The Issue The issue in Case No. 89-1706 is whether the Stearns violated provisions of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, in the construction of a dock on the Indian River. The issue in Case No. 89-1707 is whether Mr. Stearns is entitled to a dredge and fill permit for the construction of the above-described dock.
Findings Of Fact The Stearns reside at Sunrise Landing Condominium in Cocoa, Florida. The condominium complex lies on the western shore of the Indian River in north Brevard County. At this location, the Indian River is classified as a Class III water and is conditionally approved by the Department of Natural Resources for shellfish harvesting. By Purchase Agreement dated February 18, 1987, the Stearns agreed to purchase a unit at Sunrise Landings Condominiums from the developer. By subsequent Purchase Agreement Modification, the parties agreed that the Stearns had "permission to build a private boat dock providing buyer obtains all proper permits from the Army Corps of engineers and all other proper authorities." By Warranty Deed dated April 16, 1987, the developer conveyed the unit to the Stearns. The deed, which conveys a 1/72nd interest in the common elements, does not convey any right to build a dock. The deed states that the conveyance is subject to the Declaration of Condominium of Sunrise Landing II. The declaration, which was recorded prior to the deed to the Stearns, defines as Common Element the land lying adjacent and upland to the dock that the Stearns constructed. The declaration states that each unit owner owns an undivided share of the Common Element. Article III, Section 7 states: The Owner of a Unit . . . shall be entitled to use the Common Elements in accordance with the purposes for which they are intended, but no such use shall hinder or encroach upon the lawful rights of Owners of other Units. There shall be a joint use of the Common Elements . . . and a joint mutual easement for that purpose is hereby created. In February, 1987, prior to closing on their unit, the Stearns arranged with an individual named Kurt Ramseyer to construct the dock. Mr. Ramseyer completed construction of the dock on or about July 3, 1987. On or about February 22, 1987, Mr. Stearns executed an application for permit for activities in the waters of the State of Florida. The application warned the applicant that he must obtain all applicable authorizations before commencing work. The application, as well as all others completed by Mr. Stearns, was the joint Department of the Army/Department of Environmental Regulation form, effective November 30, 1982. The application describes the project as a dock consisting of two boat slips measuring 24 feet by 10 feet, a 24 foot by 4 foot pier, and a 12 foot by 12 foot deck. The application identifies as the adjacent property owners the individuals owning condominium units on either side of the Stearns' unit. Mr. Stearns did not complete the affidavit of ownership or control, in which the applicant attests that he is the record owner or, if not, will have "the requisite interest . . .before undertaking the proposed work." The Department of the Army received the application on May 11, 1987. At this time, a copy of the application was forwarded to the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") without the required application fee. By letter dated May 18, 1987, DER notified Mr. Ramseyer that the application fee had not been received and, until received, the application had not been officially received. DER received the application fee on May 28, 1987. By letter dated June 25, 1987, DER informed Mr. Stearns, through his designated agent, Mr. Ramseyer, that the proposed project would require a permit under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and that his application was incomplete. Among other items requested were descriptions of water depths within a 300-foot radius of the proposed structure, shoreline structures within 100 feet of the proposed dock, and the boats intended to be moored at the facility. By letter dated July 10, 1987, Mr. Stearns provided DER with additional information. Submitting a new application, Mr. Stearns represented this time that the proposed use was private single dwelling, rather than private multi- dwelling, as previously indicated. He also stated that the adjoining landowners were Sunrise Landings Condominium. Again, he failed to complete the affidavit of ownership or control. A partial site plan of the condominium complex shows the dock as five feet north and 45 feet south of the next nearest docks at the complex. As he had on the February 22 application, Mr. Stearns certified as true that he knew that he had to obtain all required authorization prior to commencing construction, although construction had already been completed at this time. In fact, Mr. Stearns indicated on the application, as he did on the October 27 application described below, that construction was "proposed to commence" on June 22, 1987, and was "to be completed" on July 3, 1987. The application explains a four foot increase in the length of the dock as necessitated by "water depth." Elsewhere, the application states that the river had receded four inches since March, 1987. In justifying the construction of the dock in two sections, Mr. Stearns explained that the "shallow depth of the water . . . could result in possible environmental damage to the river bottom, if power boats were allowed to be moored in close proximatity [sic] to the area of the bulkhead line." Mr. Stearns described the boats that he proposed to moor at the dock. At maximum capacity, one boat has a draft of 10 inches, and the other has a draft of 14 inches. Attached to the application is a diagram showing maximum/minimum water depths. The depths are 13"/9" at the bulkhead, 19"/15" at 10', 21"/17" at 20', 23"/19" at 30 `, 25"/21" at 40', and 26"/22" at 50'. Mr. Stearns explained: In order to minimumize [sic] the possible environmental damage to the river bottom aquatic growth, it was necessary to place the power boat mooring section of the dock a minimum of 20 feet away from the bulkhead line. Another diagram shows water depths of 22" to 26" from 50 feet to 300 feet from the bulkhead to the north and south of the dock. 15. By letter dated June 17, 1987, which Mr. Stearns attached to the July 10 application, the Department of the Army issued him a general permit for the proposed project. The letter warns that "it appears that a permit from the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation may be required." The attached diagram shows a structure with a total length of 36 feet. By letter dated July 30, 1987, DER informed Mr. Stearns that, among other things, the affidavit of ownership or control was incomplete; discrepancies existed between the original application and the most recent application, such as with respect to the names of different adjoining landowners and different proposed uses from private multi-dwelling to private single dwelling; it was unclear whether all permits were received prior to dock construction; and it was unclear what portion of the deed entitled the applicant to place the dock in its proposed location. By letter dated October 27, 1987, Mr. Stearns provided DER with additional information and submitted a partial new application. He attested to the fact that he was the record owner of the property, although he failed to provide the required legal description. As to the question involving different adjoining property owners, Mr. Stearns indicated that he believed that because the dock was located more than 25 feet from the nearest living unit, the approval of other property owners was not required. He explained that the private single dwelling unit was a condominium unit in an eight-unit building. He advised that construction of the dock was completed on July 3, 1987. As to water depths, he showed a depth of 9 inches at the bulkhead and 26 inches at 500 feet. Additionally, he showed mean low water of 12 inches at 10 feet, 16 inches at 20 feet, 23 inches at 30 feet, and 26 inches at 40 feet. By letter dated December 8, 1987, DER informed Mr. Stearns that his application was deemed complete as of October 29, 1987. By Intent to Deny dated January 8, 1988, DER notified Mr. Stearns of its intent to deny his application for a permit. The notice states that the project is not exempt from permitting procedures. The notice acknowledges the presence of about 40 piers installed at the condominium complex without the appropriate permits. The notice states that water depths within visual distance of the shoreline are relatively shallow with scattered marine grass/algae clumps in the vicinity due to the shallow water. In this regard, the notice concludes: Installation of a pier in such shallow water, less than 24 inches deep, for permanent mooring of a small watercraft will probably cause localized disturbance of the benthic community by prop wash. This situation is already evident at several of the nonpermitted piers. Additionally, the Notice of Intent raised the issue of ownership or control. Citing an earlier final order, the notice states that "`the Department will not knowingly issue a permit for dredging and filling or other activities which would constitute a trespass on private property."' By Petition for Administrative Hearing filed January 19, 1988, Mr. Stearns requested an administrative hearing on the Intent to Deny his application for a permit. By letter dated January 27, 1988, assistant general counsel for DER confirmed a recent telephone conversation with Mr. Stearns and stated that, pursuant to that conversation I will hold your petition pending further action by the Department towards resolution of the situation. If it appears that an amicable resolution cannot be reached, I will forward the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a hearing officer. By Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action dated December 19, 1988, DER notified Mr. and Mrs. Stearns and 101 other persons owning or having owned units at Sunrise Landing Condominiums that an investigation of the property on June 2, 1987, had disclosed that 43 docks had been installed and placed less than 65 feet apart with 75 boat slips. These docks had been constructed without permits. A meeting with unit owners on March 15, 1988, had not produced a resolution of the dispute. The Notice of Violation alleges that the docks extended up to 20 feet waterward of the bulkhead through water depths of 8-24 inches. The docks allegedly were constructed within an area conditionally approved by the Department of Natural Resources for shellfish harvesting, but without a Department variance. The docks allegedly resulted in damage to state waters and pollution through localized disturbance of the benthic community by associated boat traffic prop wash in shallow water. The adversely impacted submerged bottom allegedly is highly productive with scattered seagrasses providing valuable fishery resources for the Indian River. Lastly, DER alleges that it had incurred investigatory expenses of at least $1500. After reciting the statutes allegedly violated by the construction of the docks, the Notice of Violation demands, among other things, the removal of all of the docks. By Petition for Formal Proceeding filed January 12, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Stearns requested a formal administrative hearing on the Notice of Violation. Pursuant to notice, DER held an informal conference with numerous owners of docks, including Mr. and Mrs. Stearns, on February 9, 1989. At the conclusion of the meeting, DER agreed to hold open the informal conference period for an additional 30 days to allow settlement negotiations to be concluded. By Amended Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action dated March 23, 1989, DER issued another notice of violation against the ten remaining dock owners, including Mr. and Mrs. Stearns, who had not yet removed or agreed to remove their docks. The allegations are substantially identical to those of the original Notice of Violation. Because of the failure of settlement negotiations, DER transmitted both files involving the Stearns to the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 31, 1989. In several prior cases, DER had previously informed other unit owners seeking to build a dock off of the bulkhead adjoining the Common Element that no permit was required because the project was exempt under Section 403.813(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In March or April, 1987, DER changed its position on this point. The docks 45 feet north and 5 feet south of the Stearns' dock were constructed without a dredge and fill permit, apparently in reliance upon the same exemption to which the Stearns claim to be entitled in the subject cases. The operation of boats in the vicinity of the dock constructed by Mr. and Mrs. Stearns would stir up the submerged bottom and result in prop dredging of critical vegetation. In sum, the intended use of the dock would disrupt the benthic community. At times, the Stearns have been unable to reach their dock with their boats due to the shallowness of the water. The waters of the Indian River surrounding the Stearns' dock are Class III waters that the Department of Natural Resources has conditionally approved for shellfish harvesting. The Department of Natural Resources has not granted the Stearns a variance for the construction of the dock. The dock is less than 500 square feet of total coverage. The moorings from the dock five feet to the south of the subject dock remained in place following the removal of the remainder of the structure. At the time of the application, the Stearns dock, whose construction had begun no later than June 22, 1987, and been completed on July 3, 1987, was 45 feet south of the nearest dock to the north and 5 feet north of the nearest dock to the south. Both of these docks had been built under claims of exemption. The Stearns dock was maintained for the exclusive use of the Stearns and was not available to other unit owners. DER has failed to prove any investigatory expenses directly attributable to the Stearns, as opposed to the 103 unit owners in general. Moreover, given the pending applications, which disclosed most of the specifics of the subject dock, including inadequate water depths, no portion of the investigation could properly be attributed to the Stearns, especially when the sole witness for DER could not testify to any specific damage to submerged bottom and vegetation caused by boats using the Stearns' dock. Additionally, actual damage and the investigatory expenses attributable thereto are divisible and could have been attributed to a particular violator, but were not.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order denying the subject permit and ordering Mr. and Mrs. Stearns to remove their dock, upon such conditions as are necessary to avoid damage to the environment, but not imposing any administrative fine. ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of DER 1-11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12: adopted as to general shallowness and excessive shallowness with respect to the passage of boats. 13-15: adopted or adopted in substance. 16: rejected as irrelevant. 17-24: adopted. 25: rejected as recitation of testimony, unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence, and irrelevant. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of the Stearns 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance, except that last sentence of Paragraph 3 is rejected as subordinate. 4: adopted. 5: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. Placing a dock in water too shallow for safe boating may arguably constitute a navigational hazard. 6: adopted. 7: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. In the first place, the facts at the time of the application should control whether the project was, at the time of its actual construction, exempt from the permitting requirements. In addition, the evidence showed that the pilings of at least the closer dock remained in the water following the removal of the decking. 8: first two sentences adopted. Second sentence rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 9: [omitted.] 10: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. It is clear from the operative documents--namely, the warranty deed and declaration of condominium--that Mr. and Mrs. Stearns lack the legal right to use the Common Element in the manner that they have used it. A clause in an unrecorded contract, which probably does not survive closing, cannot diminish the rights of other Unit Owners in their undivided shares of the Common Element, which, in part, the Stearns have seized for their private use. 11: first paragraph adopted. Second paragraph rejected as irrelevant and unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Steven A. Medina Assistant General Counsel Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Frank J Griffith, Jr. Cianfronga, Telfer & Reda 815 South Washington Avenue Titusville, FL 32780
Findings Of Fact On March 10, 1986, Respondents, Charles R. Moeller and Julia Moeller (Applicants) entered into a consent order with Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (Department) pursuant to which their request for an "after the fact" permit to construct an 5-slip docking facility in Florida Bay, Upper Matecumbe Key, Monroe County, Florida, was granted. Petitioners, James E. Williams and Charles W. Causey (Protestants) filed a timely request for formal administrative review of the Department's action. The Applicants are the owners of a 2.2 acre parcel of property situated on the northwestern side of central Upper Matecumbe Key, with approximately 280' frontage on Florida Bay. Since 1983, the Applicants have sought authorization to construct a multi-family dock facility for use in conjunction with their plans to develop the uplands as a condominium community. Protestants, James E. Williams and Charles W. Causey, are neighbors of the Applicants. Mr. Williams' property abuts the north boundary of Applicants' property, and extends northerly with 230' frontage on Florida Bay. Mr. Causey's property abuts the north boundary of Mr. Williams' land, and extends northerly with 230' frontage on Florida Bay. Protestants have used, and use, the waters adjacent to their residences, the project site, and Florida Bay for fishing, swimming, boating and other recreational pursuits. Protestants have standing to maintain this action. Background On February 28, 1983, Applicants filed their first request with the Department and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for authorization to construct a docking facility to serve their proposed uplands development. That application sought authorization to construct a 10-slip docking facility, roughly "L" shaped, with a main pier extending into Florida Bay in a westerly direction and measuring 90' by 5', and the terminal section of the dock running southerly parallel to the shore line and measuring 100' by 5'. A row of 11 mooring piles spaced 10' apart, 20' landward of the terminal section of the dock, formed the 10 boat slips. As proposed, the facility was less than 1,000 square feet (sq. ft.), and exempt from the Department's permitting requirements. 1/ The Corps declined, however, to permit the facility as proposed. Noting that "a mixture of lush vegetation including mixed searasses and the hard corals" was located in the 2' to 3' MLW (mean low water) docking area, the Corps requested that the Applicants extend their pier further offshore to create dockage in waters of no less than -5' MLW depth. Consistent with the Corps' request, Applicants modified their proposal by extending their pier 170' offshore. In all other respects, their proposal remained unchanged. On August 12, 1983, Applicants received Corps' approval for their modified docking facility; however, their extension of the pier increased the docks' square footage to over 1,000 sq. ft., and subjected the project to the Department's permitting requirements. Accordingly, on October 7, 1983, Applicants filed a request with the Department for authorization to construct the dock facility approved by the Corps. On November 7, 1984, the Department issued its intent to deny the requested permit predicated on its conclusion that, inter alia, degradation of local water quality was expected, as well as destruction of marine habitat and productivity to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest. Although advised of their right to request formal administrative review of the Department's proposed action. /2 Applicants took no action. On December 13, 1984, the Department entered a final order, which adopted the reasons set forth in its notice of intent to deny, and denied the Applicants' requested permit. The current application On January 24, 1985, Applicants filed their request with the Department for authorization to construct the docking facility which is the subject matter of these proceedings. The application sought permission to construct an 8-slip 3/ docking facility of the same configuration as previously applied for, but with a main pier measuring 170' by 4', and a terminal section of 79' by 4'. A row of 9 mooring piles spaced 10' apart, 20' landward of the terminal section of the dock, formed the 8 boat slips. Applicants still proposed the same wood construction, and wood dock piles, as well as using the terminal section of the dock as a batterboard type breakwater by attaching heavy boards to the waterward side of the dock. 4/ As proposed, the dock facility was less than 1,000 sq. ft. and exempt from the Department's permitting requirements. Accordingly, on January 30, 1985, the Department issued the Applicants a copy of their application marked "EXEMPT FROM DER D/F PERMITTING PER FAC RULE 17-4.04(9)(c)," and apprised the Applicants of the need to secure approval from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for use of state-owned submerged lands. Applicants promptly applied for DNR approval. On February 22, 1985, they received their first completeness summary, which was responded to on April 26, 1985, and on September 4, 1985, they received their second completeness summary, which was responded to on October 15, 1985. Finally, on December 5, 1985, Applicants received DNR approval conditioned upon Applicants execution and recording of a 10' conservation easement along the shoreward extent of Applicants' property to prevent the construction of any further dock facilities. Applicants duly executed and recorded the conservation easement. On December 24, 1985, Applicants received their Monroe County building permit, and commenced construction on January 22, 1986. On January 23, 1986, Protestants contacted the Department's local environmental specialist, David Bishof, to complain of the construction. Mr. Bishof promptly telephoned the applicant, Mrs. Moeller, and advised her that the subject waters had been designated Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW), and that docks in excess of 500 sq. ft. were no longer exempt. 5/ At this point in time, only 6-8 pair of pilings had been set. Notwithstanding Mr. Bishof's advice, Applicants continued to construct the dock facility until all pilings were in place and 500 sq. ft. of the main pier area was decked. On March 10, 1986, the Department and Applicants entered into the consent order which is the subject matter of these proceedings. That order granted the Applicants an "after the fact" permit to construct their 8-slip docking facility, and granted substantially affected persons the right to petition for formal administrative review. The project site The waters of Florida Bay which abut the Applicants' 280' shoreline are classified as Class III waters and have, since May, 1985, been designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW). At Applicants' shoreline, erosion has cut an escarpment into the limestone such that the land's elevation drops abruptly from approximately 1' above MH to 2'-3' below MHW. Along much of the shoreline, erosion has undercut the limestone, forming small cliffs with an overhang of up to 5'. Very little vegetation exists on the exposed edge of the solution-faced limestone which forms the Applicants shoreline. What does exist consists of a few moderate to small red and black mangrove trees. On the face of the shoreline escarpment a rich biota is found, which includes star arene, bearded periwinkles, and star coral. A narrow band of turtlegrass, with some Cuban shoalweed, is found at the base of the escarpment. At 50' from shore along the path of the proposed pier, 6/ the depth is 4+- MHW and the bottom consists of gently sloping bedrock, with a thin layer of sediment. Sparse vegetation, consisting of patches of turtlegrass and Bataphora are found at this point, along with a healthy fauna community consisting of numerous sponges and moderate sized colonies of star coral. At a distance of 100' along the proposed dock route, the bottom is covered by a thin layer of sediment which allows for a fairly constant growth of turtlegrass. Depths at this point are approximately 6' MHW. The turtlegrass bed continues to the end of the proposed dock and generally covers the entire proposed docking area. Depths in the proposed docking area range between 6'-7' MHW. Lobster frequent the area, together with fish common to the Florida Keys. Areas of concern The only permit application appraisal conducted by the Department was done in connection with the Applicants' October 7, 1983 permit request, and at a time when the waters of Florida Bay did not carry the OFW designation. At that time, the Department's environmental specialist, David Bishof, found that: The proposed dock, along with the boats moored to it, when it is complete and in use, can be expected to shade approximately 2,000 ft 2 of seafloor. Much of the area that will be shaded, is covered by seagrass. A general decline in the quantity of seagrass in the shaded areas, can be expected to result from the project. With the loss of seagrass vegetation in the marina area, will also be the loss of the functions of habitat, sediment stabilization, primary production and pollution filtration. Activities that can normally be expected to be associated with the use of the proposed dock will result in the discharge of toxic metals, hydrocarbons, organic debris, detergents and miscellaneous trash. With a dock of the size being proposed, the above discharges are expected to be moderate in magnitude, but will probably not lower water quality below class III standards. These findings were not disputed in this proceeding. Although the dock area has been reduced from 100' to 79' in length, from 5' to 4' in width, and the number of boat slips from 10 to 8, the proposed dock, with the boats moored to it, can still be expected to shade approximately 1,900 sq. ft. of seafloor. 7/ This shading effect will result in the general decline in the quantity of seagrass in the dock area, and the consequent loss of habitat, sediment stabilization, primary production, and pollution filtration. Loss of seagrass in the dock area and surrounding area will be intensified by "prop dredging" and "scaring" due to seasonal tidal fluctuations of 1-3 feet. As sited, the proposed docks are located in waters of 6'- 7' NHW depth, as opposed to the 5' NLW depth recommended by the Department and the Corps. Other environmental consequences associated with the proposed facility include the discharge of hydrocarbons, toxic metals, detergents and organic debris into the surrounding waters. Mr. Bishof described these discharges as "moderate in magnitude" in his November, 1983 appraisal and concluded that they "will probably not lower water quality below class III standards." At hearing, with Florida Bay now designated OFW, Mr. Bishof again characterized the discharges as "moderate in magnitude" and opined that OFW standards would not be violated. While Florida Bay is a vast body of water, which offers the opportunity for pollutant dilution, the waters in the area of the proposed facility are relatively shallow and lacking in strong currents; conditions- conducive to pollutant buildup. There has been no appraisal of the proposed project since November, 1983, 8/ and no substantive evidence that the hydrography of the waters in the area is adequate to control pollutant buildup. Consequently, Mr. Bishof's opinion cannot be credited. Under the circumstances, Applicants have failed to provide reasonable assurances that the proposed facility will not violate state water quality standards. Public interest In considering whether a project is clearly in the public interest, Section 403.918(2)(a), Florida Statutes establishes seven criteria which must be considered and balanced. That subsection provides: In determining whether a project is not contrary to the public interest, or is clearly in the public interest, the department shall consider and balance the following criteria: Whether the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. The proposed project was not shown to promote any of the seven criteria. It would not, however, adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare or the property of others; adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; or adversely affect significant historical and archaeological resources. The relative condition of the vegetation and marine life in the area was shown to be good. Overall, the project was shown to be permanent and to have an adverse impact on the conservation of fish, habitat, marine productivity and recreational values. On balance, the proposed project is not clearly in the public interest, and no evidence was presented to mitigate its adverse impacts. Cumulative impact Section 403.919, Florida Statutes, mandates that the Department consider the cumulative impact of the proposed project in deciding whether to grant or deny a permit. Currently, there are no other projects existing, under construction, or for which permits or jurisdictional determinations have been sought, nor are there any projects under review, approved or vested, within one mile of the project site. Accordingly, cumulative impact is a neutral factor in the evaluation of the proposed project.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent Thomas Rosati is entitled to the Noticed General Permit and the Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged Lands issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department"), which authorize the replacement of an existing private dock with a new private dock in the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating construction activities in waters of the State. The Department also has responsibility to process and act on applications for authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands through a delegation of authority from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board of Trustees"). Rosati owns real property at 2391 Southwest Riverside Drive, Palm City, Florida. He is the applicant for the authorizations at issue in this case. Rosati does not currently own a boat, but he wants to obtain a boat that is large enough to use in the Atlantic Ocean. Petitioner Bryan Fleming owns real property that borders Danforth Creek. He also owns two nearby lots which entitle him to undivided interests in a community dock on Danforth Creek. Fleming owns several boats, including a 23-foot Penn Yan motorboat which he moored at docks on Danforth Creek. Petitioner Diane Haskett owns property that borders Danforth Creek. She has been an avid boater most of her life, but currently only co-owns, with Fleming, a 33-foot sailboat which they do not keep on Danforth Creek. She is a frequent passenger on Fleming's Penn Yan. Notice of Agency Action Rosati arranged for publication of a "Notice of General Permit" in the October 30, 2012, edition of The Stuart News. The notice was in the exact form suggested by the Department in its September 19, 2012, letter to Rosati. The notice reads in pertinent part: STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NOTICE OF GENERAL PERMIT The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the project to remove an existing dock, and relocate and construct a new dock with an access walkway measuring 4 ft. by 392 ft. and ending in an 8 ft. by 20 ft. terminal platform, including two associated 12 ft. by 12 ft. boatlifts (total 1,728 sq. ft. structure, total 2016 sq. ft. preempted area), has been determined to qualify for a noticed general permit. This is the form of publication regularly used by the Department to notify the general public that the Department has determined a proposed project qualifies for a Noticed General Permit and a Letter of Consent. The exact location of the Rosati property was also included in the newspaper notice. Petitioners did not see the newspaper publication. Fleming first became aware of the Rosati dock when he saw it being constructed on January 13, 2013. He went to the Department's offices and inquired about the dock. Petitioners filed their petition for hearing on January 23, 2013, 10 days after receiving actual notice of the Department's agency action on the Rosati dock. Background Facts The east side of Rosati's property borders the St. Lucie River, which is designated a Class III water. The submerged lands in the area of the Rosati property are sovereign submerged lands of the State of Florida. The river bottom in the area is sandy. There are no corals, marine grass beds, or other significant aquatic resources. The south side of Rosati's property borders Danforth Creek. Danforth Creek is a navigable waterbody with normal depths of three feet or more. Rosati's shoreline along the Creek is approximately 275 linear feet in length and his river shoreline is approximately 125 feet. Rosati has a dock on Danforth Creek. It is in a basin that was created by excavating the private upland. The bottom of the basin is not state-owned sovereign submerged lands. Danforth Creek flows into the St. Lucie River near the southeast corner of the Rosati property. At its confluence with the St. Lucie River, there is a shoal or sandbar that most likely formed by the deposition of sediment carried out of the Creek. Rosati had a small (32 feet long) dock on his shoreline on the St. Lucie River. The Noticed General Permit and Letter of Consent allow Rosati to remove this old dock, which he has already done. The shoal at the confluence of the Creek and River restricts navigation in and out of Danforth Creek. Navigation in and out of Danforth Creek is usually impossible during low tides, except in a canoe, kayak, or other vessel requiring only a few inches of water. The most reliable route between the Creek and the River is a narrow channel only 2 to 3 feet deep at higher tides. This channel, which runs close to Rosati's eastern shoreline, shall be referred to hereafter as the "deeper channel." For many years, Fleming regularly used the deeper channel to take his 23-foot Penn Yan motorboat from Danforth Creek into the St. Lucie River and back again. The Penn Yan has a draft of about 18 inches. Using the deeper channel, Fleming could navigate in and out of Danforth Creek every day on the high tides. An unknown boater stuck a white PVC pipe into the river bottom at the side of the deeper channel to indicate its location. The New Dock Rosati's new dock was substantially completed at the time of the final hearing in June 2013. The new dock is four feet wide, 392 feet long, and terminates at a water depth of minus four feet mean low water. The other docks in the area are much shorter. The St. Lucie River in this area is more than 2,000 feet wide. Therefore, the dock extends into the River less than 20 percent of the width of the River. The total dock square footage of Rosati's dock on Danforth Creek and his new dock does not exceed 2,000 square feet. The dock, terminal platform, and boat lifts "preempt" 2,016 square feet of sovereign submerged lands, meaning that the dock excludes public use of this area of river bottom. Rosati's new dock crosses the deeper channel. It would cross the deeper channel even if it were half as long. The Letter of Consent authorizes Rosati to preempt from public use that portion of the deeper channel that lies beneath the new dock. Now, the only route that can be used by boaters wanting to navigate in and out of Danforth Creek is a narrow channel south of Rosati's new dock, between the dock and a spit of land about 15 feet away. This route can become dry at low tide and is only about a foot deep at high tides. This south route was used by Department staff during high tide using a boat drawing 8 to 12 inches of water. At low tide, they were unable to use this route to get from the St. Lucie River into Danforth Creek, but were able to use the deeper channel that now runs beneath the Rosati dock. Fleming would not be able to take his Penn Yan through the route on the south side of the Rosati dock except in rare high water conditions, such as may occur during or after hurricanes or heavy storms. No member of the general public who formerly used the deeper channel in a vessel drawing more than a foot of water would be able to use the south route except in rare high water conditions. In addition to the shallow character of the south route, it is in a narrow space between the Rosati dock and the sand spit. This route is only reasonably navigable by canoes, kayaks, and similar small, shallow-draft vessels. The Department contends that the general public has not been affected by the Rosati dock. However, all persons wishing to navigate in and out of Danforth Creek, including Fleming, other riparian landowners on Danforth Creek, and other members of the boating public are prevented from doing so in vessels which, just prior to construction of the Rosati dock, they could have used to navigate in and out of the Creek. Respondents further assert that the shoal may get worse and the deeper channel may become more shallow. This was mere speculation, with no timeframe offered. Furthermore, it was not shown that the deeper channel would not remain the best means of navigating in and out of Danforth Creek. Rosati's consultant did not make a site visit before submitting the forms for the Noticed General Permit and no Department employee made a site visit before the Department issued its letter of September 19, 2012. Included in the materials submitted by Rosati's consultant to the Department for the Noticed General Permit is an aerial photograph with a white arrow superimposed on the south side of the proposed Rosati dock to indicate a channel or water route from Danforth Creek into the St. Lucie River. The current or historical elevation of the route indicated by the white arrow was not established in the record. It is now overgrown with upland grass and is not an alternative water route for boaters wanting to get in and out of Danforth Creek. The information submitted to the Department by Rosati's consultant did not inform the Department that the best (deepest) route in and out of Danforth Creek would be blocked by the Rosati dock. The information implied that the proposed Rosati dock would not impair navigation in and out of Danforth Creek. Although not shown to be intentional, the information was misleading because it failed to inform the Department of the true site conditions and the impacts on navigation that would be caused by the proposed dock.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order determining that Thomas Rosati qualifies for the Noticed General Permit, and denying the Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia E. Comer, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Nathan E. Nason, Esquire Gregory Hyden, Esquire Nason, Yeager, Gerson, White and Lioce, P.A. Suite 1200 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Howard K. Heims, Esquire Virginia P. Sherlock, Esquire Littman, Sherlock and Heims, P.A. Post Office Box 1197 Stuart, Florida 34995-1197 Herschel T. Vinyard, Jr., Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Matthew Z. Leopold, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
The Issue Whether Sam Patterson’s proposed dock project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Mr. Scully resides at 941 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 16, adjacent to and south-southeast of Mr. Patterson's residential property. The northern or rear portion of Mr. Scully's lot borders on an artificial canal that is designated a Class III water by Department rule. He does not have a dock per se; he moors his boat against and parallel to a narrow concrete area (and his lot line), separated by buffering material. Mr. Patterson, the applicant, owns the property at 930 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 15. Lot 15 is north-northwest and adjacent to Mr. Scully’s property. This residential property is currently leased to others. The residential property (Lot 14) adjacent to and north-northeast of Mr. Patterson's lot is apparently owned by an individual named Meloche. The Department has the jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed project is exempt from ERP requirements. The Proposed Project On or about September 13, 2004, Mr. Patterson filed an application requesting an exemption to replace an existing five- foot by 21-foot (105-square feet) marginal dock in the same location, configuration, and dimensions as the existing dock. He also requested an exemption to install a five-foot by 16-foot (80-square feet) wooden finger pier extending perpendicular to and from the middle of the existing marginal dock. As of the final hearing, the project has been revised such that the wooden finger pier will extend 11.8 feet (rather than 16 feet) and perpendicular from the middle of the marginal dock. Mr. Patterson changed the length of the finger pier to comply with City regulations, which are not at issue in this case. The “Site Plan” is attached to the Department’s Notice of Determination of Exemption. (JE 1). The “Site Plan” shows a one-story residence on Mr. Patterson's Lot 15. The front of the lot measures 100 feet, whereas the rear of the lot (that abuts the canal on the easternmost portion of the lot) is 50 feet in length from south to north. The seawall is one-and-one-half feet in width. The existing marginal dock abuts the seawall running south to north and is 21 feet long and five feet wide. Small concrete platforms abut the marginal dock on the south and north. The Department reviewed the original application and on October 13, 2004, advised Mr. Patterson, in part, that his project was exempt from the need to obtain an ERP under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d). The Department had not reviewed the change to the project prior to the final hearing. See Finding of Fact 5. Lots 16, 15, and 14 are situated as a cul-de-sac (semi- circle) with the canal north of Lot 16, east of Lot 15, and south of Lot 14. Lot 14 is across the canal from Mr. Scully's Lot 16. There are five properties on each side of the canal, running west to east. The artificial canal runs directly east from Mr. Patterson’s property for an uncertain distance to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). Mr. Patterson’s property (Lot 15) is the western end-point for this canal. Mr. Patterson’s eastern property line (fronting the canal) is 50 feet in width. However, the precise width of the canal between Lots 14 and 16 is unclear. Ms. Smith reports (in her site inspection report of March 3, 2005 (JE 3)) that the canal is approximately 50 feet wide. Mr. Patterson testified that Karen Main with the City of Boynton Beach advised him that the consensus opinion of City employees reviewing the issue was that the canal measured 66 feet in width. There appears to be some widening of the canal east of Mr. Patterson’s property line and then the canal appears to straighten-out as it proceeds to the east to the ICW and past the easterly property lines for Lots 14 and 16. See (JEs 1-site plan; 5-aerial). The weight of the evidence indicates that the canal, between Lots 14 and 16, is approximately 60 to 66 feet wide. See, e.g., id. In the past, the prior owner of Lot 15 (Mr. Patterson's property) moored a boat at and parallel to the marginal dock, which means that the bow, for example, faced Lot 14 and the stern faced Lot 16. Mr. Patterson currently owns a 16-foot boat that he wants to moor at the marginal dock. However, he feels that it is unsafe to do so, particularly if Mr. Scully’s boat drifts. Meloche (Lot 14 to the north) has a fixed boatlift, which allows for the elevation of a boat out of the water, with the bow facing west toward and in front of the northern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. (JE 4). Mr. Scully moors his boat parallel to the shoreline of Lot 16 and perpendicular to Mr. Patterson’s 50-foot eastern seawall and property line. (JEs 4 and 6). Mr. Scully’s seawall intersects Mr. Patterson’s seawall such that when Mr. Scully’s 22-foot boat is moored at his seawall, it is also in front of the southern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. Id. When Mr. Scully’s boat is tightly moored at his seawall, it does not interfere with or block Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 6). However, when Mr. Scully’s boat is loosely moored, it drifts toward the center of the canal in front of Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 4). With no boat moored at the marginal dock, Mr. Scully is able to freely maneuver his boat to his seawall with limited “backing” of his boat required (stern first). With a boat consistently moored at Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock, Mr. Scully would have to back into his area beside his seawall in order to avoid colliding with that boat. Mr. Patterson’s finger pier would enable him to safely moor a boat perpendicular to the marginal dock. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock is likely to make it easier for Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully to navigate to their respective mooring areas, depending on the size of the boats moored by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully. (The Department, in reviewing similar exemption requests, does not consider the type and size of the boat(s) to be moored at the proposed dock or adjacent mooring site.) It is preferable for the boats to be moored, in this location, stern first, with the bow facing down the canal from the wake of the boats traveling in the ICW. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock and mooring Mr. Patterson’s boat on the north side of the finger pier is likely to enable Meloche, Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Scully to moor their boats parallel to each other and avoid collisions.1 Placement of the finger pier at the northern end of the finger pier, while favored over the proposed location by Mr. Scully, is likely to interfere with Meloche’s use of his property and boatlift. With the finger pier centered on the marginal dock and a boat moored to the north, Mr. Scully can maneuver his boat to his seawall by “backing in” stern first. An experienced boater can accomplish this task in two to three maneuvers. Mr. Scully is an experienced boater and has lived on the canal for approximately eight years. Shortening the finger pier from 16 feet to 11.8 feet will not affect Mr. Patterson’s ability to safely moor a boat on the northern side of the finger pier. The Challenge Mr. Scully contends that the placement of the wooden finger pier and the mooring of a sizable boat on the proposed finger pier will interfere with his ability to navigate in and out of the canal in or around his property, and necessarily interfere with his ability to moor his boat adjacent to his property. He also contends that the marginal dock and the finger pier are two docks, not one. Resolution of the Controversy Replacement of the existing marginal dock will consist of replacing the decking and using the existing pilings. The existing marginal dock is currently functional. Reconstruction of the marginal dock and construction of the finger pier will be done by a licensed marine contractor. The licensed marine contractor will use best management practices to avoid water quality problems in the canal during construction. Construction of the proposed project is not expected to adversely affect flood control or violate water quality standards. The proposed project will not impede navigation. But see Endnote 1.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that Mr. Patterson’s proposed dock project, as revised, is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a private yacht club located on Lots 5-11 inclusive, Block D, Bayside No. 6, Unit A, 830 South Bayway Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. Founded some five years ago, the club provides a wide array of boating and social functions for its membership. It sits on the north side of Bayway Boulevard and is approximately 50 feet east of Clearwater Pass Avenue. The property is rectangular shaped and has dimensions of approximately 420 feet by 120 feet. The widest portion of the property fronts Clearwater Harbor to the north and Bayway Boulevard on the south. The yacht club is situated within an area currently zoned by the City as CTF-28 (high density commercial-tourist). This District provides for a complete range of motel-hotel developments with a major emphasis on tourism. The primary permitted uses and structures within the CTF-28 District are combination hotel, motel, apartment and business buildings, apartment houses, townhouse developments and restaurants. A number of special exceptions to the permitted uses are authorized within a CTF-28 District. These include, inter alia, three types of marina facilities, namely, Type A (pleasure craft docking), Type B (launching ramp site, commercial) and Type C (private marina). The City has never classified Petitioner under any of these categories. Upon obtaining a Type C classification, a property owner may engage in 12 separate uses of the property as a matter of right, and a thirteenth upon obtaining specific Board approval. These include: (a) sales and service facilities, (b) boat slips (excluding covered boat slips or dry storage unless specific Board approval is obtained), (c) boat handling equipment, (d) boat and gear storage, (e) launching facilities, (f) fuel station, (g) lockers and sanitary facilities, (h) restaurant facilities (not advertised), (i) club house, (j) motel or boatel, (k) recreational facilities (not commercial), (l) park or picnic area, and (m) automobile parking. Petitioner now engages in all permitted activities except items (a), and (j). It does not wish to engage in the latter three uses even if the application is granted. All activities presently conducted are done so in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. On the east side of Petitioner's property is a multi-story restaurant and lounge while to the west lies a 4-story condominium complex (Bayside 17). Directly across Bayway Boulevard and to the south are two high-rise condominium complexes, one of which is still under construction. Boat docking facilities are located on the waterfront throughout the area, including that of Petitioner and adjacent property owners. The area may be generally described as a combination of high density residential and commercial buildings and structures catering to the tourist or part-time resident. The proposed reclassification is compatible with the surrounding properties and the character of the land. Its uses fit within the general scheme of zoning for a CTF-28 District, and are consistent with the Land Use Plan. The chief concern of the adjacent property owners who testified is a fear that reclassification of the property will diminish the view of the water now enjoyed across the clear space on the west side of Petitioner's property. However, since no change in the use of the property will be made by virtue of reclassification, the existing view should not be impaired.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
The Issue The issue here presented concerns the entitlement of the Applicant/Respondent, Raymond B. Spangler, to construct a boat dock of approximately 800 square feet, included in that dimension is a boat house. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, has indicated its intention to grant the permit application request and the Petitioner, Louise C. Stone, has opposed the Department's intention to grant the permit.
Findings Of Fact THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration based upon the Petitioner, Louise E. Stone's petition and request for formal proceedings to consider the propriety of the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation's granting of an environmental permit to Raymond B. Spangler. This petition was filed after the Petitioner had received the Department of Environmental Regulation's Notice of Intent to Grant the permit. That notice was dated July 10, 1979, and a copy of that notice has been received into evidence as Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit No. 5. The Secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation opted to have the Division of Administrative Hearings consider this case and on November 5, 1979, a formal hearing was held before a Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Petitioner is an adjacent landowner to the Respondent, Raymond B. Spangler, with property located on Lake Minneola. The applicant's project is located in the northwest corner of his property and is as far removed from the common property line with the Petitioner as is possible without violating setback lines. The Petitioner's property is located to the southeast of the project. The project as now contemplated calls for the construction of a boat deck and boat house with dimensions of approximately 800 square feet. The details of this construction may be found in a copy of the Application for Permit which is the Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. The boat house and boat dock would be constructed on Lake Minneola, Lake City, Florida, near the town of Clermont, Florida. Lake Minneola is a navigable waterway and the boat dock and boat house would extend into the navigable water body. The discussion of the project as found in the Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit No. 1 is an accurate depiction with the exception that the dock will have an increase in length from the original proposal of 70 feet to a new proposal of some 80 to 84 feet. Nonetheless, with the optimum extension, the amount of square footage still closely approximates the initially requested 800-square-foot amount. The reason for the change is due to the rise in the water level of the lake causing the mean high water line to be further landward than was the case at the time the permit was first applied for. The additional extension of the dock is necessary to allow for dry access to the water and to reach the open waterway beyond the growth of maidencane grass (Panicum Hemitomon) near the shoreline. In keeping with allowed exemptions found in Section 403.813, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17-4.04, Florida Administrative Code, 500 square feet of the deck has been constructed and this portion of the dock as constructed may be seen in the Respondent, Raymond B. Spangler's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence, which is a photograph of the partially completed dock. Other photographs of the partially completed dock and the surrounding area of the lake showing the adjacent property may be found as Respondent, Spangler's Exhibits 5 through 9. The Respondent, Spangler's Exhibit No. 4, a composite which was admitted into evidence, is a series of photographs and an overlay which by scale shows a view of the completed dock and a depiction of the boat house when completed. The dock, when completed, will be constituted of a four-foot walkway extending approximately 80 to 84 feet into the water, intersecting at right angles at the terminus of the dock and forming a "T" shape. The boat house would be located adjacent to the walkway leading to the deck terminus. The dimensions of the covered boat house would be 25 feet by 14 feet. The depth of the water in the lake at the location of the continuing dock construction is sufficiently deep to allow the construction of the dock without the necessity of dredging. There is an extensive grassy community mostly constituted of maidencane (Panicum Hemitomon) and although some of the grassy community has been removed during the construction phase of the project, the denuded area may be easily reconstituted and the applicant has expressed his intent to achieve this end as a means to avoid further erosion which has started to occur at the site. None of the erosion which has occurred has interfered with the property of neighboring landowners. The impact of the continued construction in its affect on water quality would be inconsequential. Furthermore, the construction as now completed and as contemplated does not and would not constitute a hazard to navigation, nor interfere with and cause a danger to participants in water sports and related activities that take place on Lake Minneola. When the project is completed the aquatic vegetation can be expected to return and to remain as a viable wetland community. This is due to the fact that the amount of water surface covered by the project is slight and there is sufficient sunlight to support the aquatic vegetation even in the shaded areas. During the construction phase the amount of turbidity caused by the construction has been de minimis, and will be, in view of the fact that the bottom of the lake is a sand base which settles out quickly. This settling effect was seen by the project evaluator, James Morgan, Department of Environmental Regulation, when he toured the site of the construction and saw Respondent Spangler placing pilings. Morgan noted that the turbidity involved was of a short duration. The project will not interfere with fish and wildlife either in their day-to-day activities or in their propagation. None of the standards pertaining to water quality as found in Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code, will be violated by the project. The project will not be an unreasonable obstruction to the view of adjoining riparian owners and the applicant does not intend to use the boat house as a dwelling. When the project was first reviewed by the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, that agency notified the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission; the St. Johns River Water Management District, and the Department of Pollution Control of Lake County, Florida. None of these agencies have made known any objection to the project and the Department of Pollution Control of Lake County has specifically indicated their lack of opposition by written comment, a copy of which may be found as the Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Applicant/Respondent, Raymond B. Spangler, be allowed to conclude the construction of the boat deck and boat house as contemplated by the application of May 11, 1979, with the addendum that the dock length be extended to 80 feet to 84 feet as necessary; with the proviso that the applicant ensure that the grassy community be returned to its pristine condition in the area of his project, to prohibit further erosion and that these results be accomplished by the issuance of a permit pursuant to the conditions as outlined. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Vason, Jr., Esquire Raymond B. Spangler 408 East Fifth Avenue Route 3, Box 319 Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Clermont, Florida 32711 Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to determine in this matter is whether Respondent Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) properly issued its proposed verification of an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) exemption, dated March 23, 2018, for the installation of nine pilings off of Respondent Larry Lynn’s residential property, in the direction of Petitioner MarineMax, Inc.’s commercial property (MarineMax), pursuant to section 373.406(6), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the “de minimus” exemption.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Lynn has owned the real property located at 111 Placid Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, since 1994. Mr. Lynn’s residential property is a corner lot that fronts a canal on two of the four sides of his property, and also contains his home. MarineMax is a national boat dealer with approximately 65 locations throughout the United States and the British Virgin Islands. MarineMax has approximately 16 locations in Florida. MarineMax, through subsidiary companies, acquired the property at 14030 McGregor Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida, in December 2014 (MarineMax Property). Prior to MarineMax’s acquisition, this property had been an active marina for more than 30 years. MarineMax continues to operate this property as a marina. The MarineMax Property is a 26-acre contiguous parcel that runs north-south and that is surrounded by canals and a larger waterway that connects to the Gulf of Mexico. The “northern” parcel of the MarineMax Property is surrounded by two canals and the larger waterway that connects to the Gulf of Mexico. The “southern” parcel is a separate peninsula that, while contiguous to the northern parcel, is surrounded by a canal that it shares with the northern parcel, along with another canal that separates it from residential properties. Mr. Lynn’s property is located directly south of the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property, and the canal that runs east-west. As his property is a corner lot, it also fronts an eastern canal that is directly across from the southern parcel of the MarineMax Property. The eastern canal described above also serves as a border between MarineMax and a residential community that includes Mr. Lynn’s residential property. Mr. Lynn has moored a boat to an existing dock on the eastern canal described in paragraphs 5 and 6 for many years. MarineMax holds ERPs for the business it conducts at its MarineMax Property, including the canal between the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property. For example, these ERPs permit: (a) the docking of boats up to 85 feet in length with a 23-foot beam; (b) boat slips up to 70 feet in length; (c) up to 480 boats on the MarineMax Property; and (d) a boatlift and boat storage barn (located on the southern parcel). The MarineMax Property also contains a fueling facility that is available for internal and public use. It is located on the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property, directly across the east-west canal from Mr. Lynn’s property. The prior owner of the marina constructed this fueling facility prior to 2003. Request for Verification of Exemption from an ERP Mr. Lynn testified that after MarineMax took over the property from the prior owner, he noticed larger boats moving through the canal that separates his property from the MarineMax Property. Concerned about the potential impact to his property, including his personal boat, Mr. Lynn contracted with Hickox Brothers Marine, Inc. (Hickox), to erect pilings off of his property in this canal.2/ On March 8, 2018, Hickox, on behalf of Mr. Lynn, submitted electronically a Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit to DEP. The “Project Description” stated, “INSTALL NINE 10 INCH DIAMETER PILINGS AS PER ATTACHED DRAWING FOR SAFETY OF HOMEOWNER’S BOAT.” The attached drawing for this project depicted the installation of these nine pilings 16 and 1/2 feet from Mr. Lynn’s seawall, spaced 15 feet apart. On March 23, 2018, DEP approved Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit, stating that the activity, as proposed, was exempt under section 373.406(6) from the need to obtain a regulatory permit under part IV of chapter 373. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit further stated: This determination is made because the activity, in consideration of its type, size, nature, location, use and operation, is expected to have only minimal or insignificant or cumulative adverse impacts on the water resources. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit further stated that DEP did not require further authorization under chapter 253, Florida Statutes, to engage in proprietary review of the activity because it was not to take place on sovereign submerged lands. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit also stated that DEP approved an authorization pursuant to the State Programmatic General Permit V, which precluded the need for Mr. Lynn to seek a separate permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Megan Mills, the environmental specialist and program administrator with DEP’s South District Office, testified that DEP’s granting of Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit was routine, and that his Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit met the statutory criteria. After DEP granted the Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit, Hickox, on behalf of Mr. Lynn, installed the nine pilings in the canal at various distances approximately 19 feet from Mr. Lynn’s seawall and in the canal that divides Mr. Lynn’s property from the MarineMax Property (and the fueling facility).3/ MarineMax timely challenged DEP’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit. Impact on Water Resources MarineMax presented the testimony of Sam Lowrey, its corporate vice president of real estate, who had detailed knowledge of the layout of the MarineMax Property. Mr. Lowrey testified that the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s residential property is active with boating activity, noting that MarineMax’s ERP allows up to 480 vessels on-site. With the installation of the pilings, he testified that he was concerned that MarineMax customers “will be uncomfortable navigating their boats through this portion of the canal[,]” which would be detrimental to MarineMax’s business. Mr. Lowery testified that he had no personal knowledge of whether MarineMax has lost any business since the installation of the pilings. MarineMax also presented the testimony of Captain Ralph S. Robinson III, who the undersigned accepted as an expert in marine navigation, without objection.4/ Captain Robinson has been a boat captain, licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard, since 1991. He has extensive experience captaining a variety of vessels throughout the United States and the Bahamas. He is an independent contractor and works for MarineMax and other marine businesses. Captain Robinson is also a retired law enforcement officer. Captain Robinson testified that he was familiar with the waterways surrounding the MarineMax Property, as he has captained boats in those waterways several times a month for the past 15 years. Captain Robinson testified that he has observed a number of boats with varying lengths and beams navigate these waterways, and particularly, the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property. Captain Robinson estimated that the beam of these boats range from eight to 22 feet. He also testified that the most common boats have a beam between eight and 10 feet. Captain Robinson’s first experience with the pilings in the canal occurred in April 2018, when he was captaining a 42- foot boat through the canal. He testified that an 85-foot boat was fueling on the fuel dock, and when he cleared the fueling boat and pilings, he had approximately one and a half feet on each side of his boat. He testified that “[i]t was very concerning.” Captain Robinson testified that since this experience in April 2018, he calls ahead to MarineMax to determine the number and size of boats in the portion of this canal that contains the pilings. On behalf of MarineMax, in December 2018, Captain Robinson directed the recording of himself captaining a 59-foot Sea Ray boat with an approximately 15- to 16-foot beam through the canal separating the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s residential property, with another boat of the same size parked at MarineMax’s fueling dock.5/ Captain Robinson testified that these two boats were typical of the boats that he would operate at the MarineMax Property and surrounding waterway. The video demonstration, and Captain Robinson’s commentary, showed that when he passed through the canal between the fuel dock (with the boat docked) and Mr. Lynn’s residential property (with the pilings), there was approximately four to five feet on either side of his boat. Captain Robinson stated: This is not an ideal situation for a boat operator. Yes, it can be done. Should it be done? Um, I wasn’t happy or comfortable in this depiction. Captain Robinson testified that his “personal comfort zone” of distance between a boat he captains and obstacles in the water is five or six feet. Ultimately, Captain Robinson testified that he believed the pilings in the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property were a “navigational hazard.” Specifically, Captain Robinson stated: Q: In your expert opinion, has Mr. Lynn’s pilings had more than a minimal, or insignificant impact on navigation in the canal, in which they are placed? A: I believe they’re a navigational hazard. The impact, to me personally, and I’m sure there’s other yacht captains that move their boat through there, or a yacht owner, not a licensed captain, um, that has to take a different approach in their operation and diligence, um, taking due care that they can safely go through. It’s been an impact. Q: Is a navigational hazard a higher standard for you as a boat captain, being more than minimal or insignificant? A: Yes. A navigational hazard is, in my opinion, something that its position could be a low bridge or something hanging off a bridge, a bridge being painted, it could be a marker, it could be a sandbar, anything that is going to cause harm to a boat by its position of normal operation that would cause injury to your boat, or harm an occupant or driver of that boat. Ms. Mills, the environmental specialist and program administrator with DEP’s South District Office, testified that after MarineMax filed the instant Petition, she and another DEP employee visited Mr. Lynn’s residential property. Although not qualified as an expert in marine navigation, Ms. Mills testified that, even after observing the placement of the pilings and the boating activity the day she visited, the pilings qualified for an exemption from the ERP.6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that DEP enter a final order dismissing MarineMax’s challenge to the determination that Mr. Lynn’s pilings qualify for an exemption from an environmental resources permit pursuant to its March 23, 2018, approval of Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resources Permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (Florida FHA); and, if so, the relief to which Petitioners are entitled.
Findings Of Fact Sun Lake is an apartment complex located in Lake Mary, Florida. Ms. Pollock is the property manager of Sun Lake, and has been employed in this capacity for approximately seven years. Mr. Green is an African-American male. The brothers leased and resided in an apartment at Sun Lake from 2012 through July 31, 2017. Mr. Green asserted that Jude is disabled, however, no other evidence to support that assertion was provided. Mr. Green alleged that Respondent failed to provide Petitioners accommodations that were requested in December 2016: change their apartment locks to the brothers’ “own private locks”; stop the trash service pick-up to the brothers’ apartment; and establish a community garden within the Sun Lake property. It is undisputed that Respondent ceased the trash service pick-up, but the evidence was insufficient to support whether the apartment locks were or were not changed. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of fact regarding the establishment of a community garden within the Sun Lake property.5/ Mr. Green suggested a December 2016 police report was fraudulent because a name on the report was incorrect, and he had not filed a police complaint regarding noise above their apartment. The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of fact on this allegation. Mr. Green admitted to withholding rent on several occasions as a method to have the requested accommodations secured. Ms. Pollack confirmed there was a valid lease agreement between Sun Lake and Petitioners. Further, she provided that Respondent did, in fact, stop the trash service pick-up to their apartment as Petitioners requested. Ms. Pollack lacked specific knowledge regarding whether Petitioners’ apartment door locks were changed, but offered that Respondent must maintain an apartment key. This is done in order to secure access to each apartment in a timely manner for health and safety reasons. Respondent’s maintenance staff would not enter any apartment without a specific request for service. Ms. Pollack provided the multiple dates on which Petitioners’ rental payments were late. Petitioners and Respondent became involved in eviction proceedings in circuit court. At some point, Petitioners and Respondent entered a settlement stipulation that Petitioners would vacate their apartment earlier than their lease agreement, and pay the rental fees and other associated fees to Respondent. Following Mr. Green’s testimony, and both the direct and cross-examination testimony of Respondent’s sole witness, Ms. Pollock, Mr. Green moved to dismiss the case. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent discriminated against Petitioners in any fashion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2019.
