Findings Of Fact On or about August 18, 1977, Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman (Winkleman), filed an application with Petitioner, Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance (Department) for registration as an associated person with Tax Favored Securities, Inc., now known as Global Investors Securities, Inc. Winkleman's application was granted November 1, 1977. On April 11, 1984, Winkleman pled guilty to an information filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida (District Court) , Case No. 84-6043-Cr-JLK, which charged that he: did wilfully and knowingly aid assist in, and counsel, procure, and advise the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service of a United States Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) of William I. and Amy Steele Donner for the calendar year 1978 which was false and fraudulent as to a material matter, in that it represented that said William I. Donner was entitled under the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws to claim deductions in the sum of $83,313.00 representing an ordinary loss of income, as a result of being owner of a sole proprietorship managed by Charles L. Winkleman, whereas, as . Winkleman . . . then and there well knew and believed William I. Donner was not entitled to said deductions all in violation of Title 26 United States Code, Section 7206(2). 1/ On April 18, 1984, Winkleman filed an amended Form U-4 with the Central Registration Depository, and thereby advised interested parties that he had pled guilty to the information filed in the District Court. A copy of the amended Form U-4 was, contemporaneously, filed with the Department. 2/ On June 6, 1984, the District Court entered a judgment of guilt on Winkleman's plea. Winkleman was sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined $3,000.00. Winkleman failed, however, to notify the Department of such conviction until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. Following Winkleman's plea of guilty in the District Court, the Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Division of Banking, Securities and Corporations (Department of Commerce) in Juneau, Alaska, issued a notice of intent to revoke Winkleman's registration. This notice, dated June 4, 1984, sought revocation based primarily on Winkleman's plea of guilty to the charges filed in the District Court. Winkleman failed to notify the Department of the pendency of the Alaska proceeding until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. On March 10, 1987, the Department of Commerce entered an order revoking Winkleman's registration in Alaska based on his conviction in the District Court. By amended Form U-4, filed April 10, 1987, Winkleman advised the Department of his conviction in the District Court and the revocation of his registration by the State of Alaska. 3/ The order of the Department of Commerce, revoking Winkleman's registration, is currently on appeal. Winkleman seeks reversal of such order predicated on his assertion that the Department of Commerce breached an agreement to allow him to withdraw his registration in lieu of revocation. On July 20, 1987, the court, which is reviewing the Department of Commerce proceedings, entered an order staying the order of revocation pending the disposition of Winkleman's appeal. On April 1, 1987, a hearing was held before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), to consider whether Winkleman, because of his conviction, should be disqualified as a registered representative with Global Investors Securities, Inc. On August 13, 1986, NASD entered a "Notice Pursuant to Rule 19h-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934" whereby it proposed that Winkleman not be disqualified. On January 8, 1987, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rendered its decision that it would not invoke Section 15A(g)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to direct NASD to disqualify Winkleman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the registration of Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman, as an associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1987.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, what penalties should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Sarah Fuquay (now known as Sarah Fowler) has been licensed as a life and health insurance agent holding license number E082826. The Department is the state agency with responsibility for licensing and regulation of insurance licenses and appointments. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent was employed or affiliated with and appointed by Bankers Life & Casualty Company (Bankers Life), working out of the company's offices in Jacksonville, Florida. She is a captive agent, meaning she works only for Bankers Life. In 2006, Frank Hemwey was a resident of the Jacksonville area and was approximately 84 years old. He was retired and was looking to invest the proceeds from the sale of some real estate. In November 2006, Mr. Hemwey received a postcard in the mail which stated: Important! Are you like the majority of our clients and notice a drastic reduction in your income due to decreasing interest rates? At Banker's Life and Casualty Company, we offer an Alternative to a CD. Our Security Builder Bonus Annuity (Policy LA-06T) has a 1st year Interest rate of 7%, Available thru November 30, 2006. (Includes Cash, CD's, Money Market IRA and Mutual Fund Rollovers) You have to call me to believe it! To take advantage of this limited time offer, Call Frank Fowler, Licensed Agent [904-400 3662] Mr. Hemwey called the number provided. Respondent responded to the inquiry and set up an appointment at Mr. Hemwey's home for November 27, 2006. During the meeting with Mr. Hemwey, Respondent filled out a written assessment used by Bankers Life to collect information about potential clients and to make recommendations regarding appropriate investments. Information gathered included information about the family's background and financial history, current expenses and tax liabilities, estate planning options and long term care needs. During their conversation, Mr. Hemwey was totally focused on the prospect of the seven percent return mentioned in the postcard. Respondent explained to him that the product was not a certificate of deposit; Bankers Life does not issue certificates of deposit; and that the insurance company only issues annuities. A brochure was provided to the Hemweys describing the annuity product advertised. Respondent advised Mr. Hemwey several times that the annuity was not a one-year investment; that the seven percent interest rate applied only to the first year; and that a lower guaranteed rate applied after that point. However, because of his focus on the seven percent, he paid little or no attention to what she told him. In his words, "I don't remember . . . anything else because I wasn't interested in anything else." In the section called "Additional Information and Follow-Up Notes," Respondent recorded, "Frank says they understand annuities. Kept cutting me off says he knows. Tried to get him to leave interest in to possibly cut down on taxes & compound interest. Frank said they don't need the $, but might as well take it. Setting up direct deposit of interest." On or about November 28, 2006, Mr. Hemwey contacted Respondent and indicated he wanted to purchase the product they had discussed. Arrangements were made for him to execute the necessary documents at the Bankers Life Jacksonville office. On November 29, 2009, Respondent again met with Mr. Hemwey. At that time, she reviewed the contents of the Fact Finder with him, and he signed the attestation which stated: To the best of my knowledge, the information I have provided in this Fact Finder represents an accurate picture of my current situation and beliefs. . . . I understand that any recommendations made by the agent are based on these responses. Despite this attestation, Mr. Hemwey had not divulged that he and his wife already owned an annuity account. He did include the interest from that account in his estimation of current income, but did not feel that his having an annuity was any of the company's business, as long as the interest received was included in the estimated income. Respondent also went over an Annuity Suitability Questionnaire with Mr. Hemwey, which he signed. This document included the following Owner's Statement: To the best of my knowledge and belief, all statements and answers on this form are true and complete. The information on this worksheet has been explained to me and I have been provided a copy of an Annuity Buyer's Guide. I believe that the proposed annuity will meet my current financial planning objectives. I understand that if I am not satisfied with the policy once I receive it, I may return it for a full refund according to the terms of the policy. (Emphasis added.) Finally, Respondent went over the application with Mr. Hemwey. The front page of the policy specifically identifies Mr. Hemwey as an annuitant and contains the following notices: THIRTY DAY RIGHT TO RETURN THIS POLICY If the Owner is not satisfied with this policy, he or she may return it to Us within 30 days after getting it. The Owner may return it to Us by mail or to the agent who sold it. We will then refund any premium paid. This policy will then be void. THIS POLICY AND THE DATE IT BEGINS This policy is a legal contract between the Owner and Us. It consists of this and the following pages. READ THIS POLICY CAREFULLY. See the POLICY GUIDE on page 1A of this policy. The policy, which Mr. Hemwey signed, repeatedly indicated that it was an annuity contract and identified the rate of return for the first year and succeeding years. For example, on page seven Mr. Hemwey signed in the box marked "signature of annuitant." At the top of that page, it reads, "I hereby apply for an annuity. . . ." The page entitled "Schedule" identifies Mr. Hemwey as the annuitant and states that the guaranteed period is one year, with an interest rate of seven percent. After the first year, the Schedule indicates that the minimum guaranteed interest rate is 2.5 percent for the first ten policy years, and three percent for policy years 11 and after. This page also provides the withdrawal percentage applicable for withdrawal charges, which are explained in detail on page four, following the signature page.2/ Respondent credibly testified that she explained the terms and conditions related to the annuity to Mr. Hemwey in conjunction with filling out the application and related paperwork. Mr. Hemwey tendered $100,000 for the premium required to purchase the annuity. He named his wife as a beneficiary to the annuity. The policy was delivered to Mr. Hemwey's home on or about December 18, 2006. Although he signed a receipt for the annuity, he does not remember the event. When the annuity document was delivered, Respondent went over the contents of the documents with Mr. Hemwey, specifically calling attention to the 30-day cancellation provision on page one and going over the contract summary page with him. She also prepared an annuity withdrawal request, which would enable Mr. Hemwey to receive the interest on the annuity through systematic deposits in his checking account. Mr. Hemwey did not read the annuity contract documents provided to him upon receipt. In October 2007, approximately ten months into the annuity, he called Bankers Life to determine what the next year's interest rate would be. When the company could not provide that information immediately, he requested instructions on canceling the contract. His intent was to move the funds to another vehicle if he could obtain a better interest rate. Mr. Hemwey was advised that withdrawal of the annuity funds would be subject to the withdrawal schedule specified in the annuity contract, i.e., eight percent after the first year. Mr. Hemwey was dissatisfied with this response. Respondent then went to see him, reminded him of the terms of the annuity and tried to see if there was anything that would satisfy him. Mr. Hemwey wanted to continue to earn seven percent. Mr. Hemwey also spoke to Respondent's supervisor, Keith Lozowski, about his confusion regarding the terms of the annuity. He did not claim at that time that Respondent had made any misrepresentation. He maintained that he wanted to continue to receive the seven percent introductory interest rate. Mr. Lozowski explained to Mr. Hemwey that he did not have the authority to guarantee such a rate, and that his contract did not provide for seven percent beyond the first year. At hearing, Mr. Hemwey insisted that he did not know he was purchasing an annuity. His testimony simply is not credible in this regard. He responded to an advertisement for an annuity and signed a document that indicated prominently its status as an annuity. Simply put, Mr. Hemwey paid attention to the advertised introductory interest rate and ignored everything else told or provided to him. He received $7,000 in interest the first year; $3,700 in interest the second year; and is receiving 3.6% interest in the third year. His original investment of $100,000 remains in the annuity. No evidence was presented to indicate that, had Mr. Hemwey been able to withdraw the original investment, he could have received a higher return on his money elsewhere. Respondent did not misrepresent, either by commission or omission, the characteristics of the annuity product that Mr. Hemwey purchased. She did not pressure him to purchase the product he chose.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2009.
The Issue The issues in these proposed rule challenge proceedings are whether the Department of Revenue’s Proposed Rules 12B-8.003 and 12B-8.016 and Proposed Forms DR-907 and DR-908 constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Essentially, the proposed rules and forms respond to the decision in Department of Revenue vs. Zurich Insurance Company, 667 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(Zurich), and state: (1) that workers’ compensation administrative assessments (WCAA) imposed under Section 440.51(5), Florida Statutes (1995), are “special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with” workers’ compensation insurance; (2) that the retaliatory tax under Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes (1995), does not apply as to WCAA; (3) that WCAA are treated as deductions from the insurance premium tax imposed under Section 624.509, Florida Statutes (1995), as provided in subsection (7) of that statute, and are not added back in, for purposes of calculating retaliatory taxes. The positions taken in the various proposed rule challenges include: (1) Zurich was wrongly decided or no longer controlling, and WCAA are not “special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with” workers’ compensation insurance; (2) as a matter of statutory interpretation, even if WCAA are “special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with” workers’ compensation insurance, WCAA are not to be deducted from insurance premium taxes, or are to be added back, for purposes of calculating retaliatory taxes; (3) if not so interpreted, the proposed rules and forms violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution; (4) the published notice of the proposed rules and forms was fatally defective; and (5) the proposed rules and forms cannot be applied retroactively.
Findings Of Fact House of Representatives Insurance Committee Final Staff Analysis of CS/CS/CS/HB 336 (1989) contains the following example in Section II.D: D. FISCAL COMMENTS: The following is an example of an out-of-state Property & Casualty Company’s tax calculations under the provisions of this bill (assuming the company’s state of domicile imposes a 2.0% rate). Total Premiums Written in Florida $1,000,000 Premium Tax Rate x 1.75% Gross Premium Tax $17,500 Credit for Municipal Taxes ($5,000) Credit for Workers’ Comp. Assessments ($5,000) Net Premium Tax $7,500 Payroll Paid to Eligible Florida Employees $30,000 Factor for calculating Maximum Salary Credit x 15% Maximum Salary Credit $4,500 Net Premium Tax $7,500 Factor for Calculating Maximum Combined Credit 65% for Salaries and Corporate Income Taxes Paid Maximum Combined (Salary plus CIT) Credit $4,875 Corporate Income Taxes Paid in Previous Year ($2,200) Usable Salary Credit (Cannot Exceed Maximum $2,675 Salary Credit) Net Premium Tax $7,500 Corporate Income Tax Credit ($2,200) Usable Salary Credit ($2,675) Total Premium Taxes (Paid to GR) $2,625 Probable Tax from Retaliation against $535 Salary Credit ($2,675 x 20%) Retaliatory Taxes from the Rate $2,500 Differential ($1,000,000 x .25%) $3,035 Total Premium and Retaliatory Taxes $5,660 Paid to General Revenue House of Representatives Committee on Finance & Taxation Bill Analysis and Economic Impact Statement of PCB FT 94-12 (1994), stated that the 1994 amendments to Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes (1993), had no fiscal impact. The amount of workers’ compensation administrative assessments may vary. Currently, the amount of workers’ compensation administrative assessments exceeds premium taxes, which limit the amount allowed as a deduction against premium taxes under section 440.51(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties' factual stipulations, the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On August 28, 1992, Petitioner submitted to the Department its application for licensure as a mortgage lender. 1/ On October 28, 1992, the Department sent Petitioner a letter announcing its intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage lender. The text of the letter read as follows: This is to inform you that your Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Lender for Citifirst Mortgage Corp. is hereby denied. The denial is based on Section 494.0072(2)(k), Florida Statutes. Section 494.0072(2), Florida Statutes, "Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection may be taken: . . . (k) Acting as a mortgage lender or correspondent mortgage lender without a current active license issued under ss. 494.006-494.0077." The Department's investigation revealed Citifirst Mortgage Corp. has acted as a mortgage lender without a current, active license. Please be advised that you may request a hearing concerning this denial to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Requests for such a hearing must comply with the provisions of Rule 3-7.002, Florida Administrative Code (attached hereto) and must be filed in duplicate with: Clerk Division of Finance Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 (904) 487-2583 within twenty-one (21) days after receipt of this notice. Failure to respond within twenty-one days of receipt of this notice shall be deemed to be a waiver of all rights to a hearing. Should you request such a hearing, you are further advised that at such a hearing, you will have the right to be represented by counsel or other qualified representative; to offer testimony, either oral or written; to call and cross examine witnesses; and to have subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum issued on your behalf. Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing on the proposed denial of its application. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it is still pending.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Kye Harris, was president of respondent, University Prep, Inc., at all pertinent times. The corporation was originally organized for profit, as a vehicle for the establishment of a private school in Orlando, Florida. On the advice of a lawyer and an underwriter, however, Dr. Harris caused the corporation to be reorganized on a non-profit basis, so as to qualify bonds respondents proposed to issue for an exemption from certain registration requirements. Thereafter University Prep, Inc. did in fact issue bonds, including series A and B sinking fund revenue bonds dated January 1, 1976, in the aggregate principal amount of one hundred seventy-five thousand dollars ($175,000.00). Accompanying this issue was an offering circular dated December 23, 1975, which stated the corporation's net income for the period August 1, 1975, to September 30, 1975, as seven thousand four hundred seventy dollars ($7,470.00) and valued certain land and improvements at one hundred twenty thousand dollars ($120,000.00). According to the circular, the unaudited statements presented in the circular were "certified by the President/Treasurer and the Secretary. . ." Petitioner's exhibit No. 6, p. 5. According to the minutes of the corporation's board of directors meeting on September 28, 1975, however, the corporation was experiencing "a per month loss of $7,630." Petitioner's exhibit No. 7. Investors purchased some of the bonds dated January 1, 1976. On behalf of the corporation, Dr. Harris contracted for the purchase of an improved, 22 acre tract of real estate on Semoran Boulevard in Orlando, for six hundred fifty thousand dollars ($650,000.00). The transaction, which closed on June 22, 1976, was the result of arm's length negotiations. Respondents gave ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and a separate parcel of real estate (variously valued at from $35,000 to $63,000) as a down payment. The improvements on the property respondents acquired consisted of "approximately 52 units. . .in various stages of completion." (T.24) A few days later, G. E. Naumann, the real estate broker who had represented respondents in this acquisition, prepared an "appraisal" of the property assuming, contrary to fact, that most of the buildings were completed. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. Mrs. Naumann was not compensated for this "appraisal," which set the value of the property at two million one hundred fifty-five thousand dollars ($2,155,000.00). Although she was aware that respondents "had a bond issuance that they were going through" (T.27), Mrs. Naumann did not expressly authorize the use of her "appraisal" in that connection. University Prep, Inc. issued another series of sinking fund revenue bonds dated July 1, 1976, this one in the aggregate principal amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00). Accompanying this issue was an offering circular dated July 1, 1976, which included an unaudited balance sheet "as of June 24, 1976." The value of the 22 acre tract of improved real estate on Semoran Boulevard acquired on June 22, 1976, was stated as two million one hundred fifty-five thousand dollars ($2,155,000.00) more than one and one half million dollars in excess of the land's purchase price. This statement was false and misleading and resulted in a grossly exaggerated statement of net worth. Investors also purchased some of the bonds dated July 1, 1976.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner continue its cease and desist order in force and effect. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip J. Snyderburn, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 University Prep, Inc. 2000 North Semoran Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 Kye Harris Post Office Box 102 Mountlake Terrace, WA 98043
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent condominium association misused "reserve funds."
Findings Of Fact Respondent Eden Isles Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating the common elements of the Eden Isles Condominium ("Condominium"). As such, the Association is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes ("Division"). The Association retained Seth M. Lipson ("Lipson"), a certified public accountant, to audit the Association's books and prepare financial statements respecting the years ending December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003. Lipson delivered to the Board a financial report for each of these years. The respective balance sheets in each report made reference to a "replacement fund," which (as the notes to the financial statements reveal) Lipson believed constituted the statutory "reserve account" that Florida law requires be included in a condominium's annual budget unless, by a majority vote, the unit owners elect not to maintain such reserves for capital expenditures. In fact, the Condominium's unit owners, by majority vote, had always waived the funding of reserves. The account that Lipson characterized as a "replacement fund" consisted not of statutory "reserve funds," but rather of funds that the Association had received over the years, through regular assessments for "common expenses," in excess of amounts needed to pay "common expenses." These excess "common expenses" assessments had been placed in certificates of deposit and, evidently, were available for such uses as the Board might determine, from time to time, were necessary and appropriate. According to the financial reports that Lipson prepared, some of the excess funds had been used for purposes other than capital expenditures. Each balance sheet shows an amount "due" to the "replacement fund" from the account for operating expenses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order rescinding the Notice to Show Cause and exonerating the Association of the charge of using statutory reserve funds for purposes other than capital expenditures without first obtaining the unit owners' approval. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaints filed by the Petitioner against the Respondents are correct and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensure and regulation of limited surety agents (bail bondsmen) operating in the State of Florida. The Respondents are individually licensed as limited surety agents in Florida and are officers and directors of "Big John Bail Bonds, Inc.," a bail bond agency. In November of 1999, Gustavo Porro contacted the Respondents regarding bail for Jessie James Bray, a friend of Mr. Porro's son. Mr. Porro did not know Mr. Bray. Based on the charges against Mr. Bray, four bonds were issued, two for $1,000 each and two for $250 each, for a total bond amount of $2,500. The $1,000 bonds were related to pending felony charges and the small bonds were related to pending misdemeanor charges. Mr. Porro signed a contingent promissory note indemnifying American Bankers Insurance Company for an amount up to $2,500 in the event of bond forfeiture. Bray did not appear in court on the scheduled date and the two $1,000 bonds were forfeited. For reasons unclear, the two $250 bonds were not forfeited. The contingent promissory note signed by Mr. Porro provided that no funds were due to be paid until the stated contingency occurred, stated as "upon forfeiture, estreature or breach of the surety bond." After Bray did not appear for court, the Respondents contacted Mr. Porro and told him that the bonds were forfeited and he was required to pay according to the promissory note. On April 15, 2000, Mr. Porro went to the office of Big John Bail Bonds and was told that he owed a total of $2,804, which he immediately paid. Mr. Porro was not offered and did not request an explanation as to how the total amount due was calculated. He received a receipt that appears to have been signed by Ms. Vath. After Mr. Porro paid the money, Ms. Vath remitted $2,000 to the court clerk for the two forfeited bonds. The Respondents retained the remaining $804. Bray was eventually apprehended and returned to custody. The Respondents were not involved in the apprehension. On July 11, 2000, the court refunded $1,994 to the Respondents. The refund included the $2,000 bond forfeitures minus a statutory processing fee of $3 for each of the two forfeited bonds. On August 9, 2000, 29 days after the court refunded the money to the Respondents, Mr. Porro received a check for $1,994 from the Respondents. Mr. Porro, apparently happy to get any of his money back, did not ask about the remaining funds and no explanation was offered. In November of 2000, Ms. Vath contacted Mr. Porro and informed him that a clerical error had occurred and that he was due to receive additional funds. On November 6, 2000, Mr. Porro met with Ms. Vath and received a check for $492. At the time, that Ms. Vath gave Mr. Porro the $492 check she explained that he had been overcharged through a clerical error, and that the additional amount being refunded was the overpayment minus expenses. She explained that the expenses included clerical and "investigation" expenses and the cost of publishing a notice in a newspaper. There was no documentation provided of the expenses charged to Mr. Porro. At the time the additional refund was made, there was no disclosure that the two $250 bonds were never forfeited. At the hearing, the Respondents offered testimony asserting that the charges were miscalculated due to "clerical" error and attempting to account for expenses charged to Mr. Porro. There was no reliable documentation supporting the testimony, which was contradictory and lacked credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order requiring that the Respondents be required to refund $318 to Mr. Porro, which, combined with the previous payments of $1,994 and $492, will constitute refund of the total $2,804 paid by Mr. Porro to the Respondents. It is further recommended that the limited surety licenses of Matilda M. Vath and John L. Vath be suspended for a period of not less than three months or until Mr. Porro receives the remaining $318, whichever is later. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent Sauer was licensed in Florida as an ordinary life agent working for Money-Plan International, Inc. (Money-Plan) and selling National Western Life Insurance Company (National Western) insurance and annuity contracts. From October 10, 1984, until sometime prior to the events in question, Respondent Sauer had been an agent for Northern Life Insurance Company (Northern Life). Respondent Sauer had about five years' relevant job experience at the time of the events in question. At all material times, Respondent Connell was licensed in Florida as an ordinary life agent working for Money-Plan and selling National Western insurance and annuity contracts. Respondent Connell had no significant job experience prior to his employment with Money-Plan about three months prior to the events in question. His principal employment at all material times has been as a real estate broker. During the spring of 1986, Money-Plan was soliciting employees of the Manatee County School District for the purchase of two types of National Western annuity contracts. The flexible-premium annuity contract permits periodic contributions in such amounts and at such times as the policyholder selects. The single-premium annuity contract involves only a single premium, such as in the form of a rollover from another tax-qualified retirement plan. The Manatee County School Board had approved these National Western contracts and an annuity contract offered by Northern Life for sale to Manatee County School District employees, who could pay the premiums by a payroll-deduction plan. Each client described below, except for Jack Dietrich, is a schoolteacher employed by the Manatee County School Board; Mr. Dietrich is a principal of a Manatee County elementary school. Each Respondent used the same general sales procedure. First, he would contact the client, set up an appointment, make the sales presentation, and often obtain a signed application at the end of the appointment. He would then leave the client a copy of the application and a National Western brochure. Upon delivery of the annuity contract some weeks later, the client would have a chance to review the specific provisions and, if she did not like them, reject the contract without cost or further obligation. The front side of the two-sided, one-page application requires some basic identifying information concerning the annuity contract selected and the applicant. The back side contains five disclosure paragraphs in somewhat larger print than that on the front side. The first disclosure paragraph does not apply to the annuity contracts sold by Respondents in these cases. The last disclosure paragraph reminds the policyholder to review annually the tax status of the contract. The second disclosure paragraph applies to the single-premium contract. This paragraph warns that: a) a withdrawal of more than 10% of the Cash Value during the first seven years after the contract is issued will result in the loss of 10% of the contribution and b) if the policyholder fails to use one of the approved settlement options, the contribution will earn interest at the lower Cash Value rate rather than the higher Account Balance rate. The third disclosure paragraph applies to the flexible-premium annuity contract. This paragraph provides: FLEXIBLE PREMIUM ANNUITY FORM 01-1063 If, prior to the annuity date, I withdraw my contributions in excess of the renewal contributions made during the previous twelve months or if I do not use one of the retirement benefit options under the policy for distribution of my account on the annuity date, my account will be subject to the following: (a) a charge of twenty percent (20%) will be made against my contributions during the first contract year and all contribution increases during a twelve (12) month period from the date of any increase (a contribution increase occurs when the new contribution is greater than the initial contribution plus the sum of all prior increases) unless such contributions are not withdrawn prior to the end of the seventh (7th) contract year following the year of receipt, and (b) interest will be credited on my contributions at rates applicable under the Cash Value provisions and not the Account Balance provisions. The fourth disclosure paragraph applies to both the single-premium and flexible-premium annuity contracts. This paragraph identifies two types of guaranteed interest rates. Four guaranteed annual rates, ranging from 9 1/2% for the first year after issuance of the contract to 4% after ten years, apply to the Account Balance. A single guaranteed annual rate of 4% applies to the Cash Value. The brochure describes the flexible-premium contract as having: "Stop and Go privileges: Contributions are fully flexible and nay be increased, decreased or stopped, subject to employer rules and IRS regulations." Elsewhere, the brochure states: "To avoid the surrender charge, the participant simply annuitizes the contract and elects one or more settlement options." (Emphasis supplied.) The brochure states that the policyholder is not currently taxed on the portion of her salary deducted by the employer to pay for the premium or, as to both types of contract, the interest earned by the premiums within the annuity contract. National Western offers in the brochure to calculate for any policyholder the maximum amount of salary that she may defer so as to avoid current income tax on her periodic contributions. The brochure explains how a policyholder may, subject to restrictions imposed by law, borrow her annuity funds without the loan being treated as a taxable distribution. The brochure cautions that the loan must be repaid within five years unless the proceeds are used for certain specified purposes relating to a principal residence. The brochure states in boldface: "Each participant will have an Account Balance and a Cash Value Balance." The Account Balance is defined as all of the contributions or premiums with interest from the date of receipt to the annuity starting date (of, if earlier, the death of the annuitant). The brochure explains: "The Account Balance is the amount available when the participant retires or [elects to begin receiving payments] and selects one or more of the approved settlement options." In such event, "[t]here are no charges or fees deducted from the Account Balance ..." The Cash Value for the flexible-premium contract is defined as 80% of the first-year premiums and 100% of renewal premiums with interest from the date of receipt to the date of withdrawal. If the policyholder increases the amount of her premiums in any year, the amount of the increase is treated as first-year premiums. The policyholder vests as to the remaining 20% of the first-year premiums seven years after the issuance of the contract or, if applicable, seven years after the year in which the premiums are increased. The brochure explains: The Cash Value is the amount received if the participant surrenders the contract without electing one of the approved settlement options, which are described in the next section of the brochure. The brochure offers no explanation of the provisions governing the vesting of 10% of the Cash Value of the single-premium contract. The brochure sets forth the differences in interest rates between the Account Balance and Cash Value in a clear boldface table. The table notes that the Cash Value guaranteed interest rate may be higher for the first year if a higher rate is in effect at the time of the issuance of the contract. Neither the application or the brochure mentions the interest rate applicable to policy loans. The flexible-premium annuity contract generally conforms to the above- described provisions of the application and brochure. This is the type of contract that the Respondents sold to each of the clients described below. No sample of the single-premium annuity contract was offered into evidence. This is the type of contract that Respondent Sauer sold to Mr. Dietrich, in addition to a flexible-premium contract. The flexible-premium annuity contract adds an important additional requirement for the policyholder to vest in the remaining 20% of the first-year premiums when calculating the Cash Value. The flexible-premium contract requires that the policyholder pay, in the six years following the first anniversary of the contract, sufficient additional premiums so that the accrued Cash Value, immediately before the 20% credit, equals anywhere from four to seven times the total first-year premium, depending upon the age of the policyholder when the contract is issued. In the case of a policyholder with an issue age of 57 years or less, the multiple is four. No such requirement would be applicable to a single-premium contract where the parties intend from the start that there shall be no additional premiums. More favorable to the policyholder, the flexible-premium annuity- contract provides that, after ten years, the annual interest rate on the Cash Value will be the greater of the guaranteed rate or one point less than the rate then credited to the Account Balance. Concerning policy loans, the flexible-premium annuity contract states that the policyholder may obtain a loan "using the contract as loan security." The amount borrowed may not exceed 90% of the Cash Value. Interest on the loan must be paid in advance. The rate of interest, which remains in effect for an entire contract year, is the greater of the Moody's Corporate Bond Yield Average, which is determined twice annually, or one point greater than the Cash Value interest rate in effect on the contract anniversary. The initial annual loan rate stated in the annuity contract issued to Rebecca McQuillen was 10 1/2%. Each flexible-premium annuity contract issued contains a statement of benefits. The one-page statement contains four columns showing, by Cash Value and Account Balance, the accrual of benefits if guaranteed interest rates apply or if current interest rates apply. The statement warns: "This contract may result in a loss if kept for only 3 years, assuming withdrawal values are based on guaranteed rate and not on current rate." The initial guaranteed rates were, for a contract issued on April 15, 1986, 10 1/2% on the Account Balance and 8% on the Cash Value and, for a contract issued on May 15, 1986, 10% and 7 1/2%, respectively. Respondent Connell visited Ms. McQuillen and Virginia Taylor on separate occasions in the spring of 1986 for the purpose of selling National Western annuity contracts. During these visits, Henry James Jackson, Jr. accompanied Respondent Connell and made the sales presentations to the clients as part of the training that Respondent Connell was then undergoing. Mr. Jackson is the vice-president of Money-Plan and supervisor of Respondent Sauer, who manages the Sarasota office of Money-Plan and supervises four or five agents, including, at the time, Respondent Connell. Respondent Connell signed the applications of Ms. McQuillen and Ms. Taylor, as the selling agent, in order to receive the credit for the sales. Respondent Connell earned this credit by arranging the appointments. In their applications, Ms. McQuillen projected periodic contributions totalling, on an annual basis, $2400 from her to the flexible-premium contract, and Ms. Taylor projected a total annual contribution of $2280. Respondent Connell subsequently visited Linda Rush, to whom he was referred by Ms. McQuillen. Respondent Connell himself made the sales presentation to Ms. Rush. In his meeting with Ms. Rush, Respondent Connell explained the mechanics of the flexible-premium annuity contract. He discussed the current interest rates and how they were set by market conditions. Although he did not discuss the specifics of the Account Balance versus the Cash Value, he gave Ms. Rush a copy of the application and the brochure. He also discussed generally that the annuity contract was primarily a retirement policy and that Ms. Rush would not enjoy all of its benefits, partly due to penalties, if she failed to keep it until retirement. Ms. Rush signed an application at the conclusion of their meeting. She projected a total annual contribution of $1200. Later, at Ms. McQuillen's request, Respondent Connell attended a meeting with her and a friend of hers named Mike Donaldson, who represents Northern Life. Mr. Donaldson had informed the clients of both Respondents, directly or indirectly, that his company's annuity contract was superior to those of National Western because of the latter's "two-tiered" interest rate whereby a lower rate of interest was credited to the Cash Value than the Account Balance. Respondent Connell did not perform well in the confrontation with his more experienced counterpart. Subsequently, the three above-described clients timely cancelled their contracts at no cost to themselves. In the spring of 1986, Respondent Sauer made a sales presentation to Mr. Dietrich. Mr. Dietrich's issue age was 56 years and he had owned a 15-year old tax-sheltered annuity with a surrender value of $8200. Meeting with Mr. Dietrich six times for a total of six to eight hours, Respondent Sauer discussed at length tax-sheltered annuities, as well as life insurance. The discussions involved the flexible-premium annuity contract that was purchased by all of the other clients involved in these cases, as well as a single-premium annuity contract for the $8200 rollover contribution. With regard to the flexible-premium annuity contract, Respondent Sauer discussed with Mr. Dietrich the lower interest rate used if the policyholder surrendered the contract, the penalty of 20% of the first-year premiums if the contract was surrendered in the first seven years, and the various ways that the policyholder could avoid the penalties. Respondent Sauer explained generally the similar penalties and lower interest rate applicable to a prematurely terminated single-premium annuity contract. In making the sales presentations to Mr. Dietrich, Respondent Sauer emphasized the loan options available with the these tax-sheltered annuities. Respondent Sauer stressed the small margin between the interest credited on the contract and the interest charged on a policy loan and stated that, at times, a National Western policyholder could borrow his annuity funds at a lower interest rate than he was being paid on the funds by the company. He also informed Mr. Dietrich that he did not need to pay back the loan, but could instead roll it over every five years. The loan options in the National Western annuity contracts are a major selling point and offset to some degree the so-called "two-tiered" interest rate. These tax-sheltered annuities compare favorably to other annuity contracts because the National Western policyholder does not earn a lower interest rate on that portion of the policy balance encumbered by the loan. Also, National Western has historically maintained a more favorable margin than that maintained by other companies between the loan rates charged and the interest paid on the Account Balance. At the time of the hearing, for example, the interest paid annually on the Account Balance was 9.5% and the interest charged annually on policy loans was 9.09%. Mr. Dietrich signed two applications. In the application for a flexible-premium contract, he projected a total annual contribution of $3850. In the application for a single-premium contract, he projected a rollover contribution of $8200. Respondent Sauer left Mr. Dietrich a copy of the application and the brochure. In the spring of 1986, Respondent Sauer made a sales presentation of the flexible-premium contract to Noah Frantz. Respondent Sauer explained to Mr. Frantz the different interest rates applicable to the Account Balance and the Cash Value, as well as the 20% penalty for early surrender. The sales presentation to Mr. Frantz took place shortly after the confrontation between Respondent Connell and Mr. Donaldson representing Northern Life. Respondent Sauer therefore found it necessary to inform Mr. Frantz that Respondent was familiar with the Northern Life tax-sheltered annuity because he used to sell it. Respondent Sauer emphasized the point by showing his Northern Life license to Mr. Frantz. Respondent Sauer obtained a signed application for a flexible-premium contract from Mr. Frantz, who projected a total annual contribution of $300. Respondent Sauer left Mr. Frantz a copy of the application and brochure. Subsequently, Mr. Dietrich and Mr. Frantz timely cancelled their annuity contracts at no cost to themselves. An important feature of the tax-sheltered annuities is their favorable federal income tax treatment. Within certain limits, the policyholder is able to exclude front his gross income the amount of his salary used to pay the premiums. The contributions, whether periodic or one-time, then earn tax-free interest, which is taxed when distributed later in the form of annuity payments. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) imposes certain requirements on loans involving tax-sheltered annuities. In general, if these requirements are not satisfied, a nontaxable loan is converted into a taxable distribution. Both before and after TEFRA, however, a loan would be converted into a taxable distribution if the borrower, at the time of taking out the loan, had no intention of repaying it. An intent to roll over the loan periodically rather than repay it is evidence of a taxable distribution rather than a true loan. The use of a tax-sheltered annuity as security for a loan increases the risk that the policyholder will be forced to surrender prematurely the contract. In such event, the interest rate on the policy loan would generally be greater than the interest rate credited to the Cash Value because the loan interest rate is at least one point over the current Cash Value interest rate. The only time that a favorable margin could develop would be if, subsequent to setting the loan rate for the next year, the Cash Value rate increased by more than one point. It is more likely that a favorable margin would exist between the higher Account Balance interest rate and the loan interest rate. However, in April, 1986, the two stated rates were equal, although the effective rate charged on loans would presumably be somewhat higher because the annual interest is paid in advance at the beginning of each year. The viability of the strategy of borrowing at lower rates than are credited to the contract during the term of the loan depends upon the ability of National Western to establish and maintain a favorable margin between the Account Balance rate and the loan rate and the ability of the policyholder to retain his eligibility for the higher Account Balance rate. Neither Respondent made any material misrepresentations or omissions with respect to the flexible-premium contracts sold to Ms. McQuillen, Ms. Taylor, Ms. Rush, or Mr. Frantz. Each sales presentation gave an accurate and reasonably complete description of a somewhat complicated insurance product. Any possible material omissions in the presentation, or in the client's understanding of the material presented, were substantially cured by the application and brochure. The sales presentation to Mr. Dietrich was inaccurate with respect to Respondent Sauer's recommendation that Mr. Dietrich could, by continually rolling over loans, borrow against his contract without ever repaying the loan. By neglecting to mention the possible adverse tax consequences of such a strategy, Respondent Sauer inadvertently misled Mr. Dietrich. The sales presentation to Mr. Dietrich concerning the flexible-premium contract contained another omission. There was no mention in the application, brochure, or sales presentation of the requirement that Mr. Dietrich contribute, in the next four years, a sum equal to four times the amount of his first-year contributions in order to vest the unvested 20% of his first-year contributions when calculating his Cash Value. To the contrary, the brochure emphasized the flexibility accorded the policyholder in setting the amount of his contributions, as described in Paragraph 11 above. Although this omission occurred in all of the presentations, it had greater significance in the case of Mr. Dietrich, who planned on making- significantly greater first-year contributions than the other clients planned to make. In purchasing the flexible-premium annuity, Mr. Dietrich was obligating himself to contribute, based on his projected first-year contributions, an additional $15,400 over the next six years into what he had assumed was a flexible-premium contract.
Recommendation In view of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent Connell and Respondent Sauer not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against each of them. ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 88-3302, 88-3303 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4. Adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted. 7 & 9. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. 8. First sentence adopted. Second and third sentences rejected as recitation of testimony. Fourth sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as recitation of evidence. First sentence adopted. Second and fourth sentences rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Third sentence rejected as legal argument. & 14. Adopted in substance. & 15-16. Rejected as irrelevant, except that last eight words of first sentence of Paragraph 16 are adopted. 17 & 21. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Adopted. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance, except that first 16 words arerejected as unsupported by the evidence. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3 & 6. Adopted. 4 & 5. Rejected as subordinate. 7-11. Adopted in substance. Rejected as recitation of evidence. Adopted through word "policy." Remainder rejected asirrelevant. Last sentence rejected as subordinate. Remainder rejected as recitation of testimony. Rejected as recitation of evidence and legal argument. First sentence adopted. Remainder rejected as recitation of evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 18-19. Rejected as recitation of evidence. 20. First two sentences adopted, except that from "and" through end of first sentence rejected as irrelevant. Last sentence rejected as not finding of fact. 21-22 & 25. Adopted in substance. 23-24. Adopted. 26. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. 27-28. Rejected as recitation of testimony. 29-31. Adopted in substance. 30. Adopted. 32. Rejected as irrelevant through "policy." Remainder adopted in substance. 33-34. Adopted in substance, except that first sentence ofParagraph 34 is rejected as recitation of testimony. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence, except that the first and tenth sentences are adopted. Adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Richard R. Logsdon, Esquire 1423 South Fort Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 34616 Hon. William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by the Department as a limited surety bail bond agent. He was employed by and authorized to write bail bond business for County Bonding Agency. When Respondent was hired by County Bonding Agency, the office procedures for receiving and accounting for all paperwork and money were explained to him by Deolinda E. Stolowilsky, the owner and operator, and Olympia Delgado, the office manager. Licensed employees were issued a certain number of bail bond powers of attorney on Monday of each week. Each agent was given a "pay sheet" listing the number of each power of attorney. When a power was used, the agent would write on the pay sheet next to that power the defendant's name, the amount of the bail bond, and the date the power was executed. On the following Monday each agent would turn in all files with executed bail bonds. All unused powers of attorney would be re-issued to the agent and any additional needed powers would be issued. The agent's compensation was computed based on the amount of bail bond business the agent had performed during the preceding reporting period. Each Monday when files with executed bail bonds were turned in to County Bonding Agency, all premiums received by the agent for those executed bonds were required to be turned in with the executed bonds. The office manager would make a notation on the outside of that defendant's file that the premium had been paid. Some of the agents working for County Bonding Agency routinely watched to make sure that the office manager made the proper notation on the file when they gave her money. County Bonding Agency did not give its agents receipts for the money received from them. Although County Bonding Agency had an informal policy that an agent receiving a large amount of money should turn that money in on the same day or the following day, there was no specificity for what would constitute a large amount of money. Further, there was no particular consequence for failure to accommodate the owner's preference that such be done. Much of County Bonding Agency's business was written in its office rather than at the jail. In other words, much of the money received by County Bonding Agency came from indemnitors coming to the office and paying the premium there. When that occurred, the agent sent to the jail to execute the bond received no premium money since the money had already been paid at the office. On June 20, 1998, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency. He turned in files and premiums and was issued powers to be used for future bonds. On June 23, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency and was issued new powers. Thereafter, office manager Delgado began telephoning Respondent and writing to him stating that he had failed to turn in the premium money for five defendants. She also filed a police report and contacted the Department alleging that Respondent had failed to turn in money that he had collected. On July 20, 1998, a courier delivered to County Bonding Agency from Respondent folders for six defendants. The folders did not contain any money. On July 22, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency to turn in his beeper, receipt book, and unused powers. The bond money for four defendants is at issue in this proceeding. Their folders were among the six delivered by courier to County Bonding Agency. At the final hearing, Delgado admitted that one of the six defendants was an office bond, and she could not remember one of the defendants. The four at issue are Alain Yara, Seon T. Carter, Demetrius Robertson, and Stanley Bailey. The Department's exhibits admitted in evidence at the final hearing include the paperwork for those four defendants. The paperwork for Yara includes a receipt for $300 and a collateral receipt. Both are signed by Respondent and dated June 21, 1998, two days before Respondent went to County Bonding Agency and was issued new powers. The paperwork for Carter contains a premium receipt for $550 (10 percent of the $5,500 bond) dated June 21, 1998, and signed by Respondent and a collateral receipt signed by "Curly" for what appears to be the same $5,500. The paperwork for both Robertson and Bailey contain premium receipts and collateral receipts dated June 24, 1998. All four receipts are signed "Curly." "Curly" is the nickname of Irwin Stolowilsky. At the final hearing, Delgado admitted signing Curly's name to receipts for bonds when the premium money was received by the office and the agent went to the jail only to obtain the remaining paperwork and write the bond. Delgado is not licensed by the Department and, therefore, she is not authorized to receive premiums for bail. Accordingly, when guarantors came to County Bonding Agency's office to pay premium money, she signed Curly's name, representing that a licensed person rather than an unlicensed person had in fact received the money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Miguel J. Alvarez 8501 Northwest 8th Street Apartment 311 Miami, Florida 33126 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
