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EDDIE L. SWINSON vs CDR SYSTEMS CORPORATION, 01-004315 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Palatka, Florida Nov. 02, 2001 Number: 01-004315 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2002

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by CDR Systems Corporation (Respondent) due to Petitioner's race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent produces packaging for electronics in Palatka, Florida, and another plant located in the state of Oklahoma. Respondent's president, Bud McGrane, had a good relationship with his employees and provided them with his home telephone number. In January 1995, McGrane made a decision, based on business necessity, to move Respondent's "big box" production line to the Oklahoma facility. Eddie L. Swinson, a black male, began working for Respondent on August 6, 1990. By January of 1995, Swinson had become the supervisor of the "big box" production line. Approximately 12 employees in the Palatka plant, including Swinson, were affected by the move of the "big box" production line to Oklahoma. Respondent attempted to find employment for the 12 affected employees in other departments within the Palatka plant. These approximately 12 employees included Swinson as well as other black, white and Hispanic employees. Swinson’s supervisory position was eliminated when the "big box" production line moved to Oklahoma. Also, no other supervisory positions were available in the Palatka plant after moving the "big box" production line to Oklahoma. As a result, Swinson was offered an available production line position within another department, but he was unhappy in the position. Richard Ramirez is the plant manager for Respondent in Palatka, Florida, and was the direct supervisor of Swinson during January and February of 1995. The two men had enjoyed a good working relationship prior to Respondent's decision to move "big box" production line to Oklahoma. In the few months prior to his lay off in February 1995, Swinson was counseled several times by Ramirez because of his aggressive behavior toward other Respondent employees, specifically Mexican employees with whom Swinson had difficulty understanding and communicating. Swinson received an oral warning by Ramirez for insubordination on January 3, 1995, for his failure to curb his aggression toward these workers. On January 27, 1995, Swinson was involved in an altercation with another Respondent employee, Jose Montanez, who is of Hispanic heritage. When Ramirez was informed of the altercation, he immediately took Swinson and Montanez aside to resolve the situation. Despite Ramirez’s efforts, Swinson remained highly agitated and accused Ramirez of being prejudiced. Montanez appeared shaken and frightened. Fearing that the situation would escalate, Ramirez asked Swinson to leave the plant. Swinson left the plant still in an agitated state and, upon parting, threatened to get a gun and "take care of them." As a result of Swinson's threat, local police were called. The law enforcement officials told Respondent's manager that nothing could be done until Swinson took steps to carry out his threat. Respondent's management took Swinson’s threat of violence seriously and decided to hasten Swinson’s lay off. Swinson was laid off by Respondent on February 7, 1995. Swinson signed a clearance slip on February 7, 1995, acknowledging the reason for his leaving Respondent's employment was "Employee was laid off due to restructuring in production." Swinson's application for unemployment benefits from the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security was approved based on a finding that "the claimant was separated due to lack of work." Respondent never challenged these findings with regard to Petitioner. Respondent did not rehire Swinson at a later date when the "big box" production line was resumed because of his previous threat to bring a gun to the workplace. Swinson presented no evidence that he was replaced by a nonmember of the protected class or any credible evidence that he was subjected to racial discrimination while employed by Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William R. Amlong, Esquire Amlong & Amlong, P.A. 500 Northeast Fourth Street Second Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1154 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Eddie L. Swinson 1714 1/2 Westover Drive Palatka, Florida 32177 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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MARK PRAUGHT vs BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 05-002152 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key West, Florida Jun. 14, 2005 Number: 05-002152 Latest Update: Dec. 15, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Caucasian male, was born on March 23, 1949. At the time of the alleged unlawful employment practice at issue in this case, Petitioner was 52-53 years old. Petitioner was employed by Respondent since 1973. He was terminated effective August 15, 2001. Respondent, at all times material to this case, is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent, at all relevant times, is in the business of providing telephone services to individuals and businesses in south Florida and elsewhere. At all relevant times, Petitioner was employed as a Service Technician. Service Technicians are responsible to install and repair telephone equipment in response to customer requests. At all relevant times, Respondent employs individuals as Service Technicians who are older than Petitioner. Many other individuals employed as Service Technicians are over the age of 40 at all times relevant to this case. Beginning in 1997, Respondent began to evaluate its Service Technicians according to a system called "Integrated Technicians Performance Plan [ITP].” The purpose of ITP was to improve customer service by evaluating Service Technicians and the individuals who manage them, on a regional basis, in accordance with standardized performance measures. Service Technicians whose ITP evaluations revealed deficiencies, including Petitioner, were provided assistance pursuant to individualized Technician Development Plans (TDP) and given a reasonable period of time to improve. From the time ITP was implemented in 1997, Petitioner was at all relevant times on a TDP because of deficiencies in his job performance. Petitioner's job performance was consistently deficient from 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment. From 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment Petitioner was provided assistance to help him improve his performance. Despite the assistance provided, Petitioner failed to improve his job performance to minimum levels required of all Service Technicians and required by his TDP. By August 2001, supervisors responsible for the training, evaluation and supervision of Service Technicians had determined that Petitioner did not maintain his job performance at the minimum levels required of Service Technicians and did not fulfill the requirements of his TDP. Accordingly, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner could have been terminated earlier than he was. In consideration of the fact that Petitioner had been a long-time employee of the company, he was given more time to improve his performance than company policy required. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that age played any role in Petitioner's termination. Petitioner did not prove that after he was terminated, a younger worker replaced him. Similarly, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act, or that any disability played any role in his termination. Petitioner alleged his disabilities as “war wounds, tinnitus and hearing loss.” Petitioner never informed Respondent that he suffered from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, Petitioner never informed Respondent that the disabilities alleged would in any way prevent him from performing his job as a Service Technician, or from satisfying the TDP developed to assist in ameliorating his performance deficiencies. Petitioner never informed Respondent that the alleged disabilities substantially impacted any major life function, or affected Petitioner’s ability to perform the essential functions of his Service Technician job. Respondent was not, at relevant times, on notice that Petitioner might suffer from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Respondent never perceived Petitioner to be disabled at times relevant to this case. During his employment as a Service Technician, Petitioner did not indicate a need for or make any request to Respondent for accommodations for any physical condition. Finally, Petitioner alleged that his termination was in retaliation for complaints he had filed in another forum. This allegation was not proved; rather, the evidence established that Petitioner never opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In sum, the evidence established that Respondent discharged Petitioner solely on account of inadequate job performance as a Service Technician, and not on account of his age, disability, or in retaliation for complaints filed in another forum.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2005.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 1210142 U.S.C 12102 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.02760.10760.11
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EDWARD TEMPLES vs LEVITON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 06-003534 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 19, 2006 Number: 06-003534 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 2010

The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully terminated the employment of Petitioner, because of his age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner by terminating him on October 3, 2005, after Petitioner filed a complaint with human resources alleging a hostile work environment.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Leviton Manufacturing Corporation manufactures electrical equipment and components. It is a New York corporation licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Inter allia, Respondent employs a sales force that covers the entire State of Florida. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). Respondent has implemented an employee handbook aimed at fostering a work environment that is free from harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Respondent's policies contain reporting and investigation procedures that encourage employees to report any and all incidents of perceived discrimination or harassment, and ensure that all reported incidents are investigated. Petitioner was employed with Respondent from June 1995 until November 2003, and from July 2004 through October 3, 2005. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was 49 years old. Petitioner first began working for Leviton in 1995 as a Service Representative. He received merit pay raises and promotions until November 2003, when Respondent laid-off 150 people in the retail division, including Petitioner. Petitioner was rehired in July 2004, as a Sales Representative. Upon rehire, Petitioner was supervised by District Manager Scott Robbins ("Robbins"). Petitioner presented the testimony of three of Respondent's managers, one retired, who supervised Petitioner for various periods of Petitioner's nine and one-half year career with Respondent. Each of them testified that Petitioner was dedicated and professional in which ever position he was assigned, including two assignments as a manager. Scott Robbins, Petitioner's supervisor immediately prior to Goodman, recommended Petitioner for re-hire as a Sales Representative following a lay-off, and was satisfied with his work in that position. Petitioner also presented the testimony of 12 customers of Respondent, in the territory that he covered between July 2004 and October 2005. Each of them expressed their opinion that Petitioner was an honest, diligent, and professional sales representative for his employer. Respondent presented the testimony of one customer who was not satisfied with Petitioner's performance as a sales representative. In January 2005, District Manager Warren Goodman ("Goodman") replaced Robbins and assumed his territories as well as his role as Petitioner's supervisor. At the time Petitioner was terminated, Goodman was 48 years old. Goodman supervised, and currently supervises, at least, 12 Sales Representatives, the majority of whom are over the age of 40, to wit: Name Age Name Age Roy Boykin 59 Mickey Ferrell 49 Don Yeager 59 Jose Monzon 40 Michael O'Reilly 56 Duane Bishop 38 Dave Lenoir 37 Kevin Bouton 34 Ken Davis 54 Paul Dube 41 Brad Taylor 10. When Goodman 52 took over as District Manager, it became readily apparent that Goodman's management style was distinctly different from Robbins. Goodman is demanding, blunt and aggressive, and closely manages his sales representatives. He expected prompt and accurate responses to his requests from his sales representatives. Petitioner was required to fulfill the same job expectations that were demanded of all other Sales Representatives. It included, but was not limited to, the timely submission of complete and accurate paperwork, client follow up, and travel to specific areas within his designated territory. Petitioner's area extended from Lakeland, Florida, to Thomasville, Georgia. Goodman expected Petitioner to visit customers in his territory at least every three weeks, staying at least two to three days on each trip at each location. Goodman's job as District Manager is to oversee his sales force and to enforce Leviton's guidelines, as he interprets them. Moreover, Goodman is charged with measuring his employees' compliance with Leviton's policies and procedures. Over the course of his tenure, Petitioner failed to abide by company rules and policies, as well as the terms of his employment, as understood by Goodman. On more than one occasion, Petitioner failed to provide expense reimbursements in an appropriate and timely manner. He also failed to travel with the frequency required by his sales position. Additionally, on numerous occasions, Petitioner failed to verify the accuracy of orders he placed for customers. On May 2, 2005, Goodman sent Petitioner an email addressing the importance of administrative responsibility and consistency. Goodman had just reviewed Petitioner's expense reports and noted that they covered a ten-week period, clearly in violation of the requirement that they be submitted within 30 days. Goodman also noted that the expense reports reflected no travel over a two-month period to the Thomasville/Tallahassee area, which composed a large portion of Petitioner's territory. Goodman requested that, thereafter, Petitioner forward his itinerary weekly, attaching as an example a copy of itineraries submitted by Petitioner's colleagues. Petitioner responded, apologizing for the late expenses. He attributed his tardiness in part to a change in his cellular telephone carrier. Petitioner set forth all his travel dates within the northern portion of his territory since his re-hire. The dates provided demonstrated that he was not in compliance with the travel requirements established for all Sales Representatives. Goodman responded and reminded Petitioner of the importance of adhering to guidelines for travel and paperwork submission. He encouraged Petitioner to improve his performance and to do what was necessary to satisfy Goodman's expectations of the proper skills necessary to do his job effectively. On May 9, 2005, Petitioner sent Goodman an email indicating his car was being repaired. The repair estimates attached to the email evidenced that Petitioner had been driving a 12-year-old vehicle, which was not within Respondent's car policy guidelines. Petitioner had reviewed and signed the car policy guidelines on January 12, 2005, and began receiving monthly payments (including retroactive payments), effective February 11, 2005. On May 18, 2005, Petitioner received and signed an Employee Warning. Significantly, Petitioner signed the Employee Warning indicating that he read and understood it. The Employee Warning cited violations for substandard job performance and violations of company policies or procedures, with specific reprimands for: (1) failure to timely submit expense reports; (2) failure to travel as specified and agreed to; (3) sloppy submission of paperwork; (4) lack of involvement with customer; and (5) failure to maintain a proper company vehicle in accordance with company policy. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner purchased a new truck for the purpose of meeting the company vehicle policy. On May 31, 2005, Goodman reviewed numerous quotes submitted by Petitioner for review and renewal. Goodman informed Petitioner that upon review, the quotes prepared by Petitioner were inaccurate and required various revisions and corrections. Some quotes were priced higher than stock; different prices were entered for the same item in a different color (when there should have been no price difference); there were items on quotes that were never purchased; and there was no increase in items ordered/quoted. In August 2005, Goodman advised Petitioner that his sales goals were not ambitious enough and that Petitioner needed to re-evaluate and re-consider his year-end goals. Petitioner indicated that he would do as instructed. In mid-August 2005, Petitioner once again submitted an incomplete quote to Goodman for approval. When brought to Petitioner's attention, he added the items missing from the quote, offering no explanation for this oversight. On August 30, 2005, Petitioner submitted order adjustments to Goodman's administrative assistant for completion. When the request was forwarded to Goodman, he immediately reminded Petitioner that all changes were required to be submitted to him, not his assistant. Moreover, the requested changes contained errors. Goodman requested that Petitioner review the complete order and re-submit it when it was accurate. Three days later, Petitioner still had not acknowledged or responded to Goodman's request. Goodman completed and submitted Petitioner's performance review on July 25, 2005. Due to the fact that no prior goals or skills development were accomplished by Petitioner, his review was deferred until the end of 2005. Based upon his seven-month assessment of Petitioner, Goodman felt that Petitioner only partially met expectations. Rather than precluding a merit increase in salary, Goodman gave Petitioner an opportunity to improve his performance by deferring his review for several months. Petitioner signed this July review, indicating that Goodman discussed the review and appraisal with him. On September 5, 2005, (Labor Day, a holiday) Goodman sent an email to all of his Sale Representatives, which required a response to specific inquiries no later than 5:00 p.m. Petitioner did not respond until September 7, 2005, at 4:15 p.m. This was clearly past the deadline. Goodman reprimanded Petitioner in his responsive email, specifically advising Petitioner that his continued employment was in jeopardy. He invited Petitioner to call Goodman the next day to discuss Petitioner's lack of diligence and timeliness. Only after a telephone call on the morning of September 9, 2005, did Petitioner, for the first time raise the issue of unfair treatment, but he did not raise age as a factor. Petitioner requested, via email, that Goodman assist Petitioner in filing a complaint against Goodman with Leviton's Human Resource Department for creating a hostile work environment. In this same email, Petitioner informed Goodman that Petitioner had involved clients in his grievance by requesting that the clients evaluate Petitioner's performance and provide their input to Respondent. Based upon the preceding client involvement, Goodman advised Petitioner on September 12, 2005, that he was suspended immediately, with pay, pending the outcome of Respondent's investigation regarding Petitioner's inappropriate conduct. Petitioner was therefore instructed to maintain contact with only the Human Resources Department (HR) until further notice. Thereafter, Petitioner corresponded, via email, with Shephard. On September 13, 2005, Petitioner forwarded his May 5, 2005, email exchange with Goodman to Kimberly Shephard, Respondent's Corporate Human Resource Manager. On that same day, Petitioner sent another email to Shephard containing a list of items that were still incomplete and required follow up. In forwarding this lengthy "to do" list, Petitioner demonstrated his inattention to detail and inability to complete administrative tasks. On September 16, 2005, Shephard drafted Petitioner's allegations in memorandum format, the accuracy of which Petitioner verified and signed on September 20, 2005. Goodman was given a copy of the allegations and provided a written response on September 19, 2005, refuting each of Petitioner's allegations. Meanwhile, HR conducted interviews with a random selection of Goodman's employees in the district and noted each employee's assessment of Goodman. Goodman was determined by each of the interviewed employees to provide equal treatment to all employees. The employees interviewed ranged in age from 35 to 58. On or about September 20, 2005, Shephard completed her investigation of Petitioner's complaint and determined that there was no basis that Goodman created an unlawful hostile work environment. Rather, it was determined that Goodman set the same standards for all of his employees; treated them all the same; and that accordingly, there was no basis to conclude Petitioner was singled out. Petitioner was ultimately terminated on October 3, 2005. The reasons cited by Respondent were based on Petitioner's unsatisfactory job performance. The specific reasons given for Petitioner's termination were: (1) his inability to perform the tasks associated with the Sales Representative position; (2) his failure to develop end-users sufficiently; (3) his administrative inadequacies; (4) his failure to meet deadlines and failure to follow instructions; and (5) his choosing to enlist customers in an internal company matter pertaining to Petitioner's poor job performance. Although Respondent determined that Petitioner's involvement of customer's in an internal dispute was grounds for immediate termination, Respondent determined it would investigate Petitioner's complaint prior to taking other action, since it occurred at the same time as the allegations of improper conduct by Goodman. At no time was Petitioner's age raised as a factor in any of the terms and conditions of his employment by Respondent. Nor was it a factor in any work related complaints regarding his deficiencies. Petitioner never informed any member of Respondent's management that he believed he was treated differently during his employment because of his age, or that he had been terminated due to his age. After Petitioner was terminated, Respondent did not hire anyone to replace him. Rather, Respondent re-assigned Petitioner's territory to existing salesmen. Paul Dube ("Dube"), aged 41, inherited the majority of Petitioner's territory. Goodman did not require that Dube travel to, or invest time in customers that only did a nominal amount of business with Respondent. Petitioner attempted to establish that he was unable to respond to several of Goodman's inquiries in a timely manner, or at all, because Petitioner's computer was being repaired by Respondent's IT department. Nevertheless, Petitioner had access to his work email via Respondent's webmail program during this period. Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated by Respondent because of his age. Respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subject to retaliation after he filed a hostile work environment complaint with Respondent's HR department.

Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismissing his charge with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2007.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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TERRANCE D. DAVENPORT vs VILLAGE ON THE GREEN, 97-005058 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Oct. 31, 1997 Number: 97-005058 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner was demoted from his position as a security officer, and later terminated from his position with the Respondent as a groundskeeper on or about May 22, 1995, on the basis of his race (Black) or sex (male), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner is an African-American male, and is licensed as a Class D security officer by the State of Florida. Respondent, Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc., is a not-for-profit corporation, based in Iowa, which owns Village on the Green, a community with 241 independent living units and 60 skilled health center beds in Longwood, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent, on April 27, 1998, as a security guard at Village on the Green in Longwood, Florida. He worked in that capacity until May 12, 1995. In accordance with the company's standard procedure, all employees who have keys or access to resident's private property are required to have a criminal background check completed. Petitioner's position as a security guard required such a check. Petitioner signed a consent form and the background check was completed. The background check revealed that, in 1993, Petitioner was arrested for the felony of grand theft auto. The charge was later reduced from the misdemeanor charge of Trespass to a Conveyance. On May 17, 1994, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge. Adjudication was withheld by the Court and Petitioner was placed on six months probation. Petitioner successfully completed probation. It is the policy of Respondent that an employee with a prior criminal record which involves theft may not be placed in a safety-sensitive position which permits employee access to a resident's living quarters or personal property. A security officer has such access. Petitioner was then informed that he would be removed from his position as a security guard. Petitioner was then offered a position in groundskeeping and Petitioner accepted. He was transferred to groundskeeping, at the same salary, and was employed from May 15, 1995, until May 22, 1995, at which time he was terminated. Between May 15 and May 22, 1995, Petitioner performed his job satisfactorily. On May 15, 1995, a severe electrical storm knocked out electricity to Petitioner's residence. As a result, Petitioner overslept and did not report to work at 7:00 a.m., the scheduled beginning of his shift. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Petitioner called the security guard on duty and advised her of the reason he was late and that he would not be in that day because the storm had caused damage to his automobile. The fact that Petitioner reported in on May 15th was not conveyed by the unidentified security guard to Petitioner's supervisor. Respondent's policy, as stated in the Employee Handbook, called "No show/no call," requires an employee to notify his supervisor if he is going to absent, or if he is unable to contact the supervisor, then he is to report his absence or tardiness to the switchboard operator. The Employee Manual, at page 45, states in pertinent part: ". . . Failure to report for duty without notification, failure to call in prior to shift change and tardiness will result in disciplinary action." After an internal investigation, which included an interview with Petitioner, Respondent was unable to determine that Petitioner had called in on May 15, 1995. Petitioner was terminated. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Respondent's reason for termination was pretextural, or that the employer engaged in unlawful hiring, firing, pay or promotion practices.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John V. Griffin DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1998. Director of Human Resources Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc. d/b/a Village on the Green 200 East Grand, Suite 390 Des Moines, Iowa 50309 Terrance Davenport 861 Carver Street Winter Park, Florida 32789 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-4.016
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JOSEPH ROLLERSON vs WYCLIFFE GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, 14-005114 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Oct. 28, 2014 Number: 14-005114 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 2015

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment discrimination practices alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. At all times pertinent to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as an equipment operator in the golf course maintenance department. Respondent has been employed by Respondent for approximately 20 years. Respondent is a golf and country club.1/ Respondent's employment policies are contained in its "Employee Handbook."2/ The Employee Handbook provides that a "[v]iolation of any of the rules or policies set forth in this Handbook may lead to discipline, up to and including immediate discharge." Respondent's Employee Handbook contains a section on absenteeism and tardiness, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Excessive absenteeism or tardiness can result in discipline up to and including discharge. If you are going to be late or absent from work for any reason, you must personally notify your Supervisor as far in advance as possible (but no later than 2 hours before your scheduled start time) so proper arrangements can be made to handle your work during your absence. Of course, some situations may arise in which prior notice cannot be given. In those cases we expect you to notify your Supervisor as soon as possible. Leaving a message, sending a text, or having someone else call on your behalf, does not qualify as notifying your Supervisor- you must personally contact your Supervisor. If you are required to leave work early, you must also personally contact your Supervisor and obtain his/her permission. Absences of more than one day should be reported daily, unless you have made other arrangements with your Supervisor or the Human Resources Office. (emphasis in original). * * * Although an employee may be terminated at any time for failing to report to work without contacting the Club, if an employee fails to report for work or call in for three (3) consecutive calendar days they will be considered to have abandoned their job and will be terminated. Respondent's Employee Handbook also contains a provision concerning workplace violence. Employees are notified that, "[v]iolations of this policy may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment." The workplace violence policy provides in pertinent part: The Club has a zero tolerance policy regarding violent acts or threats of violence against our employees, applicants, members, vendors, or other third parties. We do not allow fighting or threatening words or conduct. We also do not allow the possession of weapons of any kind on the Club's premises, except as required by law. No employee should commit or threaten to commit any violent act against a co-worker, applicant, member, vendor, or other third party. This includes discussions of the use of the dangerous weapons, even in a joking manner. May 3, 2013, Incident On May 3, 2013, Petitioner was not at work, but rather, performing work for a resident in the community. Petitioner's vehicle was apparently parked on the wrong side of the road. Mike Jones, a security guard, advised Petitioner to move his vehicle or he was going to receive a ticket. Petitioner informed Mr. Jones that he was not going to receive a ticket, and followed Mr. Jones back to the guard gate. Thereafter, Petitioner and Mr. Jones became engaged in "some words." According to Petitioner, after the verbal altercation he left the guard gate. On May 4, 2013, Petitioner presented to work and performed his duties. The following day, May 5, 2013, Petitioner was arrested for the May 3, 2013, incident and charged with battery on a security officer. Petitioner testified that the arrest occurred in Mike Ballard's office.3/ Mr. Ballard was Petitioner's superintendent at some point in his employment. Beth Sandham, Respondent's Human Resources Director, was not present at the time of arrest. Petitioner remained in custody throughout May 6, 2013. When Petitioner did not appear for work on May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that the Human Resources department, as well as his supervisors, attempted to contact Petitioner. After several attempts to reach him by phone, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner via Federal Express.4/ Petitioner testified that he contacted his supervisor on May 6, 2013, and was advised that he had been terminated. Petitioner contends that his termination was racial in origin because Respondent did not obtain his account of the altercation prior to his termination. On this point, Petitioner testified as follows: That why I say this is a racist thing because they listen to what their two security guards say, but they never gave me the chance to explain myself. On May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham terminated Petitioner's employment on the grounds of failing to report to work and the alleged violent behavior. As an additional basis for alleging racial discrimination, Petitioner testified that Mike Ballard was a racist. Specifically, Petitioner testified that on one occasion he overheard Mr. Ballard advise another employee, Jeff Beneclas, to "[t]ell that nigger mind his own f***en business." Petitioner explained that Mr. Ballard was referring to him. Mr. Beneclas was terminated on June 25, 2010. Addressing this allegation, Ms. Sandham explained that, if the alleged statement had been made over Respondent's radio system, said statement would have been heard by the tennis department, the golf professionals, facilities maintenance, the superintendents, and golf course maintenance. Ms. Sandham credibly testified that neither Petitioner nor any other employee notified her of such a statement or made a complaint. Additionally, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that Petitioner never made a complaint to her regarding Mr. Ballard.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief against Wycliffe Golf and Country Club. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2015.

CFR (1) 29 CFR 1601.70 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11
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MARLOWE D. ROBINSON vs BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 17-006239 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Nov. 14, 2017 Number: 17-006239 Latest Update: Apr. 12, 2019

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Marlowe D. Robinson ("Petitioner"), was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent, Broward County School District ("BCSD"), his employer, based on his disability and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination, in violation of chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Civil Rights Act; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for BCSD for approximately 20 years prior to the termination of his employment on May 8, 2018. Petitioner is a disabled veteran. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was employed as the Head Facility Serviceperson at BCSD's office in the Katherine C. Wright Building ("KCW"). On February 5, 2016, Richard Volpi began working at KCW as the Manager of Administrative Support and as Petitioner's immediate supervisor. During Mr. Volpi's third day on the job, Petitioner told him that he was not happy that Mr. Volpi was at KCW and that KCW was "his house." He also told Mr. Volpi that he did not work because he "delegated to his crew." On February 18, 2016, Petitioner filed two internal labor grievances. In the first, he asked to have his job title changed to "Building Operations Supervisor." In the second grievance, Petitioner alleged that Mr. Volpi and Jeff Moquin, Chief of Staff, created a hostile and unclean work environment. Mr. Volpi processed the grievances by having a meeting with Petitioner on February 25, 2016. Finding no basis for the grievances in the collective bargaining agreement, Mr. Volpi denied them. On October 10, 2016, Mr. Volpi met with Petitioner to discuss a significant pattern of Petitioner coming in late, failing to notify BCSD when arriving late, staying after his scheduled shift to make up time without authorization, failing to call in as required for sick days, and failing to have pre- authorization for using accumulated leave. After the meeting, Mr. Volpi issued a written "Meeting Summary," which included counseling, based on Petitioner having come in late 24 days since August 1, 2016, and only notifying Mr. Volpi's assistant of the tardiness on three of those 24 days. The "Meeting Summary" was not considered discipline and stated, "If for any reason you need to change your shift hours to assist you in getting to work on time, please let me know." On October 19, 2016, Petitioner filed his third internal labor grievance after Mr. Volpi became his supervisor. The third labor grievance made numerous allegations against Mr. Volpi, including, but not limited to, sexual harassment, unspecified Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") violations, and retaliation for filing prior grievances. On October 26, 2016, Petitioner submitted a request for intermittent leave pursuant to FMLA. The next day, Petitioner was notified that his FMLA leave request was incomplete, and was therefore denied. Petitioner was later granted intermittent FMLA leave with the agreement that he was to provide advance notification of his anticipated absences. On November 9, 2016, Petitioner was notified in writing to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on November 16, 2016, for a pre- disciplinary conference to discuss Petitioner's failure to adhere to the directive of October 10, 2016, to notify Mr. Volpi if he was going to be late, out for the day, or working outside his scheduled hours. The letter specified that Petitioner was late October 11, 13, and 17, 2016, without notifying Mr. Volpi, and that Petitioner was late and worked past his regular scheduled hours on October 21, 25, and November 7, 2016. The letter also specified that Petitioner "called out" (took time off) without notifying Mr. Volpi on October 31 and November 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, 2016. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth grievance against Mr. Volpi alleging retaliation, bullying, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and various policies of BCSD. On November 16, 2016, Mr. Volpi memorialized in writing that Petitioner failed to show up for the November 16, 2016, pre-disciplinary meeting. On November 21, 2016, Petitioner was notified in writing that he was to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on November 30, 2016, for a pre-disciplinary meeting to replace the original meeting scheduled for November 16, 2016. Petitioner was not disciplined for not showing up to the November 16, 2016, meeting. The meeting on November 30, 2016, went forward as scheduled and Petitioner was issued a verbal reprimand on December 5, 2016, his first discipline from Mr. Volpi, for Petitioner's ignoring the prior directive to contact his supervisor if he was going to be late, absent, or wanted to work beyond his scheduled shift. He was again reminded that he had to make such notifications and have permission in advance of working hours other than his regular shift. On January 12, 2017, Petitioner was granted a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The accommodation granted permitted Petitioner to report to work within one hour of his scheduled work time and leave within one hour of his scheduled end time ("flex time"). Additionally, Petitioner was required to notify his supervisor in advance of using flex time. Mr. Volpi assisted Petitioner in the accommodation process. Mr. Volpi provided Petitioner the accommodation paperwork and advocated for Petitioner to be granted an accommodation. On January 26, 2017, Petitioner again came in late without providing Mr. Volpi advance notice of intent to use his flex time. On January 27, 2017, Mr. Volpi sent an email to Petitioner reminding Petitioner that he was required to notify him if he is going to be late. This was not considered discipline. On March 21, 2017, Petitioner was notified in writing that he was to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on March 27, 2017, for a pre-disciplinary meeting regarding ongoing excessive tardiness and failure to adhere to his work schedule. On March 23, 2017, Petitioner filed his fifth internal labor grievance, again alleging harassment (among other claims) against Mr. Volpi. On March 28, 2017, Petitioner filed his sixth internal labor grievance, again making harassment allegations against Mr. Volpi. On April 6, 2017, Petitioner was issued a Written Reprimand by Mr. Volpi for his nine days of tardiness in February and March and his failure to notify Mr. Volpi in advance. On April 7, 2017, Petitioner appealed the Written Reprimand. Petitioner also filed his seventh and eighth internal labor grievances alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation. Petitioner filed his Charge with the FCHR on April 13, 2017. Mr. Volpi conducted a first-step grievance hearing on April 27, 2017, and as a result of the discussion with Petitioner, who agreed to notify Mr. Volpi in advance of his inability to arrive at work as scheduled, the April 6, 2017, Written Reprimand was reduced to a verbal warning. The FCHR dismissed Petitioner's Charge with a No Reasonable Cause Determination on October 10, 2017. Between January 1 and February 15, 2018, Petitioner came to work late 14 days without providing prior notice, was absent without leave two days, and worked overtime one day without prior authorization. As a result, BCSD issued a three- day suspension on February 21, 2018. On February 22, 2018, Mr. Volpi met again with Petitioner to go over the expectations and provided a reminder memo not to work unauthorized hours without prior approval. On March 13, 2018, Mr. Volpi asked BCSD to issue a ten-day suspension to Petitioner for his ongoing failure to report to work at assigned times, unauthorized overtime, and absences without leave. In response, Petitioner filed yet another labor grievance. BCSD approved the ten-day suspension on April 10, 2018. Despite the ADA accommodation, increasing discipline, multiple counseling meetings and reminders, Petitioner continued his pattern of tardiness, unauthorized overtime, and absences. Accordingly, BCSD terminated Petitioner's employment on May 8, 2018. Petitioner's discipline and ultimate termination were not performance based, but rather, related solely to ongoing attendance issues.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing FCHR Petition 201700954. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2018.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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HOA V. HO vs CATHOLIC CHURCH OF THE INCARNATION, 93-003311 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jun. 15, 1993 Number: 93-003311 Latest Update: May 25, 1994

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Hoa V. Ho, is of Vietnamese national origin and has lived in the United States since the early 1980's. Petitioner has limited English speaking ability. He is only able to communicate in English with great difficulty. Petitioner became employed by Respondent, Catholic Church of the Incarnation (Incarnation), as a janitor during October 1984. Father Eric Hunter is the pastor of Respondent and has been since March 1989. The premises of Respondent consist of 13 acres of property where there is situated a 6,000 sq. ft. church, St. Michael's Hall, which serves as the Parish center and school cafeteria, four 1400 sq. ft. portable classrooms, offices, a Parish library building, an elementary school, a junior high school and a portable building. Additionally, there are four houses located off the 13 acre campus which includes a convent and three houses where the priests live, all of which are maintained by Respondent. When Father Hunter arrived at Incarnation in March of 1989, a majority of the buildings were in varying stages of disrepair. Some buildings required substantial renovation, including roof and other major repairs. It was necessary to have these repairs completed, as the schools's accreditation was up for renewal in 1990. At that time, the maintenance staff consisted of Richard "Scotty" Kane, who did minor repairs, Petitioner, who worked the night shift doing janitorial cleaning, and Joe Pignatello, who worked days as a janitor. Father Hunter implemented changes to upgrade the facilities including contracting with a lawn service to keep the grounds, and to free up the maintenance and janitorial staffs to work primarily on maintenance and general cleaning. Additionally, it was determined that weekend maintenance coverage would be beneficial. Scotty Kane, who served as Petitioner's supervisor, was solicited to work on Sunday mornings for which he received a $60/week increase in salary. During August 1989, Petitioner requested permission to work the day shift, and he was changed to that shift. As a janitor working the day shift, his duties did not change. Father Hunter hired Hiep Nguyen, also of Vietnamese national origin, in August 1989, to work the night shift as Petitioner's replacement. In September 1989, Ralph Davis was hired by Respondent as a maintenance man to work the night shift and on weekends. The maintenance staff consisted of employees who performed strictly janitorial work, such as cleaning, and those who did maintenance or repair work, such as fixing electrical and plumbing problems. Petitioner, Nguyen, and Pignatello did strictly janitorial work, whereas Scotty Kane and Ralph Davis did maintenance and repair work. During this period, Respondent started upgrading it's facilities and commenced the major repairs such as repairing roofs and replacing portables. During this period, Respondent was also required to pay a tithe to the Diocese of St. Petersburg which represented a percentage of its income. During 1989, the tithe was 10 percent. During subsequent years, i.e., 1990-91, the tithe was raised to 14 percent. In the 1991-92 school year, student enrollment increased significantly, requiring the construction of two new classrooms and the addition of four new teachers to cover the increased student enrollment. Respondent also underwent several other monetary changes which required it to seek additional contributions from its parishioners. During September 1991, one of the three janitors, Joe Pignatello, retired and was not replaced. However, Respondent hired Bill Browne, an independent contractor, to oversee the maintenance area, and to do various work which had previously been referred to outside contractors, such as air conditioning, electrical, and plumbing repairs. For the most part, Petitioner was an exemplary employee; however, on occasion he had been reprimanded by his supervisor, Scotty Kane, for, among other things, leaving the premises while on worktime to go home to attend to a sick family member. Petitioner lived a short distance, described as a few blocks, from the church. Scotty Kane, who was directly in charge of Petitioner's work, had no difficulty with Petitioner staying on task, and on the few occasions when he was disciplined, he accepted it constructively. Petitioner received numerous accolades from his supervisor, Scotty Kane, relative to his job performance. Additionally, several teachers requested that Petitioner clean their portables because of the good job that he did as a janitor. Petitioner continued to do a good job until Bill Browne came on board, and Browne had difficulty communicating in English with Petitioner. For that reason, Browne become frustrated and would often relay work directives through Petitioner's supervisor, Scotty Kane. Kane was able to communicate with Petitioner since he had been doing so for a long period of time, and was accustomed to Petitioner's limited English fluency. Browne's frustration manifested itself by his calling a meeting with Petitioner during October 1991, wherein he directed that Petitioner learn to speak English. Browne offered Petitioner the use of the church and school facilities and "time on the clock" to study English. He also offered to bring in a tutor to assist Petitioner to learn to communicate in English. During the meeting with Browne in October 1991, Petitioner was given a date certain (by Browne) to learn to speak English, or he would face disciplinary action. Throughout his tenure with Respondent, Petitioner's duties as a janitor did not change significantly. His duties consisted of cleaning the church, assisting Kane with maintenance projects such as painting the interior and exterior of the church, and performing minor and routine maintenance activities. Although Petitioner has a limited ability to speak and understand the English language, such was not an impediment to his performance of his job duties as a janitor for the church. During the meeting with Browne in October 1991, wherein Browne complained about Petitioner's inability to speak and understand English, Browne gave the ultimatum regarding Petitioner's requirement to speak English. Several subsequent meetings were held in October 1991, which were attended by Mr. Browne, Messrs. Shiel and Kane, a Vietnamese interpreter from the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Nhu Ngog Do, and Petitioner to discuss Petitioner's communication difficulties. As stated, Messrs. Browne and Thomas Shiel, the Church Administrator, told Petitioner that he would have to improve his English speaking ability in order to keep his job as a janitor. During the meetings in October 1991, Browne told Petitioner that "the church requires that he learn to speak English." As a result of the ultimatum by Browne, Petitioner received English tutoring from Do; however, there was only a minimal improvement in his English communicating abilities. On February 12, 1992, Browne informed Petitioner that, because he could not clearly speak and understand English, his employment with the church would be terminated effective March 13, 1992. Browne informed Petitioner that he had four weeks to find another job; and at that time, he circled March 13, 1992, on the calendar and identified that date, by showing it to Petitioner, as his last day of work. Petitioner was discharged on that date. Browne and Shiel informed Kane that Petitioner was being discharged due to his limited English speaking abilities. Throughout this period, neither Browne nor Shiel asked the translator, Nhu N. Do, to tell Petitioner that he was being discharged for any reason other than his limited ability to speak and communicate in English. The motivating factor for Petitioner's discharge was his inability to speak and understand the English language. During this time, the church did not have any written estimate from any cleaning service identifying the cost of replacing Petitioner with an independent cleaning contractor. When Browne informed Petitioner of his pending discharge, Browne was not advised of, nor did he consider or was otherwise aware of, any cost savings that Respondent would realize by replacing Petitioner with a cleaning service. Respondent, through Browne, decided to terminate Petitioner's employment prior to having any specific knowledge of cost savings that might be realized as a result of hiring a cleaning service to perform janitorial functions. Noteworthy, during February 1992, when Browne told Petitioner that he would be fired within four weeks, he also told him that there were "Americans lined up to take his job". Browne also relayed to Petitioner that he would "fire Jesus Christ if he did not speak English". Browne had the apparent authority to effectively recommend Petitioner's discharge. The fact that Respondent was terminating Petitioner based on his inability to communicate in English was upsetting to Petitioner's supervisor, Scotty Kane. As a result, Kane along with Petitioner visited the Hillsborough County Equal Employment Opportunity Department and spoke with Susan Taylor, a counselor, concerning Petitioner's termination based on his inability to speak English. Ms. Taylor phoned Respondent's administrator, Shiel, to discuss Respondent's termination. Shiel informed Ms. Taylor that the church had asked Petitioner, on numerous occasions, to obtain instruction in English. When advised that Petitioner had in fact been taking English courses, Shiel related that Petitioner had recently sought such instruction only because he was concerned about losing his job as Browne had communicated to him. During the conversation between Shiel and Ms. Taylor, Respondent, through its agent Shiel, did not advise Ms. Taylor that Petitioner was being discharged for budgetary reasons, or for that matter, any reason(s) unrelated to his English communication difficulties. Kane and Petitioner also sought assistance from federal employment officials regarding Petitioner's pending dismissal based on his inability to speak English. As a result of their efforts, on or about March 4, 1992, Rose Briceno of the United States Department of Justice, Division of Immigration, Office of Special Counsel, spoke with Shiel on the telephone concerning the Petitioner's imminent dismissal. Briceno identified herself as an attorney with the Department of Justice and then told Shiel that it was illegal to discharge an employee because of the employee's inability to speak English if speaking English is not an essential part of the individual's job. Shiel told Briceno that Petitioner must be able to speak English in case of an emergency at the church or in the event guests needed to be guided around the property. Briceno told Shiel that such requirements were discriminatory, in that those job duties were not essential aspects of Petitioner's job as a janitor. In short, Bricena made it clear to administrator Shiel, that English fluency was not a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for a janitor. Significantly, during his conversation with Briceno, Shiel did not tell Briceno that Petitioner was being discharged for any reason(s) other than his inability to communicate satisfactorily in English. On March 6, 1992, two days after Shiel conversed with Briceno, Shiel drafted a letter to Petitioner informing him that his last day of work would be March 13, 1992, and that he was being discharged for budgetary reasons. This was the first time that Respondent made any mention or claim that Petitioner was being discharged for reasons other than his English communication difficulties. 1/ Shiel's contention that on March 6, 1992, when he prepared Petitioner's termination letter, he was unaware that Browne, three weeks earlier, had advised Petitioner that his last day of work would be March 13, 1992, is not credible. On or about March 6, 1992, Shiel terminated the employment of the only other Vietnamese employee, Hiep Nguyen, effective March 27, 1992. Nguyen's termination, however, is not at issue herein. Respondent continued to employ, as maintenance employees, two non- Vietnamese employees, Richard Kane and Ralph Davis, after Petitioner's separation on March 13, 1992. Neither Kane nor Davis are members of a "protected class" under Florida law. At the time of his discharge, Petitioner was the most senior of Respondent's maintenance department employees, save Kane. When Respondent made the decision to discharge Petitioner, no attempt was made to consider whether Petitioner could be retained in the maintenance department positions held by Ralph Davis or Richard Kane. During Shiel's tenure as church administrator, Respondent has terminated the employment of only two employees, Ho and Nguyen, both of whom are of Vietnamese descent. On March 11, 1992, Shiel executed a contract with A+ Cleaning Services which provided the janitorial services previously performed by Petitioner and Nguyen. The contract with A+ Cleaning Services resulted in a net cost savings to Respondent. The written cleaning proposal from A+ Cleaning Services was received after the decision was made to discharge Petitioner. When Respondent made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment, the church had not performed calculations which would reveal the cost savings attributable to replacing Petitioner and Nguyen with a cleaning service. This is so, despite the contrary assertions by Shiel and Browne, based on the motivating factors relating to Petitioner's English speaking difficulties. Respondent's explanation that Petitioner was discharged based on budgetary considerations is a pretext for its true discharge motivation, i.e., Petitioner's inability to speak and understand the English language. Petitioner was not discharged based on any performance problems, and he was a highly motivated employee, due to the dire financial circumstances of his family (in Vietnam), to earn a good living and to assist them financially by continuing to work in this country. Petitioner has continued to seek employment after his discharge although he has been, for the most part, largely unsuccessful, having only been able to locate temporary jobs as a dishwasher and a lawn cleaning service worker which jobs paid a fraction of the wages that he was paid by Respondent. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order awarding back pay and benefits to Petitioner in an amount to be determined by stipulation of the parties, or at a hearing on damages which shall include, inter alia, back pay and benefits from the date of his discharge, March 13, 1992, to the date of entry of the Final Order as well as prejudgment interest, front pay, and related benefits to Petitioner, plus interest from the date of the Final Order until paid by Respondent. The Hearing Officer specifically retains jurisdiction, if necessary, to determine the amount of damages. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1994.

Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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ZORAIDA M. OLIVERA vs CITY OF HALLANDALE, 00-004433 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 27, 2000 Number: 00-004433 Latest Update: Jun. 04, 2002

The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) Whether Petitioner filed her charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations within 365 days after the alleged discriminatory act; and (2) Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in connection with Petitioner’s employment by Respondent on the basis of her national origin, gender, or pregnancy.

Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Olivera is a Cuban-American female. The City hired her, effective March 8, 1993, to work as a secretary in the City Manager’s office. After one week, Olivera was promoted to the position of Office Manager, a more demanding job that entailed much greater responsibilities. The evidence regarding Olivera’s performance as Office Manager is in conflict. Her supervisors believed that Olivera was a marginal employee who failed to discharge her duties satisfactorily. The City has placed in evidence a number of contemporaneous memorandums and other documents that memorialize one or another of Olivera’s perceived performance deficiencies. In contrast, Olivera believed she was performing well, and that her supervisors’ complaints about her were, for the most part, false, exaggerated, or unfair — and worse, a pretext for unlawful discrimination. (Olivera admitted that she had had problems with tardiness during her first year of employment, but all agreed that Olivera had corrected this particular deficiency.) In short, Olivera perceived that she had been singled out for disproportionately harsh treatment and had been made the scapegoat when others failed to do their jobs. More ominously, Olivera accused the City Manager, R.J. Intindola, of constantly having made racist comments about Blacks and Cubans. She claimed that Mr. Intindola uttered racial slurs with such frequency that the workplace became hostile. Further, Olivera asserted that her complaints about Mr. Intindola’s behavior fell on deaf ears. As with the issues pertaining to Olivera’s job performance, the evidence regarding Mr. Intindola’s conduct is in conflict. Mr. Intindola himself denied having uttered the slurs that Olivera put on his lips, yet he admitted that “one time,” in Olivera’s presence, he had referred to another employee, Christy Dominguez, as a “crazy Cuban.” Mr. Intindola claimed that everyone present knew that he was kidding and laughed at the repartee between him and Ms. Dominguez. No one who testified at hearing corroborated Olivera’s account of Mr. Intindola’s conduct. Indeed, Ms. Dominguez, who has been employed with the City since May 1974, disclaimed having witnessed any discriminatory behavior in the workplace there, despite having been the subject of the one possibly derogatory comment that Mr. Intindola indisputably made. On or around April 24, 1995, Olivera was asked to resign her employment with the City to avoid being fired, which would be the consequence of her refusal. Faced with this choice, Olivera submitted a letter of resignation dated April 24, 1995. Thereafter, she received severance pay equal to two-months’ salary. Some time later, most likely during the first few weeks of March 1996, Olivera filed both a Charge Questionnaire and an Affidavit (collectively, the "Federal Forms") with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In the Federal Forms, Olivera alleged that the City had discriminated against her, primarily on the basis of her national origin. The EEOC notified Olivera by letter dated March 22, 1996, that, because her charge had not been timely filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the commission had forwarded the Federal Forms to the FCHR. On May 6, 1996, according to a date stamp on the face of the document, the FCHR received a Charge of Discrimination that appears to have been signed by Olivera on April 14, 1996. In this Charge of Discrimination, Olivera again alleged that the City had discriminated against her on the basis of national origin, in violation of her rights under the Florida Human Rights Act. Ultimate Factual Determinations The evidence in this record is not sufficient for the trier to ascertain whether, as a matter of objective historical fact, Olivera adequately performed on the job or not. Suffice it say that a preponderance of evidence fails to establish anything except that Olivera, on the one hand, and her supervisors, on the other, sincerely believed the opinions they expressed on this subject. In other words, Olivera honestly believes that she performed competently and was discriminated against. Her supervisors at the City, in turn, honestly believe that Olivera did not measure up to the Office Manager’s position and needed to be let go for that legitimate reason and no others. The upshot of this inconclusiveness is that Olivera has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the City violated her civil rights. Olivera’s conviction that she was the victim of unlawful discrimination, no matter how sincerely and firmly held, is not proof of the fact, at least not without more than the evidence in this record establishes. By the same token, the evidence does not exactly exonerate the City, in the sense of proving that its hands were completely clean or that it acted honorably in respect of Olivera. Rather, more likely than not, Mr. Intindola did on occasion make offhand comments about Cubans at which some persons could take offense. A preponderance of evidence fails to show, however, that he uttered these remarks with a discriminatory intent; that Olivera (or anyone else) suffered any material harm or humiliation as a result of hearing them; or that he did so with such frequency or in such fashion that his conduct could be called extreme. In sum, while it is fair to infer, and the trier so finds, that Mr. Intindola was not always as sensitive to the feelings of others as, in hindsight, he probably should have been, there is nevertheless insufficient evidence to support a finding that he acted willfully or that Mr. Intindola’s occasionally insensitive behavior was so consistently and frequently repeated as to become a condition of Olivera’s employment with the City. Likewise, the greater weight of evidence fails to establish that the environment in which Olivera worked was a hostile or abusive one. On this record the trier cannot say that, more likely than not, the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, insult, and ridicule. Further, the evidence does not establish that Olivera was treated differently than similarly situated employees who were neither Cuban- American, female, nor pregnant. In the final analysis, then, considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence presented at hearing demonstrates no more than that the City terminated the employment of an at-will employee for performance-related reasons unrelated to her national origin, gender, or medical condition (pregnancy).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Olivera's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2001.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-5.001
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JORGE V. JIMENEX vs WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY, 95-003990 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 11, 1995 Number: 95-003990 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 1997

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his employment with the Respondent in the Hospitality Department at the Grand Floridian Hotel on or about March 18, 1993 on the basis of his national origin (Hispanic-Dominican Republic), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Grand Floridian Hotel as a valet/greeter/bellman in the Hospitality Department during the relevant period of time, including March of 1993. The Petitioner is of Hispanic origin from the Dominican Republic and is a member of a protected class. In approximately October of 1988, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent at the Contemporary Hotel as a valet/greeter. In April of 1989, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for not logging in a piece of luggage. The Petitioner did not grieve the April 1988 written reprimand. In May of 1989, the Petitioner transferred to the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel, where he was a valet/greeter/bellman. In February of 1990, the Petitioner received an oral reprimand for three separate incidents of improperly logging luggage. 9. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the February, 1990 oral reprimand. In August of 1990, the Petitioner again received an oral reprimand, this time for mixing up luggage while loading it into vehicles. The luggage had to be mailed to each rightful owner at the Respondent's expense and caused an inconvenience to the guests. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the August 1990 oral reprimand. In December of 1991, the Petitioner mishandled luggage by failing to tag all of a guest's bags. In May of 1992, the Respondent's management discussed with the Petitioner his failure to tag a piece of luggage. In July of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for failing to log in a guest's luggage. The Petitioner's verbal reprimand in July of 1992 was the result of a direct complaint by a guest, who was required to search for a piece of his own luggage in the Hotel's storage room. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the July 1992 verbal reprimand. In September of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for approaching a guest to discuss splitting a tip with a bellman, an impermissible practice. The Petitioner was not suspended for this incident. In December of 1992, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failing to follow proper procedures regarding a guest's luggage on two separate occasions. The Petitioner did not grieve the December 1992 written reprimand. The Respondent decided not to consider the two incidents in December of the Petitioner's luggage-mishandling as separate incidents for progressive discipline purposes, even though such action was permissible under the collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent's decision not to consider the two December 1992 incidents separately for progressive discipline purposes was based upon the Petitioner's length of service and his good performance in other areas. The Petitioner had a good attitude, had good people skills, and had received good guest comments during the course of his employment. In December of 1992, the Petitioner understood that he was in the progressive discipline process. In January of 1993, the Respondent met with the Petitioner and offered to remove him from the responsibility of handling luggage by putting him in a non-tipped, dispatcher position. Also, in January of 1993, the Respondent and the Petitioner's union representative were working together to preserve the Petitioner's job. The Petitioner was reminded by his union representative about his previous reprimands and that one more incident would cause his termination. The Petitioner was told by his union representative that the purpose of moving him to a dispatcher position was to get him away from the luggage-handling area. The Petitioner was told that if he remained free of similar reprimands for one year, he could return to the tipped position of valet/greeter with no loss of seniority. After initially refusing the dispatcher position, the Petitioner accepted. The Petitioner was given the shift that he requested when he was transferred to the dispatcher position. In February of 1993 while on duty as a dispatcher, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension, without pay, for using poor judgment. He interrupted a valet while the valet was servicing a guest. The Petitioner did not grieve the February 1993 suspension. The Petitioner's action as a dispatcher of interrupting a valet was grounds for the valet to grieve such actions to the union. The suspension in February of 1993 for the Petitioner's poor judgment as a dispatcher was not the basis for his termination. The Petitioner requested a reclassification back to valet/greeter/bellman position. The Petitioner understood that one more incident of any kind would result in his immediate termination. The Petitioner requested the change from dispatcher back to valet/greeter/bellman for personal financial reasons; and his union representative also advised him that if one more incident of any kind occurred, he would be terminated. On March 16, 1993, the Petitioner mishandled luggage. The Petitioner did not properly log in a guest's luggage (a garment bag). 35. The Petitioner was terminated on March 18, 1993 for poor job performance. The progressive discipline which the Petitioner received was consistent with the union contract. The contract provides that an employee can be terminated for the next offense following a single written reprimand. The Petitioner had the opportunity to grieve all of the reprimands he received, and his union representative was aware of the actions taken in connection with the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner grieved his termination, and that grievance was denied. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any similarly-situated employee who was not terminated for mishandling luggage on as many occasions as he had. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence regarding any discrimination against other Hispanic employees, other than his own belief, speculation or conjecture. The Petitioner understood that the Respondent's management was closely checking into everyone's performance. Management asked all of the employees at the Grand Floridian Hotel to help the Hotel earn a five-star rating. The Petitioner was never part of the Respondent's management and did not attend manager meetings. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was chosen to train other employees because he knew the proper procedures for his valet/bellman/greeter position. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for handling luggage received from guests. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for logging in and handling bags. The Petitioner received copies of the Respondent's policies and procedures for a valet/bellman, including luggage handling. The Petitioner did not report many of the alleged discriminatory actions of his co-workers to management. The Petitioner conceded that on those occasions when he did make reports to management, these alleged actions stopped. The Petitioner received the overtime and schedules which he requested because of his seniority. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Orlando, Florida, work site has increased from 1993 to 1996. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel has either remained the same or increased from 1992 to 1995. In January of 1993, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department was 14, of which 11 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. In February of 1996, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department (including valets, bellmen, greeters and dispatchers) was 16, of which 12 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of an overall plan by the Respondent's management to eliminate minorities, including Hispanics, from employment at the company. The Respondent allows employees to review their employment records at any time upon request. The Petitioner presented only his own beliefs, speculation or conjecture as a basis for his claims of national origin discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3990 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20, 22-31, 33-39, 41-61. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 21, 32, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Jorge V. Jimenez 2716 FDC Grove Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Myrna L. Galligano, Esquire Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P.A. 731 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana C. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-4.016
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NANCY DIZ vs ARTHREX MANUFACTURING, 04-002652 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida Jul. 27, 2004 Number: 04-002652 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her national origin.

Findings Of Fact Arthrex is a company that designs and manufactures orthopedic surgical tools, implants and devices for surgeons, medical facilities, and hospitals. Arthrex is regulated by the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and maintains certification through the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO"). Arthrex is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Hispanic female, whose primary language is Spanish. Beginning in June 2001, Petitioner worked in the cleaning and packaging area of Arthrex's production facility. "Cleaning" in this context should not be confused with janitorial services. Petitioner's job was more technical and exacting and involved the maintenance of a sterile, disinfected work area and equipment in the manufacture of items that, in some cases, are surgically implanted in the human body. She worked in the company of 10 to 12 co-workers within a relatively confined space. Arthrex obtains staffing for its cleaning and packaging area through an independent contractor, Randstad, a large employment services company. On June 13, 2003, Petitioner accompanied a friend to the local Randstad office to assist the friend in applying for a job with Arthrex in the cleaning and packaging area. Petitioner became angry with the Randstad representative who performed the screening and testing of Petitioner's friend. Petitioner believed that the Randstad employee decided at the outset not to hire her friend, and so tested the friend on difficult subjects having nothing to do with the Arthrex cleaning and packaging job, such as her ability to use a computer and her ability to "write, read and talk perfect English." Petitioner stated that other applicants were not subjected to the same scrutiny as was her friend and that both she and her friend felt humiliated by the "rude" Randstad employee. Immediately after the job interview, the Randstad representative phoned Margarita Alvarez, the human relations manager for Arthrex, and told Ms. Alvarez that Petitioner had "made a scene" at the Randstad office. Ms. Alvarez asked the Randstad representative to put her complaint in writing, and she would then address the matter with Petitioner. Shortly after the phone call, Ms. Alvarez was conducting an employee relations meeting in her office when Petitioner walked into her office. Petitioner began complaining loudly about the "ridiculous" hiring process employed by Arthrex, waving her hands and stamping her foot in anger. Ms. Alvarez told Petitioner that she would discuss the matter after her meeting was over. Petitioner walked out of Ms. Alvarez's office saying, "Thank you for nothing." Petitioner then proceeded to stamp her way down to her workplace, continuing to display her anger and disrupt the work of the other employees in her area by complaining loudly about Arthrex's hiring practices. Ms. Alvarez testified that Petitioner's behavior violated Arthrex's written policies regarding hostile, disruptive behavior in the workplace. Ms. Alvarez prepared a written warning called "performance correction notice" dated June 17, 2003. The notice described the disruptive behavior Petitioner engaged in on June 13, 2003, and stated that Petitioner was expected to maintain a "friendly work environment" and to express her disagreements with company policy "respectfully[,] . . . in private with [her] immediate supervisor or with Human Resources." The notice further warned Petitioner that any further "unprofessional conduct" (antagonism, disruptive behavior or hostility) could subject Petitioner to a "final warning." On the afternoon of June 18, 2003, Petitioner met with Ms. Alvarez and Lea Custodio, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, who had taken the day off on June 13, 2003. Ms. Alvarez presented Petitioner with the performance correction notice. She explained that while she understood Petitioner's frustration, she could not allow such displays of temper in the workplace. Ms. Alvarez testified that she believed Petitioner understood the situation, and she encouraged Petitioner to write down her thoughts, comments, or corrections before signing the notice. Ms. Alvarez told Petitioner that she could write her response in Spanish, if that would allow her better to express herself. Ms. Alvarez is fluent in Spanish. On June 19, 2003, Petitioner submitted a handwritten note to Ms. Alvarez. Written in Spanish, the note expressed Petitioner's belief that the Randstad representative discriminated against her friend by imposing unreasonable requirements for the cleaning position in question. Petitioner was not disciplined in any way for either the form or content of this note, which was incorporated with the performance correction notice as part of Petitioner's employment file. Petitioner testified that she could not recall having been disciplined for the June 13, 2003, incident. She denied causing a disturbance at the Randstad facility or at her own workplace. She admitted writing the note and submitting it on June 19, 2003, but testified that Ms. Alvarez asked her to document the incident because of other complaints she had received about the Randstad representative. Petitioner's testimony is inconsistent with the documentary evidence, including the self-justifying language of her own handwritten note. Ms. Custodio's testimony corroborated that of Ms. Alvarez's concerning the disciplinary meeting held on June 18, 2003, at which Petitioner was given the performance correction notice and counseled by Ms. Alvarez as to the company's expectations regarding her behavior. Petitioner's testimony as to the June 13, 2003, incident and its aftermath is not credible. On or about August 10, 2003, a personal conflict arose between Petitioner and a co-worker, Pierre Escanio. Petitioner loudly questioned the quality of Mr. Escanio's work. In the cleaning and packaging area, the workers' products were commingled into single lots and sent to Arthrex's quality control division for review. Petitioner claimed to be concerned that Mr. Escanio's poor work would cause quality control to return the entire lot, meaning that everyone would have to redo their work. Ms. Custodio, the supervisor, attempted to calm the situation by telling Petitioner that she would talk to Mr. Escanio about his work. Ms. Custodio did so despite the fact that she had trained Mr. Escanio and knew him to be a competent employee. Ms. Custodio next told Petitioner that she would separate Petitioner's work from that of Mr. Escanio, marking the items so they would know whose work had been rejected by quality control. Despite Ms. Custodio's effort, Petitioner continued to complain. Ms. Custodio finally told Petitioner to stop making these complaints in front of the other dozen or so people in the work area. Ms. Custodio believed that Petitioner was questioning her authority in front of the other employees. She went to Ms. Alvarez to discuss the situation and obtain the assistance of the Human Resources Department in addressing the problem of Petitioner's insubordination. Ms. Custodio told Ms. Alvarez that she could no longer handle the situation with Petitioner. In keeping with the policies of Arthrex's Human Resources Department, Ms. Alvarez investigated the matter, conducting interviews with employees who witnessed Petitioner's behavior. Ms. Alvarez testified that her investigation led her to conclude that "there was a serious problem in the department." After a final consultation with Arthrex's general counsel, Ms. Alvarez recommended that Petitioner's employment be terminated for insubordination. Ms. Custodio agreed with the recommendation. By letter dated August 12, 2003, and signed by Ms. Alvarez, Arthrex terminated Petitioner's employment. The letter stated the following express reasons for Petitioner's termination: Previous written warning referring to disruptive behavior of 6/17/2003. Numerous reports of negative comments about the company and management in front of other employees. Antagonistic behavior with supervisor and coworkers. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her language or national origin played a role in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner's chief claim is that she was terminated for refusing to obey instructions from her supervisors, including Ms. Custodio and Ms. Alvarez, to cease speaking Spanish in the workplace. Both Ms. Custodio and Ms. Alvarez credibly denied giving any such instructions to any Arthrex employee. Arthrex does have a "Language Policy" that requires employees to be proficient in English to ensure that FDA regulations and ISO certification standards are met, because the company "has determined that the English language is the most common and effective means of communications" in the United States. The policy requires employees to communicate business-related information in English, but states that it "is not intended to prevent or discourage any employee from speaking their native language at Arthrex for certain business related matters, on their own time or with regard to non-business matters." The evidence established that all but one or two people in Petitioner's work area were native Spanish speakers and that they were allowed freely to communicate in Spanish in their day-to-day work activities. Employees were encouraged to communicate with their supervisors in their native language, if doing so improved the quality of the information conveyed. Ms. Custodio and Ms. Alvarez each testified that they knew of no Arthrex employee who had ever been disciplined for speaking a language other than English in the workplace. At the hearing, Petitioner repeatedly made reference to the efforts of one lower-level supervisor, Renee Vanderberg, to force the employees in Petitioner's section to refrain from speaking Spanish and confine their work conversations to English. However, the evidence established that once the Human Resources Department learned of Ms. Vanderberg's actions, she was admonished to cease directing the employees to speak English. When Ms. Vanderberg continued to press the issue, Arthrex terminated her employment. The evidence produced at hearing demonstrated that the reasons for Petitioner's termination were limited to those set forth in the termination letter of August 12, 2003.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Arthrex Manufacturing did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2005.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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