The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent acted upon Petitioner’s application for renewal as an office surgery accrediting organization within the time frames established under Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes; and (b) whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner’s application for renewal of its status as an approved physician office surgery accrediting organization.
Findings Of Fact Background In Florida, physicians who perform certain surgical procedures in their offices are required to register the office and have the office inspected by Respondent unless the office is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or an accrediting organization approved by Respondent. § 458.309(3), Fla. Stat. (2003); Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-9.0091. In order to avoid physician office inspection by Respondent, a physician must submit written documentation of a current office-accreditation survey by one of the nationally recognized or Board-approved accrediting organizations. Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-9.0091(2)(a) and 64B8-9.0091(3)(a). A physician is also required to submit a copy of a current accreditation survey within 30 days of accreditation of the office. Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-9.0091(3)(b). Florida Administrative Code Rules 64B8-9.0092(1)(b) and 64B8-9.0092(7) list the approved national and Board-approved accrediting organizations. Petitioner is the only Board-approved accrediting organization. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(1)(a) provides that "accredited" means that an office has achieved either "full" accreditation or "provisional" accreditation when the office is in "substantial compliance" with accrediting standards. Petitioner provided Respondent with a complete application for renewal as an office surgery accrediting agency on January 17, 2003. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8- 9.0092(5) specifies that such entities must apply for renewal every three years and shall submit their applications for renewal at least three months prior to the third anniversary of their initial approval. Petitioner conducted office surgery accreditation inspections for approximately three years prior to the final hearing in this matter. Physicians who conduct office surgery are required to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009 regarding the Standard of Care for Office Surgery. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0091(2)(a) specifically provides that all nationally recognized and Board-approved accrediting organizations shall be held to the same surgery and anesthesia standards for Florida office surgery sites as adopted by rule. Petitioner's accreditation standards, as outlined in its original application for approval as an accrediting agency and its subsequent application for renewal, include the requirement that physicians comply with the standard of care rules for office surgery as outlined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009. In fact, Petitioner asserts that its standards meet or exceed the requirements of Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes (2003), and rules promulgated there under. Petitioner's accreditation standards should have remained the same throughout the three years preceding the submission of its renewal application. Petitioner did not file any changes or amendments to its accreditation standards prior to submitting its renewal application on January 17, 2003. Submission of Corrective Action Plans Throughout the first three years of its operation, Petitioner provided Respondent with copies of all the accreditation reports for the facilities it inspected and accredited as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(e). That same rule also required Petitioner to furnish Respondent copies of any corrective action plans within 30 days of receipt from the inspected physician office. Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any corrective action plans or any compliance information until after Petitioner filed its renewal application. Petitioner did not offer any corrective action plans as evidence during the hearing even though Petitioner found deficiencies (non- compliance with accreditation standards) in 24 of the 25 office inspection files entered as evidence by the Respondent in this hearing. The only materials submitted by Petitioner that address the deficiency corrections are copies of photographs, invoices, packing slips, order forms, and correspondence from the inspected offices, which are supposed to constitute evidence of subsequent compliance accreditation standards. Beth Sautner is Petitioner's Executive Secretary. Ms. Sautner's duties required her to submit the requisite accreditation materials to Respondent and to communicate with Respondent regarding such activities when needed. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's staff never told Ms. Sautner to only send the facility inspection form and that submission of corrective action plans and compliance materials was unnecessary. Ms. Sautner knew that a rule required the submission of corrective action plans. Nevertheless, Petitioner never filed any petition seeking a waiver of such rule. Action on the Application Respondent considered Petitioner's renewal application on three separate occasions. It was first considered on February 8, 2003, in Orlando, Florida, at Respondent's regularly scheduled meeting. At that meeting Petitioner waived the 90-day provision in Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002), until after Respondent's August 2003 meeting. Respondent next considered Petitioner’s renewal application at a regularly scheduled meeting on June 7, 2003, in Miami, Florida. Finally, Respondent voted to deny the application at the August 2, 2003, meeting in Orlando, Florida. Respondent filed the Notice of Intent to Deny Petitioner's application for renewal as an office surgery accrediting organization on August 28, 2003. Accreditation Process Upon the request and payment of an accreditation fee, Petitioner arranges for the inspection of an office by an inspector. Inspection is required when the physician conducts level II office surgery lasting more than five minutes or level III office surgery. The inspectors are physicians affiliated with Petitioner who personally visit the facility to conduct the inspection. The inspectors use an inspection form when conducting the accreditation inspection. The form contains a pass or fail check-off space next to each statement reflecting an accreditation standard. The form contains comment sections following the standards and at the end provides for a pass or fail designation along with two additional sections. The inspectors use the final sections for outlining minor deficiencies to be corrected within 20 working days and for major deficiencies requiring a second inspection. The form has signature lines for the inspector and the physician being inspected. After completing the inspection, the inspector forwards the form to Ms. Sautner. Next, the inspector and Ms. Sautner review the form to determine what is needed in order to complete the process. The inspector tells Ms. Sautner what is needed and she attempts to collect the requisite compliance documentation from the inspected facility. The appropriate materials are then forwarded to Ms. Sautner who sends them to the inspector for a final accreditation determination. The final accreditation determination is always made by an inspector and never by Ms. Sautner. Once the final accreditation determination is made, Ms. Sautner orders an accreditation certificate from Scribes, Inc. Scribes, Inc. sends the certificate directly to the newly accredited facility. At times, Ms. Saunter orders the certificate in advance but places it on hold until she is notified that an accreditation determination has been made. Ms. Sautner usually contacts Scribes, Inc. by e-mail to request release (delivery) of the certificate. Scribes, Inc. then sends Petitioner a facsimile copy of the physician’s accreditation certificate. Petitioner accredits offices for three years. The accreditation period begins to run from the date of the original office inspection. The certificate that Petitioner issues through Scribes, Inc. contains a month and year which reflect the final month of the facility accreditation. Therefore, if a facility’s accreditation certificate has a May 2005 date, it reflects an accreditation from May 2002 through May 2005. This is true even when the physician did not document that his or her facility fully complied with Petitioner's accreditation standards until, in some cases, months after the initial inspection. After Petitioner requests Scribes, Inc. to send a certificate to a newly accredited facility, Petitioner sends a copy of the facility inspection form, the accreditation certificate, and a cover letter to Respondent. This documentation notifies Respondent that Petitioner has inspected the physician's office and that the office is entitled to recognition as an accredited facility. Throughout the hearing Petitioner's witnesses testified that physicians' offices were not accredited until they demonstrated that they had met all of the accreditation standards. The weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner routinely accredited a facility retroactive to its inspection date. A review of every accreditation certificate in evidence shows that each facility’s period of accreditation starts the month Petitioner performed the inspection and ends three years later. This is true even when the inspection form reveals that the physician’s office did not fully comply with Petitioner's accreditation standards at the time of inspection and the physician did not demonstrate compliance until months after the initial inspection. Ms. Sautner's testimony adds support for the proposition that Petitioner gave physicians accreditation credit retroactively to the inspection date. She was responsible for notifying Scribes, Inc. to release accreditation certificates bearing specific months and years exactly three years after the date of the inspections, as opposed to three years after the date of compliance with standards. Petitioner's inspectors considered the inspection date to be the accreditation date. They knew the subsequently issued accreditation certificates would reflect compliance with accreditation standards for a period of time before the physicians actually demonstrated compliance. It is noteworthy that, upon completion of the inspections, Petitioner gave a "pass" or, in a couple of cases, a provisional pass, to every physician’s office that Petitioner inspected before it submitted its renewal application. This adds credence to the supposition that Petitioner considered the inspection date to be the date that a facility was entitled to accreditation, even though the physicians did not demonstrate compliance until some time after the inspection. It is clear that Petitioner was not routinely accrediting physicians' offices without requiring some evidence of demonstrated compliance with accreditation standards. Instead, Petitioner usually required the physicians to furnish some documentation showing compliance after an inspection revealed deficiencies but allowed the new period of accreditation to begin retroactively on the date of the inspection. The most persuasive evidence indicates that the date Petitioner completed the accreditation process occurred sometime after the inspection: (a) on the date Ms. Sautner authorized Scribes, Inc., to release the physician's accreditation certificate; or (b) the date that Scribes, Inc., faxed Ms. Sautner a copy of the accreditation certificate sent to the physician. Therefore, the information provided to Petitioner was inaccurate to the extent it reflected that physicians' offices were in full compliance as of their inspections date. Given the above, Respondent presented ample evidence which demonstrates that Petitioner's accreditation process was misleading. At the very least, Petitioner lacked sufficient quality assurance policies and procedures to ensure that physicians were not recognized as accredited before they were entitled to such recognition. Regardless of whether any physicians were actually performing surgery in their offices between the inspection dates and the dates of compliance, Petitioner's accreditation procedure created a false impression of the adequacy of the facilities that Petitioner inspected. This mischaracterization of the status would lend support for the acceptability of procedures performed in that setting when the physician was not entitled to that recognition, with potential consequences to the health and well being of the patients. Marwan Shaykh, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Shaykh’s facility on May 30, 2002. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is May 2005. Hence, his accreditation covers May 2002 through May 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Shaykh’s office did not have the following required medications: adrenalin (expired), dextrose (expired), verapamil hydrochloride (expired), succinylcholine, and nitroglycerin. Petitioner also discovered that Dr. Shaykh’s office did not have the following required monitoring and/or emergency equipment: ambu bag and emergency power able to produce adequate power to run required equipment for a minimum of two hours. (hereinafter “emergency power”). After the inspection, Dr. Shaykh provided Petitioner a copy of an invoice from the Apothecary at Memorial. The invoice indicated that Dr. Shaykh ordered adrenalin (ephedrine), dextrose, verapamil hydrochloride, succinylcholine, and nitroglycerin (nitroquick) on July 2, 2002. The invoice was dated August 15, 2002. Dr. Shaykh also provided Petitioner a copy of an invoice from Physician Sales and Services, Inc. The invoice reflected that Dr. Shaykh ordered an ambu bag (resuscitator adult disp) on July 16, 2002. The invoice was dated July 16, 2002. Finally, Dr. Shaykh provided Petitioner a copy of a letter which read in part: Please find enclosed the copies of the anesthesia record where the EBL is recorded, the physician job description and a copy of the surgery log. In addition, invoices indicate the replacement of Dextrose 50 percent, Isuprel 1:5000, Verapamil 5mg/2ml, succinylcholine 20mg/ml to the crash cart and Administration sets (Micro drips) and Adult Resuscitator bag (Ambu Bag) to the surgery room. The letter appears to be a cover letter that accompanied the above-discussed invoices. The letter is undated and does not indicate when Petitioner received it. However, if it accompanied the medication invoice from the Apothecary, Dr. Shaykh must have sent it to Petitioner on or after August 15, 2002. Ms. Sautner ordered and placed a hold on Dr. Shaykh’s accreditation certificate on June 6, 2002. She released the hold on July 16, 2002. The certificate itself has a fax date of June 11, 2002. It appears that Scribes, Inc., faxed it to Petitioner on that date. Based on the foregoing, it is not clear whether the fax date on Dr. Shaykh’s certificate of June 11, 2002, or Ms. Sautner's stated release date of July 16, 2002, is the actual release date. Nevertheless, regardless of which date is the correct release date, it is apparent that Petitioner sent Dr. Shaykh an accreditation certificate before he documented compliance with Petitioner's accreditation standards because the Apothecary invoice was dated after both possible release dates. Karen Chapman, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Chapman’s facility on April 6, 2002. The date that appears on her accreditation certificate is April 2005. Hence, her accreditation covers April 2002 through April 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Chapman’s office did not have multiple (14) medications, one of which was inderal. Petitioner also discovered that Dr. Chapman’s office did not have a required ambu bag among other missing monitoring and/or emergency equipment. After the inspection, Dr. Chapman provided Petitioner copies of invoices from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical dated April 11, 2002, which reflected that Dr. Chapman ordered all the missing medications with the exception of inderal. Dr. Chapman also provided Petitioner a copy of undated correspondence which asserted that Karen Chapman ordered and received inderal 1mg/mL, on April 11, 2002. Both the Southern Anesthesia + Surgical invoice copies and the undated correspondence regarding the inderal contain a fax strip across the top. The date on the fax strip indicates that Dr. Chapman sent the invoice copies and the inderal correspondence to Petitioner on February 12, 2003. Ms. Sautner was unable to provide an order or release date for Dr. Chapman’s accreditation certificate. However, the inspection file contained an accreditation certificate which had a fax date across the top of May 10, 2002. The Southern Anesthesia + Surgical invoice copies and the undated correspondence regarding the inderal were obviously faxed to FLACS over seven months after the accreditation certificate was sent to Dr. Chapman. Petitioner attempts to explain this discrepancy away by claiming that it had all compliance documentation prior to issuing accreditation but in some cases it could not find the documents when it conducted an audit in 2003. In those instances, Petitioner contacted the physicians and asked them to send the compliance materials again after the fact. Such an explanation is unacceptable because it does not explain why the compliance documentation was not in the file in the first place. Additionally, Petitioner has provided no documentation of compliance materials from Dr. Chapman disclosing whether she ever obtained a required ambu bag. Lucien Armand, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Armand’s facility on June 8, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is June 2004. Hence, his accreditation covers June 2001 through June 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Armand’s office did not have the following required medications: adrenalin (epinephrine) 1/10,000 dilution, calcium chloride, dextrose, dilantin (phenytoin), dopamine, and inderal (propranolol). After the inspection, Dr. Armand provided Petitioner on some unknown date a copy of an invoice from Medical III Pharmacy. The invoice reflected that on April 23, 2001, Dr. Armand ordered dilantin, dopamine, and inderal. The invoice was dated April 30, 2001. Dr. Armand also provided Petitioner, on some unknown date, unsigned correspondence indicating that he had “re- supplied” his emergency cabinet with adrenalin, calcium chloride, dextrose, dilantin, dopamine, and inderal. Ms. Sautner placed Dr. Armand’s accreditation certificate on hold on June 22, 2001. The certificate had a fax date across the top of June 28, 2001. The above-referenced invoice from Medical III Pharmacy is of course not probative as to whether Dr. Armand obtained the missing crash cart medications after the inspection because the invoice indicates that the drugs were ordered before the inspection. Furthermore, Dr. Armand’s unsigned correspondence indicating that he had “resupplied” his emergency cabinet with adrenalin, calcium chloride, dextrose, dilantin, dopamine, and inderal is obviously problematic because it is unsigned and provides no objective proof of compliance. Scott Warren, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Warren’s facility on April 11, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is May 2004. Thus, his accreditation covers May 2001 through May 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Warren’s office did not have required intubation forceps. After the inspection, Dr. Warren provided Petitioner a copy of an order receipt from an unknown pharmaceutical vendor. The order receipt reflected that, on an unknown date, Dr. Warren ordered adult and child sized McGill Forceps (a type of intubation forceps). The invoice was not dated but a fax strip across the top reveals that Dr. Warren's office faxed a copy of the receipt to Petitioner on July 11, 2001. Ms. Sautner placed a hold on Dr. Warren’s accreditation certificate on June 22, 2001. The certificate had a fax date across the top of June 29, 2001. The copy of the Magill Forceps receipt was faxed to Petitioner ten days after Petitioner released the accreditation certificate to Dr. Warren. Therefore, Petitioner could not have verified compliance prior to the awarding of accreditation. Furthermore, this discrepancy cannot be attributed to Petitioner's 2003 audit because the fax receipt date was approximately one and a half years prior to the audit. Juan Flores, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Flores' facility on July 21, 2002. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is July 2005. Accordingly, his accreditation covers July 2002 through July 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Flores’ office did not have inderal (propranolol) or nasal airways. Dr. Flores provided Petitioner correspondence dated July 30, 2002, from a Laura Leyva. The correspondence indicated that Dr. Flores’ facility had acquired the requisite nasal airways. On November 14, 2003, Petitioner received a fax copy of an invoice numbered 9927 from Prime Medical Care, Inc. The invoice dated July 15, 2002, documents Dr. Flores' acquisition of inderal. Dr. Flores’ accreditation certificate had a fax date of September 6, 2002, across its top. The Prime Medical Care, Inc., invoice copy was faxed to Petitioner on November 14, 2003, over a year after the accreditation certificate was sent to Dr. Flores. Petitioner again explains this discrepancy by raising the 2003 audit excuse. However, the explanation does not explain why the compliance documentation was not in the file in the first place. Mina Selub, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Selub’s facility on May 17, 2002. The date that appears on her accreditation certificate is May 2005. Therefore, her accreditation covers May 2002 through May 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Selub’s office did not have heparin, nasal airways, and intubation forceps. Dr. Selub sent Petitioner a copy of a customer packing slip on an unknown date. The customer packing slip revealed that Dr. Selub ordered heparin from McKesson Medical Surgical on May 3, 2002. The packing slip had a handwritten note indicating that the heparin was received on June 1, 2002. Dr. Selub also submitted a copy of a second customer packing slip to Petitioner on an unknown date. The second customer packing slip revealed that Dr. Selub ordered Magill Forceps from McKesson Medical Surgical on May 13, 2002. The packing slip had a handwritten note indicating that Dr. Selub did not receive the forceps, which were reordered from Henry Schein. Petitioner never received any other documentation indicating that Dr. Selub actually ordered or received intubation forceps. Additionally, Dr. Selub also failed to provide any documentation of compliance with the nasal airway requirement. Ms. Sautner placed a hold on Dr. Selub’s accreditation certificate on June 6, 2002. She released the hold on July 12, 2002. The accreditation certificate has a July 15, 2002, fax date across the top. The above-referenced invoice for heparin from McKesson Medical Surgical indicates that the medication was ordered before the inspection. However, the hand written notation on that same invoice indicates that Dr. Selub's office received the heparin on June 1, 2002. The lack of any documentation regarding the ordering and/or receipt of the intubation forceps is more problematic. Apparently Petitioner issued Dr. Selub's office an accreditation certificate without obtaining further written verification of compliance with accreditation standards. Abelardo Acosta, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Acosta’s facility on November 17, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is November 2004. Hence, his accreditation covers November 2001 through November 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Acosta’s office did not have the following required medications: succinylcholine, magnesium sulfate, heparin, dopamine, inderal (propranolol), and dilantin (phenytoin). Petitioner also discovered that Dr. Acosta’s office did not have the following required monitoring and/or emergency equipment: tonsillar suction and nasal airways. After the inspection, Dr. Acosta provided Petitioner with the following documentation: (a) a copy of a packing slip from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical dated November 26, 2001, reflecting that Dr. Acosta ordered dopamine, succinylcholine, dilantin, magnesium sulfate, and heparin; (b) a copy of a statement from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical dated July 15, 2002, which reflected that Dr. Acosta had ordered inderal (propranolol); (c) a copy of an invoice from Armstrong Medical Industries, Inc., with an order date of January 2, 2002, which reflected that Dr. Acosta ordered a suction unit; and (d) a copy of a packing slip from Physician Sales & Service dated December 3, 2001, reflecting that Dr. Acosta ordered numerous types of airways and a yankuar suction unit. Ms. Sautner placed a hold on Dr. Acosta’s accreditation certificate on December 5, 2001. She released the hold on December 12, 2001. The certificate has a December 12, 2001, fax date across the top. The statement from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical dated July 15, 2002, which reflected that Dr. Acosta ordered inderal, constitutes undisputed evidence that Petitioner did not verify Dr. Acosta’s full compliance with Petitioner's crash cart accreditation requirements prior to the awarding of actual accreditation on December 12, 2001. Charles Graper, M.D. (Level II Accreditation) Petitioner inspected Dr. Graper’s facility for level II accreditation on March 25, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is March 2004. Thus, his accreditation covers March 2001 through March 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Graper’s office did not have dextrose 50 percent, a required medication. Dr. Graper failed to provide Petitioner with any subsequent documentation to demonstrate compliance with accreditation standards regarding the need to have dextrose 50 percent as part of the office’s crash cart. Ms. Sautner released Dr. Graper’s accreditation certificate on April 4, 2001. The certificate has a April 19, 2001 fax date across the top. Petitioner failed to verify that Dr. Graper obtained dextrose 50 percent for his crash cart after his inspection for level II surgery and before the release of his accreditation certificate by Petitioner on April 4, 2001. Leigh Phillips, III, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Phillips' facility for level II and III surgery on January 31, 2002. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is January 2005. Hence, his accreditation covers January 2002 through January 2005. During the inspection, it was determined that Dr. Phillips' office did not have the following required medications: dextrose 50 percent and 36 ampules of dantrolene (missing 18). After the inspection, Dr. Phillips provided Petitioner a copy of an order acknowledgment form from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical dated February 7, 2002. The order acknowledgment form reflected that Dr. Phillips ordered dextrose 50 percent. Dr. Phillips' inspection file also contained a handwritten letter from Dr. Mel Propis dated January 31, 2003. The letter indicated that Dr. Propis had just returned from the office of Dr. Phillips and while there he had counted 36 ampules of dantrolene and the dextrose 50 percent in the crash cart. Ms. Sautner did not know the date that she advised Scribes, Inc., to release Dr. Phillip’s accreditation certificate. However, her records indicate that the certificate was faxed to her on February 19, 2002. Dr. Propis’ correspondence dated January 31, 2003, verifying Dr. Phillips' receipt of the requisite dantrolene was provided to Petitioner approximately 11 months after Petitioner received a copy of Dr. Phillips' accreditation certificate. Such constitutes further undisputed evidence that FLACS did not verify Dr. Phillips' full compliance with accreditation standards prior to awarding him accreditation. Brandon Kallman, M.D. and Francisco Prado, M.D. (combined inspection) Petitioner inspected Drs. Kallman and Prado’s facility on June 2, 2002. The date that appears on their accreditation certificates is June 2005. Hence, their accreditation covers June 2002 through June 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that the physicians’ office did not have the following required medications: adrenalin (1:10,000 dilution), magnesium sulfate, heparin, dopamine, pronestyl (procainamide), and dilantin (phenytoin). Drs. Kallman and Prado provided Petitioner with a copy of a packing slip from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical dated July 12, 2002. The packing slip reveals that Drs. Kallman and Prado ordered the missing adrenalin (epinephrine), dopamine, pronestyl (procainamide), and dilantin (phenytoin). However, as evidenced by the fax strip across the top of the packing slip copy, the documentation was provided to Petitioner via fax transmission on July 22, 2002. Drs. Kallman and Prado also provided Petitioner with a copy of a packing slip from Henry Schein. The packing slip is dated July 18, 2002. The packing slip has a date of July 23, 2002, on the fax strip across the top. The packing slip in the record is illegible. Therefore, one cannot determine whether the packing slip served as documentation for receipt of the missing magnesium sulfate and heparin. Additionally, Drs. Kallman and Prado provided Petitioner with copies of an e-mail dated October 14, 2002, and multiple photos dated October 11, 2002. The photos depict the facility’s crash cart, its drawers, and the presence of dantrium. The original inspection form dated June 2, 2002, did not reveal any missing dantrium. Finally, Dr. Kallman provided one more document which purports to be some attempt at curing the deficiencies that were discovered during the inspection. The document in question is a short handwritten letter on Dr. Kallman’s letterhead signed by Dr. Kallman and dated July 16, 2002. The body of the letter reads as follows: Herewith are the documents requested. I will fax tomorrow a copy of Ms. Mad. Katz RN ACLS certification. Let this letter also reflect that we have ordered from Henry Schein the appropriate missing drugs for the crash cart. They are currently on back order. I will send a copy of the shipping slip upon arrival. Ms. Sautner released Drs. Kallman and Prado’s accreditation certificate on July 17, 2002. The certificate contains a July 23, 2002, fax date across the top. It may be that the illegible packing slip from Henry Schein verifies the receipt of magnesium sulfate and heparin by Drs. Kallman and Prado. Even so, the packing slip was dated July 18, 2002, one day after Ms. Sautner released the accreditation certificate on July 17, 2002. Additionally, the packing slip from Southern Anesthesia + Surgical was provided to Petitioner after the accreditation certificate release date. Needless to say, the e-mail and multiple photos are dated almost three months after the release of the accreditation certificate. The inspection file for Drs. Kallman and Prado is particularly problematic because the handwritten correspondence from Dr. Kallman put Petitioner on notice that he and Dr. Prado did not yet have the requisite drugs needed to meet the accreditation standards. Nevertheless, the very next day, with no further verification, Petitioner released the accreditation certificate. Dr. Luis Zarate, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Zarate’s facility for level II and III office surgery on September 14, 2002. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is September 2005. Hence, his accreditation covers September 2002 through September 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Zarate’s office did not have the required 36 ampules of dantrolene. Petitioner's inspection file for Dr. Zarate does not contain any documentation of ordering or receipt of dantrolene by Dr. Zarate or by anyone else on his behalf. Ms. Sautner did not have a release date for Dr. Zarate’s accreditation certificate. The certificate had an October 3, 2002, fax date. When Petitioner inspected Dr. Zarate, he was working in the same facility as Drs. Kallman and Prado. It is possible that the dantrolene photo contained in Drs. Kallman and Prado’s inspection file was meant to document Dr. Zarate’s compliance with the dantrolene requirement. Even if that is the case, Drs. Kallman and Prado's dantrolene photos were dated October 11, 2002, which means that the photos were taken after Petitioner released Dr. Zarate’s accreditation certificate. Dr. Andrew Weiss and Dr. Anthony Rogers Petitioner inspected Drs. Weiss and Rogers’ facility on December 6, 2001. However, the date that appears on their accreditation certificates is November 2004. Hence, their accreditation covers December 2001 through November 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that the physicians’ office did not have two required medications: pronestyl (procainamide) and inderal (propranolol). Drs. Weiss and Rogers provided Petitioner with a copy of an invoice from Henry Schein dated February 6, 2003. The invoice reveals that Drs. Weiss and Rogers ordered the missing pronestyl (procainamide) and inderal (propranolol). The inspection file also contains a printed statement under the title “Andrew Weiss, M.D.” which states that “[a]ll ACLS approved drugs were present at the time of accreditation. Inspector found no deficiencies.” However, during the hearing, Ms. Sautner admitted that the statement was inaccurate and inserted into the file by error. Ms. Sautner placed a hold on the certificates for Drs. Weiss and Rogers on December 5, 2001 and December 10, 2001. She did not know the release dates of the certificates. The fax date on the certificates was December 12, 2001. The above-mentioned Henry Schein invoice dated February 6, 2003, is persuasive evidence that Drs. Weiss and Rogers ordered and received the requisite pronestyl (procainamide) and inderal (propranolol) over one year after Petitioner received a copy of Drs. Weiss and Rogers’ accreditation certificates. Such constitutes undisputed evidence that FLACS did not verify Drs. Weiss and Rogers’ full compliance with FLACS’s accreditation standards prior to awarding accreditation. Richard Edison, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Edison’s facility on April 22, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is April 2004. Thus, his accreditation covers April 2001 through April 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Edison’s office did not have the following required medications: adrenalin (1:10,000 dilution), succinylcholine, dilantin (phenytoin), and lanoxin (digoxin). Petitioner also discovered that Dr. Edison’s office did not have the following required monitoring and/or emergency equipment: intubation forceps. Dr. Edison’s inspection file contains a handwritten letter dated May 7, 2001, from Pam Rolm, R.N. Ms. Rolm wrote the letter on the letterhead for Dr. Edison’s facility, Cosmetic Surgery Center. The letter reads in part as follows: This letter is in response to request for information for certification. The following medications have been updated and the expired ones disposed of: 1) phenytoin, 2) Lanoxin, 3) succinycholine, and 4) Albuterol Inhaler. We have a McGill forceps in both anesthesia carts and an extra pair in the ORI medication cart. Dr. Edison’s inspection file also contains three invoices from Prime Medical Care, Inc. All three invoices have a fax strip across the top with a February 14, 2003, date and the sender name of Cosmetic Surgery Center. The first invoice dated December 11, 2000, indicates that Dr. Edison ordered ephedrine sulfate 50mg/ml. The second invoice dated October 30, 2001, indicates that Dr. Edison ordered lidocaine, heparin, verapamil, procainamide, and phenylephrine. The third invoice dated April 25, 2001, indicates that Dr. Edison ordered succinylcholine, albuterol inhaler, phenytoin, and digoxin. Ms. Sautner testified that she ordered and placed a hold on the certificate for Dr. Edison on May 4, 2001. She released the hold on May 10, 2001. The certificate has a May 22, 2001, fax date across the top. The above-referenced correspondence dated May 7, 2001, does not address whether Dr. Edison ordered/obtained the missing adrenalin (1:10,000 dilution). Additionally, the first invoice is dated four months prior to the inspection. The second invoice is dated months after Petitioner released the accreditation certificate. The third invoice is appropriately dated but does not show that Dr. Edison ever ordered/obtained the missing adrenalin (1:10,000 dilution). Accordingly, Petitioner released Dr. Edison’s accreditation certificate before he documented compliance with the requirements that he possess adrenalin (1:10,000 dilution) and intubation forceps. Dr. Alton Ingram, M.D. Petitioner inspected Dr. Ingram’s facility on April 28, 2002. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is April 2005. Therefore, his accreditation covers April 2002 through April 2005. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Ingram’s office did not have a required tonsillar suction unit with backup suction. Dr. Ingram’s inspection file contains a copy of a photograph of a tonsillar suction unit with a hand-written date of July 29, 2002. Ms. Sautner placed the certificate for Dr. Ingram on hold on June 6, 2002. She released the hold on July 19, 2002. The date on the certificate is not legible. The date on the photograph of the tonsillar suction unit is after Petitioner released the accreditation certificate. Petitioner accredited Dr. Ingram before he documented full compliance with accreditation standards. Mont Cartwright, M.D. (Heathrow Facility) Petitioner inspected Dr. Cartwright’s Heathrow facility on March 3, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is March 2004. Thus, his accreditation covers March 2001 through March 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Cartwright’s Heathrow office did not have the required dopamine, heparin, and inderal. In an undated letter, Dr. Cartwright’s staff advised Petitioner that Dr. Cartwright’s Heathrow facility had obtained the missing medications. Ms. Sautner released the hold on Dr. Cartwright’s accreditation certificate on April 4, 2001. The fax date on the certificate is April 19, 2001. Mont Cartwright, M.D. (Orlando Facility) Petitioner inspected Dr. Cartwright’s Orlando facility on May 13, 2001. The date that appears on his accreditation certificate is May 2004. Hence, his accreditation covers May 2001 through May 2004. During the inspection, Petitioner determined that Dr. Cartwright’s Orlando office did not have the required dilantin and heparin. Dr. Cartwright’s office staff sent Petitioner correspondence dated June 7, 2001. The letter claims that the “crash cart” in Dr. Cartwright’s Orlando facility had been “brought up to standards in accordance with compliance. ” Ms. Sautner testified that she released the hold on Dr. Cartwright’s accreditation certificate on June 22, 2001. The fax date on the certificate is June 28, 2001. Inadequate Quality Control Petitioner asserts that it has appropriate quality assurance programs and processes which Respondent reviewed without objection. Dr. R. Gregory Smith, one of Petitioner’s current co-directors for facility inspections, describes Petitioner's quality assurance program in the following manner: Right. We have regular board meetings. We go over the forms and changes and things like that. We talk to inspectors and say, you know, try to check all the boxes and that type of thing. Q. You basically go over your work again – A. Yes. – make sure everything is accurate? A. Right. Plus, I think the actual meeting with the Board of Medicine to iron out any issues is also quality assurance. Petitioner's renewal application included a two-page document titled, “Quality Improvement Plan.” The document can best be described as a description of the quality assurance exercises for physicians' offices. The document does not describe Petitioner's internal quality assurance program. Other than the above-quoted description provided by Dr. Smith, Petitioner failed to present any evidence that outlines Petitioner’s own quality assurance program. In fact, the manner in which Petitioner deals with its own errors indicates that Petitioner has inadequate quality assurance processes. In situations where an inspector fails to check yes or no on an item when conducting an inspection, Petitioner takes the position that an inspector is not to make any changes after the fact. Rather, Petitioner claims that it assumes the worse, treats the blank as a no answer, and asks the physician undergoing inspection to provide a letter of attestation, a packing slip, or some other material that documents compliance with the accrediting standard. Petitioner's inspection files reveal instances where Petitioner did not follow the above-referenced quality assurance policy. For example, the inspection form for Harold Reed, M.D., revealed no check under yes or no on page 3 under the crash cart medication succinylcholine. After the inspection, Dr. Reed did not provide Petitioner with any materials documenting compliance with the requirement to have succinylcholine on the facility's premises. It may be that the inspector made a clerical error during the inspection or he may have remembered seeing the medication in Dr. Reed's refrigerator after the inspection. In any event, Petitioner did not follow its alleged quality assurance policy of requiring the physician to show compliance after the inspection. Dr. Leonard Rubinstein’s inspection file presents another example of Petitioner's failure to follow its alleged quality assurance policies. The inspection form reveals no check under yes or no on page 3 under the crash cart medications lasix and magnesium sulfate and on page 4 under oximeter in the monitoring and emergency equipment section. After the inspection, Dr. Rubinstein did not provide Petitioner with any documentation showing the presence of the missing items. Petitioner did not attempt to determine whether the inspector had made a “clerical error” or whether Dr. Rubinstein procured the missing items. In other words, Petitioner did not follow its own policy regarding the treatment of situations where the inspector fails to check no or yes on an inspection item. Dr. Michael Freeman’s inspection file presents another example of Petitioner’s failure to follow its alleged quality assurance policies. Dr. Freeman’s inspection form reveals no check under yes or no on page 3 under the crash cart medication mazicon. The inspection file contains no deficiency documentation, and thus, does not address the mazicon issue. Again, Petitioner did not follow its own policy regarding the treatment of situations where the inspector fails to check no or yes on an inspection item. Conditions Posing a Potential Immediate Threat Dr. Hector Vila, Jr., a licensed Florida physician and an Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology and Oncology at the University of South Florida, H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center, testified during the final hearing on the issue of whether any of the facilities inspected by Petitioner posed a potential immediate threat to patients due to the deficiencies discovered during the inspection. Dr. Vila has administered anesthesia in office surgery settings in the past and currently serves as an office surgery inspector for the Respondent. Dr. Vila is an expert in office surgery and anesthesia. His testimony regarding Petitioner's failure to report conditions posing a potential immediate threat to patients is persuasive. For example, the office of Marwan Shaykh, M.D, posed a potential immediate threat to patients because it did not have nitroglycerin and epinephrine (adrenalin) on the premises. Such medications are necessary to resuscitate a patient who may suffer a respiratory arrest due to either a surgical or anesthetic complication. It would be nearly impossible to resuscitate a patient without such items. Dr. Shaykh failed to provide documentation of compliance with the nitroglycerin and adrenalin requirement until August 15, 2002, or sometime thereafter. Dr. Shaykh demonstrated compliance approximately two months after Petitioner recognized Dr. Shaykh as being accredited. It is true that Dr. Shaykh’s office was located adjacent to a hospital. Therefore, it is possible that the same teams that respond to emergencies in the hospital could go to Dr. Shaykh's office if he needed them. It is also true that Dr. Shaykh performs in vitro fertilization procedures, which could be terminated in case of an emergency. However, after Petitioner recognizes Dr. Shaykh as being accredited, he could practice any type of medicine and perform any procedure as long as he is properly trained to do so. Furthermore, the office surgery accreditation rules do not provide any type of exemption based on the location of the physician’s office because to do so would undermine the reason for the rule. Office surgery facilities are not hospitals no matter how close to the hospital they may be located. If Dr. Shaykh felt that his close proximity to the hospital did not make compliance with the office surgery rules necessary, he should have filed a petition for waiver or variance from the relevant rules rather than ignore the need to have crucial resuscitative drugs in his crash cart. The office of Karen Chapman, M.D., posed a potential immediate threat to patients because it lacked 16 of the 22 medications required in an office surgery facility’s crash cart. The office also lacked an ambu bag, a piece of equipment used to resuscitate patients. Two of the 16 missing medications were the nitroglycerin and adrenalin, which are absolutely necessary to resuscitate a patient who may suffer a respiratory arrest due to either a surgical or anesthetic complication. The ambu bag is also used on patients under respiratory arrest and it is considered a crucial piece of equipment. Dr. Chapman’s office failed to provide documentation of compliance with the crash cart requirements until February 12, 2003. She did not demonstrate compliance until approximately nine months after she obtained her accreditation. Dr. Chapman may have informed Petitioner that she did not intend to open her new practice until she obtained accreditation. However, Dr. Chapman obtained her accreditation and presumably opened her practice almost nine months before she provided Petitioner with documentation of her compliance with the crash cart medication requirements. She never provided any materials documenting whether she obtained the required ambu bag.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for renewal as an office surgery accrediting agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Alfred W. Clark, Esquire 117 South Gadsden Street, Suite 201 Post Office Box 623 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0623 Edward A. Tellechea, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Rosanna Catalano, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact In December 1982,, Ambulatory Care filed an application with the Department to be granted a certificate of need to construct a freestanding surgical center in Duval, Florida, to provide surgical treatment which does not involve overnight confinement, i.e. ambulatory or outpatient. The approximate cost of that project is $1,994,280. The proposed facility would be approximately 11,300 square feet in dimensions and contain four operating rooms with attendant substerile areas and scrub areas; necessary recovery, preoperative and postoperative areas; waiting areas; lounges staff changing areas; a business office area and physician space. The particulars of the description of the facility are more completely addressed in the application which is part of Department's Exhibit 1. The specific surgeries to be performed in this outpatient setting have not been determined; however, Ambulatory Care would anticipate proceeding on a basis similar to that of a freestanding ambulatory surgery center in Lexington, Kentucky, allowing for any differences in the two communities which might provide a different surgical mix by type. Information pertaining to that center was provided through the testimony of Dr. Edwin Nighbert, Transcript Pages 137-193. A further description of possible surgeries to be performed in the facility may be in the Department's Exhibit 1 through the Omission's Response of the applicant in an Appendix to that response numbered 1 entitled, "Types of Surgeries performed in an Ambulatory Surgical Facility." The surgeries to be performed are elective in nature and allow the patient to be discharged the same day of the procedure. The characterization of the facility as freestanding means that it is self-contained and not dependent upon other facilities in its normal operation. The exact location of that facility has not been established in that the purchase of property has not been concluded; however, Ambulatory Care intends to build the center in the Riverside area of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, as described by drawings and maps in the Omission's Response referred to before. Construction in this area would place the facility in the immediate vicinity of Saint Vincent's and Riverside Hospitals, which facilities also serve patients who undergo ambulatory surgery on an outpatient basis. Other hospitals in Duval County provide outpatient surgery, as more specifically described in latter portions of this Recommended Order. Following review, the Department issued a certificate of need for the project in its entirety, effective December 29, 1982. This action led to Petitioners' timely challenge to the proposed agency action. The Department simultaneously approved a certificate of need for another freestanding surgical facility in Duval County, Surgical Services of Jacksonville, Inc., with proposed expenditures of $2,500,000 and a plan to provide four operating rooms. That latter surgical center has not been challenged on the issue of the grant of its certificate, through protest from local hospitals. With the addition of Surgical Services and Ambulatory Care, outpatient surgery would be performed in Duval County in hospital settings, the freestanding centers, and physician's offices. The hospitals and Ambulatory Care are expected to provide the same surgical procedures either on an outpatient basis or inpatient basis. Saint Vincent's is a hospital which is owned by the Daughters of Charity, a religious order within the Catholic Church and is a nonprofit corporation. Riverside is a nonprofit hospital. Other hospitals in the area providing outpatient surgery at present or in the immediate future are Methodist Hospital, Jacksonville General Hospital, University Hospital, Baptist Medical Center, Memorial Medical Center, and Saint Luke`s Hospital. None of the hospitals referred to have freestanding outpatient surgery units, meaning all procedures provided by those institutions are hospital based. There being no rules promulgated in keeping with Section 381.494, Florida Statutes, related to the establishment of a methodology for considering the question of need for ambulatory surgical centers in Florida, the parties on this occasion attempted to establish a record basis for determining the need question. In this endeavor, objective and subjective observations and predictions were offered. Similarities and dissimilarities between hospital- based outpatient surgery centers and freestanding surgery centers were discussed and the relative merits of those sites ware debated. Given the novelty of this comparison in Florida, determination of need in the ambulatory surgery realm is less than an exact science. To accommodate this situation, factual determinations are based upon those elements of proof which tend to best describe the Duval County circumstance pertaining to the question of need for ambulatory surgeries at present and in the near future, with particular emphasis on the applicant's request for certificate. To begin, there is the issue of what constitutes a surgery for statistical purposes. In the State Agency Action Report related to the fiscal or calendar year reporting of procedures performed by Duval County hospitals ending in 1982, reference is made to the number of impatient and outpatient surgical procedures. There is uncertainty about some of the outpatient procedures reported, whether they are best described as surgical or diagnostic. As example, in Ambulatory Care's Omission's Response request it included certain procedures such as cysto which by exhibit were under a surgical heading. Subsequently, the applicant argued in the course of the hearings that these proceedings were diagnostic in nature and not surgical. One physician who testified believed that a cysto could be considered a surgery. Opinion was expressed that any procedure reported for insurance purposes as surgical should be accepted as such, even if primarily diagnostic in effect. A hospital official believed that procedures that are primarily diagnostic in effect are not surgeries. Another contributing element in the dilemma is the possibility that some procedures might be considered surgical at times and diagnostic at others depending on the intended result. Moreover, the record is not clear on whether some of the inpatient procedures reported for the 1981-82 reporting period by the Duval County hospitals would involve procedures which might arguably be described as diagnostic and not surgical. There being no consensus among the practitioners and the health care planners on the question of what constitutes a surgery and given the existence of a known statistical base, making allowances for adjustments related to numbers of outpatient surgeries in the reporting year ending 1982 which was made in the course of the hearing and consistent with Appendix 1 to the Omission's Response offered by the applicant, all procedures are considered surgical for purposes of this review, with the exception of endoscopic procedures. This determination takes into account that the applicant has not specifically delineated those procedures which it intends to perform. On a similar topic, Duval County has been identified as the service area for the Ambulatory Care facility. It is that population base which the Department used in trying to identify the surgical use rate for all surgeries and ultimately for ambulatory surgery by measure of surgeries per thousand population. This calculation fails to take into account the fact that patients from areas outside Duval County, especially from the surrounding counties use the hospitals in Duval County. It was not established in the course of the hearing what percentage or number of those patients from those outside areas were in the hospital for purposes of undergoing inpatient or outpatient surgery. Nonetheless it can be assumed based upon the facts presented that some portion of those patients did receive surgery thereby increasing the number of persons in the population base who underwent surgeries and decreasing the number of surgeries per thousand population. Moreover, the modification of statistics presented in the course of hearing to more correctly reflect the number of outpatient surgeries done in the reporting periods 1981-82 suggests that the total number of procedures was around 64,600, not the 68,000 plus first thought when the action report was prepared and the Department made its calculations. This change alone would reduce use rate for surgeries per thousand from 118 to 112. Having in mind a necessary adjustment in the population base to account for patients outside Duval County who receive surgery as well as adjustment in the outpatient surgery statistics in the 1982 reporting period, somewhat less than 112 surgeries per thousand could be expected. According to the applicant, the national experience has been an expectation of 55 to 90 surgical procedures per year per thousand population as a planning guideline. Those projections made as a result of research and data gathered are accepted as establishing the base from which more precise estimates may be made. In view of the national experience and the adjustments that are needed in the initial projection of the Department that 115 surgeries per 1,000 population would be the experience, 110 surgeries per 1,000 population is found to be a reliable figure both in 1982 and the succeeding years to include the critical years of 1985 and 1986, for Duval County, Florida, surgical procedures. This finding acknowledges the fact that 97 percent of the residents of Duval County seek their health care in Duval County. In trying to determine what percentage of all surgeries will be ambulatory or outpatient in the critical years 1985 and 1986, considerable testimony has been offered. That testimony tends to establish a potential for outpatient surgeries in the range 15 percent to in excess of 40 percent. During the reporting period for which data is available, as many as 15 percent of the surgeries performed in the Duval County hospitals have been performed on an outpatient basis. The Department has taken a median fraction or number between the extremes of 15 percent and 40 plus percent and anticipated 29 percent of all surgeries to be ambulatory surgeries in the years 1985 and 1986 in Duval County. In consideration of the dramatic increases in the number of outpatient surgeries being performed in local hospitals within the last two or three years, and the continuing improved reimbursement environment for those surgical procedures performed on an outpatient basis, 29 percent is a reasonable policy choice for making the projections. Based upon an analysis of the facts presented, it is not safe to assume that the number of outpatient surgeries performed in Duval County for its patients in the years 1985 and 1986 will approximate the 40 percent experience found in other communities outside Florida. The Department in its calculations has utilized mid-range projections of the University of Florida, BEBR, population studies showing a population in Duval County in 1985 of 387,500 and in 1986, 590,480. This midrange choice is sound. Employing the technique used by the Department, the following predictions are arrived at in terms of expected outpatient surgeries in Duval County in 1985 and 1986: 387,500 total populations x 110 procedures per thousand = 1,000 64,525 total procedures x .29 percentage of outpatient = 18,741 outpatient surgeries in 1985 * * * 390,480 total populations x 110 procedures per thousand = 1,000 64,953 total procedures x .29 percentage of outpatient = 18,835 outpatient surgeries for 1986. Who is to provide those outpatient surgeries in 1985 and 1986? In answering that inquiry, in 1981, excluding endoscopic examination, area hospitals performed 6,450 outpatient surgeries. This number increased to 9,527 in 1982 and based upon statistics provided for the first quarter of 1983 that number would approximate 11,000 outpatient procedures in 1983. This growth pattern in those reporting years reflects substantial increases in the delivery of health care related to outpatient surgeries; however, an extrapolation of percentage increases over the intervening year 1984 and into 1985 and 1986 does not give a reliable approximation of the level of outpatient surgeries to be provided by the several hospitals. Neither does the estimate by the Department that the increase in surgeries performed in the hospitals shall be only to the extent of the increase in population in Duval County in the intervening years. Therefore, the question of available capacity in the years 1985 and 1986 is considered on the basis of an inventory or audit of outpatient surgical suites which may reasonably be expected to provide outpatient surgeries in 1985 and 1986 based upon the selection or a utilization rate for those operating rooms. The applicant has initially indicated in its application that 1,200 ambulatory cases could be dealt with in one operating suite on an annual basis. Initial testimony of one of the applicant's witnesses, Andrew Miller, at transcript page 460, was to the effect that the range 1,200 to 1,250 cases approached the capacity for a single dedicated operating room performing outpatient surgery. In rebuttal testimony, Miller recanted and indicated that 1,300 cases per operating room was not a reasonable estimate for hospitals in Duval County. He suggested the use of lower figures, perhaps as low as 1,000 procedures per room. In the face of the evidence, it is determined that for purposes of this review 1,100 procedures per operating room are an acceptable approximation. Utilization of this number takes into consideration differences in the length of procedures, scheduling and turn-around time in the preparation of the operating suite for a subsequent procedure. By dividing 1,100 procedures into the 15,741 projected outpatient surgeries in 1985, there would he a need for 17 operating suites in that year. Realizing that same process of division against the 19,536 projected ambulatory surgeries in 1986, 17 plus surgery suites would be needed. At the point of hearing, there were 15 ambulatory surgery suites in the hospitals in Duval County, excluding endoscopic rooms and those rooms in which inpatients and outpatients were operated on. Eight of those rooms had capability of general anesthesia. St. Luke's, in the move of their hospital, would add two additional ambulatory surgery suites, both of which would have general anesthesia capability and both of which are under construction. The freestanding ambulatory center, Surgical Services of Jacksonville, Inc., would bring the total to 21 operating rooms with its four additional surgery rooms with general anesthesia capability. With inclusion of the St. Luke's and Surgical Center of Jacksonville, a total of 14 of the 21 operating rooms would have general anesthesia capability. This does not take into account the high number of outpatient surgery procedures which are being performed at Baptist Hospital in rooms which have an inpatient and outpatient mix, nor does it take into account future plans of area hospitals to increase their outpatient surgery capacity, which would provide even greater capacity for outpatient surgery. In summary, there is more than enough capacity to perform needed outpatient surgeries in Duval County in 1985 and 1986. Ambulatory Care and the Department have referred to the cost savings to the individual patient being treated and to the overall patient community should the Ambulatory Care Surgical Center be opened. If there was a demonstrated need for that center the proof tends to bear out the savings to the individual patient and arguably to the patient community as a whole. However, on this occasion, given the fact that the addition of Ambulatory Care's operating suites would bring the total to 25 operating rooms against the need for 17 plus operating rooms, the cost benefits to the individual patients being treated in the applicant's facility and the patient community at large, would not be realized. To the contrary, the inordinate duplication of services that would be experienced with the addition of the applicant's facility would tend to drive up health care costs in Duval County. Additionally, the applicant cannot be expected to survive financially in the overcrowded health delivery environment described in this paragraph. The innovative nature of a freestanding surgery center in matters such as ambience, related to the psychological well being of patients, especially younger patients and potential efficiency of operation of the applicant's surgical center are not sufficient to redeem its request for certificate in this instance. In a related vein, modifications to existing plans in the hospitals and the inconvenience occasioned by those adjustments are not such that those circumstances may be expected to impede the steady progress of increased outpatient ambulatory procedures in those hospitals and make them less than a viable alternative for performing the needed procedures in the 1985 and 1986 periods. Any competitive influence to be fostered by the addition of Ambulatory Care's facility would not be beneficial. Sufficient competitive influence is already present to promote quality care and cost effectiveness. Finally, if trends in outpatient surgery, particularly to be performed under general anesthesia increases beyond the predictions indicated, there is sufficient capacity in the hospitals to accommodate that eventuality by constructing new outpatient surgical suites or by conversion of inpatient surgical suites to perform outpatient surgeries to include ancillary space. This can be accomplished without having to resort to an application for certificate of need, given the $695,000 exemption or exclusion from the certificate of need review process. In view of the overburden that would be created in ambulatory surgeries by the additional capacity of the applicant, provision of needed construction of facilities is being met and can be met in the future in a less costly way then suggested by the applicant. On this occasion, the hospitals can provide more cost effective facilities. Ambulatory surgery is available and accessible in local area hospitals within Duval County in an appropriate and adequate setting. That service does not exclude any patient. Though not needed Ambulatory Care's contemplated facility addresses those contingencies set forth in this paragraph, with one proviso. That matter pertains to the fact that Ambulatory Care shall provide its services to all residents in the service area without regard for physical condition or financial standing, premised upon the willingness of the treating physician to admit those patients to the facility for treatment and subsequent screening to be done by the staff of Ambulatory Care to determine the appropriateness of that setting to achieve the surgery. This will cause a certain number of potential patients to receive their surgery in a hospital environment.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(4) (Rule) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.
Findings Of Fact The Parties VRBH is an existing hospital in Sarasota County. In the second batching cycle of 2016, VRBH applied to AHCA for a CON to establish a Class I Acute Care Replacement Hospital of up to 312 beds in AHCA District VIII, Subdistrict 8-6, Sarasota County. The CON application was preliminarily approved by AHCA on December 2, 2016. SMH is a public hospital system serving Sarasota County. In the second batching cycle of 2016, SMH applied for a CON to establish a new acute care hospital with 90 beds in AHCA District 8, Acute Care Subdistrict 8-6, Sarasota County. As with the VRBH application, the SMH application also received preliminary approval from AHCA on December 2, 2016. AHCA is designated as the single state agency responsible for administering the CON program under the Health Facility and Services Development Act, sections 408.031 through 408.045, Florida Statutes. The Challenged Rule In part, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(4) requires that CON applications contain the audited financial statements of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation. The Rule states as follows: Certificate of Need Application Contents. An application for a Certificate of Need shall contain the following items: All requirements set forth in Sections 408.037(1), (2) and (3), F.S. The correct application fee. An audited financial statement of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation if the applicant’s audited financial statements do not exist. The following provisions apply: The audited financial statement of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation, must be for the most current fiscal year. If the most recent fiscal year ended within 120 days prior to the application filing deadline and the audited financial statements are not yet available, then the prior fiscal year will be considered the most recent. Existing health care facilities must provide audited financial statements for the two most recent consecutive fiscal years in accordance with subparagraph 1. above. Only audited financial statements of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation, will be accepted. Audited financial statements of any part of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation, including but not limited to subsidiaries, divisions, specific facilities or cost centers, will not qualify as an audit of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation. To comply with Section 408.037(1)(b)1., F.S., which requires a listing of all capital projects, the applicant shall provide the total approximate amount of anticipated expenditures for capital projects which meet the definition in subsection 59C-1.002(7), F.A.C., at the time of initial application submission, or state that there are none. An itemized list or grouping of capital projects is not required, although an applicant may choose to itemize or group its capital projects. The applicant shall also indicate the actual or proposed financial commitment to those projects, and include an assessment of the impact of those projects on the applicant’s ability to provide the proposed project; and, Responses to applicable questions contained in the application forms. The 2008 CON Legislative Changes In 2008, the Florida Legislature made numerous changes to streamline the CON application process for general hospitals. It is these changes that VRBH asserts removed the requirement for general hospitals to submit audited financial statements with CON applications. Section 408.035 was amended to provide as follows: 408.035 Review criteria.— The agency shall determine the reviewability of applications and shall review applications for certificate-of-need determinations for health care facilities and health services in context with the following criteria, except for general hospitals as defined in s. 395.002: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed. The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant’s record of providing quality of care. The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation. The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness. The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction. The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. The applicant’s designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility. For a general hospital, the agency shall consider only the criteria specified in paragraph (1)(a), paragraph (1)(b), except for quality of care in paragraph (1)(b), and paragraphs (1)(e), (g), and (i). (Emphasis added). Section 408.035 has not been revised since 2008. Additionally, section 408.037 was amended to read as follows: 408.037 Application content.— Except as provided in subsection (2) for a general hospital, an application for a certificate of need must contain: A detailed description of the proposed project and statement of its purpose and need in relation to the district health plan. A statement of the financial resources needed by and available to the applicant to accomplish the proposed project. This statement must include: A complete listing of all capital projects, including new health facility development projects and health facility acquisitions applied for, pending, approved, or underway in any state at the time of application, regardless of whether or not that state has a certificate-of-need program or a capital expenditure review program pursuant to s. 1122 of the Social Security Act. The agency may, by rule, require less- detailed information from major health care providers. This listing must include the applicant’s actual or proposed financial commitment to those projects and an assessment of their impact on the applicant’s ability to provide the proposed project. A detailed listing of the needed capital expenditures, including sources of funds. A detailed financial projection, including a statement of the projected revenue and expenses for the first 2 years of operation after completion of the proposed project. This statement must include a detailed evaluation of the impact of the proposed project on the cost of other services provided by the applicant. An audited financial statement of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation if audited financial statements of the applicant do not exist. In an application submitted by an existing health care facility, health maintenance organization, or hospice, financial condition documentation must include, but need not be limited to, a balance sheet and a profit-and-loss statement of the 2 previous fiscal years’ operation. An application for a certificate of need for a general hospital must contain a detailed description of the proposed general hospital project and a statement of its purpose and the needs it will meet. The proposed project’s location, as well as its primary and secondary service areas, must be identified by zip code. Primary service area is defined as the zip codes from which the applicant projects that it will draw 75 percent of its discharges. Secondary service area is defined as the zip codes from which the applicant projects that it will draw its remaining discharges. If, subsequent to issuance of a final order approving the certificate of need, the proposed location of the general hospital changes or the primary service area materially changes, the agency shall revoke the certificate of need. However, if the agency determines that such changes are deemed to enhance access to hospital services in the service district, the agency may permit such changes to occur. A party participating in the administrative hearing regarding the issuance of the certificate of need for a general hospital has standing to participate in any subsequent proceeding regarding the revocation of the certificate of need for a hospital for which the location has changed or for which the primary service area has materially changed. In addition, the application for the certificate of need for a general hospital must include a statement of intent that, if approved by final order of the agency, the applicant shall within 120 days after issuance of the final order or, if there is an appeal of the final order, within 120 days after the issuance of the court’s mandate on appeal, furnish satisfactory proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate. The agency shall establish documentation requirements, to be completed by each applicant, which show anticipated provider revenues and expenditures, the basis for financing the anticipated cash- flow requirements of the provider, and an applicant’s access to contingency financing. A party participating in the administrative hearing regarding the issuance of the certificate of need for a general hospital may provide written comments concerning the adequacy of the financial information provided, but such party does not have standing to participate in an administrative proceeding regarding proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate. The agency may require a licensee to provide proof of financial ability to operate at any time if there is evidence of financial instability, including, but not limited to, unpaid expenses necessary for the basic operations of the provider. The applicant must certify that it will license and operate the health care facility. For an existing health care facility, the applicant must be the licenseholder of the facility. (Emphasis added). Section 408.037 has only been amended once since 2008. The revisions are not relevant to the issue presented in this Rule challenge.2/ The Parties’ Positions In support of its argument that the Rule contravenes the statutes, VRBH asserts that the Rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the laws implemented. Simply put, VRBH contends that the Rule is contrary to sections 408.035 and VRBH advances three reasons for its position that the Rule modifies the laws implemented; all three center on the assertion that in 2008, the Legislature removed the requirement for the submission of audited financial statements with general hospital CON applications: Requiring a general hospital to comply with the requirements of section 408.037(1), Florida Statutes, by submitting an audited financial statement with its CON application violates the express provision of the statute which specifically excludes general hospitals from the requirements of subsection (1); Requiring a general hospital to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application directly contradicts the submission requirements set forth in section 408.037(2), Florida Statutes, which only requires a general hospital to provide a statement of intent that it will “furnish satisfactory proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate” if the CON application is approved by final order of the agency. Requiring a general hospital to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application contradicts the 2008 legislative changes to section 408.035, Florida Statutes, which streamlined the application process for general hospitals by removing the short and long term financial feasibility of the project as a review criteria. (VRBH Petition, ¶¶ 15-17). AHCA’s ultimate position is that the Rule should be interpreted as not requiring audited financial statements for general hospital CON applicants. To reach this conclusion, AHCA relies on 59C-1.008(4)(a), which provides that a CON application must contain “all requirements set forth in Sections 408.037(1), (2), and (3), Florida Statutes.” AHCA interprets the introductory phrase contained in section 408.037(1)--“except as provided in subsection (2) for a general hospital, an application for a certificate of need must contain”--to mean that only subsection (2) of section 408.037 applies to an application for general hospitals. Because section 408.037(2) does not mention audited financial statements, AHCA reasons that they are not required. Therefore, despite the plain language of the Rule, AHCA contends that the Rule does not require the submission of audited financial statements because: the Rule references sections 408.037(1), (2), and (3); AHCA interprets only section 408.037(2) as applying to general hospitals; and section 408.037(2) does not mention audited financial statements. SMH contends that the Rule does not enlarge, modify, or contravene the laws implemented and, therefore, is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specifically, SMH contends that section 408.037 itself requires general hospital applicants to submit audited financial statements because subsection (2) does not wholesale replace subsection (1) for general hospitals. Subsection (1) applies to general hospitals, unless there is an exception to those requirements listed in subsection (2). Subsection (1) requires the submission of audited financial statements for all CON applicants; nothing in subsection (2) creates an exception to that requirement. SMH also argues that audited financial statements are reliable documents that AHCA can quickly access for relevant information, including an applicant’s provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent, both of which are prominent considerations during the review of a general hospital’s CON application. See § 408.035(1)(i), (2), Fla. Stat. Post 2008 Rule Challenged Rule 59C-1.008(4) does not expressly exclude or differentiate between general hospital CON applications and other CON applications. Instead the Rule cross-references to the statutory requirement. AHCA asserts that by doing so, the Rule incorporates the statutory scheme by reference and does not require a CON application for a general hospital to include audited financial statements. The above-cited statutory provisions clearly state that a general hospital CON application need not include an audited financial statement and that financial condition is not relevant to the CON application review process. Any rule that requires a general hospital CON applicant to provide an audited financial statement with the application would be contrary to the requirements of section 408.037. It follows, therefore, that a rule contrary to the requirements of a statute would be invalid as it would exceed AHCA’s delegated legislative authority. Requiring a general hospital applicant to comply with the requirements of section 408.037(1) would violate the provision of the statute, which expressly excludes general hospitals from the requirements of subsection (1). Further, requiring a general hospital applicant to submit an audited financial statement with its CON application directly contradicts the submission requirements set forth in section 408.037(2). AHCA’s interpretation of rule 59C-1.008 is that it must be read in conjunction with section 408.037, subsections (1), (2), and (3), and accordingly, AHCA does not require that a general hospital applicant submit an audited financial statement as part of its application. AHCA’s interpretation is consistent with the differences in the content of the CON application forms published by AHCA for general hospital applications when compared to non-general hospital applications, for instance, those seeking other beds and services such as comprehensive medical rehabilitation, psychiatric, hospice, and other CON- regulated beds in a hospital. The requirements of each application type correspond to the statutory requirements for each application type. Application forms for projects “except for general hospitals” correspond to the CON application content requirements of section 408.037(1), which requires a statement of financial resources that must include capital projects (Schedule 2 of the CON application); capital expenditures and source of funds (Schedules 1 and 3 of the CON application); and a detailed financial projection, including revenues and expenses for the first two years (Schedules 5 through 8 of the CON application). The general hospital CON application does not have these requirements. General hospitals are not required to submit proof of financial ability to operate at the time of the submission of the CON application. In accordance with rule 59C-1.010(2)(d), general hospitals are required to comply with the requirements of sections 408.035(2) and 408.037(2). Neither of those statutes requires that a general hospital applicant submit proof of financial ability to operate until 120 days after the issuance of the final CON to the applicant. AHCA’s representative, Marisol Fitch, testified that AHCA does not require applicants for general hospitals to submit audited financial statements in the CON application, and that proof of financial ability to operate is required within 120 days after the final approval of the CON application, consistent with the statutory provisions. She testified that the Rule being challenged, when read in conjunction with the AHCA CON application form (incorporated by reference into the Rule) and other AHCA rules, including 59C-1.010 and 59C-1.030, is consistent with the statute, and that no audited financial statements are required. SMH asserts that an audited financial statement for hospitals might contain useful information, such as information on a hospital’s current payor mix. However, the unrefuted testimony is that audited financial statements are not required to include payor mix information, and normally do not since they are typically used to look at an applicant’s financial feasibility to operate. Further, regardless of whether such information might be “useful,” the specific requirement of section 408.037(2) expressly “excepts” general hospitals from the requirement to include such statements in the CON application. Pursuant to rule 59C-1.010(2)(d), “an application for a general hospital must meet the requirements of Sections 408.035(2) and 408.037(2), F.S.,” neither of which require that a general hospital CON applicant provide audited financials or financial feasibility data with the CON application. However, the challenged language in rule 59C-1.008(4) does not contain the “exception” for general hospital applications. Rule 59C-1.008(4) provides, without qualification, that a CON application must contain audited financial statements. Therefore, rules 59C-1.008(4) and 59C-1.010(2)(d) are contradictory. The primary purpose of an audited financial statement in a CON application is to review the short-term and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. Requiring this financial information is contrary to the clear language of the 2008 changes to section 408.035, which removed the short-term and long-term financial feasibility of the project as review criteria in order to streamline the general hospital CON application process. AHCA has stated that their interpretation of rule 59C-1.008(4) is that it must be read in pari materia with rule 59C-1.010(2)(d) and sections 408.037 and 408.035, therefore, general hospital CON applicants are not required to submit audited financials with the CON application. According to AHCA’s interpretation, rule 59C-1.008(4) does not require a general hospital CON applicant to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application. However, regardless of AHCA’s interpretation, rule 59C-1.008(4) expressly states that a CON application must contain audited financial statements, in contravention of sections 408.035 and 408.037.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application for approval as an office surgery accrediting organization pursuant to Section 459.309(3), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092.
Findings Of Fact In Florida, physicians who perform certain surgical procedures in their offices are required to register the office with DOH. Additionally, DOH must inspect such offices unless a nationally recognized accrediting agency or an accrediting organization approved by the Board inspects and accredits the offices every three years. See § 458.309(3), Fla. Stat. and Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-0.0091. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092, entitled "Approval of Physician Office Accrediting Organizations," purports to establish requirements that FLACS must meet in order to achieve the Board's approval to operate as an accrediting organization. FLACS is a not-for-profit corporation, organized for the following purposes: (a) to promote office safety through its accreditation activities; (b) to promote cosmetic surgery; and (c) to provide continuing education courses related to office surgery. FLACS was formed in 1999 and, since that time, has participated actively in office surgery issues considered by the Board. The Board approved FLACS as an accrediting organization early in 2001. In January 2003 FLACS filed a complete renewal application, seeking the Board's approval to continue operating as an office surgery accrediting organization. The Board denied the application and, after a formal administrative hearing, entered a Final Order denying FLACS's application. See Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc. v. Board of Medicine, Case No. DOH-04-0661-FOF-MQA (Final Order, June 18, 2004)(adopting Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 03-3349, April 15, 2004.) FLACS filed a new application for approval as an office surgery accrediting organization on July 12, 2004. The Board never advised FLACS whether its application was complete or incomplete. There is evidence that a member of the Board's staff, Melinda Grey, reviewed the application, finding it incomplete in many respects. On August 5, 2004, Ms. Grey prepared a spreadsheet entitled "Board of Medicine Staff Issues Regarding FLACS Application." The spreadsheet compared the application with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Florida Administrative Code, including Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092. Larry McPherson, the Board's Executive Director, was aware that Ms. Grey was reviewing FLACS's application. She did not tell Mr. McPherson that the application was incomplete. Instead, she informed the Board's legal counsel that FLACS had filed the application. Subsequently, Ms. Grey placed the application on the agenda for the Board's next scheduled meeting. On August 7, 2004, the Board voted to deny the new application. On August 23, 2004, the Board entered an Notice of Intent to Deny FLACS's new application on the following grounds: When participating in accrediting activities in the past, the applicant violated Section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes, by failing to comply with rules of the Board in the following manner: The applicant failed to provide copies of accreditation reports and corrective action plans to the Board office within 30 days of completion of accrediting activities in violation of Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to immediately report to the Department conditions in physicians' offices that posed a potential immediate threat to patients in violation of Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(f), Florida Administrative Code. When inspecting and accrediting facilities the applicant ignored its written accreditation standards and failed to provide the Board office with accreditation standards under which it was actually operating. Such facts reveal that the applicant operated in violation of Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(g), Florida Administrative Code. When inspecting the facilities, the applicant operated with inadequate or applied inconsistently its quality assurance program in violation of Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to provide evidence of an adequate quality assurance program as required by Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to provide evidence of an adequate ongoing anesthesia related accreditation and quality assurance processes as required by Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to submit copies of all incident reports filed with the state that originated at FLACS accredited facilities as required by Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(f), Florida Administrative Code. Uncorrected "Prior Errors" After FLACS submitted its January 2003 "renewal" application, the Board's staff met several times with FLACS to discuss and "work out" problems that the Board had with FLACS's office surgery accrediting procedures. These meetings, which took place between January 2003 (when FLACS filed its renewal application) and August 2003 (when the Board denied the renewal application,) were supposed to result in changes to FLACS's inspection procedures and to alleviate the Board's concerns about FLACS' renewal application. Apparently FLACS successfully implemented some changes between the time that the Board denied FLACS's renewal application in August 2003 and the time that the Board issued the June 2004 Final Order in DOAH Case No. 03-3349. There is no evidence in the instant case that FLACS committed the following prior violations: (a) failed to provide DOH with accreditation reports and corrective action plans required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(e); and (b) awarded accreditation retroactive to the inspection date. Despite FLACS's effort to make needed changes in its inspection processes, it failed to do so on several occasions. First, on May 23, 2004, FLACS inspected the office of Anthony Rogers, M.D. Even though Dr. Rogers had one crash cart deficiency (missing the drug isuprel), FLACS's facility inspection form indicates that Dr. Rogers passed the inspection. FLACS did not receive confirmation that Dr. Rogers was in 100 percent compliance with the Board's rules regarding the mandated crash cart medications until May 27, 2004. FLACS accredited Dr. Rogers on that date based on a packing slip/boxed content list, showing receipt of the isuprel. Second, FLACS inspected the office of Rodolfo Binker, M.D., on May 22, 2004. FLACS's facility inspection form indicates that Dr. Binker passed the inspection even though he was missing intubation forceps (McGill). FLACS did not receive confirmation that Dr. Binker's monitoring and emergency equipment included intubation forceps (McGill) until May 24, 2004. FLACS accredited Dr. Binker that same day based on an invoice, showing that the forceps had been ordered and shipped to Dr. Rogers. The invoice does not indicate the date that Dr. Rogers received the forceps. Third, FLACS prefers for physicians who fail an inspection to verify compliance with the Board's rules by providing FLACS with a packing slip, showing receipt of the missing drugs or equipment. However, the evidence indicates that one of FLACS's inspectors sometimes accepts purchase orders/invoices, which do not show actual receipt of the missing items. Fourth, there is no evidence that FLACS failed to advise DOH about conditions in any physician's office that posed potential immediate jeopardy to patients as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(f). FLACS's application states that "[a]ll deficiencies, including those which pose potential immediate jeopardy, will be immediately reported to the Department of Health and the Board." However, as a practical matter, FLACS does not believe it is necessary to make such a report as long as it notifies the Board by telephone for any circumstance that it believes constitutes an "immediate threat" to a patient and provides the Board with copies of all inspection materials, facility surveys, and compliance materials on all FLACS accreditations. In other words, unless a patient is in immediate danger, FLACS will leave it to DOH and the Board to review all documentation and determine whether a physician's office poses a "potential immediate threat." Finally, Bruce Hirshman, D.O, is an anesthesiologist who participates in FLACS's ongoing anesthesia-related accreditation and quality assurance processes. At some point in time, FLACS accredited Dr. Hirshman's office surgery facility. As of June 3, 2003, FLACS was aware that Dr. Hirshman had not registered with the Board of Osteopathic Medicine and advised him to do so. FLACS took no further action regarding Dr. Hirshman's failure to register until May 2005. FLACS's May 5, 2005, letter to Dr. Hirshman, stated as follows in relevant part: As of April 28, 2004, the Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery was informed by Ms. Rina Palladino at the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine that you had not registered with the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine to perform office surgery. The Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery is withdrawing your accreditation . . . . Rule 64B8-9.0092(2)(f)--Adverse Incident Reports Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(2)(f) requires an application for approval as an office surgery accrediting organization to include copies of all incident reports that accredited physicians file with the state. The incident reports are defined by Section 458.351(4), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: (4) For purposes of notification to the department pursuant to this section, the term "adverse incident" means an event over which the physician or licensee could exercise control and which is associated in whole or in part with a medical intervention, rather than the condition for which such intervention occurred, and which results in the following patient injuries: The death of a patient. Brain or spinal damage to a patient. The performance of a surgical procedure on the wrong patient. 1. The performance of a wrong- site surgical procedure; The performance of a wrong surgical procedure; or The surgical repair of damage to a patient resulting from a planned surgical procedure where the damage is not a recognized specific risk as disclosed to the patient and documented through the informed- consent process if it results in: death; brain or spinal damage; permanent disfigurement not to include the incision scar; fracture or dislocation of bones or joints; a limitation of neurological, physical or sensory function; or any condition that required transfer of the patient. A procedure to remove unplanned foreign objects remaining from a surgical procedure. Any condition that required transfer of a patient to a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, from any facility or any office maintained by a physician for the practice of medicine which is not licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. The incident reports are further defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.001(1)(a), which states as follows in relevant part: . . . an event over which the physician or other licensee could exercise control and which is associated in whole or in part with a medical intervention, rather than the condition for which such intervention occurred, and which results in the following patient injuries: The death of a patient. Brain or spinal damage to a patient. The performance of a surgical procedure on the wrong patient. The performance of a wrong-site surgical procedure, the performance of a wrong surgical procedure; or the surgical repair of damage to a patient resulting from a planned surgical procedure where the damage is not a recognized specific risk as disclosed to the patient and documented through the informed-consent process and if one of the listed procedures in the paragraph results in: death; brain or spinal damage; permanent disfigurement not to include the incision scar; fracture or dislocation of bones or joints; a limitation of neurological, physical or sensory function; or any condition that required transfer of the patient. A procedure to remove unplanned foreign objects remaining from a surgical procedure. Any condition that required transfer of a patient to a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, from any facility or any office maintained by a physician for the practice of medicine which is not licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. FLACS understood that the "incident reports" referenced in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(2)(f) are the same as the "reports on adverse incident" defined by Section 458.351, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.001(1)(a). FLACS's application specifically references adverse incident reports as defined by Section 458.351, Florida Statutes. FLACS provided two such adverse incident reports with its new application: (a) one filed by Fabio Arturo Castro, M.D., from an incident that occurred on November 24, 2003; and (b) one filed by Kurt S. Dangl, M.D., from an incident that occurred on September 25, 2003. The new application did not include the following incident reports that FLACS included with its January 2003 renewal application: (a) one filed by Robert Gregory Smith, M.D., from an incident that occurred on August 16, 2001; and (b) one filed by Rafael A. Fleites, M.D., from an incident that occurred on March 9, 2002. As of July 12, 2004, DOH had received a total of nine (9) office incident reports from doctors' offices that are, or were at the time the incidents occurred, accredited by FLACS. FLACS's accredited physicians did not provide it with the following incident reports: (a) one filed by Michael Patipa, M.D., from and incident that occurred on March 29, 2004; (b) one filed by Constantino F. Mendieta, M.D., from an incident that occurred on February 2, 2004; (c) one filed by Edward J. Gross, M.D., from an incident that occurred on July 22, 2003; (d) one filed by Timothy Fee, M.D., from an incident that occurred on November 11, 2003; and (e) one filed by Ramiro Morales, Jr., M.D., from an incident that occurred on April 9, 2002. The Board's staff discovered that FLACS's application did not provide copies of these five incident reports by reviewing individual physician office registration files. FLACS has several methods to use in collecting incident reports. First, FLACS requires its accredited physicians and office surgery facilities to attest and acknowledge that they are required to provide FLACS with any and all adverse incident reports related to or following surgery in the accredited offices. Second, FLACS requires the staff of accredited offices to perform self-evaluation surveys after the first and second year of accreditation, said surveys to include such incident reports. Third, FLACS watches for information about adverse incidents as reported by news media or complaints from the public. Most important, FLACS can make quarterly public record requests for the reports even though the state system of record keeping for adverse incident reports is not computerized. There is no persuasive evidence that FLACS ever made an oral or written public records request for copies of incident reports related to its accredited physicians and office surgery facilities. There is no statutory or rule requirement for physicians to file copies of incident reports with their accrediting organization. However, at least two of the nationally recognized accrediting agencies, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (JACHO) and American Association for Accreditation of Ambulatory Surgical Facilities (AAAASF), have provisions in their accreditation manuals related to adverse incidents. JACHO's "Accreditation Manual for Office-Based Surgery Practices," Second Edition (2005), defines a "sentinel event" as follows: A sentinel event is an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Serious injury specifically includes loss of limb or function. The phrase "or risk thereof" includes any process variation for which a recurrence would carry a significant chance of a serious adverse outcome. Such events are called "sentinel" because they signal the need for immediate investigation and response. The terms "sentinel event" and "medical error" are not synonymous; not all sentinel events occur because of an error, and not all errors result in sentinel events. JACHO requires each accredited practice to define "sentinel event" for its own purposes in establishing mechanisms to identify, report, and manage these events. JACHO encourages, but does not require, its clients to report "sentinel events" to the accrediting agency within 45 days of the event or of becoming aware of the event. The report should include a root cause analysis and an action plan. If JACHO becomes aware of an unreported "sentinel event," JACHO will advise the accredited practice to prepare and submit the report within a certain timeframe. If the accredited practice fails to file an appropriate report within that time frame, JACHO will not revoke accreditation, but will place the accredited practice on an "Accreditation Watch" list. AAAASF's "Standards and Checklist for Accreditaion of Ambulatory Surgery Facilities" contains forms for accredited surgery facilities to use in reporting "unanticipated sequela." The forms refer one to AAAASF's "Quality Assurance and Peer Review Manual" for questions relative to their completion. The record indicates that "unanticipated sequela" are the equivalent of adverse incident reports, including but not limited to, events that result in unplanned hospital admissions. In Florida, physicians are required to file adverse incident reports with DOH's Consumer Services Unit (CSU), which is part of DOH's Medical Quality Assurance Program. On at least a quarterly basis, the Board's staff requests CSU to provide it with copies of adverse incident reports filed during a certain timeframe. The staff of the CSU has access to medical consultants who review the incident reports to determine whether there might have been a violation of law or a violation of a standard of care. If so, the matter is referred for further investigation, determination of probable cause, and possible disciplinary prosecution by the Board. The Board's staff places the incident reports in physician registration files and in office surgery inspection/accreditation files. The Board's staff also places copies of incident reports involving physicians or facilities in the respective file of their accrediting agency or accrediting organization. The Board's staff provides copies of adverse incident reports to DOH's state inspectors before they make office inspections of non-accredited facilities or facilities formerly accredited by a national agency or FLACS. The state inspector/risk manager uses the incident reports during inspections to recommend improvements so that such incidents can be avoided in the future. The Board's Surgical Care Committee, uses the incident reports for statistical purposes. The Surgical Care Committee reviews the reports to determine whether changes need to be made in administrative rules, including but not limited to, rules related to standard of care or physician registration. It is important for FLACS to be aware of adverse incident reports filed by its accredited physicians and office- surgery facilities. Such reports are an essential part of any accreditation program. Without such knowledge, FLACS cannot be assured that its accredited physicians and offices are taking steps to prevent such incidents in the future. Moreover, if FLACS is not aware of the adverse incidents occurring in the offices it inspects, FLACS cannot implement changes in its own policies to improve the accreditation process. The Board has no policy or practice for routinely sharing incident reports with accrediting organizations. Nevertheless, requiring FLACS to file copies of incident reports with the Board could alert the Board to incidents that were known to FLACS but never reported to the state and vice versa. As stated above, FLACS could make routine public records requests for copies of reports filed with the Board but not reported directly to FLACS. Rules 64B8-9.0092(4)(a) and 64B8-9.0092(4)(c) Florida Administrative Code Rules 64B8-9.0092(4)(a) and 64B8-9.0092(4)(c) were declared invalid in Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc. v. Department of Health, Board of Medicine, DOAH Case No. 05-0402RX (Final Order, August 8, 2005). For the reasons set forth below in the Conclusions of Law, it is unnecessary to report facts related to a mandatory quality assurance program or the ongoing anesthesia-related accreditation and quality assurance processes involving the active participation of anesthesiologists.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board issue a Final Order denying FLACS's application for approval as an office surgery accrediting organization. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the challenged portions of Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact In 1994, Respondent, Florida Board of Medicine promulgated Rule 61F6-27.16, Florida Administrative Code. The Rule was later renumbered twice before being referenced as 64B8- 9.009, Florida Administrative Code. In 1998, the Florida Legislature provided that the Board may "establish by rule standards of practice and standards of care for particular practice settings, including, but not limited to, education and training, equipment and supplies, medications including anesthetics, assistance of and delegation to other personnel, transfer agreements, sterilization, records, performance of complex or multiple procedures, informed consent, and policy and procedure manuals in order to establish grounds for disciplining doctors." Section 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes. On March 13, 1998, Respondent published in the Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW) a Notice of Proposed Rule-making concerning the Rule, followed by the first meeting of Respondent's Surgical Care Committee with respect to potential amendments to the Rule. After additional meetings, all of which were properly noticed in the FAW, the Surgical Care Committee presented its recommended amendments to the Rule to the full Board of Medicine from December 4-6, 1998. The full Board did not accept the Surgical Care Committee's recommendation completely, but rather voted to alter the proposed amendments. These latter amendments were approved by the Board at its January 6, 1999, conference call. On April 11, 1999 and June 3, 1999, the Board held additional public hearings, leading the Board to publish two Notices of Change, the second of which was published on June 18, 1999. Among the amendments contained in Rule 64B8-9.009 as proposed on June 18, 1999, was a deletion of Section (4)(b) which required those physicians not having staff privileges to perform the same procedure as that being performed in the office to have a "transfer agreement" with a licensed hospital within reasonable proximity. The Board considered replacing this mandate with a "transfer protocol." The June 18, 1999, version also considered a change to Section (6)(b)1., thereby permitting certain physicians to perform Level III surgery without hospital staff privileges and eliminating the mandated presence of a physician anesthesiologist. On July 8, 1999, the Florida Society of Anesthesiologists (FSA) and the Florida Hospital Association, et al. (FHA) filed separate rule challenges seeking to invalidate the proposed Rule (DOAH Case Nos. 99-2974RP and 99-2975RP, respectively). On August 7, 1999, the Board of Medicine held an additional public hearing, where further amendments were made to the Rule, none of which materially affected the above sections. A third Notice of Change was published on August 20, 1999, reflecting these amendments approved on August 7, 1999, by the Board. During the Fall of 1999, the incoming Chairman of the Board of Medicine, Dr. George El-Bahri, held several private settlement negotiations with the parties to the various rule challenges. Nevertheless, as of the Board's December 4, 1999, meeting, no settlement had been reached in either challenge, and the Board voted unanimously to proceed with the rule challenge litigation and make no further changes to the proposed amendments. This course of action was confirmed by the Board during its January 2000 conference call. Following the Board's January conference call, the parties to the pending litigation agreed to "submit to the Department of State for codification" those sections of the proposed amendments which were not at issue in the litigation. As a result, the Board, FSA, and FSPS entered into a joint stipulation on January 26, 2000. The FHA filed a Partial Voluntary Dismissal on January 28, 2000, dismissing their challenge to all proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009, except with respect to Subsections (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(i), (4)(g)1. and 2.; and (6)(b)1a. and 6., which are not at issue in this case. On January 28, 2000, the Board properly filed with the Department of State, portions of the proposed amendments which were no longer subject to the pending litigation, with the rule in its current form becoming effective on February 17, 2000. Because any proposed amendments relating to transfer protocols and Level III staff privileges were withdrawn and no longer being considered, they were not filed for adoption on January 28, 2000. Those existing sections remained unchanged in the rule and were renumbered by the Department of State. Petitioners challenge each of the approved amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 which became effective on February 17, 2000, alleging that the provisions of the existing rule are an invalid exercise of delegated Legislative authority under Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Petitioners challenge the following Subsections of Rule 64B8-9.009. Subsection (1)(a) which provides that the rule covers "any elective procedures for aesthetic, reconstructive, or cosmetic purposes;" Subsection (2) which Petitioners allege imposes costly record-keeping requirements; c. Subsections (2)(d), (3), (4), (5), and (6) which Petitioners allege limit the types and durations of aesthetic reconstructive and cosmetic procedures which may be performed in Petitioners' office surgical suites; Subsections (4)(e) and (6)(e) which Petitioners allege impose costly equipment requirements; Subsections (4)(f), (5)(b)2., and (6)(f) which Petitioners allege impose costly personnel requirements; Subsections (3), (4), (5), and (6) which Petitioners allege establish levels of surgery unrelated to any rational classification scheme. Petitioners further challenge Subsection (3)(b) and (4)(b) of Rule 64B8-9.009 relating to transfer agreements and staff privileges as they existed prior to February 17, 2000, which contain the exact same language in Subsections (4)(b) and (6)(b) of the current version of the Rule. PARTIES Petitioner R. Gregory Smith, M.D., is a licensed medical doctor practicing in Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. Petitioner Smith practices cosmetic surgery, plastic surgery, and oral-maxillofacial surgery in his office. Petitioner Smith has a dental degree from Ohio State University College of Dentistry, a residency in oral and maxillofacial surgery, a degree in medicine from the University of Florida College of Medicine, residency at the University of Florida with an internship in general surgery, and served as a faculty member at the University of Florida College of Dentistry in the Department of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery at Shands Hospital Jacksonville. After specialty training in cosmetic surgery, Petitioner Smith opened his private practice in 1991. Petitioner Smith performs various surgical procedures in his office, including hair transplantation, cosmetic eyelid surgery, functional eyelid surgery, cosmetic and functional nasal surgery, face, neck, and forehead lifts, tumor reconstruction, liposuction, abdominoplasties, breast implants, and breast reductions. Petitioner Smith is also President of the Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc. (Academy). Petitioner Academy is an organization of multispecialty physicians who perform both cosmetic and functional surgery in their offices. Functional surgery means surgery being performed as part of a disease process or correcting some deformity and is generally not done for purely cosmetic reasons. Petitioner Charles E. Graper, D.D.S., M.D., FACS, is a Florida licensed medical doctor and dentist practicing in Gainesville, Florida. Petitioner Graper received his doctorate in dental surgery from Emory University in 1971, his medical degree from Hahnemann University Medical School in 1983, and received one year of post-graduate training in general surgery at Orlando Regional Medical Center. Petitioner Graper is Board- certified by the American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, Board-certified in general cosmetic surgery, Board- eligible in general plastic surgery, and is a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons (FACS). Petitioner Graper performs in his office cosmetic surgery, functional surgery, and surgery below the head and neck which would not be authorized by his dental license. Petitioner Graper has been practicing cosmetic surgery for 20 years and has been teaching cosmetic surgery for 15 years. The Board The Board regulates the practice of medicine in Florida, and is the agency that adopted the Rule at issue. It is comprised of 15 members appointed by Florida's Governor and confirmed by the Florida Senate. The FSPS and the FSD The FSPS and the FSD are comprised of Florida physicians who practice in the areas of plastic surgery and dermatology. The FSA The FSA is a not-for-profit professional membership organization representing approximately 2,000 anesthesiologists in Florida. FSA members practice in educational institutions, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and physicians' offices. The purpose of the FSA is to provide its members information about anesthesiology and to inform the public about issues particular to anesthesiology. The Hospitals The Florida Hospital Association, Inc. (FHA) and the Association of Community Hospitals and Health Systems (ACHHS) are nonprofit trade associations which represent over 200 hospitals and health systems. FHA and ACHHS represent member hospitals and health systems on common interests before the branches of government, particularly with respect to regulations that impact the members. Rule Adoption Procedures In light of the filing of the Joint Stipulation in DOAH Case No. 99-2974RP, and the filing of the Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal in DOAH Case No. 99-2975RP, the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 were no longer subject to challenge, with the exception of the proposed changes to Subsections (1)(e), (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(i), (4)(b)2., (6)(b)1.a. and (6)(b)1.b. Accordingly, on January 28, 2000, the Board filed the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 that were no longer subject to challenge with the Department of State for adoption. Liz Cloud is the bureau chief for the Department of State's Bureau of Administrative Code (BAC). Ms. Cloud serves as the filing officer for rules and regulations filed by agencies, all laws passed by the legislature and any advertisements for publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. She oversees the publishing of the Florida Administrative Weekly and the Florida Administrative Code and has served in that position since 1977. The BAC has rule-making requirements which agencies must follow in order to file a rule for adoption. When the BAC receives a rule that is filed for adoption, specific documents must be included, or the agency is required to resubmit a corrected rule packet. The BAC verifies that the certification from the Joint Administration Procedures Commission has been received and that all the required time frames have been met. BAC checks to ensure the rule is filed within the 90-day limit in Section 120.54(3)(e), Florida Statutes, and determines if there is a challenge to the rule. The BAC receives a weekly computer printout from JAPC on which Cloud's staff relies to determine if there are outstanding rule challenges to a rule being filed for adoption. The BAC's role in the rule-making process is not merely ministerial. If, for example, an agency files a rule on which the 90-day time limit has run, the BAC rejects the rule and does not file it for adoption. Nancy Murphy is a research associate at the Office of the Attorney General. With regard to rules and rule promulgation, Ms. Murphy drafts the documents necessary for rule- making, including notices of rule development, notices of rule- making, supporting documents that have to be supplied to JAPC and any documents that have to be prepared for adoption of rule. Prior to filing a rule for adoption, Ms. Murphy verifies that the time frames are correct and she has all the documents that are required for adoption, including the certificate, the additional statement, and the correct copy of the rule text and coded copy, which is the underlined and struck- through version of the rule. Ms. Murphy also determines whether the rule is subject to challenge before it is filed, and if JAPC has received a written response to all correspondence. Ms. Murphy was responsible for filing the amendments to Rule 64B8-0.009 for adoption. In determining which portions of the rule could be filed and which remained under challenge, she reviewed the Joint Stipulation and the Hospitals' Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal in DOAH Case Nos. 99-2974 and 99- 2975. Ms. Murphy redrafted and renumbered the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 to be filed for adoption, excluding the sections that were still under challenge, after consultation from Ms. Cloud's office. Ms. Murphy also met with Vicky Macintosh at the BAC to review the Rule section-by-section before filing. Ms. Murphy provided a copy of the Joint Stipulation and Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal to establish the provisions of the Rule still under challenge. Murphy also consulted with JAPC prior to filing the amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 for adoption. The BAC's standard operating procedure with regard to a rule challenge that challenges only a portion of a proposed rule is to accept for filing the unchallenged portions of the rule. This procedure has been strictly followed in the past, and approved by the BAC's counsel. Pursuant to that policy, the BAC permitted the Board to file for adoption those portions of Rule 64B8-9.009 not subject to challenge on January 28, 2000. The BAC received a certification from JAPC that permitted the filing of Rule 64B8-9.009 pursuant to Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes. Based upon the evidence presented, it is concluded that, although the Board had considered amendments to Sections (3)(b) and (4)(b) involving transfer agreements and Level III staff privilege requirements, they were withdrawn and no longer subject to the pending litigation in DOAH Case Nos 99-2974 and 99-2975 after the Board agreed to make no change. Petitioners have not met their burden of proving that the Board materially failed to follow the rule-making procedures and requirements of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Record-Keeping Requirements: Subsection (2) Petitioners presented no evidence with regard to the record-keeping requirements or the cost of the record-keeping requirements imposed by Rule 64B8-9.009(2). Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof in challenging this subsection of the rule. Limitation on Types and Duration of Procedures: Subsections (2)(d), (3), (4), (5), and (6) Subsection (2)(d) of Rule 64B8-9.009 states: In any liposuction procedure, the surgeon is responsible for determining the appropriate amount of supernatant fat to be removed from a particular patient. A maximum of 4000 cc supernatant fat may be removed by liposuction in the office setting. A maximum of 50 mg/kg of Lidocaine can be injected in the office setting. Petitioners claim that a limitation of 4000 cc on liposuction is arbitrary and unreasonable since a physician cannot accurately estimate the amount of fat to be taken out. Notwithstanding, Petitioners' witnesses acknowledged that the risk of a liposuction procedure is heightened as the volume of fat removed and the level of anesthesia increase. Petitioners' Exhibit 8, a journal article entitled "Does the Location of the Surgery of the Specialty of the Physician Affect Malpractice Claims in Liposuction?" supports this view. It states: "Large-volume liposuction (over 4000 cc) is inherently risky, but it also involves more aggressive anesthesia, adding to its danger. Risk management for liposuction should stress smaller liposuction procedures using local anesthesia, with minimal sedation." Petitioners' Exhibit 8 also includes the "2000 Guidelines for Liposuction Surgery" of the American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery. Those guidelines recommend volumes of up to 4000 cc of supernatant fat removal in the routine liposuction process. The Board received extensive testimony and information regarding the limitation of removal of tissue in office-based surgery as part of its rule-making process. In setting the volume limit for liposuction, the Board considered the amount of material removed, the Lidocane dosage required, and fluid replaced. The Board considered testimony supporting no limit on liposuction volume, and testimony supporting limitations on volumes as low as 2000 cc. The Board determined that the consensus among experts around the country is that 4000 cc is the appropriate ceiling to ensure the safety of patients undergoing liposuction procedures in the office environment. This conclusion is reasonable and amply supported by the rule-making record. Petitioners presented no evidence at hearing regarding other limitations on types or duration of procedures relating to Subsections (3), (4), (5), or (6) of Rule 64B8-9.009. Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof with respect to their challenge to these provisions. Equipment Requirements: Subsections (4)(e) and (6)(e) Petitioners presented no evidence at hearing regarding the equipment requirements of subsection (4)(e) of Rule 64B8- 9.009, or the cost thereof. Accordingly, they have not met their burden of proof with respect to these provisions. With regard to Subsection (6)(e) of Rule 64B8-9.009, the only evidence presented by Petitioners at hearing related to the requirement that at least 36 ampules of Dantrolene be available on-site at a physician's office where Level III Office Surgery is being performed. Petitioners claim that the requirement in subsection (6)(e) for 36 ampules of Dantrolene is unreasonable. The cost of 36 ampules of Dantrolene can be as much as $2,000.00 and the shelf-life of Dantrolene is approximately one to two years. The evidence presented at hearing indicated that the manufacturer of Dantrolene will replace it for free if the shelf- life expires, and therefore, shelf-life of Dantrolene is not an economic consideration. The manufacturer of Dantrolene advises that 36 ampules of Dantrolene are necessary to ensure that a patient suffering from malignant hypothermia can be saved. The more persuasive evidence supports the Board's decision to impose a requirement consistent with this recommendation. Personnel Requirements: Subsections (4)(f), (5)(b)2., and (6)(f) Petitioners presented insufficient evidence regarding the cost of additional personnel required by Subsections (4)(f), (5)(b)2, or (6)(f) of the existing Rule. Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof with respect to their challenge to these provisions. Petitioners did, however, present some general testimony with regard to Subsection (4)(f) of Rule 64B8-9.009. The evidence was insufficient, however, to prove that Subsection (4)(f) is invalid. That Subsection states: Assistance of Other Personnel Required. The surgeon must be assisted by a qualified anesthesia provider as follows: An Anesthesiologist, Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, or Physician Assistant qualified as set forth in Rule 64B8-30.012(b)(6), Florida Administrative Code, or a registered nurse may be utilized to assist with the anesthesia, if the surgeon is ACLS certified. An assisting anesthesia provider cannot function in any other capacity during the procedure. If additional assistance is required by the specific procedure or patient circumstances, such assistance must be provided by a physician, osteopathic physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, or operating room technician. A physician licensed under Chapter 458 or 459, a licensed physician assistant, a licensed registered nurse with post-anesthesia care unit experience or the equivalent, credentialed in Advance Cardiac Life Support or, in the case of pediatric patients, Pediatric Advanced Life Support, must be available to monitor the patient in the recovery room until the patient is recovered from anesthesia. Petitioners have not presented any persuasive evidence that this requirement is vague, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Evidence was presented that during meetings of the FACS, Dr. Anthony Rogers has held courses in conscious sedation to train non-anesthesiologist physicians to be providers of anesthesia for Level II Office Surgery. Dr. Rogers testified that he does not instruct surgeons on administering anesthesia to patients upon which the surgeons are performing surgery. Rather, he trains the surgeons to serve as anesthesia providers for other surgeons as well as providing them with a better understanding of "what's happening on the other side of the table." The training given by Dr. Rogers consists of approximately six to eight hours of staged administration of anesthesia and discussion of hypothetical scenarios. The training does not involve the actual administration of anesthesia by the physicians-in-training. Physicians attending Dr. Rogers' training course are not required to be certified in Advance Cardiac Life Support. No examination is administered as part of Dr. Rogers' training course, and no certification is issued for completion. Even assuming that some FACS members have completed Dr. Rogers' course, the requirement in Subsection (4)(f) for assistance by a qualified anesthesia provider has not been shown to be unreasonable. Levels of Surgery: Subsections (4), (5), and (6) Petitioners contend that the definitions of the various levels of surgeries provided in the Rule are impermissibly vague. Subsection (4) of Rule 64B8-9.009 defines Level I Office Surgery to include: Pre-operative medications not required or used other than minimal pre-operative tranquilization of the patient; anesthesia is local, topical or none. No drug-induced alteration of consciousness other than minimal pre-operative tranquilization of the patient is permitted in Level I Office Surgery. Subsection (5) of Rule 64B8-9.009 defines Level II Office Surgery as follows: Level II Office Surgery is that in which peri-operative medication and sedation are used intravenously, intramuscularly, or rectally, thus making intra and post- operative monitoring necessary. Such procedures shall include, but not be limited to, hemmorroidectomy, hernia repair, reduction of simple fractures, large joint dislocations, breast biopsies, colonoscopy, and liposuction involving the removal of up to 4000 cc supernatant fat. Level II Office Surgery includes any surgery in which the patient is placed in a state which allows the patient to tolerate unpleasant procedures while maintaining adequate cardiorespiratory function and the ability to respond purposefully to verbal command and/or tactile stimulation. Patients whose only response is reflect withdrawal from a painful stimulus are sedated to a greater degree than encompassed by this definition. Subsection (6) of Rule 64B8-9.009 defines Level III office surgery as follows: Level III Office Surgery is that surgery which involves, or reasonably should require, the use of a general anesthesia or major conduction anesthesia and pre-operative sedation. This includes the use of: Intravenous sedation beyond that defined for Level II office surgery; General Anesthesia: loss of consciousness and loss of vital reflexes with probable requirement of external support of pulmonary or cardiac functions; or Major Conduction anesthesia. The definitions of the three levels of office surgery are based on definitions developed by the American Society of Anesthesiologists and have been adopted in substantially similar form in other states. The American Society of Anesthesiologists is recognized as a group of specialists in anesthesia. Petitioners acknowledged the expertise of the American Society of Anesthesiologists in developing definitions of levels of office surgery. Petitioners argued that the classifications of levels of surgery in the Rule are irrational and vague because it is virtually impossible to differentiate between the various levels of surgery as defined in the Rule. However, the more persuasive evidence establishes that classifications were reasonably based on accepted medical standards. In discussing the potential for a particular patient to drift between what has been defined as Level II anesthesia and Level III, Petitioners' witness, Dr. Rogers testified that medicine itself is vague in this area because there is no machine to tell you if a patient is unconscious. He suggested that anesthesia is a continuum and there is no clear way to define levels of surgery. Dr. Carl Lentz, Board-certified plastic surgeon, supported the Rule's classification scheme. In his opinion, the differences between Levels II and III are clearly understood. When preparing for surgery, a surgeon develops an anesthesia plan. The procedures are distinctly different for each level. If, during surgery, a patient temporarily crosses the line of consciousness, which is apparent if the patient is appropriately monitored, actions to reverse the level can be taken quickly. According to Lentz, if a surgeon does not determine, prior to surgery, the level of anesthesia to be provided, the surgeon should not be performing the surgery. Petitioners complain that the terms "appropriate," "adequate," and "unpleasant" are vague. Although the Petition identifies no other specific terms that are vague, during the hearing, Dr. Graper suggested that numerous other terms contained in Rule 64B8-9.009 are vague, including, "preoperative," "medication," "minimal," "tranquilization,," "anesthesia," "local," "drug-induced," "consciousness," "sedation," "intravenously," "intra-operative," "monitoring," "necessary," "procedures," "hernia repair"," "reduction of simple fractures," "large joint dislocation," "colonoscopy," "tolerate," "cardiorespiratory function," and "ability to respond purposefully." His testimony related to vagueness was unpersuasive and not supported by the evidence. After reviewing the rule and considering the evidence, it is concluded that the Rule requirements are not unacceptably vague. The terms "adequate," "appropriate" and "purposeful" have standard meanings in the field of medicine. Likewise, the remaining medical terms in the rule are not unacceptably vague. Transfer Agreements and Staff Privileges: Subsections (4)(b) and (6)(b) Petitioners contend that the transfer agreement and staff privilege requirements found in the rule are vague, fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, vest unbridled discretion in the agency, enlarge modify and contravene the law, are arbitrary and capricious and not supported by competent substantial evidence. According to Subsection 455.517(4)(a), Florida Statutes, neither the Department of Health, nor the Board of Medicine may take any action: . . . that tends to create or maintain an economic condition that unreasonably restricts competition, except as provided by law. However, Subsection 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes, provides that the Board of Medicine may establish rule standards of practice for office surgery settings, including transfer agreements, in order for the Board to determine whether a licensed doctor, subject to discipline, has practiced beyond the scope of the law or beyond his competency level. Subsection (4)(b) of Rule 64B8-9.009, relating to Level II Office Surgery, states: Transfer Agreement Required. The physician must have a transfer agreement with a licensed hospital within reasonable proximity if the physician does not have staff privileges to perform the same procedure as that being performed in the out-patient setting at a licensed hospital within reasonable proximity. Subsection (6)(b) of Rule 64B8-9.009, relating to Level III Office Surgery, states; Hospital Staff Privileges Required. The physician must have staff privileges to perform the same procedure as that being performed in the out-patient setting at a licensed hospital within reasonable proximity. There is no transfer agreement or hospital privileges requirement for Level I Office Surgery. Historically, surgeries were typically performed in hospitals, and a large body of regulation has developed to ensure patient safety. As many types of surgeries moved into ambulatory surgical centers, a new body of regulation was developed to ensure health and safety in that setting. Over the past few years, surgeons have increasingly been performing many types of surgeries in office settings with varying degrees of regulation. Among the regulations ensuring safety in hospitals are requirements for an organized medical staff, and staff-developed rules to set criteria for appointment to the staff and delineation of staff privileges. These rules promote quality of care by providing a review of the qualifications of staff physicians. Decisions regarding medical staff privileges are a function of the medical staff of a hospital with support and final approval by the Board of Trustees. Often, national standards and demonstrated competence provide a guide in making medical staff privilege decisions. The medical staff credentialing process is a well-established, but at times, subjective mechanism for evaluating the qualifications of a physician. A transfer agreement is a contract between a hospital and an office surgeon, providing for the transfer and acceptance of a patient in an emergency situation. There is no law or regulation which requires a hospital to enter into a transfer agreement with any physician. In addition, there is neither specific nor consistent criteria for the contents of a transfer agreement. Some agreements are very detailed contracts and others are general. During the rule-making process, the Board received testimony regarding surgeons performing Level II as well as Level III Office Surgeries and the requirement of staff privileges and transfer agreements. The Board's stated purpose for the Rule requiring a physician to enter into a transfer agreement is to ensure that steps are taken in advance to care for a patient who experiences a complication during surgery which exceeds the level of care that can be provided in a given facility. However, there is no reliable evidence that transfer agreements improve the quality of patient care. In the rare event an emergency occurs in the office surgery setting, the emergency 911 is called and the patient is delivered to the hospital. The absence of a transfer agreement between the hospital and office surgeon does not delay or impede the patient's admission to the hospital and access to appropriate medical care. Under Florida law, a hospital is required to accept and care for a patient who requires emergency medical attention. At the hearing, Petitioners provided significant testimony demonstrating they have been unable to obtain staff privileges and transfer agreements from certain hospitals. The determination of whether to grant staff privileges and/or a transfer agreement is solely the hospital's decision. And the evidence demonstrated that the determination doesn't always depend on the qualifications and reputation of the physician and the resources and circumstances of the hospital. It is undisputed that hospital privileges and transfer agreements may be denied (or revoked) for reasons other than physician competence. The standards for obtaining privileges vary from hospital to hospital. In fact, during the rule-making proceeding, the Board initially approved a change in Level III office surgery to remove the requirement that the surgeon have staff privileges, and recognized that: Hospital staff privileges may be denied for reasons other than competency, and that other documented training is comparable demonstration of competency. Factors other than physician competence enter into the decision of whether hospital privileges or transfer agreements may be approved. For example, turf battles at hospitals and personality conflicts among physicians at hospitals have been considered. Moreover, some physicians have refused to proctor other physicians as a part of the credentialling process. In fact, in some hospitals, competing physicians vote upon the approval or denial of the application of an office surgeon's request for hospital privileges. The evidence further showed that a physician's staff privileges can be approved by the medical staff but denied by the board of the competing hospital. Physician competence to perform Level II office surgery procedures is determined by Subsection (4)(d) of the Rule, "Training Required." Under this provision, in order to perform Level II surgery, the surgeon must either have staff privileges for the same procedure, or must be able to document satisfactory completion of training, or must document comparable background training or experience. Nevertheless, a competent office physician who possesses the "training required" to perform an office surgery procedure is precluded unless the physician has received either a transfer agreement or hospital privileges for that procedure. The inability of a qualified office surgeon to secure a transfer agreement or hospital privileges will have a drastic impact on the physician's ability to perform office surgery. The physician's office surgery will be limited to Level I office surgery. The Rule's requirements for either a transfer agreement or hospital privileges for Level II surgeries and hospital privileges for Level III surgeries unreasonably enable a competing hospital to unilaterally refuse a transfer agreement and privileges to a qualified office surgeon for reasons unrelated to physician competence. It has the direct effect of terminating a physician's Level II and Level III office surgery practice, without regard to the fact that the physician otherwise meets the "training required" elements of the Rule. It is inconsistent, provides no objective, non-competitive based criteria evaluation and tends to create and maintain an economic condition that unreasonably restricts competition which is inconsistent with and contravenes Section 455.507, Florida Statutes. Barbara Dame (Dame), who is a risk management consultant provided further support. She testified that over the last two years, many of her very qualified physician clients have had applications for transfer agreements summarily denied. Ms. Dame does not get involved in obtaining hospital staff privileges for her clients. Conversely, Bill Bell, General Counsel for the FHA, testified that the Rule requirement for physicians performing office-based surgery to have transfer agreements has existed for a few years and he is not aware of any problems physicians have had obtaining such agreements. The evidence to the contrary is more compelling. Transfer agreements can be a tool for some hospitals to control competition for surgery sites. Office surgery sites compete with hospitals for patients. Dr. Brent Amey is the Vice President of St. Joseph's Baptist Health Care, and has been an emergency room physician since 1974. He is aware of instances involving "economic credentialing", and the denial of transfer agreements and staff privileges unrelated to competence, although not at hospitals with which he has been associated.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated section 478.52(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ by accepting and performing professional responsibilities that she knew or had reason to know she was not competent to perform; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed for the violations proven.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of electrolysis pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been licensed as an electrologist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number EO2650. Respondent is also licensed by the State of Florida as an acupuncturist, license number AP 1378. Respondent is a certified surgical assistant, having obtained certification through the American Board of Surgical Assistants. Documents in the record indicate that in 1998, Respondent completed medical school at Universidad Libre in Barranquilla, Columbia. However, Respondent is not a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. Respondent’s address of record is 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent owned and operated Orozco Medical Center (“OMC”), located at 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. Patient N.M. Patient N.M. is a female born in 1964. She testified that she was familiar with OMC because she had therapy there following a car accident in 2000. N.M. presented to OMC in early 2015 for consultation regarding a liposuction with fat transfer procedure, commonly called a “Brazilian Butt Lift” (“BBL”). Fat is taken from one part of the body and reinjected into the buttocks. N.M. testified that Blanca Cabrera, who performs massages at OMC, recommended a “doctor” at OMC named Marlon Barcelo to perform her BBL. Marlon Barcelo worked at OMC as a surgical assistant but was not a medical doctor. N.M. testified that she believed Mr. Barcelo would perform her BBL procedure and that she never knew that he was not a physician. Ms. Cabrera told her that Mr. Barcelo had been a very good doctor in Columbia. N.M. testified that at her initial consultation at OMC regarding the BBL, she met exclusively with Respondent, who showed her where the fat would be removed and where it would be injected. N.M. testified that she met with Respondent three times before her surgery. N.M. testified that, at the conclusion of the initial consultation, she was given an appointment card directing her to return to OMC on January 13, 2015, for an electrocardiogram, lab work, and the medication she would be expected to take before the procedure. The medical records indicate that N.M. was confused as to the dates. It appears from the records that her initial consultation was on January 13, 2015, that her EKG and lab work were performed on March 2, 2015, and the date of her surgery was March 13, 2015. N.M. testified that each time she visited OMC prior to the surgery, she met only with Respondent, who examined her and explained the procedure to her with no other persons present. N.M. testified that on the date of the surgery, her daughter drove her to OMC. After she checked in at the front desk, N.M. was taken to an exam room and told to change into a hospital gown. Respondent then marked her body to identify the locations where fat was to be removed. Respondent gave N.M. a medication to calm her prior to the procedure. The medical record indicates that N.M.’s pre- operative medications included Keflex (cephalexin, an antibiotic), lorazepam (a sedative and anti-anxiety medication), and Benadryl (diphenhydramine, an antihistamine with sedative properties). N.M. described the medication’s effect as “like a Xanax.” N.M. testified that the medication relaxed her but did not affect her recollection of the procedure. She testified that she was awake throughout the surgery and was allowed to use her cell phone during the procedure. N.M. did not recall meeting Dr. Mark Kantzler and denied ever meeting Dr. Amina Edathodu. She believed that Mr. Barcelo was going to perform the surgery, though up until the morning of the procedure she had not met him. N.M. was taken to the surgical room and placed on a table. She stated that there was a drape that blocked her view of the surgical area, but that it was low enough to allow her to see everyone in the room. She could see two men, Mr. Barcelo and someone identified as “Abel,” and Ms. Cabrera, the massage therapist, who appeared to be assisting. N.M. testified that Mr. Barcelo performed the liposuction. She testified that everyone in the room was wearing surgical gowns and gloves but no surgical masks. N.M. testified that during the liposuction procedure, Respondent told her that she would be performing the fat injections because she was very good at that procedure. N.M. testified that after the liposuction was completed, Mr. Barcelo called on Respondent to perform the fat injections into her buttocks. N.M. stated that she saw Respondent walk into the room carrying a syringe. During this portion of the procedure N.M was positioned on her stomach but stated that she knew from the conversation in the room that it was Respondent who was placing the injections into her buttocks. Upon conclusion of the procedure, Respondent gave N.M. pain medication for post-surgical pain. N.M. returned to OMC for a follow-up visit regarding the lack of drainage from her incision. During this visit, Respondent examined N.M. and gave her medication to reduce the swelling she was experiencing. Dr. Edathodu testified that she has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida for over 25 years. From 2015 through 2017, she worked as a contract physician at OMC and acted as medical director for the facility. Dr. Edathodu developed the protocols for OMC’s tumescent liposuction procedures and ensured they were followed. Dr. Edathodu remembered N.M. as a patient who had undergone previous surgeries and presented for further liposuction and fat transfer. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the liposuction procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu’s signature is on the cosmetic surgery consent form that was also signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015. The “Liposuction and Autologous Fat Transfer” consent form signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015, specifically names Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who will perform the procedure and was signed by Dr. Edathodu. Dr. Edathodu testified that she reviewed the procedure with N.M., discussing the risks and benefits. Dr. Edathodu does not speak Spanish and uses Respondent to translate with Spanish speakers such as N.M. She identified herself to N.M. as a surgeon through Respondent’s translation. Dr. Edathodu spoke to N.M. about having realistic expectations and cautioned her that she may not obtain an optimal result because of her previous procedures. Dr. Edathodu testified that, aside from her, the persons in the surgical theater were three surgical assistants: Respondent, Mr. Barcelo, and Pavel Cabanes. It is found that Mr. Cabanes must have been the “Abel” referred to by N.M. Dr. Edathodu testified that during the surgery, there is a drape between the surgical field and the patient’s face and head, to prevent the patient from being disturbed by the sight of the procedure. The drape is made of disposable paper and is about five feet high. When performing the surgery, Dr. Edathodu is unable to see the patient’s face and the patient is unable to see past the drape. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the entire surgical procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu made the site markings on N.M. while Respondent took photographs. Respondent did not perform any part of the surgical procedure. Respondent performed none of the fat transfer on N.M. Respondent did nothing other than what Dr. Edathodu specifically directed her to do. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with N.M. on four or five occasions after the surgery. Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. Perhaps because of her inability to speak English, N.M. appeared confused and inconsistent in her testimony, at least as it appeared in the Transcript. N.M.’s credibility was strained by her uncertainty as to dates and medications. She offered improbable details, such as the lack of coverage by the surgical drape and the failure of the surgical team to wear masks. N.M. was certain that Respondent was performing the fat injection, even though N.M. could not see what was happening. Though N.M. testified that she was awake and alert during the procedure, the undersigned cannot disregard that she had been given a medication that she likened to Xanax, most likely the lorazepam. The undersigned hesitates to rely upon N.M.’s disjointed testimony where it conflicts with the straightforward and credible testimony of Dr. Edathodu.3/ Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient N.M. Patient R.C. Patient R.C. is a female born in 1988. At the time of the hearing, she worked as a claims specialist. She testified that a friend from her previous job at HealthPlan Services referred her to OMC for a consultation. She first went to OMC on or about June 6, 2016. R.C. testified that this initial consultation was with Respondent. She told Respondent that she wanted liposuction on her back and waist and wanted the fat transferred to her buttocks. They discussed the procedure and pricing. From that point until the day of the surgery, R.C. went to OMC only to drop off periodic payments for the surgery. Her only contact was with the person at the front desk. She testified that she did not see Respondent again until the day of her surgery. R.C.’s surgery was scheduled for August 5, 2016. R.C. testified that she was dropped off at OMC by her children’s father. She went in and met Respondent and a few workers in the front of the facility. When she went to the back to prepare for the procedure, she met a man wearing scrubs whom she had never seen before. Two other staff persons were present, but R.C. stated she only talked with the one staff person who spoke English. R.C. testified that Respondent and the man in scrubs marked her body for the surgery. She believed that Respondent was going to perform the surgery. R.C. stated that she was not familiar with Dr. Edathodu. R.C. stated that she filled out the consent forms on August 5, 2016. An assistant gave her medication, saying it would calm her down. R.C. was not told the name of the medication, but testified that she took a blue pill and half of a white pill. The medical records indicate she was given Ativan (a brand name for lorazepam) and Benadryl. R.C. testified that the medications made her drowsy. R.C. was assisted to the room where the surgery would be performed. R.C. testified that she was placed on her stomach, face down. Everyone in the room was wearing a surgical mask. In the room were Respondent, the man in the scrubs, and two assistants. R.C. stated that she was awake during the procedure, but was drowsy and did not recall much about it. She could hear Respondent’s voice and the noise of the liposuction machine. She could not see who actually performed the procedure. After it was over, one of the assistants phoned R.C.’s driver and helped R.C. get up and walk. Respondent handed her a bag containing pills that R.C. believed were antibiotics. She received post-operative instructions. R.C. testified that she returned to OMC for a follow- up visit about a month after the surgery and met with Respondent. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the surgical procedure, called “tumescent liposuction,” on R.C. on August 5, 2016. On August 2, 2016, R.C. signed a “liposuction & autologous fat transfer consent” form that specifically named Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who would perform the surgery. Dr. Edathodu ordered, reviewed, and signed R.C.’s lab results. Dr. Edathodu met with R.C. prior to the procedure and completed a “pre-operative clearance” form to document R.C.’s fitness and willingness to go through the surgery. Both R.C. and Dr. Edathodu signed the pre-operative clearance form. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with R.C. three or four times post-surgery. As in the case of N.M., all of the medical records support the version of events described by Dr. Edathodu.4/ Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. R.C. frankly conceded that she did not remember much about the surgery and could not see who performed it. Dr. Edathodu clearly and credibly recalled performing the procedure. The greater weight of evidence supports the finding that Dr. Edathodu performed the surgery, assisted by Respondent and Mr. Barcelo. The evidence could not sustain a finding that Respondent performed a surgical procedure on R.C. R.C. was a more credible witness than N.M., and her testimony on some of the details regarding her consultations and pre-operative events was persuasive. However, it must be kept in mind that the only relevant factual question is whether Respondent performed an “invasive/surgical medical procedure” on R.C. The evidence on this question is not persuasive. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient R.C. Patient K.H. Patient K.H. is a female born in 1989. She learned of OMC from a friend at work. She first came into OMC for a consultation regarding a liposuction and fat transfer on November 29, 2016. K.H. testified that she met only with Respondent at this initial consultation. On November 29, 2016, K.H. signed an “information certification” form accepting Dr. Mark Kantzler as the physician who would be in charge of her liposuction procedure. K.H. came back to OMC on January 9, 2017, to make a $500 deposit and to schedule the surgery. The procedure was scheduled for February 11, 2017. Again, K.H. testified that she met alone with Respondent, who told her that she would need to come in a couple of days before the surgery to get medication and a list of things she would need for post-operative care. K.H. testified that she believed that Respondent was a physician and that she would be performing the liposuction procedure. The “liposuction and autologous fat transfer consent” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, authorized Dr. Kantzler to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedure. The “surgery certification” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, indicated that Dr. Kantzler reviewed the entire medical file with her before performing the procedure. On February 11, 2017, K.H. was driven to OMC by her mother. Shortly after arriving, K.H. noted the presence of a tall man with white hair and blue eyes. An OMC assistant escorted K.H. to a room with a bed and a chair. Respondent came in to the room and marked K.H. for surgery. Respondent then called in the tall man with white hair and blue eyes, who looked at the surgical markings and then asked K.H. some questions about her stretch marks. During her direct examination, K.H. testified that she was not given the man’s name. During cross-examination, K.H. was forced to concede that during an August 2017 interview, she told Department investigators that she had been introduced to the tall man with white hair and blue eyes and that his name was Dr. Mark Kantzler. K.H. testified that Respondent gave her a pill to take before surgery. She was taken to the surgical suite and was placed on the table. K.H. testified that the surgical drape prevented her from seeing the surgical area. The only people she had noted in the room were Respondent and “Claudia,” a woman K.H. recognized as a massage therapist at OMC. She could not be certain whether or not Dr. Kantzler was in the room. K.H. testified that she was awake during the surgery. She stated that she was in pain during the surgery and complained, in Spanish, to Respondent. K.H. stated that Respondent told her she had “a little stubborn fat” and continued the procedure without doing anything to alleviate her pain. K.H. testified that all conversation during the procedure was in Spanish. She heard no English being spoken. K.H. confirmed that Dr. Kantzler was the physician who signed the letter requesting that she be excused from work immediately after her surgery. Dr. Kantzler testified that he had no specific recollection of K.H. or of her procedure. He stated that he worked on a contract basis with OMC for about three years. He came in about once a week to perform liposuction procedures, conforming to the protocols established by Dr. Edathodu. He saw the patients only briefly before their procedures, relying on Respondent to perform the patient consultations and Dr. Edathodu to prescribe the pre-operative tests in her role as medical director. He was paid by the procedure. Dr. Kantzler testified that he does not speak Spanish, but that his surgical assistants, Respondent and Mr. Barcelo, would often converse in Spanish during surgery. Dr. Kantzler reviewed the medical records and confirmed that he signed the documents and performed the surgery on K.H.: Q. Is there any doubt in your mind about whether or not you performed these procedures? A. Not when I’m looking at the files, no. Q. And if you had not done the procedures, would you have signed off on the documentation? A. I wouldn’t have had them to sign. No. Dr. Kantzler’s lack of a clear recollection distinguishes this procedure from those involving Dr. Edathodu. However, an offsetting distinguishing factor is that K.H. had a clear recollection of seeing and speaking with Dr. Kantzler at OMC on the morning of her surgery. She did not see him enter the surgical suite or hear him speak during the procedure, but she was unable to say that he was not in the room. The medical record is replete with indications that Dr. Kantzler performed the liposuction and fat transfer procedure on K.H. Dr. Kantzler testified that he voluntarily relinquished his Florida medical license in 2017 “for my own reasons not relevant to this [case].” The Department’s Proposed Recommended Order suggests that this relinquishment was “in response to or in anticipation of disciplinary proceedings.” There is no record evidence to support the Department’s suggestion, and it is disregarded here. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient K.H.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Claudia Patricia Orozco-Fandino, E.O. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2019.
The Issue This proceeding was initiated when HRS proposed to deny San Marco's application for Certificate of Need No. 3304 for an ambulatory surgical center in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. San Marco filed a timely petition for formal hearing. Initially four intervenors were involved: Baptist, Memorial, Surgical Services of Jacksonville, Inc. and Medivision of Duval County, Inc. Surgical Services filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on March 7, 1985, and Medivision withdrew on October 28, 1985. At the hearing, San Marco offered evidence through eight witnesses and 28 exhibits; HRS presented one witness and one exhibit; and the two intervenors presented nine witnesses and 26 exhibits. Certain exhibits, by stipulation of the parties, were entered as "Hearing Officer Exhibits." Those four exhibits included the state agency action plan, the petitioner's application for CON, a three-volume state health plan and the District IV health plan The primary issue is whether San Marco is entitled to Certificate of Need No. 3304 for an ambulatory surgical center which will include two operating rooms. During the course of the proceeding several ancillary issues developed; those issues are summarized here and are addressed in the body of this recommended order: In determining need for a free-standing ambulatory surgery center, is it appropriate to consider evidence of out- patient surgical services provided by hospitals? (Petitioner's Motion in Limine, T-9). Is the project proposed by San Marco an "ambulatory surgical center" as defined in subsection 381.493(3)(a), Florida Statutes? (Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, T-500). Should the intervenors, Baptist and Memorial be dismissed for failure to establish standing? (Petitioner's Motion for directed verdict, T-1182). The briefs, memoranda and proposed orders of the parties have been carefully considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is included in the Appendix attached hereto. On March 25, 1986, Petitioner filed a Motion for Restricted Reopening of Record. Basis for the motion is Medivision's withdrawal of its application for certificate of need. The motion is denied.
Findings Of Fact The Parties San Marco is a limited partnership. The owners are Stuart Yachnowitz, individual general partner and sole limited partner; Surgi-Centers of America, Inc., (SCA), a Florida corporation, corporate general partner; and Jacksonville Women's Health Organization, Inc., a Florida corporation, (JWHO), corporate general partner. The sole shareholders of SCA are Stuart Yachnowitz, his father, Joseph Yachnowitz and Susan Hill. The owners of JWHO are Joseph and Stuart Yachnowtiz. (T-47, 48, CON application pp. 20-23). San Marco intends to include local physicians in the ownership of the surgicenter. (CON application p. 40) The surgieenter will be managed by Y and S Management Corporation, the company now providing management services to JWHO. Y and S Management Corporation is owned by Joseph and Stuart Yachnowitz. Including JWHO, it manages eight licensed abortion clinics throughout the country as well as two free-standing ambulatory surgery centers (FSACs) which primarily perform abortions. Susan Hill, the chief operating officer for Y and S for the past ten years, prepared the CON application for the surgicenter. (T-47-49, 108-111). The building at 1561 San Marco Boulevard in Jacksonville, currently occupied by JWHO for its licensed outpatient abortion clinic, will be renovated and occupied by San Marco. The facility will be expanded from approximately 3000 square feet to 4700 square feet. Two operating rooms (ORs) will be added along with ancillary facilities necessary for licensure as an ambulatory surgical center. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1, CON application p. 4, T-52, 54, 55). Abortions will continue to be performed at the facility at an estimated rate of 168 procedures a month. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, T-102, 103). Other surgical procedures will be added in the categories of gynecology, general surgery, and plastic surgery at the projected rate of 15 per month for the first month of operation to 90 per month after a little over a year's operation. The 90 additional procedures per month is anticipated to continue through the second year of operation. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, CON application p. 40, T- 102, 103). San Marco anticipates drawing some patients for the additional procedures from its existing caseload and utilizing some physicians who currently practice at the abortion center. (T-62, 63, 101, 102, 247). Memorial is a not-for-profit acute care hospital, located in Duval County in close proximity to the San Marco facility. Since May 1985, Memorial has been providing outpatient surgery services in a dedicated outpatient facility adjacent to the acute care hospital. The same day surgery" facility contains two laser rooms and four operating rooms. (T-854, 913, 914). Baptist is a not-for-profit acute care general hospital also located within close proximity to the San Marco facility. It currently provides outpatient surgical services in twelve ORs and 3 cystoscopy rooms in its main facility. Sometime around August 1987, its new adjacent 17-story structure, The Pavillion, is anticipated to open. The fourth floor of that facility will be dedicated to outpatient surgery and will include four operating rooms and two cystoscopy rooms. (T-939, 984, 987, 988, 1045, 1047). HRS reviewed San Marco's application and determined that it should be denied on the following basis: "There appears to be an insufficient projected number of outpatient procedures to allow this facility to be viable." (State Agency Action Report, September 6, 1984). The State and Local Health Plans The 1985-1987 State Health Plan does not directly address the need for additional ambulatory surgical centers. It adopts as an objective that ". . . By 1989, 30 percent of all surgical operations should be performed on an outpatient basis." (Vol. II p. 81). It addresses ambulatory surgical centers as an alternative delivery system which lowers costs by substituting less costly services. (Vol. II p. 76). And, it outlines a brief history of the increase of ambulatory surgical centers in Florida during the decade of the 1980s. It acknowledges, "As in the case of hospitals, saturation of the marketplace for outpatient surgery has caused new entrants into the field to be more highly specialized in order to attract sufficient business. (Vol. II p. 27). HRS District IV includes Duval, Nassau, Baker, Clay, St. Johns, Flagler and Volusia counties. The 1985 District IV Local Health Plan adopts sub-area boundaries in planning for certain specialized services, including ambulatory surgery. Sub-area A is comprised of Baker, Nassau, Duval, Clay and St. Johns counties. (p. 112). In contrast to the State Health Plan, it makes specific recommendations: that sub-area boundaries should be used for planning purposes; that no additional units should be approved prior to the adoption of state rules; and that no ambulatory surgery units should be added to the district through 1986, when the agency will review the matter again. (p. 20). Utilizing 1983 data to base its projections and the need methodology of a challenged draft state rule, it concludes that Sub-area A has a surplus of 14 ambulatory surgical units. (p 143). Existing Like Facilities and Other Alternatives to the Proposed Service. Ambulatory surgery is typically performed in three types of facilities: general hospitals which mix inpatient and outpatient surgery in main operating rooms; hospitals which maintain separate "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, sometimes even in adjacent buildings; and free-standing surgical centers which are unassociated physically or administratively with a hospital. (T. 387-390). Testimony in this proceeding was virtually unanimous as to the distinct disadvantages of serving surgical outpatients in a non-dedicated operating room setting. The mingling of' less ill or well outpatients with seriously ill inpatients increases the opportunity for contagion, heightens patient anxiety, deprives patients of access to their families, presents scheduling problems (including the bumping of outpatients in emergencies), and generally increases the cost of the service to the outpatient consumer. (T-386, 388-392, 1125- 1128). Both Baptist and Memorial have recognized the need for separate, dedicated operating rooms. The comparison of hospital-based dedicated ambulatory surgery rooms with free-standing ambulatory surgery rooms stirs somewhat more controversy. There are advantages and disadvantages to both. A hospital-based unit may or may not be more accessible to the physicians. While doctor's offices are often near hospitals, parking still is a problem. While some patients might prefer to avoid a hospital setting altogether, some are comforted by the proximity in the event of an emergency or decision to recuperate overnight. While costs are generally lower in a free-standing facility, there may be an advantage to having the expensive equipment immediately available in some cases (T-241-246, 392, 758-760,996, 1000-1001). If comparing non-dedicated ORs to free-standing ambulatory centers is comparing apples to oranges, then comparing hospital-based ambulatory centers to free-standing ambulatory centers is comparing red apples to green apples. Personal preferences often dictate the choice, but either one will make a pie. There exists no adopted rule governing methodology for determining need for ambulatory surgery centers. In this proceeding, each party presented its own methodology through an expert witness. Those methodologies are described as follows: Petitioner's Need Methodology Howard Fagin, PhD, was qualified as an expert in Health Planning and Health Economics without objection. (T-377) In his opinion there is a need for additional ambulatory surgery rooms. His opinion is based on a four-step process which includes: Analysis of the service area and population within that service area; Review of existing facilities providing comparable or related services; Examination of the utilization of those services within the existing facilities; and Analysis of the need for new health care facilities based upon population and need for new services in the area. 393, 394) Dr. Fagin identified Duval County as the primary service area, and Nassau, Baker, Clay and St. Johns counties as the secondary service area. The surrounding counties depend on Duval for their medical care in many cases. Together, the primary and secondary service areas comprise HRS District IV, Sub- area A (Local Health Plan, p. 112). Population figures are taken from those compiled and projected by the Executive Office of the Governor. (T.-396) For several reasons it is difficult to obtain data on out-patient surgical procedures in Florida. Out-patient surgery is a relatively new phenomenon; some hospitals do not separate in-patient from out-patient procedures in reporting; other hospitals count cases rather than procedures. (T-398) Dr. Fagin felt comfortable with data obtained from the state and from the N. E. Florida Health Planning Council, as adjusted with the use of data obtained from Baptist and Memorial for 1982, 1983, and 1984. (Petitioner's exhibits #11, 12 and 13) For 1984, he figured 31.1 percent of the surgical cases in Duval County were out-patient cases, with the trend increasing. (T-403) Petitioner's Exhibit #15 is the summary of Dr. Fagin's need analysis with two columns, one assuming an out-patient surgery rate of 35 percent of total surgeries, and the other assuming a rate of 40 percent. The number of available ambulatory surgery rooms (24) is based upon the availability of four rooms in one recently opened free-standing ambulatory center (AMI) and twenty other free-standing or dedicated (used only for out-patients) operating rooms in Duval County hospitals. The analysis assumes that the rooms will be operated five days a week, two hundred and fifty days a year (5 days x 52 weeks, minus 10 days for holidays and "down-time"). The figure of 960 cases per year, per room, is further derived from the assumptions the room will be operated 6 hours a day, an average case (including preparation, surgery, and cleanup) will take 1.25 hours, and the rooms will be utilized 80 percent of the time. In addition to the number of cases described to dedicated and free-standing rooms through that process, 3000 cases are presumed to be done each year in non-dedicated operating rooms. This figure is derived from rounding off the reported 3030 out-patient cases in non-dedicated units in 1983. The rationale for including those cases is that due to lack of sufficient free-standing units, the out-patient services must be provided in the regular hospital OR environment. The number of such cases, according to Dr. Fagin, should decrease as the number of free-standing units increases. (T. 414-415). Dr. Fagin's methodology applied to various hypothetical fact situations yields the following conclusions as to need for (+), or excess of (- ), free-standing ambulatory surgery operating rooms: Assuming a service area including all of HRS District IV, Sub-area A, 24 currently available rooms; and 960 cases per room per year: (Petitioner's Exhibit #15) 35 percent 40 percent + 6 rooms + 10 rooms Same assumptions as A, above: (intervenor`s Exhibit #16) 30 percent rate + 1 room Same assumptions as A, above, except limited to Duval County: (Intervenor Exhibit #17) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -4 rooms -1 room +2 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 31 existing rooms, instead of 24: (Intervenor Exhibit #18) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent not calculated -2 rooms +3 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 31 existing rooms and service area limited to Duval County: (Intervenor Exhibit #19) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -11 rooms -8 rooms -5 rooms Same assumptions as A., above, except 1200 cases per room per year, instead of 960: (Intervenor Exhibit #20) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -4 rooms -1 room +3 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 1200 cases per room and 31 existing available rooms: (Intervenor Exhibit #21) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -11 rooms -8 rooms -4 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 1200 cases per room, 31 existing available rooms and Duval County only: (Intervenor Exhibit #22) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -15 rooms -13 rooms -10 rooms HRS Need Methodoloy Reid Jaffe, Medical Facilities Consultant for the Office of Community Medical Facilities, was qualified as an expert in health care planning with emphasis on certificate of need. (T-533) He explained the ambulatory surgical center need methodology as summarized in DHRS Exhibit #1. The Department typically uses a single county as its planning area for ambulatory surgery applications. (T-556). Therefore, the data is based on Duval County population and services provided by Duval County facilities. To obtain the volume of surgical procedures in Duval County hospitals, letters were written requesting the break-out for the period February 1984-January 1985. While the process is not an exact science, Mr. Jaffe feels that since the Department asks for the same type of information over a period of time, the anomalies in the figures will become obvious. (T-569). Based upon the returns to the questionnaire, the Duval total surgery rate, (out-patient and in-patient) was determined as 97.7 per 1000 population; the out- patient surgery rate was determined to be 30.2 per 1000 population. The July, 1987 population projection was 623,091. Need was projected at both 30 percent out-patient to total surgeries and 40 percent out-patient to total surgeries. The out-patient surgical potential (number of procedures) is derived from subtracting the hospital out-patient surgical volume from the projected number of procedures needed at a 30 percent and 40 percent rate. From that line was deducted the projected breakeven procedures for each of three free-standing ambulatory surgery centers in various stages of development in Duval County. The 30 percent rate yielded a bottom line of 5,922 excess procedures, and the 40 percent rate yielded a bottom line of 165 procedures remaining for some other facility to perform (unmet need). Since HRS considers the facility breakeven point to be considerably more than 165 procedures per year, it concludes that no additional facilities are required at this time. HRS did not explain its assumption that the rate of surgeries performed on an out-patient basis at hospitals would remain constant (30.2 per 1,000 population), while the overall percentage of out-patient surgeries to total surgeries would increase to 40 percent. (DHRS #1, T-569-576). Intervenor's Need Methodology Michael Swartz testified for Memorial and Baptist as an expert in health care planning and hospital administration. (T-704) He rejected the second-hand data utilized by both Petitioners' and HRS' experts. He devised a poll that was sent to all area hospitals and attempted to verify the responses through direct contacts and, in some instances, a walk-through of the facilities and review of hospital records. Information reported in State Agency Action reports was used for St. Luke's, since that one hospital failed to respond. (T- 704-707, 711-713). Like the other need methodology experts in this proceeding, Mr. Swartz relied on population projections from the Executive Office of the Governor. (T- 711). The geographical service area was considered Duval County, because that is what the state considers and in Mr. Swartz' opinion an ambulatory surgery center draws from a less than 30-minute driving period. (T-712). Mr. Swartz found in his data gathering that, while the number of surgeries per 1000 population has fluctuated only slightly, the mix of surgeries (in-patient to out-patient) has shown a dramatic increase in out-patient procedures. (Intervenor's Exhibit #5, T-722). After determining what he considered were the actual numbers of surgeries performed in 1983 and 1984, the actual number of operating rooms in Duval County, and the actual amount of time spent for each case, including clean-up, he determined that the bottom line showed a utilization rate of only 27.8 percent of existing surgical suites in Duval County in 1984. (Intervenor's Exhibit #6, T-729). Utilizing a fixed use rate of 103.3 surgery cases per thousand, Mr. Swartz projected an excess capacity of 109,214 cases in hospitals in 1986 and 1987, and an excess capacity for 19,279 cases in free-standing surgical centers (including AMI, Surgicare III and Medivision) in 1986 and 1987. (Intervenor's Exhibit #12 and #14, T-749, 750). The most fatal flaw in Mr. Swartz' ultimate conclusion, that there is a current and projected excess of surgery suites in Duval County, is that after his painstaking data-gathering process he lumped together all types of existing operating rooms and assumed they were all equally appropriate to handle in- patient and out-patient surgeries. This assumption is contrary to the weight of evidence in this proceeding. Of the three methodologies presented, I find Dr. Fagins most reasonable. It requires some adjustments, however, to conform to the evidence. Proceeding from Petitioner's Exhibit #15, I find the 40 percent out-patient surgery rate reasonable and consistent with credible expert testimony from all sides in this case. (Howard Fagin - T-413; Reid Jaffe - T-573; Rena Blackmer - T-106l; Carol Whittaker-T- 990: Eileen Fullernveider, T- 1125). Utilization of Subdistrict A as the service area is also 4 appropriate here. It is consistent with the District IV local health plan and recognizes the fact that Jacksonville draws from outlying counties for the sophisticated range of medical services it provides. (T-254, 255) while ordinarily free-standing surgery centers might be more neighborhood oriented and draw from a closer geographical area, it is noted that Duval is the only county in Subdistrict A with free-standing or dedicated operating rooms and for that reason patients could be expected to travel into Jacksonville. (Petitioner's Exhibit #14) The one-hour travel time addressed in the CON application, p. 226, would include some travel from the outlying counties. Reid Jaffe, the HRS expert, does not agree with the local health plan because it would be unlikely that a resident of a county that has a hospital or multiple hospitals in it and that have ambulatory surgical programs, to bypass those closer facilities just to go to Jacksonville." (T-554, 555). In the absence of dedicated ambulatory surgical programs, however, some patients very likely would travel to Jacksonville. The continued projection of 3000 cases in non-dedicated operating rooms is reasonable, since not all ambulatory surgery patients would travel to Jacksonville. Further, even when it completes its new ambulatory center, Baptist anticipates continuing to conduct approximately 2096 of its out-patient surgeries in the main ORs. (T-1063, 1064, 1085). Patient and physician loyalty would also account for some continued out-patient surgeries in those hospitals without dedicated ORs. The population projection for 1988 is appropriate, given a two-year planning horizon and the fact that the final hearing in this proceeding was continued until the end of 1985. The surgical rate of 102.94 per 1000 population is slightly higher than the 97.7 rate utilized by HRS but, just under the 103.3 rate utilized by Intervenor's expert, Howard Swartz. (Intervenor's Exhibit #14). Petitioner's Exhibit #15 understates the available ambulatory surgery rooms projected for 1988. A second free- standing ambulatory surgery center has been approved for Jacksonville and has completed its legal proceedings: Surgicare III, with 3 operating rooms. (T-562, Surgical Services of Jacksonville v. HRS, 479 So.2d 120, Affirmed 11/18/85). The record in this proceeding does not clearly reveal the status of a third surgical center, Medivision, with two rooms dedicated to opthomologieal surgery. Since that facility may still be in legal limbo, its rooms are not being counted. While Intervenor, Baptist, on cross examination posited a hypothetical application of Petitioner's methodology which included seven additional available rooms, no competent evidence followed up to substantiate any more than three additional beds. The available ambulatory surgery rooms factor in the methodology is therefore adjusted to 27. Petitioner's methodology also understates "available capacity" by understating the number of cases which could be handled per room, per year. While Dr. Fagin's methodology utilized 960 cases per room, per year, the weight of evidence and expert opinion established that at least 1300 cases per room, per year is a more realistic approximation. Intervenor's need expert, Michael Swartz, determined capacity based on ten available hours per day, five days a week, at 75 percent effici-ency (American College of Surgeons Standard) to be 2,077 cases per room, per year. (Intervenor's Exhibit #9, T-735- 737). The Hill-Burton standard utilized to determine the need for construction funds in the 1970's was 1200 cases per year, based upon data collected in the 1960s when the average time for a ease was 2 hours. (T-740, 741). Average time today is far less. (T-149, 240, 1064) Petitioner's own projected utilization assumes a capacity for 2 operating rooms, with evening and Saturday scheduling to be 300 procedures a month. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2). This translates into 1800 procedures per year, per-room. while recognizing that counting procedures rather than cases yields a higher number, San Marco never asserted that it anticipates performing two procedures for almost every case it handles. Yet this ratio is the only means of reconciling the difference between its expert's projection and that of its administrator. The above-described adjustment to Petitioner's need methodology results in the following adaptation of Petitioner's Exhibit #15: 40 percent Am. Surg. Subdistrict A 1988 Population Surgical Rate Total Surgery 861,120 102.94/1000 pop. 88,644 Ambulatory Surgery 35,457 Available Am. Surg. rooms 27 Available capacity (1300 cases) 35,100 Am. Surg. in Hospitals 3,000 Net Need Cases -2,643 Net Need Rooms - 2 Quality Of Care San Marco will occupy a building presently occupied by the Jacksonville Women's Health Organization, a licensed abortion clinic. If the certificate of need is granted, the existing building will be remodeled to provide two operating rooms and ancillary facilities required for licensure as an ambulatory surgical facility. HRS witness Reid Jaffe does not question the ability of the structure to meet requirements for licensure and does not question the ability of the proposed center to provide quality care. (T-584). The center will develop bylaws and protocols to maintain quality of care. To practice at the center, a physician must be licensed in Florida and must have privileges in good standing at a local hospital (T-59, 60). Jaroslav Fabian Hulke, M.D., was accepted as an expert in obstetrics and gynecology. He has had extensive experience in teaching and conducting out- patient surgery. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7). He has become personally familiar with Y & S Management's facilities and with their staff through his work at the center in Raleigh, North Carolina. He has also observed the facility in Jacksonville and assisted Susan Hill in developing the equipment list for the facilities. His high commendation of Miss Hill, her facilities and the planned equipment was without equivocation; his testimony as to the anticipated quality of care to be offered by this facility is most credible. (T-351, 353, 355). Anesthesia classifications range from I to IV depending on the condition of the patient. Class I and II are relatively healthy. The San Marco center will handle class I and II; some hospital out-patient units handle class III patients on a selected basis. (T-114, 141, 1120). Statistics on emergencies and deaths in free-standing ambulatory centers are not available now. The Free-standing Ambulatory Surgical Association (FASA) is in the process of gathering data. (T-1129, 1153, 1154). Depending on how they are run, equipped and staffed, the free-standing centers are considered extremely safe. (T-1128). Nothing in this proceeding would hint that the proposed administration, staffing or equipment for San Marco is less than high quality. Staffing By their Prehearing Stipulation filed on October 25, 1985, the parties agreed that there exists in Duval County an adequate labor pool of health manpower and management personnel to staff an ambulatory surgical facility. San Marco has the ability, experience and intention to obtain adequate, well- trained personnel to provide staffing for the proposed center. (T-72-75, 232- 236, 351-352). Physical and Economic Accessibility The parties have stipulated that the proposed facility is geographically available to all residents of Duval County. (Prehearing Stipulation, filed October 25, 1985). While the center will focus on the Duval County area, it also will likely draw from surrounding counties to a lesser degree. The existing abortion center already serves the wider area and as found in paragraph 12 above, no free-standing ambulatory center or dedicated out- patient ORs exist in Subdistrict A outside Duval County. For that reason, patients could be expected to drive as much as an hour to get to the facility. (CON application, p. 226). San Marco claims that it will serve 15 percent medicaid and 5 percent medicare patients. (CON application pp. 91-136). The Raleigh-Surgi-Center was used as a model since it is the one facility that receives medicaid reimbursement for non-abortion procedures. (T-89,160). However, while Medicaid does not reimburse for abortions, the State of North Carolina provides state funds and apparently those patients are computed in Raleigh's 21.6 percent figure. (T-89,90). The validity of the model is undermined by the fact that no such reimbursement occurs in Florida. (T-161). Even though the 20 percent Medicaid and Medicare projection is overstated, economic accessibility is enhanced by the willingness of the center to reduce fees for abortion procedures for otherwise Medicaid eligible patients by $50.00 or $60.00, which sum represents the management fee portion of the procedure cost. (T-158-160). More significantly, the projected standard fee for other than abortion procedures, $300.00 - 400.00, is substantially lower than fees at hospitals, including hospitals with separate ambulatory units. (T- 57, 81-82, 907, 1070, 1071, Petitioner's Exhibits #19, 20, 21, 22). Capital Costs and Financial Feasibility The total anticipated project cost for the proposed center is $246,000.00, including $80,000.00 for renovation of the building and approximately $133,000.00 for the purchase of equipment. (T-94-98, 172-173, 327). Capital is available for project start-up through the personal funds of millionaires, Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. (T-172). In its review of the application, HRS concluded: "There appears to be an insufficient projected number of out- patient procedures to allow this facility to be viable." (State Agency Action Report, Hearing Officer Exhibit #1). At hearing, HRS witness Reid Jaffe testified that because of the co-mingling of revenues from the abortion center and the proposed ambulatory surgery center, the financial feasibility of the project could not be determined. (T. 588, 589). On the other hand, if the revenues are co-mingled and if the projections in the applicant's pro formas are accurate, then the facility ought to do better than break even. (T-600-601). Christopher Fogel, Petitioner's expert accountant, represents Y & S Management and the ten out-patient facilities owned by Joseph and Stuart Yachnowitz. (T-182, 183) His financial projections for the proposed facility are found in Petitioner's Exhibits #5 and #6. The first projection is based upon the fee of $300.00 per procedure, for one hour of OR time, and the second is based upon $400.00, for 1.3 hours of OR time. The projections presume the facility would continue to offer its existing services (abortions) at its current level and expand to 250, 500 or 1000 procedures per year. At the $300.00 per procedure level, the facility would begin to make money with 500 additional procedures a year. However, by adding back 50 percent of the management fees (profit in the fees available to the Yachnowitz') and adding back depreciation and amortization, a positive cash flow results without any additional procedures, and increases substantially for 250, 500 and 1000 procedures at both the $300.00 and $400.00 per procedure rate. (T-198-206). Given the worst case scenario (no additional procedures), the owners are losing money only for tax purposes, but are actually increasing cash flow through the legitimate tax deduction of a loss which is not a loss of cash. (T-206). H. Impact on Competition The introduction of a free-standing ambulatory center in Duval County had a positive dynamic effect on existing traditional providers of surgical care in Duval County. Prices were lowered and more hospitals began out-patient surgery programs of their own. While the changes in costs and methods of surgical services is also attributable to pressure and incentives from insurers, no one disputes that the competition from AMI (the one free-standing facility in Duval County that is currently operational) was healthy. (T-639, 640, 1132, 893-894, 1061, 996- 997, 239). HRS health care planning expert, Reid Jaffe is of the opinion that currently the four ORs at AMI, the two opthalomological ORs at Medivision, and the 3 general ORs of Surgicare III (approved but not yet opened) are sufficient competition to the hospitals and to each other (T-564- 565, 643). No one seriously contends that the addition of San Marco's 2 ORs would put an existing facility out of business. Memorial's Chief Financial Officer, Earl Winston Lloyd, expects his facility's new out-patient unit to continue to be profitable with or without San Marco. Memorial's out-patient facility has exceeded Memorial's expectations in its productivity and profitability (T. 871- 874). John Anderson, Chief Financial Officer at Baptist, is concerned that Baptist will lose at least 35 procedures per month which are currently being performed at Baptist by physicians who have indicated an interest in practicing at San Marco. (Intervenor's Exhibit #23, T-943-945). However, he doesn't know whether those same doctors are performing out-patient surgeries in other facilities or whether those surgeries might be the ones that are taken to San Marco. (T-976). Rena Blackmer, Director of Surgical Services at Baptist, testified that when competing out-patient units opened at A.M.I., Memorial and St. Lukes, she felt initially that Baptist was losing a share of the market, but there has not been a continuing adverse effect. (T-1062). In 1985, Memorial`s excess revenue over expenses was approximately $2.5 million, with gross patient revenues of $80-82 million. (T. 863, 864). In 1985, excess revenue over expenses for Baptist was approximately $10 million. A $4.6 million loss on refinancing a debt is not included in that total; however, the $4.6 million is a balance sheet entry which impacts the income statement and is not a cash item. (T-956, 957) Total operating revenue in 1985 was $96 million. (T-955) David Mobley M.D. is a plastic surgeon who has been medical director of the Jacksonville Womens Health Organization since 1976. He practices at Baptist Medical Center, and his name appears on Intervenor's Exhibit #23 as one of the doctors whose out-patient surgeries the hospital is concerned about losing to San Marco. Dr. Mobley performs in his private office approximately ten surgeries a week that he would like to transfer to San Marco. Among as those cases are performed in his office, he is reimbursed only the fee that he receives for the same procedure done in a hospital. He absorbs the cost for his operating room at his office, his staff and supplies. (T- 247, 248). For the patient or his insurer however, the cost for the procedure would be at least twice as much in a free-standing surgery center as in the physician's office. (T-268). San Marco: Abortion Clinic or Ambulatory Surgical Center? From all the evidence in this proceeding the uncontrovertible fact emerges that when and if it is approved, San Marco Surgi-Center will merge with the Jacksonville Women's Health Organization and the two entities will make up a single health care facility: the building is the same; the equipment is the same; the owners are primarily the same; the managers are the same; and for purposes of predicting financial success, the revenue and expenses of the two entities have been considered one and the same. San Marco projects that even after two years of operation as a surgical center, a majority of its procedures will remain abortions. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2). Abortions are accomplished in health care facilities through a variety of surgical techniques, the most common of which is dilation and evacuation (D & E). (T-346, 347). Even though D & E's are expected to predominate at the facility in terms of projected number of procedures (168 per month, compared to 90 other surgical procedures per month, by June 1988), the D & E's will not predominate either in gross revenue from fees or in the anticipated OR time. San Marco anticipates the average patient charge for surgeries other than abortions to be $400.00 per case and the average OR time to be 1.3 hours. (T-93, 149). The non-medicaid patient charge for a D & E is $185.00, and the time in the OR room is generally about twenty minutes. (T-148, 158). Taking the same month, June 1988, and multiplying the number of abortions first by fee, then by OR time, yields a total of $31,080 in fees and 55.4 hours in the OR room. The same process for the 90 other surgical procedures yields $36,000.00 in fees and 119.7 hours OR time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Certificate of Need #3304 be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-3712 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. The surgical procedures are summarized by category in paragraph 3. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 2, 16 and 24. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 16 and 19. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 25 and 26. The statement of John Anderson's testimony is unnecessary, Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 26. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Substantially adopted as summarized in paragraph 26. Adopted in part in paragraph 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12 and 21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12, 13 and 21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 20. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as explained in paragraph 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Policy memorandum #7 is addressed in Conclusion of Law No. 3; otherwise this is rejected as a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as repetitive. Adopted in substance in paragraph 24 and 26. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence or unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 28. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in part in paragraph 28, otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 29 as to the profit of $10 million dollars, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. As addressed in conclusions of law #10 and #11, the impact on Baptist was found to be minimal and insufficient to support "standing". Adopted in paragraph 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 10 and 11. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 11. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary, except as to the apples/oranges analogy, which is adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10, as to the characterization of Dr. Fagin's testimony. Otherwise, rejected as summary of testimony rather than findings of fact. The adoption of 40 percent as reasonable is found in paragraph 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. HRS Need Methodology is rejected in paragraph 10.(b) and paragraph 12 as being less reasonable than Petitioners' experts methodology. Rejected as essentially argument, rather than findings of fact. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as repetitive. Adopted in substance in paragraph 33 and Conclusion of Law #3. Rejected as argument unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected. See paragraph 7 for discussion of State Health Plan. Rejected as argument, rather than finding of fact. No paragraph of this number is found in Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4. Rulings on Joint Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent and Intervenors. (Note, the numbers in the left column conform to the numbering of the joint proposed findings) 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 1, 2 and 3. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted -In paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. 1. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in paragraph 8, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10(b). Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 10, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a re-statement of testimony, rather than finding of fact 10.c. Description of Mr. Swartz' methodology is provided in paragraph Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. 13 - 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, except as reflected in paragraph 10. Adopted in part in paragraph 10.b., otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 25A. Adopted in part in paragraph 10, otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 10, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 22 and 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 31. Adopted in substance in paragraph 31. Rejected as contrary to the evidence by considering all uncontroverted testimony and evidence describing the facility. Adopted in part in paragraph 32 and 33, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in paragraph 32 and 33, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, 32 and 33, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as argument that is unnecessary or unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 27. 1. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 4, 5 and 10, otherwise, rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in part in paragraph 4 and 5, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Addressed in Conclusion of Law 6. 1. Adopted in paragraph 17. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. 1. Rejected as cumulative. 2. Rejected as mere re-statement of testimony rather than a finding of fact. 1. 1. 1. 1. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in part in paragraph 24, otherwise rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 1. Adopted in part in paragraph 26, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as irrelevant. 1. Addressed in Conclusion of Law 4. 1. Addressed in Conclusion of Law 4. 1. Rejected as unnecessary argument. Adopted in part in paragraph 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as the description of an exhibit and characterization of testimony. Adopted in part in paragraph 30, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 1. Adopted in paragraph 24. COPIES FURNISHED: William J. Page, Jr., Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, Esquire General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chris H. Bentley, Esquire William E. Williams, Esquire Jeannette Andrews, Esquire Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas Mannheimer, Esquire Richard Power, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Dewberry, Esquire Christopher Hazelip, Esquire 1300 Gulf Life Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robert Meek, Esquire Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner wrongfully revoked the Respondent's Pinellas County paramedic certification.
Findings Of Fact The Director is responsible for, inter alia, providing paramedic certifications in Pinellas County. Respondent, Adam C. Baginski, was duly-certified as a paramedic by Pinellas County in February 2005. Respondent was employed by Sun Star, n/k/a Paramedics Plus (hereinafter referred to as "Sun Star"), and had filed an application through his employer for certification by Pinellas County. Respondent had first entered the general health care field as a life guard; he then became an EMT in 1994. After training received at the University of Toledo, Respondent became a paramedic in 2001. He held three positions in Ohio before coming to Florida, where he became employed by Lee County. After approximately nine months, he resigned his position with Lee County and went to work with Sun Star. The application process in Pinellas County to obtain paramedic certification entails a training seminar and a background check. The requisite background check is performed and attested to by the employer. At the training seminar, applicants are required to submit written responses to a two- page questionnaire. The questionnaire contains the following preface: Please answer the following questions so that we may gather the necessary data to provide a positive, educational and stress- free learning experience. All information will be confidential. At the end of the questionnaire, this statement is found: By signing this release, I understand that any falsification, incomplete or misleading information contained on this application or in any documents presented to obtain County Certification may be grounds for immediate suspension and/or revocation of may [sic] County Certification. The Director processed Respondent's application for certification by first reviewing the questionnaire. On the first page of the questionnaire, Respondent listed all of his work experience in Ohio, but did not list his Lee County experience. He does not remember why he omitted that employment history, but thinks it may have been due to lack of adequate space on the line provided.1 A cursory review of the questionnaire would show that appropriate space is provided. Notwithstanding the omission, the Director issued a paramedic certification to Respondent.2 Upon receipt of his certification, Respondent began performing paramedic services for Pinellas County through his employer. He was generally partnered with one particular EMT for ambulance runs, but sometimes had a different partner if circumstances so dictated. (E.g., if his partner was ill or on vacation, he may be temporarily assigned to another EMT. It was generally the duty of the EMT to drive the ambulance and for the paramedic to perform direct care to the patient.) On July 11, 2007, Respondent was on duty with Kristin Burns as his EMT for that shift. Respondent cannot remember why his regular partner was not there on that day.3 Respondent and Burns were responding to an emergency call when they were interrupted by dispatch and told to go to a different location. The new location was a doctor's office located at 929 First Avenue North in downtown St. Petersburg. Before arriving on the scene, Respondent and Burns received telephone/radio reports indicating the fire department was already on the scene. Fire department employees had assessed the patient (William Newcomb) and determined him to be stable. As a result, the call was "downgraded" so that Respondent and Burns could proceed to the scene without lights or siren. A downgrade indicates the situation is no longer critical. Upon arrival, Respondent talked to a firefighter and was told that the patient believes he has had a seizure and wants to go to the VA hospital. It was again confirmed that the situation was not an emergency. The patient had walked to his eye doctor's office because he was having vision impairment. When the doctor could not see him, the patient called 911 and asked for an ambulance to take him to the hospital. There was no distress noted by the firefighters or Respondent. The patient came out of eye doctor's office building and, using a walker, walked himself directly towards the waiting ambulance. Respondent began to question the patient at that time, attempting to assess his condition. All he was able to ascertain was that the patient wished to go to the VA hospital. The cot was taken out of the ambulance, the patient was strapped in, and the ambulance headed toward the VA hospital.4 During the trip to the VA hospital, Respondent and the patient were in the rear of the ambulance; Burns was driving. Respondent was seated in the "CPR seat" which is the seat to the right of the patient. There is a window between the driver compartment and the back of the ambulance that allows some visual contact between the driver and the paramedic. Burns did not actually see Respondent provide any care to the patient (but it is unclear how well she could have seen into the rear of the vehicle due to its configuration). Newcomb does not remember what care was rendered to him during the trip to the hospital. He believes his pulse and temperature may have been taken; his oxygen level was taken. He does not specifically remember what else was done. He cannot remember who helped him into the ambulance or much else about the trip. He does maintain that Respondent talked to him a lot about Newcomb's not needing the ambulance, but remembers little other than that. Newcomb signed the patient care report (twice) acknowledging Sun Star's billing practices and receipt of--or offer of--a Notice of Privacy Rights. The patient care report filled out by Respondent to officially record the Newcomb case indicates Newcomb's vital signs were taken three times in the ambulance trip. In addition, a visual check was done to track any changes in the patient's eyesight. Respondent noted that Newcomb had no facial droops, he was speaking clearly, and he was using purposeful movements of his extremities. Each of these is a visual means of ascertaining a hostile patient's condition. Newcomb doesn't remember the trip well, and Burns did not see Respondent taking vital signs, but Respondent maintains he took the vital signs, and they are recorded on the patient care report. There is no clear evidence as to whether that happened or not. The conversations between Respondent and Newcomb were only partially overheard by Burns. She was driving an ambulance with a diesel engine in mid-day traffic. The window between the cab of the ambulance and the back was not open. There was no radio communication between Burns and Respondent during the ride to the VA hospital. Burns could maintain some partial visual contact with Respondent during the ride. She could see through the window by turning her head around or she could glance in the rear view mirror. She remembers seeing Respondent sitting in the CPR seat at the patient's head. Respondent remembers sitting in the CPR seat at the patient's side. Newcomb remembers Respondent sitting at his right side. Whether Burns was able to see substantially all of Respondent's actions was not well established in the record. When the ambulance reached the VA hospital, Newcomb walked under his own power to the triage area in the emergency room. Respondent walked in front of Newcomb, Burns walked behind. Whether Newcomb walked voluntarily or because Respondent told him to do so is not clear. Burns testified that Respondent told the patient to walk; the patient testified that he was more or less able to get out of the ambulance on his own and walk; and Respondent testified that the patient moved out of the cot on his own accord. What actually transpired is unclear, but Newcomb expressed several times that EMT Burns was attentive to him. There is no evidence that he asked Burns for a wheelchair or other assistance. When the ambulance arrived at the hospital, Newcomb was reported to be stable with no apparent distress. He ended up remaining at the hospital for about three hours, after which he walked out on his own power (using his walker), caught a taxi, and went home. Back at the doctor's office, Newcomb had advised either the firefighters or Respondent that he (Newcomb) was HIV positive. Newcomb is extremely emotional and sensitive about his condition. It appears he drew conclusions about Respondent's feelings concerning the condition even though it was not discussed in any detail. Respondent must deal with HIV positive and AIDS patients regularly in the course of his work; it is unlikely this particular situation was significantly repulsive to him. The dialogue between Respondent and Newcomb during the ride to the hospital was sometimes loud, sometimes heated, and not necessarily friendly. Burns heard some words exchanged concerning whether the ambulance was necessary. Respondent remembers the patient as uncooperative; Newcomb's recollection is that Respondent was rude. There is insufficient evidence to ascertain anything other than that Respondent and Newcomb were not on amicable terms as patient and caregiver. Respondent's demeanor and "bedside manner" were considered relevant by the Director in making a decision to revoke the paramedic certification. Past allegations against Respondent were discussed but none of them were founded; thus, they have no weight in this proceeding. Respondent had, however, been counseled by his employer regarding his relations with patients. The counseling came about as a result of complaints by patients, family members, and other caregivers. Sun Star also disciplined Respondent based on the Newcomb complaint, denying him a full week's worth of work shifts. The basis of the discipline was that Respondent had allegedly treated Newcomb unkindly because of the fact that Newcomb was HIV positive. It is clear from Respondent's demeanor in the final hearing that he may not be a "people person." However, he is very knowledgeable about his work and possesses all the necessary medical skills. There was no evidence to support the allegation that he treated Newcomb unprofessionally due to Newcomb's HIV status.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services, Office of the Medical Director, reversing the decision to terminate Respondent's certification as a paramedic in Pinellas County. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the challenged portions of the proposed amendments set forth in the Fourth Notice of Change for Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code (FAC), published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 18, 2000, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Background Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code, is the Board's Rule governing the standards of care for office surgery. The Rule was first adopted on February 1, 1994 as a Rule 61F6- 27.009, Florida Administrative Code. It was transferred to Rule 59R-0.009, Florida Administrative Code, and was amended on May 17, 1994; September 8, 1994; and November 15, 1994, and then was finally transferred to Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code. In February of 1998, the Board directed its Surgical Care Committee to evaluate Rule 64B8-9.009 and to make recommendations for any modifications or amendments to the Rule. The 1998 Florida Legislature also addressed the issue of office- based surgery and provided that the Board may "establish by rule standards of practice and standards of care for particular practice settings . . . " including office-surgery environments. As discussed below, hearings were conducted by the Board and its Surgical Care Committee to consider changes to the office surgery rule. The Parties R. Gregory Smith, M.D., Charles Graper, D.D.S., M.D. and Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery Petitioner R. Gregory Smith, M.D., is a licensed medical doctor practicing in Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. Smith practices cosmetic surgery, plastic surgery, and oralmaxillofacial surgery in his office. Smith has a dental degree from Ohio State University College of Dentistry, a residency in oral and maxillofacial surgery and a degree in medicine. Approximately 30 percent of FACS members use general anesthesia (Level III) in their office surgery procedures. At least one representative of FACS has attended each public rulemaking hearing relating to proposed Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code. FACS actively participated in the rulemaking process, expressing concerns relating to transfer agreements, hospital privileges, and the requirement for an anesthesiologist in Level III surgery. FACS' purposes include addressing adverse outcomes in the field of cosmetic surgery and implementing recommended approaches to improve patient safety. Petitioner Charles E. Graper, D.D.S., M.D., is a Florida licensed medical doctor and dentist practicing in Gainesville, Florida. Graper received his doctorate in dental surgery from Emory University in 1971, his medical degree from Hahnemann University Medical School in 1983, and received one year of post-graduate training in general surgery at Orlando Regional Medical Center. Graper is Board-certified by the American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, Board- certified in general cosmetic surgery, Board-eligible in general plastic surgery, and is a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons. Graper performs in his office cosmetic surgery, functional surgery, and surgery below the head and neck which would not be authorized by his dental license. Graper has been practicing cosmetic surgery for 20 years and has been teaching cosmetic surgery for 15 years. Graper has experience in performing Level III office surgery using general anesthesia. The Board of Medicine The Board of Medicine (Board) regulates the practice of medicine in Florida, and is the agency that adopted the rule at issue. The Florida Society of Plastic Surgeons, Inc., Florida Chapter, American College of Surgeons and Florida Society of Dermatologists The FSPS, FCACS, and the FSD are comprised of Florida physicians who practice in the areas of plastic surgery and dermatology. As licensed physicians (M.D.s), members of FSPS, FCACS, and FDS are subject to the regulations promulgated by the Board of Medicine. A substantial number of physician members of the FSPS, the FCACS, and the FSD perform office surgery and are affected by the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code. FSPS is a Florida not-for-profit corporation whose 270 members are board-certified plastic surgeons (of the approximately 375 such physicians statewide) licensed in the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. FSPS was created and exists for the purposes of promoting plastic surgery as a science and profession. FSPS regularly participates in legislative efforts, rulemaking proceedings, and litigation on behalf of its members, and has participated throughout the rulemaking process with respect to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009. FCACS is a Florida not-for-profit corporation whose 1400 members are surgeons licensed in the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. FCACS was created and exists for the purposes of promoting surgery as a science and profession. FCACS regularly participates in legislative efforts, rulemaking proceedings, and litigation on behalf of its members. Members of the Association, including Petitioner Graper, routinely perform office surgery. FSD is a Florida not-for-profit corporation whose 462 members are board-certified dermatologists licensed in the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. FSD was created and exists for the purposes of promoting surgery as a science and profession. FSD regularly participates in legislative efforts, rulemaking proceedings, and litigation on behalf of its members. Members of the Association, including David Allyn, M.D., and Diane Calderone, M.D., routinely perform office surgery. The Florida Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc., Florida Hospital Association, Inc. and Association of Community Hospitals and Health systems The FSA is a not-for-profit professional membership organization representing approximately 2,000 anesthesiologists in Florida. FSA members practice in educational institutions, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and physicians' offices. The purpose of the FSA is to provide its members information about anesthesiology and to inform the public about issues related to anesthesiology. The FHA and the ACHHS are nonprofit trade associations which represent over 200 hospitals and health systems. FHA and ACHHS represent member hospitals and health systems on common interests before the branches of government, particularly with respect to regulations that impact the members. The Florida Nurses Association (FNA) The Florida Nurses Association is a professional association of approximately 7,500 nurses licensed in the state of Florida, including approximately 1,700 advanced registered nurse practitioner (ARNP) members and a substantial number of CRNAs. Among its many purposes, the FNA represents the legal, legislative, and professional practice interests of the members. The Florida Association of Nurse Anesthetists Petitioner, Florida Association of Nurse Anesthetists (FANA), is a non-profit corporation and professional organization made up of more than 1,600 certified registered nurse anesthetists practicing throughout Florida, many of whom currently provide anesthesia for surgery performed in physicians' offices. As a part of its mission, FANA advocates its members' interests in legal, legislative, and professional practice issues. Rule Challenges by FSA and the Hospitals On July 8, 1999, the FSA filed a Petition for Administrative Determination of Invalidity of Proposed Rule challenging portions of the proposed amendments to Rule 64B- 8.9009 as set forth in the Second Notice of Change. The FSA's Rule challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 99-2974RP. Also on July 8, 1999, the Hospitals filed a petition for Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of Proposed Rules challenging portions of the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 as set forth in the Second Notice of Change. The Hospitals' Rule challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 99-2975RP. The Board conducted a third public hearing on the proposed Rule amendments on August 7, 1999. The Board published a Third Notice of Change to the proposed Rule amendments in the August 20, 1999, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. None of the changes in the Third Notice of Change related to provisions that were in litigation. On January 12, 2000, the Board, the FSA, and the FSPS filed a Joint Stipulation on provisions of Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code (Joint Stipulation) in DOAH Case No. 99-2974RP. The Joint Stipulation released from FSA's Rule challenge, Case No. 99-2974RP, the majority of the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 and reserved only the proposed amendments to Subsections (1)(e) and (6)(b)1.a. of Rule 64B8- 9.009 for challenge. On January 26, 2000, the Hospitals filed a Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal in DOAH Case No. 99-2975RP, dismissing their challenge to all proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009, except with respect to Subsections (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(i), (4)(b)1. and 2. and (6)(b)1.a. and b. In light of the filing of the Joint Stipulation in DOAH Case No. 99-2974RP, and the filing of the Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal in DOAH Case No. 99-2975RP, the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 were no longer subject to challenge, with the exception of the proposed changes to Subsections (1)(e), (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(I), (4)(b)1., (4)(b)2., (6)(b)1.a. and (6)(b)1.b. Accordingly, on January 28, 2000, the Board filed the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 that were no longer subject to challenge with the Department of State for Adoption. The Board subsequently conducted an additional public meeting and published a fourth notice of change relating to the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 still subject to challenge by the FSA and the Hospitals. These changes included the withdrawal of the proposed amendments to Subsection (4)(b)1. which would have changed "transfer agreement" to "transfer protocol." During this public meeting, the Board was informed that those parts of the Rule no longer being challenged had been filed with the Department of State. On January 28, 2000, the Board filed all of its proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-0.009, with the exception of the amendments to Subsections (1)(e), (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(i), (4)(b)1. and 2., and (6)(b)1.a-b, for adoption with the Florida Secretary of State. The proposed amendments filed for adoption on January 28, 2000, became effective February 17, 2000. The Board voted to modify some of the proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 still subject to challenge at its public meeting on February 5, 2000. The FSA filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of its Rule challenge in DOAH Case No. 99-2974RP on February 7, 2000. DOAH case No. 99-2974RP was closed on February 8, 2000. The Hospitals filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of their Rule challenge in DOAH Case No. 99-2975RP on March 9, 2000, and the case was closed on March 10, 2000. The Fourth Notice of Change was published in the February 18, 2000, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly noticing the changes to proposed amendments to Rule 64B8-9.009 voted on by the Board at its February 5, 2000, meeting. On February 25, 2000, the FACS, Graper, and Smith filed a Petition for an Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of a Proposed Rule challenging the Board's proposed changes to Subsection (6)(b)1.a. of Rule 64B8-9.009 as published in the Fourth Notice of Change. This petition was assigned DOAH Case No. 00-0951RP. On March 8, 2000, the FACS, Graper, and Smith filed an Amended Petition for an Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of a Proposed Rule in DOAH Case No. 00-0951RP challenging the Board's proposed withdrawal of the proposed changes to Subsection (4)(b)1. of Rule 64B8-9.009 and the proposed changes to Subsection (6)(b)1.a. of Rule 64B8-9.009 as published in the Fourth Notice of Change. The Board held a public hearing on April 8, 2000, in Orlando, Florida, and received testimony concerning the Fourth Notice of Change. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted to adjourn without making any changes in the Fourth Notice of Change. On April 17, 2000, the FANA filed its petition challenging the Board's Fourth Notice of Change. The FANA's petition was assigned DOAH Case No. 00-1622RP. DOAH Case Nos. 00-0951RP and 00-1622RP were consolidated by Order of the Administrative Law Judge issued May 4, 2000. The Fourth Notice of Change states that "[t]he proposed changes to Subsection (4)(b)1., shall be withdrawn." With respect to Subsection (6)(b)1.a. of Rule 64B8- 9.009, the Fourth Notice of Change states: Proposed Subsection (6)(b)1.a. shall be changed to read, (b) Standards for Level III Office Surgery. In addition to the standards for Level II Office Surgery, the surgeon must comply with the following: Training Required. a. The surgeon must have staff privileges at a licensed hospital to perform the same procedure in that hospital as that being performed in the office setting or must be able to document satisfactory completion of training such as Board certification or Board qualification by a Board approved by the American Board of Medical Specialties or any other board approved by the Board of Medicine or must be able to demonstrate to the accrediting organization or to the Department comparable background, training and experience. In addition, the surgeon must have knowledge of the principles of general anesthesia. If the anesthesia provider is not an anesthesiologist, there must be a licensed M.D., or D.O., anesthesiologist, other than the surgeon, to provide direct supervision of the administration and maintenance of the anesthesia. Petitioners have challenged the Fourth Notice of Change on the following grounds: (1) the requirement that an anesthesiologist be present for all Level III surgeries in physicians' offices will increase the cost and limit surgical procedures and practice opportunities of Petitioners resulting in a substantial adverse financial impact on Petitioners and patients; (2) the Fourth Notice of Change exceeds the Board of Medicine's rulemaking authority by attempting to regulate nurse anesthetists; (3) the Fourth Notice of Change conflicts with existing statutes governing the practice of nurse anesthetists; (4) the rule is arbitrary and capricious and is not supported by competent evidence and is inconsistent with the law and policies of the federal government and of 49 states; (5) the Fourth Notice of Change is not supported by competent substantial evidence and would not have any measurable effect on patient safety; (6) the Rule was improperly adopted; and (7) that the Fourth Notice of Change conflicted with the existing requirement to provide a choice of anesthesia providers. Each of these arguments is addressed below. Final Order in DOAH Case No. 00-1058RX The Final Order in DOAH Case No. 00-1058RX invalidated certain existing Rule requirements related to transfer agreements and hospital staff privileges as a precondition for certain office surgeries. Specifically, that Final Order invalidated Subsection (4)(b) of Rule 64B8-9.009, which required a transfer agreement for any physician performing Level II office surgery who did not have staff privileges to perform the same procedure at a licensed hospital. In addition, the Final Order invalidated Subsection (6)(b) of Rule 64B8-9.009 which required a physician performing Level III office surgery to have hospital staff privileges for the procedure performed in an out-patient setting. As grounds for invalidating the staff privileges requirement, the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board lacked specific statutory authority to mandate hospital privileges, thereby exceeding its grant of rulemaking authority. The Final Order further determined that the requirement for hospital privileges was arbitrary, deferred credentialing to individual hospitals, and was not supported by competent substantial evidence. During the prior hearing, the parties did not present specific argument related to, nor did the Final Order consider the proposed changes to the staff privileges requirement set forth in the Fourth Notice of Change due to the separate Rule challenge proceedings. The Proposed Rule Regarding Competency Demonstration Notwithstanding, Subsection 4 of the Fourth Notice of Change proposes to change Subsection (6)(b)1.a. of Rule 64B8- 9.009 to include alternatives to hospital staff privileges as a manner of demonstrating sufficient education, training and competency to perform Level III surgery in an office setting. The proposed change provides that a surgeon who seeks to provide Level III surgery in an office setting can demonstrate training as follows: The surgeon must have staff privileges at a licensed hospital to perform the same procedure in that hospital as that being performed in the office setting or must be able to document satisfactory completion of training such as Board certification or Board qualification by a Board approved by the American Board of Medical Specialties or any other Board approved by the Board of Medicine or must be able to demonstrate to the accrediting organization or to the Department comparable background, training, and experience. (emphasis added) The proposed Rule at issue in this proceeding continues to provide for the same mechanism of hospital privileges, previously invalidated. The provision remains invalid for the reasons articulated in the previous Final Order. However, the proposed Rule also provides office surgeons with two alternative methods for objectively demonstrating sufficient training and competency through certification by a recognized medical specialty board or through direct demonstration to the Board of Medicine. That provision of the proposed Rule, provides significant flexibility and meaningful options to physicians seeking to perform office surgery. The Board demonstrated that the options are an appropriate approach for the Board to utilize in exercising its delegated regulatory authority and responsibility to adopt education and training standards for the office setting. The Petitioners adequately challenged the provisions and the Board proved the validity of the proposed alternatives by a preponderance of the evidence. Increased Costs Petitioners contend that the anesthesiologist requirement in the Fourth Notice of Change violates Section 120.52(8)(g), Florida Statutes, by imposing regulatory costs on the regulated person which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives. Petitioners offered credible evidence indicating that the hourly rates charged by anesthesiologists range from 50 to 100 percent higher than the hourly rates charged by CRNAs for similar procedures. Respondent and Intervenor, FSA, on the other hand, demonstrated that hourly rates varied from market to market within Florida and in a few cases, rates for anesthesiologists were approximately the same as for CRNAs. The evidence is clear, however, that the charges for an anesthesiologist are significantly higher than those for CRNAs for similar procedures. Anesthesiologists possess broader expertise, education, and training. As a result, requiring an anesthesiologist for Level III office surgeries will increase the total cost of a typical in-office plastic or cosmetic surgery procedure between five and ten percent. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that although some surgeons periodically use anesthesiologists during Level III office surgery for a variety of reasons, including availability, complexity of procedure, current health of patient and contractual agreements, most surgeons utilize CRNAs due to the considerable cost savings. Petitioners also claimed that the Rule would create a monopoly in the provision of in-office anesthesia for anesthesiologists and would force hundreds of CRNAs out of office practice. The Fourth Notice of Change applies to Level III surgeries, so it is reasonable to conclude that the need for CRNAs to participate in the performance of Level III surgeries under the supervision of an anesthesiologist will be obviated. Their assistance is unnecessary and cost prohibitive. And although nurse anesthetists would still be permitted to provide Level II anesthesia in the office setting under the supervision of the operating surgeon, the proposed Rule imposes a significant increase in the cost of Level III surgeries and severely decreases competition. Rulemaking Authority and Conflicting Law Petitioners mistakenly contend that the proposed anesthesiologists requirement exceeds the scope of the Board of Medicine's rulemaking authority and conflicts with existing law. The authority for the Fourth Notice of Change is contained in part in Section 458.33(1)(v), Florida Statutes, which states in pertinent part: The Board may establish by rule standards of practice and standards of care for particular practice settings, including but not limited to, education and training, equipment and supplies, medications including anesthetics, assistance of and delegation to other personnel, transfer agreements, sterilization, records, performance of complex or multiple procedures, informed consent, and policy and procedure manual in order to establish grounds for disciplining doctors. Specifically, Petitioners allege that the Fourth Notice of Change constitutes an impermissible attempt by the Board of Medicine to regulate nurse anesthetists and conflicts with Chapter 464, Florida Statutes, which permits nurse anesthetists to practice under the supervision of any physician, osteopath, or dentist. The parties have stipulated that Florida-certified registered nurse anesthetists are licensed only by the Florida Board of Nursing and are subject to discipline only by the Florida Board of Nursing. In mandating that office surgeons use an anesthesiologist during in-office Level III surgery, the proposed Rule does not directly regulate any nurse or certified registered nurse anesthetist and does not subject the CRNA to any discipline by the Board of Medicine or by the Board of Nursing. Thus, the Rule on its face does not conflict with the delegated legislative authority to the Board of Medicine for rulemaking in Section 458.331(1)(v). Federal Law, Scientific Evidence, Arbitrary and Capricious, Competent Substantial Evidence Petitioners contend that the Fourth Notice of Change requiring an anesthesiologist be present during Level III surgery is inconsistent with the laws and policies of the federal government and 49 states, contrary to the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence, arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by competent substantial evidence. There is no evidence that the Fourth Notice of Change is inconsistent with the laws and policies of the federal government. There is no federal law or rule which prohibits any state from establishing its own rules governing the rights of various practitioners to administer or supervise the administration of anesthesia in any particular setting. Federal government regulations defer to state law on this subject unless a state establishes a lower standard of care. While it is insignificant whether any other state currently requires an anesthesiologist to be present for the administration or supervision of general anesthesia in an office setting, some states have considered such requirements, including Pennsylvania and New Jersey. With respect to the scientific evidence presented by the parties, it is clear that there is a lack of competent and substantial evidence to demonstrate an increased level of safety for general anesthesia patients who undergo surgery under the care of an anesthesiologist as opposed to a CRNA. CRNAs are advanced registered nurse practitioners. In addition to their nursing training, CRNAs must have at least one year of experience in a critical care setting (such as working in a hospital intensive care unit) prior to beginning their two- to-three year master's level anesthesia training. Nurse anesthetists typically are trained side by side with physician anesthesia residents, use the same textbooks, and are taught by the same instructors. Unlike physician anesthesiologists who receive a general medical-surgical license that may not require any level of training or expertise in the administration of anesthesia, CRNAs must pass a national certifying examination in anesthesia as a condition of state licensure. In addition, CRNAs must complete 40 hours of continuing anesthesia education every two years, and must be recertified every two years to retain their state license. The evidence suggests that the safety of office surgery is comparable to that of hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. Moreover, under the existing Rule, the office surgeon and patient determine the most appropriate anesthesia provider and setting based on the individual patient's needs. The direct testimony and scientific evidence indicate no significant difference in patient outcomes based on whether anesthesia is administered by an anesthesiologist or CRNA. Hence, Florida law and the existing standard of care in Florida permits a surgeon to supervise a CRNA in the office setting. Nearly forty percent of the 1600 CRNA members of FANA provide anesthesia in physicians' offices. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that anesthesiologist supervision of CRNAs in hospitals is extremely inconsistent. "Supervision" as defined by various hospitals requires the anesthesiologists to be within five to thirty minutes of the hospital. Anesthesiologists are often absent for extended periods and typically "supervise" several operating rooms simultaneously. In fact, Federal Medicare regulations permit an anesthesiologist to receive payment for the "medical direction" of as many as four CRNAs at the same time. Moreover, several smaller and often rural hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers in Florida do not have anesthesiologists on staff. CRNAs provide the anesthesia services in those venues. Dr. David Mackey, an anesthesiologist, testified that he had reviewed information on 28 deaths related to office surgery which occurred between 1987 and 1999. Dr. Mackey concluded that there have been nine deaths resulting from office surgery in the past 12 years in which anesthesia was a cause of death. However, Dr. Mackey was able to confirm that a CRNA provided the anesthesia in only two of the nine cases. Office surgeons and related professional societies agree that an office-based surgeon may safely supervise a CRNA. Currently, there are three national accrediting organizations that may accredit office surgery facilities: Joint Commission on Accreditation for Ambulatory Healthcare Organizations; American Association for Accreditation of Ambulatory Surgery Facilities; and Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care. Rule 64B8-9.0091, Florida Administrative Code. None of these accrediting organizations requires that CRNAs be supervised by an anesthesiologist. No other state currently requires anesthesiologist supervision of CRNAs in an office setting. In fact, Florida's Joint Committee of the Boards of Nursing and Medicine identify specific medical acts that may be performed by ARNPs, and the level of physician supervision required for such acts. Section 464.003(a)(c), Florida Statutes. The Joint Committee does not require anesthesiologist supervision of CRNAs in any setting. The U.S. Armed Forces do not require anesthesiologist supervision of CRNAs in any practice setting. And the American Society of Anesthesiologists' has published its own "Recommended Scope of Practice for Nurse Anesthetists" which provides for CRNAs to administer anesthesia under the supervision of the operating surgeon. Studies of Anesthesia Outcomes and Medical Error Michael B. Pine, M.D., a Board-certified cardiologist, former chief of cardiology at Cincinnati Medical school, and a former professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and two other medical schools, testified as an expert in healthcare quality assessment and improvement. Dr. Pine has served as a healthcare quality assessment and improvement consultant to the JCAHO, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Osteopathic Association, the Hospital Research and Educational Trust of the American Hospital Association, the American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons, the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and Anthem, among others. Dr. Pine characterized his career transition from clinician to consultant as moving from "dealing with diseased individuals to dealing with diseased organizations to help them assess their problems in delivering health care and help them improve and get better." Dr. Pine assisted in the development of clinical indicators for JCAHO, including indicators in anesthesia care. He has worked with the federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to measure hospital mortality and adjust for patient severity as an indicator of hospital quality. Dr. Pine's consulting experience includes evaluating outcome data for individual practitioners, groups of providers, and whole systems. Dr. Pine testified that the classic study in anesthesia mortality was a 1950's study by Beecher and Todd of 600,000 anesthetic administrations which were followed by about 8,000 deaths, 325 of which were ultimately determined to be anesthetic related. The study reflects an anesthesia mortality rate of about 1:2,500. In the Beecher and Todd study, nurse anesthetists performed twice as many cases as anesthesiologists, but the number of deaths involving nurse anesthetists was virtually the same as the number of deaths involving anesthesiologists. Beecher and Todd initially hypothesized that the greater mortality rate for anesthesiologists could be explained by the severity of illness of the patients seen by anesthesiologists rather than nurse anesthetists, but after correcting for the difference in severity of illness, they discovered the nurse anesthetists had actually treated patients who were slightly more sick. Beecher and Todd were unable to explain why physician anesthesiologists, who anesthetized only half as many patients as nurse anesthetists, were involved in an equal number of deaths. Dr. Pine testified that a later study, the Bechtoldt, measured outcomes associated with two million anesthetics in North Carolina between 1969 and 1976. The mortality rate was approximately 1:24,000; a mortality rate ten times better than the rate reflected in the Beecher and Todd study 20 years earlier. The Bechtoldt study compared the outcomes of anesthesiologists working alone, nurse anesthetists working alone, and CRNAs and anesthesiologists working together, the surgeon or dentist administering anesthesia him/herself, and deaths in which no provider could be identified. Bechtoldt concluded that: When we calculated the incidence of anesthetic related deaths for each group which administered the anesthetic, we found that the incidence among the three major groups - the CRNA, the anesthesiologist, and the combination of both - to be rather similar. Although the CRNA working alone accounted for about half the anesthesia- related deaths, the CRNA working alone also accounted for about half the anesthetics administered. A 1980 study by Forrest of 17 hospitals and about 10,0000 patents was one of the first studies to make a formal adjustment for the sickness severity of the patients. Using conservative statistical methods, Forrest concluded that "there were no significant differences in outcomes" between the hospitals that predominately used anesthesiologists and the hospitals that predominately used nurse anesthetists. Anesthesia safety continued to improve as indicated by a British study in the early 1980's, that used a procedure similar to that used by Beecher and Todd in the 1950's. The British study looked at 485,000 surgeries in which anesthesia was provided. There were 4000 deaths, only 3 of which were determined to be anesthetic related, reflecting an anesthesia mortality rate of 1:185,000. The Institute of Medicine report entitled "To Err is Human," published in 1999, reflects an even better anesthesia mortality rate of 1:200,000 to 1:300,000 cases. The Institute of Medicine report states: The gains in anesthesia are very impressive and were accomplished through a variety of mechanisms including improved monitoring techniques, the development and widespread adoption of practice guidelines and other systemic approaches to improving errors . . . . the success of anesthesia, was accomplished through a combination of technological changes, new monitoring equipment, standardization of existing equipment, information-based strategies including the development and adoption of guidelines and standards, application of human factors to improve performance such as the use of simulators for training, formation of the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation to bring together stakeholders form different disciplines, physicians, nurses, manufacturers, to create a focus for action and having a leader who would serve as a champion for the cause. Dr. Pine also addressed the recent study regarding anesthesia by Silber published in June 2000. This study examined 7,665 deaths following 217,000 hospital procedures for which medical bills were submitted to HCFA for Medicare reimbursement. The study attempted to characterize the type of anesthesia provider based on whether an anesthesiologist submitted a bill for providing anesthesia or supervising the anesthesia. The study assumed that a CRNA administered the anesthesia if either the CRNA billed for it, or if no bill was located. Moreover, instead of reviewing deaths that occurred within 48 hours after the surgery, the study counted all deaths which occurred within 30 days following surgery, and ignored any non-anesthesia related complications and deaths which were included in the 7,665 death toll. Conversely, the 7,665 deaths in 217,000 procedures produce a mortality rate of 1:28, nearly 100 times greater than the mortality rate in the 1950 Beecher and Todd study, and nearly 10,000 times what the 1999 Institute of Medicine study reflected as the anesthetic mortality rate. The greatly inflated and inconsistent death rate is highly questionable and provides little scientific support for the Board's proposed rule. With respect to Petitioners' argument relating to arbitrary and capricious mandate, the proposed Rule would not permit office-based surgeons to provide a choice of anesthesia provider for Level III office surgeries, since only one anesthesia provider is necessary or justified for Level III office surgery, and the proposed rule mandates the participation of an anesthesiologist. It is unreasonable and not economically feasible for the surgeon or the patient to pay for an anesthesiologist and a CRNA for the same procedure. Based on the current Rule's "choice of anesthesia provider" requirement in subsection (2)(b) of the existing Rule, the proposed anesthesiologist mandate for Level III surgery is inconsistent, confusing and illogical to the reasonable person.
