The Issue Whether the respondent is indebted to the complainant for the sale of Florida-grown agricultural products, and, if so, the amount of the indebtedness.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Rose has a grove of lychee trees on his property; each year he harvests the lychee nuts for sale, but the sale of agricultural products is not his sole source of income. In mid-June, 1996, Mr. Rose heard that the Growers Association was offering $3.50 per pound for lychees, the highest price of which he was aware. Mr. Rose took his fruit to the Growers Association on June 18, 1996. Mr. Rose had not done business with the Growers Association previously but had sold his fruit to another company. Mr. Rose received a grower's receipt showing that, on June 18, 1996, he had brought in 298 pounds of fruit, that 14 pounds were culls, and that the Growers Association had packed 27.9 ten- pound boxes of fruit. The Growers Association packed only marketable fruit. Ninety-nine percent of the tropical fruit grown in Florida is handled in pools.1 According to industry practice, the "handler" does not purchase the fruit outright but is responsible for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit and for accounting for and remitting the proceeds of sale, minus expenses, to the members of the pool on a pro rata basis. The pools are composed of all growers whose fruit is packed during a designated period of time. Prices initially quoted to growers participating in a pooling arrangement are not guaranteed because the actual sales price may vary, depending on market conditions. It was the practice of the Growers Association to handle lychees under a pooling arrangement, and the receipt Mr. Rose received from the Growers Association contained the notation "P- 407LY," which designated the pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned. The Lychee P-407LY pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned consisted of fruit packed by the Growers Association between June 15 and 21, 1996. Mr. Rose was told on several occasions by employees of the Growers Association that he would receive $920.70 after expenses for the sale of his lychees. This amount was reflected in a Pool Price Report generated by the Growers Association on July 10, 1997, which also showed that a total of 107.6 pounds of fruit was included in the pool and that the Growers Association anticipated receiving a total of $4,088.65 for the sale of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association maintained in its files a work order showing that 83 ten-pound boxes of lychees were sold to Produce Services of America, Inc., at a price of $38.00 per box and that the fruit was shipped on June 21, 1996. According to the July 10 report, the Growers Association had received payment of $932.90 for 24.55 ten-pound boxes of lychees sold to "L & V" on June 21, 1996, at $38.00 per box, but there is no indication in the report that the anticipated payment of $3,154.00 had been received from Produce Services of America. Mr. Rose repeatedly called the Growers Association during July and August to inquire about when he would receive payment for his fruit. In accordance with the information he had consistently been given by employees of the Growers Association, he expected to receive $920.70. When he received a check from the Growers Association dated August 29, 1996, in the amount of $367.48, he called the Growers Association for an explanation of why he had received that amount rather than the $920.70 he was expecting. Ultimately, he spoke with Mr. Kendall in early September, who told him that the $367.48 was all he was going to receive as his pro rata share of the pool because Produce Services of American had not paid in full for the 83 boxes of fruit it purchased. As reflected in the Pool Price Report dated September 19, 1996, the Growers Association received a total payment of only $1,847.42 for the fruit in the pool, rather than the $4,088.65 shown in the July 10, 1996, report. After the Growers Association's expenses were deducted, a total of $1,417.25 was distributed to the five growers in the pool. Although a copy of this final price report for the P-407LY pool should have accompanied Mr. Rose’s check, it did not. According to the information contained in the September 19 Pool Price Report, the shortfall in the amount received for the sale of the fruit in the pool is attributable to the Growers Association's receiving only $913.00, or $11.00 per box, for the sale of the 83 boxes of lychees to Produce Services of America, instead of the anticipated $3,154.00. The $913.00 was paid to the Growers Association by check dated August 19, 1996. Mr. Rose did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he had a contract for the outright sale of 27.9 ten-pound boxes of lychees to the Growers Association. Rather, the evidence establishes that Mr. Rose's fruit was handled by the Growers Association under a pooling arrangement and that, consistent with the practice in the tropical fruit industry, the Growers Association assumed responsibility for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit. The Growers Association failed to offer any credible evidence to explain why Produce Services of America paid only $11.00 per box for the 83 boxes of fruit shipped from the pool, notwithstanding that the agreed sales price was $38.00 per box.2 Even if the fruit was damaged or in poor condition when it was delivered to Produce Services of America, the Growers Association packed 27.9 ten-pound boxes of marketable fruit on Mr. Rose’s account, and, once packed, it had complete control of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association failed to offer any evidence to establish that it acted with reasonable care in fulfilling its responsibilities under the pool arrangement. Consequently, it bears the risk of loss rather than Mr. Rose and is indebted to him for $553.22, which is the difference between the $920.70 Mr. Rose would have received as his pro rata share of the pool had Produce Services of America paid the agreed-upon sales price of $38.00 per box and the $367.48 which the Growers Association paid to Mr. Rose by check dated August 29, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., is indebted to Mike Rose for the sale of agricultural products and ordering the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., to pay Mike Rose $553.22 within fifteen (15) days of the date its order becomes final. The Final Order should also provide that, in the event that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., fails to pay Mike Rose $533.22 within the time specified, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, as surety for the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., must provide payment under the conditions and provisions of its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Documents introduced into evidence revealed that the Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke is a registered real estate broker and Clarke Real Estate is an entity registered as a partnership broker and authorized to act as such with the Commission. On or about September 15, 1975, Jerry Kent, a salesman with Respondent, Clark Real Estate, obtained an oral open listing from Esther Braverman on a condominium unit denominated as "Apartment B-804, 1111 Crandon Boulevard, Key Biscayne, Florida." Pursuant thereto, salesman Kent showed the condominium unit to Jacques Benoist and Jeanine Benoist, his wife, who executed a deposit receipt contract to purchase a condominium unit on September 27, 1975. Esther Braverman, the seller, executed the contract during October of 1975. The deposit receipt contract provided for a $10,000 earnest money deposit to be held in the escrow account of the law firm of Snider, Young, Barrett, and Tannenbaum, P.A., attorneys for seller Braverman. Said deposit was made on September 27, 1975, by delivering a check to attorney Bruce L. Hollander, a member of the firm, who deposited the deposit in the firm's escrow account. (See Commission's Exhibit No. 9). The deposit receipt contract also obligated the seller, Esther Braverman, to pay Respondent Jeremiah C. Clark a commission of $7,875. Specifically, the contract provides that "I, or we, agree to pay to the above assigned broker a commission for finding the above signed purchaser for the above described property, the sum of $7,875 . . . ." Closing took place on January 19, 1976, at the offices of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida, from whom the Benoists had obtained financing for the purchase. At the closing on January 19, 1976, Esther Braverman signed and delivered a warranty deed made out to Jacques Benoist and Janine Benoist, transferring the property to the Bravermans. The warranty deed was recorded with the clerk of the Dade County Circuit Court by the lending institution, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association. (See Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) At the closing, Jeremiah Clark was given a check representing the commission to Clarke Real Estate in the amount of $7,875. Thereafter, Jerry Clarke was requested by the lending institution to hold the funds in escrow until the bank dispursed the mortgage proceeds. He was then told that the mortgage proceeds would be paid within the following week. Respondent Clarke agreed, pursuant to a request from the seller's attorney, Bruce Hollander, to hold the commission check until January 27, 1976, without depositing same. Mr. Clarke held the commission check until January 29, 1976, as agree. On that day, he dispursed the proceeds to salesman Jerry Kent and the balance was credited to Clarke Real Estate. The mortgage funds were never disbursed because the lending institution could not obtain a quit-claim deed from the seller, Esther Braverman's former husband and therefore in the lending institution's opinion, the defect was not discovered until after the closing. On May 6, 1976, attorney Hollander acting for his law firm and the seller sent Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke and Respondent Clarke Real Estate a letter stating that the mortgage proceeds had not been disbursed by the lending institution and requested a demand for the commission check. The Commission takes the position that the closing which occurred on January 19, was an escrow closing and that the Respondent Jeremiah Clarke was not authorized to disburse the proceeds from the commission check until notification that the mortgage proceeds were disbursed by the lending Institution. The Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that their only obligation was to find a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the transaction, which acts were consummated by their salesman, Jerry Kent. Based on my examination of the document introduced herein, and the testimony adduced during the hearing, the undersigned concludes that the Respondent's position that it was entitled to receive the commission monies here in dispute has merit. Although the Commission takes the position that an escrow closing occurred, an escrow has been defined as a written instrument which by its term imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or a happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. It cannot be seriously contended herein that the Respondent Clarke was acting as an escrow for himself when consideration is given to the above definition of an escrow. See Love v. Brown Development Company, 131 So. 144. It is further essential to an escrow that delivery of the instrument be to a stranger or to a third person, that is, to one who is not a party to the instrument, or a person so free from any personal or legal identity with the parties to the instrument as to leave them free to discharge his duty as a depository to both parties without involving a breach of duty to either. For example, a deed delivered to a grantee cannot be regarded as held in escrow. Here, Respondent Clarke was in no way acting for anyone other than himself or as agent for his salesman, Jerry Kent, both of whom had a direct stake in the commission proceeds. Additionally, upon examination of the deposit receipt contract, the broker became entitled to the commission proceeds when the buyer (purchaser) was found. Additionally, and as an aside, it was noted that the lending institution in fact recorded its mortgage the day following the closing This would lead any examiner of the public records to believe that the lending institution was satisfied with the title as conveyed on the closing date. It was further noted that the Respondents had no indication that there was a problem with the title until approximately five months following the closing. Finally, the undersigned received a letter from attorney Lipcon dated August 1, 1975, advising that the civil case which was pending before the Dade County Circuit Court involving similar issues as posed herein before the commission had been fully and finally settled. There was a stipulation for dismissal signed by attorneys for each of the parties including the attorney for the firm that made the complaint against the Respondents stating in essence that the monies paid to Respondent Clarke and which was retained by him as full and final settlement of his brokerage commission were to be retained by Respondent Clarke as final payment of his commission in connection of the sale of the subject condominium. For all of these reasons, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as found above, it is hereby recommended that the complaints filed herein be dismissed in their entirety. Recommended this 23rd day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The land encompassed within the mobile home park known as Mohawk Village was purchased by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, a corporation owned and controlled by the Tanner family. The majority of the stock in Respondent is owned by the oldest son; another son is president of Respondent; and the father, L. William Tanner, served as "consultant" to the corporation. This tract was initially divided into some 700-odd lots which were being sold to the public in 1980 as mobile home sites. The land was purchased from North Orlando Sewer and Water Company, which agreed to provide sewer and water services to the subdivision and to have these facilities in place by January 1, 1981. Respondent never registered with the Petitioner in accordance with Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. North Orlando Sewer and Water Company failed to provide sewer service to this development and none of the home sites were available for occupancy January 1, 1981, as promised to buyers by Respondent. Without sewer service it became necessary to go to septic tanks and this required larger lots per mobile home site. The tract was replatted to provide 300-odd lots despite the previous sale of smaller lots to buyers. These buyers were advised their lots would have to be swapped and when some objected and demanded their money back, without success, Petitioner was made aware of the development and investigated. The investigation led to the entering of a Cease and Desist and Consent Order (Exhibit 1). Therein Petitioner essentially agreed to forego action against Respondent for prior violations of Chapter 498, which Respondent contended it was subject to; and Respondent agreed to cease all leasing until the site was ready for occupancy, to provide Petitioner with copies of all leases in effect, as well as copies of all future leases executed, to deposit funds received from buyers in escrow until after receipt of a certificate of occupancy, and to take necessary steps to ensure all future leases fall within the statutory exemptions set forth in Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes. L. William Tanner was paid a consulting fee by Respondent "in the ballpark of $100,000." In addition, he was to own the companies that provided utilities to the park (after default by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company), and furnished porches, decks, built walkways, roads, etc. Following the Consent Order funds were received payable to Tanner-controlled companies that were not deposited in the escrow account. These funds were not lease payments but came from the lessees for sewer and water hookups, porches, decks, etc. Mohawk Village received its first certificate of occupancy on 14 January 1982. Between 17 April 1981, when the Consent Order was entered, and 14 January 1982, lot leases were sold to Gould on 30 November 1981; to Herring on 12 September 1981; and to Roberts on 14 January 1982 (Exhibit 6). The sales to Gould and Herring were clearly during the period Respondent had consented not to sell leases. Exhibit 1 authorized Respondent to renegotiate and relocate current lessees to new mobile home sites under a plan to use alternate utility services from those initially to be provided by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company "if such plan is implemented at no additional cost to the individual lessees." Those who had bought leases under the original scheme agreed to pay $29 per month to lessor. Leases sold after the decision to use septic tanks where the number of lots was reduced from 700-odd to 300-odd, provided the lessees would pay the lessor $59 per month. Respondent advised the earlier lessees that they would have to pay $59 per month in lieu of $29. When they objected and demanded refunds of what they had paid, some of them were promised refunds but to date very few have received any refunds. Changing their rental fee from $29 to $59 violated the Consent Order. The only change in the lease before and after the execution of the Consent Order was the change of this monthly rental payment. Since the original lease did not qualify for exemption under Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes, the amended lease, which merely changed the monthly rental fee, did not qualify for exemption. Leases on these lots were sold at prices ranging from $1,000 to $7,000. At no time relevant hereto did Respondent hold a dealer's license to deal in or sell mobile homes (Exhibit 3) There was no valid reservation program established by Respondent pursuant to Section 498.024, Florida Statutes, nor did Respondent apply for or receive approval of a public offering statement for Mohawk Village (Exhibit 2). All leases sold provided, in addition to a habitable lot, that the seller would provide recreational facilities. Those leases sold in 1980 promised a lot on which the buyer could move his mobile-home by January 1, 1981. Not only was the deadline missed but also Respondent has provided no recreational facilities. One witness who sold her home and bought a mobile home could not move it to the site in accordance with the contract because of lack of utilities and was forced to acquire another residence. Although proper demand was made she has been refunded none of her purchase money. According to his testimony, L. William Tanner has developed about one hundred subdivisions throughout the United States since 1946. Some 20 such subdivisions have been developed by him in Florida. He is aware of the Florida statutes regulating the subdivision and sale of lands, and contends that the Mohawk Village subdivision is exempt because Petitioner does not have jurisdiction over 99-year leases. He further contends that the monthly rental payments of $29 or $59 for 99 years brings the price paid for the lots to more than $50,000, thereby exempting them from the provisions of Chapter 498. Prior to the commencement of this hearing, Mohawk Village was transferred to Gould, who had been involved in supplying mobile homes to lot purchasers in the park. According to Tanner's testimony "it was not much of a sale" with him insisting Gould and Mohician Valley (apparently the new name for the mobile home subdivision) acknowledging existing mortgage, the Consent Agreement with Petitioner, and the obligation to refund the monies. No documentary evidence was presented to show that Tanner or his immediate family does not continue to own controlling interest in this mobile home park.
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent properly denied Petitioner's refund request for that portion of his Foresters licensing fee for the period July 1, 1979, through December 31, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. John T. Clark, Petitioner, is a licensed Florida Forester and, as such, received during December of 1978 a notice mailed by the Board of Registration for Foresters a license fee request for the period of January 1, 1979, through December 31, 1981. Petitioner timely submitted his license fee for the registration period in question. The Forestry Practice Act expired on June 30, 1979, based upon a veto by the Governor. (Chapter 76-168 as amended by Chapter 77-457, Chapter 6, Florida Statutes, the "Sunset Act".) Petitioner, by letter dated July 2, 1979, requested a refund of the license fee paid for the eighteen-month period of July, 1979, through December, 1981. On October 22, 1979, Gerald A. Lewis, Comptroller, advised Petitioner of the Respondent's notice of intent to deny his refund. That notice alleged in pertinent part that "pursuant to an Attorney General Opinion dated January 27, 197P) (AGO No. 078-14), Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, as construed by Florida Courts, provides that refunds may only be made from the funds benefited and if such fund does not have sufficient monies. . . to make the requested refunds, then the refunds cannot be made absent a specific legislative appropriation or claims bill." Petitioner was then advised that the fund benefited by the license payment did not have sufficient monies to pay the requested refund and, therefore, the request would be denied. Florida Statutes 215.26(1)(a) provides in pertinent part that the Comptroller of the State may refund to the person who paid same . . . any monies paid to the State Treasury which constitute: An overpayment of any tax, license or account due. Petitioner introduced into evidence the financial statement for the Board of Registration for Foresters for the quarter ending October 31, 1979, which indicates that as of October 31, 1979, the Board of Foresters had total net resources available of $17,767.91. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1.) At the time Petitioner remitted his payment, the amount remitted was correct under the laws and applicable rules of the Board of Registration for Foresters then in effect. Rule 211-2.06, Rules of the Board of Registration for Foresters, Florida Administrative Code. However, the parties also further agree that the payment tendered was a regulatory fee (as contrasted to a tax) and was used to defray the cost of regulation, and not as a general revenue producing measure. As such, the monies were deposited in a regulatory trust fund which of course reflects the fact that monies are available in said fund and which, in this instance, can be used as a refund for any overpayments. It is further undisputed that the period of regulation was for a two-year period while the regulation only lasted six months. In view of these factors, Section 215.26(1))a), Florida Statutes, authorizes a refund of an overpayment such as was paid by the Petitioner in this case. I shall so recommend.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's refund request of July 2, 1979, be GRANTED. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of March, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Mr. George Szell was presented by the Southwest Florida Water Management District and sworn as a witness. Mr. Szell was qualified and accepted as an expert hydrogeologist employed by the District. Included within Mr. Szell's responsibilities to the District were evaluation of the subject application. An application for consumptive water use permit has been filed in proper form by Pat Nathe Groves, Inc., and admitted into evidence as Exhibit A. The water source is an existing well located on a 134-acre tract in Pasco County within the Withlacoochee Basin, as shown by Exhibit A. The water is to be used for irrigation purposes. The maximum daily withdrawal sought is 432,000 gallons and the average gaily withdrawal sought is 42,608 gallons. Proper notice of this proceeding and application have been given to all persons entitled thereto by statute and rule. No objections to the application have been received by the District. The amount of withdrawal requested is 92.20 percent of the maximum average daily withdrawal allowed by the water crop theory, as set forth in Section 16J-2.11(3), F.A.C. Therefore, the requested withdrawal is not violative of the consumptive use test. Pursuant to Mr. Szell's testimony, none of the matters set forth in Subsection 161-2.11(2), (3), and (4) exist so as to require the denial of this permit.
Findings Of Fact 5. The Division hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 14 as set forth in the Recommended Order.
Conclusions The Director of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Division) enters this Final Order in the above referenced matter.
Appeal For This Case Ye ee eee THIS FINAL ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE THIS FINAL ORDER UCONN YI ES TINA eee e———EESeaeeweorose APPEALED BY_ANY PARTY SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER APPEALED BY_ANY FARK] Y olUpolANyA.T oaoes--- Oo ——o PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.1 10, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9.110(d), FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT _OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE AGENCY CLERK, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS _ AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, AT 1940 NORTH MONROE STREET, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1007 WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE RENDITION OF THIS ORDER. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Page 3 of 4 Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes v. Fernando Fernandez DOAH Case No. 04-0771; BPR 2003089755 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Certified Mail to Fernando Fernandez, 15397 Southwest 168" Terrace, Miami, Florida 33187, this day of , 2004. Robin McDaniel, Docket Clerk Copies furnished to: Division of Administrative Hearings Janis Sue Richardson, Office of the General Counsel Robert Badger, Section Head, Yacht & Ship Regulation Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Page 4 of 4 Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes v. Fernando Fernandez DOAH Case No. 04-0771; BPR 2003089755
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether petitioners are entitled to either an agricultural classification of their land under F.S. 193.461 or a reduced assessment of their land under F.S. 193.011 for purposes of ad valorem taxation. More specifically, the issue is whether the change made by the Palm Beach County Board of Tax Adjustment in the property appraiser's assessment of petitioners' property lacked legal sufficiency or whether the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome the appraiser's presumption of correctness. In accordance with F.S. 193.122(1) and the case of Hollywood Jaycees v. State Department of Revenue, 306 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1975), the evidence and argument adduced at the hearing was limited to the scope of the record established before the Palm Beach County Board of Tax Adjustment (BTA).
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, evidence introduced at the hearing and the oral argument presented by the parties, the following pertinent facts are found: Petitioners are the owners of approximately 300 acres of real property located in Palm Beach County. As of January 1, 1974, the subject property was used for agricultural purposes and had been so used by petitioners or their predecessor for some fifty years prior to 1974. Prior to 1974, the subject land had been assessed at $600.00 per acre and had not been reassessed in approximately six years. Prior to and including 1974, petitioners did not file an application for agricultural classification of their land. For the year 1974, the property appraiser assessed the subject property at $3,000.00 per acre under the provisions of F.S. 193.011. Petitioners appealed to the Palm Beach County BTA which found that the appraiser's presumption of correctness had been overcome and that petitioners should be allowed to retain the prior years' assessment on the property ($600.00 per acre). In support of this decision, the BTA found that it had the authority to extend the time for filing an application for agricultural classification and that it had the authority "in light of AGO 71-81 dated April 28, 1971, to grant the continuance of a prior years assessment where the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject property have not changed and are not expected to change." The BTA notified the respondent of the change in assessment pursuant to F.S. 193.122. The respondent's staff recommended that the BTA's action in this case be invalidated on the ground that the evidence presented to the BTA was insufficient to overcome the property appraiser's presumption of correctness. The petitioners requested a hearing to review the staff recommendation, the respondent's Executive Director requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing and the undersigned was assigned as the Hearing Officer. Due to the fact that there was no court reporter present at the hearing, the parties stipulated that their respective positions would be reduced to writing by the submission of written memoranda. To date, no such memorandum has been received from petitioners.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the action of the Palm Beach County Board of Tax Adjustment in granting an agricultural classification and in reducing the assessment of petitioners' property for the tax year 1974 be invalidated. Respectfully submitted and entered this 3rd day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1976.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty on six counts of charging an advance fee for the listing of time-share estates for sale, in violation of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of Arkansas and was authorized by the Florida Secretary of State to transact business in the State of Florida from November 1991 through December 1997. Respondent's main office is now located in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent's credit card terminals are in Arkansas. Respondent has an escrow and operating account in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent hired Jack McClure to open and operate its Florida office. Jack McClure held a Florida real estate broker's license. National Resort Mart conducted business from its Florida office in Kissimmee, Florida, until McClure's death in December 1997. Respondent opened and maintained escrow and operating accounts in Florida from 1992 through 1997 for its Florida business. The Florida office was limited to the activities of time-share real estate sales. The Respondent did not list time- shares, nor collect any advance fees for listing time-shares at its Kissimmee, Florida, branch office. Global Title Company of Naples, Florida, conducts the closings for Respondent for the majority of their Florida time- share sales. Respondent advertised its Florida office in its direct mail brochure, sent to Florida time-share owners, with the statement: "Our Orlando office is situated only seven miles from Disney World." Ms. Valnecia Williams of Madison, Florida, owns a time- share unit at Cypress Point Resorts in Central Florida. Williams received a mailed "brochure" from Respondent's home office which advised her that Respondent was in the business of buying and selling time-shares. Based on the Respondent's direct mail flyer, Williams called the Kissimmee, Florida, telephone number to find out information related to her listing. Apparently, the call was automatically switched to the home office. She received some initial information. Several weeks later she called the Respondent's Arkansas office and talked to a different salesperson. Williams agreed to list her time-share, Cypress Pointe Resort, Unit 5206, Week 37, with Respondent on March 5, 1997, at an asking price of $12,9000 in an open listing for a period of a year. Consideration was in the form of a seven percent of gross sale of the unit, or a $750 minimum commission, to be paid to Respondent at the closing of the sale. Respondent charged an advance fee of $439 from Ms. Williams of Madison, Florida, at the time she listed her Florida time-share period at Cypress Point Resort for sale with Respondent. Williams authorized Scott Fisher, Respondent's salesperson in Arkansas to charge the refundable advertising and marketing fee of $439 to Williams' USAA Federal Savings Bank charge card. Williams was not pleased with the service provided by Respondent and, on or about July 28, 1997, demanded a refund from the Respondent. Sometime within the next two months Respondent complied with the request and refunded the fee by crediting Williams' charge card with the same amount. Kim Collins of Faith, North Carolina, owns a time-share unit at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, Florida. Collins received brochures from Respondent's home office seeking a listing for her time-share unit in Florida, approximately one year later. Collins called Respondent at an "800" number which was automatically forwarded to Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Eventually, Collins decided to use Respondent's services and borrowed the money from her mother to pay the advance fee and sign the listing contract. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Richard Collins of Faith, North Carolina, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, for sale with Respondent, by mail and check to the Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Collins' time-share has been listed for sale with Respondent since July 1, 1996. Dan Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, owns a time-share unit at Orange Lake in Central Florida. Coffey received a brochure from Respondent's home office and called for more information. Coffey agreed to list his unit for sale with Respondent on October 14, 1996, at a negotiable price of $12,900. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period of Orange Lake Resort, Orlando, Florida, for sale with Respondent. In like manner, Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Rick Rogers of Maumee, Ohio, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent also collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Donald Gordon of Pensacola, Florida, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. William Budai of Duquesne, Pennsylvania, of $539 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Villas, Kissimmee, Florida, for sale with Respondent. The contract signed by each complainant was titled "Listing Agreement." The Listing Agreement between the time- share owner of the Florida unit and Respondent was for the listing of their time-share for sale for a percent of gross sale of the unit to be paid at the closing, with an advance fee payable immediately. All transactions between the owners and Respondent were made through the Respondent's home office in Arkansas. No advance fee was collected within the boundaries of the State of Florida. Complainants Collins and Coffey did not receive refunds of the advance fees they paid to Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of six violations of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes. Respondent pay a penalty of $10,000 per violation for each of the six violations, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent refund $439 each to Kim Collins and Daniel Coffey, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent cease and desist from collecting advance fees for the listing of time-share periods for Florida residents and/or Florida time-share units. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Denise O'Brien, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire James H. Gillis Associates, P.A. 8424 Pamlico Street Tallahassee, Florida 32817-1514 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condos, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
