The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Julie Wells is the principal of AccuStaff.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Van Gandy be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julie Wells AccuStaff 5710 North Davis Highway, Suite 5 Pensacola, Florida 32503 Van Gandy 8580 Vickie Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, based upon her complaints about a coworker’s conduct perceived by Petitioner to be sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, a female, was employed as a server with Respondent from May 6, 2011, through September 29, 2012. Respondent, Stavro's Pizza, Inc., is a restaurant located in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 individuals at any given time and therefore is subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. §§ 760.01-760.l1, Fla. Stat. Early on the morning of Friday, September 27, 2012, it was reported to Martha Trimble, long-time General Manager of Respondent, that a "weird conversation" took place between Petitioner and another employee, Brian Hayes, the previous evening.2/ During this conversation, Mr. Hayes allegedly told Petitioner that “he knew everything about her, including where she lived, and that her favorite color was blue.” Mr. Hayes also allegedly told Petitioner that he was soon to be the new manager of the restaurant. Ms. Trimble approached Petitioner later that day about the alleged incident with Mr. Hayes, and while Petitioner admitted she had had a strange conversation with Mr. Hayes, she denied that she was upset by it. Nonetheless, Ms. Trimble told Petitioner she would investigate the matter and that she took it seriously. Later that same day Ms. Trimble also questioned Mr. Hayes, who denied making the reported comments. And while Ms. Trimble was aware that Petitioner had voluntarily given Mr. Hayes her address,3/ out of caution, Ms. Trimble placed Mr. Hayes on leave while she continued her investigation. The following day, Saturday, September 28, 2012, there was a mandatory meeting for all employees of Respondent. The meeting was mandatory because Ms. Trimble had been made aware of horseplay among some employees, and was concerned that staff training had been inadequate. Notice of the meeting was conspicuously posted in the restaurant for two weeks prior to the meeting. The notice explained that the meeting was mandatory and that all employees were to attend unless they contacted Ms. Trimble prior to the meeting to be excused. Petitioner did not attend the Saturday meeting and was not excused in advance. Four other employees contacted Ms. Trimble ahead of time and explained that they would be unable to attend due to schedule conflicts. Those employees were excused. When Ms. Trimble contacted Petitioner later in the day, Petitioner told Ms. Trimble that she had been ill, and in bed all day. That evening Ms. Trimble also reviewed the security camera video of the one hour period the previous Thursday during which Petitioner and Mr. Hayes had been alone in the restaurant, and during which the suspect comments had reportedly been made. In reviewing the video, Ms. Trimble specifically watched for physical contact, lingering conversations, and body language. At hearing, Ms. Trimble related her observations from the restaurant video as follows: So I watched the tape. Brian basically stayed back in the kitchen. Uh, we have side work we do. We make garlic bread. We make boxes. We do little oil containers for to-go salads. And Brian was back doing that almost the entire time. Once I saw him go up to the waitress station and get a beverage and bring it back. Amanda basically was at the register. She would come back every once in a while, hang a ticket, kind of stand there and chitchat until, uh – until, uh, a salad was given to her or something like that. So, um, but mainly they were both in their own areas. I did not see anything that indicated that there was anything improper going on. Following her review of the surveillance video Ms. Trimble concluded that there was no basis to believe that Mr. Hayes had engaged in any form of sexual harassment against Petitioner. The following day, Sunday, September 29, 2012, Ms. Trimble met with Petitioner regarding her absence from the mandatory meeting the day before. At this meeting Ms. Trimble informed Petitioner that because she failed to attend the mandatory meeting without being excused, and had failed to even call Ms. Trimble to explain she was ill and would be unable to attend, her employment was terminated. A former employee of Respondent, Lindsey Yauch, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Ms. Yauch testified that she had once missed a mandatory meeting called by Ms. Trimble but had not been fired as a result. However, on cross-examination Ms. Yauch could not remember the purpose, date, or any other details surrounding the meeting. Ms. Trimble’s testimony regarding the meeting that Ms. Yauch missed was more precise. Ms. Trimble recalled that it was a “safe-staff meeting”, which is a food-handler’s course that all employees must take. Because all 27 of Respondent’s employees were required to take the class, it was offered on two separate dates, and employees were permitted to choose which session they would attend. Ms. Yaugh had chosen to attend the first session, but overslept and missed the class as a result. Since a second class offering was still available, Ms. Yaugh was permitted to attend the second session, which she did. There is no credible evidence in this record that Petitioner was treated differently than other similarly situated employees when she was terminated for missing a mandatory meeting. At hearing Ms. Trimble testified that Petitioner's termination had nothing to do with her gender or the alleged comments made by Brian Hayes. Rather, Petitioner’s termination was the result of her missing a mandatory staff meeting without excuse. This testimony is credible. To his credit, in his closing statement counsel for Petitioner candidly acknowledged that, even if true, the comments made by Mr. Hayes would not constitute sexual harassment.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination states a cognizable claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended in Sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed his original Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on March 6, 2000. He filed his amended charge on March 31, 2000, after talking to FCHR's staff on the telephone. Petitioner alleges that he experienced harassment and retaliation in the workplace because he "supported a co-worker Gary Farrell in reporting to the company about harassment he was receiving from Union Business Manager, Joe Nobles and past Job Steward, Richard Mason for quitting Local Union 1055." Petitioner's charge also alleges the following: Joe Nobles and Richard Mason retaliated against me by influencing most of the union members in the department to ostracize us by not talking to us or cooperating with us. Some co-workers have come to me and said they were told not to associate or cooperate with me, because I supported co-worker Gary Farrell in reporting harassment to Corporate Office. Petitioner's complaint did not allege discrimination or retaliation based on his race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, handicap and/or marital status. Petitioner was given an opportunity to amend his complaint before the FCHR and failed to do so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph A. Peterson, Esquire Beggs & Lane, LLP Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576-2950 R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.A. 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Optical Shop (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01– and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner, Janice Jennings (Petitioner), to discrimination in employment and by discharging Petitioner in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Respondent operates an optical shop in a Veteran’s Administration (V.A.) Hospital located in Lake City, Florida. At its Lake City location, Respondent fills prescriptions written by eye physicians at the V.A. Hospital, assists patients with choosing frames, and fits patients with their prescription eye glasses. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is fast-paced, with a constant stream of patients, averaging 50-to-60 patients a day. If the optical shop is running behind schedule, it is problematic because often physicians at the V.A. Hospital are waiting to see the patients served by the optical shop. In 2009, Petitioner interviewed for a position at Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City, Florida. During her interview, Petitioner advised Respondent that she had competent computer skills and significant experience working in an office environment and with eye doctors. On May 27, 2009, Respondent hired Petitioner as a part- time clerk at the optical shop. Petitioner was terminated prior to working 90 days for Respondent. When Petitioner was hired, two full-time employees worked at the optical shop: office supervisor, Jean Hartup, and optician, Kathleen Denton. Ms. Hartup has been employed with Respondent for approximately five years. Ms. Denton has been with the optical shop for approximately two and a-half years. As office supervisor, Ms. Hartup can be distant with employees and “hard” at times. She can also be “direct” when speaking to employees. Ms. Hartup demonstrates these traits with all of the employees at the optical shop. Ms. Hartup has written up Ms. Denton in the past and the two have had personality conflicts. Both Ms. Hartup and Ms. Denton assisted with training Petitioner. Evidence indicated that Petitioner received adequate training to perform the tasks she was assigned to perform as a clerk. She often had to be re-trained on the same tasks. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is a very small room, approximately ten-feet by ten-feet square inside the V.A. Hospital. There are two small desks in the shop and it is very crowded. Petitioner was aware of the small working environment at the time she accepted employment with Respondent as a part- time clerk. Past and present employees at the optical shop have had to share desk space. Sometimes work has to be performed in the hallway because of the small office space. All new hires for Respondent are subjected to a 90-day probationary period. As explained in Respondent’s “Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits,” of which Petitioner was aware: There will be a 90-day probationary period during which time the employer may terminate the employee at any time for any reason or for no reason regardless of any other provision of these policies. Sick leave and personal days are accrued but cannot be used during this period. Respondent’s Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits also provides: [Respondent] does not and will not tolerate any employee discriminating against their work peers for any reason i.e., race, color, religion, sex, national origin or handicap. Any known verifiable discrimination will be grounds for immediate termination. Once on the job, Petitioner was not proficient on the computer and, despite repeated training, failed to show any improvement and was slow in performing her job duties. Because of this, service to patients at the optical shop slowed down and the optical shop was frequently behind, resulting in physicians having to wait for patients being served by the optical shop. Ms. Hartup became frustrated with Petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance and the resulting delays. In addition, Petitioner began to show a lack of interest in her job and even stated that she “didn’t really need a job; she just wanted to be out of the house.” Despite repeated training and opportunities to improve her work performance, Petitioner failed to improve. Petitioner was given a notebook with information from the American Board of Opticians for review but she failed to read it or return it to Respondent. Prior to the end of her employment with Respondent, Petitioner called Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Mississippi and spoke to Mary Walker. Petitioner complained to Ms. Walker that Ms. Hartup was being too hard, was impatient, and was expecting too much of her. Petitioner did not raise concerns with Ms. Walker that she was being discriminated against based on her race, or that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race. In fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained of race discrimination or a hostile work environment based on race discrimination while she was still employed by Respondent. During that first telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Walker suggested to Petitioner that she should talk to Ms. Hartup about the problems. Petitioner assured Ms. Walker that she would. Two days later, Ms. Walker called Ms. Hartup and inquired whether Petitioner had discussed her concerns with Ms. Hartup. Petitioner, however, had not spoken to Ms. Hartup about her complaint. Ms. Walker gave Ms. Hartup the authority to run the optical shop at Lake City, including making hiring and firing decisions. Ms. Walker did not discipline Ms. Hartup because of Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, Ms. Walker told Ms. Hartup to handle the situation regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Ms. Hartup then met with Petitioner and they spoke about Petitioner’s concerns that Ms. Hartup was being too harsh and about Petitioner’s poor work performance. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Hartup felt the situation had been resolved. Petitioner subsequently advised both Ms. Denton, as well as Ms. Walker at Respondent’s headquarters, that the conversation with Ms. Hartup had gone well and that their issues had been resolved. Petitioner’s work performance, however, did not improve. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period of employment, Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment for poor work performance, for failing to reach her capabilities as an employee, and because her poor work performance was a detriment to Respondent’s Lake City optical shop. Petitioner testified that, from her point of view, she truly felt as though she had been discriminated against because of her race. That testimony, however, was without further support and was unpersuasive, especially in view of the fact that there is no evidence that Petitioner ever mentioned to anyone during her employment with Respondent that she believed she was being discriminated against. There was otherwise no evidence presented at the final hearing that would support a finding that Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaint against Ms. Hartup. Further, the evidence produced at final hearing does not support a finding that either the manner in which Petitioner was treated during her employment with Respondent, or her termination from that employment, was based on Petitioner’s race. Respondent filled the position of part-time clerk left vacant after Petitioner’s termination by hiring a Native- American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent initially employed the Petitioner in the maintenance department in January 1996. There is no evidence that the Petitioner’s employment in the maintenance department was unsatisfactory. In May 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the production department. The Petitioner’s supervisor in the production department described his performance as somewhat unsatisfactory but made no written report of any problems. On September 17, 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the laboratory and began work as a lab technician. The transfer in the lab technician position was at the Petitioner’s request. On October 21, 1996, Richard Barnes, an employee of the Respondent, assumed supervisory responsibility for the laboratory operation. On November 8, 1996, Mr. Barnes met with the Petitioner to discuss the job. At the time of the November 8 discussion, the Petitioner had been working in the lab for almost eight weeks. The Respondent’s lab employees are responsible for assuring that the materials produced by the plant comply with the "release specifications" set by the buyers of the materials. During the discussion, the Petitioner was asked about specific tasks assigned to lab employees. His response was incorrect and indicated a lack of familiarity with lab procedures. The Petitioner was informed that his job performance was unsatisfactory. Over the next week, Mr. Barnes continued to monitor the situation, and subsequently decided to terminate the Petitioner’s employment for unsatisfactory performance. On November 18, 1996, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner’s employment on the grounds of unsatisfactory work performance. At the time of the termination, the Petitioner was 56 years old. During the time of the Petitioner’s transfer into, and termination from, the lab, the Respondent was in the process of expanding the number of lab employees from six to ten employees. Shortly before terminating the Petitioner’s employment, the Respondent transferred another employee, of similar age as the Petitioner, into the lab. Shortly after the Petitioner’s termination, Respondent transferred another employee, younger than the Respondent, to the lab. The transfer of the younger employee was being processed prior to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. There is no evidence that a transfer of the younger employee was related to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. The evidence fails to establish that termination of the Petitioner’s employment was based on his age. There is no evidence that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age. There is no evidence that the Petitioner suffered any economic injury based on the termination. He became employed shortly after the termination at a salary higher than the Respondent was paying him. Subsequent employment has included additional increases in compensation. The Petitioner asserts that had he remained employed by the Respondent, his compensation would have included promotions and increased compensation. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have received further promotions from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Terry B. Hillman. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Terry B. Hillman 2048 Laurel Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Robert E. Tardif, Jr., Esquire Duncan & Tardif, P.A. 1601 Jackson Street, Suite 101 Post Office Box 249 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0249 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (Respondent or the Agency), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by discriminating against Petitioner, Sharon Douse (Petitioner), during her employment with the Agency and then by terminating her employment, based upon her disability, marital status, sex, color, race, age, and the national origin of her spouse, and by illegally retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Sunland Center in Mariana, Florida, is operated by the Agency as an intermediate-care facility for developmentally- disabled individuals. Connally Manor is a residential setting within Sunland Center for 16 developmentally-disabled individuals with significant behavioral and medical involvement. Petitioner began her employment with the Agency on July 15, 2011, until her dismissal on January 5, 2012. During her employment, she was classified as career-service employee, Human Services Worker II, assigned to provide direct care for residents in Connally Manor. As a career-service employee, Petitioner was required to serve a one-year probationary period, during which she was subject to termination at will. While employed with the Agency, Petitioner had a number of performance deficiencies and conflicts with her co-workers and supervisors. On July 22, 2011, Petitioner attended training for the treatment and care of residents. Shortly thereafter, however, Petitioner mishandled residents on at least two occasions. As a result, Joe Grimsley, a senior human services support supervisor for the Agency, suspended Petitioner from working independently with residents, and asked Petitioner to work closely with her peers to learn appropriate care procedures. On August 25, 2011, because of excessive absences and failure to perform duties in a timely manner, Petitioner received counseling from Mr. Grimsley and Agency behavior program supervisor Scott Hewett. Petitioner was counseled for excessive absences because, from July 18 through August 22, 2011, Petitioner took a total of 48 hours of leave time, which was greater than the Agency's policy of no more than 32 hours in a 90-day period. Although Petitioner discussed most of those absences with her supervisor prior to taking the time off, as a result of her absences, Petitioner missed some of her initial training, including professional crisis management training. During the August 25, 2011, counseling session, Mr. Grimsley and Mr. Hewett also discussed other issues of concern with Petitioner, including resident care, following chain of command, team work, proper parking, and data collection sheets. As a follow-up, on the same day as the August 25th counseling, Petitioner received some in-service training regarding proper log book documenting, proper use of active treatment sheet, and unauthorized and excessive absences. Mr. Grimsley permitted Petitioner to go back to her duties of working directly with residents after she received additional training on August 27, 2011. On September 8, 2011, Petitioner's supervisors once again found it necessary to counsel Petitioner regarding resident care, chain of command, teamwork, parking, and data collection, as well as to address two incidences of unsafe handling of residents, and Agency policy regarding food in the bedrooms, and class and work schedules. Because of Petitioner's continued performance deficiencies, on October 5, 2011, Mr. Grimsley wrote an interoffice memorandum to his supervisor, Agency residential services supervisor, Julie Jackson, recommending Petitioner's termination. The memorandum stated: Mrs. Jackson: I am writing to you in regard to Mrs. Sharon Douse HSW II Second Shift Connally Manor Unit 3. Mrs. Douse came to us July 15, 2011, since then she has had three employee documented conferences, due to poor work habits, resulting in corrective action, including retraining. These deficiencies include and are not limited to data collection, excessive absences, and unsafe handling of residents. This past week she was insubordinate to her immediate supervisor by refusing to answer the phone after being requested to do so twice, and being directed that it is part of her job. [Mr. Hewett] as well as my self [sic] has made every effort to help Mrs. Douse achieve her performance expectation; however these attempts have been met with resistance as Mrs. Douse openly refuses to take direction from her supervisors and also to seek the assistance of her peers, who have many years of experience working with the Connally Manor population. Mrs. Douse has not met probationary period. Her continual resistance to positive mentoring and her confrontational attitude and demeanor towards her supervisors and coworkers is creating an increasingly difficult work environment, not only on Connally Manor, but also on the other houses within the unit. It is apparent that Mrs. Douse lacks the willingness to improve her overall poor work performance. I am formally requesting Mrs. Douse to be terminated from her employment here in Unit 3. Mr. Grimsley's testimony at the final hearing was consistent with the above-quoted October 5, 2011, interoffice memorandum, and both his testimony and memorandum are credited. Upon receiving Mr. Grimsley's memorandum, Ms. Jackson submitted a memo dated October 26, 2011, to the Agency's program operations administrator, Elizabeth Mitchell, concurring with the request for Petitioner's termination. In turn, Ms. Mitchell agreed and forwarded her recommendation for termination to Sunland's superintendent, Bryan Vaughan. Mr. Vaughan approved the recommendation for termination, and, following implementation of internal termination proceedings, Petitioner was terminated on January 5, 2012, for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period. Petitioner made no complaints to Mr. Grimsley or anyone else in the Agency's management until after Mr. Grimsley's October 5, 2011, memorandum recommending Petitioner's termination. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination filed with the Commission on March 29, 2012, after her termination, charges that she was "discriminated against based on retaliation, disability, marital status, sex, color, race and age." The evidence adduced at the final hearing, however, failed to substantiate Petitioner's allegations. In particular, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination2/ alleges that Mr. Grimsley discriminated against her because of her age by "not providing [her] with the same training as offered the other employees -- [professional crisis management training] was offered to the younger employees who were hired at or around the same time [as Petitioner]." The evidence at the final hearing, however, showed that Petitioner was scheduled for, but missed professional crisis management training, because of her absences early in her employment. The evidence also showed that professional crisis management training was not necessary for the position for which Petitioner was hired. Nevertheless, the evidence also demonstrated that, if Petitioner had not been terminated, the Agency intended to provide her with that training. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination also asserts that Mr. Grimsley discriminated against her by "[n]ot allowing [her] to have . . . scheduled time off . . . [and taking away her] scheduled time off August 12th & 13th and [giving it to a] Caucasian female." The evidence did not substantiate this allegation. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner had extraordinary time off during her first two months of employment. Next, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination states that Mr. Grimsley did not follow up on her written concerns and verbal complaints to the "depart[ment] head" regarding the welfare of the disabled residents. Petitioner alleges that she was terminated as a result of her complaint that Mr. Grimsley "sat in the kitchen and baked cookies with the staff who were neglecting disabled residents." Petitioner, however, failed to present any evidence at the final hearing with regard to this allegation. Rather, the evidence showed that, while employed, Petitioner never reported any instances of abuse, neglect, or exploitation to the Florida Abuse Registry, as required by her training. And, there is no evidence that she reported any such concerns to any outside agency prior to her Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner otherwise presented no evidence suggesting that she was terminated in retaliation for engaging in any protected activity. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination further states that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability because Mr. Grimsley did not allow her to be properly monitored by her physician, and that when she would bring in her doctor's notes, Mr. Grimsley would refuse to put them in her personnel file. The only support for this claim were two medical reports on Petitioner, one prepared in April 2011, and one prepared in October 2011. According to Petitioner, she gave the reports to someone at the Agency's human resources office. She could not, however, identify the person to whom she gave the reports. Also, according to Petitioner, it was in November 2011, after she was recommended for termination, that she gave her medical reports to the Agency to be filed. Considering the circumstances, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's testimony regarding this allegation is not credible. In addition, the evidence did not show that Petitioner ever asked the Agency for an accommodation for her alleged disability. Rather, based upon the evidence, it is found that Petitioner never advised the Agency, and the Agency was unaware, that Petitioner had a disability. It is also found that Petitioner never asked the Agency for an accommodation for her alleged disability. Petitioner, in her Charge of Discrimination, further contends that part of the employee counseling session documented on employee-documented conference forms dated August 25, 2011, and all of the counseling session documented in a September 8, 2011, employee-documented conference form, were held without her, and that some of the concerns expressed on those documents were fabricated. There were two forms documenting discussions from the August 25th session that were submitted into evidence — - one was signed by Petitioner, the other was not. The employee-documented conference form from the September 8, 2011, session was signed by Petitioner's supervisors, but not Petitioner. Mr. Grimsley, who was present for all of the counseling discussions with Petitioner documented on the forms, testified that the documented discussions occurred, but that he just forgot to get Petitioner's signatures on all of the forms. During the final hearing, Petitioner acknowledged most of the documented discussions, including two incidents of mishandling residents and the resulting prohibition from working with residents imposed on her until she received additional training. Considering the evidence, it is found that all of the counseling discussions with Petitioner documented on the three forms actually took place, and that they accurately reflect those discussions and the fact that Petitioner was having job performance problems. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination also alleges that a fellow employee discriminated against her because of her age and race based on an incident where, according to Petitioner, a co-worker screamed and yelled at her because Petitioner had not answered the house telephone. At the hearing, Petitioner submitted into evidence affidavits regarding the incident from the co-worker and another worker who observed the incident. Neither of the affidavits supports Petitioner's contention that she was discriminated against. Rather, they both support the finding that Petitioner had trouble getting along with co-workers and accepting directions from Agency staff. Further, according to Petitioner, after she talked to Mr. Grimsley about the incident, he spoke to both Petitioner and the co-worker, and their conflict was resolved. The incident occurred after Mr. Grimsley had already recommended that Petitioner be terminated. Finally, Petitioner alleges in her Charge of Discrimination that Mr. Hewett discriminated against her based upon her marital status, race, and the national origin of her spouse. In support, Petitioner contends that Mr. Hewett "made rude comments about art work on my locker that Scott knew my husband had drawn[,]" asked, "[do] blacks like classical music?" and, upon seeing Petitioner's apron that was embroidered with a Jamaican flag, Mr. Hewett said, "You can't trust things from overseas," when he knew that her husband was Jamaican. Petitioner also stated that Mr. Hewett "bullied her" about answering the telephone. While Petitioner testified that she wrote to Agency management regarding these comments and the alleged bullying by Mr. Hewett, she did not retain a copy. The Agency claims that Petitioner never complained about these alleged comments or Mr. Hewett's alleged bullying while she was an employee. Considering the evidence presented in this case, and Petitioner's demeanor during her testimony, it is found that Petitioner did not raise these allegations against Mr. Hewett until after her termination from the Agency. It is further found that if Mr. Hewett made the alleged comments, as described by Petitioner during her testimony, Mr. Hewett's comments were isolated and not pervasive. Further, Petitioner's testimonial description of Mr. Hewett's comments did not indicate that his comments were overtly intimidating, insulting, or made with ridicule, and the evidence was insufficient to show, or reasonably suggest, that Mr. Hewett's alleged comments made Petitioner's work environment at the Agency hostile or intolerable. In sum, Petitioner failed to show that the Agency discriminated against Petitioner by treating her differently, creating a hostile work environment, or terminating her because of her disability, marital status, sex, color, race, age, or her spouse's national origin. Petitioner also failed to show that the Agency retaliated against her because of any complaint that she raised or based upon Petitioner's engagement in any other protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a black female who was employed by the Respondent on or about March 21, 1989. Petitioner's job with the Respondent was to assemble and wire electrical devices in a designated configuration and to a specified standard. Petitioner was the only black employee stationed in her job location, but the company employes other blacks in other areas of production. Petitioner's job was an entry level position which required minimum skills but aptitude for the work and attention to detail were necessary. During her employment with the Respondent, Petitioner was supervised by Charlie Goodman. Mr. Goodman was known to be a demanding and sometimes brusk individual. Petitioner perceived the corrections Mr. Goodman required to be personally directed toward her. Others besides Mr. Goodman observed Petitioner's work and deemed it inadequate to the requirements of the job. Both Mr. Gardner and Ms. Giles observed that Petitioner made errors or took too long to perform routine tasks. Mr. Gardner confronted Petitioner on two occasions regarding her work performance. In both cases, Petitioner responded by claiming Mr. Goodman was "nit picking" her work and was demeaning to her personally. Finally, on May 5, 1989, when Petitioner's work performance did not improve, Mr. Gardner advised Petitioner that she was terminated. Respondent is an employer within the definition of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Respondent did not terminate Petitioner on account of her race but because her work performance fell below company standards. Subsequent to Petitioner's termination, Respondent's production demand decreased resulting in layoffs. Those positions, including Petitioner's, have not been filled.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination against this Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3619 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 are accepted. All other paragraphs are rejected as irrelevant, argument, or unsupported by the weight of the credible evidence presented in this case. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Sheila D. Crawford 3650 Washington Street Sanford, Florida 32771 Stuart I. Saltman ABB Power T & D Company, Inc. 630 Sentry Park Blue Bell, PA 19422
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.
Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.
