The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Monroe County Housing Authority, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, Diane Scott, on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Diane Scott is a black women. Her husband, Kenneth Scott, who lives with her, is a black man. Respondent Monroe County Housing Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Housing Authority") is responsible for providing low income and affordable rental apartments in Monroe County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “County”), a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The Housing Authority is responsible for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. Ms. Scott and her husband (hereinafter referred jointly as the “Scotts”), are former residents of apartment number 23 (hereinafter referred to as the “Apartment”), Tropical Isle Apartments, one of the Housing Authority’s housing developments, located at 260 41st Street, Marathon, Florida. The Scotts rented the Apartment pursuant to an Affordable Housing Residential Lease Agreement entered into on March 1, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the “Lease”). The Lease provided for a one-year rental period. As the Scotts readily admitted at hearing, Ms. Scott has raised numerous complaints with the Housing Authority concerning matters ranging from drug sales and use at Tropical Isle Apartments, which door maintenance personnel should utilize to enter the Apartment, and, most recently, the employment of an individual with a criminal record at Tropical Isle Apartments. Ms. Scott’s complaints, which were made in person, by telephone, and by email, were numerous and extremely time-consuming to deal with by personnel of the Housing Authority. Efforts to respond to Ms. Scott’s complaints more often than not did not satisfy her. By letter dated January 23, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the “Notice of Violation”), the Scotts were informed that Ms. Scott’s conduct constituted a violation of the Lease and that if it continued, could result in termination of the Lease (why the letter was signed by Charla Rodriguez, Director of Operations, The Housing Authority of the City of Key West, Florida, was not explained at hearing). Jesus Manuel Castillo, Sr., Executive Director of the Housing Authority, met with the Scotts on February 28, 2008, to discuss the Notice of Violation and determined that the Notice had been properly issued. Ms. Scott’s behavior did not improve. Consequently, by letter dated October 30, 2008, Susan E. Vogt, Housing Manager for Tropical Isle Apartments, informed the Scotts that their Lease would not be renewed and that, therefore, their Lease would expire effective January 12, 2009. Ms. Vogt’s more than four-page letter described in some detail the events which had led to the decision to not renew the Scotts’ Lease. The decision to not renew the Scotts’ Lease was made by Mr. Castillo, Sr. Mr. Castillo had met with Ms. Scott on more than one occasion and had been the recipient of her emails and telephone calls and was well aware of the time and effort staff had to expend dealing with Ms. Scott’s complaints. Mr. Castillo, on behalf of the Housing Authority, decided to not renew the Scotts’ lease, rather than evicting them so that the Scotts would be able to continue to receive a Section 8 voucher. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Even the Scotts admitted at hearing that their lease was not renewed primarily because of Ms. Scott’s continuous complaints, adding that they “believed it was also because of their race.” Even Ms. Scott’s Proposed Recommended Order fails to mention how her race played any part in her treatment by the Housing Authority. Ultimately it is determined that the Housing Authority did not commit any prohibited act vis-à-vis Ms. Scott.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Monroe County Housing Authority not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Ms. Scott no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Manuel Castillo, Sr. Monroe County Housing Authority 1400 Kennedy Drive Key West, Florida 33040 Diane Scott Post Office Box 501586 Marathon, Florida 33050 Franklin D. Greenman, Esquire Greenman, Manz & Ables Gulfside Village, Suite 40 5800 Overseas Highway Marathon, Florida 33050 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether G.G. & W., LLC (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in discriminatory housing practices against Harriet E. Harris (Petitioner) on the basis of Petitioner’s race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African American female. Petitioner’s Complaint is summarized in paragraph 7 of the typed Housing Discrimination Complaint form as follows: Complainant Harriet Harris identifies as African American/Black. Therefore, Complainant belongs to a class of persons whom the Fair Housing Act (“the Act”) protects from unlawful discrimination by virtue of race. The subject property is a single family home within “99 Oaks Mobile Home Park,” located at 8521 Fowler Avenue, Lot 18, Pensacola FL 32534; owned by Respondent G, G,. & W, LLC. Complainant identified Respondent Chris Garret as the property manager associated with the subject property. Complainant alleged that she resided with Witness Rickey Wilder at 99 Oaks Mobile Home Park, which is owned and managed by Respondents. Complainant alleged that Respondent Garret told witness Wilder that, “he (Respondent) could not believe that he (Wilder) was living with a Black woman.” Complainant alleged that she later made arrangements with Respondents to rent a vacant mobile home at another location within the community, but was later told that the subject property had already been rented. Complainant alleged that she heard Respondent Garret telling another resident in the community that, “he (Respondent) would not rent to a Black woman, because they do not pay their rent.” Complainant explained that based on Respondent Garret's statements, she believes that Respondents denied her the opportunity to rent because of her race. As such, Complainant believes that Respondents subjected her to discriminatory terms and conditions and refused to rent to her in a discriminatory manner based on race. At the final hearing, it was revealed that the person identified as “Chris Garret” in the Complaint is actually Gary S. Crisp, who is the manager of Respondent’s mobile home park and who appeared at the final hearing on behalf of Respondent. Respondent’s mobile home park is known as “99 Oaks Mobile Home Park.” Petitioner’s testimony at the final hearing was somewhat consistent with the allegations of her Complaint as summarized above. Petitioner’s testimony, however, was not credible. While the one witness called by Petitioner verified that Petitioner had a telephone conversation with Mr. Crisp in June of 2014, that testimony did not bolster the credibility of Petitioner’s allegations. Mr. Crisp’s testimony explained that his contact with Petitioner was limited to a few occasions in 2014. He further testified that he did not refuse to rent a mobile home to Petitioner and that he did not otherwise discriminate against Petitioner. Mr. Crisp’s testimony was credible. There was no credible evidence presented that would support even a prima facie case against Respondent for engaging in a discriminatory housing practice. Petitioner lived with Rickey Wilder at 99 Oaks Mobile Home Park during the summer and early fall of 2014. During that time, Mr. Wilder was living in one of Respondent’s mobile homes as a benefit of Mr. Wilder’s employment with one of Respondent’s other companies. In October 2014, Mr. Wilder was evicted from 99 Oaks Mobile Home Park. There has been no contact between Petitioner and Respondent, or between Petitioner and Mr. Crisp, since that time. Petitioner did not file her Complaint until more than one year from any alleged discriminatory housing practice. Therefore, Petitioner’s Complaint is untimely. This finding is consistent with the Commission’s Determination dated April 1, 2016, where, in the second paragraph under section III, the Commission found: The actual most recent date of harm was August 15, 2014, when Complainant was allegedly told that the unit was no longer available; this was confirmed in an interview with Complainant on March 30, 2016. Complainant did not sign her complaint until January 23, 2016 and it was not received by the Florida Commission on Human Relations until January 28, 2016. In order for a complaint to be timely filed, it must be filed within one year of the last date of harm.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 14th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents committed a housing discriminatory practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about January 20, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by the Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found the Respondents had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondents for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. The Division of Administrative Hearings issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. No party appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Leaford Green Danett Green 3758 Southwest Findlay Street Port St. Lucie, Florida 34953 Paula Adams Post Office Box 1665 Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, no act of discrimination occurred in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resided in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, in April 2012, when he responded to an advertisement on ApartmentsOnline.com. He found an apartment that interested him, a one-bedroom furnished unit in Milton, Florida, that was offering a move-in special of three weeks off the first month's rent. The property qualified as Section 8 HUD housing, the classification of housing in which he currently resided, so he sought a transfer of his status from Pennsylvania to Florida. Respondent, Hubert Dawley, told Petitioner that the apartment would be available May 15, 2012. Petitioner was determined to be disabled by the Social Security Administration as of March 13, 1996, and has been receiving benefits since April 28, 1998 (retroactive to March 13, 1996), the date of his determination of disability by a federal administrative law judge entered on that date. Petitioner has a service animal, which helps with his depression. His physician in Milton believes the animal will help him better function in his daily life. Petitioner claims he told Mr. Dawley about his service animal and that he would be bringing the dog with him when he moved to Milton. Respondents have a firm "no pets" policy for their apartments, and Mr. Dawley denied ever knowing about the dog prior to Petitioner's move to Milton. On May 5, 2012, prior to his move to Milton, Petitioner signed an "Application to Rent" Respondents' available apartment in which he answered "NO" (in capital letters) to the question "Do you have any dogs, cats, or other pets?" Petitioner acknowledged signing the application and writing "NO" in response to the question about pets. Petitioner signed a residential lease agreement along with Mr. Dawley on May 5, 2012. The lease contained the following paragraph: (J.) Pets shall not be permitted. Initial here, to indicate your agreement that no pets will be allowed on the premises. Failure to adhere to this agreement shall cause forfeiture of deposits and a $200.00 non-refundable pet damage fee to be immediately due to cover damage/flea infestation. Additionally it shall be at Managements [sic] discretion to immediately terminate this lease and demand possession of residence. Additionally pet shall be immediately removed from the premises. Initial here to indicate your agreement to this provision. (Bold type in original) Petitioner signed the lease and initialed it in the two places indicated in the "no pets" provision. Petitioner gave Mr. Dawley a check for $500 at the time he signed the lease. The amount represents $225 for two weeks' rent (May 15-31) and a $250 security deposit for a total of $475. Respondents did not give Petitioner his $25 change. After Petitioner moved in, Mr. Dawley learned about Petitioner's dog when he went over one night to fix a plumbing issue and saw the pet on the couch. He informed Petitioner that the lease specifically did not allow pets. Petitioner testified that the apartment was filthy and in disrepair when he moved in. Mr. Robert Youngblood, the HUD inspector failed the apartment on a Housing Quality Services inspection due to a broken bathroom fan and requested that the fan be repaired by May 22, 2012. Mr. Dawley told Petitioner the dog would have to go. Petitioner said he would move out, but wanted a return of all his rent and deposit money. Petitioner called the Milton Police Department on May 27, 2012, to have an officer present when he moved out "to avoid any trouble." An officer and Mr. Dawley were present on May 28 when Petitioner moved out, which occurred without incident. Mr. Dawley returned $58 to Petitioner, keeping $14.51 per each day of Petitioner's tenancy (the prorated amount of $500 per month rent) and $200 to have the apartment cleaned due to the pet having been present. Petitioner claims that Respondents never had the apartment cleaned after he moved out to which Mr. Dawley produced a receipt for a carpet cleaning machine rental on June 6, 2012. Petitioner disputes the rental as having been made, if at all, for cleaning other apartments. He has no direct evidence that Mr. Dawley did not clean the apartment upon his moving out. Petitioner is seeking the return of the entire $500 he gave Respondents as the first two weeks' rent and security deposit. Petitioner acknowledges he received a $58 refund. Petitioner produced no evidence of discrimination by Respondents on the basis of his disability. His entire claim is based upon the fact that he needs the service animal to help with his depression and that Respondents were aware of the presence of the dog prior to Petitioner moving into the apartment and accepted him as a tenant with a pet.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the claim for relief brought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony Sager 6665 Magnolia Street Milton, Florida 32570 Hubert and Martha Dawley 4661 Keyser Lane Pace, Florida 32571 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Assad F. Malaty, discriminated against Petitioners, Dr. James E. Townsend and his niece, Contessa Idleburg (formerly, Ms. Rogers), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the appropriate remedy therefor.
Findings Of Fact Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Dr. Townsend has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. He suffered a stroke in May 2014, upon which the requested modifications and accommodations were based. The stroke substantially limited one or more major life activities, given his need for using a wheelchair and walker. § 760.22(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Malaty conceded as much at the hearing.3/ Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Ms. Idleburg has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. She has a shunt to drain fluid from her brain, has received Supplemental Social Security Income since at least 2014, and also has used a walker. That said, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodations solely to assist Dr. Townsend after he suffered the stroke. Thus, Ms. Idleburg’s handicap is not relevant to the claims at issue. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Petitioners informed Mr. Malaty in May 2014 that Dr. Townsend suffered a stroke and requested that he make several modifications to the Unit, including handrails in the bathroom, and handrails and a ramp at the front door, and to accommodate them by assigning them a parking spot outside the Unit. There is no dispute that the requested modifications and accommodation were never made. Importantly, however, the evidence does not establish that Petitioners’ renewed those requests again before they filed complaints with the Department of Justice in late 2016 and HUD in early 2017.4/ Although Dr. Townsend reminded Mr. Malaty in a December 2016 letter that he had failed to make the requested the modifications, the undersigned finds that letter to be more in the nature of a response to Mr. Malaty’s threat of eviction rather than a renewed request to accommodate them. The weight of the credible evidence also confirms that Petitioners never offered to pay for the handrails, ramp, or signage for the requested parking spot. Indeed, Dr. Townsend testified that he believed Mr. Malaty was responsible for making such modifications as the owner of the Unit. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Malaty did not evict Petitioners because of their handicaps or their requests for modifications or an accommodation. Mr. Malaty initially threatened to evict them for failing to pay rent in January 2013, reducing their rent in September and December 2016, and failing to take care of the lawn as required in the lease. It had been three years since Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodation due to Dr. Townsend’s stroke and they did not re-raise those issues again until after Mr. Malaty threatened to evict them for failing to pay the rent. The evidence also is clear that Petitioners could have avoided eviction by paying the missed rent by December 29, 2016. But, they failed to do so and then did not pay their rent in January 2017, which ultimately led to Mr. Malaty filing the eviction action.
Conclusions For Petitioners: James E. Townsend, Sr., pro se Contessa Idleburg, pro se Apartment 2101 140 Aida Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 For Respondent: Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esquire Law Office of Charlann Jackson Sanders 2225 East Edgewood Drive, Suite 8 Lakeland, Florida 33803
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex or an alleged handicap contrary to Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008), Fair Housing Act, as amended (the Act).
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice by "lock[ing] [Petitioner] out of [his] apartment" at the Arena Hotel, as alleged in Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint, and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) provide Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a black male. Since 2000, he has maintained a residence at the Arena Hotel (Establishment), a rooming house (with 22 rooms) located in Miami, Florida. Respondent is the former owner of the Establishment. He purchased the Establishment approximately three years ago. At the time of the purchase, there were only a small handful of blacks residing in the Establishment (including Petitioner). The percentage of black residents increased significantly during his ownership. Respondent lived in Israel when he owned the Establishment (as he does now). Every several months he traveled to Miami and visited the Establishment. Respondent had an on-site manager to take care of the day-to-day affairs of the Establishment for him. Respondent also had a brother living in the area on whom he could call to check on the Establishment. The brother, Gil Terem, worked for Majestic Properties, Inc., a Miami-based real estate brokerage firm. Gil Terem assisted in Respondent's sale of the Establishment. From the time Respondent purchased the Establishment until the time he sold it, Petitioner regularly complained to management and various governmental agencies about the conditions in his room and the common areas. Petitioner's complaints were not the only ones management received during this time frame. There were also complaints from residents of the Establishment who claimed that Petitioner was acting aggressively and harassing them. On November 6, 2002, government inspectors conducted an inspection of the Establishment. Later that same day, November 6, 2002, City of Miami police were called to the Establishment by management to look into an allegation of harassment made against Petitioner. Gil Terem was on the premises of the Establishment when the police arrived. Respondent was not present. He was in Israel. Upon their arrival, the police confronted Petitioner and spoke with him. Although the police did not arrest Petitioner or take him into custody, Petitioner was under the impression, following his discussion with the police, that he was not free to reenter his room and that he had to vacate the premises. He therefore left the Establishment without returning to his room. Notwithstanding what Petitioner may have believed, there was no intention to evict him. Petitioner pursued legal action in Miami-Dade Circuit Court alleging that he was illegally removed from his room in the Establishment. On December 4, 2002, in the case of David Powell v. Majestic Properties, Inc., Case No. 02-27703CA30, Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Judge Barbara Levenson issued an Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief, which read as follows: This cause having come on to be heard on Dec. 4, 2002 on Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief and the Court having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise advised in the premises, its is hereupon, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said Motion be, and the same is hereby, granted. A temporary restraining order is in effect pending the setting of a further hearing. [Plaintiff] is allowed to return to his residence. Following the entry of this Order, Petitioner returned to his room in the Establishment. Because there was a new lock on the door that had been installed during his absence, he was not able to enter the room until Gil Terem came by with a key to let him in. Subsequent to his return to the Establishment, Petitioner initiated various judicial and administrative actions, including the instant one,1 claiming that Respondent and others conspired to unlawfully discriminate against him by depriving him of the opportunity to enjoy the privileges of residing at the Establishment. The record evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner was in any way discriminated against on the basis of race or handicap or that any adverse action was taken against him in retaliation for his claiming that he was the victim of housing discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that no "discriminatory housing practice" has been committed and dismissing Petitioner's complaint based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.
