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DONNA ANN JENNINGS vs MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY, 90-002807RX (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 08, 1990 Number: 90-002807RX Latest Update: Jun. 03, 1992
Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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MOHAMED DALHY vs GRAND CYPRESS RESORT, 05-002399 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 05, 2005 Number: 05-002399 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2005

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his religion and national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).

Findings Of Fact No findings are made concerning the merits of the allegations of discrimination. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit any evidence to support any findings of fact. Petitioner received adequate notice of the formal hearing. The ALJ issued a Notice of Hearing on July 19, 2005, notifying the parties of the time and place of the hearing conducted on August 12, 2005. DOAH mailed the Notice of Hearing, by United States Postal Service (mailed), to Petitioner at the address of record listed in the DOAH file as 10914 Mystic Circle, Apartment 204, Orlando, Florida 32836 (the address of record). The Notice of Hearing was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the Notice of Hearing as undeliverable. On July 5 and 19, 2005, DOAH mailed an Initial Order and Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions (Pre-hearing Order) to Petitioner. The U.S. Postal Service did not return either order as undeliverable. The address of record in the DOAH filed is the same address that Petitioner listed in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief filed with the Commission. The Commission addressed the "Notice of Determination: No Cause" to the same address as the address of record in the DOAH file. Petitioner was employed by Respondent on the date of the hearing. A representative of the personnel department for Respondent testified at the hearing (the witness). Petitioner had requested and been granted annual leave for the day of the hearing and the day before the hearing. On the date of hearing, Petitioner resided at the address of record. At the request of the ALJ, the witness telephoned Petitioner from the hearing room at the telephone number listed in Respondent's personnel file. The witness is the Director of Personnel for Respondent, knows Petitioner personally, and has a longstanding employment relationship with Petitioner. The witness spoke directly to Petitioner. English is not the native language for Petitioner, but the witness had no difficulty communicating with Petitioner. The witness informed Petitioner that the ALJ would recess the hearing and wait for Petitioner to appear at the hearing. Petitioner refused to avail himself of the opportunity to appear at the hearing. Petitioner claimed he was not prepared for the hearing and had not had adequate time to prepare for the hearing. Petitioner had adequate time to prepare for the hearing. The DOAH file shows the Commission referred this matter to DOAH by cover letter dated June 30, 2005. DOAH received the referral on July 5, 2005, and issued an Initial Order on the same date. On July 19, 2005, DOAH mailed the Pre- hearing Order and Notice of Hearing to Petitioner. When Petitioner received the Initial Order shortly after July 5, 2005, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of the need to begin preparing for the formal hearing. The Initial Order requires the parties, inter alia, to estimate how long the formal hearing will take for both parties to present their evidence. Petitioner knew, or should have known, of his right to discovery and the need to complete discovery no later than five days before the date of the hearing. The Summary of Procedures attached to the Initial Order provides, in relevant part: Discovery may be undertaken in the manner provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and should be initiated immediately if desired. Necessary subpoenas and Orders may be obtained through the assigned Judge. Discovery must be completed 5 days before the date of the final hearing unless an extension of time for good cause is granted. Petitioner did not respond to the Initial Order. Respondent filed a unilateral response to the Initial Order with DOAH on July 12, 2005. On the same date, Respondent served Petitioner with a copy of the unilateral response. When Petitioner received the Prehearing Order shortly after July 19, 2005, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of the need to prepare for the formal hearing. The Pre-hearing Order, dated July 19, 2005, provides, in relevant part: No later than 15 days prior to the final hearing Petitioner and Respondent shall provide each other with a list of the names and addresses of those persons which that party intends to call as witnesses during the final hearing in this cause and shall provide to each other copies of the documents which that party intends to offer as exhibits during the final hearing. Failure to do so may result in the exclusion at the final hearing of witnesses or exhibits not previously disclosed. . . . No later than 12 days prior to the final hearing in this cause, the parties shall confer with each other to determine whether this cause can be amicably resolved. Petitioner declined to participate in the discovery described in the Pre-hearing Order. Respondent unilaterally filed its witness list with DOAH on August 1, 2005. On the same date, Respondent served Petitioner with a copy of the witness list. On August 10, 2005, at 2:45 p.m., Petitioner filed with DOAH, by facsimile, a hand-written request for continuance (motion for continuance). The motion for continuance is written in English and signed by Petitioner; as were the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. The motion requests a continuance, "[S]o I can get a lawyer, witnesses, and prepare myself for hearing." The motion for hearing does not include a certificate of service or other indication that Petitioner served Respondent with a copy of the motion for continuance. On its face, the motion is an ex-parte communication. On August 10, 2005, an administrative secretary of DOAH telephoned counsel for Respondent to determine whether counsel had received a copy of the motion and whether Respondent objected to the motion for continuance. Counsel had not received the motion. Upon hearing the motion read to counsel, counsel objected to the motion. At the instruction of the ALJ, the administrative secretary telephoned Petitioner and spoke to a person who identified himself as the son of Petitioner. The administrative secretary advised him that the ALJ had denied the motion for continuance and that Petitioner should attend the formal hearing on August 12, 2005. On August 10, 2005, the ALJ also issued a written Order Denying Continuance that memorialized the ore tenus denial of the motion. DOAH mailed the written order to Petitioner on the same date to the address of record. The Order was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed. Insufficient time to prepare for the formal hearing arguably is good cause for a continuance. However, Petitioner knew, or should have known, that a motion for continuance for good cause must be filed no later than five days before the formal hearing. The Initial Order received by Petitioner shortly after July 5, 2005, provides, in relevant part: 4. Rule 28-106.210, Florida Administrative Code, provides that requests for continuances must be made at least 5 days prior to the date of the hearing, except in cases of extreme emergency, and will be granted only by Order of the Judge for good cause shown. The applicable rule arguably required Petitioner to file the motion for continuance based on good cause no later than August 8, 2005, because August 7, 2005, was a Sunday.1 However, Petitioner did not file the motion for continuance until August 10, 2005. The applicable rule authorized the ALJ to grant a motion for continuance filed less than five days before the formal hearing, only on grounds that satisfy the test of extreme emergency. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner had insufficient time to prepare for the formal hearing, that ground is not an extreme emergency. Petitioner knew, or should have known, long before August 10, 2005, that he would be unable to prepare for the formal hearing in the 24 days between July 19 and August 12, 2005. Respondent had adequate time to prepare for the formal hearing. Respondent produced seven witnesses at the formal hearing, including four current employees and three former employees. Respondent also arranged for the attendance of a certified interpreter at the hearing. Respondent prepared 24 exhibits for admission into evidence. The Commission arranged for a court reporter to record the hearing. The ALJ traveled from Tallahassee to Orlando after instructing Petitioner, through the ALJ's administrative secretary, to attend the formal hearing. If the ALJ were to have exercised discretion by granting a continuance requested less than five days before the hearing in the absence of an extreme emergency, such an exercise of discretion would have been inconsistent with a valid existing rule. A reviewing court would have been statutorily required to remand the case to DOAH for further proceedings consistent with the rule. § 120.68(7)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2005).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2005.

Florida Laws (1) 760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.210
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY AND MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING vs GABRIEL LEONARDO TITO, M.F.T.I., 18-003636PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 16, 2018 Number: 18-003636PL Latest Update: Jun. 10, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent’s request for a substantial interests hearing under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ should be dismissed as untimely.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the State agency charged with regulating the practice of marriage and family therapy interns pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 491, Florida Statutes. Mr. Tito is a licensed registered marriage and family therapist intern in the state of Florida, having been issued license number IMT 1070, and practices in Pompano Beach, Florida. He is subject to regulation by the Department and the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling. On or about September 27, 2017, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Tito’s license to practice as a registered marriage and family therapist intern. On October 23, 2017, Mr. Tito received the Administrative Complaint sent by the Department, which included a cover letter, a settlement agreement, and an Election of Rights form. Mr. Tito signed and mailed a certified mail receipt acknowledging his receipt of the Administrative Complaint and attachments, which the Department received on November 6, 2017. Both the cover letter and the Administrative Complaint that Mr. Tito received stated that he must return the Election of Rights form to the Department within 21 days of his receipt of the Administrative Complaint if he chose to request a formal hearing. The cover letter stated, in relevant part: You must sign the Election of Rights form, and return the completed form to my office within twenty-one (21) days of the date you received it. Failure to return this form within twenty-one (21) days may result in the entry of a default judgment against you without hearing your side of the case. In a portion denominated “Notice of Rights,” the Administrative Complaint included the following language in bold print: A request or petition for an administrative hearing must be in writing and must be received by the Department within 21 days from the day Respondent received the Administrative Complaint, pursuant to Rule 28-106.111(2), Florida Administrative Code. If Respondent fails to request a hearing within 21 days of receipt of this Administrative Complaint, Respondent waives the right to request a hearing on the facts alleged in this Administrative Complaint pursuant to Rule 28- 106.111(4), Florida Administrative Code. The Election of Rights form that Mr. Tito received stated in relevant part: In the event that you fail to make an election in this matter within twenty-one (21) days from receipt of the Administrative Complaint, your failure to do so may be considered a waiver of your right to elect a hearing in this matter, pursuant to Rule 28-106.111(4), Florida Administrative Code, and the Board may proceed to hear your case. At the bottom of the Election of Rights form was a notation that the form could be mailed or faxed and provided addresses and telephone numbers. Mr. Tito wrote a letter to the Department requesting a formal hearing and mailed that to the Department along with an executed Election of Rights form. The Department received Mr. Tito’s letter and Election of Rights form on November 20, 2017, 28 days after Mr. Tito received a copy of the Administrative Complaint. The cover letter, copy of the Administrative Complaint with Notice of Rights, and Election of Rights form together gave Mr. Tito sufficient written notice of intended agency action that affected his substantial interests. These documents informed him of his right to an administrative hearing, indicated the procedures he must follow to obtain the hearing, and stated the time limits that applied.

Recommendation In view of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s request for a substantial interests hearing under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, should be dismissed as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2018.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.5720.43
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. DONNA J. DOWNING, D/B/A DOWNING HOUSE NO. 1560, 88-005032 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005032 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 1989

The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Respondent's child care facility license should be disciplined for alleged violation of chapter 402, and if so the appropriate penalties. Neither party timely submitted Proposed Recommended Orders.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Donna J. Downing owns and operates a child care facility known as the Downing House, located at 8508 Lorento Street, Panama City, Florida. The child care facility is also her family's residence. She lives with her husband, son, and daughter who help operate the facility and who have been successfully screened by HRS. Ms. Downing was licensed in 1985 and holds a currently valid license. Her license is endorsed to allow her to operate her facility during nighttime hours. In April 1988, HRS became concerned that the operation of the Downing House into the night was proving too much for the husband and wife team, since HRS regulations require an adult to be present and awake during the night. HRS, therefore, inquired of the Downings concerning their proposed arrangements to ensure the presence of an awake adult. In order to continue to operate into the night, Respondent assured HRS that either she or her husband would be awake during the night while children were present on the premises. However, the evidence established that Respondent and her husband did not always live up to Respondent's representation to HRS. A standard mode of operation by Respondent was for both she and her husband to retire in the evening, leaving the front door unlocked so that the children's parents could pick up their children without disturbing the Downings. However, occasionally one of the Downings would stay up with the children. On May 5, 1988 a two year old male child was left at the Downing House by his mother for nighttime caretaking. At approximately 11:00 - 11:15 pm., Mr. and Ms. Downing had gone to bed. There were three children present at the Downing House when the Downings retired, including the two year old male child. The three children were asleep when Ms. Downing left them in the living room. No other adults were present. Ms. Downing had made arrangements for her adult son to look after the children when he got home from work. He was expected home at about 11:30 p.m. The son arrived home at approximately 11:40 p.m. When he arrived there were two children present. No method had been established by Respondent to advise her son of the number of children who should be present when he arrived home. He therefore did not realize that one child was missing. The son laid down on the couch in the living room and went to sleep. Sometime between the Downings going to bed and the arrival of their son, the two year old male child awakened, opened the front door and left the house. The child then unlatched the front yard gate and headed down Lorento Street towards its intersection with Laurie Lane. He then proceeded down Laurie Lane. At approximately 11:15 p.m., Denise Albert was driving down Laurie Lane. About two tenths of a mile from the Downing House, at 2414 Laurie Lane, Ms. Albert saw the missing child walking down the unlit and unpaved road. He was barefoot and in his pajamas. Ms. Albert stopped and questioned the child for 15 or 20 minutes. She could not obtain any information. She therefore called the Sheriff's office. Officer Troy Johns was dispatched at 11:30 p.m. The officer picked the child up from Ms. Albert and drove him around the neighborhood, including Lorento Avenue. The child could not or would not identify where he had come from and would not give his name. The child was more interested in the officer's gun and vehicle than in his surroundings. The officer took the child to the Sheriff's station and called HRS. Debra Young an HRS protective services investigator took the call and picked the child up from the Sheriff's office. She also could not establish the child's identity or address. She placed the child in a foster home. At 4:11 a.m. the Sheriff's office received a phone call in reference to a missing male child from the Downing House. The missing child was the child the Sheriff's office had turned over to Ms. Young. The Sheriff's office contacted Ms. Young. Mother and child were reunited the next morning. The call to the Sheriff's office from the Downing House had been prompted when the child could not be found after a search. The search ensued when, at approximately 3:00 a.m., the mother arrived to pick up her son. She discovered his absence and woke Respondent's son who in turn woke Mr. and Ms. Downing. One child remained. A second child had been picked up at approximately 2:30 a.m. by that child's mother. The son did not awaken and was not aware that the second child had been taken from the room in which he was asleep. The Downings searched the neighborhood for the missing child, including checking the Lagoon which is within a few blocks of the Downing House. The call to the Sheriff's office located the child. From 1985 until May 1988, Respondent was cited for the following violations of chapter 402, F.S. and the rules related thereto: September 3, 1985 Two gates in the play yard were left unlocked making it possible for children to have access to the road, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, in that this was an obvious hazard. Medicine was left on the kitchen cabinet within the children's reach, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(1) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. April 22, 1986 Cleaners were on the washer and dryer within the children's reach and Lysol and Windex were on the kitchen cabinet with food within the children's reach, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(1)(b) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. No fire drills, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(8)(a), Florida Administrative Code. October 1, 1987 Clorox, detergent, charcoal, briquettes, pliers, plastic bags, cigarette and cough drops were out at several locations throughout the facility and within the children's reach, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(1)(b) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. An iron was left with the cord hanging over the table within the children's reach making it possible for the iron to be reached and pulled down on top of a child, in violation of Rule 10M- 12.003(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code. March 23, 1988 A medicine bottle containing medicine and tanning accelerator within the children's reach were located inside the facility and rose dust, Progreen, Spectracide ant killer and touch up paint were at several locations on the porch at the main entrance within the children's reach, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(1)(b) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. Suntan lotion and tanning accelerator and three sand filled milk cartons, all located on the patio at the back of the house leading to the play yard and all within the children's reach, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003 (1)(b) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. The gate to the play yard was unlocked allowing children access outside the play area, in violation of Rule 10M- 12.003(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. The store room containing a lawn mower and other tools and hazardous materials was left unlocked, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(4)(b) , Florida Administrative Code in that it was an obvious hazard, with the children having access to said store room. A throw rug was on the steps leading to the patio and was not secure making an obvious hazard, in violation of Rule 10M-12.003(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. To Respondent's credit, all of the above violations were corrected within the time frames established by HRS. No fines were ever levied on the Respondent for the above violations. Also, to Respondents credit, the evidence disclosed that Respondent is generally a good caretaker of children.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services revoke the nighttime operation endorsement on Respondent's license and impose an administrative fine of $1000. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of March 1989, in Tallahassee, Lean County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Pearce, Esquire 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 200-A Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Donna J. Downing 8508 Lorento Street Panama City, Florida 32407 R. S. Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (7) 120.57402.301402.305402.3055402.308402.310402.319
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YOLANDA CHEESMON vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 99-003501 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Blountstown, Florida Aug. 18, 1999 Number: 99-003501 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2000

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a license to operate a family day care home should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This licensure proceeding involves a request by Petitioner, Yolanda Cheesmon, for a license to operate a family day care home at 1012 Yates Avenue, Blountstown, Florida. On July 2, 1999, Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), denied the application on the grounds that Petitioner was "previously denied an application to operate a Licensed Day Care Home"; that she had begun "operating at a Day Care Home at 920 Thomas Avenue without being properly registered"; that she had operated for "an unknown period of time" without a telephone, "which is a requirement"; and that she had "requested to become a licensed home and provided [the Department] with false information and a forged letter." The denial of the application prompted Petitioner to request a hearing. The Department regulates three types of day care facilities. In descending order of regulatory oversight, they are a licensed family day care facility, a licensed family day care home, and a registered family day care center. While the first two categories of facilities require annual on-site Department inspections, background screening for all personnel, training, and more extensive paperwork, a registered family day care center involves no Department inspections and only requires that the operator undergo background screening, complete a training course, and provide to the Department certain paperwork, including shot records of the children, in order to secure the registration. On August 19, 1998, Petitioner filed the necessary paperwork to operate a registered family day care center at 1012 Yates Avenue, Blountstown, Florida. She received a registration the same month. In its post-hearing submission, the Department represents that the registration was subsequently "terminated." As noted above, a registered home is the least restrictive type of day care facility, and it only required that Petitioner file an application with the Department, undergo background screening, and provide the Department with certain paperwork. Petitioner was, however, required to conform with certain Department "standards," one of which required that she have a working telephone on the premises of the facility, so that Department personnel could always contact her, if necessary. Whether this requirement is based upon a rule or an informal regulation was not disclosed. In September 1998, a Department licensing counselor, Michelle Barsanti (Barsanti), attempted to contact Petitioner by telephone and learned that the telephone had been disconnected, which violated the unidentified Department requirement. Barsanti then sent a registered letter to Petitioner on October 7, 1998, advising that Petitioner must provide a telephone number. By letter dated October 12, 1998, Petitioner advised Barsanti that after she had received her registration from the Department, she had moved the day care center to 920 Thomas Avenue, Blountstown, Florida, and that she had a new telephone number. This move was made because Petitioner says the Yates property "wasn't properly fixed up and all to pass for the inspection." However, an operator must re-register each time the facility is moved; by operating at the new location without a valid registration, Petitioner contravened a statute which prohibits any person from operating a registered family day care center without a registration. It is fair to infer from the evidence that Petitioner was unaware of this requirement and that the violation was unintentional. On October 23, 1998, Barsanti met with Petitioner to assist her in obtaining a registration for the new location. During that meeting, Barsanti learned that Petitioner now desired to operate a licensed, as opposed to a registered, family day care home at her new address, and that Petitioner leased the property from Judy A. Davis (Davis), an absentee landlord who resided in Riviera Beach, Florida. At some point during this process, Petitioner was also advised that she must close her day care center at 920 Thomas Avenue until she obtained the appropriate license. Rule 65C-20.009(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that if the operator leases the property on which the facility will be located, "[w]ritten approval from the owner of the property must be secured prior to issuance of the license." Accordingly, Petitioner was required to comply with this requirement since she intended to lease the Davis property. In response to the foregoing requirement, Petitioner provided Barsanti with a letter dated October 7, 1998, purportedly written by Davis, and which stated that Davis "[gave] Yolanda Cheesmon permission to operate a Daycare at my appointed residence." Shortly thereafter, Barsanti received an anonymous letter which caused her to question the authenticity of the Davis letter. After Barsanti contacted Petitioner and requested the address and telephone number of Petitioner's landlord, on October 29, 1998, Petitioner sent Barsanti a letter stating in part as follows: I regret to have to tell you that I lied about the letter. I'm very sorry but I was desperate to go ahead without any delay to be licensed so that I can get the insurance policy that my landlord needs. . . . Please forgive me and I hope this doesn't affect my case in any way. And again, I'm very sorry that I thought I had to lie to you. The foregoing admission confirms the Department's allegation that Petitioner provided the Department "with false information and a forged letter," as charged in the letter of denial. Notwithstanding the foregoing admission, Petitioner pursued her application for a license at the Davis property. The application was preliminarily denied on the ground that Petitioner had provided the Department with a forged document. Petitioner requested a formal hearing, and the matter was assigned Case No. 98-5593. After a formal hearing was conducted on April 22, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Steven F. Dean issued a Recommended Order on June 14, 1999, in which he recommended that Petitioner's application be denied, not on the ground that she had made a false statement as alleged by the Department, but rather because the application was moot by virtue of "the passage of time" since Petitioner had by then moved back to her former residence at 1012 Yates Avenue and desired to operate her facility from that location. In addition, at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Dean advised Petitioner to file a new application for licensure using her most current address. Based on that advice, Petitioner filed the instant application. As noted in Finding of Fact 1, the Department has preliminarily denied the second application on numerous grounds. In a Final Order Reversing Recommended Order and Denying Application for Licensure filed on December 27, 1999, the Department rejected the conclusion that the application was moot and instead denied the application on the ground that Petitioner had failed to "meet all of the Department's requirements for licensure." Therefore, Petitioner has had a prior application denied, as alleged in the Department's letter denying her application. In summary, the foregoing facts establish the Department's contentions that Petitioner operated for a short period of time as a family day care home without an appropriate registration; that she operated without a telephone on the registered premises; that she gave false information to the Department when attempting to secure a license; and that she has had a prior application for licensure denied. At the hearing, Petitioner again apologized for filing a forged document; stated it was based on "bad judgment"; argued that the forged document alone is not a sufficient basis to disqualify her from licensure;, and established that she sincerely desires to engage in the day care business. Petitioner has requested that if the license is denied, that she be allowed to retain her registration previously issued in August 1998.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license to operate a family day care center at 1012 Yates Avenue, Blountstown, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Yolanda Cheesmon 1012A Yates Avenue Blountstown, Florida 32424 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, No. 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57402.305402.310402.312402.318402.319 Florida Administrative Code (1) 65C-20.009
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs BRANDI SPIERS, 17-004170 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Jul. 21, 2017 Number: 17-004170 Latest Update: Feb. 02, 2018

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent made false reports to the Florida Abuse Hotline in violation of section 39.206, Florida Statutes1/; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the State agency responsible for managing the Florida abuse hotline and investigating allegations of abuse, abandonment, and neglect of children. Respondent is the biological mother of E.W., a minor child. Respondent called the Florida abuse hotline on August 14, 2014, and reported that the father of E.W., Derwin Worley, was physically abusing E.W. and exposing her to drunken behaviors. In response to the call, the Department generated Intake Report number 2014-213532-01 (First Case), which contains the following allegation narrative: The father spanks [E.W.] and leaves bruises. The father closes and locks the door when he spanks [E.W.]. The father may be using his hand or whatever he can pick up when he spanks [E.W.]. Two days ago, four bruises were observed on [E.W.’s] butt that were caused by the father. The bruises were red. [E.W.] also has bruises on her legs that were explained to have been caused by tubing down the river. It is not believed that the injuries match the explanation. The bruises are small and greenish. [E.W.] also has a bruise under her eye that goes from one side to the other. It was explained that the bruise was from a mosquito bite. The explanation does not match the injuries. The father drank Saturday or Sunday night and law enforcement had to be called to the home. When [E.W.] pees in her diaper, the father lets her sit around in the diaper. It is unknown how long she had been in the diaper. The father curses around [E.W.]. [E.W.] curses because the father curses around her. The mother was allowing the father to babysit more and more, because she doesn’t trust babysitters. The father will not give [E.W.] back to the mother. He has kept [E.W.] from her for one night. The mother has full custody. The mother was trying to move in with he[r] grandmother. The father does not work. He gets disability income. The mother does not believe in spanking a child of [E.W.’s] age. Investigation of the First Case was assigned to Department Child Protective Investigator Sheila Ferguson. During her investigation, Investigator Ferguson found that there had been ongoing custody disputes over E.W. between Respondent and Mr. Worley, and that there were apparently times that Respondent needed assistance in getting E.W. back from Mr. Worley. According to Investigator Ferguson, custody was Respondent’s primary motivation for making the allegations against Mr. Worley. Investigator Ferguson testified that, during her investigation in August of 2014, although Respondent claimed that she had photos of E.W.’s bruises, including injuries to E.W.’s eye and buttocks, Respondent delayed for over two months in providing any photographs, and when she did, Respondent only provided photos of E.W.’s legs. According to Investigator Ferguson, the photos only showed bruises on E.W.’s legs and shins, which are common childhood injuries and not indicative of abuse. At the time of the August 2014 allegations, Respondent and E.W. were living in the home of Mr. Worley and Loretta Worley, his wife, who was E.W.’s stepmother. Investigator Ferguson said that when she questioned Respondent about the delay in showing the photos, Respondent explained that she delayed because she was afraid that the Worleys would put her out of their home. Investigator Ferguson felt that Respondent’s explanation of delay did not make any sense. Inspector Ferguson reported that she examined the child for marks and bruises and fully investigated the home and care given to E.W. by the Worleys and found no reason to question the child’s safety. According to Inspector Ferguson, she observed a very loving and appropriate relationship between Mr. Worley and E.W. Because of purported lack of evidence to support Respondent’s allegations, and a belief that Respondent did not produce clear facts or timelines and was motivated by a custody dispute, Inspector Ferguson felt that the First Case was a false report. Inspector Ferguson’s supervisor, Holly Cummings, agreed. However, because the First Case was the first report called in by Respondent, Inspector Ferguson only warned Respondent against making false reports and closed the case as “No Indicators.” According to the Department’s internal operating procedures manual, “no indicators” means there was no evidence to support the allegations.2/ On August 27, 2015, Respondent was involved in another call made to the hotline regarding Mr. Worley and E.W. The second report was assigned Intake Report number 2015-229587-01 (Second Case). The reporter who made the call in the Second Case identified herself as Respondent’s friend and asked that the case not to be assigned to Inspector Ferguson. Respondent was in the background during the call at the location where the call originated. The allegation narrative in the intake report from the Second Case states: The father is an alcoholic. The father drinks alcohol to the point of intoxication every day. When the father drinks, he becomes aggressive and belligerent. Law enforcement has been called out to the home several times. When the father drinks he slurs his words and can barely talk on the phone. There are pictures of finger prints on the legs of [E.W.]. The pictures also depict a hand print to the inside thigh of [E.W.]. The pictures were taken about a month ago. It is unknown how the injuries were sustained. There are pictures of [E.W.] being held by her uncle. The uncle is a registered sex offender. There are no indications that the uncle has ever been left alone with [E.W.] or has been sexually abused by him. The mother and father do not get along. The mother temporarily signed over custody to the father but now the father refuses to allow the mother to have custody of [E.W.]. The mother is taking the father to court on 09-30-2015. The Second Case was also investigated by Inspector Ferguson, who once again found that the evidence did not support the allegations. In addition, the Second Case was assigned to the Child Protection Team, a subcontractor of the Gulf Coast Children’s Advocacy Center affiliated with the Florida Department of Health’s Children’s Medical Centers. The Child Protection Team is a separate entity from the Department and its employees are independent from Department personnel. Inspector Ferguson again suspected false reporting because custody was still at issue and Inspector Ferguson did not believe that Respondent produced evidence to support the allegations. However, as in the First Case, instead of concluding that the report was false, the Second Case was also closed with a conclusion of “No Indicators.” On January 19, 2017, Respondent made another call to the Florida abuse hotline and reported that Mr. Worley had sexually abused E.W. The intake report from that call was assigned Intake Report Number 2017-018546-01 (Third Case). The allegation narrative in the Intake Report from the Third Case states: The father has been touching [E.W.’s] vagina and buttocks when she gets up in the morning and while she is asleep. When [E.W.] takes a bath she cries. [E.W.] has been playing with herself. It was reported that [E.W.] learned this behavior from her father. [E.W.] does not feel safe in the father’s home. Three weeks ago, [E.W.] fell and hit a bed or dresser after jumping up and down on a mattress. She sustained a bruise on her head. The bruise looks like a handprint. She was taken to an emergency room. She had bruises on her body in the past. The father has back and heart problems. An additional, related call came into the hotline on February 12, 2017, and was assigned Intake Report number 2017- 044728-01 (Fourth Case). The allegation narrative from the Fourth Case’s Intake Report states: The father has been sexually abusing [E.W.]. The father touches her private area while she sleeps. [E.W.] has been scratches [sic] her private area a lot lately, it is believed this is from the father sexually abusing her. [E.W.]’s private area are [sic] red. The mother is aware the father sexually abusing [E.W.] and is allowing her to go back to the father’s house today, 02/12/2017. The Fourth Case was based on the same allegations as the Third Case, but was reported by a Jackson County Sheriff’s Office deputy after the Sheriff’s office had received notice of Respondent’s allegations of sexual abuse against Mr. Worley. Law enforcement officials are mandatory reporters.3/ The Fourth Case was eventually closed because the Third Case, based on the same allegations, was already opened. Investigation of the Third Case was assigned to Department Child Protective Investigator Daniel Henry. Given the nature of the allegations, Investigator Henry responded “immediately,” which, according to the Department’s protocol, requires investigation within four hours. Investigator Henry arrived at Mr. Worley’s home to investigate the allegations within four hours of the call, and, based upon his meeting with Mr. Worley and E.W., Investigator Henry concluded that E.W. was not in danger. According to Investigator Henry, interactions between E.W. and her father were very “comfortable and free” and the child did not seem afraid of her father in the least. Allegations of sexual abuse, especially when made against a parent, are considered severe in nature and taken very seriously by the Department. Because of this, the Department once again referred E.W. to the Child Protection Team for a “forensic interview.” Angela Griffin with the Child Protection Team conducted the forensic interview of E.W. According to Ms. Griffin, a forensic interview is “a legally-sound interview, non-leading.” From the interview, Ms. Griffin concluded that E.W. had not been abused by Mr. Worley. Ms. Griffin testified that she found E.W. to be very forthcoming and truthful with no hesitation in her statements. She recalled asking E.W. about anyone touching her inappropriately and no disclosures were made. Ms. Griffin reported that she saw no evidence of sexual abuse of E.W. According to Ms. Griffin, after observing E.W. with Mr. Worley, she had no concerns. She reported that E.W. and Mr. Worley appeared to be bonded with a loving and appropriate father-daughter relationship. Ms. Griffin’s interview with E.W. was recorded and offered into evidence at the hearing. Although the recording was delivered to the undersigned at the hearing, ruling on the evidentiary value of that recording was reserved. After the hearing, the undersigned reviewed the recorded interview. Based upon that review, and considering the context and manner in which the recording was offered into evidence, it is found that the recording is non-corroborative hearsay4/ that does not support a finding that Respondent made false accusations or a false report against Mr. Worley.5/ E.W.’s kindergarten teacher, Amy Glass, who has had daily contact with E.W. in her kindergarten class, is of the opinion that E.W. is a well-cared for child and is not concerned that E.W. has been abused. She described E.W.’s father and stepmother as loving and appropriate caregivers. Ms. Glass believes that E.W. is the type of child that would tell her if she was being abused. According to Ms. Glass, E.W. has never told her that she has been abused by her father or stepmother. While Ms. Glass further testified about statements made by E.W. concerning Respondent, those statements, and any other statements attributed to E.W., are hearsay and were not considered. E.W.’s stepmother, Loretta Worley, also testified. Ms. Worley’s testimony confirmed that there have been ongoing disputes between Respondent and Mr. Worley regarding custody of E.W. Ms. Worley testified that she and Mr. Worley provide a loving home for E.W., where E.W. is well cared for. She said that neither she nor Mr. Worley spank E.W. Ms. Worley also testified that Respondent’s accusations against Mr. Worley were false and motivated by Respondent’s desire to gain custody of E.W. Ms. Worley further testified that Respondent has been ordered to pay child support to Mr. Worley for E.W., and that Respondent is over $4,000 behind in those payments. Respondent confirmed that she is behind on child support payments. On the other hand, Ms. Worley’s testimony provided support for Respondent’s allegations regarding Mr. Worley’s drinking. Ms. Worley confirmed that law enforcement has been called to their home on a number of occasions, both before and after 2014. Ms. Worley testified that law enforcement had been called a couple of times while Respondent was living with them for six to eight months in 2014, when Mr. Worley would get angry with Respondent while he and Respondent were bickering back and forth. Ms. Worley also testified that law enforcement had been called “three or four times, maybe” since 2014, because of Mr. Worley’s drunkenness. According to Ms. Worley: Yeah. I mean, I’m not for sure how many - - but I know it ain’t been like she’s claiming; that they’re out there every single day. Her daddy does not drink every single day. Ms. Worley’s testimony regarding Mr. Worley’s drunkenness is credited and inconsistent to departmental investigative findings of “no indicators” in the first two cases. Ms. Worley also offered testimony about things that E.W. allegedly told her that Respondent had said. That evidence, however, was not considered because it is hearsay, is not corroborative of other non-hearsay evidence, and is not otherwise reliable. Notably, while it is found that the video recording of Ms. Griffin’s interview of E.W. offered by the Department is non-corroborative hearsay as to the Department’s case, the video provides statements from E.W. that are contrary to Ms. Worley’s assertion that Mr. Worley does not spank E.W. When asked whether she gets along with everybody in the house, E.W. stated during the recorded interview, “Daddy get me in trouble.” When asked what happens when she gets in trouble, E.W. replied, “He pop my butt.” When asked what her daddy pops her butt with, E.W. responded, “With his hand.” When asked does something happen to her butt when he pops her with his hand, E.W. stated, “When I be bad, he pops me.” When further asked whether something happens to her butt when he pops her, E.W. shook her head from side to side, and Ms. Griffin stated, “No?” in confirmation of E.W.’s head gesture. When asked if something else happens when he pops her, E.W. changed the subject. Aside from being hearsay that should not be considered because it does not corroborate any competent evidence, even if the video of E.W.’s “forensic interview” is taken into account, it does not support a finding that Respondent’s reports were false, and does not disprove Respondent’s allegation that Mr. Worley was sexually abusing E.W. Contrary to the Department’s findings of “no indicators,” the evidence adduced at the hearing provided support for Respondent’s allegations regarding Mr. Worley’s drinking behavior, as well as for alleged bruises and E.W’s contact with a sex offender while in Mr. Worley’s custody. In addition, although the Department made an issue of the timing of Respondent’s presentation of photographic evidence in support of her allegations, Respondent provided photographs of bruises to E.W.’s legs and a photograph of Mr. Worley’s brother, a convicted sex offender, holding E.W. These photos were presented by Respondent to the Department prior to the hearing, as well as at the hearing. In fact, during the time period of one of Inspector Ferguson’s investigations, Respondent went to the Department’s local office and attempted to present the photographs, but Department personnel involved in the investigation were too busy to see her. Respondent also presented a compact disk that purportedly has a recording of E.W. making statements about sexual abuse by her father. That recording, however, is unintelligible and is otherwise non-corroborative hearsay. The facts that Respondent and Mr. Worley were having ongoing custody disputes and that Respondent was behind on child support payments raise suspicions about Respondent’s motive in calling in the reports. Those suspicions, however, are not more persuasive than the evidence supporting the first two calls to the hotline. The Department’s failure to acknowledge that evidence in its investigations, instead finding “no indicators,” undermines the Department’s preliminary determinations and the reliability of its case against Respondent. And, while the evidence does not prove that E.W. was subjected to sexual abuse, the Department’s submissions were insufficient to support a finding that E.W. was not sexually abused. In sum, the Department did not prove that Respondent called in false reports to the hotline.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2018.

Florida Laws (4) 120.5739.0139.20690.803
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SHIRLEY CARTER vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 09-001241 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Mar. 10, 2009 Number: 09-001241 Latest Update: Nov. 20, 2009

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's licensure to operate a child-care facility in Leesburg, Florida, should be denied, under relevant authority cited below.

Findings Of Fact This dispute arose when the Department notified the Petitioner, by letter of January 16, 2009, that the application submitted by the Petitioner to authorize operation of a child- care facility was denied. The facility was to be located at 1329 Marshall Drive in Leesburg, Florida. The application was submitted on October 23, 2008. Upon being informed of the intended denial of the Application for Licensure, the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing and the dispute was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for adjudication. The Department had denied the application based on a history of serious violations of statutes and rules, related to the safety of children, during the Petitioner's previous operation of Small Fries Daycare Center in 2004. The renewal of licensure for Small Fries, as well as an application for licensure to operate a second facility, "The Learning Tree," was denied after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, by a Final Order entered by the Department on December 12, 2005. The Petitioner offered no credible evidence to show why the previous, serious violations would not re-occur if the subject facility was granted licensure. The Petitioner's testimony was somewhat contradictory and she appeared focused on the wrongs she believes were done with regard to her licensure and her facilities in the 2004 dispute, as much as on the present application dispute. She offered no evidence of additional training or rehabilitation since her flawed operation of the Small Fries facility, other than her own self-serving statements. Although she testified that she would be a good operator and follow all relevant rules, she testified in a misleading fashion as to her credentials and training. It became apparent that she was reading from a list of available, relevant educational courses for operators for daycare facilities, but provided no proof that she had actually completed the courses. She also admitted that she did not have the required Director's credentials to operate a child-care facility. She offered no employment history and testified that she had, in fact, not worked since the closure of the Small Fries facility, in 2005, by the above-referenced Final Order. The findings in the Recommended Order in that case, as adopted in the Final Order, entered in 2005, established that the Petitioner was responsible for a number of violations of statutes and rules pertaining to licensure and safe operation of her child care facility.1 The Petitioner made a misrepresentation of a critical fact on her application. The primary reason the Respondent took the position that licensure in this case should be denied was the past operational and licensure history of the Petitioner and her facility, which culminated in the referenced Recommended and Final Orders denying licensure. There were multiple legal violations which resulted in her loss of licensure. On the subject application the Petitioner misrepresented a critical fact by failing to acknowledge that she had her licensure denied in the past. Ultimately, the Petitioner admitted in testimony that she had not been truthful on her application when she answered the question at issue and did not disclose a previous licensure denial. Moreover, there is no dispute that the Petitioner's application to operate the day care facility was incomplete at the time it was submitted. The Petitioner ultimately, and reluctantly, admitted in testimony that she did not have a Certificate of Occupancy for the building, did not have the required sanitation and environmental inspection from the Health Department, nor an approved fire inspection. These are all items that are required to be obtained before an application can be considered complete and subject to being granted, under the relevant Department rules. These were all items that the Petitioner knew or should have known must be submitted for an application to be complete. The Department, as a routine procedure, reviews applications for completeness and required documentation. If items are missing, the Department sends a letter to the applicant, within 30 days of receipt of the application, in order to comply with Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2009). The Department Licensing Counselor, Ms. Burleson, sent the letter containing the list of missing items to the Petitioner at the address of record on November 19, 2008. This was well within 30 days of the application submission (October 23, 2008) in compliance with Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2009). The Petitioner was informed of the lack of information, and the need to supply it, by the Department after the filing of her application during the fall of 2008. She maintained that she had faxed the information to the Department, which proved not to be true. The Department never received any faxed information prior to the letter sent by Ms. Burleson to the Petitioner on November 19, 2008, specifically listing missing items. Moreover, the Petitioner also admitted that the Fire Department was requiring her to install additional sprinklers in the second floor of the building she proposes to use for her facility, before she could receive the necessary approval. She stated that this was a large expense that she was not able to complete at this time. The Petitioner contended that had she known within 30 days which specific items were missing from her application, as to compliance with licensure requirements, she would have had time to complete them. That statement is not credible and, indeed, the Petitioner's own testimony refutes it. The Petitioner admitted that she did not have the required health and fire inspections or the Certificate of Occupancy as late as the date of the hearing. She claimed to have faxed the missing CPR certificate to the Respondent in December 2008, after the date of the letter, November 19, 2008, informing her of missing items. In fact, the purported fax of the missing certificate never happened. The Petitioner also claimed to have taken some of the missing items with her to a meeting she had with Ms. Burleson on January 16, 2009. If she did not know what items were missing from her application, because of purportedly not having received the November 19, 2008, letter (even though she executed the application herself) then she could not have known what to fax to the Department or take with her to the meeting with Ms. Burleson. In fact, however, the missing items referenced in these findings of fact remain missing from the application, rendering it non-compliant, as of the date of the hearing. The Petitioner's testimony that she did not receive the November 19, 2008, letter from the Department is not credible. It is not supported by any evidence produced by the Petitioner. The Petitioner admitted that the address on the letter (241 Mont Clair Road, Leesburg, Florida) is her current mailing address and the address where she currently receives mail. She admitted receiving the September 8, 2008, letter from the Department, as well as the Notice of Intent which she later completed and returned to the Department. Her statement that she did not receive the November 19, 2008, letter from the Department, advising her of incomplete documentation is inexplicable and not credible, given the evidence that she knew what was missing from her application. The Petitioner knew, or should have known, that at the time she requested the hearing and at all times through the hearing date that she could not possibly meet the requirements for licensure. This is because she admittedly lacked the four critical items required for licensure: a current Directors Certificate; an Occupancy Permit for the building from the City of Leesburg; an approved Health and Sanitation Report from the Lake County Health Department; and an approved Fire Safety Inspection and evidence of it. The Petitioner instead, admitted at the hearing that she had chosen not to comply with the fire inspection requirement, which would result in the addition of more fire sprinklers, because they were too expensive. The Petitioner's refusal to expend time and money to comply with the licensing requirements, in essence, resulted in her demanding a hearing when the inevitable Notice of Intent to Deny Licensure was issued from the Department. This resulted in the expenditure of resources by the Department and the Division of Administrative Hearings, when such use of resources for the formal hearing process might have been avoided. In essence, she approached the hearing as an attempt to re-try the prior facts which resulted in her loss of licensure in 2005, rather than make a more affirmative showing of how she could comply with the licensure and operational requirements attendant to the potential grant of the subject application.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services denying the application in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2009.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.60381.006381.0072402.3055402.310402.319 Florida Administrative Code (2) 65C-22.00265C-22.005
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YOLANDA CHEESMON vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 98-005593 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Dec. 21, 1998 Number: 98-005593 Latest Update: Jan. 11, 2000

The Issue Should the Petitioner's application for registration to operate a family day care home be approved?

Findings Of Fact In August 1998, Petitioner, Yolanda Cheesmon, registered her home at 1012 Yates Avenue in Panama City, Florida, as a family day care home with Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services. In September 1998, Michelle Barsanti, the Department's Licensing Counselor, attempted to reach Ms. Cheesmon at her home by telephone. She was unable to do so because the telephone had been disconnected. Because the Department's day care standards required day care homes to have telephones, Ms. Barsanti continued to try an reach Petitioner. She eventually contacted Petitioner by phone, found she had moved, and sent her a new application to 920 Thomas Avenue, Panama City, Florida. On October 23, 1998, Ms. Barsanti attempted to visit Ms. Cheesmon at her new home. It was only then that she noticed that Ms. Cheesmon's address had changed. She obtained directions to the new home, and went there to discuss with Ms. Cheesmon licensing her home as a family day care home. During this visit, Ms. Barsanti reminded Ms. Cheesmon that it was the home and not the operator which was licensed or registered; and, therefore, the Department had to be notified whenever the operator of a family day care home changed residence. Ms. Barsanti discussed with Ms. Cheesmon during this meeting that Ms. Cheesmon would have to procure a written statement form the landlord approving the use of the property as a family day care home. The facts reveal a mix up between the Petitioner and the investigator regarding almost every aspect of Petitioner's application. As both women endeavored to perfect the application, more and more things arose which needed to be done. All of this occurred under circumstances in which the Petitioner's income was reduced because she had quit her job to care for children. Ms. Cheesmon filed her application and a letter which purported to be from her landlord giving Ms. Cheesmon permission to operate a family day care home on the property. Ms. Barsanti received an anonymous letter alleging the permission letter was a forgery. After being confronted by Ms. Barsanti Ms. Cheesmon admitted that she had forged the permission letter. Ms. Cheesmon testified that she forged the letter which she gave to Ms. Barsanti in order to get the application processed and obtain insurance which the landlord required as a condition for approval. The landlord did not disapprove of the child care activity. The landlord wanted insurance to hold her blameless. The Petitioner needed approval by the Department to obtain insurance. Petitioner's forgery was not so much a false statement of the landlord's position, as an improper means to accomplish what the landlord wanted. By the time of hearing, the Petitioner had moved back to her original address into property which she does not rent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order which would deny the current application as moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Yolanda Cheesmon 1012 Yates Avenue Blountstown, Florida 32424 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 65C-20.009
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs EAGLE'S NEST CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, 16-007554 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Dec. 21, 2016 Number: 16-007554 Latest Update: Jan. 06, 2025
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