The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was sexually harassed and constructively discharged contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013), and if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing HPC was a rehabilitation and long-term care facility with 180 beds.1/ Petitioner is a female who was employed at HCP as a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”). Petitioner was working at HCP during the evening of Friday, March 21, 2014. She had finished assisting with the transfer of residents from the dining area and was standing at a nurses’ station. Three other HCP employees (Derrick Hahn, Atrice Jones, and Erica Russell) were engaged in a conversation about seven feet from Petitioner. Mr. Hahn was a nurse supervisor. While he was in a position in which he could have supervised Petitioner, there was no testimony that he ever did so. Petitioner was standing with her back against a computer, and she was not participating in the conversation. Mr. Hahn turned to leave Ms. Jones and Ms. Russell. As he was doing so, he collided with Petitioner, and his chest made contact with her chest. At the final hearing, Mr. Hahn and Ms. Jones testified that the collision resulted from Mr. Hahn tripping over a wheelchair and losing his balance. Petitioner testified that there was no wheelchair, thus implying that Mr. Hahn intentionally collided with her. An unidentified person who witnessed the collision immediately asked aloud if Mr. Hahn was trying to run over the CNAs. Mr. Hahn replied by stating that the collision was a “love bug” or a “love bump” and walked away. Petitioner was disturbed by this incident went outside to compose herself. At some point, Petitioner continued with her duties. However, after 15 to 20 minutes, she decided to report the incident to her direct supervisor, Carrie Harper. Ms. Harper immediately called HCP’s facility supervisor, Tonya McAteer. After Petitioner described the incident to her, Ms. McAteer called the Director of Nursing, Holly Henry. Mr. Hahn did not return to work until Monday, March 24, 2014. When he did so, Ms. Henry and Joseph Ballay (the lead administrator of HCP) met with him to discuss the incident. Mr. Hahn told them that he had tripped over a wheelchair and that the collision with Petitioner was accidental. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry also met with Petitioner on March 24, 2014. Petitioner reported to them that Mr. Hahn intentionally collided with her. Mr. Ballay told Petitioner that an investigation would be initiated and that Petitioner would not be required to have any additional contact with Mr. Hahn. In order to maintain separation between Mr. Hahn and Petitioner, Ms. McAteer assumed full responsibility for supervising Petitioner. During their investigation, Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry talked to Atrice Jones, one of the nurses who were present when the incident occurred. Ms. Jones stated that the incident was accidental and that Mr. Hahn was embarrassed that he had collided with Petitioner. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry also conferred with other HCP employees but found no evidence that this incident was part of a continuing pattern of inappropriate conduct by Mr. Hahn. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry completed their investigation by Friday, March 28, 2014, and concluded that Mr. Hahn unintentionally collided with Petitioner. At the conclusion of their investigation, Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry admonished Mr. Hahn for describing the incident as a “love bug” or “love bump” after a bystander asked him if he was trying to run over the CNAs. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry also advised Mr. Hahn that an apology to Petitioner immediately after the incident would have been appropriate. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry spoke to Petitioner about the outcome of their investigation, but Petitioner did not agree with their conclusion. Over the next three months, there were no further incidents between Petitioner and Mr. Hahn. During her testimony, Petitioner cited no other instances of alleged misconduct by co-workers or supervisors. Petitioner’s employment with HCP ended in late July or early August of 2014. Petitioner testified that she voluntarily separated from HCP after concluding she could no longer work for an organization that did not care about her feelings. In contrast, Mr. Ballay testified that Petitioner was dismissed after she failed to report to work on July 30 and July 31, 2014. During the final hearing, the testimony differed as to what HCP’s management did immediately after the incident. Petitioner testified that three weeks passed before HCP’s management initiated its investigation. In contrast, Mr. Ballay testified that he and Ms. Henry completed their investigation within one week following the incident. As a matter of ultimate fact, the undersigned finds that the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry completed their investigation by Friday, March 28, 2014. As noted above, the testimony also differed as to whether Mr. Hahn tripped over a wheelchair prior to colliding with Petitioner. In light of what Mr. Hahn said immediately after he collided with Petitioner and his failure to apologize, it is not surprising that Petitioner concluded that Mr. Hahn intentionally collided with her. However, even if Petitioner’s recollection were to be found more credible than that of the other witnesses, Petitioner’s allegations do not demonstrate that she was subjected to a hostile work environment or that she was constructively discharged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of sex, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"), section 760.10, Florida Statutes; and, if so, the remedy to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Ileene C. McDonald, is a female, and, thus, is a member of a class protected under the FCRA. At the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct that gave rise to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by Kelly Services ("Kelly") as a temporary employee and was assigned to work at Respondent's facility located in Riviera Beach, Florida. Respondent is a limited liability company registered to do business in Florida. It owns and operates a beverage bottling facility in Riviera Beach, Florida. It is owned by PepsiCo, Inc. ("PepsiCo"). Respondent is an "employer," as that term is defined in section 760.02(7).4/ Evidence Adduced at Hearing As noted above, Petitioner was employed by Kelly as a temporary worker. Pursuant to a national contract between Respondent and Kelly, Petitioner began working at Respondent's facility as a temporary worker in early to mid-May 2016.5/ She was assigned to work in a warehouse, sorting and preparing cardboard sheets for use and reuse in Respondent's processes. Her work hours were from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Petitioner credibly testified that as soon as she started working at Respondent's facility, she was constantly subjected to verbal and physical harassment of a sexual nature from one of Respondent's hourly-paid employees, Brandon Owens. The credible evidence establishes that on an essentially daily basis, Owens made suggestive and overt comments of a sexual nature to Petitioner. These included remarks about her "nice small frame" and, among other things, suggestions that they "spend time together" and engage in acts involving "whipped cream, strawberries, and chocolate sauce." Additionally, on one occasion, Owens grabbed Petitioner's arm and told her "you need a real man." These actions by Owens made Petitioner uncomfortable, nervous, and frightened for her personal safety. Petitioner credibly testified that she repeatedly verbally rebuffed Owens' advances and that on the occasion when he grabbed her arm, she hit him and told him if he didn't leave her alone, she was going to hurt him. Petitioner testified, credibly, that some of Respondent's workers observed Owens talking to Petitioner on numerous occasions. Petitioner identified these workers as "Eugene Johnson" and "Willie Tate." She testified, credibly, that she told Johnson and Tate about being harassed and bothered by Owens. She testified that they told her to contact "Reggie," and that she had tried to do so, but was unable to reach him. The evidence does not establish how many times Petitioner attempted to reach him. Although Petitioner thought Johnson was a supervisor at Respondent's facility, the evidence establishes that neither Johnson nor Tate was in a supervisory or management position at Respondent's facility. As such, neither was under any employment-imposed duty to report Owens' conduct to Respondent's management. The evidence establishes that the "Reggie" whom Petitioner had attempted to contact was Reggie Tribble, a warehouse supervisor for Respondent's first shift at its Riviera Beach facility. Tribble was Petitioner's direct supervisor. However, the credible evidence establishes that Petitioner did not contact Tribble, and that he did not observe, was not informed of, and did not otherwise know about Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. Petitioner testified that another employee, Robert Gary Walker, frequently saw Owens near her at work. She testified: He [Walker] noticed that he was constantly over by me. And he asked, 'is he bothering you,' and he was looking at me and he turned his head. I started shaking my head 'yes' and he left. And a little while after that, Gary came back and he said —— 'Gary tried to get me in trouble, but Reggie didn't do anything.' I don't know what was said after they went over that way, but that's what Brandon told me when he came back. I don't know if it was true or not, but that's what Brandon told me.[6/] Petitioner testified that based on this discussion with Walker, she thought he would report Owens' behavior to the appropriate authority at Respondent's facility. The evidence establishes that Walker was a supervisor on Petitioner's shift.7/ Petitioner also credibly testified that while she worked at Respondent's facility, other male workers who drove forklift trucks often would come around to where she was working to talk to her, and that some had asked for her telephone number and had asked her out on dates. She credibly testified that she consistently rebuffed their advances. On or about the morning of June 17, 2016, as Petitioner arrived at work, Owens drove a semi-trailer truck in front of her, cutting her off as she approached the warehouse in which she worked. This badly frightened her. Petitioner credibly testified that as a result of Owens' action in cutting her off by driving a truck in front of her, she was afraid for her personal safety, and that as result, she left Respondent's facility and did not return. Petitioner's last day of work at Respondent's facility was June 17, 2016. On June 20, 2016, Petitioner reported Owens' behavior to Christie Finnerty, her supervisor at Kelly. This was the first time Petitioner had reported Owens' conduct to Kelly. She also testified that she "may" have verbally reported to Finnerty at that time that a man on a forklift truck came over to talk to her while she was working at Respondent's facility. Finnerty completed a Harassment Complainant Interview ("Harassment Form") memorializing Petitioner's statements regarding the alleged harassment. Attached to the form were four handwritten pages prepared by Petitioner, describing Owens' conduct toward her. Petitioner signed the form and handwritten pages. On cross-examination, Petitioner acknowledged that she did not report Owens' behavior or that of Respondent's other male employees who had talked to her, asked her out, or asked for her phone number, to Respondent's management. The competent, credible evidence establishes that on one occasion, in response to a question from Walker, she confirmed that Owens was "bothering" her. However, there is no evidence showing that Petitioner specifically told Walker that Owens had made physical and verbal advances of a sexual nature toward her, and there is no evidence showing that Walker was otherwise aware of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. Petitioner testified that the incident in which Owens drove a truck in front of her "rattled her nerves a little bit," affected her sleep and appetite, and bothered her "a lot," but that she can "get over it."8/ On June 21, 2016, Finnerty contacted Respondent's production supervisor, Norman Medina, by electronic mail ("e-mail") to inform Respondent of Petitioner's harassment complaint that was filed with Kelly on June 20, 2016. Attached to the e-mail were the Harassment Form and a video depicting an individual identified as Brandon Owens. Medina immediately notified Respondent's Riviera Beach plant director, Armando Velez, of Petitioner's harassment complaint. By e-mail sent on June 21, 2016, Velez notified Jacer Collins, Respondent's senior human resources manager for the south and southwest Florida markets, of Petitioner's complaint. Collins was at Respondent's Miami location when she was informed of Petitioner's complaint. On June 22, 2016, Finnerty forwarded to Collins and Velez a copy of the video showing Brandon Owens talking to Petitioner. Also attached to the e-mail was a photograph that appeared to be a still shot of Owens taken from the video. The video, taken by Petitioner and depicting her vantage point, shows Owens approaching Petitioner in the warehouse where she was working. Owens and Petitioner are the only individuals that appeared in the video. Owens followed Petitioner and stood in close proximity to her as the video was recorded. Parts of the conversation between Petitioner and Owens are unintelligible due to the background noise of the vacuum Petitioner was using. However, Petitioner can be heard telling Owens "I can't stand you," Owens asking why, and Petitioner responding "you know why" and admonishing Owens for grabbing her. Owens responded that he was just playing with Petitioner, apologized, and said he would not come over to talk to her anymore. The evidence does not definitively establish the date on which the video was taken. PepsiCo has adopted a global equal employment opportunity policy that applies to, and is enforced by, Respondent in the operation of its Riviera Beach facility. Among other things, this policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Additionally, PepsiCo has adopted a global anti- harassment policy, also applicable to and enforced by Respondent, that prohibits any type of harassment or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, national origin, disability, veteran status or any other category protected by law. The policy states in pertinent part: Sexual Harassment According to PepsiCo policy, sexual harassment is any verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is unwanted and that a reasonable person, on account of his or her gender, would find offensive. * * * Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances; requests for sexual favors; and other verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature when: * * * Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. Sexual harassment can occur in many different forms. It can be physical, verbal, visual or in a written form. Examples of sexual harassment include but are not limited to: unnecessary and unwelcome touching; unwelcome sexual flirtation; direct or subtle pressure for sexual activity; coercion to date or unwelcome demands for dates; unwelcome or offensive sexual jokes, innuendo, lewd language or obscenities; explicit or degrading remarks about another person or his/her appearance or body; e-mails, posters, graffiti, calendars or other sexually suggestive pictures or objects displayed in the work place; demands for sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt threats concerning pay or other aspects of employment; the taking of or refusal to take any personnel action based on an employee's submission to or refusal to submit to sexual overtures or behavior. * * * Reporting Procedure If you are being subjected to conduct that you believe violates this policy, you should: Step 1: Tell or notify the offending person that such conduct is not welcome and to stop. Step 2: In addition to Step 1, immediately report the incident or your complaints to your supervisor. However, if you believe it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter with your supervisor or you are uncomfortable discussing the matter with your supervisor, report the matter to your Human Resources Representative. You may also contact the PepsiCo Speak Up Line. In the U.S., call 1-866-729-4888 . . . . You may file a complaint via the Speak Up Webline by visiting https://speakup.eawebline.com[.] Step 3: If additional incidents occur, you should immediately report them to the above individuals. Any reported incident will be investigated by the Company. Complaints and actions taken to resolve complaints of harassment or discrimination will be handled as confidentially as possible. Retaliation against an employee who makes a claim of harassment or discrimination is prohibited. Violation of this policy, including retaliation against a person who brings a claim and/or who participates in an investigation pursuant to this policy, may result in discipline up to and including termination on the first offense. Further, any manager/supervisor who receives a complaint of harassment, discrimination or retaliation and fails to notify Human Resources will also be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, it initiated an investigation of the matter. Specifically, on June 23, 2016, Collins interviewed employees, including Johnson and Owens, at the Riviera Beach facility. Owens was not scheduled to work on June 21 or 22, so June 23 was his first day available to be interviewed. Owens denied having spoken to Petitioner and denied all of her allegations regarding his conduct toward her. Respondent suspended Owens from his employment on June 23, 2016. Owens was escorted from Respondent's facility that day and not allowed to return pending completion of the investigation into Petitioners' complaint. Respondent's investigation confirmed that Owens had engaged in the conduct that Petitioner had alleged. Specifically, the video that Petitioner provided, as well Owens' inconsistent answers to questions Collins asked him based on the information provided by Petitioner in the Harassment Form, established that Owens had engaged in the sexually harassing conduct that Petitioner had alleged in the Harassment Form. This conduct violated Respondent's Global Anti-Harassment Policy. On July 12, 2016, Respondent terminated Owens' employment.9/ As part of its investigation into Petitioner's complaint, Respondent also attempted to identify the forklift drivers, including a "Hispanic male" driver to which Petitioner had referred in the handwritten pages attached to the Harassment Form. However, due to the non-specific description provided in the Harassment Form, Respondent was unable to identify the forklift drivers, including the "Hispanic male" driver, who Petitioner claimed made unwelcome advances toward her.10/ It is undisputed that while she was employed at Respondent's Riviera Beach facility, Petitioner did not report to Respondent's management or to her supervisors that forklift drivers had engaged in unwelcome advances toward her. Additionally, in the handwritten pages attached to the Harassment Form, Petitioner acknowledged that the "Hispanic male" forklift driver had approached her only once and that at the time, she "didn't think it was something to report." The credible evidence establishes that once Respondent concluded its investigation, verified Petitioner's allegations regarding Owens' conduct, and terminated Owens, Respondent contacted Finnerty at Kelly Services to let her know that Petitioner was welcome to return to her temporary position at Respondent's facility. Petitioner declined to do so. Findings of Ultimate Fact As discussed in greater detail below, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that while she was employed at Respondent's Riviera Beach facility, Petitioner suffered severe, pervasive harassment as a result of Owens' frequent verbal and physical advances of a sexual nature toward her. However, the competent, persuasive evidence does not establish that Respondent received, during Petitioner's employment at Respondent's facility, either constructive or actual notice of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. The evidence shows that Petitioner indicated, by nodding her head in response to a question from Walker, that Owens was "bothering" her. However, there is no competent, credible evidence in the record showing that Petitioner specifically informed Walker of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward her, or that Walker otherwise had knowledge of such conduct. Thus, at most, the evidence shows only that Walker was informed that Owens was "bothering" Petitioner. Further, there is no competent evidence establishing that any other supervisors or managers of Respondent's Riviera Beach facility were aware, or should have been aware, of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. The evidence shows that Respondent only received notice of Owens' sexual conduct toward Petitioner when she complained to Kelly after she had left her employment with Respondent, and Kelly then forwarded that complaint to Respondent. The credible, persuasive evidence further establishes that as soon as Respondent received notice of Owens' conduct, it immediately initiated an investigation and interviewed persons identified by Petitioner as witnesses, including Johnson and Owens. As a result of Respondent's investigation, Owens was suspended from employment on the day he was interviewed, and was terminated from employment once Respondent completed its investigation——approximately 21 days after Respondent received notice of Owens' harassing behavior toward Petitioner. Additionally, the evidence shows that Respondent diligently attempted to identify and investigate the forklift drivers who were mentioned in the Harassment Form and accompanying pages, but due to the non-specific description provided therein, were unable to do so.11/ Finally, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that once Owens was discharged, Respondent contacted Kelly to let them know that Owens was no longer employed at the Riviera Beach facility, and that Petitioner was welcome to return to her previous position. Notwithstanding that Owens no longer worked there, Petitioner refused to return.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex and/or in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent's business provides consulting and technical-services management on a contract basis. Specifically, the business involves performing environmental consulting, engineering, remediation/construction, and information technology services to both private and public entities throughout the country. Petitioner began working for Respondent in February 1998 as a receptionist and administrative assistant in Respondent's Jacksonville, Florida, office. Her duties included answering the phones, processing mail, filing, creating, and revising reports. Petitioner's job description also included providing administrative support to the engineers, scientists, project managers, and geologists in the office. Initially, Petitioner worked under the direction of Sam Patterson, Respondent's division director. After Mr. Patterson resigned, Sam Pratt became Respondent's manager and Petitioner's supervisor in the Jacksonville office. On or about March 24, 1998, Respondent evaluated Petitioner's work performance. The evaluation indicates that Petitioner was outstanding in the following expected behavior and performance areas: (a) knowledge; (b) initiative/problem solving; and (c) relations with others. Petitioner received an excellent rating in all other performance areas, including the following: (a) communication/marketing ability; (b) quality of work; (c) dependability; and (d) adaptability/professional development. Respondent paid for Petitioner to attend computer courses. Petitioner completed the following courses on the following dates: (a) April 29, 1998, Beginning Power Point; (b) September 19, 1998, Beginning Excel; (c) January 7, 1999, Beginning Word; (d) March 25, 1999, Intermediate Excel; (e) April 9, 1999, Intermediate Word 97; and (f) April 27, 1999, Advanced Excel. Mr. Pratt evaluated Petitioner's job performance on March 11, 1999. He found that Petitioner met the expected behavior and performance requirements in all areas. Mr. Pratt listed her strengths as follows: (a) has good relationship with clients; (b) works long hours to meet deadlines; (c) has excellent knowledge of company resources and corporate information; and (d) has detailed filing system that allows for tracking data. Mr. Pratt listed her weaknesses as follows: (a) has failed to contact office when unavailable to work due to family illness; (b) lacks computer skills necessary for a project assistant; (c) fails to perform a complete review of her own work; and (d) takes constructive criticism too personally. There were no areas in which Petitioner failed or exceeded her job requirements. In July 1999, Gregg Roof became Respondent's manager and Petitioner's supervisor in the Jacksonville office. Mr. Roof experienced problems with Petitioner's job performance, finding that she had difficulty completing simple tasks, such as copying, without making errors. Merve Dale was a geologist who worked for Respondent. Mr. Dale worked part-time in the field and part-time in Respondent's Jacksonville office. Petitioner found Mr. Dale's behavior offensive on several occasions. In June 1999, Mr. Dale told Petitioner that he could not smell the toxic odor in the warehouse but he could smell her perfume, which made him want to jump her. Petitioner ignored Mr. Dale and did not immediately report this statement to Mr. Roof. Mr. Dale sent Petitioner an e-mail from his home on August 19, 1999. The message stated, "I have sent myself a test message and I thought of you, so here is another test to see if my e-mail works from home. Have a wonderful day." Petitioner responded electronically that she had received the message. Petitioner then called Richard May, Respondent's senior regional manager in the Tallahassee, Florida, office. Petitioner told Mr. May that she was not happy about the content of the e-mail message or the fact that it was sent from Mr. Dale's home at 6:00 a.m. She also informed Mr. May about Mr. Dale's prior comment about smelling her perfume. However, Petitioner did not want Mr. May to take any action against Mr. Dale. She specifically stated that she did not want to file a formal complaint pursuant to Respondent's anti-discrimination or anti-harassment policy. She wanted to deal with the situation herself. Later that same day, Mr. Dale called the office from the field to ask Petitioner to have lunch with him. Petitioner declined the offer, stating that she usually worked through the lunch hour. Petitioner did not report this incident to Mr. Roof or Mr. May immediately. In the afternoon, Mr. Dale asked Petitioner what he was going to get in return for giving her charge numbers for her timecard. Petitioner responded that the question was what he would not get, which was a hard time. When Mr. Dale indicated that it was not a fair exchange, Petitioner replied, "That's the way it is." Mr. Dale then gave Petitioner the information she needed for her timecard. Petitioner did not immediately report this incident to Mr. Roof or Mr. May. On August 20, 1999, Mr. Dale was with Petitioner when another geologist asked her if she was wearing a new outfit because she really looked sharp. Petitioner laughed and responded negatively, stating that she was finally losing weight and able to wear some old clothes. At that point, Mr. Dale stated, "I told her she was really looking hot and she better watch out." Mr. Dale then reached out with a roll of drawings, five feet in length, and slapped Petitioner on her backside. Petitioner immediately told Mr. Dale to behave himself. In a letter to Mr. Dale dated August 24, 1999, Petitioner recounted the above-referenced incidents and demanded an apology. The letter specifically informed Mr. Dale that his actions were unwanted and offensive. Petitioner furnished Mr. Roof with a copy of the letter. Mr. Roof and Petitioner also shared her concerns with Mr. May. Mr. Roof subsequently counseled with Mr. Dale and Petitioner. During the meeting with Mr. Roof on August 25, 2000, Petitioner rejected Mr. Dale's apology. Mr. Roof then proceeded to admonish Mr. Dale, warning him that his behavior towards Petitioner was inappropriate. Petitioner did not request Mr. Roof or Mr. May to take any further action against Mr. Dale even though she knew she could have filed a formal complaint pursuant to Respondent's policies and procedures. On February 18, 2000, Petitioner happened to be alone in the office with Mr. Dale. She was helping him label samples for shipment to a laboratory when Mr. Dale handed Petitioner a doctor's business card. Mr. Dale stated that he found the card on the sidewalk in front of the office entrance and wondered if it might belong to Petitioner. Other than giving Petitioner the business card, Mr. Dale did not say or do anything to Petitioner. Petitioner concedes that it was customary for staff to give found items to her as the office receptionist. However, the business card made Petitioner feel uncomfortable because it listed the name of a gynecologist who specialized in reproductive endocrinology, infertility, pelvic reconstructive surgery, and gynecology. Petitioner kept the business card and faxed a copy of it to Mr. May in Tallahassee. When she called Mr. May, he said he would talk to Mr. Dale. Mr. May was extremely supportive of Petitioner and took her complaints regarding the card seriously. Petitioner requested Mr. May to report the incident to Faye Thompson, Respondent's director of Human Resources. This was the first time that Petitioner had made such a request. During the telephone conversation, Mr. May asked Petitioner if she wanted to transfer to the Tallahassee office so that he could protect her. Mr. May and Petitioner had previously discussed such a transfer because some of her duties were regional in nature. Petitioner responded that she would think about it. In an e-mail dated February 22, 2000, Mr. May asked Petitioner to plan a luncheon for Ms. Thompson and other employees who would attend a project manager's seminar at the Jacksonville office. Petitioner responded that she would be happy to prepare the meal and other refreshments for the seminar. On February 23, 2000, in anticipation of the seminar, Petitioner asked Mr. Roof if he was going to have the warehouse cleaned over the weekend. He responded negatively because the staff had already worked long hours. Petitioner then stated that she would work on the weekend to organize the files and certain areas of the warehouse. Mr. Roof again responded negatively, explaining that he did not want to pay overtime. When Petitioner continued to insist on cleaning the office for the dignitaries, she and Mr. Roof had a verbal exchange in front of other staff. Petitioner followed Mr. Roof into his office. She then asked him what she should do with the extra electronic equipment stored in the cubicles. When Mr. Roof told her to throw it in the dumpster, Petitioner refused and began to question him about the company's policy for disposing of excess equipment. Next, Mr. Roof closed his office door and began to explain that he was tired of having to tell Petitioner things multiple times and that he did not want her to clean the office. Although Mr. Roof inappropriately raised his voice in talking to Petitioner, there is no persuasive evidence that he blocked her exit from the office after Petitioner requested him to move. Mr. Roof lost his temper with Petitioner, but he was not retaliating against her because she accused Mr. Dale of sexual harassment. Instead, Mr. Roof was frustrated because Petitioner would not follow his directions. Before the day was over, Mr. Roof and Petitioner had a civil discussion about the incident. Petitioner was upset about Mr. Roof's behavior. She subsequently expressed her feelings to Mr. May in a telephone call. On February 29, 2000, Ms. Thompson was in the Jacksonville office for the project manager's meeting. After the meeting, Ms. Thompson spoke to Petitioner about her sexual discrimination claim. During the conversation, Petitioner gave Ms. Thompson a copy of the August 24, 1999, letter to Mr. Dale and a copy of the business card. On or about March 1, 2000, Mr. May met with Mr. Roof and Petitioner to complete Petitioner's work evaluation. During the meeting, Mr. May counseled Petitioner and Mr. Roof. Mr. Roof again apologized to Petitioner for his losing his temper on February 23, 2000. The written evaluation indicates that Petitioner did not meet her job requirements in the following areas: (a) decision making; (b) reliability; and (c) quality and quantity of work. According to the evaluation, Petitioner met her job requirements in the following areas: (a) knowledge of job; (b) interpersonal and communication skills; and (c) professional development. The only area that Petitioner exceeded job requirements was in safety. The performance evaluation correctly reflected several areas in which Petitioner had a positive influence in the office. Some examples of her contributions include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Petitioner successfully coordinated health and safety training for Respondent's offices in Florida; (b) Petitioner was an excellent person to represent Respondent when performing telephone reception duties; (c) Petitioner performed successfully as the regional human resources representative; and (d) Petitioner successfully coordinated partner meetings, including making hotel reservations and arranging for meeting rooms. The evaluation also correctly reflected Petitioner's job performance skills that required improvement. These skills included the following: (a) Petitioner had a poor attitude toward her supervisor as indicated by her failure to follow directions and her failure to understand office hierarchy; Petitioner had difficulty prioritizing her work; Petitioner often seemed overwhelmed by a minimal amount of work resulting in a disorganized desk and poorly maintained files; (d) Petitioner spent too much time in personal telephone conversations; (e) Petitioner rarely made an effort to determine when assigned work was due so that it could be completed in a timely fashion; and (f) Petitioner's word processing and spreadsheet manipulation skills were below standards required for a person in her position. Mr. May wanted all administrative personnel to work more as "project assistants," helping the professionals with the administrative tasks of particular projects. Petitioner assured Mr. Roof and Mr. May that she would make an effort to improve her performance. Soon thereafter, Ms. Thompson called to thank Petitioner for the luncheon and snacks during the project manager's meeting. Ms. Thompson also inquired whether Petitioner had thought more about transferring to the Tallahassee office. Petitioner said she would make the move if the company paid her expenses. Some time after the March 2000 evaluation, Petitioner informed Mr. May that she did not believe she could sufficiently demonstrate her skills to receive the promotion and pay raise she wanted while she worked in the Jacksonville office. Mr. May again offered Petitioner an opportunity for a fresh start in the Tallahassee office working directly for him. However, Mr. May cautioned Petitioner that her work performance had to improve if she were going to accept the offer. Mr. May agreed that Respondent would reimburse Petitioner for her relocation expenses. Petitioner moved to Tallahassee, Florida, and began working in the Tallahassee on or about May 1, 2000. In her new position, Petitioner worked as receptionist and administrative assistant. Once again her duties included providing administrative support to the professionals in the office. At all times material here, Petitioner enjoyed working for Mr. May. She does not attribute any discriminatory or harassing behavior to him. However, immediately after her transfer, Petitioner again demonstrated deficiencies in her job performance. Mr. May had hoped that Petitioner would become a "resource" for him. Instead, the opposite was true despite the additional training provided to Petitioner. Petitioner often went to Mr. May with questions regarding simple tasks that were part of her regular job duties. It did not take Mr. May long to confirm Mr. Pratt's and Mr. Roof's earlier complaints regarding deficiencies in Petitioner's performance. Mr. May began to document his observations about Petitioner's job performance. On May 8, 2000, Petitioner did not get to work until 9:00 a.m. Additionally, another employee had to take the regular FedEx to the kiosk because Petitioner did not get it out on time. On May 9, 2000, Petitioner again failed to get the regular FedEx out on time. This failure was more serious because the package contained checks in the amount of $32,000. On May 10, 2000, Petitioner did not get to work until after 9:00 a.m. Other staff members had to interrupt their work to sign for deliveries. Later that day, Mr. May told Petitioner that she did not have to put cover sheets on all her work. Petitioner then complained that she had to do "regional stuff" all the time. On May 19, 2000, Petitioner did not get the FedEx delivery out on time. The package had several checks in it, as well as an important communication regarding an offer of employment for a new employee. On May 22, 2000, Petitioner was not in the office by 9:15 a.m. In the meantime, Petitioner began to experience interpersonal relationship problems with members of the staff. For example, problems with Karen Harnett, Respondent's systems administrator, began soon after Petitioner made the move. The evidence indicates that Ms. Harnett was a bully who routinely picked on people. Ms. Harnett's attitude caused one employee to quit her job and caused another employee to seek help from Respondent's employee assistance program. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent ever condoned Ms. Harnett's behavior in retaliation for Petitioner's filing of the sexual harassment complaint. In June 2000, Ms. Harnett and two other staff members found it amusing to harass an employee who worked for VALIC, an investment firm located in Respondent's office building. The harassment resulted in a feud over parking spaces in the building's parking lot. Petitioner was aware of Ms. Harnett's inappropriate actions but did not participate in the harassment. Petitioner did not know that it was customary for Respondent's receptionist to accept deliveries for VALIC when its office was closed. One day, Petitioner refused to accept a delivery of a UPS or FedEx package for VALIC. Later, the VALIC employee stormed into Respondent's office demanding to know why Petitioner had refused the delivery. Howard Engle, one of Respondent's project managers, heard the encounter between the VALIC employee and Petitioner. He went to the front of the office to see what was going on. Jimmy Hatcher, the building's owner, later complained to Mr. May about Petitioner's refusal to accept the package. Mr. May was not in the office with the VALIC incident took place. When he returned to the office, he heard several versions about the dispute. He concluded that Petitioner's poor decision-making and reaction to the angry VALIC employee had contributed, at least in part, to undermine Respondent's positive working relationship with Respondent's neighbor. On or about June 14, 2000, Mr. May discussed the VALIC incident with Petitioner. During that conversation, Mr. May also counseled Petitioner regarding her working relationship with other employees. He advised her to pay more attention to details and to improve her technical skills. Mr. May explained to Petitioner that several of the professionals in the office avoided giving her work because they lacked confidence in her work. He encouraged her to work more cooperatively with the professionals in the office. During the conversation on June 14, 2000, Petitioner admitted that she needed to improve her computer skills. She felt that everyone was against her and that Mr. May's only option was to go ahead and fire her. Mr. May later sent Ms. Thompson a summary of his conversation with Petitioner. On June 16, 2000, Mr. Engle sent Mr. May an e-mail complaining about Petitioner's substandard performance. The message stated that Mr. Engle had resorted to doing his own copying because he could not depend on Petitioner. Additionally, she had misplaced an important laboratory report, which would not have been delivered in a timely manner if another employee had not discovered Petitioner's error. Mr. Engle also complained that Petitioner had misfiled and never shown him a time-sensitive letter from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection regarding Respondent's re-certification to perform work in the state. This error could have had a calamitous impact on Respondent's business interests. In a written correspondence dated June 29, 2000, Mr. May gave Petitioner a written warning that she would be terminated if her job performance did not improve. The communication outlined specific job performance areas that required immediate and sustained improvement. As of June 29, 2000, Petitioner had misdirected incoming facsimile transmissions, failed to ensure that outgoing FedEx deliveries met the regular schedule, and sent at least one FedEx delivery to the wrong location. Competent evidence indicates that Petitioner needed to pay more attention to detail. Petitioner failed to proofread final drafts of monthly reports that she prepared. As of June 29, 2000, every such report had errors in them. Petitioner failed to focus on directions for work assignments. She often failed to return the work in the order that it was assigned. Petitioner failed to prioritize her work. She did not give project-related activities priority over day-to-day overhead issues. When Petitioner felt overwhelmed by an assignment, she was unwilling to shift gears to handle a higher priority activity. Petitioner had difficulty working the office schedule. She needed to understand that she could not work a later schedule. She also had to understand that overtime pay would not be authorized except for work directly related to client projects or for important overhead objectives. Petitioner failed to be accountable to the professional staff that depended on her administrative assistance. At times, she was unwilling to accept work assignments from staff members other than Mr. May. At times Petitioner was argumentative with her co-workers and inflexible regarding office procedures and protocols. She needed to moderate her behavior towards her co-workers. Petitioner was paid at Respondent's top pay rate for the second highest administrative support grade. She should have been serving as a resource for staff members that were not expected to have expertise in word processing. However, Petitioner's computer proficiency was at a beginners level at best. At times, Mr. May had to assist Petitioner with computer skills that she should have mastered. After receiving the written warning, Petitioner showed no improvement in her job performance or ability to work with the people in Respondent's Tallahassee office. Therefore, Mr. May terminated Petitioner's employment on July 25, 2000, for substandard work performance. Respondent's decision to fire Petitioner was based solely upon her poor performance record. It was not a result of any complaints she made against Mr. Dale the preceding year when she worked in the Jacksonville office. In making his decision to terminate Petitioner, Mr. May did not receive input from anyone in the Jacksonville office or from any other of Respondent's employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sharon Jensen 2692 Spring Lake Road Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Mother & Daughter Cleaning Service, Inc. (Mother & Daughter) is a Florida corporation. Frank Brown, age 65, is the Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer of the corporation, and his wife, Betty Brown, is the corporation's president. The corporation provides house cleaning services to its customers. In addition to Mr. and Mrs. Brown, who serve as the cleaning crew leaders, the corporation has employed numerous other laborers, mostly women, over the past five years and employs five or more employees on a regular basis. The Petitioner was hired to perform cleaning services for Mother & Daughter clients as part of a two or three person cleaning crew on March 13, 1989. The Petitioner, Lisa Glennon, age 26, was initially interviewed for this position in the Brown home by Mrs. Brown and was offered employment. However, the offer was withdrawn when the Petitioner revealed that she did not own her own car. Then, after some discussion between Mr. and Mrs. Brown, the Petitioner was hired in spite of this circumstance. Initially, the Petitioner was trained and supervised by Mrs. Brown as part of her crew, but after about a month she was transferred to the crew led by Mr. Brown (Brown). Evelyn Engle was the other regular member of this crew, although there were a few occasions when Engle did not come to work. There was also a period of about a week when Lori Kent Brady filled in for Engle. Petitioner worked as a part of Brown's crew until June 16, 1989, when she was fired. Mother & Daughter employees would usually report to work at the Brown home. Brown's crew members were transported to various job sites, including private residences, in a van owned and driven by Brown. The crew would take a lunch break, usually at a fast food establishment such as Burger King, and would then proceed to the next job site, although not always directly. The routes to many of Mother & Daughter clients took the crew within the vicinity of the beach or causeway. On many occasions over the period of Petitioner's employment, Brown, while transporting the work crew in the van, would stare at and remark upon the physical appearance of women he would see walking in the beach area. These remarks concerned a woman's breasts or "tits"--that she was a "well-built" or "well-stacked" woman, her rear end, or figure in a T-back swimsuit. These remarks were sometimes accompanied by lip licking or growling sounds. Petitioner informed Brown that this behavior was "rude." Petitioner was offended by these remarks. In addition to drives down the beach enroute to a job site, Brown, frequently between jobs and normally after the lunch break, drove his crew to the beach or causeway to park and pass the time before the next job. During these "waiting times," Brown would comment on female passersby as well. Previous Mother & Daughter employee Joanne Goodale found these parking times disconcerting and described Brown's routes to other job sites, apart from these "parking" incidents, slightly out of the way, and the amount of time spent driving on the beach abnormal for a job circumstance. Brown frequently told off-color jokes in the presence of Petitioner and other employees. Brown constantly commented on Petitioner's appearance and body, mostly her "lovely" breasts, and he admonished Petitioner not to fuss with or adjust her clothing because he found it "distracting"; that on one occasion he suggested she take off her bra (she was complaining about sunburn pain to Engle at the time); that she and Engle take off their shirts while working (they had complained a resident's home was hot and asked about the air conditioning at the time); and that he once recounted to her that he and another unidentified woman had worked without shirts in a residence. On one occasion, Brown encouraged Petitioner to appear in a swimsuit for him. The crew had completed work early and, in reply to a question from Brown, Petitioner said she would go to the beach. Brown suggested that he drive her to her house so she could change into her swimsuit, then he would drive her to her car at his home. Petitioner declined, but Brown pursued the idea, remarking "Oh, you would really want to ruin an old man's day" by not permitting him to see her in her swimsuit. Once on a Monday, Brown told Petitioner he saw her car that weekend at the beach and considered stopping "to give her a hard time." This remark frightened Petitioner, and she protested to him. Brown recounted to Petitioner and Engle an obscene phone call his wife and daughter received at home wherein the caller inquired whether Mrs. Brown or her daughter "spit or swallow [ed]." This was offensive to both Petitioner and Engle. Brown discussed with Petitioner and Engle on more than one occasion his dissatisfaction with his sex life with his wife. In connection with these complaints, Brown stated his desire to find a girlfriend for whom he would provide in exchange for sex "with no strings attached." Petitioner objected to these discussions. On several occasions, Brown displayed the centerfolds of "Playboy" magazines to these women. On one occasion, Brown displayed a "men's" magazine in a residence the three were cleaning, made "mouth noises," and remarked on the models "lips." The women understood this remark to refer to the model's genitalia, which the model was touching with her hand. Brown on several occasions "brushed up against" his female workers that were not unintentional incidents caused by the circumstances of cleaning. Shortly after she started on his crew, Brown swatted Petitioner's rearend in the kitchen of a residence. On the same day, Brown brushed against her hip while loading the van, and Petitioner protested saying "that's enough." Brown replied "I see I'm not going to get very far with you" and told the Petitioner to loosen up and relax. The incidents, remarks and behavior of a sexual nature were sufficiently persistent to constitute a "hostile workplace." These were not isolated incidents described by the Petitioner or her witnesses, but an almost constant stream of discourse on the part of Brown. Petitioner testified, that she was offended by this behavior on the part of Brown, and was disturbed by it to the point that she feared going to work, feared that Brown would approach her during non-working hours and experienced nightmares as a result of his conduct. Brown protested that he did not intend to offend the Petitioner. The Petitioner testified that Brown's behavior and advances were unwelcome to Petitioner, and she communicated her disgust to Brown on many occasions. Petitioner did not casually use foul language at work, but did so when she became angry. On one or two occasions, she did say "fuck you" or some variant thereof to Brown. The Petitioner did not dress in a revealing manner, but normally wore calf length pants, two blouses and always a brassiere to work. Lori Brady's testimony that the Petitioner visited her home dressed in a revealing manner without a brassiere and expressed interest in dating Brady's brother is not relevant. This incident did not occur on the job or in the presence of Brown so as to solicit or incite any sexually explicit behavior on his part. Toward the end of Petitioner's employment with Mother & Daughter, Brown complained to her that she and Engle were treating him "coldly" and that, while previously Brown had been highly complimentary concerning her job performance, he became critical of it. On June 16, 1989, Brown criticized Petitioner's vacuuming. Petitioner questioned his criticism, and Brown instructed her to go to the van. Once all were in the van, an argument ensued, and the Petitioner may have threatened or offered to resign at this point. To which Brown replied, "If you want your job, be here Monday." The Petitioner later received a phone message that she was fired because of her "attitude." After she was fired from her job at Mother & Daughter on June 16, 1989, Petitioner secured part-time evening employment at "Excaliber," five days a week from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. at a wage of $4.00 an hour, on approximately June 30, 1989. On August 17, 1989, Petitioner secured additional employment at Pinecrest Place at a wage of $4.25 per hour, working Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. She received one raise of $0.25 after three months and another raise of $0.25 after one year. Petitioner is presently employed at both jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued which in favor of Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination, and it is FURTHER RECOMMENDED Petitioner be awarded her actual damages in the total amount of $1,001. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Accepted: paragraphs I, subparagraphs 1,2 Rejected as irrelevant: paragraphs I, subparagraphs 3,4,5 (in part) Rejected, as conclusion of law: paragraphs II and III (substantially), IV and V Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: Accepted: paragraphs 2,3,7,8 (in part), 17 (in part) Rejected as irrelevant: paragraph 14 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence: paragraphs 1,9,10,11,12,13,16,19 Rejected, as a conclusion of law: paragraphs 4,5,6,15,18 COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald M. McElrath Manager City of Clearwater Post Office Box 34618-4748 Sally Ruby Clearwater Community Relations Board Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 34618 Patricia Fields Anderson, Esquire 233 Third Street North St. Petersburg, FL 33701 J. David Haynes, Esquire Sugar Creek Professional Center 655 Ulmerton Road, Building 11 Largo, FL 34641
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, specifically sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment due to Petitioner's gender in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, a Caucasian female, from sometime in December of 2003 until termination of her employment on June 21, 2004. Petitioner worked in Respondent’s warehouse facility from December, 2003 until sometime in February, 2004, when she was transferred to one of Respondent’s retail stores, the Ocala store, where she worked until she was transferred back to the warehouse at the end of May or beginning of June, 2004. Petitioner conceded at hearing that she was terminated after she argued with her supervisor and called her a bitch. Petitioner does not believe that she was terminated on the basis of her sex. During the course of her employment, Petitioner alleges that Respondent’s president, Barry Lay, made inappropriate comments to her of a sexual nature and touched her in an inappropriate way twice. All alleged sexually inappropriate conduct occurred from December of 2003 through February of 2004, during the period of time Petitioner worked in Respondent's warehouse facility. Petitioner testified that Barry Lay engaged in the following inappropriate conduct: At the end of her initial employment interview when she was hired, and out of the presence of other witnesses, Barry Lay allegedly said to her, “If we were to fuck that’s nobody’s business but ours.” In her charge of discrimination, Petitioner alleged that this statement was “said in front of witnesses.” Due to Petitioner's inconsistencies in testifying, her demeanor while testifying and Barry Lay's candid testimony of denial with regard to making such statements to Petitioner at any time, Petitioner's allegation is not credited. Petitioner testified that, right before Christmas of 2003, Barry Lay told her, "if I would let him eat me out just one time I wouldn't think about any other man." (T. 23). Petitioner testified that other witnesses, including her mother, were sitting nearby at a processing table when this comment was made. No witnesses corroborated Petitioner's testimony on this allegation and, coupled with Barry Lay's denial testimony, Petitioner's allegation is not credited. Petitioner testified that Barry Lay grabbed her face and tried to kiss her about the same time as he allegedly made the comment discussed above. Again, Petitioner alleges that witnesses were present, but all witnesses testifying in the matter, including Barry Lay, denied that such an incident occurred. Petitioner's testimony on this point is not credited. Petitioner also testified that Barry Lay grabbed her hips and tried to pull her from behind when she was bent over at a refrigerator. The allegation was denied by Lay and no corroborating testimony was presented. Petitioner's allegation is not credited. On one occasion, Barry Lay overheard conversation between Petitioner and her mother regarding their breast size and that they could form the “little titty committee.” Lay commented to the duo that both of them could be president of the committee. Barry Lay never attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with Petitioner and never threatened her with job transfer or termination if she failed to provide sexual favors. On one occasion during the course of Petitioner's employment, when employees were discussing a rumor that Barry Lay was having an affair with several people at one time, he overheard the discussion, became irritated, and addressed the employees as a group saying, “It doesn’t matter if I’m fucking you, you, you, or you, it’s none of your business.” Petitioner was transferred to the Ocala Store during the course of her employment to assist her in getting her children to day care on time. Additionally, the store hours were more suitable to her schedule at the time. Petitioner made sexual remarks, participated in discussions of a sexual nature, or participated in sexual horseplay in the workplace during the course of her employment with Respondent. Petitioner was heard and observed to smack or slap Barry Lay’s bottom and say, “I want a piece of that.” Barry Lay did not do anything to provoke Petitioner’s conduct, but responded by saying, “if you did, you’d never go back to your boyfriend.” While at work Petitioner discussed having oral sex with her boyfriend and the length and frequency of those encounters. During Petitioner's assignment to the Ocala store, she developed problems with absenteeism from the job. She quit calling in when she unable to work and demonstrated a poor attitude when she was at work. As a consequence, Petitioner was transferred back to Respondent's warehouse, where any absenteeism by the Petitioner would result in less of a hardship to operations. The transfer occurred at the end of May or beginning of June, 2004. After Petitioner was transferred back to the warehouse, she continued to exhibit a poor attitude and unacceptable conduct while at work. In June of 2004, just before she was terminated, Petitioner screamed at her supervisor that she was not going to perform a requested task due to medical restrictions. The supervisor informed Petitioner that she was not being asked to perform the task by herself, but simply to assist. Petitioner began using abusive language to the supervisor, calling her a “bitch.” Petitioner was asked to leave, but replied that she would not unless and until the supervisor “fucking” fired her. Petitioner pushed the supervisor and call her a “fucking whore” and “bitch.” Eventually, after using further epithets, Petitioner left the premises. Barry Lay did not witness the argument between Petitioner and the supervisor, but when he was later informed he instructed the supervisor to tell Petitioner that her employment was being terminated. The decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was communicated to her the next day. Petitioner's stated response to the supervisor, before walking away, was “get fucked.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Hesser, Esquire Seven East Silver Springs Boulevard Suite 300 Ocala, Florida 34470 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope and Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner on the basis of her sex or age, or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment based on her sex or age.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Frito-Lay, Inc. ("Frito-Lay"), makes and sells snack foods, including many familiar brands of chips. Petitioner Frances G. Danelli ("Danelli") is a former employee of Frito-Lay. Frito-Lay initially hired Danelli in or around 1998 as a packer for its West Valley, Utah, plant. When Danelli's husband was transferred to Florida, she took a job for Frito-Lay in Pompano Beach, Florida, and later moved to the company's West Palm Beach Distribution Center as a route sales representative ("RSR"). Danelli worked in Florida as a Frito-Lay RSR for more than 15 years, and her routes eventually included such large stores as Publix, Walmart, Winn-Dixie, and Target.1/ RSRs sell and deliver Frito-Lay products to retail stores, and these stores, in turn, sell the products to consumers. RSRs are responsible, as well, for presenting the company's products to shoppers in the best way possible to increase sales. So, RSRs not only sell and deliver products to stores, but they also unload the products, stock the shelves, set up displays, and remove unsold items whose sell-by dates have expired. RSRs are paid an hourly wage plus commissions. RSRs are required to compete for sales against other companies' vendors, who (like Frito-Lay's personnel) are trying to place as many of their products as possible onto the shelves of the snack food aisle. Shelf space is essential for growing sales, and competition for product placement can be fierce. There is no dispute that Danelli's performance as an RSR was fine, perhaps even exemplary. Frito-Lay considered her to be a good employee. Danelli went to work early each morning, usually arriving at the warehouse by 4:00 a.m. so that she could get to her first store by 5:00 a.m., which would give her a head start on other vendors. When Danelli got to the warehouse, she would clock in on her handheld computer, which she also used to track the goods she delivered to each store. Upon returning to the warehouse, she had paperwork to complete and print from the handheld computer. In 2013, Frito-Lay started requiring drivers of delivery trucks over a certain size, including RSRs such as Danelli, to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. As relevant, these regulations require an RSR to take at least a ten-hour break before driving a commercial vehicle, and they prohibit an RSR from driving a commercial vehicle after 14 consecutive hours on duty. Frito-Lay programmed its employees' handheld computers so that an employee subject to the DOT regulations would receive a conspicuous warning if he or she attempted to clock in to work less than ten hours after last going off duty. As Danelli testified at hearing, if the computer told her to wait, she would go to the warehouse, pick up some product, fix her truck, and then sign in when the handheld said she could go. Evidently, however, to get the warning, an employee needed to log on as a "regulated" employee; if, by mistake, a "regulated" employee logged on as "non-regulated," she would not get the warning. Danelli found it difficult to comply with the DOT regulations, which led to Frito-Lay's imposing discipline against her in accordance with the company's Corrective Action Process set forth in its Sales National RSR Handbook, which governed Petitioner's employment. The handbook prescribes a process of progressive discipline that begins with "coaching," which is a form of pre- discipline. As the name suggests, a "coaching" is, essentially, a nondisciplinary intervention whose purpose is to correct an issue before the employee's conduct warrants stronger measures. If coaching is ineffective, the Corrective Action Process calls for increasingly severe steps of discipline. The steps of discipline consist of a Step 1 Written Reminder, a Step 2 Written Warning, a Step 3 Final Written Warning, and a Step 4 Termination. The particular discipline to be imposed depends upon the severity of the infraction and the step of discipline, if any, the employee happens to be on when the infraction is committed. Steps of discipline remain "active" for six to nine months, depending on the step. If the employee does not commit any further disciplinary infractions during the active period, the step "falls off." If the employee commits another disciplinary infraction within the "active" period, however, he or she moves to the next disciplinary step in the Corrective Action Process. On June 5, 2014, after having previously been coached to maintain compliance with the DOT regulations, Danelli received a Step 1 Written Reminder for four violations of the 10-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. On July 25, 2014, Danelli received a Step 2 Written Warning for a new violation of the 10-hour rule. Once again, Danelli did not appeal the discipline. On October 7, 2014, Danelli was given another coaching, during which she was informed that (i) an investigation into her DOT hours was in process, and (ii) the company was concerned that she might be getting assistance on her route from her husband in violation of the RSR Performance Standards. On January 27, 2015, Danelli received a Step 3 Final Written Warning for violating the 14-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. Under the Corrective Action Process, a Step 3 Final Written Warning remains "active" for nine months and is the final step prior to a Step 4 Termination. On May 2, 2015, Danelli committed another DOT violation. Because she was already on a Step 3 Final Written Warning, she was suspended pending further investigation. Danelli maintains that this violation, and others, resulted from her making a simple mistake with the handheld computer, namely failing to log on as a "regulated" employee, which cost her the electronic warning she otherwise would have received. She points out, too, that in this instance, the violation was minor, merely clocking in ten minutes early. These arguments are not wholly without merit, and if Frito-Lay had fired Danelli for a single, ten-minute violation of the DOT regulations, the undersigned would question the company's motivation. But that is not what happened. Danelli did not just violate the ten-hour rule once or twice, but many times, after multiple warnings, and in the face of increasingly serious disciplinary steps. Further, Frito-Lay did not terminate Danelli's employment over this latest violation of the ten-hour rule, even though it would have been justified in doing so within the parameters of the Corrective Action Process. Instead, the company placed Danelli on a Last Chance Agreement. Last Chance Agreements are not specifically provided for in the Corrective Action Process but are used, at the company's discretion, as a safety valve to avoid the occasional unfortunate termination that might result from strict adherence to rigid rules. In this regard, the agreement given to Danelli, dated May 15, 2015, stated as follows: We strongly considered [terminating your employment]. However, due to the unique facts and circumstances involved here, as well as your 15 years of service with the Company, the Company is willing to issue this Last Chance Warning. This step is over and above our normal progressive disciplinary process, and is being issued on a one-time, non-precedent setting basis. . . . [A]ny subsequent violations by you may result in discipline up to and including immediate termination. More specifically, any future violations [of the DOT regulations] will result in your immediate termination. As Danelli put it, the Last Change Agreement was a "sign of grace" from Frito-Lay. By its terms, it was intended to be "active and in effect for a period of 12 months." The undersigned pauses here to let the Last Chance Agreement sink in, because the fact that Frito-Lay did not fire Danelli in May 2015 when——for objective, easy-to-prove reasons, after a by-the-book application of progressive discipline——it clearly could have, is compelling evidence that the company was not harboring discriminatory animus against Danelli. After all, if Frito-Lay had wanted Danelli gone because of her age or her gender, why in the world would the company not have jumped at this golden opportunity, which Danelli had given it, to fire her with practically no exposure to liability for unlawful discrimination? The irony is that by showing mercy, Frito-Lay set in motion the chain of events that led to this proceeding. In or around November of 2015, Danelli underwent surgery, which required her to take some time off of work. For several years before this leave, Danelli's route had consisted of a Super Walmart and two Publix stores. When she returned, the Super Walmart had been assigned to another RSR, and to make up for its loss, Danelli's supervisor, Stanley Gamble, put a third Publix grocery on Danelli's route, i.e., Publix #1049 located in Tequesta, Florida. Danelli was acquainted with one of the managers at the Tequesta Publix, a Mr. Morgan. On her first day back, Danelli and Mr. Gamble went to that store, where Mr. Morgan told Mr. Gamble that he was "glad Frances is here." Mr. Morgan had complained to Mr. Gamble about the previous RSR, who left the store "all messed up," according to Mr. Gamble. Danelli also met Sarah Oblaczynski, the store's "backdoor receiver," which is the Publix employee who checks in merchandise. On her new route, Danelli usually went to the Tequesta store first, early in the morning. She soon ran into a vendor named Tony who worked for Snyder's of Hanover ("Snyder's"), a snack food company that competes with Frito-Lay. From the start, Tony was nasty to Danelli and aggressive, telling her that "there is no space" for two vendors. Tony was possessive about shelf space within the store, as well as the parking space close to the store's loading dock. Danelli thought, because of Tony's behavior, that he might be using drugs. On Tuesday, April 6, 2016, Petitioner had an argument with Tony over the shelf space that the store manager previously had awarded to her for the display of Frito-Lay products. Tony asserted that he had been promised the same space and said to Danelli, "You're going to take that stuff out of the shelf." Danelli told him, "No, Morgan said that's still my space." At this, Tony began cursing and pushed Danelli's cart into her, yelling, "That fucking Morgan!" Danelli later spoke to Mr. Morgan, who assured Danelli that the shelf space in question was hers and said he would leave a note to that effect for Ms. Oblaczynski. There is a dispute as to when Danelli reported the forgoing incident to Frito-Lay. She claims that, before the end of the day on April 6, she told Mr. Gamble, her supervisor, all about the matter, in detail, and requested that someone be assigned to accompany her on her route the next day because Tony planned on taking her shelf space. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble just laughed and said he did not have anybody to help her. Mr. Gamble testified, to the contrary, that Danelli had neither reported the April 6, 2016, incident to him nor asked for any assistance. (Danelli admits that she did not report the incident to Mr. Canizares, sales zone director, or to Human Resources ("HR")). Without written documentation regarding this alleged discussion, it is hard to say what, if anything, Danelli reported on April 6, 2016. It is likely that Danelli did complain to Mr. Gamble about Tony on some occasion(s), and might well have done so on April 6. What is unlikely, however, is that Danelli notified Mr. Gamble that she felt she was being sexually harassed by Tony. Tony's boorish and bullying behavior, to the extent directed at Danelli, seems to have been directed to her qua competitor, not as a woman. At the very least, the incident is ambiguous in this regard, and one could reasonably conclude, upon hearing about it, that Tony was simply a jerk who resorted to juvenile antics in attempting to gain the upper hand against a rival vendor. The undersigned finds that if Danelli did speak to Mr. Gamble about Tony on April 6, he—— not unreasonably——did not view the incident as one involving sexual harassment. As far as Mr. Gamble's declining to provide Danelli with an escort, assuming she requested one, his response is reasonable if (as found) Mr. Gamble was not clearly on notice that Danelli believed she was being sexually harassed. Danelli, after all, was by this time an experienced and successful RSR who undoubtedly had encountered other difficult vendors during her career. Indeed, as things stood on April 6, a person could reasonably conclude that Danelli in fact had the situation under control, inasmuch as Mr. Morgan had clearly taken Danelli's side and intervened on her behalf. What could a Frito-Lay "bodyguard" reasonably be expected to accomplish, which would justify the risk of escalating the tension between Tony and Danelli into a hostile confrontation? During the evening of April 6, 2016, Danelli talked to her husband about the problem at Publix #1049, and they decided that he would accompany her to the store the next morning before reporting to his own work, to assist if Tony caused a scene. On April 7, 2016, Danelli's husband drove to Publix #1049 in his own vehicle. Although no longer an employee of the company, Danelli's husband entered the store wearing a Frito-Lay hat, and he stayed in the snack aisle while Danelli went to the back to bring the order in. Ms. Oblaczynski, the receiver, presented Tony with a note from Mr. Morgan stating that Danelli's products and sales items were assigned to aisle one. In response, Tony started swearing about Mr. Morgan and the denial of shelf space, made a hand gesture indicative of a man pleasing himself, and told Ms. Oblaczynski that "they can take a fly[ing] F'n leap." Tony had made this particular hand gesture about Mr. Morgan on a number of previous occasions, in front of both men and women. Mr. Danelli left to go to work once Danelli's product was placed, and she left to go to the next store on her route. When Danelli returned to the warehouse, she went to Mr. Gamble's office and told him about the April 7, 2016, incident. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble laughed in response. Danelli asked Mr. Gamble if the company would conduct an investigation, and he said yes. She recalls that every day thereafter, she asked Mr. Gamble if he had heard anything because she thought "we [Frito-Lay] were investigating" and that HR was on top of it. Danelli admits, however, that she "intentionally" did not tell Mr. Gamble that her husband had accompanied her to Publix #1049 to assist her in the store that morning. She did not report this detail because she knew it was "bad." In conflict with Danelli's account, Mr. Gamble testified that Danelli did not report that Tony made a sexual gesture in front of her or used coarse or profane language in her presence on April 7, 2016. The undersigned finds that Mr. Gamble most likely did not laugh at Danelli or otherwise treat her dismissively upon hearing her report of the incident. If Mr. Gamble had believed the matter were so trivial or amusing, he would not likely have agreed to investigate. The undersigned finds, further, that however Danelli described the incident, she did not make it clear to Mr. Gamble that she perceived Tony's behavior as a form of sexual harassment. Danelli did not make a formal written complaint to that effect at the time, and the situation at Publix #1049 was, at the very least, ambiguous. More likely than not, Mr. Gamble viewed the troublesome vendor from Snyder's as an unwelcome business problem to be dealt with, not as a perpetrator of unlawful, gender-based discrimination. To elaborate, putting Tony's "sexual gesture" to one side momentarily, the rest of his conduct, even the cursing, while certainly objectionable, is not suggestive of sexual harassment; it is just bad behavior. Tony's temper tantrums and outbursts no doubt upset Danelli and others, but that does not turn them into gender discrimination. Further, Danelli seems to have handled the situation well until she resorted to self-help on April 7, 2016. The responsible Publix employees were already aware of the problem, and in due course, they complained to Snyder's, which unsurprisingly removed Tony from that store. Meantime, had Danelli felt physically threatened or afraid as a result of Tony's more aggressive antics, she (or Publix) could have called the police; this, indeed, would have been a safer and more reasonable alternative to bringing along her husband or another civilian for protection, which as mentioned above posed the risk of provoking a fight, given Tony's volatility. Ultimately, it is Tony's "sexual gesture" that provides a colorable basis for Danelli's sexual harassment complaint. But even this gives little grounds for a claim of discrimination, without more context than is present here. To be sure, the "jerk off gesture" or "air jerk" is obscene, and one would not expect to see it in polite company or in the workplace. Yet, although it clearly mimics a sexual practice, the air jerk is generally not understood as being a literal reference to masturbation. That is, the gesture is not typically used to convey a present intention to engage in masturbation or as an invitation to perform the act on the gesturer. Rather, the jerk off gesture usually signifies annoyance, disgust, disinterest, or disbelief. As with its cousin, the "finger" (or bird) gesture, the sexual connotations of the air jerk are (usually) subliminal. Here, there is no allegation or evidence that Tony's jerk off gesture was undertaken in pursuit of sexual gratification or was intended or perceived as a sexual advance on Danelli (or someone else)——or even as being overtly sexual in nature. (Obviously, if the evidence showed that, under the circumstances, Tony was, e.g., inviting Danelli to participate in sexual activity, this would be a different case. The undersigned is not suggesting, just to be clear, that the air jerk gesture is inconsistent with or could never amount to sexual harassment, but only that it is not unequivocally a sign of such harassment, given its commonly understood meanings.) To the contrary, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that Tony made the gesture to indicate that he regarded Mr. Morgan's note as pointless and annoying. It was roughly the equivalent of giving them the bird, albeit arguably less contemptuous than that. For these reasons, the undersigned finds it unlikely that, assuming Danelli described the gesture (which is in dispute), Mr. Gamble thought Danelli was complaining about sexual harassment, as opposed to a very difficult vendor. On April 13, 2016, Mr. Gamble visited Publix #1049 and spoke to Ms. Oblaczynski about the situation. During this conversation, Ms. Oblaczynski stated that the "Frito-Lay people" did nothing wrong. She further specified that "the person [Danelli] had with her did nothing wrong." After speaking with Ms. Oblaczynski, Mr. Gamble met with Danelli while she was servicing her second account. Right off the bat, Mr. Gamble asked Danelli who was with her at Publix #1049 on April 7, 2016. She eventually admitted that her husband was with her in the store that day. Aware of the seriousness of her offense and the active Last Chance Agreement, Danelli asked Mr. Gamble, several times, if she would be fired. That same day, Mr. Gamble called Carlos Canizares to tell him what he had learned. Mr. Canizares instructed Mr. Gamble to stay with Danelli while she finished servicing her accounts and then to obtain a written statement from her about the incident. Later on April 13, 2016, Danelli provided a written statement in which she confirmed that her husband had been working with her at Publix #1049 the previous week. Danelli has since described this statement as a "full written account of the harassment [and] rude sexual gestures." Danelli knew, of course, that HR would review her statement, and yet she said nothing therein about having complained to Mr. Gamble or any supervisor about harassment generally or Tony in particular; about Tony's use of course or improper language; or about having requested an escort to help keep Tony in line. On the instructions of the company's HR department, Mr. Gamble conducted an investigation into the "rude sexual gesture" about which Danelli had complained. Specifically, he called Mr. Morgan, the Publix manager, and asked him about the incident. Mr. Gamble also requested that he be allowed to review any videotapes and documents concerning the incident. Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Gamble that Publix was investigating the matter. Mr. Gamble's request to allow Frito-Lay access to Publix videotapes and documents was, however, turned down. Tony's boorish behavior aside, the fact remained that Danelli, without prior approval, had allowed a non-employee to perform work or services for Frito-Lay at one of the stores on her route, which the RSR Performance Standards specifically prohibit without express authorization. RSRs who are found to have permitted non-employees to accompany them on their routes are either discharged or issued multiple steps of discipline, as Danelli knew. Because Danelli violated this rule while on an active Last Chance Agreement, Frito-Lay decided to terminate her employment. On April 26, 2016, Mr. Canizares met with Danelli to inform her that she was fired. Danelli timely appealed her termination pursuant to the company's Complaint and Appeal Procedure, electing to have her appeal decided by a neutral, third-party arbitrator. The arbitration hearing took place in January 2017. Three months later, the arbitrator ruled that Danelli's termination had been proper and carried out in accordance with Frito-Lay's employment policies. Danelli does not presently deny that she violated the DOT regulations and the company policy forbidding the use of non-employees as helpers while on duty, nor does she dispute that Frito-Lay had sufficient grounds for imposing the disciplinary steps leading to the Last Chance Agreement. Indeed, she does not contend that it would have been wrongful for Frito-Lay to have fired her in May 2015 instead of offering the Last Chance Agreement. Her position boils down to the argument that because Frito-Lay could have exercised leniency and not fired her for bringing her husband to work at Publix #1049 (which is probably true2/), its failure to do so can only be attributable to gender or age discrimination. Put another way, Danelli claims that but for her being a woman in her 50s, Frito-Lay would have given her another "last chance." This is a heavy lift. As circumstantial evidence of discrimination, Danelli points to the company's treatment of another RSR, a younger man named Ryan McCreath. Like Danelli, Mr. McCreath was caught with a non-employee assisting him on his route. Unlike Danelli, however, Mr. McCreath was not on any active steps of discipline at the time of the incident, much less a Last Chance Agreement. Although Mr. McCreath's disciplinary record was not unblemished, Frito-Lay did not terminate his employment for this violation of the RSR Performance Standards. Instead, he received three steps of discipline and was issued a Final Written Warning. Mr. McCreath's situation is distinguishable because he was not under a Last Chance Agreement at the time of the violation. Moreover, it is not as though Mr. McCreath got off scot-free. He received a serious punishment. Danelli could not have received a comparable punishment for the same offense because she was already beyond Step 3; her record, unlike his, did not have room for the imposition of three steps of discipline at once. The McCreath incident does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Frito-Lay unlawfully discriminated against Danelli when it terminated her employment for committing a "three-step violation" while on an active Last Chance Agreement. There is simply no reason to suppose that if Danelli, like Mr. McCreath, had not had any active steps of discipline when she violated the rule against having non- employees provide on-the-job assistance, Frito-Lay would have terminated her employment for the April 7, 2016, infraction; or that if Mr. McCreath, like Danelli, had been on a Last Chance Agreement when he violated the rule, Frito-Lay would have issued him a Final Written Warning in lieu of termination. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of Frito- Lay's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Danelli, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age- or gender-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age or gender discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay took any retaliatory action against Danelli for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay committed or permitted sexual harassment of Danelli or otherwise exposed her to a hostile work environment. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Frito-Lay did not discriminate unlawfully against Danelli on any basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Frito-Lay not liable for gender or age discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on Petitioner's pregnancy and sexual harassment, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business engaged in the retail sales of wine, spirits, cigars, specialty gourmet foods, and party favors. Respondent operates about 28 stores, mostly in south Florida. Respondent employs at least 225 employees. Its chief executive officer is Paul (Bubba) Kassal. Other executive officers, superior to Bubba Kassal, are his brother Michael, who also serves as vice-president of personnel, and their father, who, with his father, started the company in 1955. Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 2003, as a human resources manager. As such, Petitioner reported to the human resources director. At the time of hiring Petitioner, Bubba Kassal informed her, presumably secretly, of his intent to fire the existing human resources director. Six months later, after the termination of the human resources director, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position. As human resources director, Petitioner's primary duties were to ensure that all of Respondent's employees were paid, file all reports with the appropriate agencies, prepare internal employment policies, train managers in good hiring practices, run background checks, ensure compliance with all safety, workers' compensation and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) issues, terminate employees, counsel employees, file unemployment compensation reports, and participate in the strategic planning for new stores. The Kassals were satisfied with Petitioner's work performance during her entire employment with Respondent. Respondent's main offices are located in Ft. Lauderdale. While working for Respondent, Petitioner commuted over one hour each day from her home in Port St. Lucie to her office in the corporate headquarters. The issues in this case divide neatly into the claims of a hostile work environment and sex discrimination due to pregnancy. The claim of a hostile work environment pertains to Petitioner's first two years with Respondent, which were from late 2003 through late 2005. The claim of discrimination due to pregnancy pertains to Petitioner's last months with Respondent, which were from spring 2008 through fall 2008. As noted below, there is evidence supportive of a claim of a hostile work environment, although this evidence fails to establish such a claim for the reasons explained below. However, the limited evidence of a hostile work environment is in no way linked to the termination of Petitioner's employment in 2008 while she was pregnant. This termination, which was due to complications associated with her pregnancy, was essentially by mutual agreement and in no way was due to some form of quid pro quo sex discrimination or retaliation for her failure to reciprocate Michael Kassal's flirtation or infatuation. Petitioner's version of events for 2003-05 is credited because Michael Kassal did not testify. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is largely uncredited due to some inconsistencies in her testimony where she implies, for instance, that she understood that Respondent might not keep open her existing job until after she delivered. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is less than the more plausible testimony of Bubba Kassal and Respondent's outside counsel, Amy Galloway. Shortly after starting work, Petitioner began receiving unwelcome attention from Michael Kassal, whose office was near Petitioner's office. Michael Kassal, who was married at all material times, routinely complimented Petitioner's hairstyle, teeth, shoes, and clothes. When Respondent sponsored a wine tasting at its Port St. Lucie store, Michael Kassal invited Petitioner to attend. Michael Kassal repeatedly asked Petitioner to lunch or dinner. Petitioner went to lunch with Michael Kassal only a couple of times because she was uncomfortable with the level of attention that she was receiving. During her first year of employment, Petitioner was preoccupied with the demands of her job and largely ignored the uninvited attention that Michael Kassal directed toward her. During her second year of employment, Petitioner initiated corporate-wide training sessions in sexual harassment. She used these occasions to remind Michael Kassal, when he made her uncomfortable with his comments or behavior, that he knew better and he needed to stop such inappropriate behavior. Undeterred, Michael Kassal instead confided in Petitioner that he felt trapped in his marriage, could not leave his wife due to their two children, and believed that he would have been much happier if he had met Petitioner a couple of years earlier because they would have been so good together. Michael Kassal said that his wife, who was, at times, an employee of Respondent, was an alcoholic. Petitioner suggested that Michael Kassal or his wife take advantage of Respondent's employee assistance program. Michael Kassal rejected this advice and instead stated that, if Petitioner would not go out with him, he would go out with a woman at the gym where he worked out. On Petitioner's birthday, Michael Kassal routinely gave her a card. Petitioner kept only two of the cards and could not identify the years that they were received. One card contains a handwritten note: "And I need you more than want you[,] and I want you til the end of all time." Michael Kassal printed his name at the bottom of the note, adding a heart- shaped symbol in place of the dot over the "i." The other birthday card states: Dear Angella, It[']s presently July 10th and you are in India and I am wishing I were with you riding on Elephants and protecting you from the dangers so far from home. I must tell you we all miss you and only have kind thoughts about how professionally you have with us with Cami and Johanna. You have always blessed us with organization and administrative magic. I sit here and count the days before I can smell Victor[i]a's Secret Rapture perfume. Thank you for your intervention. You have been a breath of fresh air. I know it[']s been a whirlwind to some of us to catch up but it[']s worth the effort. I always have your back. I hope this year[']s birthday brings happiness and fills your heart with songs and sunshine. I hope you get a new pair of shoes and a toothbrush. Thanks again for all your loyalty and dedication. Sincerely, Michael Kassal. The "i" in "Michael" bears no dot or other symbol. Bubba Kassal testified that Michael sent birthday cards to all of the employees of the company and that this was part of the family atmosphere that characterizes the company, which continues a tradition of family picnics, employee fitness programs, and comprehensive fringe benefits. Bubba Kassal also testified that he and his brother kiss each morning. However, Bubba Kassal did not testify that the contents of the birthday cards quoted above resemble the contents of the birthday cards that Michael Kassal sends to, say, the company truck drivers or warehouse workers. The thoughtfulness that Michael Kassal extends daily to his brother and annually to his employees is distinct from the intimacies inherent in the shorter birthday card and the reference to smelling Petitioner's perfume again. These intimacies corroborate the portion of Petitioner's testimony that describes an inappropriate level of emotional attachment from Michael Kassal toward Petitioner; the inference easily follows that this level of emotional attachment is atypical of the conventional employer-employee relationship at Respondent. Three omissions loom large in Petitioner's proof of her claim of a hostile work environment. These omissions are considered in ascending order of significance. First, at no time during her employment with Respondent did Petitioner complain to anyone about Michael Kassal's behavior. She testified that she believed a complaint would be futile because Michael Kassal was the boss. Respondent countered with evidence that complaints about Michael Kassal's wife led to her termination and argument that Petitioner's complaints would likewise have received a fair hearing. Respondent's contention overlooks the fact that Michael's wife was convicted of driving under the influence, and her continued operation of a company vehicle presented an insurance problem for Respondent that could not be ignored. Petitioner is right on this point--her complaint would have been futile. Bubba Kassal was not in a position to control his brother, and, on this record, their father does not seem to have been playing a prominent role in the business during the time in question. Factually, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes undermine the credibility of the complainant. This is not the situation here, though, because, as noted above, Petitioner's version of events from 2003-05 is unrebutted and confirmed by two birthday cards. Legally, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes preclude a finding of notice to the employer, so as to preclude a conclusion of vicarious liability. This is not the situation here, though, because, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Michael Kassal was Respondent for purpose of establishing notice and concluding vicarious liability for his behavior. The second omission is that nothing in the record establishes that the behavior of Michael Kassal impeded Petitioner's work performance. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, this omission is not outcome-determinative, but, as noted above, Petitioner's work was always satisfactory, at least until her health deteriorated during her pregnancy, which is discussed below. The third omission is that the evidence fails to establish that Michael Kassal continued to lavish inappropriate attention on Petitioner after the end of 2005. The record is silent as to the nature of the relationship between Michael Kassal and Petitioner for the two and one-half years from the end of 2005 until the disclosure of her pregnancy in the spring of 2008. It is at least as plausible that, unfueled by any encouragement from Petitioner, Michael Kassal's infatuation with her tapered off after a couple of years, rather than burned with the same intensity for four and one-half years. The behavior of Michael Kassal from late 2003 through late 2005 suggests nothing more than an infatuation with Petitioner, which, however inappropriate, excludes the sexually charged actions of offensive touching or sexually explicit invitations or comments. The behavior in this case is limited to unaccepted invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates, inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, and transparent attempts at flattery that, at their best, suggest a failure to recognize boundaries and, at their worst, wander between the narcissistic and infantile. The record is not especially rich in detailing Petitioner's response to the inappropriate attention lavished on her by Michael Kassal, except that there is no indication whatsoever that Petitioner welcomed the attention, reciprocated in any fashion, or was in any way flattered by Michael Kassal's two-year infatuation. There is some evidence that the attention made Petitioner embarrassed and somewhat uncomfortable, but this evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner's subjective reaction took the form of a feeling that she was physically threatened or personally humiliated or that she was laboring under an alteration of her working conditions. Such reactions, if they had occurred, would have been disproportionate to the level of attention that Michael Kassal directed toward Petitioner. Except for the frequency of comments about attire or appearance, which may have occurred on a daily basis, the record fails to establish the frequency of the invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates or the inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, but these occurrences were probably infrequent. Objectively considered, none of Michael Kassal's behavior was physically threatening or humiliating, none of his behavior was so pervasive or severe as to alter the conditions of Petitioner's employment, and none of his behavior could reasonably have adversely affected Petitioner's work performance. Based on these findings and the Conclusions of Law below, Petitioner has failed to prove a hostile work environment from 2003-05. The inception of the claims arising out of Respondent's treatment of her pregnancy is March or April 2008, when Petitioner learned that she was pregnant and due to deliver in November. In June, Petitioner decided to reveal her pregnancy to family, friends, and Respondent. On the morning that Petitioner had decided to inform Respondent of her pregnancy, the first person who came to her office was Bubba Kassal. He congratulated Petitioner, laughingly saying, in a manner that did not offend Petitioner, that he did not know that she had a boyfriend. Bubba Kassal then spoke of his two boys and added that he was sorry that Petitioner's mother was no longer alive to support her at this time. Bubba Kassal called his mother and told her, and she called Petitioner the next day and congratulated her. The record does not disclose whether Petitioner told Michael Kassal at this time, or, if she did, the nature of his response. A short while later, on June 13, Petitioner had an office visit with her physician, who became concerned about her high blood pressure. The physician asked if Petitioner could work at home, and Petitioner assured him that she could. The physician wrote a note to this effect. Driving back to the office, Petitioner called Ms. Galloway, with whom Petitioner had worked on human-resource issues. Petitioner told Ms. Galloway about her pregnancy, the health risks, and the support that she had already received from "the Kassals." Ms. Galloway advised Petitioner just to go in and tell them that she needed to work at home. Toward this end, Petitioner arranged a meeting with Michael and Bubba Kassal on June 18. At the meeting, Petitioner gave the Kassals a copy of her physician's note. Petitioner acknowledged that she had been with Respondent a long time, and she thanked them for the work that she had been allowed to do. She mentioned her pregnancy complications, which included blacking out and falling--these made the long drive between work and home especially dangerous. Petitioner offered to recruit someone to replace her, but she wanted to be kept on the payroll in return for performing various human resource duties as best as she could, mostly from home. Michael Kassal reacted to the request poorly. He replied that it had not been his idea to purchase a house so far from the office in Port St. Lucie, and the human resources director needed to be onsite. Notwithstanding Michael Kassal's reaction, Respondent accepted Petitioner's request, as Bubba Kassal and Petitioner generally agreed to an arrangement in which Petitioner would continue to be paid her normal salary through delivery in return for working on human resources matters on a limited basis. An important component of the understanding reached at the June 18 meeting was its term, which was through the birth of the baby. Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if, after baby was born, Petitioner decided not to return to work. Petitioner was unable to promise that she would return to work, but replied that she needed to work, and she could bring her aunt from Jamaica to watch the baby. Bubba Kassal asked when the work-at- home arrangement would go into effect, and Petitioner replied it was intended to go into effect right away, but she would try to work with them and offered to help find someone to perform her duties in her absence. Bubba Kassal replied that he had someone in mind. Petitioner herself testified that Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if they liked the replacement, and Petitioner replied that she understood that they had a business to run, implying that, consistent with this understanding, they might not have a position for her after the baby were born, just as she might not want to return to work with Respondent. Bubba Kassal promised to memorialize the understandings reached at the meeting. Despite the doctor's orders, Petitioner continued to report to the office until the July 4 weekend. At that time, she asked Bubba Kassal about the document to memorialize their understandings, and he said that Amy Galloway was working on it. On July 7, Ms. Galloway emailed to Bubba Kassal a draft letter agreement, which, among other things, confirmed that neither party was committing to Petitioner's ongoing employment after the birth of the baby. On July 8, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal and Ms. Galloway advising them that she was on bed rest and would submit FMLA paperwork as soon as possible. For some reason, the recipients did not receive this email, so they were unaware in early July of the status of Petitioner, who, understandably, did not undertake any unnecessary communications during her period of bed rest in order to save the baby. On July 11, Petitioner visited the doctor, who found that her blood pressure had soared to 200/100. Petitioner talked him out of ordering an ambulance to take her to the hospital, but the doctor ordered bed rest for Petitioner. By this time, Petitioner realized that, for the remainder of her pregnancy, she would not be able to perform even at the limited level that she had said she would work at the June 18 meeting. From this point forward, the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's medical issues. On July 11, Petitioner returned to the office briefly to advise her staff that she would be going home for the time being. While at the office, she saw an invoice from Ms. Galloway's law firm that reflected legal research conducted a couple of days after the June 18 meeting and concerned the Title VII ramifications of Petitioner's situations. Petitioner assumed that Respondent was terminating her and began to cry. On the same day, Petitioner returned to the doctor's office and had him complete the FMLA paperwork, which Petitioner had previously thought was unnecessary. The necessity for FMLA paperwork was as much Petitioner's realization, on July 11, that she could not perform even the limited duties contemplated by the June 18 understanding as her discovery, also on July 11, that Respondent had ordered its counsel to research Title VII. Later on July 11, Petitioner returned to the office with the completed FMLA paperwork and left it for Bubba Kassal. Pursuant to this paperwork, the FMLA period, during which Respondent would have to keep open her job, expired before the projected delivery date. On July 14, Petitioner returned a telephone call of Ms. Galloway and updated her on her condition. As Ms. Galloway confirmed in an email of the same date to Bubba Kassal, Petitioner wanted to take her FMLA time and understood that she would not be able to perform the transitioning tasks contemplated in the June 18 understanding. Ms. Galloway promised Petitioner that she would discuss with Bubba Kassal a reworking of her benefits, including maintaining present health benefits and obtaining disability benefits. On August 5, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal advising that she had not received her paycheck on August 2 and stating that she "continued" to be available to perform her end of the June 18 understanding. This is an attempt to document a fact that was untrue: Petitioner had not been able to perform her responsibilities under the June 18 understanding at any time after July 11. Ten minutes after receiving the email, Bubba Kassal emailed Ms. Galloway stating that they would proceed by paying Petitioner disability benefits through the birth, paying the company's portion of the health insurance until the birth, and giving Petitioner access to her company laptop computer and cellphone until October 1 in return for a release, presumably from any employment-related liability claims. It is impossible to infer that Bubba Kassal was miffed at Petitioner's misstatement, but it is likely that the misstatement motivated Bubba Kassal to define the status of Petitioner's employment relationship. By letter dated August 5 from a human relations employee to Ms. Galloway, the position of Respondent was documented, at least internally. This letter states that Petitioner's FMLA start date is July 11, 2008, and end date is October 4, 2008. This letter restates the undertakings that Bubba Kassal detailed in his August 5 email and notes that Petitioner has exhausted all of her sick and vacation time. The letter notes that the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's subsequent incapacitation. On August 14, Ms. Galloway emailed a letter to Petitioner reiterating much of the contents of the August 5 email and noting that, due to Petitioner's emergent health needs, Respondent had hired an acting human resources director on July 28. Ms. Galloway's letter restates the conditions set forth in Bubba Kassal's email of August 5, adding only that there is no expectation that Petitioner can perform any human resource duties and omitting the request for a release. A couple of weeks later, Petitioner emailed a brief message to Ms. Galloway acknowledging receipt of the letter and thanking her for all that she "does," but not otherwise responding to the letter. On October 8, Ms. Galloway sent another letter to Petitioner noting that the FMLA period had expired and that Respondent continued to perform the conditions detailed in the August 14 letter. The letter asks for the return of the laptop computer and cellphone. On November 5, Petitioner delivered her baby. One month later, she spoke with Ms. Galloway exploring, in Ms. Galloway's opinion, the possibility of returning, if her replacement were not working out, or obtaining additional severance pay. Ms. Galloway explained the company's view that the termination was voluntary, not involuntary. Eventually, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner another week's salary, through July 18, and extended her insurance through December 31, so that Petitioner would have another chance to exercise her COBRA rights. Respondent advised that it was treating Petitioner's termination date as October 4, which was when the FMLA period had expired. There is no evidence of discrimination in Respondent's handling of Petitioner's pregnancy. Respondent assigned no role of substance in the 2008 events to Michael Kassal, whose objections to the June 18 understanding were completely ignored. There is no evidence that the company's actions in 2008 were influenced in any way by Michael Kassal's 2003-05 infatuation. Petitioner testified to a 4-6 week period during which she had previously worked at home. However, this earlier period of working at home was when Petitioner was engaged in the solitary task of converting payroll systems on the computer, and she needed a quiet place to work. Working at home under these conditions is entirely appropriate. During this period, Petitioner was working exclusively on this task, leaving her other human resources duties to others or deferring them until the conversion was finished. Any insistence by Respondent in 2008 that Petitioner work in the office is justified because Petitioner's duties generally required her to be in the office, where she would be available for, among other things, drop-in visits by corporate management needing assistance in the wide range of personnel matters that arise daily in a business of this size. However, Petitioner's claim of discriminatory treatment regarding working at home misses the larger point that, in the June 18 understanding, Respondent allowed her to work at home for the duration of her pregnancy. This understanding was defeated, not by Respondent's insistence that she work in the office, but by Petitioner's deteriorating medical condition. Petitioner also testified that Respondent allowed other managers to work at home. Again, this proof overlooks the fact that Respondent also allowed Petitioner to work at home under the June 18 understanding, and her subsequent inability to do so was due to her deteriorating health, not the demands of Respondent. Also, the other situations are distinguishable, even if Respondent had prohibited Petitioner from working at home. While one district manager's wife recovered from a broken leg and another district manager recovered from a heart attack and stroke, they worked in some fashion, either with reduced hours in the office or reduced hours from home. Petitioner's situation was different in the nature of her duties, which were corporate-wide, not district-wide; the fact that she was completely unavailable for an extended period of time; and probably for the fact that, for a substantial period of time, she failed or was unable timely to communicate her situation to Respondent. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove any form of sex discrimination in Respondent's handling of her pregnancy in 2008.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2010 . COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Bogdan, Esquire Robert Anthony Bogdan, P.A. 410 Southeast 1st Terrace Pompano Beach, Florida 33060-7108 Salvatore H. Fasulo, Esquire Trip Scott, P.A. 110 Southeast Sixth Street, 15th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether the Respondent intentionally committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner on the basis on her national origin/Hispanic (Puerto Rican) or gender/female (sexual harassment). Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was removed from her position with the Respondent in retaliation for her filing of a sexual harassment complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 12, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these proceedings and the parties involved. All procedural prerequisites and requirements have been duly accomplished or satisfied. Respondent, Martin-Marietta Electronics Information and Missiles Group, is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Florida which employs more than fifteen employees. Respondent is an "employer" within the definition found in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Margarita Coll, is a female, hispanic, citizen of the United States who resides in the State of Florida. Petitioner is a member of a protected class. Petitioner was an employee of Hi-Tec Associates, Inc., during all relevant periods, and was a de facto employee of Respondent for approximately four and one-half years. Petitioner was employed at Respondent company through a temporary agency called Associated Temporary Services and placed with the Respondent on January 5, 1987 as a receptionist/secretary in Martin-Marietta's Fleet Administration Department off Sand Lake Road, Orlando, Florida. Her responsibilities included record keeping, filing and helping Respondent's employees with company vehicles. Petitioner reported to the Respondent's Fleet Manager, Linda Reilly. Her day to day work assignments and supervision were received exclusively from the Fleet Manager. Petitioner worked in her position at the pleasure of the Respondent. She was assigned a "buyer" at Martin- Marietta who worked with the requesting department to fashion a position to meet the department's needs. The work was bidded out and awarded to the temporary employment agency who best met Respondent's criteria, on an annual basis. Over time, Petitioner assumed additional job responsibilities and in June, 1988 received a commendation for exceptional performance from Respondent's supervisors. In an effort to reward her efforts, Reilly successfully upgraded her position, first to Administrative Assistant and then to Fleet Analyst. When she was reclassified as a Fleet Analyst, the contract for her position was awarded to Hi-Tec Associates, Inc., since Associated Temporary Services did not provide technical employees under their contract with Respondent. Petitioner always worked at Martin-Marietta as a temporary employee and was never employed as a regular employee of the company. As such, she had no company benefits; she was classified as a contract laborer and her services were purchased by purchase order. Petitioner completed no company employment application, was not subject to Martin-Marietta performance appraisals and had no Martin-Marietta employment records or personnel file, other than her contract labor time slips. Petitioner received her pay from Hi-Tec. In June, 1990, Marilyn Quinonez was placed in the Fleet Administration Department as a Fleet Administrative Assistant by a temporary employment agency. Friction quickly developed between Petitioner and Quinonez. Petitioner believed that Quinonez was hired to assist her and became upset when she would not follow Petitioner's supervision or directions. Quinonez understood that she was to report to the Fleet Manager, and objected to the way Petitioner treated her. On November 15, 1990, Reilly was laid off by Respondent as part of a reduction in force and was replaced by Joseph LaPak. LaPak observed the bickering between Petitioner and Quinonez and that it continued to escalate over time. In December, 1990, the temporary positions in the department were reevaluated and the contract requirements for both positions were rewritten. The titles of both Petitioner and Quinonez were changed to that of Fleet Administrative Assistant. Any language in the contract which called for Petitioner to direct the clerical duties of the department were eliminated. In the fall of 1991, Quinonez met with LaPak and Wally DuBose to clarify her reporting responsibilities. It was confirmed that Quinonez and Petitioner were to report to the Fleet Manager, and that Petitioner did not have supervisory authority over Quinonez. Nevertheless, disputes between Petitioner and Quinonez continued. Attempts by management to resolve the problems were unsuccessful. On February 17, 1992, during the normal lunch hour, an altercation occurred between Petitioner and Quinonez. When Quinonez returned from lunch, she found Petitioner at her computer terminal. Quinonez asked for it back. Petitioner refused and an argument ensued. The two women became so angry and loud that a neighboring supervisor had to come over and separate them. Wally DuBose sent both Petitioner and Quinonez home for the day. Petitioner's immediate supervisor, LaPak was not in the office at the time. DuBose then discussed the matter with his supervisor, Paul Smilgen, and it was decided that Petitioner would be removed from the contract for her failure to work with fellow employees and management, and for general insubordination. LaPak was not involved in the decision to remove Petitioner. The decision was communicated to Hi-Tec. They, in turn, notified Petitioner that same evening that she was being replaced on the contract and not return to the Fleet Administration Department. Hi-Tec offered to attempt to place Petitioner elsewhere at Martin-Marietta but Petitioner refused because the openings available at the time paid less that the Fleet Administrative Assistant position. When LaPak first became the Fleet Manager in November of 1990, Petitioner and Quinonez worked in a very small work space. While Petitioner was training LaPak and working on the computer, LaPak's body was frequently close to Petitioner's and she felt pinned in a corner by him. After the initial working relationship was established and LaPak came into Petitioner's work area, he would touch her on her arms or shoulder in order to get her attention. In December, 1990, Petitioner complained to DuBose about LaPak touching her and making her uncomfortable. Both Petitioner and DuBose talked to LaPak about the fact that Petitioner did not want LaPak to touch her. LaPak honored that request and did not touch her again. He made every reasonable effort to get her attention when he needed to talk to her without touching her. In October, 1991, Petitioner complained to the Martin-Marietta EEO office that LaPak was sexually harassing her by inappropriate touching. Respondent then conducted an immediate investigation into the allegations and attempted to resolve the matter through internal mediation. Petitioner's testimony and other witnesses' testimony concerning sexual comments, innuendoes or propositions and inappropriate touching allegedly made by LaPak that occurred between December, 1990 and October, 1991 were inconsistent and are not credible. Petitioner presented no relevant or material evidence to show that Petitioner was the victim of national origin discrimination. Respondent's articulated reason for its decision to remove Petitioner from her contract labor position was not based on gender discrimination or national origin discrimination, nor was it pretextual. Petitioner failed to prove that her termination of employment at the Respondent's company was in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment or national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the testimony and evidence submitted on the record in the formal hearings on this matter and by application of the relevant or governing principles of law to the findings of facts established on such record, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be issued in which the Charge of Discrimination is DENIED and the Petition for Relief is DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(in part), 6(in part), 7(in part), 8(in part), 9(in part), 10(in part), 13, 14(except as to date of hire), 15(in part), 16(in part), 18(except as to the date of the counseling session), 19(except as to the date of the counseling session), 20, 21(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 5(in part: Petitioner was first a contract employee with Associated Temporary Services), 6(in part), 7(in part), 8(in part), 9(in part), 10(in part), 15(in part), 16(in part), 17. Rejected as immaterial, irrelevant or subsumed: paragraphs 11, 12, 21(in part). Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4(in part), 5, 6(in part), 7, 11(in part), 12, 13, 14(in part). Rejected as argument or a conclusion of law: paragraphs: 9, 10, 15, 16, 17. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or subsumed: paragraphs 4(in part), 8, 11(in part), 14(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 6(in part). COPIES FURNISHED: Kay L. Wolf, Esquire John M. Finnigan, Esquire GARWOOD, MCKENNA & MCKENNA, P.A. 815 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 James Sweeting, III, Esquire 2111 East Michigan Street Suite 100 Orlando, Florida 32806 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., subjected Petitioners, Jasen Baker and Bernard Southwell, to a hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a chain of casual Italian restaurants. Respondent has adopted a policy against discrimination and harassment. In addition to prohibiting harassment, the policy instructs employees whom to contact if they experience harassment. The policy is contained in an employee handbook that is distributed to all employees during the initial orientation process. During orientation, Respondent's manager reviews the employee handbook with the new employee, including the policy on sexual harassment. During the orientation process, Respondent also requires employees to view a video that explains that Respondent will not tolerate harassment. The video familiarizes the employees with the company's expectations regarding the reporting of harassment in the workplace. During the orientation process, the employees are required to sign an acknowledgment on the exterior of their employee folders indicating that they have received and read the policy against harassment. The critical sections of the policy are reprinted on the folders immediately above the signature lines. All of Respondent's restaurants are required to display a poster known as the "Carrabbamico Info" poster in the kitchen area. This poster reprints the harassment policy and provides employees with a list of names to call if they feel that they have been harassed. Respondent has implemented reasonable precautions to prevent harassment from occurring in its restaurants. In the Central Florida market, Respondent's restaurants are overseen by a joint venture partner named Dick Meyer. Meyer is responsible for hiring and firing the managers of the restaurants that he oversees. In March 2000, Lawton DePriest became the managing partner at Respondent's Palm Bay location. DePriest reported to Meyer. DePriest remained in that capacity until September 2003, when he became the managing partner of Respondent's restaurant located in Formosa Gardens. It was DePriest's management style to frequently yell at employees in order to motivate them. It is also possible that he had favorites on the staff of the Palm Bay restaurant. Baker was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in January 2002. At the time that Baker began working for Respondent, he attended an orientation session conducted by DePriest. It was DePriest's practice during orientation to discuss harassment issues and instruct employees to come to him directly if they experience any problems with sexual harassment. If for some reason an employee is not comfortable with him, DePriest would encourage the employee to contact any other person listed on the poster. Baker was given a copy of Respondent's handbook, which contains the company's policy against harassment. On that same date, January 19, 2002, Baker signed his employee folder on the blank line under the harassment policy indicating that he had read and received the policy. Whether he reviewed the employee handbook further after that date is irrelevant. Baker "vividly remembers" that during his orientation, he watched the videotape that included instructions on what he should do if he felt harassed. However, during the hearing, Baker denied ever seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster. However, Baker admitted on cross-examination that during his deposition, he had acknowledged seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster posted in the store. During the deposition, Baker specifically remembered that there were business cards with contact information for Meyer and Cheri Ashe attached to the bottom of the poster. Despite Baker's attempt to deny seeing the poster, his earlier answers in deposition were more credible in view of his specific recollection of the attached business cards and the lack of any persuasive explanation for the discrepancy. After completing his orientation, Baker initially worked as a dishwasher. Later, he was shown how to do food preparation work. Before coming to work for Respondent, Baker had previously worked for a restaurant by the name of Golden Corral. During the time that he worked with Golden Corral, he became acquainted with a co-worker named Bernard Southwell. In the summer of 2002, Petitioners discussed the possibility of Southwell coming to work for Respondent. Baker spoke favorably of the restaurant and recommended that Southwell submit an application. At the time, Baker had worked for Respondent for six or seven months. Baker did not express to Southwell that he had observed or experienced any problems with unwelcome harassment. Southwell submitted an application and was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in August 2002 as a dishwasher. At the time he began employment with Respondent, Southwell was living with a friend of his named Joe Corbett. At the time, Baker was living in a one-bedroom apartment with his girlfriend. Several weeks later, Baker's girlfriend decided to move out. According to Petitioners, she suggested to Southwell that he move into Baker's apartment to replace her. Around October 2002, Southwell moved out of the Corbett residence and moved in with Baker. A third employee named Chris Germana also moved into the residence around the same time. Because the apartment only had one bedroom, Germana slept on the couch. Petitioners slept in the bedroom. When employees at the restaurant learned of these arrangements, speculation began about whether the two men were homosexual. According to Petitioners, sometime after Southwell started to room with Baker, co-workers at the restaurant started referring to Petitioners by nicknames. The co-workers referred to Baker as "powder," "crack pipe," and "crack head." Baker knew that "powder" was a reference to a character from the movie "Powder" and that the name had nothing to do with his sexuality. The co-workers also referred to Petitioners as "butt buddies." Southwell testified that a male co-worker, Christopher Bouley, told him, "I know you guys are lovers." Bouley, Arnold Samuel and DePriest all used these nicknames on occasion to refer to both Petitioners, according to Baker. After several months, Southwell eventually went to DePriest and complained about the "powder," "crack pipe," and "butt buddies" nicknames. Southwell told DePriest that the nicknames were funny at first, but that they started getting old. DePriest then told Samuel and Bouley to stop using the nicknames. Thereafter, the use of the nicknames stopped. Southwell claimed that Bouley would gyrate his hips behind other employees as they were bending down. However, Petitioners both admitted that Bouley would do these hip motions to both male and female employees. During the hearing, Petitioners claimed that Bouley subjected them to unwelcome touching. Baker claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks once. However, Baker acknowledged that when his deposition was taken prior to the final hearing, he did not mention that Bouley touched his buttocks. In fact, when asked during his deposition whether he had been sexually harassed, Baker testified that he had not and that he had only been verbally harassed. Furthermore, Baker made no mention of any physical touching in the Affidavit that he submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination. Southwell never saw Bouley touch or grab Baker's buttocks. And despite their close relationship, Baker never told Southwell that Bouley had grabbed his buttocks. Accordingly, Baker's allegation that he was touched inappropriately by Bouley or any other of Respondent's employees is not credible. Southwell claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks on two or three occasions and touched his nipples twice. Southwell also claimed that Bouley had touched his penis on one occasion. According to Southwell, he was bending down to pick up sauté pans when Bouley, who was supposedly standing behind him, reached between Southwell's legs from behind and clutched Southwell's genital area through his trousers. This incident supposedly occurred during the restaurant's hours of operation while customers were in the restaurant. The alleged grabbing supposedly took place in front of a stove that sat in full view of customers seated at the restaurant's bar. Bouley flatly denied ever touching Southwell's genitals or private area. In the Affidavit that Southwell submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination, Southwell made no mention of Bouley touching Southwell's penis. At the time that he submitted this Affidavit, Southwell was represented by counsel. Southwell did not offer any convincing reason for the omission of any description of his genitals being grabbed. Accordingly, Southwell's allegation that Bouley touched Southwell's genitals is not credible. Although Petitioners testified that they spoke to DePriest on several occasions, they admit that they never spoke to any of the other individuals listed on the harassment poster to complain about sexual harassment. DePriest testified that the only complaint he ever received had to do with the nicknames and that he took prompt action to resolve this problem. Annually, Respondent submits an employee experience survey to its employees that is completed anonymously and forwarded to an outside company for analysis. After the survey is completed, employees participate in a small group feedback session to discuss the results of the survey. On March 11, 2003, DePriest held the feedback session for his store, which was attended by Petitioners. During the session, Southwell commented about the situation with the nicknames. He indicated that the situation was resolved when it was brought to DePriest's attention. This was the sole extent to which either employee complained of unwelcome behavior. Respondent was not on notice of any problems with regard to touching or more serious inappropriate behavior. On March 12, 2003, Petitioners' last day of work, Southwell approached DePriest to complain about scheduling for a special event at the convention center. Southwell stated that he and Baker had signed up to participate in this event. Southwell was scheduled for the event, but Baker was not. DePriest explained that he needed Baker to float, because there were not enough people scheduled to work at the restaurant that night. DePriest later talked to Baker, who indicated that he was not disappointed that he was not participating in the event. That conversation, however, was the last time that DePriest saw Baker. DePriest learned that Petitioners had left before the end of their shift, when the plates in the restaurant were getting low and the sauté pans were getting stacked up. DePriest asked about the whereabouts of Petitioners and learned that they were seen riding their bicycles away from the restaurant. DePriest could not contact them because they did not have a telephone. DePriest eventually terminated their employment for voluntarily walking off the job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order that: Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Jasen Baker, in DOAH Case No. 05-0623, FCHR No. 23-03891; and Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Bernard Southwell, DOAH Case No. 05-0632, FCHR No. 23-03892. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jason M. Gordon, Esquire Gordon & Cornell 103 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Kevin D. Johnson, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A. 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner was harassed on the basis of national origin or discriminated against on the basis of a disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent in the summer of 1994 and was terminated from his employment on July 28, 1999. The Respondent operates a machine shop where different types of large metal parts are fabricated according to customer order. The Petitioner was employed as a "mill operator" in the "caterpillar" department. As a mill operator, the Petitioner was required to load metal parts into machines for further processing, check the quality of his work, and return the parts to a container of finished parts. At all times material to this case, the Respondent had a policy prohibiting employee harassment on the basis of numerous grounds including "national origin." The policy provided that any employee who believed that such harassment was occurring should report it immediately to a supervisor or to another company official. The non-harassment policy was included in the employee handbook. The Petitioner received the handbook when the Respondent employed him and was aware of the policy. The Petitioner, of Polish origin, asserted that at various times he was harassed on the basis of national origin; specifically, he was sometimes addressed as "pollock" by some co-workers. Although the evidence establishes that employees, perhaps including the Petitioner, occasionally referred to each other by ethnic slurs (i.e., "pollock," "speedy Gonzalez," and "buddha") the testimony regarding such incidents was anecdotal, and the times and dates of such references are uncertain. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner was subjected to a hostile work environment or was harassed on the basis of national origin. Other than as set forth herein, the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner or any other employee ever advised a supervisor or a manager that co-workers were making ethnic references or that any employee felt harassed by the behavior. In March 1998, a note was taped to the men's restroom door reading "Polish Department – Jerry's [sic] Office." The Petitioner reported the note to his supervisor. A meeting was held with the Petitioner's co-workers on March 16, 1998, where the Respondent's managers advised the employees that such behavior was not acceptable and that similar events in the future would result in disciplinary action against the perpetrators. The Petitioner also asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of an alleged disability. In December 1998, the Petitioner had a total replacement of his right hip. He was medically cleared to return to work on March 1, 1999, with restrictions of not working more than 10 hours per day for two weeks and not lifting more than 20 pounds. The Petitioner reported for work on March 4, 1999, but was sent home by his supervisor because there was no work that met his restrictions, particularly the weight restriction. Generally the metal parts involved in the Respondent's manufacturing process weighed in excess of 20 pounds. By March 18, 1999, the restrictions were lifted and the Petitioner returned to work without incident until July 1999. On July 6, 1999, the Petitioner received a written warning from a plant supervisor who determined that the Petitioner was not properly inspecting parts being produced in the Petitioner's machine. An excessive number of parts were not within acceptable fabrication tolerances and had to be "re- worked." The warning specifically provided that failure to improve the quality and inspection of parts would result in termination of employment. On July 27, 1999, the Petitioner reported hip pain to his physician and was again placed on a restricted workload that included no lifting of weight in excess of 20 pounds and no "twisting" until the physician determined that the pain had been resolved. Based on the medical restrictions and his experience, the Respondent was unable to locate work suitable for the Petitioner. The Petitioner's employment was terminated because there were no jobs available that complied with the Petitioner's medical restrictions. Review of the Petitioner's performance evaluations establishes that he was generally an average worker who was sometimes warned about becoming too involved in other employees' activities. His evaluations of August 1996 and September 1998 contained references to such involvement and indicated that he should "spend less time worrying" about other employees. The 1996, 1997, and 1998 performance evaluations suggested that the Petitioner obtain additional training in order to advance his career. The Respondent offered a program to fund such training, and notices regarding the training were posted on a bulletin board accessible to employees, but the Petitioner did not take advantage of the program. At the time of the July 1999 medical restrictions, the Petitioner's skill set did not qualify him to perform tasks other than as a mill operator using the machine for which he was originally employed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Jerzy Josefik in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerzy Jozefik 9605 Southwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34476 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Ignacio J. Garcia, Esquire Haynsworth Baldwin Johnson & Greaves LLC 600 North Westshore Boulevard, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33609-1117 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
