The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by failing to reasonably accommodate her handicap, in violation of Florida?s Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Unit No. 710 (“Unit”) in the Sixth Moorings Condominium, located in Miami, Florida. Petitioner lived there for approximately 11 years. She is not currently living in the Unit. Respondent is the condominium association responsible for the operation and management of the Sixth Moorings Condominium. In early 2010, Petitioner suffered a stroke and underwent heart surgery. It is undisputed that as a result of her illness, Petitioner is “handicapped” for purposes of the Fair Housing Act.4/ Petitioner spent several months in hospitals and nursing homes recovering from her stroke and surgeries. When she was released from these facilities, she did not resume living in the Unit. She testified that this was because she could not go up a curb or steps, and because the condominium?s elevator frequently was out of order.5/ She moved into a ground floor apartment a few blocks away from the Sixth Moorings Condominium. Petitioner is not able to perform many basic tasks, such as grocery shopping, driving, cleaning her apartment, taking out the garbage, or retrieving her mail. Consequently, she decided to invite her nephew, Charles Alsberg, to move into the Unit, where he would be only a few minutes away from the apartment in which she was residing, and thus could serve as her caretaker. Alsberg moved into the Unit in or around August 2010. Petitioner did not reside in the Unit with Alsberg. She testified that even though he is a family member, she would not live in the Unit with him because she is “an elderly woman from a different generation and [she] would not live with a young man unless he was [her] biological son.” In late 2010, Respondent?s President, John Koble, contacted Petitioner about Alsberg living in her Unit. Petitioner asked Koble to allow Alsberg to reside in the Unit so that he could serve as her caretaker, but Koble told her that because she was not residing there, Alsberg was considered an unauthorized guest in violation of the condominium?s restrictive covenants, and that he therefore must move out. Nonetheless, Alsberg continued to reside in the Unit for several more months, until he became ill and was hospitalized. Following his release in August 2011, Alsberg returned to live in the Unit. At this point, Respondent——this time, through counsel——sent Petitioner a letter stating that she was violating the restrictive covenant prohibiting unauthorized guests, and demanding that Alsberg vacate the unit. On September 13, 2011, Petitioner?s attorney sent a response letter requesting that, due to restrictions on Alsberg?s activity as a result of his illness, he be allowed to remain in the Unit for approximately 60 days. By correspondence dated September 15, 2011, Respondent agreed to allow Alsberg to remain in the Unit through November 12, 2011. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that Respondent granted her request to allow Alsberg to stay there during his recuperation. Notwithstanding this agreement, Alsberg did not vacate the Unit until sometime in early 2012, several months after the November 12, 2011 deadline. During this time, Respondent sent numerous pieces of correspondence that Petitioner characterized as “harassing” and “threatening,” regarding enforcement of the condominium?s covenants and rules. Alsberg finally vacated the Unit after Respondent sent a “final notice” letter. Currently, Alsberg is residing in an apartment approximately four blocks from Petitioner?s apartment and is serving as her caretaker. Koble testified that he was sympathetic to Petitioner?s circumstances, but it was imperative that Respondent consistently enforce the restrictive covenants for the benefit of all unit owners. Koble noted that other unit owners also wanted to allow unauthorized guests to live in their units, and that if Respondent relaxed enforcement of the covenant for Petitioner, it would be forced to do so for others. The undersigned credits this testimony. Koble also testified, credibly, that if Petitioner were residing in her unit, Respondent would have granted an accommodation of the covenant to allow Alsberg to live there for the purpose of serving as her caretaker.6/ The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not request any accommodation from Respondent that was necessary for her equal opportunity to use and enjoy the Unit; rather, the purpose of Petitioner?s request that Respondent not enforce the restrictive covenant against her was to enable her nephew to live in the Unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no unlawful discrimination by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Center Lake Owner's Association, Inc. ("Center Lake"), discriminated against Petitioner, James Schweim ("Schweim"), on the basis of his purported disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Schweim is a white male who at all times material hereto resided at Center Lake. Schweim provided some evidence of his medical condition at final hearing, but did not affirmatively establish a disability, per se. Notwithstanding that fact, a review of the facts will be made concerning the merits of Schweim's claim. Center Lake is the homeowner's association for the Center Lake subdivision located in Manatee County. The association has been in existence since 1986. The subdivision is subject to various deed restrictions as set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Centre1/ Lake, recorded at O.R. Book 1168, Page 1508, in the public records of Manatee County, Florida. Of significance to this proceeding, Section 11 of the deed restrictions is relevant. Section 11, as it will be referred to herein, states in whole: Vehicles. No vehicle of a subdivision resident shall be parked in the subdivision except on a paved driveway, or inside a garage. No vehicle shall at anytime be parked on grass or other vegetation. No trucks or vehicles which are used for commercial purposes, other than those present on business, nor any trailers, may be parked in the subdivision unless inside a garage and concealed from public view. Boats, boat trailers, campers, vans, motorcycles and other recreational vehicles and any vehicle not in operable condition or validly licensed shall be permitted in the subdivision only if parked inside a garage and concealed from public view. No maintenance or repair of any boat or vehicle shall be permitted upon any Lot except within an enclosed garage. Beginning some time in 2004, Schweim and Center Lake commenced a dispute concerning Schweim's alleged violation of the provisions of Section 11. Specifically, Schweim was accused of parking a recreational vehicle (the "RV") on his property in violation of the deed restriction. There is no dispute between the parties that Schweim owns a 23-foot recreational vehicle, which is kept on his property (at 3550 65th Avenue Circle East). As a result of the 2004 dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation signed by Center Lake and its attorneys on December 6 and 7, 2004, respectively. Schweim's attorney signed the document on November 24, 2004; Schweim and his wife signed on that same date. The Settlement Stipulation was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Schweim asserted that the version of the Settlement Stipulation entered into evidence was not the version he signed, but the most persuasive evidence is that it is the same version. Schweim does not agree that all the terms and conditions in the Settlement Stipulation were extant at the time he signed, but he could not produce a copy of any other version of the document for comparison. In the Settlement Stipulation, Schweim agreed to move the RV from his property and not to bring it onto the property except for loading or unloading. In exchange, Center Lake agreed to voluntarily dismiss its then-pending lawsuit against Schweim. Despite the resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit, Schweim did not remove his RV from his property. Instead, Schweim kept the RV on the property and, ultimately, filed a discrimination action against Center Lake because of their efforts to have him remove the RV. That action is the subject of the instant proceeding. Schweim does not dispute that he is keeping the RV on his property in violation of the deed restrictions. Rather, Schweim suggests that he should be allowed to do so on three bases: One, that he is proposing a fence on his property that will cover the RV and make it hidden from view from the street; Two, that there are other residents of the subdivision who are also in violation of the deed restrictions; and, three, that he is disabled and needs the RV parked on his property to accommodate his disability. As to his first reason, Schweim's proposal is simply that, a proposal. There is no evidence that the fence proposed by Schweim would satisfy the requirements of the deed restriction. Further, Center Lake has no confidence, based on its history with Schweim, that he would follow through with the proposal. There is some evidence that other residents in the area appear to be in violation of the deed restrictions. However, there was no evidence presented at final hearing that those residents had refused to move their vehicles upon filing of a complaint. That is, the homeowner's association tends not to take any action unless a homeowner files a formal complaint concerning a violation. In Schweim's case, several complaints were filed as to his RV. There was also some discussion at final hearing as to the appropriate licensure for the RV. Any vehicle not properly licensed is not allowed to be parked in the subdivision based on the deed restrictions. However, Schweim says the license is currently up-to-date and that is no longer an issue. Concerning Schweim's disability, he presented the following facts: At age 23, Schweim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen, causing long-term damage; In 1991, Schweim had a ruptured disc; Surgical fusion of his disc was performed in 2002 and again in 2004; In 2009, Schweim underwent a lumbar fusion. As a result of those events, Schweim has what he describes as an acute medical condition limiting his ambulatory abilities. At the final hearing, Schweim negotiated the hearing room slowly and with some difficulty. Judy Schweim, a nurse, testified that she transports Schweim to doctor's appointments and other medical situations. At times, Schweim's back will "go out," and she is responsible for getting him to medical treatment as soon as possible. Schweim produced evidence that he has received a Florida parking permit for disabled persons. The application for the permit indicates his condition as "severe limitation in a person's ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." A doctor's order dated May 6, 2004, indicates that it is "medically necessary for [Schweim] to have ready access to a walk-in vehicle to accommodate his disability." An August 19, 2010, memo from Dr. Tally at the Neuro Spinal Associates, P.A., and a September 27, 2010, memo from the Dolphin Medical Group, state essentially the same thing. None of the hearsay documents were sufficient to establish a disability, per se. Schweim says that his disability makes it necessary for him to have the RV parked in his yard so that, when necessary, he can use it to get medical treatment. Schweim says that when his back goes out, he needs a vehicle that he can walk into while standing up. He cannot sit down into an automobile at those times. The incidences of Schweim's debilitating back pain only occur every couple of years. When not experiencing that pain, Schweim is able to drive his red car, described by neighbors as a "hot rod," without any problem. Schweim drove a motorcycle for years, but says he has not driven it for quite some time. Schweim said that an ambulance was not a viable option for him when he has the back pain, because the ambulance will not take him where he needs to go, i.e., straight to a particular doctor, rather than the emergency room. There is no competent evidence to support that contention. Schweim candidly admits that the only time he needs the RV is when he has an episode with his back and that such episodes are few and far between. And while it is true that an episode may occur at any time, there is insufficient evidence to support Schweim's claim that the RV is integral to him receiving prompt and appropriate medical care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, James Schweim, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner Robert Cowden was the subject of housing discrimination by Respondents based on Mr. Cowden's physical handicap, in violation of Florida's Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has AIDS, which qualifies him as a person with a handicap under state and federal fair housing laws. Petitioner's mother, Alice Cowden, is a resident of King's Gate Club in Venice, Florida. Charles Clotfelter is the general manager of King's Gate Club. King's Gate Club is an adult mobile home community operated by King's Gate Club, Inc. The Articles of Incorporation for King's Gate Club, Inc., specify that permanent occupants shall be 55 years old or older. No permanent occupancy is permitted for persons under the age of 55 unless an exemption is granted at the sole discretion of the board of directors and only if granting the exemption will not result in less than 80 percent of the mobile homes in the community having at least one resident aged 55 or older. The rules of King's Gate Club require residents to limit visits by adult guests under age 55 to a maximum of 120 days within any consecutive 12-month period. Petitioner is an adult, but less than 55 years old. In 2005 and 2006, Petitioner was a frequent visitor at his mother's home in King's Gate Club. Several times in 2006, Respondents informed Petitioner's mother that Petitioner's visits had exceeded the community's visitation rule. Mr. Clotfelter, the manager of King's Gate Club, also discussed the visitation rule issue with Petitioner. On May 7, 2006, Mr. Clotfelter sent a letter to Ms. Cowden requesting that Petitioner either vacate the premises or become a member of King's Gate Club. As a member, Petitioner would not be subject to the visitation rule. Becoming a member requires a $120 application fee and includes a "background check." In June 2006, Petitioner first informed Mr. Clotfelter that Petitioner had AIDS. On July 13, 2006, a certified letter was sent to Ms. Cowden by Harlan Domber, the attorney for King's Gate Club, Inc., informing her that Petitioner's visits exceeded the limits stated in the rules. Mr. Domber advised Ms. Cowden that Petitioner must vacate her premises or she and Petitioner must apply to make Petitioner a co-owner of the mobile home. Instead, Petitioner responded by filing a complaint with the Commission. Petitioner claims that Respondents were required to allow him to visit his mother at King's Gate Club as often as he wanted as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Petitioner testified that he takes medications and receives treatments for his AIDS, but that he has no physical limitation that requires him to use any assistive device, such as a wheelchair, or assistive technology. He also testified that he does not need the care of his mother for his disability. Petitioner never requested that King's Gate Club provide any particular accommodation for his disability. Based on his understanding of the fair housing laws, Petitioner assumed that when he informed Mr. Clotfelter that he had AIDS, Mr. Clotfelter would understand that King's Gate Club could not require Petitioner to comply with the visitation rule. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner's understanding of the law was mistaken. Nevertheless, following Petitioner's complaint to the Commission, the board of directors of King's Gate Club decided not to enforce its visitation rule against Petitioner, and he now visits his mother at King's Gate Club as often as he wishes. This action by the board does not make the case moot, however, because the board could change its position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent, in providing housing or related services to Petitioner, failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner’s disability.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation doing business pursuant to chapter 718, Florida Statutes, as Daytona Beach Riverhouse Condominium Association. Respondent is responsible for the day-to-day operations and management of Daytona Beach Riverside Condominiums. In May 2009, Petitioner rented Daytona Beach Riverhouse Condominium Unit B-103 from a third party who owns the unit. In that same month, Petitioner signed an application for lease/purchase with Respondent, which contains an acknowledgment of his receipt of the condominium association’s rules and regulations, declaration of condominium, and by-laws. There is also a pet registration form attached to the application which identifies one pet, a Jack Russell named “Peanut.” See Exhibit P-1. Petitioner alleges that he has a brain injury that requires him to have a dog as a service animal to assist him in his daily living. At the final hearing, Petitioner provided his own testimony to support his claim of a brain injury and need for a service dog. Petitioner’s testimony in that regard was unrebutted and is therefore credited. In addition, Respondent’s manager, Mary Cash, acknowledged receiving a letter from Petitioner’s doctor advising that Petitioner had a brain injury and needed a service dog. Petitioner otherwise, however, failed to prove the allegations of the Complaint. According to the Complaint, Respondent failed to make reasonable accommodation by refusing to allow Petitioner to use his two service animals (dogs) required because of Petitioner’s disability. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not submit any evidence indicating that Respondent failed to allow him to have one or more service dogs. Instead, Petitioner admitted that he lives in the condominium with two dogs, a service dog and a pet. Rather than submitting evidence in support of his Complaint, during the final hearing, Petitioner testified that Respondent, through employees, discriminated against him by harassing his dogs, entering his condominium unit without his permission, and moving or hiding his personal property within the unit. According to Petitioner, the personal property that Respondent moved in his condominium included his medications, a showerhead, a light in his dining room, and one of his dogs that he later found shut inside his walk-in closet. Respondent, through the testimony of Mary Cash, denied the allegations of the Complaint and testified that none of Respondent’s agents or employees had ever entered Petitioner’s condominium without his permission or moved any of Petitioner’s personal property. The testimony of the other witnesses besides Petitioner corroborated Mary Cash’s testimony. Mary Cash’s testimony is credited over Petitioner’s. While Petitioner may have believed that Respondent was harassing his dogs and going into his apartment, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s testimony in that regard was based on mere speculation. Other than his own testimony, Petitioner did not present any witness or evidence which supported his allegations against Respondent. The letter dated May 21, 2010, from Mary Cash to Petitioner, is written on behalf of Respondent. The letter discussed issues related to Petitioner’s two dogs causing disturbances. The letter also notified Petitioner that Respondent did not have a key to his top door lock and did not have a telephone number to reach Petitioner. The letter does not support the Complaint or any other allegation raised by Petitioner in this proceeding. In sum, Petitioner failed to submit evidence to support of his claim that Respondent failed to make reasonable accommodation for his disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2011. 1/ Mary Cash is Respondent’s manager. At the final hearing, Ms. Cash testified on behalf of Respondent. 2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2010 version. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry McIntire 719 South Beach Street, B-103 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 D. Michael Clower, Esquire 322 Silver Beach Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on race regarding the renting of an apartment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns more than 25 residential rental properties in the State of Florida, including the duplex located at 8472 and 8474 Barrancas Street, Navarre, Florida, which he purchased approximately three years ago. In January 2011, Respondent placed an advertisement in the newspaper for the rental of both sides of the duplex, and put a "For Rent" sign in the front yard. On January 27, 2010, Respondent entered into a lease agreement for the rental of Unit 8472 with Jeffery White, who is Caucasian. Respondent had to evict Mr. White for non-payment of rent. Mr. White was cited for leaving garbage and other things stacked around the home. When he moved out around August 2010, Mr. White left Unit 8472 filthy on the inside and out. Petitioner, Karen Davis, was the next person to have a lease on this property, approximately five months later. On January 7, 2011, Ms. Davis, who is African-American, was looking to rent a home and saw Respondent's advertisement in the newspaper for the duplex on Barrancas Street. Ms. Davis called Respondent and set up an appointment to view the duplex the same day. Ms. Davis and her mother, Sylvienne Pearson, arrived at the property before Respondent, so they walked around the duplex and looked through the windows while they waited. Respondent showed Unit 8472 to Mses. Davis and Pearson. They learned that the hot water heater had insulation coming out of it, the front door knob did not have a lock, the refrigerator was pulled out from the wall, and the unit appeared not to have been cleaned or prepared for a new tenant since the last tenant had moved out. A storage room in the back of the duplex had to be pried open because it was filled with furniture that had been left by a previous tenant. There was garbage around the outside. Respondent indicated that the home was available "as is." Unit 8472 needed to be cleaned and a hole in the door repaired. Respondent told Ms. Davis that he would deduct the reasonable cost of having the carpet cleaned from the rent. Ms. Pearson asked if they could take a look at the adjoining unit, 8474, which she learned was also available to rent. Respondent told Ms. Pearson that the carpet was damaged, and he would not show it to them because he was not going to rent it until the repairs had been made. After viewing Unit 8472, Ms. Davis called her friend, Brigitte Brahms, who is Caucasian and works part-time as a real estate agent. Ms. Brahms did a search on the property and determined that there was not a lien or foreclosure on it. Ms. Davis described to Ms. Brahms that the front door lock was not working, a lot of belongings were left from a previous tenant, garbage was in the yard, the hot water heater had insulation coming out of it, and that Respondent was not willing to fix any of these items. Respondent's only qualification for a potential tenant in his rental properties is that the tenant has some money. Once Ms. Davis presented Respondent with $350, he determined that she was qualified, and agreed to sign the lease with her. He told Ms. Davis that she would save $80 if she moved into Unit 8272 right away. After Ms. Davis signed the lease and gave him $350, Respondent gave Ms. Davis the keys to the unit. Ms. Davis told Respondent that she did not have all the money required for the rent, and that she would have to get some of it from her family. The next morning, January 8, 2011, Ms. Davis called Respondent to ask to see Unit 8474. Respondent's wife answered the telephone and indicated that Unit 8474 had already been promised to someone else. A short time later, Ms. Brahms, posing as a potential tenant, called Respondent, and asked about the availability of Unit 8474. Respondent indicated that it was available, and Ms. Brahms told him that she would call back later. Ms. Davis went to Ms. Brahm's house and called Respondent again on speakerphone while Ms. Brahms listened. Respondent again told Ms. Davis that Unit 8474 was not available because it had already been rented, and he would not show it to her. An hour later, Ms. Brahms called Respondent to verify that Unit 8474 was available, and Respondent offered to show it to her the same day. Mses. Davis, Pearson, and Brahms went to the duplex before the appointment with Respondent and walked around Unit 8472 so Ms. Brahms would be able to compare it with Unit 8474. Ms. Brahms noted that Unit 8474 was in much better condition than Unit 8272; everything was cleaned up; the unit had been vacuumed; the kitchen was set up properly; the storage unit was empty; and there was no garbage left out in the yard. The carpet was stained and there was a small strip of carpet that was missing between the master bedroom and the living room, but Respondent did not indicate that he would change the carpet or make any repairs. The problems with Unit 8474 were minor in comparison with the problems with Unit 8472, and Unit 8474 was in much better condition than Unit 8472. Respondent did not tell Ms. Brahms that there was anything that had to be repaired before he would rent Unit 8474 to her, and he did not indicate that it was being held for someone else. Instead, when Ms. Brahms asked if Unit 8474 was available to rent, Respondent indicated that she could rent it that very day. January 8, 2011, knowing that Respondent had shown Unit 8474 to Ms. Brahms after refusing to show it to her, Ms. Davis told Respondent that she was no longer interested in renting Unit 8472; tried to return the key to him; and requested a refund of the $350 deposit. Respondent refused, so Ms. Davis sent the key to him in a letter on January 13, 2011, again requesting the refund of the $350 deposit. Respondent has never returned Ms. Davis' $350 deposit. Ms. Davis never actually moved into the duplex. After she decided not to rent Unit 8472 from Respondent, he next rented the unit to a Caucasian on February 25, 2011, then later to another Caucasian followed by a Hispanic tenant. Towards the end of January 2011, Ms. Davis located another rental and moved in on February 1, 2011. Since she never moved into Respondent's duplex, she paid $80 to keep her furniture in storage for a month until she found a new place to live. She paid a $400 deposit and a $300 pet fee for two dogs. Respondent provided several reasons for not showing Unit 8474 to Ms. Davis. Respondent testified that Ms. Davis never asked to see Unit 8474. Instead, he alleges that she simply asked if it was empty, to which Respondent indicated that it was empty and available for rent, but that the unit needed several repairs, and it had not been cleaned. However, Respondent later testified that the previous tenants had left Unit 8474 in such a condition that it only required minor "TLC" from him and was ready to be rented. Additionally, Respondent admitted that he was willing to show Unit 8474 to Rita Davis (no relation to Petitioner), who is Caucasian, despite the fact that he had not repaired the carpet or cleaned Unit 8474. Respondent stated that he had agreed to hold Unit 8474 for an unidentified person until Monday, January 10, 2011, but admitted that he had not received a deposit to hold the unit. Respondent explained that many times he has allowed his tenants to transfer to another one of his properties, even months later, without penalty or charges of any kind. Respondent admitted he did tell Ms. Brahms that Unit 8474 was available for rent and showed it to her, but states that had she actually offered to rent it, he would have told her that it still needed work that she would have had to complete herself. Also, she would only have been allowed to rent that unit if the other person for whom he was holding it did not come up with a deposit. Respondent testified that if a prospective tenant is likely to get into one of his rental properties and tear it up, he will not rent to that person. No evidence was produced to prove that Ms. Davis had a prior record of not caring for apartments or places where she lived.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent discriminated against Karen Davis in violation of section 760.23(1) and (4), Florida Statutes; prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondent; and directing that Respondent submit a cashier's check to Karen Davis within 10 business days from the date of the final order in the amount of $430.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul Tinsley 3014 Shearwater Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondents engaged in prohibited conduct against Petitioner by discriminating against him based on his race and/or national origin in the terms and conditions, privileges, or provision of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Commission on Human Relations is the state agency charged with investigating complaints of discriminatory housing practices and enforcing the Fair Housing Act. It is also charged with investigating fair housing complaints filed with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et seq. Petitioner, Emmanuel Agbara, is an adult, black male, who is of Nigerian decent. On or about September 18, 2008, Petitioner submitted an offer to purchase Condominium 406 in Orchid Springs Village. Because the real property sought to be purchased was a part of a condominium, there were several contingencies imposed by the declaration of condominium and associated house rules. Respondent, Orchid Springs Condominium, No. 200, Inc., is a non-profit corporation charged with the management of the condominium. Incidental to this responsibility, in conjunction with Bay Tree Management Company, the board of directors has the responsibility to approve or disapprove of the sale of a condominium to a third party. In the event the board of directors or Bay Tree Management Company disapproves of the sale, the condominium documents outline a procedure wherein the proposed sale can be pursued by the property owner and prospective buyer (Petitioner herein). After Orchid Springs advised Petitioner that it had not approved his sale, this alternative was not pursued. Orchid Springs is a part of a mixed-use development of condominiums, patio homes, and private [single-family] residences and is diverse in terms of religion, national origin and income. Prospective buyers, and the Petitioner herein, were required to complete an application that inquired into the prospective buyer's background, intended use of the property, and required three character references. In addition, prospective buyers were required to pay for a "background" check. On September 20, 2008, Petitioner traveled from his home in Maryland to meet with Respondent, John Carroll, president of the condominium board of directors. As they met, an inspection of the condominium unit was being conducted by a home inspection professional. Petitioner anticipated that he would meet with Carroll and two other board members for the personal interview required by the condominium documents as a prerequisite for board approval. The two board members were not available to meet with Petitioner during his September 20, 2008, visit. During the course of the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, it became apparent that Petitioner anticipated being an "absentee landlord." Carroll advised Petitioner that the owner/residents had various problems with renters, including recent police activity incidental to a drug laboratory in one of the rented condominium units. Carroll also related that four of the absentee owner units were in foreclosure and that placed an economic burden on the remaining owners. During the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, Petitioner inquired as to whether he could do the three-board member interview by telephone. Mr. Carroll advised him that a telephone conference might be arranged, but that one board member could not do it alone. On October 8, 2008, Petitioner submitted his Association Application. As a part of the application process, Petitioner certified that he had been supplied copies of the Articles of Declaration of Condominium Ownership and By-Laws of Orchid Springs Village, No. 200, Inc.; the Service and Maintenance Agreement; and the manual, "Condominium Living--The Seville." The Association Application includes the following language: "[A]pplicant purchasing Condominium certifies that he/she has . . . read [and] agrees to abide by" the foregoing documents. The Association Application states that "[i]mmediately after submission of the application, Applicant is requested to arrange with the President for a personal interview with at least [three] Board Members present. Such personal interview is a firm requirement [and] may not be waived." Following receipt of a prospective buyer or renter's Association Application, the tasks of conducting the customary background and criminal checks are divided among board members. In this instance, Mrs. Thibodaux, now deceased, did the background check; and Mrs. Douglas did the criminal background check, which, apparently, was a local records check utilizing the county records available through the internet. Testimony reveals that Mrs. Thibodaux reported that she had some problems with two of Petitioner's character references and that the Social Security number he provided was incorrect. This testimony is discounted as Mrs. Thibodaux is dead and not available to testify, and there is no indication that Petitioner's Social security number is incorrect. In addition, two of Petitioner's character references testified at the final hearing. Mrs. Douglas' local criminal background check revealed a January 13, 1997, arrest for battery--domestic violence. The case was "nolle prossed" after the Petitioner was placed in pre-trial diversion. Orchid Spring's critical examination and appraisal of prospective buyers and renters is apparently "slipshod," but not atypical when the prospective cost of a thorough examination that would involve an investigation of an individual's credit history and a thorough criminal and background check. Concern raised by the background and criminal check prompted Carroll to contact Petitioner and request that he come to Florida and meet with three board members for the interview required by the condominium documents. Petitioner was unable to meet with the interview committee. On November 7, 2008, Petitioner was advised by Respondents that his application had been denied. No evidence of damages was advanced by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emmanuel Agbara 1822 Metzerott Road, No. 206 Adelphi, Maryland 20783 Rex P. Cowan, Esquire Post Office Box 857 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-0857
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination based upon disability against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner claimed to be living in his grandfather’s condominium at Respondent, Oceana II North Oceanfront Condominium Association, Inc. (“Oceana II”), 9900 South Ocean Drive, Apartment 4, Jensen Beach, Florida 34957, pursuant to a month-to-month lease under which he paid $1,000.00 monthly. Petitioner neither produced a written lease nor provided testimony from his grandfather, the putative owner of the condominium, of the existence of such lease. Petitioner also offered no competent evidence (e.g., cancelled checks, receipts, etc.) that he had made any payments under the alleged lease, whether written or oral. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was living in Texas and had no immediate plans to return to Florida or his grandfather’s condominium. Oceana II is a condominium homeowners’ association created and authorized under chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Tiffany Ferguson, is the community association manager for Oceana II and the corporate representative for Oceana II for purposes of this hearing. Petitioner testified that his claim of discrimination came about because his car was parked in a disabled space with an expired disability placard. He was informed by Respondents or their agents that his vehicle must be moved to a parking lot away from the entrance to the building in which he was staying. He claims to have told Respondents’ agents that he could not park that far away from “his” unit due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any fine or suspension was ever levied by Respondents on him. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any of Petitioner’s vehicles were ever towed by Respondents. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents treated any other person outside of the protected class any more favorably than Petitioner was treated with respect to the rule requiring a current license plate. Petitioner brought several different vehicles, one of which had an expired Maryland tag, onto Oceana II’s premises. Despite the fact that he worked on many of these disabled vehicles, Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents in any way caused Petitioner to purchase such vehicles, which may have needed repair or had issues obtaining a license plate. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner attempted to purchase or lease a unit in the condominium and was denied by Respondents due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner had any lease at any time for his grandfather’s unit which Petitioner testified was a family vacation unit. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner provided any information in response to Respondents’ request for information as to an alleged disability, the disability-related need for an accommodation, and how any accommodation was necessary to ameliorate any alleged disability. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ email which said no fines would be imposed. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ request for additional information to make a meaningful review from Respondents’ counsel. Petitioner admitted he refused to provide the additional information requested by Respondents (through counsel) to make a meaningful review of an accommodation request on October 20, 2020. Petitioner admitted he voluntarily removed the original vehicle (a Pontiac Sunbird) while it had a valid license plate. Petitioner admitted at hearing that he brought in other vehicles at a later time--a green van, a white Saturn, and a gray van--onto the property without plates on purpose to provoke a response and engineer a hearing under section 718.303(3)(b), which pertains to the rights and obligations of condominium associations in levying fines against owners or occupants. He was attempting to set up a claim by intentionally not showing license plates because he wanted a hearing. Petitioner admitted he never tried to register the green van or the gray van with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). Petitioner admitted the white Saturn has a current plate, not a Florida plate, and it is currently located in Texas. The white Saturn did not display a plate while on the condominium property. Petitioner admitted he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds whether he ever displayed a plate on any of the vehicles. Petitioner admitted he left Florida in early February and lives in Texas, in San Marco near San Antonio. Petitioner could not renew the Maryland tag on the Sunbird because the VIN (vehicle identification number) on the registration was missing a digit, yet he admitted he has no evidence of any efforts to fix the VIN on the Sunbird with the Maryland DMV.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief, finding both that he has failed to make a prima facie case of housing discrimination and that, because he resides in Texas and has no ownership or legal claim to the condominium in Florida, his claim is moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 J. Henry Cartwright, Esquire Fox McCluskey Bush Robison, PLLC 3461 Southeast Willoughby Boulevard Post Office Drawer 6 Stuart, Florida 34995 John Sebastian Quick Apartment 4 9900 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
