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INA LUDKA vs WINSTON TOWERS 600 CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC., 13-003704 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 24, 2013 Number: 13-003704 Latest Update: Oct. 13, 2014

The Issue Whether Respondents committed the unlawful housing discrimination practices alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner is a "unit owner" of a condominium located at 210-174th Street #310, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida. Said unit is located in the Winston Towers 600 Condominium ("Condominium"). Respondent, the Association, is a Florida non-profit corporation and the entity responsible for the operation of the Condominium. Respondent, Board of Directors, possesses the powers and duties necessary for the administration of the affairs of the Condominium. Pursuant to the Association By-Laws, the affairs of the Association are to be governed by a board of initially three, and not less than three, nor more than nine directors. Respondent, Jorge Nunez, was the President of the Association's Board of Directors at all times material to the Complaint. During his tenure, Mr. Nunez was also the chairman of the financial committee.4/ Respondent, Monica Zarante, possesses a Florida Community Association Manager ("CAM") license and at all times material was the Association's manager. Condominium Facilities and Services Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following facilities have been constructed in the Condominium, and form a part of the "common elements" of the Condominium and are to be used exclusively by the unit owners, their tenants, and guests: clubroom and entertainment areas (billiard room, library, men's and women's card rooms, meeting room and kitchen, bicycle room, and large screen television room); (b) main lobby; (c) mail room; (d) laundry room and vending machine room; (e) association office; (f) four elevators; (g) recreational facilities (tennis court, recreation pavilion, men and women's health clubs, party room, and sun deck); (h) L-shaped swimming pool; (i) jogging trail; (j) two shuffleboard courts; and (k) an irregularly-shaped reflecting pool. Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following are the delineated utilities and services available to the Condominium: electricity, telephone service, waste disposal, domestic water supply, sanitary sewage, storm drainage, and master antenna service. Association Committees As noted above, Petitioner's Complaint alleges that, "sometime in 2012 she was denied her right to participate on Association committees because of her race." Association By-Law 5.2 addresses committees and provides as follows: Committees. The Board of Directors may designate one or more committees which shall have the powers of the Board of Directors for the management of the affairs and business of the Association to the extent provided in the resolution designating such a committee. Any such committee shall consist of at least three members of the Association, at least one of whom shall be a Director. The committee or committees shall have such name or names as may be determined from time to time by the Board of Directors, and any such committee shall keep regular minutes of its proceedings and report the same to the Board of Directors as required. The foregoing powers shall be exercised by the Board of Directors or its contractor, manager or employees, subject only to approval by Unit Owners when such is specifically required. Respondent Nunez credibly testified that the availability to participate on committees is open to all unit owners. If an owner wishes to be on a committee, he or she simply needs to communicate that desire to the particular committee chairperson. Mr. Nunez, at some point in time, was apparently the chairman of the financial committee. In Petitioner's direct examination of Respondent Nunez, the following exchange occurred: Q. Okay. Did you say, "You sit at this table with us, never?" A. Never. I can't say that. I can't say "never." I cannot reject anybody to belong to any committee. I can't. It's impossible. Q. Okay. A. I like you, I don't like you, you want to be on the committee, you have a right to be on the committee. Petitioner testified that she was denied access to the financial committee to which Mr. Nunez chaired. Petitioner failed, however, to present sufficient evidence for the undersigned to determine whether this alleged denial occurred during the time relevant to the allegations of Petitioner's Complaint. Even if relevant, outside of her bare assertion, which is not credited, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that she was ever denied the right to participate on any Association committee. As a subset, Petitioner argues that she was denied "meaningful participation" on the committees, and thus, in condominium decision-making. In support of this contention, Petitioner references the testimony from Association Board Member Audrey Bekoff. In response to Petitioner's question of "why did the Petitioner point her finger at you?," Ms. Bekoff responded as follows: I haven't got the slightest idea. When you get angry, you pull your hair, you scream, you yell, you wipe the things off Monica's desk. You knock the things off. Everybody knows you on the Board. When you come into the meeting, everybody leaves. Petitioner contends that the "refusal to allow her to participate arose from Respondents' extreme dislike for her, and this extreme dislike was likely based, at least in part, on her race." Petitioner's contention, however, is belied by the record evidence. Indeed, audio recordings of various Association meetings provide multiple examples of Petitioner's robust participation in a variety of condominium issues. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner provided evidence to support the position that she is not well-liked, aside from her bald allegation, she failed to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in regards to Association committee participation. Association Records Petitioner claims she was denied access to the Association's financial records (in general) and records related to a particular condominium unit, Unit 2007, on the basis of her race. Petitioner alleges that the records requests were made on July 30, 2012, and November 1, 2012. Monica Zerante testified that the Association's protocol for requesting records from the Association included submitting a request in writing, and, thereafter, the Association provides a copy of the requested document or the requesting party may be given access to find the document. She further explained that the Association's policy is to charge 25 cents per copy; however, that charge is frequently waived. Mr. Nunez provided the further detail that once the Association receives a records request, the Association has ten days to accommodate the request. Although the Association has established rules regarding the frequency and time of record inspections and copying, Mr. Nunez credibly testified that same were not enforced concerning Petitioner. It is undisputed that on at least one occasion, while Petitioner was present in the Association's office for the purpose of inspecting/reviewing Association documents, a conflict arose between Petitioner and Monica Zerante such that Ms. Zerante requested law enforcement assistance. In support of her contention that she was treated differently because of her race, Petitioner testified as follows: Okay. Mr. Nunez, while not on the Board, goes to the office and he gets a monthly statement of the Association operating budget on a monthly basis and he is entitled to that. I go and request the same thing and I'm told I have to pay for it. And if I object to paying for it, then the police is called. * * * Q. You have no evidence that Mr. Nunez, when he was off the Board, did not similarly have to pay for records, correct? A. I have seen with my eyes that he has not. Q. Well, you have no idea if he actually paid for those records separately, do you? A. I've never seen him pay for that. Inconsistently, Petitioner subsequently testified that, at times, like Mr. Nunez, she was also provided documents free of charge. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any document that the Association was required to maintain (and not prohibited from disclosure) was not, in fact, provided or made available for inspection. Respondents' witnesses credibly testified that Petitioner had access to all available documents, and their testimony was buttressed by the record evidence. Furthermore, a review of the record reveals that Respondents' legal counsel, on multiple occasions, provided written responses to Petitioner's document requests.5/ Even if Petitioner had presented sufficient evidence to establish that she was denied access to the Association's records, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any such denial was due to any discriminatory animus on the basis of her race.6/ Access to Property Petitioner's Access The original Condominium Rules and Regulations provided that, "[a]utomobiles belonging to residents must at all times bear the identifying garage sticker provided by the Association." On July 27, 2011, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to all residents. The contents of the memorandum are as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT AS OF TODAY, YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES, WHILE COMING INTO THE BUILDING SO YOU CAN USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AND WHILE YOUR CAR IS PARKED IN YOUR ASSIGNED PARKING SPACE. ALSO, THE DRIVER SIDE OF THE CAR'S WINDSHIELD MUST DISPLAY THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL SHOWING THE SPACE NUMBER. IN CASE YOU DO NOT HAVE THE BARCODE LABEL OR THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL, PLEASE, STOP BY THE OFFICE IN ORDER TO GET THEM. IF YOU ALREADY HAVE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL DISPLAYED IN YOUR CAR, WE ASK YOU TO PLEASE REFRAIN FROM USING THE VISITOR'S GATE AND TO ALWAYS USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE. On that same date, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to the gate security personnel. Said memorandum set forth the same information as above, and further advised the gate personnel to advise residents without the requisite barcode and label to stop by the office to obtain the same. The memorandum further instructed the security personnel as follows: SHOULD THE RESIDENT WITH A CAR BARCODE LABEL ALREADY PLACED IN THE CAR STILL DECIDES [sic] TO USE THE VISITOR'S GATE, PLEASE TELL THEM THAT YOU WILL ONLY OPEN THAT TIME FOR THEM, THAT IN THE FUTURE THEY MUST USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AS YOU WILL NOT OPEN FOR THEM. SHOULD THEY HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE BARCODE LABEL, PLEASE TELL THEM TO STOP BY THE OFFICE. On September 8, 2011, the Board of Directors issued a memorandum to "Residents Using Visitor's Gate" entitled "FINAL NOTICE/RESIDENT BUILDING ACCESS." The memorandum advised the residents as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES. YOU MUST USE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL AND USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE WHEN ENTERING OUR BUILDING. SHOULD YOU CONTINUE USING THE VISITOR'S GATE, WHICH IS FOR VISITORS AND DELIVERIES ONLY, YOU WILL NOT BE ADMITTED. AS AN OWNER/RESIDENT YOU WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER; HOWEVER, YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL NOT. IF YOU LEAVE YOUR AUTOMOBILE IN THE VISITOR'S ENTRANCE THE POLICE WILL BE NOTIFIED AND YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL BE TOWED. PLEASE, ABIDE BY THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS. The Condominium maintained regular office hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for residents to obtain the aforementioned barcode/label. On or about September 14, 2011, Petitioner attempted to enter the Condominium using the visitors' gate. Despite being advised of the barcode/label requirement and the admonition against using the visitors' gate, Petitioner had not acquired the barcode/label. After the security officer advised Petitioner that he was not permitted to open the visitors' gate for residents, Petitioner entered the security gate house and opened the gate herself. As a result of her actions, law enforcement was called to the scene, and ultimately Petitioner gained access to the Condominium. Subsequently, as a result of Petitioner's actions, she was advised via correspondence that her actions were improper.7/ After obtaining the requisite barcode/label, there is no evidence that Petitioner experienced any further inconvenience regarding the gate. The undersigned finds that Petitioner was not denied access to her property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner presented no evidence that any inconvenience regarding the gate was due to her race. Petitioner's Son Visitors of unit owners were required to pay $2.00 to park in the guest parking lot. Unit owners, like Petitioner, for the convenience of their guests, were permitted to pre-pay for a guest if the guest was anticipated to arrive that day. Carlos Devesa, a security guard at the front gate, testified that a special exception was made for Petitioner, wherein she was allowed to accept a deposit for her guests for a longer period of time. Petitioner testified that on one occasion, a security guard, who is not an employee of the Condominium or the Association, delivered a package to Petitioner's son at the front gate. Petitioner extrapolates that benefit into a denial of access to her property: Security was trying to be nice by greeting him off the property with a package that was left on the property for him. Q. Okay. What evidence do you have that was based on race? A. In the case of my son, again, he was denied access to come to the property. It wasn't because of parking, so maybe you should have been asking security what was his motivation. Q. I'm asking you because you made the allegation. A. Well, I believe that he met him out at the street because he wanted to interfere with his right to come on the property. The undersigned finds that Petitioner's son was not denied access to Petitioner's property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner failed to present any evidence that Petitioner's son's access to Petitioner's property was denied due to her or his race. Lien Between the twelfth and fifteenth day of each month, the Association runs a "delinquency report." If it is determined that a unit owner or resident is delinquent (in maintenance fees, assessments, etc.) an initial letter is issued reminding of the delinquency. If the delinquency is not then satisfied, a thirty (30) day certified letter is issued. Thereafter, if the delinquency is not cured, the Association ceases to be involved and refers the matter to the Association's legal counsel for further handling. It is undisputed that Petitioner became delinquent in maintenance fees. Following the above protocol, a lien was ultimately placed on Petitioner's unit. Thereafter, Petitioner satisfied the maintenance fees; however, she refused to pay the attorneys' fees associated with the legal process. Petitioner contends that she was treated differently in the lien process due to her race. In support of her position, Petitioner believes that Unit 2007 was not subject to the same protocol. The evidence establishes that Unit 2007 was delinquent for a longer period of time than Petitioner's unit prior to being sent to the Association's counsel. Unlike Petitioner's unit, however, Unit 2007 was placed in foreclosure, and was ultimately sold through a foreclosure sale. The undersigned finds that a lien was placed on Petitioner's unit. The undersigned finds that Petitioner presented no evidence to establish that the lien process was initiated due to her race.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2014.

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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. WINDSOR PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 85-002614 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002614 Latest Update: Feb. 26, 1986

The Issue Whether Respondent, a condominium association, violated Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; by holding board meetings on January 2, 7, and 16 or 17, 1985, which were not open to all unit owners and for which notice was not posted; If so, what sanctions should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, is the state agency charged with the duty of enforcing Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, the Florida Condominium Law. Respondent, Windsor Park Condominium Association, Inc., is the condominium association responsible for a 64-unit residential condominium known as the Windsor Park North Condominium ("Condominium") located at 120 Wettaw Lane, North Palm Beach, Florida. In their Prehearing Stipulations, the parties agreed that the disputed issues are whether the Association, contrary to law, held condominium board meetings on January 2, 6 and 16 and 17, 1985, which were not open to all unit owners and for which notice was not posted. The Association contends that if such meetings were, in fact, held, they were "emergency" meetings for which notice was not required under the statute. In December 1984, a five-member board of administration was elected by the members of the Association to run the condominium association in 1985; Muriel Siebern was elected President. Until November 1984, Respondent had contracted with a professional management company known as First Columbia Management to manage the Condominium. Norma Calhoun carried out those management duties on behalf of the company. When the contract expired in November 1984, Harry Christie (then President of the Association) signed a new one-year contract, on behalf of the Association, with Florida Management Professionals, Inc., a newly formed management company which was owned by Norma Calhoun. Until November 1984, the First Columbia Management hired, fired, and supervised employees, maintenance personnel and repairmen billed and collected assessments of common expenses paid Association bills prepared the annual budget and year-end financial statements communicated with the Association's attorney and, attended unit owner meetings. From November until early January, 1985, these functions continued to be performed by Norma Calhoun, on behalf of her newly formed management company. But in early January 1985, the newly elected board of administration terminated the Association's contract with Ms. Calhoun's company and began performing the management duties of the Association without the assistance of a professional management company. II. The newly elected board of administration of the Association held four meetings between January 2 and January 17, 1985. Advance notice of these meetings was not posted on the Condominium property; and no unit owners other than members of the present (or past) board attended. The first meeting was held on January 2, 1985, at the former management company's offices in North Palm Beach. Four members of the board (a quorum) were present: Muriel Siebern, President; Sue Day, Vice President; Fred Kelly, Treasurer; and Lori Powers, Member-at-Large. Ms. Calhoun, and Harry Christie, President of the outgoing board, were also present. One purpose of this meeting was to affect a turn-over of the Association's records to the new board. Mr. Christie, outgoing president, presented the key to the locker room, financial statements for the Association from January through October 1984, the book of minutes, a history of the names and addresses of all unit owners, and the results of the vote taken at the December 1984 annual meeting. The board, however, also discussed with Ms. Calhoun the nature and performance of her management duties, reviewed various contracts, and discussed with her a pending court hearing in a lawsuit in which the Association was a party. No emergency conditions surrounded this meeting which would have precluded the posting of notice at least 48 hours in advance. Ms. Siebern had called Ms. Calhoun five days before the meeting to ask her to attend. III. On January 7, 1985, Ms. Siebern and two other members of the board (a quorum) met in the offices of Richard Breithart (the attorney who now represents the Association) to discuss the management contract which Mr. Christie had signed with Florida Management Professionals, Inc., in November 1984. (The board members had discussed the contract on the way to attorney Breithart's offices and felt it was not binding.) After Mr. Breithart concurred, the board decided to fire Ms. Calhoun and terminate the contract with her management company. After polling the two absent board members (by telephone) and obtaining their concurrence, the three board members met with Ms. Calhoun that same day at First Columbia Management's offices, and informed her of their decisions. They asked that she turn over to them all of the Association's records, including all financial statements. Some of those records were not immediately available since they were kept at the former management company's offices in Clearwater. Ms. Calhoun responded that she would retrieve the material, but that it would take several weeks to receive it. The board members asked her to call them when it was received. No one told Ms. Calhoun that an emergency existed or that there was an urgent or pressing need for the records. The board members also asked that the Association's checkbook be returned. Although the Association asserts that these were emergency meetings which excuse their failure to post 48 hours notices, no emergency has been shown. Prior to their January 7 meeting, the individual board members were given at least 24 hours notice. The ostensible "emergency" was based on the need to obtain the Association's complete records from Ms. Calhoun, but Mrs. Siebern and other members of the board became aware of the need to obtain the Association's records as early as December 1984. Moreover, the board members, thereafter, did not articulate a need to obtain the records on an emergency basis, which precluded 48 hours notice. (See letter of Ms. Siebern to Mr. Cassels, dated February 12, 1984, attached to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). The Association's answers to the Division's interrogatories also fail to mention the existence of an emergency. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) Finally, the Association has not shown any likelihood of injury if it had delayed its January 7 meeting an additional 24 hours in order to post 48-hour notices to all unit owners. Although the board encountered delay in obtaining the Association's complete records from Ms. Calhoun, no injury was shown. There is no evidence or even allegation that Ms. Calhoun was guilty of misappropriation of funds or that the Condominium's bills were not being timely paid. IV. On January 16 or 17, 1985, three board members, including Ms. Siebern, met again at the offices of attorney Breithart. After obtaining concurrence (by telephone) of the two absent board members, the board decided to dispense with the services of attorney Levine, who had been representing the Association in the pending lawsuit, and hire attorney Breithart in his place. The Association asserts that an emergency existed (precluding the need to post notice in advance of the meeting) since a hearing in the pending lawsuit was imminent. This emergency, however, was self-induced even if it existed, it was brought about by the board's failure to timely act. (The board members were dissatisfied with attorney Levine as early as December 1984, when he advised the members at the annual meeting of the Association that they would not prevail on the merits of the pending lawsuit. The board members were aware--then--that a hearing would be scheduled in the lawsuit during the next several weeks.) Another reason for firing attorney Levine was his alleged charging of expensive fees. But it has not been shown why action could not be taken to resolve this concern after giving 48 hours notice, as required by the Condominium Law.

Recommendation Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Association be found guilty of four violations of Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; that it be required to submit a certified check for $4,000 to the Division; and that it be ordered to henceforth conduct all board meetings in accordance with the notice and open meeting requirements of the Condominium Law. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esq. 725 S. Bronough St. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Richard O. Breithart, Esq. 818 U.S. Highway One, Suite 8 North Palm Beach, FL 33408 APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-7. Approved, in substance. 8. Adopted, except the last nine lines are rejected as not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 9-31. Adopted, in substance. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-2. Adopted, in substance. 3a-d; 4-7. Rejected as not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57718.112
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. PEBBLE SPRINGS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION OF BRADENTON, 83-001930 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001930 Latest Update: Mar. 05, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, the Respondent, Pebble Springs Condominium Association of Bradenton, Inc., was the condominium association for Pebble Springs Condominium VI in Bradenton, Florida. Matthew Ford is and, at all times relevant to this complaint, was a unit owner at Pebble Springs Condominium VI and a member of the condominium association. Matthew Ford requested to inspect the Respondent's records, hereafter described in paragraph 4 and referred to as Exhibits A and B, which were prepared and provided by the law firm of Becker, Poliakoff and Streitfeld, P.A., to the Respondent as a bill for legal services rendered in the Respondent's suit against Ford. At the time that Ford made his request for Inspection of the Respondent's records pursuant to Section 718.111(7), Florida Statutes, he was the defendant in a circuit court lawsuit in which the Respondent was plaintiff. Said court case is currently on appeal. Joint Exhibits A and B constitute the entirety of said law firm's bill to the Respondent. Joint Exhibit B describes each instance of attorney's service to the Respondent and the amount of time attributed to said service. The parties stipulate that the information contained in the document sought by Ford is the same as that reported in Exhibit B. The data in Exhibit B is reported in four columns, as follows: date, attorney, time, and actions. The information listed under "actions" includes the following listings: (03/14/83) Telephone conversation with bank officers and association officers re unfreezing of association funds. (03/14/83) Preparation for meeting with board members and witnesses; preparation of counterclaim. (03/14/83) Research concerning mandamus and other injunctive relief; preparation of counterclaim. (03/15/83) . . . preparation of counterclaim and motions to strike. (03/16/83) Preparation of counter-claim; . . . filing of counterclaim and coordination of service. (04/06/83) Preparation of motion to dismiss or for more definite statement and motion to strike on behalf of firm and Daniel J. Lobeck. (04/07/83) Memorandum to Alan E. Tannenbaum re Murley contempt of court order. (04/08/83) Receipt and review of motion to dismiss filed on behalf of board by insurance counsel; . . . (04/12/83) Preparation of motion to hold [deleted in exhibit] in contempt. (04/13/53) Correspondence to auto owners; correspondence to [deleted]; amendment of motion for contempt; setting of contempt hearing. (04/15/83) Review of motion to appoint special master and notice of bearing; telephone conference with Alan Tannenbaum re same. (04/18/83) Conference with Daniel J. Lobeck re: motion to appoint receiver. (04/19/83) Preparation of proposed order dismissing motion to appoint special master; research and preparation for hearing on motion; hearing on motion; telephone conferences with clients re hearing and order. Ford's request as to Joint Exhibit B was refused by the Respondent, which did provide him with Joint Exhibit A which states the sum due for legal services together with stated costs and total balance due. The Respondent also provided for Ford's inspection the Respondent's ledgers and checkbooks, which displayed the sums paid each month by the Respondent to the law firm. In the course of the litigation between the Respondent and Ford, Ford sought the production of documents from the Respondent as evidenced by Exhibit C. In the context of the hearing for attorney fees in the litigation between the Respondent and Ford, the Respondent has offered to provide Ford with the information which he had previously sought. During March or April 1983, Ford filed a complaint with the Petitioner alleging that he was being denied access to the Respondent's books and records contrary to Section 718.111(7), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner conducted an investigation of Ford's complaint, which resulted in the issuance by the Petitioner of a Notice to Show Cause to the Respondent issued May 9, 1983. The Respondent requested a formal hearing by petition dated June 1, 1983, which request was granted.

Recommendation Having found the Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel J. Lobeck, Esquire 1343 Main Street, Suite 204 Sarasota, Florida 33577 Gary Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57718.11190.502
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. THE PINES OF DELRAY, 83-003134 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003134 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 1984

Findings Of Fact The Division is the administrative agency of this state empowered to ensure that condominium associations comply with the Condominium Act. The Association is the condominium association which manages and operates 12 separate condominiums known as the Pines of Delray, located in Delary Beach, Florida. This case involves a structure placed on the common elements of three of those condominiums: The Pines of Delray condominiums 5, 6, and 11. Condominium 5 has 64 units, 6 has 72 units, and 11 has 96 units. Initially, the 12 condominiums received television under a "Central Television Antenna System Lease" with the Pines of Delray CAT, an agent of the condominium developer. On November 1, 1979, the unit owners of 8 of the 12 condominiums, including condominiums 5, 6 and 11--by vote equal to or in excess of 75 percent of the unit owners in each of the 8 condominiums--voted to cancel or terminate the television system lease pursuant to Section 718.302, Florida Statutes. The leased television equipment was eventually removed by the owner. On February 1, 1982, the Association entered into a written agreement with A-I Quality TV, Inc. d/b/a Denntronics Cable to provide television service for the 12 condominiums. The agreement was authorized by the Association's board of directors; the unit owners were not given an opportunity to vote on the agreement. An addendum to the agreement was entered in December, 1982. The addendum authorized Denntronics to install a satellite receiving station or dish at an unspecified location on the property of the 12 condominiums. The addendum was authorized by the Association's board of directors, but again, a vote of the unit owners was not taken. The Board subsequently selected the site for the receiving dish, centrally locating it on common elements of condominiums 5, 6, and 11, between building no. 65 in condominium 6, no. 25 in condominium 5, and nos. 66 and 110 in condominium 11. On December 24, 1982, Denntronics, with the Board's authorization, entered the premises of the condominiums and cut down four full-grown pine trees on the site to allow construction of a concrete foundation or pad and erection of the satellite dish. The parties stipulate that this cutting of the trees was an alteration of the common elements and that it was not approved by the owners of 75 percent of the condominium units in the affected area. The pertinent declarations of condominiums provide a specific procedure for obtaining approval before altering or improving common elements of the condominium. Article 5.1(b) of each declaration states: 5 MAINTENANCE, ALTERATION AND IMPROVEMENT Responsibility for the maintenance of the condominium property and restrictions upon the alteration and improvement thereof shall be as follows: .1 Common Elements. (b) Alteration and Improvement. After the completion of the improvements included in the common elements which are contemplated in this Declaration, there shall be no alteration nor further improvement of common elements without prior approval, in writing, by record owners of 75 per cent of all apartments. The cost of such alteration or improve ment shall be a common expense and so assessed. After removing the trees, Denntronics poured the concrete pad and attached it to the realty. The pad measures 10 feet by 10 feet, has a depth of 18 inches, and is reinforced with no. 5 grade steel bars. The construction of this pad, as with the tree removal, was not approved or voted on by the condominium owners. Denntronics then anchored the satellite receiving dish to the concrete pad. The dish is approximately 16 feet in diameter, extending 20 to 25 feet in the air. It remains the property of Denntronics since it was only leased to the Association. It is not a fixture since it may be detached and removed from the concrete pad. The cutting of the trees, the construction of the concrete pad, and the erection of the satellite dish altered the common elements. The condition of the real property was changed and the satellite dish affected nearby residents' view and enjoyment of the park-like green space in which it was placed. The replacement of the trees with the concrete pad and satellite dish affected the appearance of the surrounding area. A park-like environment of grass and pine trees surrounds the condominiums; it was this feature which persuaded some residents to originally purchase condominiums at Pines of Delray. Both the name of the condominium and its accompanying description on the condominium documents, "A Condominium in the Woods" emphasize this aesthetic feature of the condominium. As shown by the photographs in evidence, the reinforced concrete pad with satellite dish is an intruding presence in a park- like, pristine area. It is an incongruous, even imposing structure, 1/ and, in the setting in which it was placed, is aesthetically displeasing. 2/ It has adversely affected some residents' enjoyment of the grassy green space and has disturbed the scenic view which they enjoyed from their windows. Some residents now keep their window shades closed or no longer use the park-like surroundings. One resident was so upset by the sudden placement of the structure that she sold her condominium and moved away. Another nearby resident who purchased his unit, in large part, because of its proximity to the park-like green space, would not have purchased it if the pad and satellite dish had been there. Denntronics has a franchise application pending before the City of Delray Beach. If it is granted a franchise, Denntronics will remove the pad and satellite dish, and replace it with underground cable. If Denntronics is not granted a franchise, it intends to maintain and operate the satellite dish at least until June 30, 1987, when the agreement with the Association expires and is up for renewal. If the satellite dish is removed now, however, the Pines of Delray Condominium will not necessarily be without cable television service. Leadership Cable, the only cable T.V. company franchised by the City of Delray Beach, is willing and able to provide cable T.V. reception to the pines of Delray Condominiums.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums find the Association guilty of violating Section 718.113(2) and order it to cease and desist from further violations. Further, the order should require the Association to remove the concrete pad and satellite receiving dish within 10 days and restore the affected area, as nearly as possible, to its prior condition. Restoration should include the placing and maintenance of grass sod and at least four healthy trees, aesthetically pleasing and not less than 12 feet in height. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. Caleen, Jr. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1984.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57718.113718.302718.501
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. EDEN ISLES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 79-000440 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000440 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 1979

Findings Of Fact Eden Isles Condominiums are residential condominiums consisting of 7 identical buildings with 52 units in each building. Each building has a separate Declaration of Condominium which declaration is identical with the other 6 Declarations of Condominiums except as to the identification of the condominium. There are 4 swimming pools, parking areas, etc., the expenses for which are shared by the 7 condominiums. The Declarations of Condominiums provide for the percentage of the common ownership and expense associated with each unit in the condominium. The Declarations provide that the affairs of each condominium will be managed by the Eden Isles Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent. Duties of the Association include the preparation of budgets, collection of assessments for expense of maintaining common elements from each unit owner, maintenance of all common elements and generally conducting all of the business dealings associated with the common elements. From the inception of the Association in 1972 a common budget has been prepared for the 7 condominiums which is assessed against unit owners by taking total expenses for the common elements of the 7 buildings, dividing this by 7 and then allocating to each of the 52 unit owners in each building his pro rata share of those expenses. This has the effect of requiring the unit owners housed in Building D to share the cost for the replacement of an elevator in Building P or the replacement of a roof on Building C. The net result of the consolidated budget is to treat the 7 condominiums as one for the purpose of maintaining the common elements. When built and the Declarations of Condominiums recorded, Eden Isles was not a phased development.

Florida Laws (3) 718.111718.115718.501
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CAROL GOLD vs LARRY SHEEHAN AND TOM GRIFFIS, 03-002669 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 22, 2003 Number: 03-002669 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 2004

The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondents discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of familial status in the sale of her condominium.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was the owner of a condominium unit located at 3350 Thornwood Road within the Crooked Creek condominium development in Sarasota, Florida. In May 2003, the Petitioner decided to sell her unit. At the time of the Petitioner's sale, Respondent Larry Sheehan was president of the Crooked Creek Owner's Association. At the time of the Petitioner's sale, Respondent Tom Griffis was the manager of the Crooked Creek Owner's Association. The Petitioner received more than one offer to purchase her unit. The Petitioner claims that one of the offers came from a prospective buyer who had a child under the age of 14. Section XI(d) of the Crooked Creek Declaration of Condominium provides as follows: No children under the age of 14 shall occupy units, except for temporary houseguests and visitors. A "temporary" occupant shall mean one that occupies such Unit for no more than 30-days in any one calendar year. Permission for a longer period of occupancy (but no more than 90 days) may be given by the Board of Directors. The Petitioner asserts that the alleged prospective buyer withdrew the offer to purchase the unit based on the cited Section of the Declaration of Condominium. The prospective buyer did not testify at the hearing. There is no evidence that the alleged prospective buyer had any discussion about the cited Section of the Declaration of Condominium with either of the Respondents. There is no evidence that the Petitioner discussed the cited Section with either of the Respondents, either before her unit was offered for sale or during the transaction with the alleged prospective buyer. The evidence establishes that there are children living in the Crooked Creek condominium development. There is no evidence that the condominium association enforces the cited Section of the Declaration of Condominium. There is no evidence that there has been any attempt to enforce the cited Section in this case by the Respondents or by any other party. The Petitioner sold her condominium unit to another buyer. For reasons that are unclear, the buyer who purchased the Petitioner's unit made the offer to the Petitioner and was approved for purchase by the condominium's board of directors prior to the date of the contract from the prospective buyer who allegedly withdrew the offer. In any event, there is no evidence that the Petitioner suffered any damage, financial or otherwise, based on the allegedly withdrawn offer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Carol Gold in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carol Gold 3917 Woodrow Street Sarasota, Florida 34233 Larry Sheehan Tom Griffis 1801 Glengary Street Sarasota, Florida 34685 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57760.22760.23760.29760.34
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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. WATERSIDE LAND CORP., D/B/A GLENWOOD MANOR CONDO, 87-001517 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001517 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 1988

The Issue On February 27, 1987, petitioner issued a Notice to Show Cause which alleged that respondent had violated various provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 7D-17 and 7D-23, Florida Administrative Code. On March 20, 1987, respondent served petitioner with a Response to Notice to Show Cause and Request for Formal Hearing. The Notice to Show Cause and response identify the specific violations alleged and issues to be resolved as follows: CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.116(1)(a) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), by excusing itself from the payment of its share of common expenses pertaining to assessments on unbuilt developer-owned units in Phase VI and VII of Glenwood Manor by failing to pay assessments on the units until certificates of occupancy were issued; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it had any liability for assessments on unbuilt developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums, and alleged that respondent paid assessments on developer-owned units commencing with the creation of the unit pursuant to Section 718.403, Florida Statutes (1985). CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.112(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.), Section 718.112(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 7D- 23.04(2), Florida Administrative Code (1985), by failing to properly waive or fully fund reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance for the years 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1986; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that reserve accounts were improperly waived or funded as alleged in the notice, asserting that reserves were properly waived for the years 1981, 1982, and 1984, were not waived for the year 1985, and that respondent was without knowledge as to 1986 because the turnover of the condominium took place prior to the 1986 annual meeting. CHARGE: Respondent, while in control of the association, violated Section 718.112(2)(h), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), and Section 718.112(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), by failing to adopt budgets and make assessments for the fiscal years 1984, 1985 and 1986 in an amount no less than required to provide funds in advance for payment of all anticipated current operating expenses and all of the unpaid expenses previously incurred, in that respondent loaned the association $8,000 from May 19, 1983 to May 19, 1985, to cover operating expense, with repayment plus interest due after turnover; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it failed to adopt budgets and make assessments for fiscal years 1984, 1985 and 1986 in amounts sufficient to provide funds in advance for payment of anticipated current operating expenses and for all of the unpaid expenses previously incurred. Respondent alleged that it adopted in good faith budgets which the association estimated would be required to meet these expenses. Respondent admitted loaning money to the association to meet the needs of the association. CHARGE: Respondent failed to follow its plan of phase development as stated in the original declaration of condominium or amend the plan of phase development, in violation of Sections 718.403(1), (2)(b), (6) and 718.110(4), Florida Statutes (1983), in that the original declaration describes Phase IV as containing eight units while the amendment adding Phase IV created only seven units; RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it failed to follow its plan of phase development as stated in the original declaration of condominium in that the Declaration of Condominium provided that the developer would have the option of constructing a swimming pool in Phase IV and that the construction of the pool would require a reduction in the number of units contained in Phase IV from eight to seven. CHARGE: Respondent violated Section 718.104(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), by creating a condominium in which the aggregate undivided share in the common elements appurtenant to each unit, stated as a percentage, does not equal the whole, in that Glenwood Manor consists of 55 units with each unit owning a 1/56th share of the common elements. RESPONSE: Respondent denied that it created a condominium in which the aggregate undivided shares in the common elements appurtenant to each unit did not equal the whole, and alleged that any reference to a unit owner owning 1/56th undivided share in the common elements is due to a scrivener's error which respondent would be willing to correct to clarify that each unit owner owns 1/55th undivided share in the common element. CHARGE: Respondent offered 33 condominium units for sale, and entered into purchase contracts in Phase II, III, V, VI and VIII of Glenwood Manor prior to filling the subsequent phase documents with the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Division) on February 5, 1986, in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.), and Rule 7D- 17.03(2), Florida Administrative Code; CHARGE: Respondent closed on 33 units prior to obtaining Division approval on February 10, 1986, of subsequent phase documents for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII, in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.), and Rule 7D- 17.01(3), Florida Administrative Code; RESPONSE TO (6) AND (7): Respondent admitted that due to the death of one of its attorneys, it inadvertently did not file the subsequent phase documents for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII prior to offering some of those units for sale and closing on the sale, but filed the necessary documents with the Division and obtained the necessary approvals upon realizing that the documents had not been filed. CHARGE: Respondent accepted a deposit on the purchase contract for unit 605, Phase V, without filing a fully executed escrow agreement for Venice Realty, Inc., with the Division, in violation of Rule 7D-17.02(6), Florida Administrative Code. RESPONSE: Respondent admitted that due to confusion between respondent and the realtor involved, Venice Realty, Inc. inadvertently accepted a deposit on a contract for the purchase of Unit 605, Phase VI, but that prior to closing on the unit, respondent directed Venice Realty to transfer the deposit to the proper escrow agent which transfer was accomplished. Respondent requested a formal hearing on the issues thus joined, and on April 9, 1987, this matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. At the hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of Glen Turnow, a resident of Glenwood Manor Condominium and association board member; Candy McKinney, Examination Specialist with the Bureau of Condominiums; John Benton, Financial Analyst, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes; and Marcel Cloutier, Secretary/Treasurer of Waterside Land Corporation. Petitioner's exhibits 1-8 were admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, Petitioner's First Request for Admissions and responses, and petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, were admitted into evidence as late-filed exhibits. Marcel Cloutier, an officer of Waterside Land Corporation, was accepted as the authorized representative for respondent and testified on respondent's behalf. Respondent did not enter any exhibits into evidence. A prehearing stipulation was submitted by the parties prior to the hearing. No transcript of the hearing has been filed. However, both petitioner and respondent have filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a ruling on each of the proposed findings of fact is included in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.

Findings Of Fact At all times between October 21, 1981, and February 27, 1987, respondent was the developer, as that term is defined by Section 718.103(14), Florida Statutes (1985), of Glenwood Manor Condominium. Glenwood Manor Condominium is a phased condominium consisting of seven (7) phases with fifty-five (55) units located in Sarasota County, Florida. Between October 21, 1981, and February 17, 1986, respondent was in control of the Board of Directors of Glenwood Manor Owners Association, Inc. (Association). Control of the Board of Directors of the Association was turned over to the unit owners on February 17, 1986. The Declaration of Condominium of Glenwood Manor Condominium was recorded in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, on October 21, 1981. Paragraph II of the Declaration of Condominium provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Developer does hereby declare the property owned by it and first described above, to be Condominium property under the Condominium Act of the State of Florida, now in force and effect, to be known as: GLENWOOD MANOR CONDOMINIUMS, hereinafter referred to as the CONDOMINIUM??, and does submit said Condominium property to Condominium ownership pursuant to said Act. Developer may, but is not obligated to create additional Phases of Development of GLENWOOD MANOR CONDOMINIUMS ... which said Phases, if any, shall be operated and managed in conjunction with this Condominium through that certain nonprofit corporation known as: GLENWOOD MANOR OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and hereinafter referred to as the "ASSOCIATION." The creation of any such further Phases will merge the common elements of this Condominium with the common elements of such additional Phases. As Developer creates such additional Phases, Developer shall ... record an amendment to this Declaration of Condominium describing the lands and improvements so added and the revised percentage of owner- ship in the common elements of this Condominium as so enlarged. (e.s.) The details of the phase development are set forth on Exhibit B to the Declaration of Condominium, entitled Phase Development Exhibit, which provides as follows: This Condominium is being developed as a Phase Development under Florida Statute 718.403. The first Phase of Development, which is the Phase hereby submitted to Condominium ownership, is designated on the Condominium plat described in paragraph II of the Declaration of Condominium above as Phase I. It consists of 8 Condominium Units numbered 1 through 8. Each Unit owner will own 1/8th of the common elements and share 1/8th of the common expenses and is entitled to 1/8th of common surplus relative to this Condominium. Phase II consists of 8 proposed Condominium Units as depicted on said condominium plat. At such time as Phase II is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the two phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/16th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/16th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/16th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase III is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the three phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such mercer each unit shall be vested with a 1/24th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/24th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/24th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase IV is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the four phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/32nd ownership of the common expenses of said phases as merged, bear 1/32nd of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/32nd of the common surlus [sic] of the merged phases. At such time as Phase V is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the five phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/40th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/40th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/40th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase VI is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the six phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/48th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/48th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/48th of the common surplus of the merged phases. At such time as Phase VII is added to this Condominium by appropriate amendment of this Declaration of Condominium, if that be the case, the seven phases shall then and there be considered as merged. Upon such merger each unit shall be vested with a 1/56th ownership of the common elements of said phases as merged, bear 1/56th of the common expenses of the merged phases and be entitled to 1/56th of the common surplus of the merged phases. (e.s.) The units in Phases II - VII were submitted to condominium ownership pursuant to amendments to the Declaration of Condominium filed in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, on the following dates: First Amendment Phase II November 16, 1981 Second Amendment Phase III June 10, 1983 Third Amendment Phase IV November 3, 1983 Fourth Amendment Phases V, VI and VII April 5, 1984 Each amendment provided for the merger of the common elements of the new phase with the previous phases, listed all units included in the condominium, and indicated the new share of ownership in and expenses for the common elements of the condominium for each unit. For example, the First Amendment of Declaration of Condominium, which added Phase II, consisting of eight units, to the condominium, which initially consisted of eight units, provided: As a result of the addition of the Phase II lands to the Condominium, as set forth above, each unit of Glenwood Manor, Condominiums as amended heretofore and hereby, shall be vested with a 1/16th owner- ship of the common elements of the merged Phases I and II lands and each unit shall bear a 1/16th share of the common expenses and be entitled to a 1/16th share of the common surplus of said merged phases of development. Both the First and Second Amendments added eight units to the condominium in accordance with the Phase Development Exhibit included in the Declaration of Condominium. However, the Third Amendment, adding Phase IV, added only seven units to the condominium, resulting in a total of 31 units. The Third Amendment correctly stated that each unit "shall be vested with a 1/31st ownership of the common elements of the merged Phases I, II, III and IV lands and each unit shall bear a 1/31st share of the common expenses ..." However, when the Fourth Amendment was filed, adding Phases V, VI and VII, each consisting of eight units, the share of ownership in the common elements for each unit was stated as 1/56th, whereas the total number of units included in the condominium was correctly shown as 55. Each amendment to the Declaration of Condominium ratified and confirmed the declaration and plat "[e]xcept as expressly modified" by the amendment. Unit owner and board member Glen Turnow stated that it was his understanding that he owns 1/55th of the common elements and that each unit owner pays 1/55th of the common expenses at Glenwood Manor; however, he has no documents indicating his ownership interest to be other than 1/56th of the common elements. Although the amendment creating the units in Phases VI and VII was filed on April 5, 1984, respondent paid no monthly assessments on developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII until Certificates of Occupancy were issued for those phases. Certificates of Occupancy for Phases VI and VII of Glenwood Manor were issued on October 25, 1985, and November 13, 1985, respectively. The assessment per unit of the condominium per month was $55 from April, 1984, through August, 1985; as of September, 1985, the assessment increased to $70 per unit. For the developer-owned units in Phases VI and VII from the date of amendment until the certificates of occupancy were filed, the assessments would have been $17,182.65. At 18 percent simple interest computed from the end of the year respondent owed for the assessments to the day before turnover of the association to the owners, interest on the assessments totals $2,029.92. Respondent admitted that it paid no assessments on the units in Phase VI and VII until Certificates of Occupancy were issued. Mr. Cloutier testified that respondent did not pay the assessments because it received legal advice that a unit is not in existence until a certificate of occupancy is issued. However, the first assessment was paid on November 4, 1981, and the certificates of occupancy for the first sixteen units were not issued until December 17, 1981. Mr. Cloutier also testified that respondent relied on language in the Declaration of Condominium which excused it from paying such assessments until the certificates of occupancy were issued. However, respondent did not introduce into evidence the portion of the Declaration on which it relied. Further, the Fourth Amendment to the declaration, which added the units in Phases VI and VII to the condominium, clearly provided that each unit would bear a proportionate share of the "common expenses." In the declaration "assessment" is defined as the "share of the funds required for the payment of common expenses." Respondent admitted that it made no guarantee to unit owners at Glenwood Manor Condominium which would excuse it from payment of assessments on developer-owned units other than pursuant to the provisions of Section 718.116(8)(a)1., Florida Statutes (1985), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (8)(a) No unit owner may be excused from the payment of his share of the common expense of a condominium unless all unit owners are likewise proportionately excused from payment, except ... in the following cases: If the declaration so provides, a developer or other person who owns condominium units offered for sale may be excused from the payment of the share of the common expenses and assessments related to those units for a stated period of time subsequent to the recording of the declaration of condominium. The period must terminate no later than the first day of the fourth calendar month following the month in which the closing of the purchase and sale of the first condominium unit occurs ... The closing of the purchase and sale of the first unit at Glenwood Manor occurred on October 20, 1981. Reserves are monies put aside each month to provide for future replacement or repair of major items. The original budget provided for funding of reserves in the amount of $6.00 per unit per month. Funding of reserves at Glenwood Manor for 1981 was waived at a meeting of unit owners on January 10, 1982; for 1982, on January 10, 1982; for 1983 on January 10, 1983, and for 1984, on August 16, 1985. If the reserves cannot be waived retroactively, the respondent would owe $3,036.55 for reserves that were not properly waived. However, respondent made one deposit to reserves in the amount of $1,800; therefore, respondent's total liability for underfunded reserves would be $1,236.55. Between May 19, 1983, and May 20, 1985, the developer made the following loans to the association: June 19, 1983 $ 500 at 13 percent interest June 3, 1983 $ 500 at 13 percent interest August 6, 1984 $1200 at 12 1/2 percent interest September 7, 1984 $1500 at 12 1/2 percent interest September 28, 1984 $2300 at 12 1/2 percent interest March 2, 1985 $ 600 at 12 1/2 percent interest May 20, 1985 $1400 at 12 percent interest On July 14, 1983, the first two loans were repaid with interest. The loans made from the developer to the association during the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 were necessary to provide operating funds for the association. At a meeting of unit owners on August 25, 1985, it was decided that repayment of these loans would take place after turnover of control of the association to the non-developer owners. On the dates these loans were made, the percentages of units which had been sold by the developer were as follows: August 6, 1984 - 56.4 percent; September 7, 1984 - 56.4 percent; September 28, 1984 - 56.4 percent; March 3, 1985 - 60 percent; and May 20, 1985 - 61.8 percent. If the repayment of the loans were based on the percentage of units owned by the developer vis-a-vis the non- developers on the date of the loan, the developer would owe $2954.80 and the non-developer unit owners would owe $4045.20. Respondent offered 33 condominium units for sale, and entered into purchase contracts for units in Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums, prior to February 5, 1986. Respondent closed on the sales of 33 units in Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominiums prior to February 10, 1986. Respondent first filed subsequent phase documents with the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes for Phases II, III, V, VI and VII of Glenwood Manor Condominium on February 5, 1986. On August 11, 1985, Venice Realty accepted a deposit from the Days for the purchase of Unit 605 at Glenwood Manor Condominium. Ms. McKinney testified that the Division's records indicated only that the Law Firm of Rosen, Able and Bryant would serve as escrow agent for sales of units at Glenwood Manor Condominium. In its answer to the charges, respondent admitted that Venice Realty was not the proper escrow agent for respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that respondent committed the violations alleged in Charges 1-7, finding that respondent did not commit the violation alleged in Charge 8, and imposing a civil penalty against respondent of Four Thousand, Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($4,250), assessed as follows: For the violations set forth in the first charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in the second charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in the third charge, $1,000; for the violations set forth in charges four and five, $750; and for the violations set forth in charges six and seven, $500. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that the respondent take the following affirmative action: Within sixty (60) days of the Final Order, file the appropriate documents in the public records of Sarasota County, Florida, indicating that Glenwood Manor Condominium consists of 55 units, and that each unit's share of the common elements, expenses, and surplus is 1/55th. The filing of such amendments shall comply fully with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-17, Florida Administrative Code. Within thirty (30) days of issuance of the Final Order, remit permanently and irretrievably to Glenwood Manor Owners' Association, Inc., the respondent's liability for assessments and reserves in the amount of $19,210.16 for assessments and $1,236.55 for reserves. Accept as full repayment of the loans made by respondent to the association, the sum of $4,045.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1988.

Florida Laws (16) 120.5717.0217.03210.16718.103718.104718.110718.112718.116718.202718.403718.501718.502718.503718.504718.704
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