Findings Of Fact Six signs were described in a violation notice to Respondent Dandy Signs from Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation dated July 7, 1977. The notice stated the signs were alleged to be in violation of Chapter 479 and rules 14-10.04; rule 14-10.03. By stipulation of the parties the charges on the signs listed were dropped except for the following two signs: a sign located one mile west of U.S. 1, State Road 44, Mile Post 28.25 with copy "Bob's Sandpiper Restaurant" and a sign located at Junction 17-92 Deland, U.S. Highway 17 (Section 35 Mile Post .02) with copy "Buddy Sheats". The foregoing signs have no permit and evidence was presented to show that each sign is nearer to a permitted sign than 500 feet. The Respondent admits that neither sign has been permitted and that both signs violate the spacing requirements. Respondent was given time to submit evidence that the signs had at one time been permitted, but no evidence was submitted to this hearing officer although the hearing was held in excess of three months before this order is being entered.
Recommendation Remove the subject signs and invoke penalty under Section 479.18, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1978. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dan Richardson, Owner Dandy Signs 324 Flagler Street New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32069
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and Respondent shall abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into in this matter. Filed September 11, 2014 2:09 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this \\ day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon Cobur Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 County, Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this } { day of September, 2014. NOTICE OF APPEALRIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: Richard A. Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 34239 filsonlawfirm@gmail.com Damaris E. Reynolds, Esquire Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A430, MS61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 damarisreynolds@flhsmv.gov William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 6 fees. eat
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent's, Jamie Gonzalez, conduct evidenced lack of "good moral character" as alleged in the Administrative Complaint in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent was certified by Petitioner on April 26, 1983, and devoted approximately 20 years to his career in law enforcement. He is 58 years old. He holds Law Enforcement Certificate No. 117162. On the evening of December 13, 2002, Respondent left a social function at approximately 11:00 p.m. and was operating his motor vehicle, a pick-up truck, while his ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcoholic beverages. Respondent acknowledged this at the onset of the final hearing. As he drove in an erratic manner on a rural Seminole County, Florida, roadway, he was observed by seven teenagers traveling together in two motor vehicles. One of these individuals contacted a law enforcement agency using a cellular telephone. The law enforcement agency directed these young people to follow Respondent and to continue reporting his route. Because of Respondent's proximity to the City of Oviedo, Florida, the Oviedo Police Department was alerted that a drunk driver was headed toward their city. Respondent was driving to the location of his business in an industrial park located in Seminole County, Florida, in close proximity to, but not within, the Oviedo city limits. When Respondent arrived at his business, he departed his motor vehicle and entered his business premises. The drivers of the two vehicles which were following Respondent placed their vehicles in position to block Respondent's exit from the industrial park which had only one exit road. After spending approximately ten minutes in his office, Respondent re-entered his vehicle and began to leave the industrial park. As Respondent drove his pick-up out the exit road, he was confronted by two vehicles blocking the exit road and seven individuals standing in close proximity of the blocking vehicles. There is no evidence that, until his exit was blocked, Respondent was aware that he was being followed. At approximately the same time as this confrontation was taking place, Officer Heather Capetillo, Oviedo Police Department, having been alerted and on watch for a drunken driver, approached the scene on the main road and observed all three vehicles. Because the industrial park was not within the City of Oviedo, she turned her vehicle around and parked within the City of Oviedo city limits several hundred feet from the road leading from the main road to the industrial park. It is not apparent that Respondent or the seven young persons were immediately aware of Officer Capetillo's presence. Although testimony regarding the ability of the various participants to observe what was happening varied, the closest street lights were approximately one mile from the industrial park. At least one vehicle had its headlights on; the remainder of the lighting was natural, moonlight. Lighting conditions were not good. Upon observing the blocking vehicles and the dismounted passengers, Respondent stopped his vehicle approximately 50 feet from them, leaving the vehicle's headlights on. Earlier in the evening Respondent had $4,400 in his possession, which he had deposited in a safe in his office. Believing himself to be the potential victim of a robbery, Respondent exited his vehicle carrying his automatic pistol and his cellular telephone. Because he did not want to confront these seven individuals, he retreated up the road toward his office in the industrial park. Observing Respondent with a handgun, the seven young people were understandably alarmed and began shouting and taking cover. Two young women, observing what they believed to be a Florida Highway Patrol vehicle, ran to Officer Capetillo's vehicle, screaming that "the man had a gun" or words to that effect. Acting immediately, Officer Capetillo activated her emergency lights and drove to the scene. When Respondent realized that a law enforcement officer had arrived on the scene, he turned and began walking toward the vehicles, which now included the police cruiser. Upon exiting her vehicle, Officer Capetillo could not initially see Respondent. He was immediately pointed out to her by one of the young people. She observed him near the road behind and to the side of his truck. She was approximately 50 feet from Respondent's vehicle in the immediate proximity of her cruiser and the two blocking vehicles. Officer Capetillo advises that "her adrenaline was flowing." She immediately announced, "Oviedo Police. Where's the gun?" Respondent answered, "Right here." She observed that Respondent had something in both hands. Respondent's right hand then moved up, and Officer Capetillo was able to observe the "barrel of a gun." Respondent was holding the weapon in his right hand at the barrel housing between his thumb and forefinger. She then said, "Put your hands up." Respondent "immediately" (Officer Capetillo's quote) put his hands up. She then said, "Drop it," and "I could hear it clunk." "There was no hesitation"; again, Officer Capetillo's quote. Respondent actually dropped the weapon into the cargo bed of the pick-up. She then said, "Drop the other thing," and she immediately heard a second "clunk." Respondent's hands were now free. Officer Capetillo then instructed Respondent to kneel down, which he did, and he was handcuffed. When Officer Capetillo observed the weapon in Respondent's right hand with the barrel directed at her, she believed herself to be in imminent danger. Fortunately, she used excellent judgment and did not use her firearm.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found not guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002), and that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jamie Gonzalez 1041 Sugarberry Trail Oviedo, Florida 32765 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact On May 23, 2005, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a ready-mix concrete truck driver at Respondent’s Gainesville plant. Petitioner was a good employee. He had a clean driving record, and he did not have any disciplinary problems while working for Respondent. On or about July 27, 2007, Petitioner had a “mild” heart attack and was placed on medical leave by Respondent. In September 2007, Petitioner was released by his personal physician to return to work. Thereafter, Petitioner returned to work for a couple of days and began the process of being recertified for his driving duties. He reviewed safety materials and videos and did “ride- alongs” with other drivers. Before Petitioner could return to his driving duties, he was required by federal Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations to pass a physical and be certified as “physically qualified.” Recertification is required every 24 months and after an injury that impairs the driver’s ability to perform his/her normal duties, such as the heart attack suffered by Petitioner. Petitioner understood that he could not return to his job as a ready-mix concrete truck driver until he passed a physical and received his DOT certification. On September 12, 2007, Respondent sent Petitioner to a DOT-approved physician in Ocala for his physical. Petitioner did not pass the physical. The DOT-approved physician expressed concerns about Petitioner’s cardiac surgery, possible sleep apnea (based upon a questionnaire filled out by Petitioner), and blood pressure issues. There is no credible evidence that Respondent influenced the DOT-approved physician’s decision in any way. Petitioner’s suspicion that Respondent had something to do with the decision is unfounded. Petitioner’s personal physician disagreed with the concerns expressed by the DOT-approved physician, and after Petitioner underwent a series of tests, it was determined that he did not have sleep apnea. On November 9, 2007, Respondent laid Petitioner off based upon his “failure to meet job qualifications.” Petitioner was 48 years old at the time of the lay- off. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s age or medical condition played any role in Respondent’s decision to lay Petitioner off. Rather, the decision was based solely upon Petitioner’s failure to have the DOT certification that was required for him to drive a ready-mix concrete truck. Respondent gave Petitioner ample time to obtain his DOT certification before it laid him off. Approximately two months passed between the time that Petitioner was cleared to return to work by his personal physician and the time that he was laid off for not having his DOT certification. Petitioner did not obtain his DOT certification until some point in January 2008. Petitioner was treated no differently by Respondent than other drivers -- both older and younger than Petitioner -- who lost their DOT certification. Like Petitioner, those drivers were fired because they did not meet the applicable job qualifications. Petitioner testified that he was told that he would be rehired when he got his DOT certification. This testimony is corroborated by the comment on the Employee Separation Notice for Petitioner, which stated “Jesse has been unable to get his DOT card/when he does he will be rehired.” By the time Petitioner obtained his DOT certification in January 2008, Respondent’s business had declined due to the slow-down in the economy and the building industry, and it did not have any work for Petitioner. Respondent laid off three drivers at its Gainesville plant in December 2007, and it laid off an additional five drivers at the plant in February 2008 because of the decline in its business. Six of the eight drivers who were laid-off were younger than Petitioner. After these lay-offs, there were still three drivers employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who had less seniority than Petitioner, but in order to rehire Petitioner, Respondent would have had to fire one of those drivers. There were also a number of drivers still employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who were older and had more seniority than Petitioner. Respondent’s decision not to fire one of the other drivers in order to re-hire Petitioner was reasonable under the circumstances. And, more importantly, there is no credible evidence that this decision was motivated in any way by Petitioner’s age or a perceived disability based upon his heart attack. Respondent has not hired any drivers at its Gainesville plant since the lay-offs described above. Petitioner has not worked since he was laid off by Respondent. He testified that he has tried to find another truck-driving job, but that like Respondent, most companies are not hiring drivers because of the slow-down in the economy and the building industry. Petitioner would likely still be employed by Respondent if he had obtained his DOT certification before Respondent started laying off drivers because Petitioner was a good employee with more seniority than all but one of the drivers who were laid off in December 2007 and February 2008. Petitioner believes that Respondent could have put him to work in the warehouse or on the yard until he obtained his DOT certification and could return to driving duties. However, the record does not reflect whether any positions were available in the warehouse or on the yard or whether Petitioner was qualified for those positions. Petitioner testified that he was told by other employees that they overheard Respondent’s managers stating that they did not intend to return Petitioner to his driving duties because his heart attack made him a “high risk driver.” No evidence was presented to corroborate this hearsay-based testimony. Petitioner also testified that a supervisor made a critical comment to him regarding his use of a cane immediately after he returned to work. The supervisor denied making the comment, and even if the comment was made, there is no credible evidence that it was anything more than an isolated comment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The signs located one mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 and one-half mile west of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 and bearing copy advertising Best Western Tivoli Inn are owned by Mr. Fleming. These signs are located within 15 feet of the right-of-way of a federal interstate highway outside an incorporated municipality or town. The copy of these signs is visible from the interstate highway. The signs do not have permits issued by the Department of Transportation attached to them.
Recommendation Based on the violation of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation direct the owner to remove said signs. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 746 Niceville, Florida 32570 Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 Frank King, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN RE: NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BEST WESTERN TIVOLI INN, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-2180T FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner L. H. Turner is a Highway Patrol Officer II with the Florida Highway Patrol, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, having been employed since 1977. By memorandum dated August 10, 1982, to Troop Commanders and Florida Highway Patrol Staff, the Acting Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, Roger C. Collar, gave the following instructions: Effective August 20, 1982, all off-duty employment, including self-employment, shall be reported by all uniformed personnel on a weekly basis to coincide with the weekly report of daily activity. The first reporting period will be August 20-26, 1982, and the report shall be submitted each week along with the trooper's weekly report of daily activity. The attached sample reporting form will be used until permanent forms are developed. The sample reporting form attached to the memorandum required personnel to list the starting and ending time of their "off-duty employment" on a daily basis, the number of hours worked and the Florida Highway Patrol vehicle miles. At the bottom of the form is a signature line, above which is written I certify this is an accurate report of all off-duty employment (including self- employment) worked during the reporting period. The form also requires the signature of the "immediate supervisor" after the word "reviewed." The instructions contained in this August 10, 1982 memorandum are intended to apply to all uniform members of the Florida Highway Patrol. Failure to file a weekly report of off-duty employment or the filing of an inaccurate report would subject the employee to discipline for insubordination. Article XIII of the current collective bargaining agreement between the State of Florida and the Florida Police Benevolent Association pertains to employment outside State government. The Agreement requires advance approval for out- side employment, and provides that approval will not be unreasonably withheld as long as such employment does not conflict with the employee's State employment or with the agency's procedures limiting outside employment. With regard to off-duty police employment, Article XIII provides that approval will be granted if it does not constitute a conflict of interest, does not interfere with the employee's primary duties, is within the employee's jurisdiction and scope of employment, and as long as all mileage placed on a State automobile is paid for by the employee at the statutory mileage rate. General Order Number 19, adopted by reference in Rule 15B-11.03, Florida Administrative Code, contains provisions relating to prohibited acts which may constitute a conflict of interest, including, in certain instances, the acceptance of other employment or other business or professional activity. Paragraph 15 of General Order Number 19 requires a written request and authorization before an employee may accept "part-time employment outside of this Department." The request for outside part-time employment must include a statement of the nature of duties, the approximate hours of duty contemplated and the name and address of the firm. Guidelines for part-time employment are listed. Paragraph 15(b) sets forth the procedures for approval of requests to be employed or compensated by more than one State agency or to hold employment during the normal working hours for which the employee is being compensated by the Department. Paragraph 15(c) contains guidelines for "off-duty police details." Among such guidelines is that an employee may only engage in up to twenty (20) hours per week of such off-duty police details, unless the employee is on annual leave for the week in question or receives approval for work in excess of twenty (20) hours 4 per week. There are no limitations on the hours per week which an employee may devote to employment other than "off-duty police details."
Findings Of Fact The parties to this proceeding stipulated to the existence of three cases presently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings in which the Department of Transportation seeks to enforce the challenged rules against Petitioner. As such, the Department of Transportation has conceded that Petitioner herein is "substantially affected" so as to clothe it with standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. On January 27, 1972, the Governor of the State of Florida entered into an agreement with the United States of America, represented by the United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration. That agreement contained certain restrictions on outdoor advertising signs near controlled interchanges, and is now commonly referred to as the "Interchange Rule." That rule is now contained in Rule 14-10.09(2), Florida Administrative Code.' The agreement contained in Rule 14-10.09(2), Florida Administrative Code, was ratified by the Florida Senate in Concurrent Resolution No. 657.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Clifford McCullough (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Nesco Resources (Respondent) in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2015)1/.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a company that refers pre-screened job candidates to employers upon request by an employer seeking to fill a specific position. The Petitioner is an African-American male, born in 1959, who sought employment through the Respondent. The Respondent does not make the hiring decision. The actual decision is made by the employer requesting referrals from the Respondent. The Respondent is compensated by the employer if and when the employer hires an applicant referred by the Respondent. On occasion, the Respondent publishes advertisements seeking applications to fill specific positions, such as “forklift drivers.” The fact that the Respondent seeks applications for specific positions does not mean that an employer has contacted the Respondent seeking referrals for such positions. The advertisements are used by the Respondent to create an inventory of applicants who can be referred to employers. On December 20, 2013, the Petitioner submitted a job application to the Respondent seeking a “forklift driver” position. At that time, the Petitioner indicated to the Respondent that he was available to perform “warehouse, packing, production, shipping and receiving tasks.” Several weeks prior to the Petitioner’s application, the Respondent had referred job candidates to an employer seeking to fill an available forklift driver position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African-American male born in 1961 who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. As of December 20, 2013, the Respondent had no pending employer requests seeking referrals to fill forklift driver positions. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent had any employer requests at that time which were consistent with the Petitioner’s skills. The Respondent’s general practice when contacted by a prospective employer is to recommend applicants who have maintained ongoing contact with the Respondent’s staff after the submission of an application. There was minimal contact between the Petitioner and the Respondent after the Petitioner submitted his application in December 2013. The Respondent presumes that some people who submit applications subsequently relocate or obtain employment elsewhere. Accordingly, the Respondent requires that previous applicants periodically submit new employment applications so that the Respondent’s inventory includes only active job seekers. On April 8, 2014, the Petitioner submitted another application to the Respondent. Also in April 2014, an employer contacted the Respondent to obtain referrals to fill another forklift driving position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African- American male born in 1964, who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. Prior to his referral for the forklift driver position, the successful applicant routinely contacted the Respondent’s staff, in person and by telephone, regarding available employment opportunities. The evidence fails to establish whether the Respondent was included within the applicants who were referred to the requesting employer. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s referral process reflected factors related to any applicant’s race, color, sex, or age. The Petitioner has also asserted that his application should have been referred to an employer who, on one occasion, was seeking to fill an available cleaning position. The position was a part-time job paying an hourly wage of $10. The Petitioner had not submitted an application for such a position. Nothing in the information provided by the Petitioner to the Respondent indicated that the Petitioner was interested in such employment. Through the Respondent’s referrals, the employer filled the cleaning position by hiring an African-American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2016.
