . . . [the ratio] varies somewhere between 12 and 16 and a half percent which is comparable with any other facility. . . . [W]hen you mix in such a large pediatric population into the adult population, obviously it dilutes out the number and drops [the ratio] down . . . . (Tr. 2568.) A solution to emergency room diversion at Memorial West and an alternative to the construction of Memorial Miramar proposed by Cleveland Clinic and Westside is more SBHD urgent care centers in the Miramar area. SBHD operates seven urgent care centers. Of these seven, the proposed Miramar PSA has only one. Additional urgent care centers more readily accessible in the 10 zip code area that comprises Memorial Miramar's PSA might reduce the number of visits to the ER at Memorial West. But they might not. Patients don't self-triage when they are presented with a problem. They go to the hospital. [Triage is a medical decision.] Patients usually come to the hospital, even [with] urgent care centers down the block, because they don't know what the problem is and they allow the hospital to make the decision about what the problem is. (Tr. 2571.) Additional urgent care centers would not solve the problem created when diversion is a result of the lack of acute care beds for Memorial West ER patients who need to be admitted to the hospital for treatment beyond that provided in the ER. Cleveland Clinic hospital is not likely to offer much of an alternative. Because of the closed nature of the Cleveland Clinic specialty staff, it will not be a hospital of choice for community physicians in the South Broward Hospital District. Nor will it be a hospital of choice for patients able to elect the hospital at which to seek emergency services. It is apparent from the demand on Memorial West, despite the number of beds and other emergency departments within acceptable reach, that a Memorial West-type facility is what the residents of southwest Broward County prefer and opt for even if it means they have will have to wait for emergency services. In cases of patients transported from southwest Broward County via ambulances forced to go to Cleveland Clinic in Weston to deliver patients in need of emergency services, the transport presents difficulties of their own. It is not efficient management of emergency services due to their very nature to require ambulances to leave their service areas. There are no clear solutions to the problems emergency room diversions present for patients, their families, physicians, and the emergency medical system in general in southwest Broward County other than construction of new acute care hospital in Miramar. Construction of a new acute care hospital in Miramar will help to alleviate the high occupancies and emergency room diversions currently experienced at Memorial West. It will reduce disruptions to Miramar residents and will provide an easily accessible alternative to southwest Broward County residents, thereby enhancing access to emergency services. High Occupancy Rates at West and Regional The current and reasonably-projected high occupancies at Memorial West and Memorial Regional are extraordinary circumstances for a health planning district with as many excess beds as District 10. The calculation under AHCA's formula for hospital bed need for the January 2001 batching cycle yielded an excess of 1,717 beds. Calculation by the Agency using the same formula for the July 2001 batching cycle showed an excess of 1,786 beds or 59 more excess beds than just six months earlier. The import of these results was described at hearing by Scott Hopes, Westside's expert health planner: Obviously when you have a situation like this, the default is a zero published fixed need which is what was published. But the importance here is that there are so many excess beds. And if you look also on the line [of Westside Ex. 23] that deals with occupancy rate, the occupancy rate is about 48 percent, and it hasn't varied much between the six-month period. In fact, the occupancy rate in Broward County has been under 50 percent for some quite sometime. (Tr. 2076-7). It is extraordinary that a health planning district with so many excess beds would also have two hospitals, Memorial West and Memorial Regional, with capacity problems. Memorial West, by any standard, is a successful hospital. Since it opened in 1992, the inpatient volume there has tripled. Opening as a 100-bed facility, Memorial West now has 184 licensed beds, an expansion aimed to meet the demand for its services. As alluded to elsewhere in this order, because there are often not enough available acute care beds at Memorial West, some patients have to wait in the ER six hours or more. It is not unusual for more than 40 patients to wait at one time. Despite these conditions, patients, when offered the opportunity for a transfer to another hospital, rarely accept the offer. More often than not the patients do not wish to go. The reputation of Memorial Hospital West, the loyalty factor, if you will, to Memorial, to the medical staff, the patients want to remain at the facility. (Testimony of Memorial West Administrator Ross, Tr. 152-3.) Memorial West plans expansion but even with its current planned bed expansion, it is reasonable to expect it to reach unacceptably high occupancy rates by 2006 if Memorial Miramar is not built. Furthermore, the only obstetric programs in south Broward are at Memorial West and Memorial Regional. Memorial West performed 4,400 births last year, and its obstetrics unit often operates in excess of 100% occupancy. The only constraint on additional births at West is the limited physical capacity of the facility. Memorial Regional experienced even more births last year than West with about 5,000 deliveries. Memorial Regional is operating at or exceeding its functional capacity in other departments. The current medical/surgical occupancy at Memorial Regional is approximately 80% year round. Some units experience much higher occupancies. The intensive care unit's occupancy frequently exceed 100%, as does the cardiac telemetry unit. In certain medical/surgical units, peak occupancy is as high as 125%. Memorial Regional's capacity to handle its high patient volume is limited by certain factors. Semi-private rooms are limited to use by members of the same sex. As a tertiary facility, there are specialty patients who must be served by nurses trained in that patient's specialty, with appropriate monitoring equipment. Without approval of Memorial Hospital Miramar, Memorial Regional will reach 85% occupancy by 2008 and 88% occupancy by 2010. These occupancy rates create an inefficient and untenable environment in which to deliver the mix of specialized and tertiary services offered by Memorial Regional. The overcrowding at Memorial West and Memorial Regional is dramatic and continuing. There are simply more patients seeking care at these hospitals than the hospitals can serve appropriately. This overcrowding exists despite the excess of acute care beds within the health planning district. In sum, despite the plentiful nature of the number of acute care beds in the health planning district, a need exists to either decompress Memorial Regional and Memorial West by some means such as the proposed new hospital in Miramar or to expand one or both of the two hospitals by way of new construction or conversion of LDR and observation beds. A decompression alternative to the new hospital is to transfer beds from existing hospitals to create a satellite hospital. Because of high occupancy rates at West and Regional and because Pembroke's lease will expire in 2005, transfer of existing beds is not a feasible option. That leaves expansion, as the only alternative to a new hospital in Miramar. Cleveland Clinic and Westside argue there are ample opportunities at the two hospitals for expansion. Expansion New Construction In pre-CON application evaluation, SBHD commissioned a study from Gresham, Smith and Partners, an architecture firm. The firm studied the three Memorial facilities to determine whether expansion of the acute care bed complement at any of them was feasible. In a "Memorial Health System Facility Expandability and Master Plan Review Report" the firm concluded that it was clearly not feasible to expand either Memorial Pembroke or Memorial Regional and there were problems with expanding Memorial West. With significant problems including its aged plant and its uncertain future, expansion at Memorial Pembroke would not be cost-effective. It would cost $31 million in capital improvements to maintain Pembroke's functional capacity at 149 beds. If the present location of nursing administration, hospice and other necessary services were moved out of the hospital, the hospital's function could be expanded to 215 beds. No evidence was presented with regard to the advisability of moving those services or the additional costs associated with this alternative. HCA's willingness to make the investment necessary to renovate the facility at Pembroke was not supported by any specifics. HCA's announced its intention, "to take the hospital back at the end of the lease and run it," (tr. 1511-2) but, in fact, the company has not taken any action to evaluate the potential for assuming operation of the hospital in 2005. Nor has it even begun the process it must go through before final decisions are made. The overarching intention to "re-take the hospital and run it," at this point in time, does not mean HCA will be willing to make the investment necessary to renovate the facility either during the term of SBHD's lease or afterward. It still needs to "do a very detailed discounted cash flow analysis to make a final decision on the investment needed and the return on that investment." (Tr. 1514.) Memorial Pembroke's uncertain future makes it an unlikely candidate for expansion. However unlikely such a result, with the problems that afflict Memorial Pembroke, there is, moreover, no guarantee that HCA's intended analysis will convince it even to continue operation of the hospital. Memorial Regional has different problems from Memorial Pembroke. It takes up an entire block surrounded by residential property and parking garages. There is almost no opportunity for growth on the site. Of the few areas that could be expanded vertically, only one would be conducive to bed addition. "[I]t is so remote, it doesn't tie back to the main nursing care areas." (Tr. 482.) Expansion at Regional would also be plagued with concurrency problems and zoning issues. Of the three hospitals, Memorial West presents the best option for expansion. A facility master plan for Memorial West provides for the addition of a patient tower on the north side of the facility ("the north tower"). The addition of the north tower could add as many as 50 beds to Memorial West at a cost substantially less than the construction of Memorial Miramar. Still, SBHD's architects, Smith and Gresham, concluded that expansion of the size necessary to alleviate the overcrowding at West was not cost-effective. The force of the Smith and Gresham opinion is tempered by the firm's standing to benefit financially to a much more significant degree if Memorial Miramar is built than if the planned-for tower is constructed to add 50 beds to Memorial West. But the opinion is not groundless. Put simply, construction of an additional tower at West is no simple solution to its capacity problems. The tower was planned for maternal services but like the minimal opportunity for expansion at Regional, it would be "remote from the rest of the nursing function . . . [it would, moreover] trigger huge upgrades to the infrastructure." (Tr. 480.) The hospital site is constricted already because of additions that have almost completely built out the campus. A new north tower would add inefficiencies in hospital operations because of the increase in travel distance for materials delivery and meeting the dietary needs of patients. Despite the master plan for growth, an improvement the size of the north tower would begin to turn West into another Memorial Regional: a huge hospital, overdeveloped for its site. The improvement, like every improvement thereafter, would require patient shuffles and disruptions in patient care. Like Memorial Regional, expansion at West, too, would have concurrency issues and could create a land use dispute with neighbors, the outcome of which is uncertain. In light of these obstacles, SBHD prefers the option of constructing the new hospital in Miramar over expansion at West. There is, however, in the view of SBHD's opponents, another option for expansion of existing facilities: conversion of LDR and observation beds. Expansion through conversion of LDR and Observation Beds Cleveland Clinic and Westside contend that another option to relieve overcrowding is conversion of observation and LDR beds to acute care hospital beds. But these beds are used to meet the need of observation and maternity service patients. There are patients who need closely supervised medical care but whose care has not been determined to require admission to the hospital. Observation patients, sometimes referred to as "23 hour" patients, may suffer from various conditions, including chest pain, fever, abdominal pain, rectal bleeding or nausea. Given the high number of births at Memorial West, many obstetrical patients present at the hospital in "false labor" or for antipartum testing, complications of pregnancy, or symptoms that should be treated as observation or on an inpatient basis. It would be impractical for Memorial West to convert observation and maternity service beds, whether existing or still planned for, to inpatient acute care beds. If these beds were converted, Memorial West would find itself once again in its present straits of not enough beds for observation purposes particularly for obstetrical patients for whom there is little choice where to obtain obstetrical services in the South Broward Hospital District. Limited Functionality and Uncertain Future of Memorial Pembroke Memorial Pembroke has undergone seven ownership changes since it first opened. Perceived as a hospital where neither patients nor physicians want to go, it has suffered from a stigma within the community. Even with recent gains in utilization, it achieved an occupancy rate of only 24% in calendar year 2000. Pembroke suffers from physical and infrastructure limitations that reduce its functional bed capacity to 149 beds. Its mechanical and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems are outdated and inadequate. For example, a primary generator is vented to the outside by a 6-foot hole in the ceiling. The electrical panels are at absolute capacity. The first floor has an outdated, plenum air return with no ducts in the ceiling. The generators have transfer switches that require them to be turned on manually. Facilities management personnel are reluctant to do so for safety reasons. The semi-private patient rooms at Pembroke are too small for modern care and do not have adequate space for the monitors, IV equipment, pumps and other technology required by today's health care delivery system. Many rooms do not have showers. The hospital has a number of three bed wards woefully outdated by the standards of modern care. It would cost $31 million in capital improvements to simply maintain Pembroke's functional capacity at 149 beds, to upgrade the facility to bring it into compliance with existing code and to otherwise modernize inadequacies. Whether Pembroke will continue to operate after 2004 is unknown. While HCA stated its intention to do so, it has not made a final decision to assume operations. It still needs to conduct a financial analysis sufficiently detailed to determine whether the necessary expenditures to bring the hospital up to par are practical. Any capital investment by HCA in excess of $1 million requires the approval of HCA's national office, approval that has not yet been provided. The level of capital investment required at Memorial Pembroke is significant and it cannot be assumed that HCA will make this investment. (See paragraph 89, above.) Increasing Retraction for Access in SW Broward Of the three hospitals located within the ten zip codes that constitute southwest Broward County: Memorial West, Memorial Pembroke and Cleveland Clinic, each poses some manner of access impediment for the residents of the area. Memorial West is overcrowded. Memorial Pembroke's future is uncertain, its present clouded by significant physical plant problems and stigma that keeps its occupancy low. Cleveland Clinic's distinctive character, its closed specialty staff and its regional, national and international draw discourages utilization by southwest Broward residents seeking routine acute care hospital services at a community hospital. The Cleveland Clinic medical staff is open to community primary care physicians. "[W]ith the qualification that if there's a specialty for some reason that is not adequately manned, the clinic can go out and contract with community physicians to provide the services" (District No. 55, p. 39), the Cleveland Clinic medical staff is not open to community specialists or sub-specialists. Its specialty and sub- specialty staff, therefore, is closed. The medical staff building, moreover, located on the campus is also closed to community practitioners even to those primary care physicians with privileges at the hospital to manage their patients care. Like the specialty medical staff, the building is restricted to Cleveland Clinic salaried specialists. Due to the closed nature of the specialty staff at Cleveland Clinic, any patient admitted to the Cleveland Clinic hospital will be seen by a Cleveland Clinic physician. This sets up reluctance on the part of community physicians to use the Cleveland Clinic hospital. As expressed by the hospital's CEO, "it's sometimes difficult to convince a primary care physician that he needs to change his referral patients, so yes, there is some concern [about the willingness of community physicians to utilize the hospital]." Id., p. 40. In multiple prior CON applications approved by AHCA, Cleveland Clinic projected that up to 30% of its patients would come from outside Broward County and that it would draw patients from throughout Broward County, rather than having a more traditional, limited service area typical of a community hospital. Patient origin data for Cleveland Clinic when at its old location in Pompano Beach shows the hospital, unique among Broward County hospitals, has a broad county-wide, regional and national draw. While all other hospitals in Broward County can identify fewer than 25 zip codes that generate the first 75% of patient admissions in 1999, 60 zip codes generated the first 75% of Cleveland Clinic's admissions. Similarly, while all other hospitals in Broward County can identify fewer than 25 zip codes that generate the first 90% of their patient admissions in 1999, the first 90% of patient admissions at Cleveland Clinic's hospital were generated by no less than 287 zip codes. Cleveland Clinic presented evidence of its intention to be available to the local community. It has marketed in Broward County by means of newspaper and television advertisements and various community programs. It has also conducted outreach and training programs with the emergency medical service providers in the Broward County area, not only to improve the quality of care for the patients of Broward County but also to educate the emergency medical service providers about Cleveland Clinic. The patient origin data for Cleveland Clinic's first three months of operation in Weston, however, verifies its continued broad draw. This data shows that within Broward County, only 30% of patients originated within the 9 southwest Broward zip codes that Cleveland Clinic identifies as its "immediate service area"; the other 70% of its patients come from outside the immediate service area. Cleveland Clinic is not a typical community hospital. Its previous CON applications have been granted in part on its unique characteristics. Whether its image or persona will change with the move to Weston to attract more patients from southwest Broward County is an open question. Given its nature and the focus of the health care it is likely to deliver, however, it is not likely that it will be utilized regularly by residents of southwest Broward County seeking routine hospital care either because not their hospital of choice or because of community physician referral patterns. h. Assurance that SBHD Can Fulfill its Mission The final "not normal" circumstance relied on by SBHD relates to the affluence of the patients in southwest Broward County and the profits that are reasonably expected to be generated by virtue of the proposed hospital's location in this affluent area. The expected profits will both subsidize SBHD's charity care and support its ability to be competitive. The importance of SBHD remaining competitive and able to serve the indigent in Broward County was explained at hearing by Jeffrey Gregg, Chief of AHCA's Bureau of Health Facility Regulation: [A]s a major indigent care provider for the State of Florida, [SBHD is] providing a service that extends far and wide that benefits everyone. In our state we have indigent care concentrated in relatively few facilities … [I]t is a very important resource that needs to be nurtured and protected to the greatest extent possible because it is fragile and vulnerable. We have many uninsured people in the state, somewhere between two and three million. It is reasonable to expect now with the economic downturn that we are going to be seeing an increase in uninsured people, so the value of hospitals that function as safety net providers is . . . very important. (Tr. 1240-1). This rationale supported the District's CON application for Memorial West. Because of SBHD's financial success to which Memorial West has been a major contributor, SBHD has achieved a significant degree of financial stability in this day of decreasing reimbursements, managed care, and increased health care costs. It is not contested that its financial position is sound. For fiscal year 2002, SBHD was running ahead of revenue and profit projections at the time of hearing. Nonetheless, if hospitals are constrained and the payor mix becomes less favorable, financial conditions can change quickly. Only three years ago, the District posted an $18 million debt. The capacity constraints at Memorial West will limit its ability to generate additional profits. At the same time, the District must accept all charity care patients. This requirement coupled with capacity constraints has the potential for an unfavorable payor mix for the District. The addition of Memorial Miramar will help to ensure that the District maintains its strong market position and will sustain a favorable payor mix. The profits expected to be generated by Memorial Miramar will ensure that the District can continue to provide care to the indigent without raising, and perhaps by lowering, the tax rate for the tax payers of Broward County. The Proposed Primary Service Area The District's proposed primary service area ("PSA") is a 10 zip code area in southwest Broward County. It excludes zip codes in Dade County that might have been included as well as the eight easternmost zip codes in south Broward County. Usually a set of contiguous towns or minor subdivisions or zip codes that represent a substantial majority of a hospital's patients, there is no single way of defining a hospital's primary service area. Some health planners use a region from which 75% of the patients come but a range of 60 to 80 percent is not unreasonable. There are other approaches to defining primary service areas: zip codes, for example, in which a threshold level of market share was achieved or that account for a minimum percentage of the hospital's patients. While one method may be more usual than another, any of a number of ways of defining a PSA may be reasonable. Cleveland Clinic's health planner, Ms. Patricia Greenberg sees Dr. Finarelli's PSA for the Miramar hospital as not rational from the perspective of health planning. The zip codes Dr. Finarelli chose include a number that are to the east of Memorial West. Ms. Greenberg asserts that it is unlikely that patients will drive from the east past Memorial West in order to reach Memorial Miramar. It would have made much more sense, in her view, for the PSA to have included three zip codes to the north of the PSA in western Broward County: zip codes 33327, 33326 and 33325. But these zip codes, entirely within North Broward Hospital District, are not South Broward Hospital District zip codes. Nor are three other zip codes that Ms. Greenberg sees for the Miramar PSA as more rational choices than zip codes east of Memorial West that Dr. Finarelli chose. Ms. Greenberg's other choices outside Dr. Finarelli's PSA are not only not in the hospital district, they are not in AHCA Health Planning District 10. They are in Dade County. Determinations of bed need do not always rise and fall on the selection of the primary service area. To the contrary, as Dr. Finarelli stated at hearing, "[h]ow and where the boundaries are drawn between the primary and secondary service area is less important [than] making sure that any analysis of bed need and demand incorporates both the primary and secondary service areas." (Tr. 724). This statement loses its potency, however, and the import of the choice of the primary service area is raised in light of the population-based bed need projections made by Dr. Finarelli within the PSA in support of the application. Population Based Bed Need Projections within the PSA Dr. Finarelli conducted a standard population based bed need analysis to determine the gross bed need within the PSA selected for the proposed hospital. His bed need calculations were computed separately for adult medical, surgical, pediatric and obstetric beds. The assumptions used by Dr. Finarelli were reasonable and appropriate. The level of detail in Dr. Finarelli's model was described by another of SBHD's expert health planners who testified in this case, Mr. Balsano and who has been qualified as an expert in health planning and health care financial feasibility approximately 20 times over the last decade, as the most detailed model he had ever seen. Dr. Finarelli's analysis accounted for the current and projected population as well as the current and projected hospital discharge rate per 1000 population within the PSA. Multiplying the population (in thousands) by the discharge rate yields the total number of current and projected hospital discharges by PSA residents for the planning horizon. The total number of hospital discharges was then multiplied by an appropriate average length of stay ("ALOS") to determine the total number of current and projected patient days by PSA residents. The total patient days were divided by 365 (days in the year) to arrive at the current and projected hospital average daily census ("ADC"). Finally, the ADC was divided by the desired 75% occupancy rate to arrive at a gross bed need for the PSA. The calculations result in a projected need in the 2006 planning horizon for a total of 457 acute care beds; including 386 adult medical surgical, 25 pediatric, and 46 obstetric beds. Based only on projected population growth within the PSA, there will be an incremental gross bed need for 75 acute care beds; 67 medical/surgical, 3 pediatric and 5 obstetric. Existing Inventory and Bed Supply The three hospitals located within the 10 zip code PSA have a total of 667 licensed acute care beds, existing or approved. Including the 36 approved and 16 conditionally approved beds at West, Memorial West has 216 beds. Memorial Pembroke has 301 and there are 150 licensed beds at Cleveland Clinic. This total, however, is "simply not a reasonable or realistic measure of how many beds in those three hospitals are truly available to the residents of Southwest Broward County . . . ." (Tr. 837-8.) Patient origin statistics and representations made by Cleveland Clinic in its certificate of need applications bear out that it is not a typical community hospital. Appropriate to its mix of tertiary services and its focus on education and research, it has a broad service area reaching far beyond Broward County. Consistent with the nature of the hospital, in its first three months of operation at Weston, 35% of its patients came from outside Broward County and only 16% have come from southwest Broward County or the 10 zip code PSA used by SBHD in its application for the Miramar hospital. Based on available data and information, it is reasonable to project that Cleveland Clinic will draw approximately 26% of its patients from within Memorial Miramar's PSA. It is reasonable, therefore, to allocate 26% of Cleveland Clinic's 150 beds to meet the population based demand for adult medical surgical beds in the PSA, for a net contribution of approximately 40 beds. With its functional capacity of 149 beds, it is not reasonable to consider all of the 301 beds at Memorial Pembroke. Fifty-four percent of its patients come from within the Memorial Pembroke PSA. The product of 149 beds multiplied by 54% is approximately 80 beds available to meet the population-based demand of the residents of southwest Broward County. There is, moreover, some doubt about whether any beds will be available at Memorial Pembroke after the expiration of SBHD's lease with HCA. Given the stigma Memorial Pembroke suffers and its uncertain future, an estimate of 80 beds is a reasonable projection for the number of beds at the hospital available to meet the needs of the residents of southwest Broward County. With 65% of its patients coming from within the proposed PSA for the Miramar Hospital, Memorial West is the hospital of choice for the residents of the proposed PSA. With 186 adult medical surgical beds, 120 meet the needs of patients coming from Miramar's PSA. Thus, there are approximately 240 adult medical surgical beds (120 at West, 80 at Pembroke and 40 at Cleveland Clinic) available to meet the projected need of 386 adult medical surgical beds in the 2006 planning horizon. Subtracting the 240 beds from the 386 needed yields a net need of 146 beds to serve residents of the Miramar PSA. Although some patients will continue to seek services outside the PSA, Dr. Finarelli's projection that there is a sufficient net need to support the 80 adult medical surgical beds proposed at Memorial Miramar is reasonable. Building Memorial Miramar will help reduce the percentage of people who leave the area for acute inpatient adult medical surgical services from its current level of about 50% to approximately 25%. This will improve access to health care for the residents of southwest Broward County. Memorial West is the only provider of obstetrical services in southwest Broward County, and only one of two in all of south Broward (the other being Memorial Regional). Both Memorial West and Memorial Regional are operating above capacity in their obstetrical units. In calendar year 2000, Memorial West's 24-bed obstetric unit operated at 130% occupancy. Hollywood Medical Center recently closed its obstetric unit thereby increasing the pressure on Memorial Regional and Memorial West to provide services to area patients. With a projected gross need for 46 obstetric beds in the planning horizon, there is a net need for at least 22 more obstetric beds. The proposed 12-bed unit at Memorial Miramar will help to meet that need. Memorial Hospital West's 6-bed pediatric unit is the only unit of its kind in southwest Broward County. The only other provider of pediatric services in all of south Broward is Memorial Regional's Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital. Dr. Finarelli reasonably projects that one-half of the pediatric patient beds needed in southwest Broward would continue to be filled by Joe DiMaggio's Children Hospital. This leaves a net need for at least 7 pediatric beds in southwest Broward; the proposed 8-bed unit at Memorial Miramar will fill that need. Patient Days, Utilization and Market Share Projections To project utilization and market shares for the proposed hospital, Dr. Finarelli used a geographic area comprised of 28 zip codes that represent the primary and secondary service areas of the proposed hospital. The areas are expected to account for 90% of the hospital's admissions. The 28 zip codes were divided by Dr. Finarelli into four geographic clusters: the 10 zip code PSA or "Southwest Broward", 9 zip codes in "Other South Broward", 3 zip codes in "North Broward" and 6 zip codes in north Dade County or "Select North Dade." Based on historical and current data and market trends, Dr. Finarelli assigned current and projected inpatient market shares in each zip code cluster to each hospital in south Broward County and to select hospitals in north Broward County and north Dade County, with and without the existence of Memorial Hospital Miramar. He also assigned market shares and projected patient days separately by service category for adult medical/surgical, obstetric and pediatric services. Dr. Finarelli's market share assumptions for the proposed hospital were as follows: for Southwest Broward County in the Adult Service Category, 6% and 18%, in OB, 7% and 20%, in Pediatrics, 7% and 20%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively; for Other South Broward County, in the Adult Service Category, 0.3% and 1%, for OB, 0.3% and 1%, for pediatrics, 0% and 0%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively; for North Broward in the Adult Service Category, 0.6% and 2%, for OB, 0.8% and 3% and for pediatrics, 0.8% and 3%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively; and for Select North Dade, in the Adult Service Category, 0.8% and 2.5%, for OB, 1% and 3%, and for pediatrics, 0.8% and 2.5%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively. Taking into account available data and projected trends in each of the zip code clusters, these market share projections are reasonable. Dr. Finarelli applied his market share assumptions to overall projections of hospital discharges for each zip code cluster to arrive at the projected number of discharges for the proposed hospital in its first and second year of operation. He included an additional 9% to 10% in projected discharges to account for patients admitted from outside the 28 zip codes, such as patients from areas elsewhere in Broward, Dade, other parts of Florida and out of state. It is typical for hospitals in Broward County to receive approximately 10% of patients from outside of their primary and secondary service areas. By multiplying the projected number of hospital discharges by a reasonable length of stay for each category of service, Dr. Finarelli arrived at his projections of patient days. His "average length of stay" assumption was less than the District average. These calculations demonstrate that Memorial Miramar will have total acute care utilization of 19,958 patient days in its first full year of operation, and 25,503 patient days in its second full year of operation. Dr. Finarelli's projections of market shares, admissions and patient days for the new hospital appear to be reasonable. The Statutory Criteria Section 408.035, Florida Statutes, provides the review criteria for CON applications. The parties agree that subsections (3) and (4) are not in dispute. Section 408.035(1) concerns whether the proposed project is supported by and consistent with the applicable district health plan (the "Plan"). The Plan contains recommendations, preferences and priorities. The majority of the preferences and priorities contained in the Plan are not applicable to this application. The Plan recommends that there should be a reduction of licensed beds in Broward County until a ratio of 4.0 beds per 1,000 population is less than 4.0 beds per thousand and/or an overall occupancy rate of 85% is achieved. Although the bed population ratio is less than 4.0 beds per thousand, the annual occupancy rate is below 50%. This criterion, quite obviously, is not met by SBHD. But its importance diminishes in light of the "not normal" circumstances in support of the application, particularly the overcrowding at Memorial West and Regional. The Plan states that "priority consideration for initiation of new acute care services or capital expenditures shall be given to applicants with a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so." SBHD promises to provide 3.21% of gross revenue for charity care and 4.14% of its patient days for Medicaid patients at Memorial Pembroke. These figures are not unattainable. Memorial West provided 3.2% of its revenues toward charity care in the most recent year. The effect of the expiration of SBHD' lease without renewal at Memorial Pembroke may increase pressure on Memorial Miramar's charity care services. On the other hand, in light of Memorial West's history in meeting its charity care commitment and the relative affluence of the Miramar's PSA, there is some question as to whether Memorial Miramar can meet the commitment contained in the application. West has fallen far short of its 7.0% commitment. Less than 1% of its admissions were charity care admissions between 1997 and 2000 and only 2.6% of its gross revenues were for charity care in 1999, for example. Whatever West's experience bodes for Miramar's future, it is clear that SBHD has a documented history of providing services to the medically indigent. It is committed, moreover, to do so throughout the hospital district whether it achieves its commitment at Memorial Miramar or not. The preferences of the Plan related to the provision of care for the indigent is clearly met by SBHD. Section 408.035(2) addresses the availability, quality of care, accessibility and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. There is no problem with quality of care in the district. The extent of utilization of all the facilities in the district is not high. Nonetheless, there is an access problem that constitutes not normal circumstances. Memorial West, in particular, is overcrowded. A new hospital in Miramar will enhance access for the residents of the hospital district who want to access one of the District's hospitals and so directly meets the criterion in Section 408.035(7), the "extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district." Section 408.035(5) addresses the needs of research and educational facilities including facilities with institutional training programs and community training programs for health care practitioners at the student, internship and residency training levels. The District's affiliation with medical schools provides some satisfaction with this criterion but on balance, SBHD receives little credit under this criterion. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes is "[t]he availability, of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation." The parties stipulated that SBHD has the ability to recruit and retain the staff needed for the proposed hospital. Cleveland Clinic and Westside argue that SBHD's recruitment of staff will have a detrimental impact on existing providers. A shortage of skilled nurses and other allied professionals exists nationally, in Florida and in Dade and Broward Counties. The nursing shortage has intensified in recent years due to the decline in the number of licensed nurses further compounded by a drop in the number of nurses enrolled in nursing schools. As a result it has become increasingly difficult for hospitals to fill nursing vacancies. In order to ensure adequate staffing in the midst of the nursing shortage, especially during the peak season of late fall and the winter months, Westside and Cleveland Clinic are forced to utilize "agency" or "pool" nursing personnel. These nurses command higher wages than non-agency nursing personnel. The District's application projects a need for 128 registered nurses who will be full-time employees ("FTE"s). This need increases to 167. New hospitals are usually able to attract staff from other facilities who prefer to work with new equipment in a new setting. Recruitment of personnel to staff the Miramar Hospital will come at the expense of existing providers such as Cleveland Clinic and Westside. Subsection (8) of the Review Criteria is "[t]he immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal." The District has the financial resources to construct the hospital and meet start-up costs. There was no challenge to SBHD's demonstration of short-term financial feasibility. Projections of revenues and expenses were based on SBHD experience at Memorial West and its other hospitals. These projections are reasonable. Based on Dr. Finarelli's patient day projections, showing a net profit of $1.6 million in year 2, the project is feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9) of the Review Criteria is "[t]he extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness." Aside from the impact the new facility will have on Cleveland Clinic and Westside's ability to recruit and retain staff, the evidence failed to show that either Cleveland Clinic or Westside would suffer significant impact if SBHD's application is approved. No matter which experts projections of lost case volume are accepted, both Cleveland Clinic and Westside should generate substantial net profits. The future of Memorial Pembroke, after the expiration of the current lease, is too speculative to factor into the impact to HCA. Subsection (10) of the Review Criteria relates to the costs and methods of the proposed construction. The District satisfies this criterion. (See paragraph 34, above). Subsection (11) addresses the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. As stated above, while there is legitimate doubt whether or not SBHD can meet the conditions it proposes in its application, there is no question about its past provisions of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Rule Criteria There are two rule criteria that relate to the application. Rule 59C-1.038, acute care bed priority considerations and Rule 59C-1030, additional review criteria. Under the Rule 59C-1.038 there are two priorities, only the first of which (documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so) is applicable. Stated in the disjunctive, just as its corollary statutory criterion, SBHD clearly meets the criterion based on its documented history regardless of the case Cleveland Clinic and Westside present relative to doubts based on the history of condition compliance at Memorial West. The criteria in Rule 59C-1.030 generally address the extent to which there is a need for a particular service and the extent to which the service will be accessible to underserved members of the population. The application did not identify an underserved segment of the population that is in need of the services proposed for Memorial Miramar. As for the remainder of the criteria under the rule, there is a need for the proposed project as concluded below in this order's conclusions of law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration grant South Broward Hospital District's CON Application 9459 to establish a 100-bed acute care hospital in southwest Broward County. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Gary Williams, Esquire Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 F. Philip Blank, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Meenan & Smith, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 George N. Meros, Jr., Esquire Michael E. Riley, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gerald L. Pickett, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (3) 120.569408.035408.039
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