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NELLA GAROFOLO, D/B/A SEMINOLE ANTIQUES AND PAWN vs DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 97-000865 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 10, 1997 Number: 97-000865 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 1997

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner lacks good moral character in violation of Section 539.001(4)(a)1., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). 1/

Findings Of Fact Petitioner and her husband own and operate Seminole Antiques and Pawn ("Seminole Antiques") at 6115 Seminole Boulevard in Seminole, Florida. The business of Seminole Antiques includes pawnbroking. Petitioner first engaged in the business of pawnbroking in 1990. On November 28, 1995, officers from the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office") arrested Petitioner on charges of dealing in stolen property and failing to maintain adequate records. On March 4, 1995, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to both charges. The court accepted Petitioner's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, assessed costs of $144, and placed Petitioner on probation for two years. On March 14, 1997, the court entered an order terminating Petitioner's probation. Registration And License Prior to October 1, 1996, pawnbrokers had been required by former Chapter 538, Part I, Florida Statutes (1995). 2/ to register with the Department of Revenue ("DOR") as secondhand dealers. From 1990 through 1996, Petitioner was continuously registered with DOR as a secondhand dealer. In relevant part, former Section 538.09(4) provided: . . . registration may be denied . . . or any registration granted may be revoked, restricted, or suspended . . . if the applicant or registrant: (f) Has, within the preceding 5-year period, been convicted of, or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, a crime . . . which relates to registration as a secondhand dealer or which involves . . . dealing in stolen property. . . . The registration provisions in former Section 538.09 did not include a requirement that a pawnbroker be of good moral character. Effective October 1, 1996, Section 539.001 transferred responsibility for licensing and regulating pawnbrokers from DOR to Respondent and prescribed license eligibility requirements. 3/ The license eligibility requirements in Section 539.001 include a requirement that an applicant be of good moral character. On October 1, 1996, the eligibility requirements in Section 539.001 did not prohibit a plea of nolo contendere to a criminal charge of dealing in stolen property within a five year period. However, Sections 539.001(4)(a)3. and 4. did prohibit a conviction in the last 10 years of any felony or any other crime that directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of a pawnbroker ( a "related crime"). In 1997, the legislature amended Sections 539.001(4)(a) and 4. to prohibit a plea of nolo contendere to a felony or related crime. The amendments took effect on June 3, 1997, approximately 36 days after the hearing in this case. As amended, Section 539.001 provides inter alia: (4) ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE-- (a) To be eligible for a pawnbroker's license, an applicant must: 1. Be of good moral character; Not have been convicted of, entered a plea of . . . nolo contendere to, or had an adjudication withheld for a felony within the last 10 years . . . . Not have been convicted of, entered a plea of nolo contendere to, or had adjudication withheld for a crime that involves dealing in stolen property . . . within the last 10 years. * * * (6) SUSPENSION, REVOCATION, AND SURRENDER OF LICENSE . . . (a) The agency may, after notice and a hearing, suspend or revoke any license upon a finding that: The licensee . . . has violated this section . . . . A condition exists that, had it existed when the original license was issued, would have justified the agency's refusal to issue a license. . . . (emphasis supplied) The underlined provisions became effective June 3, 1997. Pawnbrokers already in business had six months from the date Section 539.001 became effective to comply with the "registration . . . provisions" of Section 539.001. 4/ Section 539.001(21) provides, in relevant part: (21) TRANSITION PERIOD FOR LICENSING--Each pawnbroker operating a pawnshop in business of the effective date of this section shall have 6 months from the effective date of this section to comply with the registration . . . provisions before the agency may initiate any administrative . . . action. (emphasis supplied) Section 539.001 became effective on October 1, 1996. Petitioner, had until April 1, 1997, to comply with the registration provisions in Section 539.001. Prior to April 1, 1997, Respondent was statutorily prohibited from initiating any administrative action against Petitioner. On October 8, 1996, Petitioner applied for a pawnbroker license. On December 4, 1996, Respondent initiated administrative action by denying the application. Notice In the letter of denial dated December 4, 1996, Respondent stated several grounds for denying Petitioner's application. In relevant part, the letter stated: Section 539.001(4) . . . provides that to be eligible for a pawnbroker's license, an applicant must be of good moral character and must not have been convicted of a felony within the last 10 years . . . that directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of a pawnbroker. Our background investigation has revealed that you were found guilty of or pleaded nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records, case number CRC9519648CFANOB in 1996 (sic). Based upon these findings, your application for a pawnbroker license is hereby denied for failure to meet the eligibility requirements of s. 539.001(4) . . . . (emphasis supplied) Consistent with Section 539.001(4), Respondent's letter of denial listed as separate and distinct requirements the requirement for good moral character and the requirement of no felony conviction within the last 10 years. However, Respondent's letter of denial deviated from the statute that was in effect at the time, by expanding the definition of a conviction to include a plea of nolo contendere. Petitioner timely requested an informal hearing with Respondent. Respondent conducted the informal hearing by telephone conference. During the telephone conference, Petitioner testified that she was not guilty of dealing in stolen property. She testified that law enforcement officers, posing as consumers, had tried, unsuccessfully, to get her husband to purchase a watch. The transaction was not completed, and Petitioner was not present at the time. Nevertheless, Petitioner was charged with dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records. Petitioner further testified that she chose to enter a plea of nolo contendere in order to quickly resolve the issue. Respondent disregarded Petitioner's testimony. On January 13, 1997, Respondent issued a letter overruling Petitioner's objections and denying Petitioner's application. Respondent based its administrative action on the ground that Petitioner was not of good moral character. Respondent did not make an independent determination that Petitioner was guilty of dealing in stolen property. Respondent determined that Petitioner lacked good moral character solely on the basis of the criminal charge and plea of nolo contendere. In relevant part, Respondent's letter of January 13, 1997, stated: The facts set forth in the . . . denial letter dated December 4, 1996, are undisputed. As part of the . . . review of your application, a criminal background check . . . by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement . . . revealed that you pled nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records. Adjudication was withheld. During the proceeding, you stated that law enforcement officers, posing as consumers, had tried, unsuccessfully, to get your husband to purchase a watch. Although according to your testimony the transaction was not completed and your were not present at the time, you were charged. Subsequently, you chose to enter a plea in order to quickly resolve the issue. . . . Pursuant to Section 539.001(4) to be eligible for a pawnbroker license the applicant must be of good moral character. Based upon your criminal arrest and plea discussed herein, you fail to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in the Florida Pawnbroking Act. Therefore, your objections to the denial of your application for a license are hereby overruled. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner retained counsel. On February 5, 1997, Petitioner's counsel sent a letter to Respondent requesting a formal hearing. In relevant part, the letter stated: . . . my client . . . received a letter indicating that she had been turned down for her license because of a criminal matter where she had been charged with dealing in stolen property and received a withhold of adjudication and probation. It is my understanding that her probation is now complete. . . . Mrs. Garafolo received a letter from Geoffrey G. Luckemann informing her that she was not eligible for a pawn broker's license because she was not of good moral character. . . . I . . . believe that the ends of justice would be honestly met by allowing . . . a Formal Hearing. . . . (emphasis supplied) On February 24, 1997, Respondent referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge to conduct the administrative hearing. From February 24 through April 28, 1997, Petitioner's counsel did not file a request for discovery. On April 11, 1997, Respondent voluntarily served Petitioner's counsel with a copy of its administrative file. The administrative file contained numerous exhibits, including the exhibits Respondent submitted for admission in evidence at the administrative hearing. On April 15, 1997, the parties entered into a Prehearing Stipulation that included a list of Respondent's witnesses. The only witnesses listed by Respondent were the two undercover investigators Respondent called at the hearing. The Prehearing Stipulation stated that the issue for determination at the administrative hearing was whether Petitioner lacked good moral character. The parties did not stipulate that Respondent was limited to evidence of Petitioner's ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". In relevant part, the Prehearing Stipulation stated: . . . the application for a pawnbroker license was denied by respondent on the basis petitioner did not have good moral character. * * * The issue of fact to be determined is the good moral character or lack thereof by Nella Garafolo. At the administrative hearing, Respondent stated, for the first time, that it intended to prove Petitioner's lack of good moral character by evidence other than evidence of her ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". Respondent sought to prove that Petitioner actually dealt in stolen property and failed to keep adequate records. Petitioner's counsel objected to the admissibility of any evidence other than the ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . ." and moved to suppress any other evidence. Petitioner's counsel stated numerous grounds for the objection and motion, including due process requirements for adequate notice. The objections by Petitioner's counsel were overruled, and the motion was denied. Petitioner's counsel had adequate notice of the nature and scope of evidence Respondent intended to present at the administrative hearing. Even if Respondent had been required to file an administrative complaint in this case, due process would not require the complaint to satisfy the technical niceties of a legal pleading. 5/ Due process requires a specific accusation in the charging document or a procedure for disclosure, but not both. 6/ Respondent's letters of denial specifically charged that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Petitioner's counsel had adequate time from January 13, 1997, through April 28, 1997, to seek disclosure of the nature and scope of the evidence Respondent intended to adduce at the hearing. Petitioner's counsel declined to avail himself of the benefit of any procedure for disclosure. Petitioner's counsel had notice that Respondent intended to call the undercover investigating officers as witnesses in the administrative hearing. Neither Petitioner's arrest nor her plea were disputed issues of fact. The testimony of the undercover investigators was unnecessary to prove the criminal arrest and plea. It was reasonable to conclude that the undercover investigators were going to testify to facts other than Petitioner's ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". The notice to Petitioner's counsel was timely. On April 11, 1997, Respondent served Petitioner's counsel with a Notice of Filing Discovery. The notice listed the two undercover investigators as Respondent's only witnesses. On April 15, 1997, Petitioner's counsel signed the Prehearing Stipulation with a list of Respondent's witnesses attached as Exhibit 1. The Prehearing Stipulation identified the undercover investigators as Respondent's only witnesses. Petitioner's counsel had approximately 17 days from April 11, 1997, until the hearing on April 28, 1997, to inquire into the scope of the witnesses' testimony and to either prepare his case accordingly or to request a continuance to allow him time to do so. Petitioner's counsel chose not to avail himself of that opportunity prior to the hearing. There was no material error in procedure that impaired the correctness of Respondent's action. Respondent followed prescribed procedure. 7/ Good Moral Character In support of the allegation that Petitioner lacked good moral character, Respondent submitted evidence of an investigation and arrest that took place in November, 1995. On November 7, 1995, two undercover investigators for the Sheriff's Office began an investigation of Seminole Antiques. They were supported by four more officers at remote locations who monitored the conversations of the two undercover investigators. One or both of the undercover investigators visited Seminole Antiques on November 7, 14, 17, 20, 22, and 28. The investigation concluded on November 28, 1995, when Sheriff's deputies arrested Petitioner and her husband. The evidence submitted by Respondent consisted of the testimony of two undercover investigators, their arrest reports, tapes of visits they made to Seminole Antiques on November 14 and 17, 1995, transcripts of those two tapes, and transcripts of the tapes of the other visits. The evidence also included other miscellaneous documents. The tapes and transcripts purport to evidence conversations between the investigators, Petitioner's husband, and Petitioner. The two tapes submitted by Respondent are copies of the original tapes made by Sheriff's office personnel who monitored the conversations of the undercover investigators from outside Seminole Antiques. The original tapes were destroyed by the Sheriff's Office in accordance with department policy for cases in which a nolo contendere plea is entered. One of the undercover investigators made copies of the original tapes for November 14 and 17, 1997. Both copies are in evidence in this proceeding, without objection. Transcripts exist for the original tapes for each of the six visits that the undercover investigators made to Seminole Antiques. None of the transcripts are verbatim transcriptions. Each transcript is a summary prepared by one or the other of the two undercover investigators. Each summary contains only that portion of the recorded conversations which, in the opinion of the author of the transcript, are inculpatory. 8/ Respondent did not provide Petitioner with the notice of intent to use summaries that is required in Section 90.956. Similarly, Respondent did not make available to Petitioner the data from which the summaries were prepared because the data had been destroyed by the Sheriff's Office. The undercover investigators did not conduct business transactions every time they visited Seminole Antiques. On each occasion that the undercover investigators did conduct business, they used stolen property that the Sheriff's Office had recovered, inventoried in its log books, and stored. For the initial transaction conducted on November 7, 1995, the undercover investigators used two rings. One ring was a 14 karat gold ring with an onyx stone. The investigators placed a wholesale value of approximately $30 on the ring. The other ring was a gold ring with four diamond chips. The investigators placed a wholesale value of $35 on the second ring. On November 7, 1995, the undercover investigators pawned the two rings to Petitioner for $30. 9/ Petitioner completed the required paperwork evidencing the transaction. One of the undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques on November 14, 1995. He carried a bag containing two gold rings, two gold bracelets, and a gold necklace. One ring was a 10 karat gold ring with one sapphire stone flanked by two small diamond chips. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $40. The other ring was a 14 karat gold ring. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $39. One bracelet was a seven inch, 14 karat, bracelet. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $27. The other bracelet was also a seven inch, 14 karat, bracelet. The investigator estimated its retail value at $54. The necklace was an 18 inch, 14 karat, necklace. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $108. When the undercover investigator presented the bag of items to Petitioner, she and her husband were standing behind the counter at Seminole Antiques. Petitioner opened the bag and appraised the items inside while the undercover investigator conducted simultaneous conversations with Petitioner and her husband. Petitioner did not agree with the value placed on the goods by the undercover investigator. Petitioner gave the undercover investigator $30 for all of the items. She completed the required forms. The investigator terminated the transaction and returned to the Sheriff's Office. The same undercover investigator returned to Seminole Antiques on November 17, 1995. He did not conduct a transaction. He described to Petitioner and her husband a fictitious transaction on the previous day in which the investigator said he sold a gold Rolex watch to a competing pawn shop for $600. Petitioner was upset and told the investigator she would have given him more money. The investigator stated that Seminole Antiques was closed and that he needed the money. On November 20, 1995, both investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with unopened video cassettes. The investigators placed an aggregate value on the cassettes of $340. The investigators conducted a transaction with Petitioner's husband and agreed to take $60 for the cassettes. Petitioner paid the investigators $60 and completed the required forms. The investigators returned to the Sheriff's Office. On November 22, 1995, the two undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with a video cassette recorder and remote control. They valued the two items at $149. The investigators conducted a transaction with Petitioner's husband and agreed to $55 for both items. Petitioner paid the investigators $55 and added the VCR to the pawn ticket for the previous transaction. On November 28, 1995, the two undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with two Rolex watches. One watch was a stainless and gold watch. The other was an 18 karat gold watch with a 14 karat gold band. The undercover investigators valued each watch, respectively, at $2,995 and $6,995. The investigators first offered to sell the watches to Petitioner for $300 each. The investigators conducted the balance of the transaction with Petitioner's husband. The investigators agreed to accept $600 for the watches. Law enforcement officers from the Sheriff's Office arrested Petitioner and her husband. They took Petitioner and her husband to the Sheriff's Office and questioned them. Petitioner stated that she did not know any of the items had been stolen. She said that she was going to do the paper work on the watches and then resell them in the store. Petitioner did not have actual knowledge that the items she purchased were stolen. The investigators never represented to Petitioner that the items were stolen. As one of the investigators explained during his testimony: . . . at some time . . . it has to be represented as stolen. And that's hard to do sometimes because a lot of stores and pawn shops are fully aware of the law, and once you say something is stolen, they'll throw you right on out. * * * I did not say stolen. Transcript ("TR") at 40, 68. Respondent failed to show that Petitioner should have known that the items were stolen. Much of the evidence submitted by Respondent consisted of opinion testimony by the undercover investigators and hearsay statements by Petitioner's husband. The investigators opined that Petitioner paid them amounts far below the fair market value of the property. When asked how he determined the fair market value for each item, one investigator testified: . . . we've been taught by jewelers how to appraise and pawn brokers, and we give, at the Sheriff's Office, an incredibly low retail value. Wholesale and retail very low so that this way there's never no error. TR at 41. The investigators are not qualified experts in appraising property as diverse as jewelry, video equipment, VCRs, and watches. Respondent offered evidence that the investigators were dressed to portray someone who, in the opinion of the investigators, Petitioner should have known was of bad character. When questioned on this issue, one investigator testified: I had a goatee. I would wear a hat that I've got that's a very scrubby hat. I've got several of them that are scrubby. Holes in my pants. . . . I cut my grass. I don't shower. I get real sweaty. You can see the sweat stain on my shirt, and I walk in looking crummy. Pretty crummy. . . [t]o portray someone of bad character. TR at 42. Respondent offered evidence that the investigators conducted themselves in a manner which, in the opinion of the investigators, Petitioner should have known was typical of bad guys. When questioned on this issue, one investigator testified: I pulled the second [ring out of my pocket], which is typical of bad guys because they want to see how much money they can get for an item. TR at 47. The transactions conducted with Petitioner on November 7 and 14, 1997, do not show that Petitioner should have known she was dealing in stolen property. The investigators did not conduct a transaction on November 17. The transactions of November 20, 22, and 28, 1997, were conducted primarily with Petitioner's husband. Respondent relied on hearsay statements allegedly made by Petitioner's husband in the same room with Petitioner. Those statements are not competent and substantial evidence that Petitioner should have known she was dealing in stolen property. Petitioner maintained adequate records. The investigator who was at Seminole Antiques on each occasion originally testified that Petitioner did not complete the required records. He later testified that Petitioner completed the required paperwork after every transaction but did not give the investigator a copy of the paperwork.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for a pawnbroker license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1997.

Florida Laws (5) 120.68538.09539.001812.01990.956
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DOUGLAS MICHAEL BURLESON vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 83-002914 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002914 Latest Update: Dec. 08, 1983

Findings Of Fact According to petitioner's uncontroverted testimony, he signed the notarized application for licensure as a real estate salesman, dated March 30, 1983, and gave the otherwise blank form, along with a separate piece of paper on which he had written answers to questions appearing on the form, to an employee of a real estate school he attended. The form was to be completed and mailed without his seeing it again; this was customary, he explained. On the separate piece of paper, he wrote answers to every question but number six, which asks: Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned, or paroled? Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. An anonymous typist supplied the word "no," and typed "NA" in the blank following the instructions, "If yes, state details including the outcome in full." Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. In fact, petitioner was arrested on January 29, 1971, and subsequently convicted for failure to appear in court on traffic charges in Pensacola. On October 28, 1976, petitioner was arrested on bad check charges. He pleaded guilty and was convicted on two counts on November 12, 1976. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. On January 10, 1977, petitioner was convicted of seven additional counts of "worthless checks." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Later the same month, also in Pensacola, he was adjudicated guilty of another such offense. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Petitioner's next brush with the law was his apprehension and, in Pensacola, on May 11, 1978, conviction for indecent exposure. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. On October 10, 1978, petitioner failed to appear for a trial scheduled on still another bad check charge. As a result, he was adjudicated guilty of contempt of the County Court of Escambia County. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. At the hearing in the present proceedings, he first testified that he had not been adjudicated guilty of this charge, then said that this conviction was reversed on appeal. In giving this second version of events, petitioner recounted a highly improbable appellate hearing. He described in detail being present at oral argument on the appeal before a panel of three circuit judges, whom he named, and reported that his lawyer argued for reversal against the county judge who appeared in person to argue for affirmance of the contempt conviction. On April 9, 1979, petitioner was convicted of five counts of making and utilizing forged instruments. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. These instruments purported to be checks drawn on his grandmother's account. Probation imposed on account of earlier charges was revoked at the same time. In addition, he was adjudicated guilty of writing numerous bad checks. Respondent's Exhibit 9. On this as on other occasions, he spent time in jail. He never spent more than four months in jail at one stretch, however. He was convicted in Pensacola on May 20, 1981, of writing two more checks against insufficient funds, each for $500. Petitioner claimed to be current on his child support payments and testified that he thinks he is honest and honorable. Before counsel for respondent produced the court records at hearing, petitioner, while under oath, misrepresented his criminal record in various respects. Petitioner's civil rights, except for the right to bear arms, were restored administratively on September 23, 1982. The second time he applied for licensure as a real estate salesman, petitioner answered question six more candidly. Both parties made posthearing submissions. Proposed findings of fact have been considered and adopted, in substance, for the most part. Proposed fact findings have been rejected where unsupported by the evidence, immaterial, subordinate or cumulative.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Room 212, 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Douglas Michael Burleson Post Office Box 18045 Pensacola, Florida 32523 Randy Schwartz Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 212 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.60475.17475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs JOSEPH C. MCAULIFFE, JR., 94-003732 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 08, 1994 Number: 94-003732 Latest Update: Feb. 13, 1995

The Issue Whether the Respondent's Florida real estate license should be disciplined because the Respondent was guilty of false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondent is guilty of operating Bellwether Developments, Inc. as a broker, without holding a valid license as a broker in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondent is guilty of failure to account or deliver a share of a commission in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. The Respondent, Joseph C. McAuliffe, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He was issued license number 0260690 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license was issued as a broker percentBellwether Realty, 526-A Emmett Street, Kissimmee, Florida 34741. On January 9, 1990, and August 9, 1990, Respondent in his own capacity and as the chairman and secretary of Bellwether Development, Inc. (not licensed) entered into written contracts to sell four lots to Jerry P. and Kimberly M. Wray. Pursuant to addendum II of the contracts and the agreement dated January 25, 1990, the Respondent agreed to resell the lots within one year at minimum prices of $16,000; provide the buyers with reimbursement for the total closing cost of $689.08 on three lots; and reimburse the buyers for the monthly payments and any other ordinary and necessary expenses related to the lots. Additionally, if no sale were made by Bellwether, the Respondents agreed to buy back the lots and to provide the buyers a 25 percent return on their investment. The Respondent breached the contracts and the January 25, 1990 agreement by failing to sell the lots or repurchase the lots in accordance with the written agreement. Afterward the buyers lost title to the lots as a result of actions in foreclosure. On February 26, 1992, the buyers filed a civil complaint against the Respondent and Bellwether Development, Inc. based, inter alia, on breach of contract, fraud, constructive fraud, and misrepresentation. On July 14, 1993, the Circuit Court in St. Lucie County entered a judgment against the Respondent individually and as an officer of Bellwether Development, Inc. for damages of $67,542.70. The Respondent has failed to satisfy the $67,542.70 judgment or to otherwise pay the money claimed by the buyers, and said debt remains outstanding. Beginning October, 1987 through January, 1989, the Respondent registered Bellwether Realty, Inc., Bellwether Management, Inc. and Bellwether Development, Inc. with the Secretary of State. On October 14, 1987, and on January 18, 1989, Respondent registered Bellwether Realty, Inc. and Bellwether Management, Inc. with the Petitioner. According to Petitioner's official records Respondent maintained a licensed office located at 526A Emmett Street, Kissimmee, F lorida for Bellwether Realty, Inc. and a licensed office located at 200 Albany Avenue, Stuart, Florida for Bellwether Management, Inc. On or about October 9, 1992, the Secretary of State involuntarily dissolved Bellwether Realty, Inc. and Bellwether Development, Inc. for failure to file an annual report. The Respondent was an officer of both corporations. The Respondent operated Bellwether Development, Inc. as a brokerage without a valid license. In late 1990, Annkarol Cemer was employed through Bellwether Realty, Inc. to solicit and negotiate sales contracts. On August 31, 1990, the Respondent, in dissolving that relationship, agreed to pay Annkarol Cemer $4,647.50 in real estate sales commission and $1,000 vacation pay by December 31, 1990. After December 31, 1990, Annkarol Cemer demanded the payment of the $4,647.50 in commissions owed and $1,000 in vacation pay. Respondent received and kept those commissions and refused to share the commission with Cemer. On February 25, 1993, Cemer obtained a Final Judgment in the County Court of St. Lucie County, Florida in the amount of $6,422.60 against Respondent individually and Bellwether. Said judgment remains outstanding.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the evidence of the record, including the contents of the several exhibits received into evidence, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of violating the aforementioned statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that his real estate license be suspended for two years. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent McAuliffe be fined $1,000.00, payable within 30 days of the entry of a final order, and such other and further conditions as the Commission deems just and reasonable. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-17. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Joseph C. McAuliffe, Jr. 3846 S.W. Savoy Drive Palm City, Florida 33990 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0702

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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MARINA PADRO CINTRON vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 92-007368 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 10, 1992 Number: 92-007368 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1993

The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at final hearing was whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be approved.

Findings Of Fact In October 1992, Petitioner filed an application with Respondent for licensure as a real estate salesperson, together with the required fee. The application asked several questions, including in pertinent part: Question 9: if Petitioner had been "convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld," and Question 13: if Petitioner had had a license to practice any regulated profession revoked upon grounds of fraudulent or dishonest dealing or violations of law. Petitioner responded in the affirmative to both questions and provided written documentation and statements regarding the questions. Petitioner attached to her October 1992 application for licensure various letters to support her application. The letters included one from her probation officer indicating her compliance with her probation; from the local board of realtors indicating that no complaints had been registered against Petitioner during her membership with them, which was from 1979 to 1982 and 1990 to 1992; and from her present employer who is a licensed real estate agent and has employed Petitioner since 1989. On October 21, 1992, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. The denial was based upon her response to questions 9 and 13 on the application, specifically her 1991 conviction and sentence and the 1992 revocation of her real estate salesperson license. On May 29, 1991, Petitioner plead nolo contendere to three felony counts of grand theft in the third degree. She was placed on probation for five years with special conditions, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. The special conditions of Petitioner's probation were that she would make restitution in the amount of $19,864.52, that she would perform 500 hours of community service, that she would fully cooperate with the State Attorney's Office in the investigation of the criminal activity in which she was involved, and that the probation may be terminated, upon motion, after 30 months. The theft involved a scheme devised by Petitioner's "boss" to obtain funds, beyond entitlement, from the City of Miami. Petitioner was employed as a bookkeeper by an elderly center from 1986 to 1988, which provided transportation, lunches and recreational activities for senior citizens. The center received funds from the City of Miami to operate by being reimbursed for monies paid to vendors. From 1986 to 1988, the center was performing poorly economically. In order to obtain additional monies, the invoices of vendors who did business with the center were inflated or increased and submitted by the center to the City of Miami for reimbursement. As bookkeeper, Petitioner was instrumental in the scheme. The difference between the actual cost and the inflated cost was retained by Petitioner and her boss and distributed at the end of the year to the center's employees, including Petitioner and her boss. Petitioner and her boss controlled the illegally obtained funds. At the end of the center's budget year, which was June 30th of each year, the center was withholding back payments to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), using the funds held to pay salaries. As a result, a debt to IRS was created, and when IRS attempted to collect on the debt in 1988, the scheme was discovered and stopped. Petitioner cooperated fully with the State Attorney's Office. At the time of her conviction, Petitioner was licensed by Respondent as a real estate salesperson. Less than a month after her plea of nolo contendere to the grand theft charge and sentence, in June 1991 Petitioner notified Respondent of her conviction and sentence in accordance with statutory provisions regulating the practice of her profession as a licensed real estate salesperson. No evidence of any other conviction was presented. Subsequently, on or about October 30, 1991, an administrative complaint was filed by Respondent against Petitioner based upon her conviction. Petitioner admitted the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. She saw no need to deny the allegations, since she had reported the incident to Respondent. To Petitioner's shock and surprise, in a Final Order dated February 14, 1992, Petitioner's license as a real estate salesperson was revoked by Respondent. Petitioner had been licensed for 13 years without a complaint being filed against her. On February 13, 1992, Petitioner's probationary terms were modified by the court due to her inability to pay the $19,864.52 restitution. The modification included, among other things, that Petitioner was only required to pay monthly the restitution to individuals, which totaled $1,700, that the restitution to the City of Miami could be paid through community service at $10.00 per hour for each month that Petitioner was unable to pay, and that probation could be terminated early after 30 months if restitution was paid in full. By March 9, 1993, Petitioner had completed 500 hours of community service in accordance with the original court order, and for compliance with the modified court order, she had completed 235 hours of community service and paid $125.00 restitution to individuals. Prior to her conviction and license revocation, in 1989. Petitioner was employed with a real estate broker at Allied Associates of the South, Inc. (Allied Associates), in Miami Springs, Florida, as a sales associate, and continued in that position until sometime in 1991 when, due to economic constraints on Allied Associates, the broker cut her staff, choosing a more experienced salesperson over Petitioner. During her employment as a sales associate, no complaints were received by Allied Associates against Petitioner, and no money which was entrusted to her was reported missing. Allied Associates received many complimentary remarks from clients and real estate brokers alike. Subsequently, in November 1991, the broker re-employed Petitioner as a sales manager at Allied Associates. Petitioner informed the broker of her conviction and the circumstances of her conviction. The broker has allowed Petitioner to manage the financial books of the business with no problems. And Respondent has audited Allied Associates' financial books without citing a problem. Furthermore, Petitioner has handled escrow deposits and cash without any problems. Since October 1992, Petitioner has been working with Allied Associates as a sales manager on a part-time basis due to financial constraints experienced by Allied Associates. She has continued to handle escrow deposits and cash without any problems. Moreover, the broker/owner of Allied Associates has no hesitation in putting Petitioner in a position of trust. Further, Petitioner has assisted in the guidance of Allied Associates' sales associates.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order allowing Petitioner to take the real estate salesperson's examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of October 1993. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-7368 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact consists of one paragraph with several sentences. 1. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 2, 4, 5, and 7-14; but rejected, regarding the second sentence, as unnecessary to the determination of the issues of this case and rejected, regarding the sixth sentence, as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 1. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 10. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 10. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 11. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9; but rejected, regarding notice and failure of Petitioner to appear at the informal hearing, as unnecessary to the determination of the issues of this case. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 5; but rejected, regarding the first sentence, as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of testimony and rejected, regarding the last sentence which indicates that only Petitioner received and used the monies, as contrary to the evidence present. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 8. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 12-14. Note: Respondent proposed finding of fact is very close to constituting recitation of testimony. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 13. Note: Respondent proposed finding of fact is very close to and constituting recitation of testimony. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Marina P. Cintron 151 Fairway Drive #2301 Miami Springs, Florida 33166 Manuel E. Oliver Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 107 South Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.01475.17475.25
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JAMES L. CRAIG, JR. vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 90-007184 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 13, 1990 Number: 90-007184 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 1991

Findings Of Fact On or about June 11, 1990, the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman was received by the Respondent. In response to question 7 on the application, the Petitioner stated that he had been convicted of passing worthless checks in Indiana in 1972 (2 times), 1975, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987 (3 times), and 1988. Criminal history records obtained from the F.B.I confirm the Petitioner's admission, with the exception of any charge in 1981, which was dismissed by the State of Indiana. Based upon the information reflected in response to question 7 on his application, the Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure at its meeting on August 22, 1990, and thereafter, the Petitioner timely sought review of this denial. At hearing, the Petitioner admitted that he had been convicted of repeatedly passing worthless checks in Indiana from 1972 to 1988. He urged, however, that these incidents resulted from difficulties he was having in his personal business, that he had openly revealed these matters on his application, and he had not had any similar occurrences since he moved to Florida in approximately March, 1990. Therefore, it is the Petitioner's position that these matters should not disqualify him for licensure. The Petitioner has not sought expungement of these convictions in Indiana. The Petitioner was licensed in the State of Indiana as a real estate saleman on or about February 15, 1989, and there is no evidence in the record of any license disciplinary action involving the Petitioner in Indiana during the approximately 12 months he resided in Indiana following his licensure. The Petitioner did not offer competent substantial evidence which would establish his honesty, trustworthiness and good character, particularly in view of his admitted history of repeatedly passing worthless checks. The Petitioner did not show that he has established any ties in the community, or that he has any regular means of employment. He has recently moved from south Florida to Bronson, Florida, and testified, without any specific detail, that he is engaged in some form of general construction. All purported character references are in the form of unsworn letters, which cannot be considered since they clearly constitute unsupported hearsay. There is no indication from the Petitioner's testimony at hearing that he realizes the seriousness of his offenses, and the direct impact which these offenses have on his qualification to be licensed as a real estate salesman in Florida. Based upon the foregoing, it is found that the Respondent properly determined that the Petitioner is not qualified to be licensed as a real estate saleman in the State of Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the determination that he is not qualified for licensure as a real estate salesman. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of March 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-7184 The Petitioner submitted a narrative letter summarizing the evidence presented at hearing. Specific rulings cannot be made to the unnumbered paragraphs contained in his letter since they mix proposed facts with proposed conclusions of law, but Petitioner's letter has been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Findings 3 and 5. Adopted in Finding 4, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James L. Craig, Jr. R.R.-1, Box 1585 Bronson, FL 32621 Manuel Oliver, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street Suite 107-South Orlando, FL 32801 Jack McRay, Esquire Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.17475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs FRANK LA ROCCA, 89-005796 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 25, 1989 Number: 89-005796 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Frank LaRocca, Respondent, was the holder of Real Estate Broker License Nos. 0050488, 0236407 and 0170796 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. On or about July 12, 1989, the Respondent, in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, upon a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury, was found guilty of five counts of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a felony. On or about July 12, 1989, Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for four years. On or about August 1, 1989, the United States District Court Judge ordered a stay of the judgment against Respondent pending completion of Respondent's appeal. Frank LaRocca was a vice-president of the Central Bank in Tampa, Florida, when he retired in May 1984 after working at this bank for 31 years. During this period, he enjoyed a good reputation in the community. Upon his retirement from the bank, he became an active real estate broker principally investing in real estate. The transactions which formed the bases for his conviction in federal court involved bank loans on condominiums he and three other partners purchased. These bank loans had all been repaid at the time of Respondent's trial but one, which had been refinanced by the bank.

Recommendation Taking all these factors into consideration, it is recommended that the licenses of Frank LaRocca as a real estate broker be revoked, but the revocation be stayed pending completion of his appeal to the court of appeals or two years whichever first occurs. At that time, depending upon the action of the court of appeals, his license be revoked or these proceedings dismissed. ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Kenneth E. Easley Division of Real Estate General Counsel 400 W. Robinson Street Department of Professional Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Frank LaRocca Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 4814 River Boulevard Tampa, FL 33603 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs RICHARD G. CASH, 99-002034 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Apr. 30, 1999 Number: 99-002034 Latest Update: Dec. 13, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes (1993), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant hereto. Respondent, Richard G. Cash (Cash), has been a licensed Florida real estate broker since 1993. His broker's license number is BK-0267856. Prior to becoming a broker, Cash had been a licensed real estate salesperson since approximately 1973. On or about July 22, 1994, Michael J. Provost, Assistant State Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, charged Cash, by information, with aggravated battery. The charge arose from a domestic dispute involving Cash and his former wife, when she appeared uninvited at his home late one night under the influence of drugs and demanded to take their four year-old daughter. His former wife was considerably taller and heavier than Cash, and a struggle ensued in which Cash hit her with a stun gun. Both Cash and his former wife received injuries as a result of the altercation. On or about December 15, 1994, in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit for Collier County, Florida, Cash entered a plea of nolo contendere to Count I of the information, which was aggravated battery, a second degree felony. Adjudication was withheld, and Cash was placed on probation for five years. As a condition of probation, Cash was to pay his former wife $4,000 within 30 days of the sentencing and another $4,000 within 12 months of sentencing. In exchange, the former wife agreed to release Cash from any civil liability arising from the incident. Cash paid the $8,000 to his former wife. Cash did not notify the Florida Real Estate Commission that he had pled nolo contendere to a second degree felony. His explanation for failure to do so was that he understood from his attorney that because adjudication had been withheld, he had not been convicted of a crime. On or about January 16, 1998, a warrant was issued for Cash for violation of probation for having shotguns and handguns at his home without first obtaining consent from his probation officer. On April 17, 1998, Cash pled guilty to violation of probation. He was adjudicated guilty of violating probation and aggravated battery, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to three years, seven months, and fifteen days with credit for fifteen days already served.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that Richard G. Cash violated Sections 475.25(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes (1993), and that his broker's license be suspended for one year or until he is released from the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, whichever occurs first. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 29th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert S. Fecker, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard G. Cash Fort Pierce CCC 1203 Bell Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34982

Florida Laws (3) 120.5720.165475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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