Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Earl Burno Allen, was born November 7, 1951. As of April, 1981, the Petitioner had attained an Associate Arts Degree from Dade County Community College. The Petitioner has had no teaching experience as of the date of the final hearing. The Petitioner presently is employed with the Veterans Administration at its hospital in Dade County, Florida, where he is employed as a "facilitator." The Petitioner testified, in a general way, that although he had a number of criminal offenses of record, that he was last released from prison on October 1, 1980, and has had his Civil Rights restored and therefore maintains that his past convictions should not be used against him to his prejudice in denying him certification as a substitute teacher. Subsequent to his last release from prison, the Petitioner obtained a federal civil service position at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Dade County. The Petitioner acknowledged that his earliest altercation with legal authorities occurred in approximately May of 1970, when he was allowed by an unidentified court to enlist in the Army "to avoid termination of probation." The Petitioner was enlisted in the United States Army for approximately one year when he was given a general discharge "under honorable conditions." The Petitioner maintains that the discharge under those conditions occurred because of the offense of Absent Without Leave. The Petitioner argued that his denial of certification as a substitute teacher was motivated by reasons of racial discrimination, citing an instance where a white coach employed by the School Board of Dade County was rehired after committing a crime. The Petitioner presented no proof establishing that to be the motivation for the Respondent's denial of his certification in this instance however. The Respondent, through Exhibits 1 through 6, established that on or about October 3, 1969, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed a two count information in Case No. 69-8540, charging the Petitioner with larceny of an automobile, which was the property of one Carl E. Stoeber on or about September 10, 1969, in violation of Section 811.20, Florida Statutes. In count two of that information, the Petitioner was charged with unlawful use of the vehicle without the owner's consent in violation of Section 811.21, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to count two of that information on March 23, 1970, and adjudication was withheld with the Petitioner being placed on probation for a period of six months. On or about December 10, 1971, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, filed a one count information in Case No. 71-10209-B. In that information, the Petitioner was charged with breaking and entering a dwelling on or about December 2, 1971, in violation of Section 810.01, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner was charged with feloniously breaking and entering the property of George Investment Company, Inc., a corporation doing business as Turf Motel. That entry was charged to be with the intent to steal or carry away money, goods or chattels of value of more than $100, in violation of Section 810.01, Florida Statutes. On January 17, 1972, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to that charge and was adjudged guilty and sentenced to one year in the Dade County Jail with credit for time already served. On or about November 17, 1971, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County filed a one count information in Case No. 71-9595, in which it was charged that the Petitioner was guilty of larceny of an automobile belonging to one Dwight Carey on or about November 9, 1971, in violation of Section 814.03, Florida Statutes. As a result of that charge, a plea of guilty was entered by the Petitioner on January 17, 1972, and the court adjudged him to be guilty of that charge, sentencing him to confinement in the Dade County Jail for two days followed by probation for a period of two years. On or about December 28, 1972, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County filed a five count information in Case No. 72-8959 against the Petitioner. The first count of that information charged him with an offense, on December 9, 1972, of carrying a concealed firearm, to wit: a shotgun, in violation of 790.01, Florida Statutes. The second count of that information charged the Petitioner with unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in violation of Section 790.221, Florida Statutes. Count three of that information charged the Petitioner with robbery, on or about December 9, 1972, in that he allegedly unlawfully and feloniously assaulted one Willie Smith and did by force and violence or placing that person in fear, rob or carry away certain personal property of his, in violation of Section 813.011, Florida Statutes. Count four of that information charged the Petitioner with possession of a stolen motor vehicle on December 9, 1972, to wit: a 1965 Dodge automobile which was the lawful property of Robert Vawdergri, in violation of Section 814.03, Florida Statutes. Lastly, count five of that information charged the Petitioner with unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen property, to wit: that same 1965 Dodge automobile, in violation of Section 811.16, Florida Statutes. The plea of guilty was entered by the Petitioner to count two of that information involving the unlawful possession of the sawed-off shotgun. Petitioner was adjudged guilty and a nunc pro tunc order amending his sentence, dated November 20, 1979, directed that the Petitioner be confined in the State Penitentiary for two and one-half years, with credit given for time already served in the Dade County Jail. On or about February 13, 1978, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, filed a two count information in Case No. 78-1225. The first count of that information charged the Petitioner with unlawfully entering a structure, to wit: the property of H & S Stores, Inc., a building, on or about January 24, 1978. He was charged with entering that building with intent to commit a theft, in violation of Section 810.02, Florida Statutes. The second count charged the Petitioner with grand theft of the second degree by his removing from that property three television sets valued at more than $100, which were the property of H & S Stores, Inc., contrary to Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner was convicted of count one of that information, which charged him with burglary, and the court, on or about December 18, 1978, entered a order adjudging him guilty of the offense of burglary and sentencing him to two and one-half years imprisonment, which sentence was to run concurrently with the two and one-half year sentence pertaining to Case No. 72-8959-A. The Petitioner was released from prison on or after October 1, 1980, and subsequently completed two years of higher education at the Miami-Dade Community College and has obtained employment in the Federal Civil Service System as a "facilitator" at the Veterans Administration medical facility in Dade County.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's application for the issuance of a substitute teacher's certificate be DENIED and that the petition be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Earl Burno Allen 6043 North West 20th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142 Craig R. Wilson, Esquire 315 Third Street Suite 204 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 The Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 3230
The Issue Whether Respondent, First Coast Technical College (Respondent) retaliated against Petitioner, Gregory R. Lulkoski (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), section 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes?1/ Secondary issues raised by Respondent are whether the St. Johns County School Board (School Board) is immune from Petitioner’s allegations, and, if not, whether the School Board was Petitioner’s employer during the relevant period.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the School Board by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). A charter technical school is a creature of Florida statute, distinct from school boards and districts, including those school districts in which they are located, which act as the sponsor of the school. FCTI and the School Board entered into a charter which governed the operating relationship between them. The last operative charter between FCTI and the School Board became effective July 1, 2013. The School Board was the sponsoring entity of FCTC under the charter. The School Board had no involvement in the day to day operations of FCTC when it was operated by FCTI. FCTI had its own management team and board of directors. FCTI had its own articles of incorporation, employment handbook, organizational structure, management plan, human relations (HR) director and department, and its own legal counsel. FCTC’s president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, entered into a contract of employment with FCTI. No one from the School District is on FCTI’s organizational chart. FCTI and FCTC management, and not the School Board, were responsible for the daily operations of FCTC and all personnel matters of FCTC employees. FCTI had its own procedure in its employee handbook for reporting discrimination and harassment. FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees solely for wage payments, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes under the charter. For this reason, FCTC employees received checks and tax documents from the School Board and the School Board remitted contributions to the Florida Retirement system on their behalf. FCTI reimbursed the School Board for these pass-through expenditures, and the School Board charged FCTI a fee for this service. The School Board’s only involvement in personnel- related decisions of FCTC was the ministerial act of the School Board superintendent signing off on employment decisions made by FCTI officials, which were then placed on the consent agenda of the School Board to be approved at its next meeting. This process--which was necessary given the fact that FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees under the charter for wage payment, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes-- involved ensuring the statutory requirements to take an employment action were met, but did not involve second-guessing the merits of the personnel decisions made by FCTI. Indeed, the charter expressly provides that the School Board assigns and FCTI assumes and retains all responsibility for FCTC employees, including responsibility for the selection and discipline of employees, and all other aspects of the terms and conditions of employment at FCTC. Petitioner submitted his application for employment to FCTC. Petitioner had an FCTC e-mail address and not a school district e-mail address. The School Board was the signatory to some grant applications for funding to be expended at FCTC, however, FCTI was responsible for fulfilling the obligations relating to the grant awards, and appropriately utilizing those funds at FCTC. The School Board was not involved in the day to day administration of programs funded by those grants at FCTC. During the spring of 2016, district personnel became aware of financial irregularities at FCTC through its monitoring of FCTI’s unaudited financial statements. Under state statute, the School Board was required to take certain actions as the sponsor of FCTC when put on notice that FCTC might be in a deteriorating financial condition. The School Board investigated those irregularities and found significant financial mismanagement and budgetary shortfalls at FCTC under FCTI’s administration. On May 3, 2016, the School Board declared that the school was in a deteriorating financial condition. This declaration triggered statutory obligations on the part of the School Board and FCTC to develop a corrective action plan to address these issues. On May 26, 2016, the School Board served a notice of financial emergency stating that it had reason to believe that there was a financial emergency at FCTC and that there was no way to save FCTC other than to terminate the charter and begin operating the programs at FCTC itself. The School Board Superintendent sent a letter to FCTI’s board on June 8, 2016, detailing the findings of the School Board’s investigation into FCTC and the financial issues plaguing the school. On June 14, 2016, FCTI’s board voted to terminate the charter with the School Board and cease operating the programs at FCTC, effective June 31, 2016. On June 15, 2016, the School Board voted to approve an agreement to terminate the charter with FCTI and to take over the programs at FCTC effective July 1, 2016. As part of this transition of the responsibility for operating FCTC, the School Board and FCTI entered into an agreement specifically stating that any liabilities of FCTC arising prior to July 1, 2016, would not be assumed by the School Board. Just before the School Board began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed his Complaint with FCHR. In that Complaint he alleges that he was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. Petitioner specifically listed two discrete instances of alleged protected activity in his Complaint: I am being discriminated against on the basis of retaliation by my employer. I began employment with Respondent on 11/7/2007, as a Case Manager and most recently as a Grant Writer. On 5/21/2015, I filed a formal grievance due to harassment and nepotism; creating a hostile work environment. This grievance was investigated internally but I never received a response. On 6/30/2015, I filed a second grievance after experiencing retaliation by my Supervisor, Renee Stauffacher. Up to date, both grievances remain unanswered and I continue to experience harassment and retaliation. Petitioner’s claim of discrimination was based solely upon a charge of retaliation. Petitioner did not allege that he was discriminated against based upon race, religion, age, marital status, or any other protected class. Petitioner filed the first grievance referenced in the FCHR Complaint on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then- president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and over e-mail. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was mistreated by any School Board employee, and he did not direct the grievance to anyone at the School Board. Petitioner filed this grievance with FCTC’s human resources office. In his second grievance, filed June 26, 2015, Petitioner alleges that Renee Stauffacher, his supervisor at the time, retaliated against him for naming her in his May 21, 2015, grievance by giving him an evaluation on June 26, 2015, that contained some information or statements with which he disagreed, even though he thought the evaluation itself was good and that he was given high numbers. No one from the School Board was involved in this evaluation. When Ms. Stauffacher gave Petitioner this evaluation, she was an employee of FCTC and not the School Board. Petitioner alleges that Sandra Raburn-Fortner retaliated against him for his first two grievances by giving him another position. That change, from “Career Pathways Supervisor” to “Grant Writer” occurred on or about August 4, 2015. Petitioner’s salary did not change. At this time, Ms. Raburn-Fortner, who had a contract with FCTI, was an FCTC employee, and not an employee of the School Board. Later, in the Spring of 2016, Petitioner submitted numerous other grievances, a total of nine more, to FCTC officials and FCTI’s board. Petitioner only introduced his ninth and tenth grievances into evidence at the final hearing. Both are similar. Those grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Raburn-Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s human resources director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Both grievances state that Petitioner believed he was disclosing violations of equal employment opportunity law. During the time that Petitioner submitted these additional grievances, the School Board was in the process of investigating the financial irregularities at FCTC. Petitioner submitted some of these grievances to School Board officials, who told him he needed to take his concerns to the FCTI Board who was still operating FCTC at the time pursuant to the charter. None of Petitioner’s complaints, including those relayed to the School Board and its officials, concerned complaints of discrimination based on a protected class, or retaliation for complaining about discrimination based on a protected class. Petitioner stated he believed he was reporting equal employment opportunity violations in alleging Ms. Raburn-Fortner was hiring or favoring friends and family, because this action prohibited members of many different protected classes from getting a fair shot at positions that would go to family, friends, or associates of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. Petitioner admits all protected classes were treated similarly in this regard and that all protected classes lacked equal access to positions if they were not friends or family of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. While Petitioner does not allege any discrete instances of retaliation that occurred after his title change, Petitioner also contends that he was harassed, including that he felt harassed about how data at the school was handled, the pressure put on him by financial difficulties brought about by the administration of FCTI, and that he was given the cold shoulder by peers. By May 2016, Ms. Raburn-Fortner was no longer working at FCTC.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether the School Board of Dade County has cause to terminate Respondent's employment on the grounds that Respondent was "willfully absent from duty without leave," within the meaning of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges filed in the instant case? If not, what relief should Respondent be afforded?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent was employed as a teacher by the Dade County School Board during the 1988-89 school year on an annual contract basis. His employment commenced on August 31,1988. At all times he was assigned to the ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) program at Carver Middle School. The principal of Carver Middle School, and Respondent's immediate supervisor, was Samuel Gay. Simine Heise was one of Gay's assistant principals. In Gay's absence, Heise served as acting principal. At around 12:00 p.m. on Monday, January 30, 1989, following a meeting with Gay, Respondent became physically ill at school. He left school for the day after notifying Gay and securing his authorization. Respondent was placed on sick leave for the remainder of the school day. At no time thereafter did Respondent report back to work. Various substitute teachers covered Respondent's classes during the period of his absence. Effective April 20, 1989, he was suspended by the School Board and it initiated action to terminate his employment on the ground that he had been willfully absent without authorization. During the period of his absence, Respondent was under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Adolfo M. Vilasuso. He was suffering from depression, insomnia, stress, anxiety and stress- induced gastrointestinal distress. He was treated by Dr. Vilasuso with psychotherapy and medication. Respondent's condition was primarily the result of personal problems involving his son and former wife. He was obsessed by these matters. He paid very little attention to anything else, including his teaching responsibilities. Although he was physically able to report to work, he was so distracted and preoccupied by his personal problems that he could not effectively discharge his teaching duties. The School Board requires that, in order to continue to obtain sick leave, a teacher absent because of illness must contact his immediate supervisor or the supervisor's designee by 2:00 p.m. of each day of absence and give notice that he will be out sick the following day. Teachers are advised of this "2:00 p.m. notification" requirement in the teacher handbook, a copy of which Respondent had received prior to his absence. Throughout the period of his absence, Respondent was capable of understanding and complying with this requirement. A teacher who complies with the "2:00 p.m. notification" requirement, but has exhausted all of his accrued sick leave credits, will automatically be placed on authorized leave without pay for illness for a maximum of 30 days, without the necessity of formal School Board approval. The leave will be extended beyond 30 days only if the teacher submits an appropriate application for an extension, accompanied by a "statement from [the teacher's] physician explaining why such [extended] leave is necessary." After leaving school on January 30, 1989, Respondent did not contact any member of the Carver Middle School administration or its staff concerning his absence until Saturday, February 11, 1989, when he telephoned Principal Gay's secretary, Maria Bonce, at her home and left a message with her daughter that he would not be at work the following Monday. On February 15, 1989, Dr. Vilasuso telephoned Carver Middle School and spoke with Assistant Principal Heise. Dr. Vilasuso told Heise that Respondent was under his care. He was vague, however, regarding the nature of Respondent's illness and he did not indicate when Respondent would be able to return to work. On February 21, 1989, not having heard anything further from either Respondent or Dr. Vilasuso, Principal Gay sent Respondent the following letter: The purpose of this communication is to determine your intentions for the balance of this school term. You've been absent from your teaching position at Carver Middle School since 12:00 a.m [sic] on January 30, 1989. On Saturday, February 11, you called my secretary, Mrs. Bonce, indicating you would return to work next week. On February 15, an individual identifying himself as your doctor called Carver Middle School and spoke to the assistant principal, Mrs. Heise. When he was requested [to provide information] about your illness, medical status and your ability to return to work, he stated he would not give further information without your approval. Until now we have not heard from you since February 11 when you contacted Mrs. Bonce at home. Also, the phone number and address we have on record obviously are no longer yours, therefore, I am unable to ccntact you. In addition to the above, we have no lesson plans, roll books, grade books for your students. It has been reported to me by custodial staff that you are frequently observed in the building after duty hours yet you have failed to communicate with me personally or the assistant principal or speak with your department head or the assistant principal for curriculum. I must call your attention to the contract between Dade County Public Schools and UTD and the teacher handbook which has information whiih addresses teachers' absences. You are clearly in violation of these documents. Finally, may I remind you of a memorandum given to you on January 27. A written response was due to me on February 1st. In addition, a conversation for the record was scheduled for February 1st. That conference will be held. You simply need to tell me when. I must remind you that failure to comply with district and local rules can result in non-reappointment for the 1989-90 school year. After receiving the letter, Respondent, on Thursday, February 23, 1989, telephoned Carver Middle School and spoke with Gay. Although he did not indicate to Gay when he was going to return to school, he did leave Gay with the impression that his condition was improving. Respondent also intimated during the telephone conversation that Gay would be receiving a letter from Dr. Vilasuso concerning Respondent's illness. The following Monday, February 27, 1989, at around 9:00 p.m., Respondent telephoned Secretary Bonce at her home and told her that he would be absent from school the remainder of the week due to illness. On Wednesday, March 8, 1989 Respordent telephoned Gay at school. He told Gay that he wanted to apply for sick leave and asked how he would go about doing so. Gay responded that he had referred Respondent's case to the School Board's Office of Professional Standards and that therefore the matter was "out of his hands" and Respondent would have to contact that office. On no occasion other than during the foregoing telephone conversations of February 11, 23 and 27, 1989, and March 8, 1989, did Respondent communicate with Gay or any member of Gay's administrative staff concerning his absence. Respondent's failure to so communicate with either his immediate supervisor or anyone on his immediate supervisor's administrative staff was willful. On March 28, 1989, Dr. Joyce Annunziata, the head of the School Board's Office of Professional Standards, sent Respondent a letter, which provided in pertinent part as follows: The Office of Professional Standards has been advised that you have been absent without authority from your duties as an employee in the Dade County Public Schools. During this period you did not obtain authorized leave from your supervisor. Florida Statute 231.44 provides: Any District school board employee who is willfully absent from duty without leave shall forfeit compensation for the time of such absence, and his employment shall be subject to termination by the school board. Your absence without authorized leave constitutes willful neglect of duty and subjects your employment with the Dade County Schools to immediate termination. Please be advised that unless you provide within five days from receipt of this letter a written notification to the Office of Professional Standards, 1444 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 215, Miami, FL 33132, of your resolution of your unauthorized leave status, your termination will be submitted to the School Board for final action at its meeting of April 19, 1989. Respondent received Dr. Annunziata's letter on April 10, 1989. He did not provide the Office of Professional Standards with the requisite "written notification" within five days of his receipt of the letter. Accordingly, the matter was considered by the School Board at its April 19, 1989, meeting. Thereafter, Respondent submitted to the Office of Professional Standards a written request for leave without pay for illness. The request sought leave for the period from February 8, 1989, through June 19, 1989. Although the form on which Respondent made his request noted that a "[d]octor's statement indicating diagnosis [and] length of time required for leave" was required, no such statement accompanied Respondent's request. A letter from Dr. Vilasuso concerning Respondent's condition was subsequently received by the Office of Professional Standards on April 28, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Dade County enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment as an annual contract teacher pursuant to Section 231.44, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of January, 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3231 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: School Board's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First, second and third sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Fourth and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: To the extent that it suggests that Respondent "never" complied with the "2:00 pm. notification requirement," it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Second sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it suggests that Respondent was absent without authorization during a portion of the period from January 30, 1989, to April 19, 1989, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it suggests that he was absent without authorization during the entire period, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is irrelevant and immaterial. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Rejected because it is a summary of testimony, rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Rejected because it is a summary of testimony, rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected because it is a summary of rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is a summary of testimony, rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument than a finding of fact. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument than a finding of fact; Remaining sentences: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it suggests that a teacher need not comply with the "2:00 p.m. notification" requirement to obtain authorized leave for illness and that Respondent was on such authorized leave during the first 30 days of his absence. Otherwise, they have been accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire School Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Jaime C. Bovell, Esquire 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 William DuFresne, Esquire 2929 Southwest Third Avenue, Suite One Miami, Florida 33134 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Joseph A. Fernandez Superintendent of Schools Dade County School Board School Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Petitioner, Seminole Community College, is a community college governed by a community college district board of trustees vested with the responsibility of operating the college in accordance with applicable statutes, rules of the State Board of Education and State Board of Community Colleges, as well as its own rules. Each community college board of trustees is responsible for establishing and discontinuing programs and course offerings. Each community college board of trustees is responsible for the appointment, employment, and removal of personnel. Such personnel includes course instructors employed by the college to teach specific courses or programs offered by the school. The Petitioner offers instruction in courses ranging from basic academic subjects, which might be comparable to high school courses, to sophisticated courses that might be comparable to four-year college courses. Additionally, the Petitioner is the area vocational center and adult continuing education function for Seminole County. Prior to April 9, 1991, the Respondent had been a continuing contract instructor employed by the Petitioner for several years. Respondent was employed to teach the welding course/program offered by the college. In January, 1991, Dr. Samuels, as Vice President for Instructions, issued a memorandum to the Deans' Council advising them of budget cuts incurred and expected by the college. Further, the memorandum provided that it was expected that instruction would have to absorb a major fraction of the expected future decrease in funding. On January 17, 1991, the college president issued a memorandum to all full-time college employees that addressed the cuts experienced to that date and the expectation of cuts which would be considered for planning the next budget year. In connection with planning for the 1991-92 budget year, Dr. Samuels met with the deans for areas of instruction under his supervision and requested that they consider alternatives given budget cuts of three levels: $200,000; $400,000; and $600,000. The goal was to prioritize spending to meet the instructional needs of the college, and to assume potential budget "worst case" scenarios. Dean Tesinsky gave the directors of her applied technologies area the following guidelines to prepare their proposals for services and programs: to preserve full-time faculty positions; to preserve full-time equivalent (FTE) student hours; if possible, to reduce regular part-time support first; and to eliminate unproductive programs. "Unproductive programs" were defined as having low enrollment relative to capacity and a decreasing enrollment trend. Such programs are also referred to as "weak programs" in this record. When the directors completed the reviews of their programs, Dean Tesinsky reported the findings to Dr. Samuels. Ultimately, such findings recommended the elimination of the upholstery, welding and culinary arts (on- campus) programs at the $600,000 budget cut level. The reviews performed by the directors and Dean Tesinsky did not follow the guidelines set forth in Appendix K. Appendix K is a procedure utilized by the Petitioner to evaluate and review programs or courses offered by the school. Concurrent with the planning performed incidental to the expected budget cuts, Dr. Samuels reviewed information regarding the course offerings and courses or sections not available at the college but for which large numbers of students had expressed demand. Courses of instruction which were identified as being in critical need of full-time instructors were: computer assisted drafting (CAD); biology, with laboratory experience; mathematics, foreign languages, and humanities. Further, there were vocational programs within the applied technologies area where additional sections and, consequently, instructors, were needed to meet student demand for courses. As a result of the foregoing, Dr. Samuels concluded that the budget amounts needed for instructors' salaries would have to increase, not decrease. To that end, Dr. Samuels concluded that monies captured from the elimination of unproductive programs could be redistributed to fund sections in the high demand areas of instruction previously identified. Given the notion that they would have to eliminate Respondent's program, Dean Tesinsky, Dr. Samuels, and Russ Calvet attempted to relocate Respondent to another program or course of instruction. However, no course or instructor opening was found for which they felt Respondent could qualify. On March 22, 1991, the college president issued a letter to Respondent that provided, in part, as follows: I have been informed that it is no longer feasible to continue the Welding program. Therefore, in consideration of the College's mission to meet the educational needs of the community, the current budget concerns for the next fiscal year, and the past, present, and projected future enrollments of the Welding program, it has been determined that the program will be discontinued at the end of this fiscal year. It is therefore with considerable regret that I inform you that a recommendation shall be made to the District Board of Trustees on April 9, that your contract with the College be terminated as of June 30, 1991. Your educational qualifications do not make it possible to reassign you to another instructional program area; however, should a position vacancy occur for which you are qualified, you will be notified. On April 1, 1991, the president forwarded a memorandum to the district board of trustees members that addressed the proposed termination of employment of the three vocational instructors. That memorandum reiterated the information given to the Respondent in the letter dated March 22, 1991. On April 9, 1991, the board of trustees voted to terminate the full- time, continuing contract position held by Respondent. Subsequently, Respondent timely requested an administrative hearing to review that decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Trustees of the Seminole Community College enter a final order confirming the elimination of the welding program and the termination of Respondent's continuing contract. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1 through 3, 5 through 8, 11, 13 through 21 are accepted. As to paragraph 4, it is accepted that Respondent was hand-delivered the letter notice dated March 22, 1991; otherwise rejected as a conclusion of law, not fact. It has been concluded, however, that such letter was sufficient to place the Respondent on notice of the college's position regarding the proposed actions. Paragraph 9 is rejected as a misstatement of Petitioner's exhibit 42. That exhibit showed the headcounts as stated but showed the "instructor salary w/benefits" to be $57,133. With the following clarifications, paragraph 10 is accepted: that additional full-time instructors were needed; that the number of adjunct instructors would be reduced since full-time instructors would be added; that adding full-time instructors was a meaningful goal in order to upgrade programs/courses; add "therapy" after the word "respiratory" in the first sentence of 11b.; add under 11c., that there are now less than 500 students on overload status. The first sentence of paragraph 12 is accepted. The remainder is rejected as irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: To the extent addressed in the foregoing findings of fact, paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. Paragraphs 3 through 5 are accepted but are irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 6, it is accepted that Dr. Samuels is Vice President for Instructions with the general responsibility for all the instructional programs at the college and that he made recommendations to the president of the college; otherwise rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as not supported by record cited. Paragraph 9 is accepted with the clarification that Mr. Calvet's title is Dean of Personnel Services. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as it does not make sense. Paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant; no wrongdoing or misconduct has been suggested by the Petitioner. With regard to paragraph 15, it is accepted that the letter dated March 22, 1991, was the first written notice of the proposed action; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With regard to paragraph 16, see comment above regarding proposed finding of fact 15. Paragraph 17 is rejected as a misstatement of the record. To suggest the Petitioner contemplating "firing" Respondents grossly misstates their position. The Respondents' programs were eliminated and, consequently, their continuing contracts terminated. No suggestion of misconduct, incompetence, or wrongdoing on the part of these instructors should be suggested. To the contrary, these instructors were well qualified in their respective fields and respected by the employer. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are accepted. Paragraph 20 is accepted to the extent addressed ruling 12 above. Paragraph 21 is rejected as repetitive; see above. Paragraph 22 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 23 is rejected as repetitive; see above. Paragraphs 24 through 30 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, irrelevant, or not supported by the record cited. Paragraphs 31 through 37 are accepted. Paragraph 38 is accepted when clarified to add "an administrative procedure" for "the" after the word "out." Paragraph 39 is accepted. Paragraph 40 is rejected as a conclusion not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 42 is accepted. Paragraph 43 is rejected as repetitive or irrelevant. Paragraph 44 is rejected as not supported by the record cited or irrelevant. Paragraph 45 is rejected as not supported by the record cited or irrelevant. Paragraph 46 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 47 is rejected as argument and irrelevant. Paragraph 48 is rejected as argument and irrelevant. Paragraphs 49 through 52 are accepted. Paragraph 53 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 54 is accepted. Paragraph 55 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 56 is accepted. With the deletion of the word "only" paragraph 57 is accepted. Paragraph 58 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 59 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 60 is rejected as repetitive or irrelevant. Paragraph 61 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 62 is accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 63 is accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or not supported by the evidence cited or speculation. Paragraph 64 is accepted. Paragraphs 65 and 66 are rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraphs 67 is accepted to the extent that the meeting(s) identified the programs as "weaker." Paragraph 68 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 69 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraphs 70 through 73 are rejected as argumentative, irrelevant, or not supported by record cited. The first sentence of paragraph 74 is accepted; otherwise rejected as argument, irrelevant, or not supported by record cited. Paragraph 75 is rejected as argumentative, irrelevant, or not supported by record cited. The first two sentences of paragraph 76 are accepted; otherwise rejected as not supported record cited or contrary to the weight of evidence. Paragraph 77 is rejected as repetitive, irrelevant, and not supported by record cited. Paragraph 78 is rejected as conclusion of law or irrelevant. Paragraph 79 is rejected as it does not make sense or irrelevant. Paragraph 80 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 81 is rejected as irrelevant. With the addition of the phrase "or could be" after the word "would," paragraph 84 is accepted; otherwise rejected as contrary to the record cited. Paragraphs 85 and 86 are rejected as contrary to the record cited. Paragraph 87 is accepted. Paragraph 88 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 89 is repetitive in part but is accepted. Paragraph 90 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 91 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 92 and 93 are accepted. Paragraph 94 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 95 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 96 is rejected as repetitive or irrelevant. Paragraph 97 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 98 is rejected as not supported by record cited, contrary to the weight of evidence. Paragraph 99 is rejected as repetitive and irrelevant. Paragraph 100 is rejected as repetitive and irrelevant. Paragraph 101 is accepted. Paragraphs 102 through 105 are rejected as repetitive or irrelevant. Paragraphs 106 through 110 are accepted but are irrelevant. Paragraph 111 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. Paragraphs 112 through 115 are accepted. Paragraph 116 is rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 117 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 118 is rejected as not supported by record cited. Paragraphs 119 through 122 are accepted. Paragraph 123 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 124 and 125 are accepted. Insert word "contact" after "thirty" in paragraph 125. Paragraph 126 is rejected as irrelevant or argumentative. Paragraph 127 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 128 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 129 is accepted. Paragraph 130 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 131 through 134 are accepted. Paragraph 135 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 136 and 137 are accepted with the addition to paragraph 137 that such position was only part-time and not vacant. Paragraph 138 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 139 through 141 are accepted. Paragraph 142 is rejected as repetitive or irrelevant. Paragraphs 143 through 147 are accepted. Paragraph 148 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 149 through 152 are accepted. Paragraph 153 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 154 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraphs 155 through 160 though repetitive in part are accepted. Paragraph 161 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 162 is rejected as repetitive, argumentative, or irrelevant. Paragraph 163 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Dana Fogle FOGLE & FOGLE, P.A. 217 East Plymouth Avenue Post Office Box 817 DeLand, Florida 32721-0817 Joseph Egan, Jr. EGAN, LEV & SIWICA, P.A. Box 2231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Margaret T. Roberts COBLE, BARKIN, GORDON, MORRIS & REYNOLDS, P.A. 1020 Volusia Avenue Post Office Drawer 9670 Daytona Beach, Florida 32120
Findings Of Fact Respondent has taught in the State of Florida for 33 years. The last 26 of those years have been with the Dade County school system. His most recent assignment was at Coral Gables Senior High School as a Cooperative Education teacher. Part of the duties of a Cooperative Education teacher is to work two weeks each summer doing preplanning activities prior to the opening of the fall term. The two weeks are to be used for job development, developing training plans, getting training agreements signed by employers, visiting parents of students that will be in the program in, the fall, recruiting, and reviewing student files. One week is required to occur just prior to the opening of school in the fall. The second week can be taken at any time during the summer after summer school starts on July 5. During the summers of 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, Respondent had a summer job with the City of Miami as director of the lunch program in the City's parks. In that job, he supervised four monitors employed by the lunch program, who visited the parks and reported back to Respondent. Respondent also visited the parks to ensure that the lunch program operated efficiently, and he was responsible for much of the paperwork involved in the program, including tally reports. During each of the summers in question, the lunch program for the City of Miami ran for eight weeks. Although the Recreation Department of The City of Miami requires that its administrative offices be open during the normal working hours of 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., the same schedule was not required of persons working in the lunch program. The monitors working in the lunch program were part-time employees for the reason that the caterer commenced delivering lunches to the various parks at approximately 10:30 a.m. The anticipated schedule was that lunches would be served to the children involved in the program between noon and, hopefully, 1:00 p.m. but by 2:00 p.m. at the latest. Although there were more parks involved in the program than monitors, each park had its own supervisors overseeing operation within the park. If a problem arose regarding delivery of the lunches or during the serving of the lunches and neither Respondent nor any of the monitors were on site, the park's employees could temporarily resolve the problem and call the office at the City of Miami to advise of the need for any further assistance. During most of his eight-week employment with the City of Miami, Respondent worked normal hours involved in a 40-hour work week. However, during the summers of 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, two weeks of the City's lunch program involved the same two weeks when Respondent was employed by the School Board for his preplanning activities. The two-week periods (actually ten working days) when Respondent was on the payrolls of both the School Board of Dade County and the City of Miami were as follows: August 7-18, 1978; August 6-17, 1979; July 28-August 8, 1980; and August 10-21, 1981. Respondent was hired each of the summers involved by Basha Schlazer, the Recreation Program Supervisor for the City of Miami. Prior to Respondent's acceptance of the summer job each year, he advised Schlazer that he had a two- week preplanning period which would overlap the City's employment, during which time he would be a full-time employee of the School Board and he would have to work at Coral Gables Senior High School before he could undertake his duties at the City of Miami. Schlazer told Respondent not to worry about it, since his duties with the City could be worked around his duties with the School Board. Because his employment at the City of Miami would not interfere with his work hours at Coral Gables Senior High School during those two weeks inn question each year, Respondent accepted the position with the City of Miami. Schlazer was Respondent's immediate supervisor during his employment with the City of Miami. During the two-week employment overlap period each summer, Respondent went to Coral Gables Senior High School at approximately 7:30 to 8:00 a.m. He worked there each day completing the activities previously planned for in the plans completed by him, as required of all teachers prior to their summer employment. He completed all of the activities listed in his daily plans and left Coral Gables Senior High-School at approximately 1:30 p.m. each day. He then went to his job at the City of Miami, arriving there at approximately 2:00 to 2:30 p.m. He then worked at the City of Miami until approximately 5:00 p.m. He took home with him the paperwork he did not complete at his job with the City and completed that paperwork during the evenings and on weekends. The hours during which Respondent worked at home were supplemented, at Schlazer's request, by Respondent working on other activities involving the City of Miami, such as working at talent shows, dog shows and a hula-hoop contest, all during the evening or weekend hours. Respondent was not compensated for these extra activities, but rather, at Schlazer's direction, he continued to simply fill out payroll sheets so they reflected that he continued to work eight hours a day during those two weeks in question each year. By devoting his own time to his duties at the City during the two weeks in question each year, Respondent continued to enjoy his reputation at the City as a good worker, and the park lunch program ran smoothly at all times under his direction. The only difference which occurred in The lunch program during the two weeks of overlap is that during that time the park employees and monitors were instructed not to call in if there were a problem until after 2:00 p.m., when Respondent came to work. During each of The two weeks of each of the four summers in question, Respondent was never at the City of Miami in the mornings except on one occasion during the summer of 1981. On that day, Respondent worked at Coral Gables Senior High School until 11:00 a.m., when he was entitled to a break. During that break, he drove to the City of Miami to drop off a report that he had completed at home the night before. As he was leaving the City of Miami office to return to Coral Gables Senior High School, he received a telephone call from his department chairman at the school telling him that his principal wished to speak with him. During the regular school year, Respondent is not expected to be at Coral Gables Senior High School throughout the normal teaching day because of the nature of his teaching position. Rather, he is expected to be off the campus canvassing to find prospective employers, visiting parents, following up on job leads and otherwise doing the normal activities expected of a teacher in the Cooperative Education program. Although the contract between the School Board and the teachers' union specifies that the contractual workday for teachers in senior high schools is 7 hours and 20 minutes long, commencing at 7:30 a.m. and ending at 2:40 p.m., That was not necessarily Respondent's workday normally, since his job took him off the school site. Respondent believed that the work hours required during The two-week preplanning period were more lenient, and no evidence was introduced that Respondent had ever been advised of the specific time frame contained within the union's contract with the School Board. The School Board utilizes a form entitled "Voucher for In-County Travel Reimbursement and Monthly Visitation Report for Vocational Cooperative Teachers." Although Cooperative Education teachers are required to provide such forms for travel reimbursement regarding mileage and have been so advised during various monthly inservice meetings, some of those teachers do not fill out those forms for reimbursement, since they choose to claim those items on their personal income tax returns. Respondent is one of those teachers. If a teacher chooses not to fill out such a form, no monitoring is done by the School Board since there is no specific rule which would be violated by the failure to fill out such a form. It simply means that the School Board will not have to reimburse its employees for travel expenses. In his 33 years of teaching in the State of Florida, 26 years of which have been for the School Board of Dade County, Respondent has never been suspended or disciplined. No evidence was presented to show that Respondent's work with the City of Miami interfered with his School Board job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Notice of Charges filed against Respondent and reinstating him to his former position with full back pay. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 4th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Dade County School Board 141 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Ellen L. Leesfield, Esquire 2929 SW Third Avenue, Fifth Floor Miami, Florida 33129 Dr. Leonard Britton Superintendent of Schools Dade County Public Schools 1410 NE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= THE SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 83-464 GEORGE Y. BUTLER, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Miami-Dade Community College, has adopted a statement of agency policy in violation of Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 2, 2002, the Respondent employed the Petitioner, Lonny Ohlfest. At the time of his termination, the Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing with the Respondent to challenge his termination from employment. The Petitioner challenged the basis for his termination as he wanted to clear his name regarding some unflattering allegations but, equally important, he wanted to keep his job with MDC. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing and found that the Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing. More specifically, the Respondent concluded that since the Petitioner did not have a contract of employment he was not entitled to an administrative hearing. The Petitioner disputed the Respondent's claim and argued that he did have a contract, that he had a reasonable expectation that his employment would continue, and that the Respondent unlawfully refused to afford him regress through the administrative process. When the Petitioner's appeal of his request for an administrative hearing failed, he filed the instant case to challenge the Respondent's policy of not referring administrative cases for formal hearing. The delays in the appeal process explain and support the Petitioner's delay in filing the instant challenge to the agency's alleged rule. To understand the historical perspective of this case, the following findings are made pertinent to the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent: The Petitioner began employment with the MDC on or about April 4, 2001. He was hired as a part-time, hourly worker within the school of allied health technologies. The position he assumed was funded and operated within the "Health Careers Opportunities Program" or HCOP. The HCOP was funded by a federal grant. The monies coming from the grant were renewable each year and ran concurrent with the school's fiscal year (July 1-June 30). All employees paid through the HCOP grant were considered "temporary" as the grant monies were necessary to assure continued employment. In January 2002 the Petitioner was given a full-time position within the HCOP. He was designated "Program Leader/Student Services" for the upcoming summer bridge program. At all times material to this case, all parties knew that absent federal funding the HCOP would not continue to operate. Moreover, the Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his employment with the Respondent would run only until June 30, 2002. Thereafter, it was expected that if and when the federal funding came through, the HCOP employees (including the Petitioner) would continue to work within the scope of the program. At the end of the summer program in 2001, the HCOP employees took leave until the school year started and the funding of the program was assured. Accordingly, after the summer bridge program was completed, the Petitioner expected to be on leave during the summer of 2002 until called back to work. Instead, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment. The 2002 summer bridge program had not finished well for the Petitioner. Amid allegations of sexual harassment (unsubstantiated and not at issue in this proceeding) the Petitioner's working relationship within the HCOP floundered. The Petitioner was aghast that unsubstantiated claims had been reported, he wanted the accusations resolved, he wanted his name cleared, and he was disappointed by the process that failed to timely and fully resolve the issues. When the Petitioner left the campus for what he believed would be the break (similar to the one they had taken the prior year), he was uncertain as to his employment status. In fact, when he left the campus he cleaned out his desk and returned his keys. Nevertheless, on July 26, 2002, Dr. Miller directed the Petitioner to present for work on July 29, 2002. He did not do so. On July 29, 2002, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor directed him to appear for work on July 30, 2002. He did not do so. In fact, the Petitioner did not return to the office until July 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not understand that his attendance was mandatory for the two days that he did not appear for work. When the Petitioner did check in with the HCOP office on the 31st he came to understand the gravity of the situation. As a result of the absences, the Respondent cited the Petitioner with insubordination and terminated his employment with MDC. The Petitioner timely challenged the termination but the Respondent ruled he was not entitled to an administrative review of the decision. The Petitioner filed for, and received, unemployment compensation. The termination was not justified by the standards applicable to that forum. The rules governing unemployment compensation do not, however, govern the administrative process regarding whether or not one's employment constitutes a property interest that is protected by law. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's petition seeking an administrative review, the Respondent declined to afford the Petitioner with a hearing. The Respondent does not forward petitions filed by non- contract employees when such individuals seek to challenge their termination of employment. The Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, they are not required to forward such petitions for formal review. The Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are not entitled to administrative review when their employment is terminated. Conversely, the Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are entitled to an administrative review when their employment is terminated. The Petitioner was not a full-time, contract employee of the Respondent. The Respondent's policy affords full-time contractual personnel a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Lissa Nappier, committed the violations alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges and, if so, whether such allegations are just cause for termination of her employment with the School Board.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a duly constituted entity charged with the responsibility and authority to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within the Miami-Dade County Public School District. As such, it has the authority to regulate all personnel matters for the school district. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent, Lissa Nappier, was an employee of School Board and was subject to the disciplinary rules and regulations pertinent to employees of the school district. The Respondent’s employment relationship with the Petitioner began in 1984 when she was retained as a temporary instructor. In 1988 she was hired as a permanent teacher and was assigned to Homestead Senior High School where she has continued service until the instant issues emerged. From 2004 until the time of her recommended termination, the Respondent was employed as the Student Activities Director at the school. Prior to the instant matter, the Respondent has had no disciplinary issues or actions. As a condition of her employment with the Petitioner, the Respondent is subject to the terms and conditions of a contract between the School Board and the United Teachers of Dade (UTD contract). Article XXIV of the UTD contract provides for credential payment to encourage employees of the School Board to pursue further studies and expertise in their respective fields. Such pursuit enhances the quality of education for students in the school district. At all times material to this case, the credential payment increase for a teacher with a doctorate degree was $7000. The effective date for the implementation of the credential payment is computed “after completion of eligibility requirements, as indicated on the transcript by the issuing university.” The UTD contract further provides that: Completion of eligibility requirements shall be defined as: (a)filing an official M- DCPS/UTD application for credential payment with the Office of Human Resources (receipt acknowledged and dated by M-DCPS); and (b) completion of course work/degree requirements prior to the date of the quarter for which payment is requested, as indicated by the date on the transcript, or other appropriate evidence provided by the university. M-DCPS shall notify all new employees of the availability of the credential payment programs and the procedures for making application. Under the heading “Eligibility,” the UTD contract also states: To qualify as graduate level, credit must have been earned after the applicant was granted the Bachelor’s degree and must be clearly identified as such. Pursuant to the UTD contract, Applicants whose applications are disapproved shall be notified that they may appeal the decision to the committee by resubmitting and supplying such additional and germane information and/or documentation as will be helpful in reaching a decision regarding the appeal. The decision of the committee is final and not grievable or arbitrable. On or about April 8, 2004, the Respondent submitted a note to the Petitioner’s Office of Compensation Administration that stated: Enclosed please find my official transcript for my Doctorate Program. Along with the transcript is a verification form. My employee number is 152174. Thank you for your attention in this matter, and with the necessary adjustments with payroll. Attached to the note described above, was a document purportedly from Rochville University. The Rochville document contained the words “Official Transcript” and purported to indicate that the Respondent had completed the noted courses. The document represented the Respondent had obtained a “Doctor of Arts (Major: Education).” Also attached to the note described in paragraph 11 was a form purportedly executed by the Rochville University Registrar and President that stated: This is to verify that Lissa A. Nappier has successfully completed the Doctor’s Program from Rochville University in the year 2004. In order to obtain the “Doctor of Arts” from Rochville University, the Petitioner submitted her transcripts from Brenau College, Nova Southeastern University, the requisite fees required by the school, and a summary of her 18 years of teaching experience to Rochville. Rochville University is an “on line” institution. The Respondent did not complete additional course work, did not write a thesis, and did not attempt to verify that Rochville University was an acceptable, accredited school prior to paying her fees for the degree and submitting the documents to the Petitioner for credential payment. It is unlikely that Rochville is an accredited university. Its academic claims are related to its status as an accredited “on line” institution. For approximately $600.00 the Respondent received a doctorate degree. After reviewing the Respondent’s documentation, the Petitioner denied the credential payment increase. The Respondent did not challenge or seek additional review of that denial. The matter was referred to the Petitioner’s Office of the Inspector General because the Respondent had “submitted a transcript to obtain credential payment for an advanced degree using a transcript from an unaccredited university.” None of the courses depicted on the Rochville University transcript that was appended to the Respondent’s note were actually for course work completed by the Respondent while attending (even online) Rochville classes. None of the hours for the courses depicted on the Rochville University transcript were earned while attending (even online) Rochville classes. The Respondent knew or should have known that a credible doctor of arts degree requires more than the submission of prior coursework, life experience, and the payment of fees. Moreover, the Respondent did not present evidence of any “life experience” that would entitle her to a doctor of arts degree from any accredited university. That Rochville University accepted the Respondent’s experience and prior academic work as sufficient to award a doctorate degree dishonors the hours of work that are, in reality, required of post-graduate students who obtain doctorate degrees from reputable institutions. Although technically truthful in Respondent's representation to the Petitioner, the Respondent’s request for credential payment was clearly not supported by credible academic achievement. The Respondent attempted to obtain credential payment using a non-creditable source. This was a tremendous lapse of good judgment. The Respondent, did not, however represent that Rochville University is an accredited university. She only represented that she had obtained a doctorate degree from that entity. Her lapse of judgment was in attempting to parlay her worthless degree into a credential payment increase. Her effort failed due to the attentive review of her request. At the time the Respondent was going through a divorce and needed additional income. The online approach to obtaining the doctorate degree appeared to be an easy, affordable alternative. The Respondent did not verify that Rochville University was accredited by any national accreditation source or that the university was acceptable to the School Board for purposes of obtaining a post-graduate degree.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a Final Order sustaining the Respondent’s suspension without pay for the amount of time it deems appropriate, but returning the Respondent to full employment thereafter. S DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Rudolph F. Crew, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1394 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 John L. Winn Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jean Marie Middleton, Esquire School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Carol R. Buxton, Esquire Florida Education Association 140 South University Drive, Suite A Plantation, Florida 33324 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a consumer’s certificate of exemption from sales and use tax.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. At all material times, Petitioner has qualified as a Section 501(c)(3) organization under the Internal Revenue Code. Since March 1992, Petitioner has also held the sales and use tax exemption that it seeks in this case. Pursuant to a change in law requiring all exempt organizations to reapply, Petitioner submitted an Application for Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption dated February 1, 1997. By stipulation, the parties agree that, for the purpose of this case, the sole legal basis for the application is Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes, and, if Petitioner fails to prevail in this case, it may immediately file an application seeking the same exemption under another statute, such as Section 212.08(7)(n). Petitioner was incorporated in 1989. It was first incorporated in 1975, but its corporate status lapsed. Petitioner has been in operation for 40 years. In broadest terms, Petitioner’s purpose is to assist social-studies education in Florida. Petitioner’s major activities involve training teachers of social studies. The most important annual activity of Petitioner is to sponsor a statewide conference that gives social-studies teachers a chance to receive inservice training. This inservice training satisfies, in whole or in part, each teacher’s requirement to obtain inservice training credits in order to maintain her teaching certificate. Petitioner conducts the conference in October during inservice days on which public-school teachers statewide are generally relieved from classroom duties. Between 600 and 1200 teachers participate in this annual conference. The conference runs two days, but Petitioner offers preconference institutes for a day or two prior to the start of the conference. These institutes, which are held at the same location as the conference, provide social-studies teachers with more specialized training in social studies. Petitioner also assists four regional affiliates in conducting inservice training to social-studies teachers. These affiliates are the Southwest Florida Coalition for the Social Studies, Big Bend Council for the Social Studies, Central Florida Coalition for the Social Studies, and Northeast Florida Council for the Social Studies. Petitioner works with various organizations, including the Florida Department of Education, ensuring that these organizations are aware of the interests of social- studies teachers and that the teachers are aware of the activities of these organizations. Petitioner quarterly publishes Trends in Social Studies, which provides useful, current information to social- studies teachers. Petitioner sells advertising space in the journal, mostly to educational publishers. Petitioner provides free space to the Florida Department of Education, state universities, state community colleges, the Holocaust Center, and African-American educational centers. Partly through the use of an endowment fund, Petitioner also provides additional funding for the development of social-studies teachers and the promotion of social-studies education. Petitioner provides awards, including small monetary sums, for exceptional social-studies teachers in Florida, and recognizes, at the annual conference, the outstanding social-studies teacher from each of Florida’s 67 districts. Petitioner’s major sources of income are membership fees and conference registration fees. Individual teachers pay membership fees. Conference registration fees are paid by checks from individual attendees, school districts, archdioceses, and the State of Florida. Educational vendors pay Petitioner fees for the privilege of showing their products and services at the conference. Vendors’ fees typically make up the margin by which Petitioner’s revenues exceed expenses for the conference. Petitioner does not have any paid employees. Dr. Theron Trimble, who started teaching social studies in Florida in 1966, is the executive director of Petitioner and has been associated with Petitioner for 30 years. Dr. Trimble’s full-time employment is in the Collier County School District, where he is director of Fulltime Equivalents and Resource Allocations. All persons working for Petitioner are, like Dr. Trimble, volunteers with full-time educational employment throughout Florida. Petitioner pays small sums to instructors or presenters at the annual conference and pre- conference institutes, but these payments are strictly for their services in conducting their seminars. Petitioner intends to continue helping social- studies teachers meet students’ changing needs in social- studies education. For example, Petitioner recently sponsored an inservice program designed to help teachers incorporate computers in social-studies education. At a time of reduced state involvement, Petitioner has tried to fill the gaps in funding and curriculum control. Petitioner’s funding efforts are directed toward schools and teachers, rather than school districts. Three years ago, Petitioner started an endowment fund to establish a long-term mini-grant program for social- studies teachers. According to the Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, the first definition of “office” is “a special duty, charge, or position conferred by an exercise of governmental authority and for a public purpose: a position of authority to exercise a public function and to receive whatever emoluments may belong to it <hold public ~> [and] a position of responsibility or some degree of executive authority.” The fourth definition is “something that one ought to do or must do: an assigned or assumed duty, task, or role [and] the proper or customary action of something: FUNCTION.” The fifth definition includes: “a place in which the functions (as consulting, record keeping, clerical work) of a public officer are performed [and] the directing headquarters of an enterprise or organization.” The last definition is “a major administrative unit in some governments <British Foreign Office [and] a subdivision of some government departments <Patent Offices>.” According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the second and third definitions of “office” are “[a] duty or function assigned to or assumed by someone: “the maternal office was supplied by my aunt (Gibbon) [and] “[a] position of authority, duty, or trust given to a person, as in a government, corporation, or other organization: the office of vice president.” However, the fourth definition is: “[a]ny of the branches of the Federal government of the United States ranking just below the departments [and a] major executive division of the British national government, often headed by a cabinet minister.” And the fifth and seventh definitions are “[a] public position: seek office" [and] [o]ften plural[; a]n Act performed for another, usually beneficial: a favor: 'The projected duel . . . was halted by the offices of friends on both sides.' (Katherine Anne Porter).” Webster’s second and third definitions of “administration” are “performance of executive duties: MANAGEMENT [and] the execution of public affairs as distinguished from policymaking.” The fourth definition includes “a governmental agency or board.” American Heritage’s first definition of “administration” is “[t]he management of affairs.” However, the second definition is “[t]he activity of a sovereign state in the exercise of its powers or duties.” The fourth definition is “[t]he management of any institution, public or private.”
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order granting Petitioner’s application for a consumer’s certificate of exemption from sales and use tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Theron Trimble 3710 Estey Avenue Naples, Florida 34104 Kevin J. O’Donnell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service in the Florida Retirement System for service in the Florida Virtual School from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). On October 23, 2003, Petitioner entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and left her employment on June 30, 2004. Petitioner worked most of her career as a teacher and an administrator for the Pasco County School Board (School Board). The School Board is a local education association (LEA) and a local agency employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(42)(a), Florida Statutes (2001). Beginning with the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner undertook additional employment by working in the Florida Virtual School (FVS) in accordance with former Section 228.082, Florida Statutes (2000).1 Petitioner undertook additional employment to increase the average final compensation (AFC) that Respondent uses to calculate her retirement benefits. From September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2004, Petitioner worked for the LEA and served in the FVS. During the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner was a full-time employee for the LEA and also served part-time in the FVS. Beginning with the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner served full-time in the FVS and also worked for the LEA during the summer. The LEA paid Petitioner annual salaries as a full-time employee for all relevant school years and made the necessary contributions to the FRS. The AFC includes compensation Petitioner received from the LEA, and that compensation is not at issue in this proceeding. With one exception, the AFC includes the compensation Petitioner received for service in the FVS. The AFC does not include $6,150 (the contested amount) that Petitioner earned during her first year of service in the FVS from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002 (the contested period).2 Sometime prior to April 2004, Petitioner requested that Respondent include the contested amount in her AFC. In a one- page letter dated April 6, 2004 (the preliminary denial letter), Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent proposed to deny the request. The grounds for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position and that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. In relevant part, the preliminary denial letter states: . . . you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor whose employment was contingent on enrollment and funding pursuant to Section 60S- 1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C., copy enclosed. As such, you are ineligible for . . . FRS . . . participation for the time period in question. The School joined the FRS on December 1, 2001 and past service was not purchased for you since you filled a temporary position. Effective July 1, 2002, you began filling a regularly established position with the Florida Virtual High School and were correctly enrolled in FRS. The School has reported your earnings from July 1, 2002, to the present to the FRS. Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R-2). A two-page letter dated June 23, 2004 (the denial letter), notified Petitioner of proposed final agency action excluding the contested amount from her AFC. The only ground for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position. The denial omits any statement that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. However, the denial letter includes a copy of the preliminary denial letter and is deemed to include, by reference, the stated grounds in the preliminary denial letter. In relevant part, the denial letter states: By letter dated April 6, 2004 (copy enclosed). . . [Respondent] advised you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor from September 15, 2001 through June 30, 2002. We have reviewed the information submitted in your recent letter and maintain our position that you were an adjunct instructor from September 2001 through June 2002, pursuant to Section 60S-1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C. (copy enclosed). Your employment with the Florida Virtual School during the time period in question was contingent on enrollment and funding. Since you filled a temporary position, the School was correct in excluding you from the [FRS]. This notification constitutes final agency action. . . . R-3 at 1. The legal definition of a temporary position varies depending on whether the employer is a state agency or a local agency. If the employer is a state agency, a position is temporary if the employer compensates the position from an account defined as "an other personal services (OPS) account" in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001) (OPS account). If the employer is a local agency, a position is temporary if the position will exist for less than six consecutive months; or as otherwise provided by rule. § 121.021(53), Fla. Stat. (2001). The distinction is based, in relevant part, on the practical reality that local agencies do not maintain OPS accounts for "the fiscal affairs of the state." § 216.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was not an LEA. Three different employers may have been responsible for payment of the contested amount. Some evidence supports a finding that the employer was the Board of Trustees of FVS (the Board). Contracts of employment for service in FVS identify the employer as the Board.3 The Board has statutory authority over personnel serving FVS and has statutory authority to govern FVS. Other evidence supports a finding that the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was FVS. The record evidence identifies the employer that enrolled in FRS and made contributions on behalf of Petitioner as FVS. Finally, there is evidence that the Orange County School Board, acting as the statutorily designated fiscal agent for FVS (the fiscal agent), was the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount. The contested amount was paid from funds administered by the fiscal agent in the name of FVS. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each exemplify distinct characteristics of a state agency defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(qq), Florida Statutes (2001). The Board consists of seven members appointed by the Governor for four-year staggered terms. The Board is a public agency entitled to sovereign immunity and has authority to promulgate rules concerning FVS. Board members are public officers and bear fiduciary responsibility for FVS. The Board has statutory authority to approve FVS franchises in each local school district. §§ 228.082, Fla. Stat. (2000) and 1002.37, Fla. Stat. (2001). FVS is administratively housed within an office4 of the Commissioner of Education, as the Head of the Department of Education (Commissioner). The fiscal year of FVS is the state fiscal year. Local school districts cannot limit student access to courses offered statewide through FVS.5 The fiscal agent of FVS is a state agency. The fiscal agent receives state funds for FVS and administers those funds to operate FVS for students throughout the state. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each satisfy judicial definitions of a state agency pursuant to "territorial" and "functional" tests discussed in the Conclusions of Law. Each agency operates statewide in accordance with a statutory mandate to serve any student in the state. Each serves students in public and private schools; in charter schools; in home school programs; and in juvenile detention programs. Unlike an LEA, the scope of authority and function of the employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was not circumscribed by county or other local boundaries; regardless of whether the employer was the Board, FVS, or the fiscal agent (collectively referred to hereinafter as the employer). The employer did not pay the contested amount from an OPS account. The fiscal agent for FVS is the presumptive repository of funds appropriated for FVS. The fiscal agent is organically structured as a local agency even though it functions as a state agency in its capacity as fiscal agent. Unlike a state agency, an organic local agency does not maintain an OPS account, defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001), for the "fiscal affairs of the state." The legislature funded FVS during the contested period in lump sum as a state grant-in-aid provided in a line item appropriation pursuant to Subsection 228.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). The legislature subsequently began funding of FVS through the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). Each FVS student with six-credit hours required for high school graduation is included as a full-time equivalent student for state funding. Each student with less than six-credit hours counts as a fraction of a full-time equivalent student. A local LEA cannot report full-time equivalent student membership for courses that students take through FVS unless the LEA is an approved franchise of FVS and operates a virtual school. As student enrollment in FVS increased, the legislature changed the funding formula to avoid paying twice for students in FVS; once to fund FVS and again to fund local LEAs that were authorized to earn FTE funding for students enrolled in FVS. The employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was a state agency that did not compensate Petitioner from an OPS account defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner did not earn the contested amount in a temporary position within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(53)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(62). Respondent argues that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position in a local agency defined in Subsection 221.021(42), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(36). A temporary position in a local agency is generally defined to mean a position that will last less than six months, except as otherwise provided by rule. By rule, Respondent defines a temporary position to include temporary instructional positions that are established with no expectation of continuation beyond one semester. Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-1.004(5)(d)3. Respondent supports its argument with limited documentary evidence (the documents). The documents consist of several items. An undated FVS Information Sheet indicates the employer started Petitioner as an adjunct instructor on September 15, 2001. An FVS memorandum dated several years later on March 16, 2004, indicates Petitioner started an adjunct position on September 6, 2001, and includes a parenthetical statement that it was seasonal employment.6 The employer paid Petitioner $3,150 during 2002 as miscellaneous income and reported it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a "Form 1099-Misc." An undated letter of intent for the 2002-2003 school year, which requests submission before March 8, 2002, indicates that Petitioner intended to continue her adjunct employment status and requested a full-time position if one became available.7 Use of labels such as "adjunct" to describe employment status during the contested period would be more probative if the duties Petitioner performed were limited to the duties of a part-time, on-line instructor. As discussed hereinafter, Petitioner earned the contested amount while occupying a dual- purpose position in which she performed both the duties of an instructor and significant other duties unrelated to those of an instructor. The trier of fact would be required to disregard a substantial body of evidence to find that Petitioner's position was limited to that of a part-time, on-line instructor. The IRS requires taxpayers to report miscellaneous income paid to independent contractors on Form 1099-Misc. Neither the denial letter nor the preliminary denial letter includes a statement that Petitioner occupied a non-employee position as an independent contractor. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law give little weight to the use of IRS Form 1099-Misc in cases such as this one where there is little other evidence of independent contractor status or where the evidence establishes an employer-employee relationship. The record evidence discussed hereinafter shows that Petitioner and her employer enjoyed a continuing employment relationship within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(32)(f). Respondent was not a party to the employment contract and did not witness the employment relationship between Petitioner and her employer. Nor did Respondent call a witness from FVS who was competent to testify about events that occurred during the contested period. The testimony of Petitioner is supported by the totality of evidence. In relevant part, Petitioner disclosed to her supervisors at FVS at the time of her employment that she sought employment to enhance her retirement benefits. The proposed exclusion of the contested amount from the AFC is inconsistent with a material condition of employment. Respondent asserts that the documents satisfy requirements for notice and documentation of a temporary position in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6.1004(5). The rule requires an employer to notify an employee at the time of employment that the employee is filling a temporary position and cannot participate in the FRS; and to document the intended length of the temporary position. However, the terms of the documents from Respondent are ambiguous and insufficient to provide the required notice and documentation. The documents did not expressly notify Petitioner she was filling a temporary position that did not qualify as a regularly established position in the FRS. None of the documents use the term "temporary" or "temporary position." The notice and documentation requirements of the rule must be satisfied, if at all, by implication from terms on the face of the documents such as "adjunct," "adjunct position," and "adjunct employment status." Unlike the term "temporary position," neither the legislature nor Respondent defines the term "adjunct." One of the several common and ordinary uses of the term "adjunct" can mean, "Attached to a faculty or staff in a temporary . . . capacity." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, at 21-22 (4th ed. Houghton Mifflin Company 2000). The employer used an undefined term such as "adjunct" as an ambiguous euphemism for a temporary position. The ambiguity of the term "adjunct" is underscored when each document from Respondent is considered in its entirety. The letter of intent form requested Petitioner to indicate whether she intended to continue her "adjunct employment status" and whether she would be interested in "a full-time position." The form did not refer to either a "temporary position," or a "part-time position." Petitioner reasonably inferred that "adjunct employment status" was the part-time alternative to "a full-time position." The inference was consistent with the announced purpose for serving in FVS and the evidence as a whole. Respondent also does not define part- time employment to exclude a regularly established position. The FVS utilized different contracts for adjunct and part-time instructors. The contracts of record pertaining to Petitioner are not contracts for adjunct instructors (adjunct contracts). The contracts are annual contracts. Even if Petitioner were to have signed a contract for adjunct instructors, the contract used for adjunct instructors was ambiguous. In relevant part, the adjunct contract included a caption in the upper right corner labeled, "Terms of Agreement for Part-Time Instructional Employment." (emphasis supplied) As previously found, a part-time position may be a regularly established position. Use of the term "part-time employment" on a contract for an adjunct instructor supported a reasonable inference that the employer was using the terms "adjunct" and "part-time" synonymously to differentiate part-time employment from full-time employment. The employer required Petitioner, unlike adjunct instructors, to sign in on an instructor log sheet and to attend training sessions and staff meetings. Petitioner attended training sessions on September 8 and 22, and October 24, 2001. Petitioner attended other training sessions on February 26 and 27, 2002, and on March 27 and April 10, 2002. The employer also issued office equipment to Petitioner that the employer did not issue to adjunct instructors. Petitioner performed significant duties in addition to those required of a part-time instructor. Petitioner wrote grant applications and assisted in writing a procedures manual for FVS. By November 30, 2001, Petitioner had completed and submitted a federal "Smaller Learning Communities Grant" for $230,000. On December 27, 2001, Petitioner began working on the procedures manual, finalized the work on January 3, 2002, and was listed in the credits in the manual. The additional duties assigned to Petitioner continued through the second semester of the contested period. On February 26 and 27, 2002, FVS asked Petitioner to develop their "FCAT" course for the eighth grade. Petitioner wrote and developed the course. By May 30, 2002, Petitioner had written and submitted three more grant applications and was a member of a team that developed strategies for additional fundraising. For the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner entered into an annual contract for a full-time non-instructional position, as Grants Manager, and a separate contract for employment in a part-time instructor position. Each contract was terminable only for "good cause" within the meaning of Subsection 1002.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). The expectation of continued employment is further evidenced by the general business experience of FVS leading up to the contested period. In the 1997-1998 school year, approximately 25 students were enrolled statewide in FVS. In the next three years, enrollment grew to 5,564. Professional staff grew from 27 teachers to 54 full-time teachers. Legislative funding was adequate for the growth FVS experienced, and the legal contingency of enrollment and funding was not a realistic condition of continued employment. There was nothing temporary in the expectations of the employer and Petitioner during the contested period. FVS staff had legitimate business reasons to expect continued student enrollment and legislative funding during the contested period. The employer also had legitimate reasons to expect continued employment of Petitioner based on the individual experience the employer enjoyed with Petitioner, the ongoing and continuous nature of Petitioner's work, and the significant additional duties assigned to Petitioner. The employer, in fact, employed Petitioner continuously after the contested period. When FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, some employees purchased past credit. Petitioner was not on the list of employees for whom past credit was purchased. That omission is consistent with Petitioner's understanding that she was already receiving FRS credit. By rule, Respondent required the employer to make an affirmative disclosure that Petitioner did not occupy a position qualifying for FRS credit. After FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, FVS was required to make contributions to the FRS on behalf of Petitioner for approximately 208 days during the remainder of the contested period. FVS did not make the required contributions to the FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order including in the AFC that portion of the contested amount earned on and after December 1, 2001, and excluding the remainder of the contested amount from the AFC. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2005.
