The Issue Whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioners’ failure to appear at the scheduled telephonic final hearing.
Findings Of Fact Upon receipt of the Petitions for Relief at the Division, Initial Orders were issued on October 24, 2012, requiring Petitioners to coordinate a joint response to provide certain information within seven days or to file a unilateral response if a joint response was not possible. Neither Petitioners nor Respondents responded to the Initial Order in either case. Case I was initially set for final hearing on December 17, 2012, by video teleconference at sites in Pensacola and Tallahassee, Florida. Case II was initially set for final hearing on December 27, 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. Prior to consolidation of the cases, Respondent Hamilton requested a continuance of the final hearing scheduled in Case I. Hamilton’s correspondence, which was taken as a motion, represented that Hamilton had attempted to contact Petitioners to determine whether they would agree to a continuance, that Hamilton had left a voice message with Petitioners, and that Petitioners had not responded. At the direction of the undersigned, the Division also attempted to contact Petitioners to determine their position on the requested continuance. Division personnel also left voice messages with Petitioners. On December 10, 2012, Michael Edwards contacted Division staff, identified himself as Petitioners’ son, stated he had received the messages, and represented that Petitioners had no objection to a continuance. Further, Mr. Edwards explained that a continuation would be needed because Myrna Edwards was recovering from major surgery and McArthur Edwards was suffering with complications from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Having received confirmation that Petitioners did not oppose continuance, and would likely have been unable to attend the final hearing as scheduled, the undersigned entered an Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Case in Abeyance on December 10, 2012. The Order required Petitioners to confer with Respondents’ counsel and advise as to the status of the matter no later than January 30, 2013. Further, Petitioners were required to include in the status report mutually-agreeable dates for scheduling the final hearing if Petitioners intended to pursue the matter. The cases were consolidated on December 17, 2012, thus the Order was binding in both cases. Neither the original Notice of Hearing nor the Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Case in Abeyance mailed to Petitioners was returned as “undeliverable.” On January 30, 2013, Respondent Bristol filed a status report representing that Bristol had not been contacted by the Petitioners to coordinate the status report as directed in the Order. Further, Bristol represented that it had attempted to reach Petitioners by phone the previous day and had left a voice message, but had received no return call from Petitioners. Despite the fact that Petitioners did not comply with the Order, the undersigned requested Division personnel to contact Petitioners to determine whether Petitioners intended to pursue the matter. Division staff called Petitioners’ residence and left messages for Petitioners to contact the Division regarding this case. The Division received no return call. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned scheduled the case for telephonic final hearing on February 28, 2013. Telephonic hearing was chosen to afford Petitioners, now residing out of state, every opportunity to be heard on their complaints. The undersigned also issued an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions (Order) requiring the parties to confer no later than seven days prior to the final hearing to determine whether the matter could be resolved amicably and to exchange witness lists and copies of proposed exhibits. Neither the Notice of Telephonic Hearing nor the Order mailed to Petitioners was returned “undeliverable.” On February 20, 2013, Respondent Hamic filed its witness list and served proposed exhibits on all other parties. On February 21, 2013, the same Respondents provided copies of proposed exhibits to the undersigned. On February 21, 2013, Respondent Bristol filed its witness and exhibit lists and provided copies of proposed exhibits to the undersigned. Petitioners filed neither a witness list nor an exhibit list and did not provide the undersigned with any proposed exhibits. On February 21, 2013, Respondent Hamic filed a Notice of Attempt to Comply in response to the undersigned’s Order. The Notice documents Respondents’ unsuccessful attempts to reach Petitioners to confer and exchange witness lists and proposed exhibits. On February 22, 2013, Respondent Hamic filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, to Close the Case. The Motion represented that Petitioners had not contacted Respondents as required by the Order to confer and exchange witness lists and exhibits. The Motion was denied. The final hearing commenced as scheduled, via telephone, on February 28, 2013. Respondents Hamic and Bristol entered appearances. Petitioners did not appear. The undersigned allowed 20 minutes from the noticed hearing time, 9:30 a.m., for Petitioners to make an appearance. None was made. Respondent Hamic offered Exhibits 1 through 41 into evidence, which were received without objection. Respondent Bristol offered Exhibits B-1 through B-8 into evidence, which were received without objection. No witnesses were called. The proceedings closed at approximately 10:00 a.m. No transcript of the proceedings was made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioners McArthur and Myrna Edwards’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents violated section 70-176, Pinellas County Code of Ordinances (Code), as alleged in Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint (Complaint).
Findings Of Fact This case concerns an allegation that Petitioner, an African-American female, was the victim of housing discrimination in two respects. First, after complaining that her bathroom was not timely repaired by her landlord, Petitioner reported the problem to the City of St. Petersburg (City). When the manager came to repair the bathroom, Petitioner alleges he told her he "would throw her black ass out of here for calling the city on them." Second, Petitioner alleges she was told by the manager to move her car that was parked "for a few days" on the property, yet white tenants were allowed to keep a truck with "no tags and flat tires" on the premises for more than a year. Because no evidence was presented on the second issue, only the first allegation will be addressed. By way of background, from August 2012 until she was evicted in October 2015, Petitioner resided in an apartment complex at 3865 9th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. The complex is owned by Holly Berry Gifts, Inc., whose president is Holly Bonk. The complex is managed by Mike Prusinski. Bonk and Prusinski are employed full-time in other jobs, but devote attention to apartment matters when required. Bonk has a practice of leasing units to whoever is qualified, regardless of their race. She was drawn into this affair because of the alleged comments of her manager. It is fair to assume that Bonk has delegated responsibility to Prusinski to deal with maintenance issues and to evict tenants. Pursuant to a one-year Residential Lease executed by Petitioner in July 2012, she was required to pay $500.00 rent each month, due no later than the fifth day of the month. If rent was paid after the fifth day, a $60.00 late charge was imposed. After the lease expired on July 31, 2013, Petitioner continued renting her apartment on a month-to-month basis, but all terms and conditions in the original lease still applied, including the same monthly rent and late payment provisions. Prior to 2015, Petitioner was periodically late in paying her rent. For the months of February, March, July, and August 2015, she was either late paying her rent, or she did not pay the full amount. No rent was paid for September 2015. Despite Petitioner being in arrears throughout her tenancy, Prusinski "worked with" her because of her financial constraints, and according to Petitioner, he never demanded she pay the late charge. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner sent a text message to Bonk complaining that her upstairs neighbor (a female) was playing loud music and was noisy, which interfered with Petitioner's enjoyment of her apartment. When the neighbor came to Petitioner's apartment to discuss the complaint, Petitioner opened the door and "maced" the neighbor in the face. The neighbor filed a complaint with the police. Petitioner was arrested and charged with battery. In 2016, a jury convicted her of battery, and she was sentenced to 15 days in jail and placed on probation for 11 months. According to Prusinski, the macing incident was the final straw that led him to begin the eviction process. Besides the macing incident, Prusinski explained that Petitioner "harassed" the air-conditioning crew that serviced the complex to the point they refused to provide further service unless they received a $45.00 surcharge for each visit. He described Petitioner as being "hostile" towards him throughout her tenancy, and he noted it reached the point where she would not answer the door half of the time when he knocked. On August 14, 2015, a Fifteen Day Notice to Vacate the premises was personally served on Petitioner informing her that she must vacate the premises by August 31, 2015. An Eviction Notice was then obtained from the court. Before it was served on Petitioner, she changed the door locks, padlocked the circuit breaker box to her apartment, and moved out without notice to Respondents. Each of these actions violated the terms of her lease. Petitioner says she did this because she was "scared" that "Mike was coming over to throw her out," and a friend told her it was okay to change the locks. Prusinski was forced to call a locksmith to access the empty apartment and use bolt cutters on the padlock to restore electricity. In all, Petitioner still owes $1,933.00 for past due rent, late charges, court costs, locksmith charges, and the cost of a bolt cutter. There is no evidence that the eviction process was motivated by racial bias. The record shows that Prusinski has evicted four black tenants and eight white tenants for failing to pay their rent. Although Petitioner was upset that she had to relocate to new housing, she agrees there was justification for her eviction. A month after her eviction, Petitioner filed her Complaint. Petitioner says the Complaint was filed only to address issues other than her eviction. Against this backdrop, the only allegation that requires resolution is an assertion by Petitioner that Prusinski directed a racial slur towards her when he was repairing her bathroom.2/ Due to a leak in the upstairs bathroom, Petitioner's bathroom developed multiple problems, which required repairs to the walls and ceiling and professional mold remediation. Although these problems were eventually resolved, they were not resolved as quickly as Petitioner desired. Therefore, she reported the problem to the City. The City inspected her unit in early April 2015, determined that repairs were needed, and relayed its findings to Prusinski. After receiving the City's report, Prusinski came to the apartment to repair the bathroom. Petitioner says an argument over the repairs ensued, and he told her he would "throw her black ass out of here for calling the city on them." Except for Petitioner's testimony, there is no other credible evidence to corroborate this statement. Notably, even though the incident occurred in early April 2015, Petitioner never reported it to Bonk (Prusinski's boss), she did not mention the incident at the eviction hearing, and she waited until after she was evicted to raise the issue with the County. Prusinski denies making any racial comments to Petitioner and attributes her allegation to the hostile relationship between the two and her eviction in September 2015. Having considered the record as a whole, Prusinski's testimony is accepted as being the most credible on this issue. Ironically, Petitioner sometimes used the term "black ass" when referring to herself in text messages sent to Bonk, and during the hearing, she sometimes referred to herself as a "black ass."
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner by evicting him from his apartment as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American. Prior to his eviction in the fall of 2000, Petitioner occupied a handicapped apartment at Park Place by the Bay (Park Place), an apartment complex located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. By notice dated May 25, 2000, Respondent Park Place, through its management, advised Petitioner that it intended to terminate his tenancy as of August 31, 2000. Petitioner did not surrender his tenancy and, consequently, Respondent Park Place instituted eviction proceedings against him in September 2000. As a result of those eviction proceedings, Respondent Park Place regained possession of the premises and Petitioner was evicted. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner was evicted for any reason other than the fact that he made threatening statements to the staff of Respondent Park Place. There was no evidence that Petitioner was evicted because of his race.1 There was no evidence that Petitioner was evicted because of a physical handicap.2 There was no evidence that Petitioner was evicted because of his religion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2002.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race, sex, or handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Vincent Hall ("Hall") is a middle-aged black man. Although he alleges that he is handicapped, Hall failed to produce any evidence during the final hearing concerning his alleged disability——or even to identify it.1 Respondent Miami-Dade Housing Agency ("Housing Agency") is a department within Miami-Dade County (the "County"), which is a political subdivision of the State of Florida.2 The County is the public housing authority ("PHA") within its territorial jurisdiction. As the PHA, the County, through its Housing Agency, administers several federally funded housing programs, including the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program ("Section 8"). The County is subject to, and must comply with, the Ann-Marie Adker Consent Decree ("Consent Decree"), which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered in 1998. The Consent Decree requires the County to give certain preferences in housing programs to eligible black public housing residents who qualify as "mobility pool members." Hall is a former resident of Smathers Plaza, one of the County's public housing developments. (Hall lived in Smathers Plaza for a period of time in 2000, leaving voluntarily in November of that year, at which time he relocated to Palm Beach County, where he continued to reside as of the final hearing.) As a former public housing resident, Hall is a mobility pool member. On December 3, 2007, Hall executed a form called an "Application for Assistance Under the Ann-Marie Adker, Et. Al. Vs. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Miami-Dade County Consent Decree," whose purpose is evident from its title. Hall submitted this application to the Housing Agency's Applicant and Leasing Center. By letter dated May 2, 2008, the Housing Agency instructed Hall to appear at the Applicant and Leasing Center on May 15, 2008, for an appointment intended to begin the process of verifying Hall's eligibility for assistance under the Consent Decree. Hall attended this meeting, during which he completed additional paperwork, including a form entitled "Change of Address/Family Size or Special Unit Requirements." One of the questions on this document asked: "Does the Head of Household or other member of the family have a disability?" Hall answered, "No." By signing the document, which Hall did on May 15, 2008, Hall declared "that the information presented [herein] is true and accurate." Despite having disclaimed the existence of any disability, Hall requested that he be provided a live-in aide. Hall was furnished the documents necessary to apply for "reasonable accommodations" such as an aide, which documents included a certificate to be signed by a physician attesting to the disability, but Hall never returned the completed forms. Accordingly, the Housing Agency could not provide Hall a reasonable accommodation and had not done so as of the final hearing. The Housing Agency did, however, authorize the issuance of a Section 8 voucher for Hall, which he picked up on August 21, 2008. The voucher gave Hall 60 days (extendible to a maximum of 120 days) within which to locate an owner willing to participate in Section 8. As of the final hearing, Hall had not found a unit. The County's fair housing center, operated by Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc. ("HOPE, Inc.") stood ready to assist Hall if he sought help in returning to Miami-Dade County to live. Unfortunately for him, Hall had not taken advantage of the counseling available through HOPE, Inc. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the County and, specifically, its Housing Agency, did not commit any prohibited act vis-à-vis Hall.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Housing Agency not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Hall no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2009.
