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JUDITH A. RICHARDS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 20-004558 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Kissimmee, Florida Oct. 14, 2020 Number: 20-004558 Latest Update: Jan. 03, 2025

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Judith Richards, is eligible for the health insurance subsidy offered to Florida Retirement System retirees.

Findings Of Fact In November 2011, Petitioner was hired by the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office to work as a crossing guard. The Osceola County Sheriff’s Office is an FRS-participating employer, and the position held by Petitioner was in the 2 It is well established that issues related to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the pendency of a proceeding. 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). “Regular Class” of FRS membership. In 2011, newly hired eligible employees (members) of the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office were required to participate in either the FRS pension plan or the investment plan. Petitioner elected to participate in the investment plan. Generally, the pension plan offers eligible employees a formulaic fixed monthly retirement benefit, whereas an employee’s investment plan benefits are “provided through member-directed investments.” Pursuant to section 112.363, Florida Statutes, retired members of any state-administered retirement system will receive an HIS benefit if certain eligibility requirements are satisfied. Section 112.363(1) provides that a monthly subsidy payment will be provided “to retired members of any state- administered retirement system in order to assist such retired members in paying the costs of health insurance.” Section 112.363(3)(e)2. provides that beginning July 1, 2002, each eligible member of the investment plan shall receive “a monthly retiree health insurance subsidy payment equal to the number of years of creditable service, as provided in this subparagraph, completed at the time of retirement, multiplied by $5; … [and] an eligible retiree or beneficiary may not receive a subsidy payment of more than $150 or less than $30.” On July 18, 2019, Petitioner’s employment with the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office ended, and at that time she had 7.77 years of FRS creditable service.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the application for retiree health insurance subsidy submitted by Mrs. Richards. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Judith Richards 2337 Louise Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (5) 112.363120.569120.57121.021768.28 DOAH Case (1) 20-4558
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MALBA LANIER vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-000128 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000128 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1980

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 1.04120.57121.011121.021121.051121.091216.011216.262
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RICHARD S. MITCHELL vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-000417 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 06, 2003 Number: 03-000417 Latest Update: May 22, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner is "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Prior to July of 2000, Petitioner worked on a permanent part-time basis as an adult education teacher for the Miami-Dade County School Board (School Board), accumulating 7.10 years of retirement credit. On Sunday, July 2, 2000, Petitioner was hospitalized because of a "blood disorder." Since his hospitalization on July 2, 2000, Petitioner has been under a doctor's care and has not been physically able to return, and therefore has not returned, to work. Petitioner was hospitalized again in 2001 and for a third time in 2002 for the same ailment. After each visit he has made to the doctor during the time he has been out of work, Petitioner has apprised the principal of the South Dade Adult Education Center (South Dade), where he had worked before his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, of his condition. It is now, and has been at all times following his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, Petitioner's intention "to return to work upon clearance from [his] doctor." Petitioner has not been paid by the School Board during the time he has been out of work. In April of 2001, Petitioner spoke separately with a representative of the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) and with a School Board staff member concerning his employment situation. The UTD representative advised Petitioner that Petitioner "was on an approved leave of absence." The School Board staff member told Petitioner that he "should be on an approved leave of absence"; however, she was unable to "find that authorization in the computer." She suggested that Petitioner go to School Board headquarters and inquire about the matter. Petitioner went to School Board headquarters, as the School Board staff member had suggested. The persons to whom he spoke "couldn't locate the [leave] authorization either." They suggested that Petitioner contact the principal of South Dade. Taking this advice, Petitioner wrote two letters to the principal inquiring about his employment status. He received no response to either letter. During the summer of 2001, Petitioner contacted the Division to ask about his eligibility to receive retirement benefits. Lisa Skovalia, a Benefits Specialist with the Division, responded to Respondent's inquiry by sending him the following letter, dated August 22, 2001: Our records indicate that you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date. As such, you must return to active employment, to earn one additional year of service credit, before you will be vested in the Florida Retirement System and eligible for retirement benefits. I have enclosed a copy of the FRS Retirement Guide for the Regular Class for your information. Please call or write if you have any further questions. In February of 2002, Petitioner again made contact with School Board personnel and "was told that [his] name [had been] removed from the computer (school records)." In July of 2002, Petitioner wrote United States Senator Bob Graham "seeking [Senator Graham's] assistance in helping [Petitioner] get [his] retirement form Miami-Dade Public Schools." Petitioner's letter to Senator Graham was referred to the School Board's Superintendent of Schools, who responded by sending the following letter, dated August 29, 2002, to Petitioner: Your letter . . . to Senator Bob Graham was referred to me for response. A review of our records indicates that your earnings as a part-time teacher ended in July 2000. As a part-time employee, you were not eligible for a Board-approved leave of absence. You were notified by letter (copy attached) dated August 22, 2001 from Ms. Lisa Skovalia, Benefits Specialist, State of Florida, Division of Retirement, that because ". . . you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date," you would have to return to active employment and earn one additional year of service credit before being vested in the Florida Retirement System. The State of Florida Division of Retirement is solely responsible for developing rules and procedures for implementing changes in the retirement law. If you disagree with their determination, you may request an administrative hearing by sending a written request to the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Cedars Executive Center, 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. On September 12, 2002, Petitioner sent a letter to the Division's Bureau of Retirement Calculations (Bureau) "seeking [its] assistance in helping [him] get [his] retirement from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The Bureau responded to Petitioner's letter by providing him with the following Statement of Account, dated September 20, 2002: We audited your retirement account and you have 7.10 years of service through 07/2000. Please note that the vesting requirement for FRS members has been changed to 6 years of creditable service effective July 1, 2001 for those members who were actively employed on that date or on a board approved leave of absence. Former members with 6 years, but less than 10 years of creditable service who were not employed with a participating FRS employer on July 1, 2001, must return to covered employment for one year to become eligible for the six-year vesting provision. Per Maria Perez at the Miami-Dade County School Board you were not on a board approved leave of absence on July 1, 2001, nor were you eligible for a board approved leave of absence due to your position as a part time adult school instructor. Although your school may have allowed you to take a leave of absence, only board approved leaves fulfill the vesting requirements required by law. On November 15, 2002, Petitioner sent the Bureau a letter expressing the view that it was not "fair that, after all [his] efforts as a teacher, [he] should lose out [on his] retirement" and requesting "an administrative hearing concerning [his] efforts to get retirement benefits from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The State Retirement Director responded to Petitioner's letter by sending him the following letter, dated December 18, 2002: This is in response to your recent letter concerning your vesting and eligibility for retirement benefits. You currently have 7.10 years of retirement credit through July 2000, your last month of employment in a Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered position. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)1, F.S., states that "Any member employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, who completes or has completed a total of 6 years of creditable service shall be considered vested. . ." An FRS employer (Dade School Board) last employed you in a regularly established position in July 2000 and you were not granted a leave of absence to continue the employment relationship. Dade School Board has informed us that as a part-time teacher, you were not eligible for an approved leave of absence. Therefore, you do not meet the statutory requirement for coverage under the six year vesting provision. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)2, F.S., provides the vesting requirement for members who were not employed on July 1, 2001, as follows: "Any member not employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, shall be deemed vested upon completion of 6 years of creditable service, provided that such member is employed in a covered position for at least 1 work year after July 1, 2001 (emphasis supplied). It is certainly unfortunate that you had to leave your employment because of your illness, but the current retirement law requires that you must return to covered employment and earn one year of service credit to be vested and eligible for retirement benefits. This letter constitutes final agency action. If you do not agree with this decision and wish to appeal this action, you must file a formal petition for review in accordance with the enclosed Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) within 21 days of receipt of this letter. Your petition should be filed with the Division of Retirement at the above address. Upon receipt of the petition, you will be notified by the Division or the Administrative Law Judge of all future proceedings and hearings. If you do not file an appeal within the 21-day period, you will waive your right to request a hearing or mediation in this matter in accordance with Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. By letter dated January 2, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the "final agency action" announced in the State Retirement Director's December 18, 2002, letter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2003.

Florida Laws (7) 112.021120.569120.57121.021121.091121.19057.10
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REX C. BISHOP, JESSIE N. KARP, ET AL. vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-001297 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001297 Latest Update: Jun. 08, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, State of Florida, Division of Retirement, is charged with the general administration and the responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system, and for implementing the provisions of Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. The Division of Retirement was created in 1972, and is the trustee of the annuities savings trust fund and the pension accumulation trust fund of which Petitioners are beneficiaries. In this capacity Respondent is successor to prior trustees, the Teachers Retirement System and the State Board of Administration. Subsection 238.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes, provides for a teacher's retirement upon reaching the age of 50 after 25 years of service (known as Plan D). Petitioners retired in 1973 an 1974, having satisfied the requirements of Plan D and are receiving retirement allowances under this plan. The allowance consists of a pension funded by the State of Florida and an annuity funded by member contributions. Petitioner, Rex C. Bishop, was a teacher in the Dade County Public School System from 1949 until his retirement under Plan D in 1974. At retirement on August 1, 1974, Mr. Bishop began receiving an annual retirement allowance of $5,656.40 which included an annual pension of $3,477.65 and an equal annuity of $2,178.75. The annuity was financed by the member's accumulated contributions plus accrued interest of $34,422.07, resulting in a monthly benefit of $471.37 under the option chosen by Mr. Bishop. Petitioner, Jessie N. Karp, was a teacher in the Alachua County Public Schools from 1950 until 1969, at Lake City Community College from 1969 through 1972, and the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, from 1972 until her retirement in 1973 under Plan D. At retirement on July 1, 1973, Mrs. Karp began receiving an annual retirement allowance of $4,158.85 which included an annual pension of $2,676.67 and an annual annuity of $1,482.18. The annuity was financed by the member's accumulated contributions plus accrued interest of $25,111.13, resulting in a monthly benefit of $346.58 under the option chosen by Mrs. Karp. Petitioner, Stanley G. Rosenberger, was a member of the faculty of the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, from 1947 until his retirement in 1974 under Plan D. At retirement on January 1, 1975, Mr. Rosenberger began receiving an annual retirement allowance of $7,446.33 which included an annual pension of $4,708.44 and an annual annuity of $2,737.89. The annuity was financed by the member's accumulated contributions plus accrued interest of $41,572.08, resulting in a monthly benefit of $620.53 under the option chosen by Mr. Rosenberger. Plan D provides for a pension to be funded from monies paid by the State equal to one one-hundredth (one percent) of the average final compensation times the number of years served. Plan D also includes a variable annuity funded by the member's accumulated contributions. The total benefit or retirement allowance is not a fixed percent of average salary because the annuity is variable. However, Plan D was designed to provide an annual retirement benefit equal to approximately one-half of the average final compensation after twenty-five years of service at age fifty. This would require an annuity of one percent, which would approximately match the state funded pension. 1/ When Mr. Rosenberger, who was the only Petitioner to testify in this proceeding, elected to participate in Plan D effective in 1947, he was advised by the personnel administrators at both the Florida Agricultural Extension Service and the University of Florida that he would receive half of his average income at the retirement age of 50 after 25 years of service. This information was consistent with the goal of Plan D as established in Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. An actuary had assisted in setting up Plan D in 1947, based on 1939 data. However, no actuary was utilized again until about 1955. By the early 1950's, it became apparent to retirement system administrators that Plan D was not obtaining the funds required for the one percent annuity. Factors contributing to annuity benefits of less than one percent included increasing average salaries, low earnings on investments, and a limitation on contribution rates. The rate of contribution to Plan D as initially set by the actuarial firm of George Buck & Company, New York, was 9.24 percent to 13.58 percent of salary depending upon the member's age at entry into Plan D. That rate of contribution was later raised to 9.49 percent to 13.83 percent based on a legislative increase in the Survivor's Benefit Fund under Subsection 238.09(5), Florida Statutes (1957). The actuarial funding of a one percent annuity would ultimately have necessitated raising the contribution rate to between fifteen and twenty percent of salary during the years of active employment. Rather than increase contribution rates to levels considered prohibitive, retirement system administrators closed Plan D to new members on July 1, 1951. When the annuity funding problems became apparent to administrators, various meetings were held with teachers' groups and letters were mailed to personnel officials in the state school system to advise Plan D members that they could not expect the proposed one percent annuity to be realized. However, retirement system officials did not attempt to inform individual members of the Plan D annuity shortfall since mailing addresses were not maintained. Petitioner Rosenberger first became aware of the shortfall in 1972, when he began preparing for retirement. Until 1957, the funds were invested by the Board of Trustees of the Teachers Retirement System. During this period, investments were limited by law to government guaranteed securities. Interest was distributed to member accounts by determining total earnings in the annuity trust fund, subtracting expenses, and distributing the remainder proportionally to each member's account. The interest credited to members' accounts from 1947 to 1957 did not exceed three percent. After 1957, the State Board of Administration assumed responsibility for investing all state funds including retirement funds. Interest credited to member accounts increased from three percent in 1957 to seven percent in 1974. During comparable years, U.S. Treasury Note interest payments generally exceeded these annual interest credits by one to two percentage points. High grade corporate bond interest rates and new home mortgage yields were substantially higher than the interest credited to member accounts during comparable years. The annuities Petitioners now receive are the actuarial equivalent of their accumulated contributions on the basis of the assumptions in effect at the time of their retirement in 1973 and 1974. Had Petitioners retired before an annuity rate table change in 1972, they would have received a 15 percent higher annuity with respect to their final salaries. These reduced rates resulted from changes in mortality assumptions and interest rates, and cost of living escalation mandated by the Legislature. As a result of changes in the system and the early funding shortfalls, each Petitioner suffers a deficit in anticipated retirement benefits in excess of $1,000 annually. However, each Petitioner had the opportunity to make a lump sum contribution to the retirement trust account in order to assure a retirement allowance equal to one-half of his or her prospective average final compensation. See Subsection 238.09(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Mr. Rosenberger specifically declined the limp sum contribution option when it was called to his attention. The remaining Petitioners were presumably aware of this provision and likewise declined.

Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, enter a final order dismissing the Petition. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1981.

Florida Laws (4) 238.07238.09422.07768.28
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ARMANDO MARTINEZ vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 97-001688 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 04, 1997 Number: 97-001688 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue Whether at the time of his father's death, Armando Martinez, Jr., was a "dependent beneficiary" of his father, a vested member of the Florida Retirement System, so as to be entitled to his father's retirement benefits?

Findings Of Fact Armando Martinez, Jr., was born on February 22, 1974, to Natalie M. Martinez and the late Armando Martinez, Sr. In 1992, when Armando, Jr., was eighteen years old, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were divorced. The following year, 1993, less than two weeks after Armando, Jr.'s, nineteenth birthday, Armando Martinez, Sr., died. The cause of death was liver cancer, a disease from which Ms. Martinez presently suffers. At the time of his death on March 7, 1993, Mr. Martinez was a vested member of the Florida Retirement System. A municipal employee, he had been a bus operator. At some point close to commencement of his employment, slightly more than ten years prior to his death, Armando Martinez, Sr., had executed a Form M-10. The form named his wife, Natalie, as his primary beneficiary. Armando, Jr., the only child of Armando, Sr., and Natalie Martinez, was named as the sole contingency beneficiary. Following Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s death, Ms. Martinez disclaimed Florida Retirement System benefits. She did so in order for Armando, Jr., as the contingent beneficiary, to be able to receive the benefits. On February 17, 1997, the Division of Retirement denied Armando, Jr., survivor benefits. Had Mr. Martinez, Sr., died one-year and several weeks earlier, that is, prior to Armando, Jr.'s eighteenth birthday, the Division would have approved distribution of survivor benefits to him. But, although he was still a high school student, since he was older than nineteen by a few days at the time of his father's death, the Division required proof that Armando, Jr., had received half of his support from his father at the time of his father's death. No such proof was provided to the Division prior to or at the time of its preliminary denial. In fact, in his 1992 tax return, Mr. Martinez did not claim his son Armando, Jr., as a dependent. In this formal administrative proceeding, however, Armando Martinez, Jr., provided such proof, proof which was lacking until hearing. The year 1992 was very difficult for Armando Martinez, Jr., and his family. His parents separated, Armando, Jr., lived with his mother. Armando, Sr., lived elsewhere. Prior to his death, divorce proceedings were finalized. In the meantime, Ms. Martinez had lost her job. She remained unemployed for the entire year and in early 1993 as well. Armando, Jr., was still in high school at the time of his father's death. During the 1992-93 school year, to support himself and his mother, he obtained work part-time while he remained in school. Ms. Martinez paid the rent for their apartment at a rate of between $370 and $500 per month. The monthly phone bill of Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr., was approximately $50; utility payments $70; groceries $300; gasoline $10, automobile insurance $100; and school supplies $40. There were other expenses, clothes, for example, that occurred from time-to-time. In addition to minimal government support to Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr.'s, part-time employment income, Armando, Jr., was supported by cash payments provided by his father. Two or three times a month, Armando's father and a girl friend, Karen Jones, would drive to the front of the house. Because of his illness, Mr. Martinez remained in the car while Ms. Jones brought cash, usually between two and five hundred dollars in an envelope to the front door. On more than one of these occasions, Ms. Jones, the envelope, and the cash were observed by friends of the family at the moment of delivery. Ms. Martinez log of the estimates of these payments totals approximately $8,500, an amount in excess of Mr. Martinez's income reported in his 1992 tax return filed before his death in 1993 to be $6,389.00. But, Mr. Martinez, Sr. had access to other means of support and other monies including proceeds from insurance policies. The $8,500 provided to Armando, Jr., by Armando Martinez, Sr. constituted more than half of Armando, Jr.'s, support for the year 1992 and up until Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death in early 1993.

Recommendation Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the Division of Retirement recognize Armando Martinez, Jr., to have been the dependent beneficiary of Armando Martinez, Sr., at the time of Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death, and therefore entitled to retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Natalie Martinez Suite 3811 3801 Northgreen Avenue Tampa, Florida 33624 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.021
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MIRTA SCHLUSSLER vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 87-002472 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002472 Latest Update: Feb. 04, 1988

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to benefits for a deceased Florida Retirement System member.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: William H. Schlussler, Jr. was employed with the police department for Metro-Dade County beginning in June, 1970. On December 1, 1970, Mr. Schlussler became a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Schlussler remained continuously employed and a member of the System until his death on September 30, 1986. On July 13, 1970, Mr. Schlussler designated his father, William H. Schlussler, Sr., as the sole beneficiary of benefits under the retirement system. On July 14, 1972, Mr. Schlussler married Mirta Schlussler, Petitioner herein. The couple remained continuously married until the time of Mr. Schlussler's death. Throughout the course of their marriage, the Schlusslers acquired property in their joint names. Property which Mr. Schlussler had owned prior to his marriage was transferred to include Mirta Schlussler. In connection with his work, Mr. Schlussler participated in a group life insurance program. After his marriage, Mr. Schlussler amended the beneficiary forms to provide Mirta Schlussler as his sole beneficiary for life insurance proceeds. At his death, Mirta Schlussler received those benefits. Mr. Schlussler intended to designate Mirta Schlussler as his beneficiary for benefits under the Florida Retirement System. And although he stated this intention to several co-workers/friends, documentary evidence to establish that he completed and filed a change of beneficiary form does not exist. Moreover, no one witnessed Mr. Schlussler execute and file a change of beneficiary form for the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The only form on file with the FRS was the one executed on July 13, 1970, which designated William H. Schlussler, Sr. the sole beneficiary. William H. Schlussler, Sr. survived William H. Schlussler, Jr.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying benefits to Petitioner. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 4th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2472 Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraph 2 is accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted. Paragraph 4 is accepted but is unnecessary to the determination made herein. Paragraph 5 is accepted but is irrelevant, immaterial, and unnecessary to the determination made herein. With regard to paragraph 6 and its subparts, the first two sentences are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence presented. However, subparts a., b., c., d., e., and f. are accepted. There is no doubt William H. Schlussler, Jr. intended his wife to receive all benefits available. Subpart g. is rejected to the extent it suggests Mr. Schlussler did, in fact, execute the required form. There was no direct evidence that this deceased completed the form required to change the beneficiary designation. Subparts h. & i. are accepted but cannot constitute proof of this deceased having executed the required form. Paragraph 7 is accepted but is unnecessary to the resolution of the issue herein. Paragraph 8 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and unnecessary. Paragraph 9 is accepted but is irrelevant, immaterial and unnecessary. The file destroyed was a duplicate not the sole file. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected. Mr. Schlussler's file did not contain the form in issue. The absence of it does not prove its existence. Moreover, the file required, by statute, would be maintained by the Division. That the local government might also have the form would be a sound argument of its execution. Of course then the argument would be as to filing. In this case, the proof failed as to both execution and filing. The proof offered established only intent. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2285 Southwest 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33145 William A. Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207 Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration Division of Retirement 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
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EUGENE R. MCREDMOND vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-007104 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Nov. 07, 1990 Number: 90-007104 Latest Update: Aug. 30, 1991

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Peter McRedmond, the deceased, should have been permitted to change the beneficiary on his state retirement plan to elect an annuity for the benefit of his estate and the Intervenor, Martin Horton.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Division of Retirement, was the state agency responsible for the control, operation and monitoring of the State Retirement System. Petitioner, Eugene McRedmond, is the surviving brother of Peter McRedmond, deceased, a former member of the Florida Retirement System. Intervenor, Martin V. Horton, is the former live-in friend and companion to Peter McRedmond and the individual who claims an interest in Peter's retirements benefits. For some period prior to 1988, Peter McRedmond was employed at Manatee Community College as a psychology professor and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System, (FRS). He was so employed until he retired for disability in early 1990. Before that time, however, in August or September, 1988, he was diagnosed as having AIDS by Dr. Warren D. Kuippers, a physician with the Community Migrant Health Center. Tests taken at or around that time indicated he was suffering from toxoplasmosis, a disease of the brain in which significant portions of that organ are eaten by parasites, resulting in intermittent periods of impaired judgement and reasoning ability. He also suffered numerous other medical problems including weight loss, a wasting syndrome, general weakness and fatigue. Notwithstanding the seriousness of his illness, because Mr. McRedmond wanted to qualify for retirement under the FRS system, he continued to work for another year to meet the minimum requirements for retirement. On April 27, 1990, he made application for disability retirement to be effective July 1, 1990. As a part of that application, Mr. McRedmond selected Option 1 under the FRS as the method under which he desired his benefits be paid and named the Intervenor, Mr. Horton, as his designated beneficiary to receive any benefits legally due after his death. Mr. McRedmond could have elected to receive benefits under either Option 1 or Option 2 of the plan. Option 3 was not available to him because of his marital status. Under Option 1, he would receive payments of $639.33 per month for the remainder of his life, regardless of how long he lived. Under Option 2, he would have been paid a slightly lesser monthly sum, $587.51, for the rest of his life, but not less than 10 calendar years, and if he were to die before 10 years were up, the payments would go to his designated beneficiary. In May, 1990, consistent with the procedure then in effect within the Division, Mr. McRedmond was sent a second Option selection form to give him as much information as was possib1e and to make sure he understood what he was doing as it related to his option selection. Mr. McRedmond again selected Option 1, had his signature notarized, and returned the executed form to the Division. The individual who performed the notary service did not recall the transaction but indicated her routine practice was not to notarize a document for anyone who did not appear to know what he was doing. Peter McRedmond died on August 23, 1990 from the disease with which he was afflicted. Several months before his death, in mid June, 1990, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton discussed finances and what Horton could expect after McRedmond's death. It is clear that Mr. McRedmond wanted to make arrangements for Mr. Horton to finish his education without having to work while doing so. At that time, McRedmond's life insurance policy, in the face amount of $60,000.00, had Horton as the beneficiary. Shortly before his death, however, upon the prompting of his brother, Eugene, Petitioner herein, Peter McRedmond directed the policy be changed to make his estate the beneficiary. This was done by Eugene through a power of attorney. There was also some discussion of an additional $500.00 per month which was to go to Mr. Horton, but no one, other than Mr. Horton, recalls this. Also shortly before his death, Mr. McRedmond and Mr. Horton travelled to the family home in Connecticut for several weeks. During that time, Mr. McRedmond had at least one major seizure and family members noticed that while he was sometimes forgetful, for the most part his thinking was rational and normal. There can be little doubt that Mr. McRedmond had deep feelings for Mr. Horton and wanted the latter to be provided for after his death. Friends of both relate the numerous comments McRedmond made to that effect and are convinced that at the time he made the contested election, Mr. McRedmond was not of sound mind sufficient to knowingly make the choice he made. To be sure, the ravages of his disease had taken its toll and there were numerous occasions on which he was not lucid or competent to determine issues such as here. On the other hand, the benefits administrator with whom McRedmond talked at the time he selected his retirement plan option was totally satisfied that at that time, he fully understood the nature and effect of the option he selected and was choosing that which was consistent with his desires at the time. By the same token, the notary, whose testimony was noted previously herein, also was satisfied he knew what he was doing at the time of the second election. In its final configuration, Mr. McRedmond's estate includes all his assets, including the proceeds of the insurance policy previously designated to go to Mr. Horton, for a total of approximately $120,000.00. According to the terms of the will, the estate is to be put into a trust from which Mr. Norton is to receive $1,000.00 per month for his lifetime, as well as all his medical expenses. Since Mr. Horton has tested HIV positive, these can be expected to be extensive. Eugene McRedmond is the executor of the estate. Petitioner and Mr. Horton claim that since the trust contains all of Peter's assets existing at his death, the only other source of the additional $500.00 per month would be the benefits from the FRS. Both cite this as evidence of Mr. McRedmond's intent that the option selection providing for payment after death was his intention. This does not necessarily follow, however. Notwithstanding what Petitioner and Intervenor state were his intentions, Mr. McRedomnd took no action to make the change in option selection which would have effectuated them. Instead, he went out of town to visit family for several weeks, and even after receipt of the first retirement check, received on July 31, 1990, still took no action to make the change. During this period, after the return from Connecticut, Mr. McRedmond's condition deteriorated to the point he was often bedridden and was periodically unaware. However, there is ample evidence to indicate that he was often lucid during this period and still took no action to change his retirement option. During this time, Mr. Horton conducted come of Mr. McRedmond's business affairs for him pursuant to specific instructions. These included making bank deposits and as a part of one of these deposits, when Horton was to deposit two checks as requested by McRedmond, he also deposited the first retirement check. Horton and Eugene McRedmond both claim that at no time did Peter McRedmond ask or authorize him to do so. In a visit that Petitioner made to his brother in early August, 1990, just weeks prior to Peter's death, according to Petitioner his brother explained he had selected the wrong retirement option and requested that Eugene attempt to change the election. Peter gave Eugene a Power of Attorney with which he was to do this as well as to change the beneficiary on the life insurance policy. Consistent with those instructions, Eugene wrote a letter to the Division explaining the situation and that the check had been deposited by mistake. On August 13, 1990, Eugene telephonically contacted the Division where he spoke with Melanie White. During this conversation, in which he again spelled out the circumstances which he believed constituted the mistaken election, he was told to file a power of attorney. When he did this, the Division would not honor it claiming that since it had been executed in May, 1990, some three months earlier, it was not current. Subsequent to the death of Peter McRedmond and the filing of the claim against the Division, Eugene McRedmond and Martin Horton have entered into an agreement whereby any sums recovered from the Division will be split with 25% going to Mr. Horton and 75% going to the Trust. Upon the death of Mr. Horton, any sums remaining in the trust will be split by Eugene McRedmond and another brother.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's and Intervenor's claims for retirement benefits under Option 2 of the Florida Retirement System retirement plan, on behalf of Peter McRedmond, be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 29th day of July, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi5g 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clark of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1991 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 90-7104 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER AND INTERVENOR: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First two sentences accepted and incorporated herein. Third sentence not proven. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted that Peter McRedmond had numerous conversations with friends about providing for Mr. Horton, but it was not established that he mentioned using his retirement benefits for that purpose. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as not necessarily following from the facts. Rejected as speculation not supported by fact, except that Petitioner claims Peter desired to change the option selection. First sentence accepted. Second sentence accepted in so far as it asserts Peter told Horton he would receive a monthly sum of $1,000.00. Balance rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as speculation and conclusion except for first sentence and first clause of second sentence. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17.-20. Accepted and incorporated herein. 21. First and second and last sentences accepted. 22.-24. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 28. Accepted. 29. Irrelevant. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1-4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8.-10. Accepted. Ultimate finding accepted. On the date he filed his application, Peter McRedmond was capable of understanding what he was doing and the implications thereof. & 13. Rejected as comments of the evidence and not Findings of Fact. First four sentences accepted. Remainder rejected except that McRedmond wanted Horton to get at least $1,000.00 per month for life, and more if possible. & 16. Accepted except for last two sentences of 16. Accepted except for last sentence which is a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. & 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Stafman & Saunders 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 John A. Pieno Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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DELORIS WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 19-005499 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Oct. 14, 2019 Number: 19-005499 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 2020

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.66120.68121.021121.091 DOAH Case (5) 01-161810-000116-042917-142419-5499
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EVELYN S. WRIGHT vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 75-000187 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-000187 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 1975

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, EVELYN S. WRIGHT, as an employee of Metropolitan Dade County and a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, elected to transfer into the Florida Retirement System (FRS) effective December 1, 1970. (Exhibit 3) On April 10, 1972, Petitioner terminated her employment with Metropolitan Dade County and applied for FRS disability retirement benefits pursuant to Section 121.091(4), Florida Statutes, on May 22, 1972. (Exhibit 2) Petitioner's application for FRS disability retirement benefits was initially denied by the Administrator of the Florida Retirement System on August 21, 1972. (Exhibit 4) On January 6, 1975, Petitioner inquired of the Supervisor of the Respondent's Disability Determination Unit, Mr. David Ragsdale, as to the possibility of withdrawing the accumulated contributions in her retirement account. At this time, Petitioner, was advised by Mr. Ragsdale that a withdrawal of contributions would cancel her membership rights in the Florida Retirement System. (TR - p.9) Respondent forwarded to Petitioner, by letter dated January 7, 1975, the appropriate form for making application for a refund of accumulated retirement contributions. The transmittal letter specifically advised the Petitioner that, "Should you complete and return the enclosed card, M81, you would have no further rights or service credit with the Division of Retirement." (Exhibit 5) On January 14, 1975, Petitioner executed, and her employer verified, an application for refund of accumulated retirement contributions. The application form clearly stipulated: "I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement System. I do hereby waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement System." (Exhibit 6) Petitioner's application for refund of contributions was received by the Respondent on January 17, 1975. Respondent refunded to Petitioner her accumulated contributions in the amount of $3,056.02 by Voucher No. 237738, Warrant No. 0309435, dated January 28, 1975. (Exhibit 6) The attorney for Petitioner, John H. Abramson, was advised by the undersigned hearing officer by telephone that Leave to Take Deposition was granted. By letter from the said attorney the Division was notified that Petitioner's file was being closed.

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
# 9
JAMES B. ANDERSON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 15-005416 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 25, 2015 Number: 15-005416 Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2016

The Issue The issue in this case is whether James B. Anderson, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 3 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree).

Findings Of Fact On June 30, 2007, the named Petitioner, James B. Anderson, terminated his employment with the University of South Florida (USF) at the age of 69 years and 9 months. At the time, his tenure at USF spanned 27 years and entitled him to receive pension benefits under the Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan. Also on June 30, 2007, Mr. Anderson completed an application for retirement. By applying Mr. Anderson, who was USF’s Director of Insurance and Risk Management, acknowledged that he would not be able to add service, change options, change his type of retirement (regular, disability, and early) or elect the Investment Plan once his retirement became final, which would be when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Also on July 2, 2007, Mr. Anderson and his wife, Mitzi Anderson, executed a Statutory Official Form FRS 110 before a notary public. By doing so, they selected Option 1, which provides the maximum pension benefits to Mr. Anderson until his death and no pension benefits to his wife after his death. The form stated clearly, in bold print, that Option 1 did not provide a continuing benefit after Mr. Anderson’s death and that the selection of Option 1 would be final when Mr. Anderson cashed or deposited any benefit payment. The next day, Mr. Anderson faxed the executed form to the Division of Retirement, which mailed Mr. Anderson an acknowledgement of receipt of the executed form. The acknowledgement included a clear statement, in bold print, that Mr. Anderson would not be able to change his benefit option selection after retirement and that his retirement would become final when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Mr. Anderson had second thoughts about his benefit option selection and contacted Donna Pepper, a retirement specialist employed by USF, to discuss changing to Option 3, which would give him a reduced pension benefit that would continue and be paid to his wife after his death. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Pepper sent an email to Mr. Anderson stating: “Here is another option selection form so that you can change your option.” The email attached a blank Statutory Official Form FRS 110. Ms. Pepper’s email also stated: “As we discussed, you may want to indicate that this form should supersede the previously submitted form.” It also advised the Petitioner to keep a copy for his records and send the original to the Division of Retirement as soon as possible. On July 20, 2007, at 12:53 p.m., a comment was entered on the Integrated Retirement Information System (IRIS) telephone log, documenting that Mr. Anderson was considering changing his benefit option selection and would “either FAX a form with a change of option on it or call to let them know he would not make the change.” The comment also documented that Jan Steller in retirement payroll was asked to hold Mr. Anderson’s first check until “this is resolved.” Later the same day, at 2:30 p.m., another comment was added to document that Mr. Anderson had called back to say he had decided to stay with Option 1 and that Jan Steller had been called back and asked “to release his check.” On July 31, 2007, an initial pension check was sent to Mr. Anderson in the amount of $4,188.45, in accordance with his selection of benefit Option 1, which was about $1,200 more than it would be under Option 3. This check was not immediately cashed. On August 31, 2007, a second Option 1 pension check in the same amount was sent to Mr. Anderson. On September 4, 2007, Mr. Anderson deposited the first two benefit checks into his Bank of America account. He continued to receive and cash or deposit monthly Option 1 benefit checks through January 2015. Mr. Anderson died on February 14, 2015. His wife notified the Division of Retirement, which stopped benefit payments in accordance with Mr. Anderson’s Option 1 selection. In March 2015, Mrs. Anderson found among her husband’s papers a copy of an executed Form FRS 110 that selected Option 3. Notwithstanding the telephonic communications with the Division of Retirement on July 20, 2007, the executed form indicates that it was notarized on July 23, 2007. Included in handwriting at the bottom of the executed form was the language, as suggested by Ms. Pepper: “This option supersedes option dated 7-02-07.” Mrs. Anderson also found a copy of Donna Pepper’s e-mail dated July 6, 2007, with instructions on how to change the selection of pension payments. Mrs. Anderson sent copies to the Division of Retirement and requested Option 3 spousal benefit payments. The Division of Retirement denied Mrs. Anderson’s request because it did not receive an Option 3 benefit selection before the copy Mrs. Anderson sent in March 2015. There was no evidence that the form was sent to the Division of Retirement before then. This, together with the fact that Mr. Anderson received and cashed or deposited seven and a half years’ worth of monthly Option 1 benefit checks, which were each over $1,200 more than the Option 3 benefit would have been, support a finding that Mr. Anderson actually selected Option 1 and never switched to Option 3. It is not clear from the evidence why Mr. Anderson kept a copy of an executed change from Option 1 to Option 3 after deciding not to send it to the Division of Retirement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Mr. Anderson selected benefit Option 1, finally and irrevocably and that Mrs. Anderson is not entitled to Option 3 spousal benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas E. Karatinos, Esquire Law Office of Karatinos Suite 101 18920 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33540 (eServed) Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Ste. 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68121.09157.105
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