The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of race and religion, and retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Lawrence N. Brown, III, is an African- American male and is of the Christian faith. Petitioner has been employed with Respondent since April 14, 2014, at its store located at 3800 Oakwood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida (hereafter, the "Store"). As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent at the Store. Respondent is a corporation doing business in Florida. Respondent owns and operates the Store at which Respondent was employed at the time of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination ("Discrimination Charge") with FCHR on or about March 10, 2016.4/ The pages attached to the Discrimination Charge form (which apparently was filled out in typewritten form by FCHR staff) were prepared by Petitioner. On or about July 18, 2016, Respondent issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause, determining that Petitioner had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed unlawful employment practices against him. On or about August 16, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief requesting a hearing to determine whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices against him. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination against him on the basis of both his race and religion, and also alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful retaliation. These charges, as specifically set forth in the Petition for Relief, are the subject of this de novo proceeding.5/ In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to promote him into supervisory or managerial positions for which he claims he was qualified; by giving him lower scores on his employment evaluations than were given to a white employee working in the same position (part-time hardlines merchandiser); by not paying him as much as they paid that same white employee; and by retaining that same white employee as a part-time hardlines merchandiser in the Toy Department, while moving Petitioner to another position as cashier. Petitioner also claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015, while giving other employees that day off. Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal department about having to work on Christmas Day 2015, by removing him as a hardline merchandiser in the Toy Department and reassigning him to a cashier position, then subsequently effectively "terminating" (in his words) his employment. Petitioner seeks an award of $5,000,000 in damages in this proceeding. Background Events As noted above, Petitioner was hired by Respondent on or about April 14, 2014. Petitioner initially was hired in a part-time position as a part-time overnight hardlines replenishment associate. In this position, Petitioner's work scheduling availability was between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. When Petitioner was hired, Alberto Rodriquez was the Store manager. In his position as a part-time employee with Respondent, Petitioner was not guaranteed any specific number of weeks or hours of employment in any given calendar year, nor was he guaranteed that he would attain full-time employee status. The number of work hours Petitioner was assigned was dependent on the company's business needs and on Petitioner's ability to meet the applicable job performance standards. Petitioner acknowledged these and the other conditions of his employment as evidenced by his signature on the Pre-training Acknowledgment Summary dated April 14, 2014. As a result of the elimination of the overnight replenishment associate position, on or about October 26, 2014, Petitioner was transferred to another position as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. In this position, his work scheduling availability was between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. As a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was responsible for stocking store shelves with merchandise, straightening merchandise on store shelves, putting returned merchandise on shelves, and generally keeping the hardlines departments neat and the shelves fully stocked. The Toy Department at the Store was one of several departments that were categorized as "hardlines" departments. In his duties as a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was not assigned to any specific hardlines department, and his responsibilities entailed working in any hardlines department as needed. However, as a practical matter, due to the work demand, Petitioner worked mostly, if not exclusively, in the Toy Department until he was reassigned to the cashier position after Christmas 2015. David Leach became the Store manager in April 2015. At some point before Christmas Day 2015, the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, December 25, 2015. Petitioner did not volunteer, and had not otherwise requested, to work on Christmas Day 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid holiday for Respondent's employees. On or about December 23, 2015, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, requesting to be removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015. Pursuant to a directive from Respondent's corporate office, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for that day. Petitioner was not required to work on Christmas Day 2015, and he did not work that day. Petitioner was paid for the Christmas Day holiday. Although the Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, some Store employees were scheduled to work, and did work, that day on a volunteer basis, for which they were paid. On December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Petitioner signed the form. The form was marked as showing that Respondent "granted" the religious accommodation. Also on December 28, 2015, Leach informed Petitioner that he had eliminated the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. He offered Petitioner other part-time positions, either as a cashier or in making pizza at the Little Caesar's pizza station in the Store. Leach did not offer any other positions to Petitioner at that time. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, but informed Leach that he was unable to stand in a single place for long periods of time due to injuries he previously had sustained while working on the overnight shift. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, effective January 3, 2016.6/ Petitioner's hourly wage did not change when his position changed to cashier. He continued to make the same hourly wage that he had made as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. At some point on or after December 28, 2015, Petitioner signed a Personnel Interview Record form that reflected his revised work hours associated with his position change to cashier. The form stated his availability to work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The evidence is unclear as to whether Petitioner did (or did not) call in to inform the appropriate Store personnel that he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or on Thursday, December 31, 2015. Regardless, the persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner worked on Monday, December 28, 2015; did not work on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015; and worked on Saturday, January 2, 2016. The work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, was computer-generated some time during the week of December 27, 2015, through January 3, 2016. If an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to be excused from work on those days, this situation is termed a "no call-no show," and the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week. This is to ensure that there are cashiers available as needed to work on upcoming dates. Regardless of whether Petitioner did or did not call in to inform Respondent he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015, the posted work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work that week. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, work a total of 15.90 hours the week of January 3 through 10, 2016. The work schedule posted as of Saturday, January 9, 2016, also showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner worked a total of 15.41 hours the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. At some point between January 13 and January 26, 2016, Petitioner was moved from the cashier position to the Store's date code specialist position. The date code specialist position also is a part-time position, for which Petitioner is paid the same hourly wage as he was paid as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent, working as the Store's date code specialist. Race Discrimination Claims As previously noted, Petitioner began working for Respondent at the Store on April 14, 2014. His initial employment position was as a part-time overnight replenishment associate. In October 2014, he moved to a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. In both positions, he was responsible for stocking and restocking merchandise in all hardlines departments, so was not assigned exclusively to the Store's Toy Department. However, as noted above, due to work demand in the Toy Department, Petitioner did most, if not all, of his work in that department until he was moved to the cashier position in late December 2015.7/ Petitioner contends that starting in mid-2014,8/ he periodically requested to be promoted to "Toy Lead" or to another supervisory or managerial position. He testified that he had undertaken many activities and implemented various systems to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Toy Department and other departments at the store, and had documented these activities and transmitted that information to the Respondent for inclusion in his personnel file. He testified that rather than promoting him to a supervisory position in the Toy Department, Respondent instead hired a non-African-American person to fill that position.9/ Petitioner additionally testified that he periodically would request to be transferred or promoted to other supervisory positions, but that Respondent did not grant these requests. He contends that since he was qualified for these positions, the only basis for Respondent's decision to fill those positions with other employees was discrimination against him on the basis of his race. In response, Leach testified that there was no formal "Toy Lead" position at the Store; rather, the person supervising the Toy Department is an assistant store manager, a position that entails supervising other hardlines departments besides the Toy Department. Further, Leach testified that in his view, Petitioner was not qualified to occupy certain supervisory positions because of his lack of experience in those areas and his relatively short period of employment with Respondent. Leach also testified that Petitioner had not ever formally applied for a promotion through Respondent's online application process. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race because he was not paid the same amount as Corey Harper, a white male hardlines merchandiser who also often worked part-time in the Toy Department on the afternoon or evening shift, even though he worked harder and received higher evaluation scores than did Harper.10/ However, Leach credibly testified that Respondent does not currently base its pay rate for part-time employees on job performance evaluation scores, but instead pays them a set hourly pay rate. According to Leach, Respondent has not given an hourly pay rate raise to part-time employees since 2009, so that any pay differential depended on whether employees were hired before or after 2009. Leach credibly testified that Harper has been employed by Respondent since 2004, so had received hourly pay rate raises between 2004 to November 2008; this would result in his hourly pay rate being higher than Petitioner's, even though both are part-time employees. Petitioner testified that when he was moved from the daytime hardlines merchandiser position to the cashier position after Christmas 2015, he made it clear that he wanted to remain in the Toy Department; however, Respondent transferred him out of that department while allowing Harper to remain in a hardlines merchandiser position, which entailed work in the Toy Department. Petitioner also made clear that he wished to return to the hardlines merchandiser position in the Toy Department when such a position became available; however, at some point, Leach reassigned Carol Yaw, who was white, from her previous office manager job to a hardlines merchandiser position. Petitioner asserts that Respondent's actions in allowing Harper to remain as a part-time hardline merchandiser and reassigning Yaw to a hardlines merchandiser position constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his race. However, Leach credibly testified that the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position that Petitioner had occupied was eliminated because of the lack of work in that position, primarily due to declining Toy Department sales after the holiday season. Additionally, immediately after Christmas 2015, Leach consolidated the overnight merchandise unloading and daytime shelf stocking positions and moved the overnight unloading employees to the day shift, where their duties consist of unloading merchandise from trucks and stocking shelves.11/ Leach credibly testified that Harper was not moved from his position because Leach had specifically decided not to move others unaffected by this reorganization out of their existing positions, and that Harper was an afternoon/evening hardlines merchandiser. Leach also credibly testified that he had moved Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position was eliminated because she was a 25-year employee of Respondent, and he felt that she deserved that position out of loyalty for being a long-term employee of Respondent. Petitioner also contends that Respondent's evaluation of his job performance was unfair because it was conducted by an assistant store manager, Marjorie McCue, who was not his direct supervisor. Specifically, he contends that McCue was unfamiliar with his job performance, so did not appropriately consider, in his evaluation, improved Toy Department sales performance and efficiency that were due to measures that he had implemented. Petitioner also contends that McCue initially deliberately gave him an inaccurately low job performance evaluation in an effort to create a record to support terminating his employment, but that when he complained, those lower scores were changed to higher scores. The only performance evaluation regarding Petitioner's job performance that was admitted into evidence is a document titled "Employee Review" that was dated January 31, 2015; Petitioner received a 3.10 overall performance score on this performance evaluation.12/ The Employee Review for Harper dated January 31, 2015, also was admitted into evidence; Harper's overall performance score was 3.00. Upon careful consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden13/ to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his race. To do so, Petitioner must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated.14/ It is undisputed that Petitioner, as an African- American, is a member of a protected class. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was subject to adverse employment action. With respect to his assertion that Respondent failed to promote him on the basis of his race, Petitioner needed to show that, in addition to being a member of a protected class, he applied for and was qualified for a promotion; that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and that other equally or less-qualified employees outside of his class were promoted.15/ While Petitioner frequently sent email correspondence to Respondent's corporate legal office requesting to be promoted, the evidence does not show that he followed Respondent's formal online application process for applying for promotions.16/ Further, although the evidence indicates that Petitioner is very hard-working, energetic, bright, and detail-oriented, he did not demonstrate that those characteristics necessarily qualified him for the supervisory positions about which he inquired. He also did not demonstrate that Respondent filled the positions about which he had inquired with less-qualified non-African-American employees. In fact, Petitioner acknowledged, in testimony at the final hearing and in email correspondence with Respondent's corporate legal office, that in his view, some of the individuals who had been promoted were qualified for the positions to which they had been promoted. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate adverse employment action by Respondent by failing to promote him on the basis of his race. Petitioner also did not show that he received a lower pay rate and lower evaluation scores than did other similarly- situated employees who were not members of his protected class. The only comparator to which Petitioner referred was Harper, the other part-time hardlines merchandiser that sometimes worked in the Toy Department. However, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Harper actually scored lower than did Petitioner on the January 31, 2015, evaluation.17/ Further, Harper was not similarly situated to Petitioner with respect to pay rate because Harper is a longer-term employee who had received hourly pay rate raises in 2005 through 2008, before Respondent ceased giving raises of hourly pay rates in 2009, but Petitioner was hired in 2014, after Respondent ceased giving hourly pay raises. Petitioner also did not show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Leach discriminated against him on the basis of his race by electing to reassign him, rather than Harper, to a cashier position after Christmas 2015, and by later reassigning Yaw to fill a full-time hardlines merchandiser position that included responsibilities of working in the Toy Department. As discussed above, when Leach decided to eliminate the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position, he chose not to reassign other employees who were not directly affected by the elimination of that position. The evidence shows that Leach did not reassign Harper to a cashier position because Harper's position was not directly affected by the elimination of the daytime hardlines merchandiser position——not because Leach favored Harper over Petitioner due to race. Also as discussed above, Leach reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position——also a full-time position——was eliminated. Because Yaw was a full-time employee, she did not fill a position for which Petitioner was eligible as a part-time employee; furthermore, under any circumstances, she was not similarly situated to Petitioner because of her longer term of employment with Respondent. For these reasons, neither Harper nor Yaw are similarly situated to Petitioner for purposes of being comparators. For these reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination against him by Respondent on the basis of his race. Further, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race, Respondent articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with respect to Petitioner. As discussed above, Respondent did not promote Petitioner because he did not go through Respondent's formal application process for seeking promotions, and also because Leach determined, on the basis of Petitioner's lack of experience and employment longevity, that Petitioner was not qualified for supervisory positions at that time. Additionally, Leach's decisions regarding reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position while retaining Harper and reassigning Yaw to hardlines merchandiser positions were management decisions based on business needs and requirements, rather than on the basis of race. Petitioner did not present evidence showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination against him on the basis of his race. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of his race, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Religious Discrimination Claim As previously discussed, shortly before Christmas Day 2015, the employee work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted in the Store. This schedule showed Petitioner as being scheduled to work from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, which fell on a Friday in 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid employee holiday; however, employees could work that day on a voluntary basis and they would be paid time-and-a-half for doing so. As noted above, Petitioner did not volunteer or otherwise indicate that he was willing to work that day. Upon seeing that he was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, which then contacted Leach. Leach had Petitioner removed from the work schedule for December 25, 2015. Petitioner was not required to work that day, did not work that day, and was paid for the Christmas Day 2015 holiday. Petitioner claims that by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day, Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. Petitioner asserts, as evidence of Respondent's discriminatory intent, that there are others who worked in the Toy Department who were not of the Christian faith, so that if someone was needed to work on Christmas Day, one of those individuals could instead have been scheduled. As previously noted, on December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Leach credibly testified that the purpose of having Petitioner sign the form was to have a written record of Petitioner's religion so that Petitioner would not again be assigned to work on a Christian religious holiday. Petitioner signed the form, but protested being required to do so, because, in his view, Respondent already was on notice that he is of the Christian faith because he always had Sundays off of work. Petitioner testified that when he was hired in April 2014 (notably, before Leach became Store manager) he had verbally requested Sundays off, effectively placing Respondent on notice that he is of the Christian faith. On this basis, Petitioner asserts that Leach and other managers and supervisors at the Store knew that he is Christian and that they nonetheless intentionally scheduled him to work on Christmas Day. Petitioner acknowledged that he never heard Leach make any comments with respect to his (Petitioner's) religion. Leach credibly testified that before he was contacted by Respondent's corporate office regarding Petitioner's concerns about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015, he did not know that Petitioner was Christian, and he had not inferred that from the fact that Petitioner did not work on Sundays.18/ Leach testified, credibly and persuasively, that Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by mistake. He explained that the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was generated using a pre-populated "template" method. This method, which is a method by which the Store sets its weekly work schedules, entails week-to-week copying of the regular——i.e., "template"——work schedule for all Store employees, then modifies that schedule as needed to address changes to individual employee work schedules. Leach explained that in using this method to establish the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, Respondent had inadvertently scheduled employees who had not volunteered to work on Christmas Day. He surmised that this was a possible explanation for why Petitioner mistakenly was scheduled to work that day. As noted above, Petitioner was not the only Store employee scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. Upon consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his religion. To do so, Petitioner must show that he: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) informed Respondent of this belief; and (3) suffered adverse employment action as a result of failing to comply with the employment requirement that conflicted with his belief. It is undisputed that Petitioner falls within a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim on the basis of religion. However, Petitioner did not prove the existence of the other two elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent knew that he was Christian or that his Christian faith prohibited him from working on Christmas Day. As noted above, Petitioner was hired at the Store before Leach became Store manager. Further, because Petitioner had not been required to complete a written religious accommodation form when he was hired in April 2014, Respondent did not have any written notice in its possession that would have informed Leach that Petitioner was Christian or that Petitioner needed certain Christian holidays, such as Christmas Day, off of work. As noted above, Leach credibly testified that he did not know that Petitioner was Christian until Respondent's corporate legal office contacted him regarding Petitioner's religion-based complaint about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The evidence also shows that Petitioner did not suffer any adverse employment action. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015, did not work that day, and was paid for that holiday. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by Respondent against him on the basis of his religion. However, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, Respondent produced credible, persuasive evidence showing a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for its action——that is, that through the Store's use of the template work scheduling system, Petitioner was mistakenly scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. As noted above, as soon as Petitioner complained to Respondent, Respondent immediately accommodated his request by removing him from the Christmas Day 2015 work schedule. Petitioner did not present any evidence showing that Respondent's proffered reason for scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015 was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his religion. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Retaliation Claim Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by reassigning him from his position as a daytime hardlines merchandiser——a position that he clearly liked and at which he believed he excelled——to a cashier position——a position that he clearly considered demeaning and that also was physically difficult for him to perform due to a previous injury. Petitioner was informed that he was being reassigned to a cashier position only five days (and the first workday) after he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day.19/ Petitioner testified that Leach told him that the part- time daytime merchandiser position had been eliminated due to the lack of work demand, particularly in the Toy Department, after the Christmas season was over. Petitioner testified that when he asked Leach about available positions in to which he could transfer, Leach told him that only cashier or pizza-making positions were available. Petitioner provided evidence that a softlines customer service job, which he claims he would have preferred, was open at the time he was reassigned and that Leach did not inform him of that opening or offer him that position. Petitioner also disputes that the part-time daytime merchandiser job that he had occupied had been eliminated. As evidence, he contends that Harper continued to occupy that position, and also that Leach subsequently reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser rather than transferring him back into a hardlines merchandiser position, as he had requested. The part-time cashier position to which Petitioner was transferred was the same level of employment position in Respondent's employment hierarchy as was the part-time daytime merchandiser position that he previously held. Additionally, as discussed above, as a part-time cashier, Petitioner continued to receive the same hourly pay rate and work scheduling availability as he had received when he was employed as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. As discussed above, on or before January 26, 2016, Petitioner was reassigned to the Store's date code specialist position. According to Leach, that position came open after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, and Leach believed that the date code specialist position would play well to Petitioner's strengths of being methodical and detail- oriented. Petitioner bears the burden, by the greater weight of the evidence, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Respondent. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.20/ For the following reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. It is determined that Petitioner engaged in a "protected activity" when he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office, by email dated December 23, 2015, that he had been scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The email stated: Attn: Legal My schedule states that I am scheduled for Christmas day. I am a Christian I exercise religious right no work on a high religious day. Christmas is the day I celebrate the birth of Christ thus the name Christmas day. A Jewish person was assigned to my department (toys) and was allowed to have off all the Jewish holidays. I was told that is his right and approved, I said fine, I don't know who was arguing this but this was fine with me, because I have many Jewish friends, so I understand. Easter which falls on a Sunday and Christmas are my holidays. I am requesting off. I am requesting Christmas day off with holiday pay as my religious day, just like I requested Sundays off. Only I can change my religious day and work on Sunday, which I might have to when promoted. If management tells me I cannot be promoted because I exercise my religious right not to work on the seventh day, then I will have to do as Jewish people have done for centuries, they are released from the commandment that they may only eat Kosher. If captured by the enemy they may eat to survive. So if I can only be manager if I give up my religious right not to work on Sunday, then I will do what management says is a requirement. Thank you. Lawrence Brown Kmart-Hollywood, Fl Oakwood Plaza To be a "protected activity," the activity giving rise to the alleged retaliatory action must, at the very least, communicate to the employer that the complainant believes the employer is engaging in discrimination against him. Petitioner's email can be read broadly to inform Respondent that he believed he was being discriminated against on the basis of his religion by being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. To that point, Petitioner specifically compared his circumstances to those of a Jewish employee who had requested and been allowed to have all Jewish holidays off of work. While not specifically using the word "discrimination," Petitioner's email can be reasonably read to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner believed he was being treated differently than a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of Petitioner's protected class and who had been excused from work on the holidays observed by his religion. Additionally, Leach was aware that Petitioner had complained to Respondent's corporate legal department about being scheduled to work on a Christian holiday. Accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has established the "protected activity" element of his retaliation claim. However, Petitioner did not show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of having engaged in protected activity. His reassignment to the part-time cashier position effectively was a lateral transfer that did not affect his hourly pay rate or hours of work scheduling availability. Although Petitioner subjectively considered the cashier position to be demeaning and below his skill level21/ and although his job responsibilities changed, the evidence shows that Petitioner was not reassigned to an objectively less prestigious or otherwise inferior employment position. Furthermore, in any event, approximately three weeks after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, Respondent reassigned him to a position as the Store's date code specialist——a position that he has officially held since January 26, 2016, and from which he has not requested to be transferred. In this position, Petitioner earns the same hourly wage and has the same number of hours of work availability as he did in the hardlines merchandiser and cashier positions. He is solely responsible in the Store for ensuring that date-coded merchandise on the shelves has not exceeded its expiration date—— a position that entails significant responsibility and, as Leach put it, is "very important." The evidence also does not support Petitioner's assertion that his removal from the work schedule in early January meant that he was effectively terminated. Although the evidence does not clearly show what days Petitioner did not work during the week after Christmas in 2015, or whether he did (or did not) call in to notify Respondent that he would be absent, the evidence does clearly establish that Petitioner was not scheduled to work the first week of January 2016, and it is also clear that management personnel at the Store did not believe that he had called in to notify them of his absence. Leach explained that if an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to notify the Store of his or her absence, the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week; this is to ensure that there are enough cashiers available as needed to work in the upcoming week. In any event, when Petitioner noticed that he had not been scheduled to work, he contacted the Store's human relations manager, who told him to come back to work. In fact, Petitioner worked the first and second weeks of January 2016, and thereafter, and he continues to be employed at the Store. Further, Petitioner was never told or otherwise notified, formally or informally, that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action by being reassigned for a short period of time from a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser to a part-time cashier position. Petitioner also did not demonstrate the existence of a "causal link" between a protected activity and adverse employment action. As discussed above, Petitioner's sending an email to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 constituted a "protected activity." However, as discussed above, it is determined that Respondent did not engage in an adverse employment action; thus, Petitioner's engagement in protected activity did not "cause" Respondent to take any material adverse employment action against him. Furthermore, in any event, Respondent articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position shortly after Christmas Day 2015—— specifically, that the part-time daytime merchandiser position that Petitioner had held was eliminated due to seasonal workload decline and other business management decisions reallocating hardlines merchandise-related tasks between the overnight and daytime shifts. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Respondent retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10(7). Damages Petitioner has requested an award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000. However, section 760.11(6), which governs the award of remedies in administrative proceedings brought under the FCRA, does not authorize DOAH to award damages. Further, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not engage in any unlawful employment practices with respect to Petitioner, and, in any event, Petitioner did not present any evidence to support his entitlement to an award of damages in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Caucasian male, was born on March 23, 1949. At the time of the alleged unlawful employment practice at issue in this case, Petitioner was 52-53 years old. Petitioner was employed by Respondent since 1973. He was terminated effective August 15, 2001. Respondent, at all times material to this case, is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent, at all relevant times, is in the business of providing telephone services to individuals and businesses in south Florida and elsewhere. At all relevant times, Petitioner was employed as a Service Technician. Service Technicians are responsible to install and repair telephone equipment in response to customer requests. At all relevant times, Respondent employs individuals as Service Technicians who are older than Petitioner. Many other individuals employed as Service Technicians are over the age of 40 at all times relevant to this case. Beginning in 1997, Respondent began to evaluate its Service Technicians according to a system called "Integrated Technicians Performance Plan [ITP].” The purpose of ITP was to improve customer service by evaluating Service Technicians and the individuals who manage them, on a regional basis, in accordance with standardized performance measures. Service Technicians whose ITP evaluations revealed deficiencies, including Petitioner, were provided assistance pursuant to individualized Technician Development Plans (TDP) and given a reasonable period of time to improve. From the time ITP was implemented in 1997, Petitioner was at all relevant times on a TDP because of deficiencies in his job performance. Petitioner's job performance was consistently deficient from 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment. From 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment Petitioner was provided assistance to help him improve his performance. Despite the assistance provided, Petitioner failed to improve his job performance to minimum levels required of all Service Technicians and required by his TDP. By August 2001, supervisors responsible for the training, evaluation and supervision of Service Technicians had determined that Petitioner did not maintain his job performance at the minimum levels required of Service Technicians and did not fulfill the requirements of his TDP. Accordingly, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner could have been terminated earlier than he was. In consideration of the fact that Petitioner had been a long-time employee of the company, he was given more time to improve his performance than company policy required. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that age played any role in Petitioner's termination. Petitioner did not prove that after he was terminated, a younger worker replaced him. Similarly, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act, or that any disability played any role in his termination. Petitioner alleged his disabilities as “war wounds, tinnitus and hearing loss.” Petitioner never informed Respondent that he suffered from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, Petitioner never informed Respondent that the disabilities alleged would in any way prevent him from performing his job as a Service Technician, or from satisfying the TDP developed to assist in ameliorating his performance deficiencies. Petitioner never informed Respondent that the alleged disabilities substantially impacted any major life function, or affected Petitioner’s ability to perform the essential functions of his Service Technician job. Respondent was not, at relevant times, on notice that Petitioner might suffer from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Respondent never perceived Petitioner to be disabled at times relevant to this case. During his employment as a Service Technician, Petitioner did not indicate a need for or make any request to Respondent for accommodations for any physical condition. Finally, Petitioner alleged that his termination was in retaliation for complaints he had filed in another forum. This allegation was not proved; rather, the evidence established that Petitioner never opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In sum, the evidence established that Respondent discharged Petitioner solely on account of inadequate job performance as a Service Technician, and not on account of his age, disability, or in retaliation for complaints filed in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Optical Shop (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01– and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner, Janice Jennings (Petitioner), to discrimination in employment and by discharging Petitioner in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Respondent operates an optical shop in a Veteran’s Administration (V.A.) Hospital located in Lake City, Florida. At its Lake City location, Respondent fills prescriptions written by eye physicians at the V.A. Hospital, assists patients with choosing frames, and fits patients with their prescription eye glasses. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is fast-paced, with a constant stream of patients, averaging 50-to-60 patients a day. If the optical shop is running behind schedule, it is problematic because often physicians at the V.A. Hospital are waiting to see the patients served by the optical shop. In 2009, Petitioner interviewed for a position at Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City, Florida. During her interview, Petitioner advised Respondent that she had competent computer skills and significant experience working in an office environment and with eye doctors. On May 27, 2009, Respondent hired Petitioner as a part- time clerk at the optical shop. Petitioner was terminated prior to working 90 days for Respondent. When Petitioner was hired, two full-time employees worked at the optical shop: office supervisor, Jean Hartup, and optician, Kathleen Denton. Ms. Hartup has been employed with Respondent for approximately five years. Ms. Denton has been with the optical shop for approximately two and a-half years. As office supervisor, Ms. Hartup can be distant with employees and “hard” at times. She can also be “direct” when speaking to employees. Ms. Hartup demonstrates these traits with all of the employees at the optical shop. Ms. Hartup has written up Ms. Denton in the past and the two have had personality conflicts. Both Ms. Hartup and Ms. Denton assisted with training Petitioner. Evidence indicated that Petitioner received adequate training to perform the tasks she was assigned to perform as a clerk. She often had to be re-trained on the same tasks. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is a very small room, approximately ten-feet by ten-feet square inside the V.A. Hospital. There are two small desks in the shop and it is very crowded. Petitioner was aware of the small working environment at the time she accepted employment with Respondent as a part- time clerk. Past and present employees at the optical shop have had to share desk space. Sometimes work has to be performed in the hallway because of the small office space. All new hires for Respondent are subjected to a 90-day probationary period. As explained in Respondent’s “Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits,” of which Petitioner was aware: There will be a 90-day probationary period during which time the employer may terminate the employee at any time for any reason or for no reason regardless of any other provision of these policies. Sick leave and personal days are accrued but cannot be used during this period. Respondent’s Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits also provides: [Respondent] does not and will not tolerate any employee discriminating against their work peers for any reason i.e., race, color, religion, sex, national origin or handicap. Any known verifiable discrimination will be grounds for immediate termination. Once on the job, Petitioner was not proficient on the computer and, despite repeated training, failed to show any improvement and was slow in performing her job duties. Because of this, service to patients at the optical shop slowed down and the optical shop was frequently behind, resulting in physicians having to wait for patients being served by the optical shop. Ms. Hartup became frustrated with Petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance and the resulting delays. In addition, Petitioner began to show a lack of interest in her job and even stated that she “didn’t really need a job; she just wanted to be out of the house.” Despite repeated training and opportunities to improve her work performance, Petitioner failed to improve. Petitioner was given a notebook with information from the American Board of Opticians for review but she failed to read it or return it to Respondent. Prior to the end of her employment with Respondent, Petitioner called Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Mississippi and spoke to Mary Walker. Petitioner complained to Ms. Walker that Ms. Hartup was being too hard, was impatient, and was expecting too much of her. Petitioner did not raise concerns with Ms. Walker that she was being discriminated against based on her race, or that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race. In fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained of race discrimination or a hostile work environment based on race discrimination while she was still employed by Respondent. During that first telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Walker suggested to Petitioner that she should talk to Ms. Hartup about the problems. Petitioner assured Ms. Walker that she would. Two days later, Ms. Walker called Ms. Hartup and inquired whether Petitioner had discussed her concerns with Ms. Hartup. Petitioner, however, had not spoken to Ms. Hartup about her complaint. Ms. Walker gave Ms. Hartup the authority to run the optical shop at Lake City, including making hiring and firing decisions. Ms. Walker did not discipline Ms. Hartup because of Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, Ms. Walker told Ms. Hartup to handle the situation regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Ms. Hartup then met with Petitioner and they spoke about Petitioner’s concerns that Ms. Hartup was being too harsh and about Petitioner’s poor work performance. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Hartup felt the situation had been resolved. Petitioner subsequently advised both Ms. Denton, as well as Ms. Walker at Respondent’s headquarters, that the conversation with Ms. Hartup had gone well and that their issues had been resolved. Petitioner’s work performance, however, did not improve. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period of employment, Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment for poor work performance, for failing to reach her capabilities as an employee, and because her poor work performance was a detriment to Respondent’s Lake City optical shop. Petitioner testified that, from her point of view, she truly felt as though she had been discriminated against because of her race. That testimony, however, was without further support and was unpersuasive, especially in view of the fact that there is no evidence that Petitioner ever mentioned to anyone during her employment with Respondent that she believed she was being discriminated against. There was otherwise no evidence presented at the final hearing that would support a finding that Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaint against Ms. Hartup. Further, the evidence produced at final hearing does not support a finding that either the manner in which Petitioner was treated during her employment with Respondent, or her termination from that employment, was based on Petitioner’s race. Respondent filled the position of part-time clerk left vacant after Petitioner’s termination by hiring a Native- American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Wade Raulerson Pontiac,1/ committed unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009),2/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race by subjecting him to different terms and conditions than similarly situated employees outside of his protected classification, or by reducing Petitioner’s wages and ultimately discharging Petitioner from his employment in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct.
Findings Of Fact Wade Raulerson Honda and Wade Raulerson Pontiac are each an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. They are subsidiary companies of Morgan Auto Group, a Tampa-based company that owns eight car dealerships in Gainesville, Ocala, and the Tampa Bay area. On March 7, 2008, Petitioner, a black male, commenced employment at Wade Raulerson Honda as a detailer. In April 2008, Petitioner was promoted to detail manager. As Detail Manager, Petitioner earned a salary of $950 per week, or $49,400 per year. At the time he was hired, Petitioner received from Morgan Auto Group an “Associate Manual,” essentially an employee handbook setting forth, among other things, the parent company’s policy promoting equal employment opportunity and prohibiting discrimination or harassment based on age, sex, disability, race, color, national origin, sexual orientation, marital status, or “any other non-merit factor.” The Associate Manual also set forth a conflict resolution process for any employee complaints or grievances, including those of harassment, discrimination, or denial of equal employment opportunity. The employee was to first discuss the problem with his supervisor or department manager. If the response at the first step was not timely or satisfactory, the employee could then submit his complaint to the general manager of the dealership, or to the HR manager for the parent company. There were three employees in the Detail Department of Wade Raulerson Honda. As detail manager, Petitioner supervised the other two employees, Berton Curtis, who was black, and Matthew Luchenburg, who was white. Mr. Curtis worked for $8.50 per hour, and Mr. Luchenburg was paid $8.00 per hour. The work performed by Petitioner was termed “detailing” and was performed to prepare used cars for the showroom and sales lot. Petitioner pressure washed the engine, buffed and waxed the car, and shampooed the interior. He examined every detail of the interior and exterior of the used car to ensure that it was clean and ready to show on the lot. The bulk of the work performed by the other two employees was termed “cleaning” or “washing” and was performed on new cars and used cars already on the showroom floor. They vacuumed and dusted the interior, then ran the car through the car wash. Their work was much less exacting and time consuming than the detailing work performed by Petitioner. The evidence presented at hearing established that Mr. Curtis performed some “detailing” work, but that the great majority of the detailing performed on the premises of Wade Raulerson Honda was performed by Petitioner. In addition to paying Petitioner for detailing work, Wade Raulerson Honda also paid an outside vendor $125 per car to perform detailing on used cars. Wade Raulerson Honda also sent some of its used cars to be detailed at Wade Raulerson Pontiac for a fee. These outside sources were used because the volume of used cars was more than Petitioner could handle alone, not due to any dissatisfaction with Petitioner’s job performance. Respondent stipulated that Petitioner’s job performance was very good throughout his employment. In late 2008 and into 2009, the poor economy was especially hard on retail automobile sales. By June 2009, business was off by 40 percent at Wade Raulerson Honda, and management looked for any way possible to cut costs. Wade Raulerson Honda was organized under the headings of “fixed operations” and “variable operations.” Fixed operations comprised the Parts Department and the Service Department, which included the Detail Department. Variable operations included the Sales and the Finance and Insurance Departments. Dan Schmidt, then the general manager of Wade Raulerson Honda, explained that fixed operations are easier to control, and that when business turns down, they are the most obvious place to cut expenses. In June 2009, Mr. Schmidt, in consultation with Tom Yonkers, his Fixed Operations Director, decided to close the Detail Department and to send his used cars to Wade Raulerson Pontiac’s larger detailing facility. Petitioner’s Detail Manager position was eliminated altogether. Mr. Curtis and Mr. Luchenburg were reassigned to new positions in which they performed their washing duties as well as lot cleanup, mowing and edging, and sundry other duties that allowed Mr. Schmidt to make further cuts in maintenance and janitorial expenses. Mr. Schmidt also laid off service advisors and two lube technicians. Mr. Schmidt testified that Petitioner was a good employee, and “good employees are very hard to come by.” Mr. Schmidt sought ways to retain Petitioner’s services. He offered Petitioner a non-management position that would have essentially involved performing the type of work being done by Mr. Curtis and Mr. Luchenburg, but at a rate of $600 per week, significantly more than the other two men were paid. Petitioner declined the offer, saying he could not take such a large cut in salary. Mr. Yonkers contacted his fixed operations director counterpart at Wade Raulerson Pontiac, Charles Jones, to inquire whether Mr. Jones had any openings appropriate for Petitioner. Mr. Jones already had three detailers and was paying them $13 an hour. Two of these employees, including the detail manager, were black. Mr. Jones agreed to meet with Petitioner and to try and make a space for him. Mr. Jones testified that he was interested in grooming Petitioner for the detail manager position. He understood that Petitioner had been making around $900 per week at Wade Raulerson Honda, and believed that a productive Detail Manager would be worth that much money. On or about June 12, 2009, Petitioner met with Mr. Jones at Wade Raulerson Pontiac. They discussed the position that Mr. Jones had in mind for Petitioner and talked about money. Mr. Jones made a tentative offer to Petitioner of $17 per hour with a guarantee of 55 hours per week. He gave Petitioner a “Morgan Auto Group Pay Plan” form filled in with those terms. The form contained signature spaces to be completed by the employee, the employee’s manager, and the general manager of the dealership. Mr. Jones told Petitioner that the offer was not considered binding until all three parties had signed the pay plan. This form was never signed by management of Wade Raulerson Pontiac. Mr. Jones testified that he reported the $17 per hour offer to Mr. Dalessio, who would not agree to pay Petitioner any more money than his current detailers were receiving. Mr. Dalessio believed it was unfair to his current employees to bring in a new man at a significantly higher wage than they were making. A second Morgan Auto Group Pay Plan was prepared for Petitioner, with a pay rate of $13 per hour and no guarantee as to the number of hours per week. Petitioner initially declined this offer. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner was given a transfer notice by Wade Raulerson Honda, stating that he was transferring to Wade Raulerson Pontiac due to the closure of the Honda’s dealership’s Detail Department, “with time served and benefits not lost.” The notice also stated that Petitioner’s future wages were to be negotiated at Wade Raulerson Pontiac, not at Wade Raulerson Honda. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner happened to meet Morgan Auto Group’s HR manager, Jason Hillman, in the parking lot of the Honda dealership. Petitioner showed Mr. Hillman the $17 offer sheet and asked to discuss the matter with him. Mr. Hillman agreed to meet with Petitioner at the Pontiac dealership. They went separately to Wade Raulerson Pontiac and met with Mr. Dalessio to discuss the situation. Mr. Hillman explained that the $17 offer was not binding and that the $13 offer was the only offer on the table for Petitioner. Mr. Hillman stated, not very diplomatically, that the $17 offer sheet was “not worth the paper it was written on.” Petitioner became upset and asked Mr. Hillman to fire him so that he could collect unemployment. Mr. Hillman explained that he could not fire Petitioner because he had not yet accepted the offer from Wade Raulerson Pontiac. He further explained that if Petitioner declined the offer, he would be considered to have been laid off from Wade Raulerson Honda and that the company would not oppose his claim for unemployment benefits. Petitioner eventually accepted the $13 per hour offer from Wade Raulerson Pontiac. He worked and was paid for 12 hours over the course of two days, at the rate of $13 per hour. On June 19, 2009, Mr. Jones met with Petitioner to have him formally sign the $13 per hour pay plan. At that time, Petitioner told Mr. Jones that he could not work for those wages. He left the dealership and did not return to work. Petitioner was not fired from his position. Petitioner alleged that, subsequent to his leaving Wade Raulerson Pontiac, the dealership hired a white detailer named “Joe” at a rate of $15 per hour. However, evidence presented at the hearing established that Wade Raulerson Pontiac hired a detail technician named Joe Halliday on July 13, 2009, at a rate of $13 per hour, the same rate offered to Petitioner. Petitioner offered no evidence to establish that the terms and conditions of his employment were different than those of similarly situated persons outside of his protected classification, or that his wages were reduced or he was terminated in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner ever complained or even mentioned harassment or discrimination on the basis of race to any member of management at Wade Raulerson Honda or Wade Raulerson Pontiac.3/ Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Wade Raulerson Honda or Wade Raulerson Pontiac discriminated against him because of his race, subjected him to harassment because of his race, or retaliated against him in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Wade Raulerson Honda for closing its Detail Department, or by Wade Raulerson Pontiac for declining to hire Petitioner at a salary nearly equal to the amount he made as detail manager at Wade Raulerson Honda. Petitioner disputed the company’s claim that the Detail Department at Wade Raulerson Honda was itself losing money, but failed to establish that the company’s decision to make large cuts in fixed operations expenses was anything other than a rational business decision necessitated by a severe decline in sales revenue. The evidence established that Petitioner was considered a good employee and that the Wade Raulerson dealerships made every good faith effort, consistent with the economic realities of the retail automobile sales business as of June 2009, to retain Petitioner’s services during the economic downturn. The discussions between the parties turned on money, not race. Petitioner simply decided that he could not work for the amount that Wade Raulerson Pontiac offered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Wade Raulerson Honda and Wade Raulerson Pontiac did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (Respondent or the Agency), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by discriminating against Petitioner, Sharon Douse (Petitioner), during her employment with the Agency and then by terminating her employment, based upon her disability, marital status, sex, color, race, age, and the national origin of her spouse, and by illegally retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Sunland Center in Mariana, Florida, is operated by the Agency as an intermediate-care facility for developmentally- disabled individuals. Connally Manor is a residential setting within Sunland Center for 16 developmentally-disabled individuals with significant behavioral and medical involvement. Petitioner began her employment with the Agency on July 15, 2011, until her dismissal on January 5, 2012. During her employment, she was classified as career-service employee, Human Services Worker II, assigned to provide direct care for residents in Connally Manor. As a career-service employee, Petitioner was required to serve a one-year probationary period, during which she was subject to termination at will. While employed with the Agency, Petitioner had a number of performance deficiencies and conflicts with her co-workers and supervisors. On July 22, 2011, Petitioner attended training for the treatment and care of residents. Shortly thereafter, however, Petitioner mishandled residents on at least two occasions. As a result, Joe Grimsley, a senior human services support supervisor for the Agency, suspended Petitioner from working independently with residents, and asked Petitioner to work closely with her peers to learn appropriate care procedures. On August 25, 2011, because of excessive absences and failure to perform duties in a timely manner, Petitioner received counseling from Mr. Grimsley and Agency behavior program supervisor Scott Hewett. Petitioner was counseled for excessive absences because, from July 18 through August 22, 2011, Petitioner took a total of 48 hours of leave time, which was greater than the Agency's policy of no more than 32 hours in a 90-day period. Although Petitioner discussed most of those absences with her supervisor prior to taking the time off, as a result of her absences, Petitioner missed some of her initial training, including professional crisis management training. During the August 25, 2011, counseling session, Mr. Grimsley and Mr. Hewett also discussed other issues of concern with Petitioner, including resident care, following chain of command, team work, proper parking, and data collection sheets. As a follow-up, on the same day as the August 25th counseling, Petitioner received some in-service training regarding proper log book documenting, proper use of active treatment sheet, and unauthorized and excessive absences. Mr. Grimsley permitted Petitioner to go back to her duties of working directly with residents after she received additional training on August 27, 2011. On September 8, 2011, Petitioner's supervisors once again found it necessary to counsel Petitioner regarding resident care, chain of command, teamwork, parking, and data collection, as well as to address two incidences of unsafe handling of residents, and Agency policy regarding food in the bedrooms, and class and work schedules. Because of Petitioner's continued performance deficiencies, on October 5, 2011, Mr. Grimsley wrote an interoffice memorandum to his supervisor, Agency residential services supervisor, Julie Jackson, recommending Petitioner's termination. The memorandum stated: Mrs. Jackson: I am writing to you in regard to Mrs. Sharon Douse HSW II Second Shift Connally Manor Unit 3. Mrs. Douse came to us July 15, 2011, since then she has had three employee documented conferences, due to poor work habits, resulting in corrective action, including retraining. These deficiencies include and are not limited to data collection, excessive absences, and unsafe handling of residents. This past week she was insubordinate to her immediate supervisor by refusing to answer the phone after being requested to do so twice, and being directed that it is part of her job. [Mr. Hewett] as well as my self [sic] has made every effort to help Mrs. Douse achieve her performance expectation; however these attempts have been met with resistance as Mrs. Douse openly refuses to take direction from her supervisors and also to seek the assistance of her peers, who have many years of experience working with the Connally Manor population. Mrs. Douse has not met probationary period. Her continual resistance to positive mentoring and her confrontational attitude and demeanor towards her supervisors and coworkers is creating an increasingly difficult work environment, not only on Connally Manor, but also on the other houses within the unit. It is apparent that Mrs. Douse lacks the willingness to improve her overall poor work performance. I am formally requesting Mrs. Douse to be terminated from her employment here in Unit 3. Mr. Grimsley's testimony at the final hearing was consistent with the above-quoted October 5, 2011, interoffice memorandum, and both his testimony and memorandum are credited. Upon receiving Mr. Grimsley's memorandum, Ms. Jackson submitted a memo dated October 26, 2011, to the Agency's program operations administrator, Elizabeth Mitchell, concurring with the request for Petitioner's termination. In turn, Ms. Mitchell agreed and forwarded her recommendation for termination to Sunland's superintendent, Bryan Vaughan. Mr. Vaughan approved the recommendation for termination, and, following implementation of internal termination proceedings, Petitioner was terminated on January 5, 2012, for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period. Petitioner made no complaints to Mr. Grimsley or anyone else in the Agency's management until after Mr. Grimsley's October 5, 2011, memorandum recommending Petitioner's termination. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination filed with the Commission on March 29, 2012, after her termination, charges that she was "discriminated against based on retaliation, disability, marital status, sex, color, race and age." The evidence adduced at the final hearing, however, failed to substantiate Petitioner's allegations. In particular, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination2/ alleges that Mr. Grimsley discriminated against her because of her age by "not providing [her] with the same training as offered the other employees -- [professional crisis management training] was offered to the younger employees who were hired at or around the same time [as Petitioner]." The evidence at the final hearing, however, showed that Petitioner was scheduled for, but missed professional crisis management training, because of her absences early in her employment. The evidence also showed that professional crisis management training was not necessary for the position for which Petitioner was hired. Nevertheless, the evidence also demonstrated that, if Petitioner had not been terminated, the Agency intended to provide her with that training. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination also asserts that Mr. Grimsley discriminated against her by "[n]ot allowing [her] to have . . . scheduled time off . . . [and taking away her] scheduled time off August 12th & 13th and [giving it to a] Caucasian female." The evidence did not substantiate this allegation. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner had extraordinary time off during her first two months of employment. Next, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination states that Mr. Grimsley did not follow up on her written concerns and verbal complaints to the "depart[ment] head" regarding the welfare of the disabled residents. Petitioner alleges that she was terminated as a result of her complaint that Mr. Grimsley "sat in the kitchen and baked cookies with the staff who were neglecting disabled residents." Petitioner, however, failed to present any evidence at the final hearing with regard to this allegation. Rather, the evidence showed that, while employed, Petitioner never reported any instances of abuse, neglect, or exploitation to the Florida Abuse Registry, as required by her training. And, there is no evidence that she reported any such concerns to any outside agency prior to her Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner otherwise presented no evidence suggesting that she was terminated in retaliation for engaging in any protected activity. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination further states that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability because Mr. Grimsley did not allow her to be properly monitored by her physician, and that when she would bring in her doctor's notes, Mr. Grimsley would refuse to put them in her personnel file. The only support for this claim were two medical reports on Petitioner, one prepared in April 2011, and one prepared in October 2011. According to Petitioner, she gave the reports to someone at the Agency's human resources office. She could not, however, identify the person to whom she gave the reports. Also, according to Petitioner, it was in November 2011, after she was recommended for termination, that she gave her medical reports to the Agency to be filed. Considering the circumstances, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's testimony regarding this allegation is not credible. In addition, the evidence did not show that Petitioner ever asked the Agency for an accommodation for her alleged disability. Rather, based upon the evidence, it is found that Petitioner never advised the Agency, and the Agency was unaware, that Petitioner had a disability. It is also found that Petitioner never asked the Agency for an accommodation for her alleged disability. Petitioner, in her Charge of Discrimination, further contends that part of the employee counseling session documented on employee-documented conference forms dated August 25, 2011, and all of the counseling session documented in a September 8, 2011, employee-documented conference form, were held without her, and that some of the concerns expressed on those documents were fabricated. There were two forms documenting discussions from the August 25th session that were submitted into evidence — - one was signed by Petitioner, the other was not. The employee-documented conference form from the September 8, 2011, session was signed by Petitioner's supervisors, but not Petitioner. Mr. Grimsley, who was present for all of the counseling discussions with Petitioner documented on the forms, testified that the documented discussions occurred, but that he just forgot to get Petitioner's signatures on all of the forms. During the final hearing, Petitioner acknowledged most of the documented discussions, including two incidents of mishandling residents and the resulting prohibition from working with residents imposed on her until she received additional training. Considering the evidence, it is found that all of the counseling discussions with Petitioner documented on the three forms actually took place, and that they accurately reflect those discussions and the fact that Petitioner was having job performance problems. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination also alleges that a fellow employee discriminated against her because of her age and race based on an incident where, according to Petitioner, a co-worker screamed and yelled at her because Petitioner had not answered the house telephone. At the hearing, Petitioner submitted into evidence affidavits regarding the incident from the co-worker and another worker who observed the incident. Neither of the affidavits supports Petitioner's contention that she was discriminated against. Rather, they both support the finding that Petitioner had trouble getting along with co-workers and accepting directions from Agency staff. Further, according to Petitioner, after she talked to Mr. Grimsley about the incident, he spoke to both Petitioner and the co-worker, and their conflict was resolved. The incident occurred after Mr. Grimsley had already recommended that Petitioner be terminated. Finally, Petitioner alleges in her Charge of Discrimination that Mr. Hewett discriminated against her based upon her marital status, race, and the national origin of her spouse. In support, Petitioner contends that Mr. Hewett "made rude comments about art work on my locker that Scott knew my husband had drawn[,]" asked, "[do] blacks like classical music?" and, upon seeing Petitioner's apron that was embroidered with a Jamaican flag, Mr. Hewett said, "You can't trust things from overseas," when he knew that her husband was Jamaican. Petitioner also stated that Mr. Hewett "bullied her" about answering the telephone. While Petitioner testified that she wrote to Agency management regarding these comments and the alleged bullying by Mr. Hewett, she did not retain a copy. The Agency claims that Petitioner never complained about these alleged comments or Mr. Hewett's alleged bullying while she was an employee. Considering the evidence presented in this case, and Petitioner's demeanor during her testimony, it is found that Petitioner did not raise these allegations against Mr. Hewett until after her termination from the Agency. It is further found that if Mr. Hewett made the alleged comments, as described by Petitioner during her testimony, Mr. Hewett's comments were isolated and not pervasive. Further, Petitioner's testimonial description of Mr. Hewett's comments did not indicate that his comments were overtly intimidating, insulting, or made with ridicule, and the evidence was insufficient to show, or reasonably suggest, that Mr. Hewett's alleged comments made Petitioner's work environment at the Agency hostile or intolerable. In sum, Petitioner failed to show that the Agency discriminated against Petitioner by treating her differently, creating a hostile work environment, or terminating her because of her disability, marital status, sex, color, race, age, or her spouse's national origin. Petitioner also failed to show that the Agency retaliated against her because of any complaint that she raised or based upon Petitioner's engagement in any other protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s (“Dillard’s”), discriminated against Petitioner based upon his national origin or disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).2/
Findings Of Fact Dillard’s is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Dillard’s is a department store chain. Petitioner, a Mexican male, was hired as a sales associate in the men’s department of Dillard’s store at Tallahassee’s Governor’s Square Mall on May 13, 2014. Petitioner’s job was to sell men’s fragrances directly to customers at the store. Allen Gustason was manager of the Dillard’s store at Governor’s Square Mall during the time Petitioner was employed there. Dee Thomas was the assistant store manager. Mark Kronenberger, who testified at the final hearing, was the men’s department sales manager and was Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the entire time that Petitioner worked at Dillard’s. Petitioner started at a salary of $12.00 per hour as a sales associate. His job performance and pay increases were assessed primarily on the basis of sales. On January 6, 2015, Petitioner received a raise to $12.60 per hour. On April 14, 2015, Petitioner was promoted to the position of fragrance specialist and received a raise to $14.50 per hour. Petitioner’s promotion did not change his basic duties, i.e., direct sales to customers. Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s ended on November 28, 2015. Dillard’s did not dispute Petitioner’s testimony that he was a good and effective salesperson. Petitioner developed a regular clientele of Spanish-speaking customers who liked his ability to communicate with them in their native language. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received, read, and agreed to abide by Dillard’s Associate Work Rules and General Policies, which among other things forbade insubordination by sales associates. “Insubordination” was defined to include failure to follow lawful instructions from a supervisor and engaging in contemptuous or taunting conduct that undermines the authority of management. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Petitioner claims that he is a Mexican male with a disability. The claimed disability is the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Dillard’s did not dispute that Petitioner has HIV. Petitioner claims that he was harassed by fellow employees because of his Mexican national origin. Petitioner claims that he complained to his supervisors, Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Gustason, about the harassment. Petitioner claims that no effective action was taken to curb the harassment. Petitioner described a pervasive sense of discrimination at Dillard’s of which he became conscious only after about a year of working there. He testified that he is from California and had no real concept of being discriminated against because of his Mexican heritage. It took some time for him to realize and acknowledge to himself that it was happening. However, Petitioner was unable to describe many specific instances of discriminatory behavior by fellow employees. People were “mean,” or “picked on me,” or “didn’t like me,” but few of Petitioner’s complaints pointed toward racial discrimination as opposed to personal dislike. He complained that co-workers planned parties and get-togethers away from work but never asked him along, even for Mr. Kronenberger’s birthday party, but could only speculate as to the reason for his exclusion. Petitioner testified that he was an aggressive and successful salesperson. While its salespeople are assigned to specific departments, Dillard’s allows them to cross-sell in other departments. Several of the incidents described by Petitioner began when he took customers to other departments to sell them something. The undersigned infers that at least some of the bad feelings toward Petitioner were due to his perceived “poaching” of sales from other sections of the store. Petitioner testified that an employee named Carol would yell at him, apparently without provocation, so consistently that he went out of his way to avoid crossing her path. Petitioner stated that one day Carol screamed that he was good-for-nothing and was a “damn Mexican,” in front of customers and co-workers. Petitioner testified that he had no idea why she did this because he had done nothing to provoke her. He walked away, covering his ears from her abuse. Petitioner testified that he went upstairs and spoke to Mr. Gustason about the incident but that nothing was done. Petitioner stated that he returned to the sales floor. Other employees told him that Carol had worked for Dillard’s for many years and was a friend of Mr. Gustason and that he should not expect anything to be done about her behavior. Petitioner testified that an employee named Eric, who worked in the men’s department, made fun of his accent, particularly Petitioner’s difficulty in pronouncing “Saturday.” Petitioner testified that another fellow employee, a white woman named Amber who also worked in fragrance, was constantly rude and mean to him. In front of customers, Amber would say that she did not know why Petitioner was there, that he was only good for cleaning the counters. Petitioner repeatedly complained to Mr. Kronenberger about Amber. Mr. Kronenberger told him to continue doing a good job and not to focus on Amber. Petitioner stated that Mr. Kronenberger directed Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter, but she ignored the order and continued to harass him. Petitioner stated that matters came to a head when he was helping some female customers and went to Amber’s counter one day. He reached behind her to get the fragrance the customers wanted and Amber struck him with her elbow. The customers were aghast and complained to Dillard’s management despite Petitioner’s entreaties that they let the matter drop. Petitioner and Amber were called to the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Yami Yao, the manager of women’s cosmetics. Amber denied everything. The supervisors told Petitioner and Amber to get along. They told Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter. Petitioner testified that Amber ignored the instruction and continued to harass him. Petitioner testified that on another day he was approached by a customer who wanted to pay Petitioner for a pair of shoes. Petitioner testified that he asked Mr. Kronenberger about it, because he did not want to steal a sale or anger anyone. Mr. Kronenberger told him that he was there to sell and that cross-selling was fine. As Petitioner was completing the sale, an older white man working in the shoe department threw a shoe at Petitioner and said, “You damn Mexican, I’m going to raise hell against you.” Petitioner testified about an altercation with Risa Autrey, a fragrance model who worked in Dillard’s and who Petitioner stated was another longtime friend of Mr. Gustason. One day, Ms. Autrey approached Petitioner--again, with zero provocation, according to Petitioner--and began berating him, saying that she had no idea why Dillard’s kept Petitioner around. This occurred in front of co-workers and customers. The customers went upstairs and complained to Mr. Gustason, who followed up by admonishing Petitioner to stop telling people to complain to him because nothing was going to come of it. Petitioner testified that a day or so after the incident with Ms. Autrey, he met with Mr. Gustason and Mr. Thomas.4/ During the course of this meeting, Petitioner disclosed his HIV status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Gustason’s attitude towards him changed immediately, and that Mr. Gustason had him fired two weeks later on a pretextual charge of stealing and insubordination. Petitioner testified that he got sick a few days before Black Friday, which in 2015 was on November 27. When he returned to work on November 25, he attempted to give Mr. Gustason a doctor’s note that would have entitled Petitioner to paid leave, but Mr. Gustason would not talk to him. Petitioner worked a long shift on Black Friday. On Saturday, November 28, 2015, he was called to Mr. Thomas’s office about an altercation he had on November 25 with Ms. Yao, the woman’s cosmetics manager. Mr. Kronenberger was also in the office. Petitioner testified that Mr. Thomas accused him of stealing, as well as insubordination to Ms. Yao, and fired him. Two mall security officers, the Dillard’s security officer, and Mr. Kronenberger escorted Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner testified that he was given no paperwork to memorialize his firing or the reasons therefor. Mr. Kronenberger testified at the final hearing. He testified that Petitioner constantly complained about someone not liking him or picking on him. Petitioner never gave him specifics as to what happened. Mr. Kronenberger stated that Petitioner never complained about racial slurs or that any of his alleged mistreatment had a discriminatory element. It was always, “This person doesn’t like me.” Petitioner had issues with tardiness and absenteeism throughout his employment with Dillard’s. Mr. Kronenberger testified that there would be days when Petitioner simply would not show up for work, or would send a text message to Mr. Kronenberger saying that he had things to do or someone he had to meet. Employment records submitted by Dillard’s supported the contention that Petitioner was frequently late for, or absent from, work. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner was erratic in his communications. Petitioner would send a text message saying he could not come in. Then he would send a text telling Mr. Kronenberger how happy he was to have the job. Mr. Kronenberger recalled once receiving a text from Petitioner at midnight that read, “I know I’ve been bad.” In November 2015, Petitioner had six unexcused absences, including four consecutive days from November 21 through 24. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner finally admitted that he needed to cut his hours in order to qualify for some form of public assistance. Mr. Gustason told Petitioner that something could be worked out to cut his hours, but that just not showing up for work was unfair to Mr. Kronenberger and the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Dillard’s would normally terminate an employee with six unexcused absences in one month under the heading of job abandonment. He stated that Mr. Gustason bent over backward to work with Petitioner and keep him on the job. When Petitioner was absent, Mr. Gustason would leave messages for him, asking him to call and let him know what was going on. During the string of November absences, Mr. Kronenberger phoned Petitioner, who said that he was afraid to come into work for fear that Mr. Gustason would fire him. Mr. Kronenberger assured Petitioner that Mr. Gustason had no such intent, but that in any event no one would have to fire him because he had not been to work in a week. Petitioner was effectively “firing himself” by abandoning his position. Petitioner showed up for work on November 25, 2015, at 4:50 p.m. He had been scheduled to come in at 9:45 a.m. Mr. Kronenberger testified that he was not present for Petitioner’s altercation with Ms. Yao, but that Ms. Yao reported she had attempted to counsel Petitioner about gifts with purchases. The promotional gifts were to be given away only with the purchase of certain items, but Petitioner was apparently disregarding that restriction and giving the gifts with non-qualifying purchases. Ms. Yao told Mr. Kronenberger that Petitioner quickly escalated the counseling into a shouting match in front of customers and co-workers. He yelled, “You’re not going to talk to me that way.” Ms. Yao told Petitioner that she worked in another department and did not have to deal with his antics. She told him that she was going to report the matter to Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas.5/ Mr. Kronenberger testified that his conversation with Ms. Yao was brief because there was no need to give many particulars. He was used to getting reports of employee run-ins with Petitioner and did not need much explanation to get the gist of what had happened. Mr. Kronenberger decided not to raise the issue with Petitioner on Black Friday, the busiest day of the year at the store. On the next day, November 28, Petitioner was called into the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas. Mr. Kronenberger testified that this meeting was not just about the incident with Ms. Yao but also Petitioner’s absences. In Mr. Kronenberger’s words, “[I]t was to follow up with the incident with Yami, and it was to follow up with, ‘Hey, you’ve just missed a week, you’ve been back a day, and you’re having this blow-up with a manager on the floor.’ Like, ‘What’s going on?’” Mr. Kronenberger testified that neither he nor Mr. Thomas went into this meeting with any intention of terminating Petitioner’s employment. However, two minutes into the conversation, Petitioner was on his feet, pointing fingers, and shouting that he knew what they were trying to do and he was not going to let them do it. He was quitting. Petitioner walked out of the office. Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Kronenberger to walk Petitioner out of the store so that there would be no incidents on the floor with the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger accompanied Petitioner to the fragrance area, where Petitioner retrieved some personal items, then walked him to the door. They shook hands and Petitioner left the store. Mr. Kronenberger was firm in his testimony that no security personnel were involved in removing Petitioner from the store. Petitioner was not accused of stealing. His parting with Mr. Kronenberger was as cordial as it could have been under the circumstances.6/ After Petitioner left his office, Mr. Thomas prepared a “Separation Data Form” confirming Petitioner’s dismissal for “violation of company work rules.” The specific ground stated for Petitioner’s dismissal was violation of the Associate Work Rule forbidding insubordination. Mr. Kronenberger testified that in his mind the “insubordination” included not just the scene with Ms. Yao, but the explosion Petitioner had in the meeting with Mr. Thomas. At the time of Petitioner’s dismissal, Mr. Kronenberger was unaware of Petitioner’s HIV status. Mr. Kronenberger credibly testified that Petitioner’s HIV status had nothing to do with his dismissal from employment at Dillard’s. Mr. Gustason, who apparently was aware of Petitioner’s HIV status, was not at work on November 28, 2015, and was not involved in the events leading to Petitioner’s dismissal. Mr. Thomas, the assistant store manager, made the decision to treat Petitioner’s situation as a dismissal for cause.7/ Mr. Kronenberger’s testimony is credited regarding the circumstances of Petitioner’s dismissal and as to the general tenor of Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s. Petitioner was constantly in the middle of conflicts, but never alleged until after his termination that these conflicts were due to his national origin or disability. Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was extremely emotional. He cried frequently and seemed baffled that Mr. Kronenberger was disputing his testimony. The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s version of events was genuine in the sense that it conveyed Petitioner’s subjective experience of his employment as he recollected it. However, the undersigned must also find that Petitioner’s subjective experience did not conform to objective reality. However, Petitioner internalized the experiences, it is not plausible that Dillard’s employees were yelling at Petitioner without provocation, hitting him, throwing shoes at him, and calling him a “damn Mexican” in front of customers. It is not plausible that Petitioner’s superiors would ignore such flagrant discriminatory behavior when it was brought to their attention. Petitioner’s feelings about the motives of his co-workers and superiors cannot substitute for tangible evidence of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner offered the testimony of two Dillard’s customers, neither of whom saw behavior from Petitioner’s co- workers that could be attributed to anything beyond personal dislike or sales poaching. Santiago Garcia testified that he noted other Dillard’s employees rolling their eyes at Petitioner, but he thought the reason might be that Petitioner talked too loud. Mr. Garcia also saw “bad looks” from other employees and believed that the atmosphere among Dillard’s employees was “tense,” but did not offer a reason for the tension. Claudia Pimentel testified, through a Spanish language interpreter, that she always went directly to Petitioner because she speaks only Spanish and Petitioner was able to help her. Ms. Pimentel noted that a female Dillard’s employee got mad at Petitioner because he sold Ms. Pimentel a cream from her counter. During the years 2015 and 2016, the Dillard’s store in Governor’s Square Mall terminated two other sales associates for insubordination. Neither of these sales associates was Mexican. One was a black female and the other was a black male. Neither of these sales associates had a known disability at the time of termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by Dillard’s for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s national origin or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s discriminated against him because of his national origin or his disability in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s, did not commit any unlawful employment practices, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October 2017.
Findings Of Fact Based on all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a claim by petitioner, William C. Eagle (petitioner or Eagle), that in February 1994 he was denied employment as a delivery helper by respondent, S. R. Perrott, Inc., on account of a real or perceived handicap. According to the complaint, at the time the alleged discriminatory practice occurred, petitioner was suffering from a "soft tissue injury" from a "work related accident with his former employer." Because the evidence shows that in February 1994 petitioner did not enjoy in some measure the full and normal use of his physical facilities, he was a handicapped person, at least temporarily, within the meaning of the law. A preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Respondent is a beer distributor in Ormond Beach, Florida. Whether respondent employs "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year" so as to be subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, is not of record. In February 1994, petitioner learned of an opening for a delivery helper at respondent's plant. The position required that the employee unload beer kegs weighing 167 pounds from a delivery truck onto a dolly and then push the dolly into the business establishment. At that point, the employee would have to bend over and lift the keg off of the dolly to a waist-high position and place it in the desired location. Empty kegs would then be loaded onto the dolly and taken back to the truck and loaded. Since a truck would typically make up to 30 to 40 stops per day, the helper was required to engage in repetitious bending, twisting and lifting of heavy objects. After filing an application with respondent, petitioner was interviewed by respondent's general manager, Gary Connors, on February 23, 1994. During the interview, petitioner failed to disclose that he had suffered a back injury on a previous job, he was receiving worker's compensation benefits, he was then being treated by a doctor, and because of the injury, he was, at least arguably and temporarily, a handicapped individual. Without these undisclosed facts, Connors believed Eagle was qualified for the job and told him to report to work the next morning as a delivery helper. Like every other applicant, however, Eagle was also told that the job was contingent on his successfully passing a pre- employment physical examination. On the same morning that petitioner began work, or February 24, 1994, Connors contacted the office of Dr. James W. Bennett, a local chiropractic physician who conducted employment physicals for respondent, to set up an appointment for Eagle. During his telephone conversation with Dr. Bennett, Connors learned that Eagle was being treated by Dr. Bennett for a back injury suffered on his previous job, and that he had been examined by Dr. Bennett on February 14, 1994, or ten days earlier. Dr. Bennett accordingly saw no need to re-examine Eagle, and he advised Connors that Eagle could aggravate "an existing, active injury," and that he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Based on this information, Connors immediately spoke with the plant manager, Richard Shaffer, and instructed him to recall Eagle from his route and terminate his employment. In making this employment decision, Connors was not motivated by discriminatory animus, but rather he made the decision solely because of Eagle's inability to pass a pre-employment physical examination, a prerequisite for employment for all job applicants. Indeed, at that time, while Connors knew that Eagle had a pre-existing back injury through conversations with Dr. Bennett, he neither knew, or had reason to believe, that the injury constituted a handicap under the law. Shaffer recalled Eagle from his route and discharged him around noon on February 24, 1994. Since Shaffer did not know the reason for the termination, he told Eagle to check back in a few days and he would find out the specific reason for his discharge. A few days later, Eagle returned and met with Connors who told him that he was discharged because he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Several months later, Eagle filed his charge of discrimination. At hearing, Eagle denied that he was handicapped and asserted that as of February 1994 he "felt fine" physically. Indeed, he described in some detail the type of heavy manual labor he had performed with another employer up to the time he applied for the position. He also contended that the injury was minor and would not interfere with a delivery helper's tasks. But testimony from Dr. Bennett established that as of February 24, 1994, Eagle had "a current, precarious injury," namely, moderate chronic lumbar sprain strain, that work restrictions with his former employer had been recommended, and that Eagle was "highly likely" to worsen that injury should he engage in the job activities required of a delivery helper. This testimony was not credibly contradicted. Although Eagle was later discharged from Dr. Bennett's care on April 1, 1994, Eagle could not pass the pre-employment physical examination on February 24, 1994, when the employment decision was made, and thus he did not qualify for the job. Eagle further suggested at hearing that, assuming he was handicapped, respondent failed to take reasonable steps to accommodate his disability. But Eagle made no request for accommodation either at the time he sought the position or after he learned the reason for his termination. Even if Eagle had requested accommodation, respondent had no positions in the business that did not require some heavy lifting except for a secretarial slot, for which Eagle was not qualified. Moreover, respondent's general manager did not know, or even believe, that Eagle was handicapped and thus may have required accommodation. Then, too, in order to accommodate Eagle, respondent would have had to make fundamental alterations in its work program or even create a new job. Eagle did not rebut this showing at hearing, and he failed to respond with any evidence regarding his individual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations by respondent within the restrictions imposed by Dr. Bennett. There is no evidence regarding the compensation Eagle would have received as a delivery helper. The record also fails to establish his compensation since that time, and thus there is no basis on which to make a finding as to lost wages. Whether petitioner seeks reinstatement as a delivery helper is also not of record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition for relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1788 Petitioner: Petitioner filed an "order" with nine unnumbered paragraphs containing a mixture of proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5 and 8. 6-8. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. 9. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence or a conclusion of law. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the more credible evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: P. Daniel Williams, Esquire P. O. Box 1007 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Winston K. Borkowski, Esquire P. O. Box 1725 Ormond Beach, Florida 32175 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his race or age when he was not selected as Lead Mechanic in Area I KA/Nitric.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male who was over 40 at the time he applied for the Area I (One) Lead Mechanic position. At the time Petitioner applied for the Area I Lead Mechanic position, he was a lead mechanic in the Central Maintenance Compressor and Gear Box shop, pay grade level 28 position. Pay grade level 28 is the highest nonexempt pay grade at Solutia, Inc. On January 25, 1999, Solutia posted a job opening for a lead mechanic position in Area I KA/Nitric, a pay grade level 28 position. Petitioner applied for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. Had Petitioner been selected for the Area I Lead Mechanic position, it would have been a lateral transfer and not a promotion because Petitioner was already at a level 28 pay grade. No evidence was received that the incumbent of the Area I Lead Mechanic position would have had more authority or promotion opportunities than the position previously held. Petitioner, along with three other mechanics, interviewed for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. The other three applicants were: William G. Cook (a white male); Joseph S. Mann (a white male); and David Wolfe (a white male). Petitioner admits that all the applicants were qualified for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. Respondent used a ranking procedure to evaluate the applicants for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. The applicants were ranked by subjectively grading their answers to questions in five areas: 1) problem-solving and decision-making ability; 2) teamwork and coaching ability; (3) communication ability; (4) honoring differences; and (5) results orientation and initiative. The applicants were given a score from one to five by each panel member based upon the panel members' subjective assessment of applicants’ answers on each of the five criteria. Five was the highest grade and one being the lowest. The points were totaled and converted into a percentage score. The applicant having the highest overall score was selected to fill the job. The applicants were interviewed by a panel composed of six employees: Nikki Owens; Mike Conley; Darren Dobson; Tony Williams (a black male); Terry Wilcox (who was over 40 at the time of the interview); and Greg Barker. All of these persons were from Area I. The majority of the panel worked regularly with the person ultimately selected. Petitioner admits that there was no overtly discriminatory questions or activity in the interview. There were no questions or discussions amongst the panel members about the applicants' race or age. The panel members scored each applicant separately without knowing how the other panel members scored the applicants. The panel members scored the applicants as follows: W. Cook S. Holly J. Mann D. Wolfe Nikki Owens 45% 77% 90% 67% Michael Conley 53.3% 63.3% 70% 63.6% Darren Dobson 40% 63% 70% 67% Greg Barker 40% 57% 73% 57% Tony Williams 57% 73% 67% 50% Terry Wilcox 33% 66.6% 76.6% 57.7% After the individual panel members totaled their respective scores, the applicants were ranked. Joseph Mann was ranked first by five of the six panel members, and one panel member, the black male, ranked Petitioner first. The panel discussed the results and reached a unanimous consensus to offer the Area I Lead Mechanic position to Joseph Mann. The panel prepared and provided feedback to all the applicants. Petitioner's shortcoming was that he failed to give specific examples to questions posted during his interview. When he was not selected, Petitioner complained about the outcome, believing he was the most qualified applicant and was rejected for racially motivated reasons. Rachel Gold (a black female) and Lerissa Rowe, who both worked in Respondent's Human Resources Department, investigated Petitioner's complaint. During their investigation, it came to their attention that a panel member, Terry Wilcox, stated to a co-employee, "I don't think that there would ever be two black people in charge of a group of white mechanics in a shop." After learning of Terry Wilcox' comment, Respondent took the following action: (a) Respondent recalculated the panel's score leaving out Terry Wilcox' score; and (b) Respondent disciplined Terry Wilcox by suspending him for two days without pay. After recalculating the scores, Joseph Mann still had the highest overall score. Petitioner's overall score remained the same. Petitioner remained with Respondent until he voluntarily retired effective November 1, 1999. No one forced Petitioner to retire. The decision was Petitioner's alone, prompted in part by a change in Respondent's retirement plan. Petitioner admits that none of the panel members had ever discriminated against him because of his race or age prior to the complained of selection. Since retiring, Petitioner has not sought employment elsewhere. He is basically enjoying retirement.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the instant petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvester A. Holly, Jr. Post Office Box 301 Cantonment, Florida 32533 Erick M. Drlicka, Esquire Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon 30 South Spring Street Pensacola, Florida 32596 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was terminated from her employment with Respondent for a discriminatory reason.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sharon Singleton, was employed by Respondent in the Information Technology (IT) Department. Petitioner served, as did other IT employees, under an annual contract. Respondent is the administrative government entity for the public schools of Escambia County, Florida. Contracts of employment are with the Escambia County School Board. Mr. Johnnie Odom supervised Petitioner until the last eight months of her employment. Her supervisor was Kathy Cooper during the last eight months of her employment. For many years, Petitioner and the other technicians used a software program that supported the management of school records that was known as “TERMS.” During the last few years of Petitioner’s employment, the District changed the supporting software program from TERMS to a program known as “FOCUS.” This was a major conversion of software programs that took place over an extended period of time. When the FOCUS program was initiated, Respondent hired three additional technicians to support FOCUS. Petitioner disagreed with the hiring of new technicians to support FOCUS, but acknowledges she was not treated any differently from the other Tech III support staff. Her disagreement was over the hiring of the new technicians, rather than allowing the existing ones to serve as primary support for FOCUS. Petitioner sought a promotion to a higher level position in 2011. The promotion process was administered by a selection committee that interviewed and evaluated candidates. As a result of the competitive selection, Petitioner was not recommended or selected for the promotion. On two prior occasions, Petitioner had sought a promotion, and on both occasions a selection committee ranked and evaluated the candidates. Petitioner was not successful in being selected or promoted on those two prior occasions. For the 2011-2012 school year, Petitioner received unsatisfactory ratings for her administrative/professional techniques and skills, as well as for her professional relationships with staff. The evaluation contained a note stating that Petitioner has difficulty in resolving conflicts with her co-workers and that her supervisor would like to see her resolve conflicts with her co-workers in a more diplomatic manner. Petitioner had received some unsatisfactory or needs improvement marks in her previous years’ evaluations, so 2011- 2012 was not the first time she had received less than satisfactory marks. Nevertheless, following the 2011-2012 annual evaluation, Petitioner received an annual employment contract for the next school year. At the end of the next school year, Petitioner again received an unsatisfactory mark for her professional techniques and skills. She also was cited for needing improvement in other areas. The notes to that evaluation stated Petitioner had improved her relationships with co-workers, but was still having problems adjusting to the new programs that required modernizing her skill set. Despite a few negative marks on her evaluation, Petitioner received an annual contract for the 2013-2014 school year. Petitioner did not dispute the fact that her evaluator and supervisor, Mr. Odom, believed her performance was unsatisfactory. She disagreed, however, with his assessment of her performance. Petitioner believed she had been demoted in the 2013-2014 school year and testified she signed a paper acknowledging a demotion in a disciplinary meeting with the IT department director, Tom Ingram. She did not receive a reduction in salary or benefits, however. Mr. Ingram classified the action taken against Petitioner as a restriction of her duties to Level I telephone support, rather than the more challenging Level II telephone support duties that she had performed in the past. He did not consider this a demotion, but more of a recognition of assigning Petitioner to duties that he believed she could better handle with her skill set. Petitioner testified that Ms. Cooper told her on several occasions she should consider retirement. Petitioner took this as evidence of Ms. Cooper’s belief she was too old to perform her job. Ms. Cooper testified she made the suggestion because Petitioner had an elderly mother who lived in a nursing home and needed assistance. Ms. Cooper was responding to Petitioner having told her she was left with little time to care for her mother when she finished with work. Petitioner acknowledged that her mother was elderly and needed help and that she had told this to Ms. Cooper. During Petitioner’s final eight months of employment, she worked mainly telephone support under the direction of Ms. Cooper, the support manager for the District. Ms. Cooper manages the help desk and IT support staff. She manages two levels of support. Level I support involves matters that can be resolved by telephone, while Level II support is for matters that cannot be resolved in five minutes or less and require more expertise to cure. Ms. Cooper developed concerns about Petitioner’s support performance. She took her concerns to the Director of IT, Mr. Ingram. Similar concerns with Petitioner’s performance had been raised by another support technician, as well. That technician reported that one of the schools to which he and Petitioner had both been assigned, asked that Petitioner not be allowed to return there for support in the future. When Ms. Cooper brought her concerns about Petitioner to Mr. Ingram, he asked that she bring him documentation of her concerns evidencing recent issues concerning Petitioner’s performance. Mr. Ingram met with Petitioner on September 3, 2013, to review her performance. Mr. Ingram’s notes from that meeting document his concern with Petitioner’s performance and he restricted her duties at that time to telephone support because he did not believe she could independently provide on-site support to more schools. His notes further indicate that Petitioner was not satisfied with his conclusions regarding her performance. Mr. Ingram conducted a follow-up interview with Petitioner on September 4, 2013, because Petitioner wanted to share with him the evaluation she had received from Mr. Odom for the 2012-2013 school year. Mr. Ingram told Petitioner he agreed with the evaluation conducted and recorded by Mr. Odom. Mr. Ingram had yet another meeting with Petitioner in March 2014 regarding her performance. With Ms. Cooper present, Mr. Ingram reviewed documentation concerning Petitioner’s unsatisfactory performance. The meeting was held pursuant to a Notice of Consideration of Disciplinary Action served on Petitioner. As a result of the meeting, Mr. Ingram was not confident Petitioner could satisfactorily improve her performance. He believed that Petitioner refused to accept the representative examples he gave her of her unsatisfactory performance. After concluding at the March meeting that Petitioner’s performance would not sufficiently improve, Mr. Ingram decided not to renew Petitioner’s annual contract when it expired in June 2014. Petitioner believed she had been marginalized by her perceived demotion to a Level I telephone support technician. She also was removed from ZENworks, a scheduling program she had previously been involved with over the years, becoming the only employee on the support team that was not allowed to participate in that program. Petitioner believed that all the criticisms of her work by management were hyper-technical, and that she received little, if any, feedback or training during the period for which she was evaluated when the unsatisfactory findings were made. She also attempted to show that others who made errors similar to hers were given promotions. The evidence presented on this point was insufficient to support her claim of disparate treatment. Several retired or long-serving District employees testified that their interaction over the years with Petitioner resulted in responsive and high-quality service from Petitioner. None of these witnesses testified about specific support they received from Petitioner during the last three years of her employment, employing the new FOCUS system, which served as the basis for the non-renewal of her contract. Petitioner testified she should receive damages in the amount of $384,000 as the result of her employment being terminated while she was a participant in the midst of D.R.O.P.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the “unlawful employment practice” alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner’s employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Ryan M. Barnett, Esquire Whibbs and Stone, P.A. 801 West Romana Street, Unit C Pensacola, Florida 32502 (eServed) Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire The Hammons Law Firm, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
