Findings Of Fact The following are the facts to which the parties have stipulated: Respondent is the holder of a pound net registration issued on November 30, 1983, by Dennis E. Holcomb, Director, Division of Fisheries, for the Executive Director of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (Commission). The registration authorizes the Respondent to operate pound nets for Commercial purposes on certain areas of the St. Johns River, subject to law and Commission rules. On April 30, 1986, Petitioner pled guilty to illegal fishing with pound nets and was adjudged guilty and fined by the County Court of Putnam County, Florida. As a result of this Conviction, Respondent's pound net registration was temporarily revoked for a period of six (6) months dating from June 23, 1986 until December 23, 1986. On October 15, 1986, during the afore-mentioned revocation period, Respondent pled guilty to illegal fishing with unpermitted pound nets, and was adjudged guilty and fined by the County Court of Putnam County, Florida. Based on the Respondent's conviction of illegal fishing with pound nets during the revocation period, the Commission found just cause to permanently revoke Respondent's pound net registration and filed an Administrative Complaint on March 30, 1987 against Respondent to effectuate that revocation. Based on Respondent's unrebutted testimony which I found to be credible, the following relevant facts are found: That in addition to the fine imposed on the Respondent by the County Court of Putnam County, Florida on October 15, 1986, for illegal fishing, the Commission seized and Confiscated two (2) of Respondent's pound nets worth approximately $6,000.00. Respondent, subsequent to October 15, 1986, continues to fish pound nets as the designee of other parties holding pound net registrations, without incident and in compliance with the law and Commission rules. The Respondent is substantially dependent upon pound net fishing for his livelihood and has been prohibited from fishing his pound nets since June 23, 1986. Respondent's pound net registration was not reinstated at the end of the revocation period ending on December 23, 1986.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the conduct and demeanor of Use witness, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order temporarily revoking Respondent's pound net registration for a period of twelve (12) months beginning December 23, 1986. Respectfully submitted and entered this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987.
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner, Kelly Boat Service, Inc.'s and Cape Kennedy Charter Boats, et al's activities fall within the admissions tax liability imposed by Section 212.04, F.S. (1973). Based upon the pleadings filed herein, the documentary evidence introduced during the course of the hearing, the other evidence of record including the arguments of counsel, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact In the instant matter, the Department of Revenue issued two sales tax assessments. The first such assessment is against Cape Kennedy Charter Boats and covers the audit period of March 1, 1973, through February 29, 1976. The Department also assessed Kelly Boat Service, Inc., in a series of three separate assessments covering the audit periods August 1, 1970, through January 31, 1976. Based on such assessments, a tax liability resulted in the amount of $25,072.37. Of this amount, $10,000 was paid by the tax payer on July 21, 1976 (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The remaining tax liability plus interest which has accrued from July 21, 1976, is outstanding and continues to accrue. During the course of the hearing, the parties agreed that the specific liabilities as set forth in the assessment were not at issue. Rather, Petitioner solely challenged the legal authority of the Department of Revenue to impose the assessments in question. The Petitioners are owners and operators of a fleet of deep sea fishing boats in and around Destin, Florida, which, for a fee, carry individual fishermen to certain fishing banks which lie beyond the three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico. While there, the Petitioners sell food and drinks to the fishermen and rent them fishing equipment. The fishing is done at the snapper banks in the Gulf of Mexico or in the vicinity of those banks. The fishing equipment and tackle used on these trips are mainly used beyond the three-league limit in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico; and most, if not all, of the food and drinks sold at the galley of the refreshment stand on the boat was outside the three-league limit of the State of Florida. In an earlier summary final judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeal declared, as authorized by Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, 1973, the liability of Kelly Boat Services, Inc., for payment of the admissions tax by Section 212.04, F.S., 1973, from which the Department of Revenue filed an appeal. In that decision, the Court held that Kelly, whose boats take on passengers at Destin for fishing in the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial limits of Florida, is taxable at the statutory rate on the admission fare charged at the dock, but that the State is foreclosed from assessing Kelly for taxes that should have been paid between August, 1970, and the first day of August, 1973, the period in which the Department demanded the production of Kelly's records for audit. Section 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. Kelly cross-appealed and urged that its activities were not subject to the tax, citing Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla.App. 1st 1968). In its decision, the First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly B Boat Service, Inc., 324 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1976), indicated that the trial court was correct in its reading of its decision in Dept. of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corp., 257 So.2d 56 (Fla.App 1st 1972), Cert. Denied, 262 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1972), Cert. Dismissed, 287 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1974), and in hold that Kelly's commercial activities, as evidenced by the record, render it liable to assessment for the admissions tax. The Court noted that the trial court was incorrect, however, in foreclosing the Department of Revenue from making the assessment for the full three-year period authorized by Subsection 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. The decision goes on to read that the State is not foreclosed by reason of the Court's 1968 decision in Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., or otherwise to assert that on the facts evidenced by record, Kelly should satisfy its full tax liability incurred three years prior to August 1, 1973. North American Company v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1960); Jackson Grain Company v. Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 So. 464 (1939). Based on the above decision of the First District Court of Appeal, the Department's assessment, which the parties admit is factually correct, is valid both as to the August 1, 1970, through July 31, 1973, and the August 1, 1973, through January 31, 1976, audit periods. Since this matter has previously been adjudicated, the same is res judicata as to the legal validity of the Department's assessment. Further, since the assessment relative to Cape Kennedy Charter Boats is based upon the same factual circumstances and legal authority as the one against Kelly Boat Service, Inc., which was upheld as aforementioned in the case of the Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, there is no factual challenge to the validity of the Department's assessment and there being no assertion by the Petitioner that any rules of law other than those enunciated by the District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, are applicable, such assessment must likewise be upheld. I shall so recommend. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue's assessment in the instant matter against the Petitioners be UPHELD. Additionally, in view of the Petitioners' letter of April 11, 1979, Petitioners' motion to treat this matter as a class action is hereby DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission on February 17, 1988, and was issued certificate No. 03-87-502-08. On October 3, 1988, Metro-Dade Police Officer Jay Rogers was on duty and was dispatched to the Kendall Town and Country Mall to assist the Mall's security officers in clearing the parking lot after a night club closed. Officer Rogers walked up to a group of people, including the Respondent and asked them to finish saying good-bye and leave the parking lot. Officer Rogers then backed off and gave the remaining people in the lot about ten to fifteen minutes to finish saying good-bye. Officer Rogers again approached the group which included the Respondent, and asked that they leave. At that point, the Respondent replied to the officer's request with words to the effect of, "You wait, you can't make us leave, I'm looking for my keys." Officer Rogers asked the Respondent to find her keys, do whatever she needed to do, finish saying good-bye, and to please leave. The Respondent replied with words to the effect of, "I'll leave when I'm ready," and, "You're not telling me what to do." At about this point in the communication between Officer Rogers and the Respondent, an unidentified male approached the Respondent and said words to the effect of, "Come on, let's leave, the officer told us to leave, let's get out of here." The Respondent pushed the unidentified male away, and he got into a vehicle and left. Officer Rogers again asked the Respondent to leave. At some point in the interchange the Respondent replied, "What are you going to do, arrest me?" Eventually, Officer Rogers told the Respondent to leave or she would be arrested for trespassing after warning. The Respondent continued to say that she was not leaving. Officer Rogers thereupon advised the Respondent that she was under arrest for trespassing after warning and removed his handcuffs from his belt. At this point the Respondent became belligerent and hostile and told Officer Rogers, "You're not arresting me," and, "You'd better call for a lot of police, I'm not leaving." Officer Rogers requested backup units at this time. At about the same time, a man named Randall Rymes attempted to intervene between Officer Rogers and the Respondent. Officer Rogers told Mr. Rymes to leave and not interfere with the arrest. Mr. Rymes moved away and got into a two-door, black Isuzu automobile. As Officer Rogers attempted to place the handcuffs on the Respondent, she pulled her arm away and twisted her body. Officer Rogers continued with his efforts to arrest the Respondent and grabbed her left arm while asking her not to resist or struggle. The Respondent again pulled her left arm away and then struck Officer Rogers in the neck with her right fist. With Officer Rogers holding onto her arm, the Respondent pulled the officer towards the black Isuzu occupied by Mr. Rymes. Mr. Rymes drove the car beside the Respondent, opened the passenger door, and yelled to Respondent to get into the car. Mr. Rymes also grabbed the Respondent and attempted to help pull her into the car. At that point the Respondent kicked Officer Rogers in the left knee and as Officer Rogers continued to try to put the handcuffs on, the Respondent got partially into the car. Thereupon, Mr. Rymes started driving away with Officer Rogers running beside the automobile still holding onto the Respondent. Officer Rogers finally had to let go to avoid the risk of further injury. The vehicle driven by Mr. Rymes continued for several hundred feet until it was blocked by a vehicle driven by another law enforcement officer. Officer Rogers ran to the automobile driven by Mr. Rymes, removed the Respondent from the car, handcuffed her, and placed her in a police vehicle. Although Respondent had been drinking alcoholic beverages, she was not intoxicated at the time of the events described above. The Respondent has never been arrested or charged with a crime other than in the incident described above. /1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order in this case concluding that the Respondent is in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 11B-27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code, and imposing a penalty of probationary status for one year conditioned on the Respondent not engaging in any conduct during the probationary period which constitutes failure to maintain good moral character within the meaning of Rule 11B-27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of May 1990. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st of day of May 1990.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent, William C. Leistner, was the holder of registered pool contractor's license number RP 0026242 issued by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation. On or about October 20, 1978, Respondent contracted with Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Caiazzo to construct a pool at 700 Coronado Drive, Punta Gorda Isles, Florida. Construction began on November 1, 1978, and Respondent was paid in full on December 8, 1978. On or about April 14, 1979, and July 13, 1979, the Respondent received two notices of additions or corrections from the City of Punta Gorda for violations of the city code on work relating to the construction of the pool. Because of Respondent's failure to make the aforesaid additions or corrections, the City of Punta Gorda revoked the license of Respondent on August 13, 1979. Respondent admitted that the above violations occurred. However, he declined to present any mitigating evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent William C. Leistner, be found guilty of the charges set forth in the Administrative Complaint and that his license be suspended for a period of six months from the date of the final order entered herein. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. William C. Leistner 741 Sabal Palm Lane Punta Gorda, Florida 33950
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. Respondent was issued certificate number 02-7330 on March 30, 1973. There was no evidence that Respondent's certification had been the subject of any other disciplinary proceeding. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a police officer by the City of Bal Harbour, which is a municipality located in Dade County, Florida. The following events occurred in Bal Harbour, Florida, on January 14, 1989, while Respondent was on duty as a police officer: A few minutes past 7:00 a.m., Respondent encountered a 1975 Plymouth that had broken down on Collins Avenue near its intersection with 102 Street. Respondent observed a young male (who he later learned was 17 year old Haroon Nabee) pushing this disabled car by himself trying to get the car off the street and into an adjacent parking lot. Mr. Nabee was pushing the car with one hand and steering it with his other. Respondent assisted Mr. Nabee by pushing the disabled car from the rear with his patrol car. After the disabled car and Respondent's patrol car were in the parking lot, Respondent asked Mr. Nabee his name and asked to see his registration and his drivers license. Mr. Nabee identified himself as Nevin Maharaj and showed Respondent a registration certificate that reflected that the car was registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Stein. Respondent later learned that Mrs. Stein was Mr. Nabee's sister. While Mr. Nabee looked through his wallet for his drivers license, Respondent observed two credit cards in the name of John J. Mendoza. When asked about the credit cards, Mr. Nabee reported that he had found them. Respondent became suspicious and requested a backup. In response to that request Officer Pamela Robinson Adlet (at the formal hearing, Officer Adlet had reverted to the use of Robinson as her last name) appeared on the scene at 7:20 a.m. After Officer Adlet arrived on the scene, Respondent placed Mr. Nabee under arrest, handcuffed his hands behind his back, searched him, and placed him in the back seat of Respondent's caged patrol car. Respondent then called for a tow truck and requested that Officer Adlet assist him in conducting an inventory of the automobile. The officers inventoried the interior of the automobile, but they could not gain access to the trunk. Because the rear seat was loose, Officer Adlet could observe objects in the trunk, but she was unable to inventory those objects because of her limited access. While waiting for the tow truck, Respondent returned to his patrol car, which was parked immediately behind the disabled vehicle, and began making out the arrest form using the false name Mr. Nabee had given him. Respondent had partially completed the arrest form when the tow truck arrived. Because his patrol car was blocking the tow truck's access to the disabled vehicle, Respondent drove the patrol car to a spot approximately thirty feet from the disabled vehicle. Respondent then walked from his patrol car towards the tow truck and he and Officer Adlet engaged in a brief conversation with the tow truck driver. Officer Adlet told the driver that she and Respondent wanted to get into the trunk of the disabled vehicle and asked if he had a screwdriver they could use for that purpose. 1/ Respondent decided to look into the glove box of the disabled vehicle for the second time because his earlier search of the vehicle had been interrupted by his efforts to help Officer Adlet gain access to the trunk. Respondent found in the glove box a passport which reflected Mr. Nabee's true name and which contained Mr. Nabee's photograph. Respondent showed the passport to Officer Adlet, who confirmed that the passport photograph appeared to be of Mr. Nabee. Respondent returned to his patrol car and began addressing Mr. Nabee in loud, profane language and accused Mr. Nabee of lying to him. Respondent opened the rear door of the patrol car on the driver's side and, while holding the passport in his clenched right hand, made three punching motions with his right hand in the direction of Mr. Nabee. With the first of these three blows the back of Respondent's right hand made contact with the right side of Mr. Nabee's face. (The right side of Mr. Nabee's face was struck because Mr. Nabee had turned towards Respondent when Respondent opened the door of the patrol car.) In reaction to that blow, Mr. Nabee stretched out on the back seat of the patrol car, and, consequently, the other two blows did not make contact with Mr. Nabee. Thereafter, Respondent transported Mr. Nabee to the Bal Harbour police station where Mr. Nabee complained to another officer about Respondent's acts. Mr. Nabee was not injured by Respondent. There was no evidence that he suffered any cut or bruise as a result of the contact with Respondent. Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee because he had lied about his name, which caused Respondent to have to redraft his arrest form. Respondent contends that the contact was accidental and was a result of his gesticulating in an angry fashion after learning that Mr. Nabee had lied to him. This contention is rejected. Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee and that Respondent intentionally struck Mr. Nabee in retaliation for Mr. Nabee's lying to him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent committed a battery upon the person of Haroon Nabee on January 14, 1989, which determines, pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, and which suspends his certification as a law enforcement for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of July, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Charles M. Childers, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs from Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Charles M. Childers, has been at all time material to this proceeding a commercial shrimp fisherman in the State of Florida. Mr. Childers has held, and continues to hold, a Saltwater Products License (hereinafter referred to as the "License") issued by the State of Florida. Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the administration of Chapter 370, Florida Statutes. On or about September 27, 1995, Mr. Childers, was cited for alleged violations of Article X, Section 16(b)(2), Florida Constitution. In particular, Mr. Childers was charged with using shrimp trawl nets greater in size than 500 square feet in the nearshore and inshore waters (within three nautical miles of the shore) of the State of Florida. On February 9, 1996, following a non-jury trial, the County Court for Franklin County, Florida, determined that Mr. Childers was guilty of a second degree misdemeanor as a result of the activities that gave rise to the September 27, 1995, citation. Adjudication of guilt was withheld by the County Court. Mr. Childers was required to pay $125.00 in court costs. By letter dated July 5, 1996, the Department notified Mr. Childers that it intended to suspend his 1996/1997 License for a period of ninety days. The Department gave the following reason for its proposed action: This suspension is based upon your failure to comply with Saltwater Fisheries statutes for a conviction of a violation of Section 16, Article X of the State Constitution. Specifically, this concerns your September 27, 1995 arrest and subsequent conviction of using a gill net in Florida waters. The Department's decision to suspend Mr. Childers' License was predicated upon the following provision of Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided: (b) In addition to being subject to any other penalties provided in this chapter, any violation of s. 16, Art. X of the State Constitution or any rules of the Marine Fisheries Commission which implement the gear prohibitions and restrictions specified therein shall be considered a major violation; and any person, firm, or corporation convicted of such violation shall be subject to the following additional penalties: 1. For a first major violation within a 7-year period, suspension of the saltwater products license for 90 days. [Emphasis added]. The Department informed Mr. Childers of his right to contest the proposed suspension of his License by requesting administrative proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On July 11, 1996, Mr. Childers requested an informal hearing to contest the Department's proposed action. Mr. Childers argued that the Department's proposed suspension of his License was inappropriate because he had not been "convicted" of any offense for which the Department could suspend his license. On or about August 8, 1996, the office of the Department's General Counsel issued a Memorandum discussing the issue of whether Mr. Childers had been "convicted" within the meaning of Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida, Statutes (1995). General Counsel's office opined that the Florida Legislature's use of the word "convicted" in Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), was intended to mean: any disposition by the court in a criminal proceeding, other than dismissal, acquittal, or entry of a finding of not guilty. "Conviction" includes a disposition based on a guilty or nolo contendere plea that incorporates adjudication withheld [sic] as part of the disposition or the charges. On August 23, 1996, an informal administrative hearing was held by the Department. At the informal hearing, Mr. Childers admitted that he had violated Article X, Section 16(b)(2), Florida Constitution. Mr. Childers argued, however, that no suspension of his license should be imposed because he had not been "convicted" of such violation. On September 30, 1996, a Notice of Final Order was entered by the Department rejecting Mr. Childers' argument that he had not been "convicted" of any offense as required by Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), and suspending his License for ninety days. In entering its Notice of Final Order, the Department gave the following rationale for rejecting Mr. Childers' assertion that he had not been "convicted" of any violation for which his License could be suspended under Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1995): C. The withholding of adjudication of guilt fails to alter the clear and unequivocal sanctions imposed by Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes. Any person, firm or corporation "convicted" of violation Article X, Section 16(b)(1), Florida Constitution, shall be (emphasis added) subjected to additional administrative and civil penalties listed in Section 370.092(8)9b), Florida Statutes. The intended meaning of the term "convicted" used by the Legislature in Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes, is clear. In the context of 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes, the word "convicted" was selected by the Legislature to indicate a judicial determination of sanctionable behavior, not necessarily the final resolution of any and all criminal proceedings. Mr. Childers appealed the Department's Notice of Final Order to the District Court of Appeal, First District (hereinafter referred to as the "First District Court"). On July 16, 1997, the First District Court entered an opinion reversing the Department's Notice of Final Order. Childers v. Department of Environmental Protection, 696 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The First District Court concluded that Mr. Childers had not been "convicted" within the "unambiguous meaning," of Section 370.092, Florida Statutes (1995). On October 9, 1997, pursuant to the Mandate of the First District Court, the Department entered an Order adopting the decision of the First District Court and dismissing its complaint letter against Mr. Childers. On October 30, 1997, Mr. Childers filed an Application for Attorney's Fees seeking an award pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997). At the time Mr. Childers was cited for the violations of Article X, Section 16(b)(2), Florida Constitution, Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes, required a "conviction" for the Department to take action against a license. This provision, however, had been amended during the 1996 Legislative Session by substituting for the word "convicted" the phrase "receiving any judicial disposition other than acquittal or dismissal." Chapter 96-300, Laws of Florida 1996. This amendment to Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes, was not effective until January 1, 1997. The First District described the following pertinent history concerning the amendment to Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes: The Natural Resources Committee of the House of Representatives produced a Final Bill Analysis dated May 16, 1996. Under the heading "Substantive Analysis," it addressed the "Present Situation," reporting that, within months of the passage of the 1995 laws implementing the net ban, "F[lorida]M[arine]P[atrol] officers began to realize there were loopholes in the law." Fla. HR Comm. on Nat. Res., CS for HB817 (1996) Final Staff Analysis (May 16, 1996)(on file with comm.) at 3. One of the "loopholes" identified was that "DEP has encountered certain circuit court judges who, more often than not, have adjudicated without guilt [sic] alleged net-ban violators." Id. In the "Section-By-Section Analysis," the effect of the amendment proposed to section 370.092, Florida Statutes (1995) was described: "Imposes penalties on people . . . who have received any judicial disposition other than acquittal or dismissal, rather than only on those entities which have been convicted of violating the constitutional net ban." Id. At 6 (emphasis supplied). . . . Childers at 965-966. The foregoing legislative history and the amendment to Section 370.092(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), were available prior to the date that the Department first proposed to suspend Mr. Childers' License. The Department should have been aware of the foregoing legislative history at all times pertinent to this case. In support of its actions in this matter, the Department has asserted that it had a reasonable basis in fact to suspend Mr. Childers' License because: Mr. Childers admitted that he violated Article X, Section 16(b)(2), Florida Constitution; The disposition sheet from the County Court indicated that the "verdict" was "guilty"; The General Counsel's Office of the Department had opined that the Department's action was appropriate; and The action of the Legislature in amending Section 370.092, Florida Statutes, made the Legislature's intent clear that licenses be suspended even if adjudication is withheld. The Department has asserted that it had a reasonable basis in law to take the action it took with regard to Mr. Childers because: The term "convicted" was not defined by Section 370.l092(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), any other provision in Chapter 370, Florida Statutes (1995), or the constitutional amendment it was intended to implement; and Where definitions of "convicted" are provided, whether in other statutes, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in Florida appellate court decisions, the definitions conflict. Therefore, the Department was justified in following one line of authority which supported its action.
The Issue The issue is whether proposed amendments to Rule 46-39.005 adopted by the Marine Fisheries Commission, setting maximum lengths for nets used for the commercial harvesting of mullet, establishing one week alternating closure periods for mullet harvests during the late fall/ early winter roe season, setting a 500 pound per vessel per day harvest limit during the pre-roe season and a one thousand pound limit if two licensed commercial fishermen fish together during the roe season, constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The Petitioners assert that the economic impact statement which accompanied the notice of rulemaking is inadequate.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Sigma International, Inc., owns and operates a mullet processing, wholesaling and exporting business in Florida. The restrictions embodied in the proposed rules will substantially affect its interests. Seafood Consumers and Producers Association is a non-profit association of businesses and consumers interested in fishery resources and fish harvesting in Florida and elsewhere. The rules would substantially affect interests of the association and the interests of individual members of the association. Bob Combs Fish Co. are fishermen, a first receiver of fish caught by others, and a fish wholesaler doing business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interests. Everglades Fish Corporation are fishermen, are first receivers of fish caught by others, and fish wholesalers doing business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect their interests. Houston Brown is a fisherman who does business in the State of Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect his interests. Triad Seafood is a first receiver of fish caught by others, and a fish wholesaler which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interests. Horse Weeks Fish Co. is a first receiver of fish caught by others, and a fish wholesaler which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interest. A.P. Bell Fish Co. are fishermen, a first receiver of fish caught by others, a wholesaler, retailer, and distributor of fish and fish products which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interests. SaltWater Enterprises, Inc., are fishermen, a first receiver of fish caught by others, a wholesaler, retailer and distributor of fish and fish products which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interest. The Fisherman's Market, Inc., is a first receiver of fish caught by others, a wholesaler, retailer and distributor of fish and fish products which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interest. The Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission) is legislatively created and assigned to the Department of Natural Resources. It has authority to adopt rules. Sections 370.025, 370.026 and 370.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991). It adopts fishery conservation and management measures which promote the continued health and abundance of marine fisheries resources in Florida. Section 370.025(2)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1991). The Fish Black or striped mullet is a popular food sought for the flesh of the fish and especially for its roe, which is available annually during the autumn spawning season beginning in October. Mullet roe is highly valued by the Japanese, and much of the roe is exported to Japan. Mullet is the most intensively harvested finfish in Florida; in 1989 mullet accounted for 19.3 percent of the state's total finfish catch. Florida is the source for 85 percent of the nation's black mullet catch. Since 1976 the demand for the export of black mullet roe has increased, which has increased fishing pressure on the species' egg bearing females. Roe-bearing fish caught during roe season are about four times as valuable as the fish would be if caught in the pre-roe season. Mullet has a shelf life as a fresh fish of no more than four days due to the oil in its flesh. Although it can be frozen, in the Florida retail market frozen mullet is not considered a desirable food. There is a California market for frozen mullet, however, where it is popular with Asians. Since the closures during the roe season proposed in the Commission's rules will be for periods of one week, there could be days when no fresh mullet would be available to Florida consumers. Earlier Regulation of the Black Mullet Fishery - 1989-1992 Black or striped mullet (mulgi cephalus) are regulated by the Commission as a restricted species. Section 370.01 (20), Florida Statutes (1991), and Rule 46-39.001(4), Florida Administrative Code. Size and bag limits are imposed on recreational takings of mullet. Commercial fishermen taking mullet must hold a saltwater products license with a restricted species endorsement. When they sell their catch they must provide a trip ticket to the purchaser of the fish which includes the fisherman's name and license number, the gear used in the catch, the place of the catch, the species caught and the number of pounds of fish caught. This information is then sent by the purchaser to the Department of Natural Resources, and is an important part of the Department's data base used in regulating the fishery. The Marine Fisheries Commission began a study of black mullet in 1987, and adopted rules restricting commercial black mullet fishing in 1989. Those rules established gear restrictions, amended certain qualifications for licensure to catch mullet in commercial quantities, and set roe season closure periods for mullet fishing. During 15 weekends of the year, the fishery was closed for 36-hour periods. The minimum net size for mesh was set at three inches. Amendments to the rules in 1990 closed new areas to fishing, set minimum net mesh size which could be used during the roe season at four inches, and prohibited commercial fishermen from using spotter aircraft to locate schools of fish. The weekend closures were extended from 36 to 54 hours, and two more weekends were closed for fishing. In drafting all its management measures, the Commission attempted to make it possible for fishermen to fish year round for mullet, and thus make fresh mullet available to consumers throughout most of the year; See the Purpose and Effect Statement of the rule published at 18 Florida Administrative Weekly at 4931, which reflects this Commission policy. In 1991 the Commission debated whether additional regulation was necessary for the mullet stock and proposed new rules and amendments to existing rules which were published in Volume 17, No. 32, of the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 9, 1991, at pages 3593 et seq. but, as noted above, the validity of these rules was challenged. In a final order that was issued on December 9, 1991, provisions of those rules were found to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority (DOAH Case Nos. 91-5408R and 91-5422R). The District Court of Appeal affirmed that determination in the opinion entered in Florida Marine Fisheries Commission v. Organized Fishermen of Florida, 610 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Those invalidated rules had their genesis in a decision made by the Commission in February 1991 which set a statewide spawning potential ratio (SPR) for black mullet. The SPR is a measurement tool used by the Commission and by other regulatory groups, such as the Federal Fishery Management Councils, in the regulation of fish stocks. It is a measure of the biomass (essentially the total weight) of those fish capable of reproducing, divided by an estimate of what would have been the total biomass of fish of reproductive age if there were no fishing at all in the fishery. The goal the Commission set of maintaining a 35 percent SPR for black mullet was chosen using the best information available. The goal is a reasonable tool for the Commission to use in assessing the effectiveness of any of its efforts to manage the black mullet population to produce maximum stock abundance. The 35 percent target is the minimum level which could be set to provide adequate management of the stock and avoid the risk of a dramatic reduction in the number of fish available. The Commission was disappointed that its August 1991 efforts to increase regulation (and in its view, protection) of the mullet population had been turned back through litigation. It credited data on mullet landings showing a continuing decline in the mullet population. This led the Commission to believe that the spawning potential ratio for mullet in the 1991-1992 fishing year had declined to 18-25 percent, well below the target of 35 percent. Review of nine management options and debate at its August 1992 meeting led the Commission to advertise proposed new rules and amendments to existing rules published in Volume 18, No. 35 of the Florida Administrative Weekly at pages 4931 et seq. on August 28, 1992. According to the Purpose and Effect Statement and Summary for these rules the changes proposed to the regulatory regime for black mullet would do six things: proposed rule 46-39.0036 would prohibit the recreational harvesting of mullet from October 1 through October 15, from November 1 through November 15, and from December 15 through January 15 each year; an exception to the closures would be recognized for possessing cut mullet to be used on boats as bait; an amendment was proposed to existing rule 46-39.005 to prohibit the use of gill or trammel nets or beach or haul seine nets longer than 600 yards; subsection (4) of existing rule 46-39.005 was deleted, it had closed the fishery to commercial operation during weekends in the roe season; a new subsection (5) was proposed to rule 46-39.005, which would close the fishery to commercial harvests for the same periods specified for recreational closures; a new subsection (6) was also proposed for rule 46-39.005, which set a limit on commercial harvesting of mullet to 500 pounds of mullet per vessel per day from July 1 through September 30, which is the pre-roe season. At its meeting of September 25-26, 1992, the Commission conducted a legislative-type hearing under Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes (1991), for the rules it had noticed for adoption. More than 60 people commented on the proposed new rules and amendments to existing rules. On September 26, 1992, the staff of the Commission made a presentation of options it believed were available to the Commission to achieve increased SPR for black mullet and the Commission deliberated using all the information placed before it. Based upon the rule making record compiled, the Commission voted to make changes to the text of the rules as they had been published for comment on August 28, 1992. The Commission decided that instead of two week alternating closures of the mullet fishery for 61 days during the roe season (from October 1-15, November 1-15 and December 15-January 15), it would close the fishery for 56 days using alternating one week periods (from the first through the seventh and fifteen through the twenty-first days of the months of October, November, December and January). The proposed 600-yard maximum net length and 500-pound per fisherman trip limit during the pre-roe season remained, but an increased limit of 1,000 pounds per vessel during the roe season was added if two licensed commercial fishermen used a single vessel. These changes were published in Volume 18, No. 42, of the Florida Administrative Weekly, pages 6221 et seq., on October 16, 1992, as a notice of changes to the Commission's proposed rules. DSPOPS Model for Estimating Spawning Potential Ratio Authorities which manage stocks of pelagic fishes commonly assess the condition of the stock with biological models. Models attempt to account for dynamics of a fishery represented by variables, in an effort to mimic the behavior of the population in its natural state. The models' results provide managers with as accurate an estimate of future fish populations as current science can provide. The choice of a particular model is significantly affected by the data available to be loaded into the model equation. How well any model mimics the natural population necessarily is affected by the accuracy of each of the values used in running the model. The federal National Marine Fisheries Service uses models to assess the condition of stocks of king mackerel, Spanish mackerel and dolphin. The Florida Marine Fisheries Commission has used similar a model known as GXPOPS 1/ to manage the red drum population, with good results, and another for management of Spanish mackerel, which has been brought back from the point of collapse (i.e., a dramatic change in population from an insufficient number of juveniles reaching adulthood). Commission staff chose the biological model known by the acronym DSPOPS 2/ to analyze the current spawning potential ratio of the black mullet fishery. The DSPOPS model is rather sophisticated and contains a significant number of input parameters or variables, such as growth rates, age at sexual maturity, observed harvest levels, recruitment and mortality. The value for some of these parameters are relatively well known through biological sampling, such as age, size, sex and maturity. Values for others, such as mortality of black mullet due to fishing, are subject to some debate. There is sufficient data available to use the DSPOPS model. The model can be run using the high and low estimates for input variables, which yields a range for the SPR, based on those runs. Data the Commission staff used to run the model came from the southwest Florida area. About 75 percent of all mullet landings are made there (especially in the Tampa area), and there is no reason to believe that the dynamics of the black mullet population operate differently there than in the panhandle area or in eastern Florida waters. Catch and effort data for all areas of the state are sufficiently similar to show the fishery is a single unit. Analysis of mullet show Gulf and Atlantic mullet are part of a single gene pool. Moreover, the statute encourages the Commission to manage species populations as a single biological unit. Section 370.025(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1991). The Commission used data only for female mullet, which is appropriate when calculating the spawning potential for a fish where eggs are a limiting factor for the number of fish in a population. Recruitment is a term that refers to those fish that survive the egg and larval stages and eventually mature into adults which can be harvested with fishing effort. There is a relationship between the number of fish able to spawn and the number of fish that are added or "recruited" into a fishery as the result of the spawning, which is known as the spawner recruit relationship. Unfortunately, the spawner recruit relationship cannot be estimated for mullet with enough precision to incorporate it into the model. To account for this, Commission staff ran the model assuming constant recruitment, that is, the assumption was made that there is no relationship between spawning stock and recruitment. This produces an estimate of spawning potential ratio that may be accurate or may be higher than it would be had a spawning recruitment relationship been determined (or assumed). Thus, use of a constant recruitment assumption tends to produce an optimistic assessment of the spawning potential ratio. The most basic variables used in a biological model designed to predict future fish stock are those for mortality rates. In fisheries science, total mortality is universally represented as the variable "Z." It is equal to the rate of fishing mortality, represented as "F," plus the rate of natural mortality "M." 3/ Thus, the equation is that Z = F + M. This is as basic to fishery science as the equation "debits = credits" is to accounting. It is also significant that under this equation, if any two of the three variables are known, the third can be calculated. Non-Parametric Statistics and Independent Review Many of the parameters used in the DSPOPS model have threshold values, they are not parameters which would be expected to have a normal or bell-curved type distribution (such as the average age of fish in a population). Threshold values are non-parametric statistics, and there are no confidence intervals or other measures of variation, such as coefficients of variation, associated with them. This does not mean that the expected SPR levels produced by the model lack utility, are unscientific, or are inherently untrustworthy. Other efforts are made to test the correctness of the parameters values used in the model, or in using the model's output. Using the model to estimate a range of SPR for various regulatory regimes is the best way to manage a fishery. It is for this reason that the Department convened an independent review panel to evaluate the values which its staff had loaded into runs of the DSPOPS model, to represent what would happen in the fishery if various management measures were imposed. This group of outside scientists met with the Commission staff on July 9-10, 1992, to review the data and reach a consensus on the appropriate values to be used for all parameters introduced into the model equation. They cross checked data, and evaluated its consistency with published studies. Although Petitioners complain that scientists who testified for them at the Section 120.54(4) final hearing on the 1991 rules were not invited to this meeting, the Commission's explanation for this is persuasive. The scientists invited were independent, had no association with the Commission, DNR or the Petitioners, and had no other prior associations or biases militating against reaching a consensus. The panel concluded that data available showed female SPR was in the range of from 15 percent to 26 percent, with the most likely value being 21 percent or less. F Value Determined by Tag/Recapture Data and Z Using Time Series of this Data Dr. Behzad Mahmoudi, of the Florida Marine Research Institute, performed a tag/recapture experiment on mullet in southwest Florida in an attempt to determine the F value (fishing mortality) to be used in the DSPOPS biological model. The determination of F can be a problem; for some fish species it is not available. In a few fisheries researchers are assigned to observe and record activity on commercial fishing vessels; there F (fishing mortality) may be calculated by analyzing catch per unit of fishing effort, i.e., the number of pounds of fish landed per hour or per day of fishing. Florida's data gathering through trip tickets does not permit this, since it provides no means to account for the common situation of a fishing trip which yielded no mullet catch. Dr. Mahmoudi's experiment for determining fishing mortality was a good one, which carefully accounted for the biases normally associated with studies designed to estimate F. In a tagging experiment mullet are handled, a smooth plastic filament streamer or tag inserted in a small slit, and then the fish is reintroduced into the waters of the Gulf. These streamers are thin enough to be pulled through the mesh of the crown of fishing caps, where they are sometimes worn by fishermen disinclined to return them to the Commission's researchers, although they are paid $5.00 per tag returned. These tags are then returned to the Florida Marine Research Institute by fishermen or fish processors when tagged fish are caught. When used in conjunction with data on landings of mullet, the proportion of tags returned from among those landed gives an indication of the fishing mortality for the species. The fish were tagged at the beginning of the '89-'90 and '90-'91 seasons, and captured over the following two seasons. Fish tagged in the first year may not be caught until the second year or later. Dr. Mahmoudi also performed ancillary experiments. He put a sample of tagged fish in pools, and evaluated mortality over time caused by the tagging process itself. He also evaluated tag rejection by monitoring tagged fish placed in pools to determine the proportion of spontaneous tag loss. Lastly, he and associates evaluated the non-return rate for tagged fish commercially caught by going to fish processors, and examining commercial catches made by licensed fishermen. After the fishermen and processors had finished with the fish, and returned all tags that were going to be returned, researchers examined those fish to see how many tags yet remained and had not been removed or returned to the Commission. This permitted calculation of the rate at which tags on fish caught are returned. Through these three ancillary experiments, Dr. Mahmoudi accounted for the major variability likely to be introduced into estimations of F (fishing mortality) based on tag recovery. He did not add a specific adjustment to his F value for any increased predation on tagged fish, for there was no reason to believe that it would be anything other than de minimis. Due to the nature of the tag and the placement of the tags on the fish, it is unlikely that tagged fish were ensnared in nets at any higher rate than untagged fish. It is also significant to remember that the recovery rate for tags is not affected by fishing effort. It is based on the percentage of tags which are returned from among fish caught, and is a proportion of fish caught. The more fishermen fish, the larger the absolute number of tags returned, but if the price of fish falls, and fishermen make fewer fishing trips, the proportion of tags returned does not change, although fewer tags may be returned. The range of values which Dr. Mahmoudi estimated for F based on his tag return data of .88 through 1.13 are quite accurate. Moreover, the numbers are consistent with published studies and confirmed by separate calculations discussed below which are consistent with these F values. By treating tagged fish as if they were the whole fish population, Dr. Mahmoudi was also able to determine how many tags were returned at different time intervals, and by using this time series data, was able to calculate a value for Z (total mortality) of 1.5. Since he then had values for both F and Z, he was able to calculate the value of M (natural mortality) as .3. Independent Calculation of Z Through Catch Curve Analysis A commercial catch of fish contains individual fish of different ages. When gear such as gill nets are used, small fish escape, but after the fish reach a certain size, all but the biggest fish are caught (big fish may bounce off or swim around gill nets). The range of ages of the fish caught in gill nets mirrors the age distribution in the fish population, after an adjustment for the smallest and largest fish which escape gill net capture. It is possible then to calculate the slope of a line by plotting the age of fish versus the percent of fish of that age in the catch, and by this method to derive a value for Z (total mortality). Dr. Mahmoudi did this. He then went through an additional verification step. He made a catch of fish using a purse seine net which, unlike a gill net, catches all fish regardless of size. He was able to superimpose the catch curve analysis from this purse seine catch over that generated by the catch curve for fish caught with gill nets, and they matched. This gave him two additional independent and consistent estimates of Z, which also were consistent with his Z estimate of 1.5 from the tag/recapture data. Corroboration of Z value by Otolith Size Mullet have bones in their ear which lay down layers of clear and opaque material creating rings. Counting the number of rings yields a determination of the fish's age. Dr. Mahmoudi counted otolith rings using a large sample of mullet, and he determined the average age of mullet in the fishery was 3.5 to 4 years. This is consistent with the estimates of Z as being 1.5, because use of 1.5 in the equation Z = F + M means that the average age of mullet in the fishery is 3.5 to 4 years old. Independent Calculations of M Natural mortality, or M, is a significant parameter in the DSPOPS biological model, and it is important to have a good estimate for it. Dr. Mahmoudi used three independent methods to calculate a value for M. The first he used, Pauly's method 4/, is one which can be done with little data, but provides a somewhat weak estimate. It was developed for use in estimating sardine populations, and is based on water temperature readings, and the rate of the growth of fish. It yields an estimate of mortality which is accurate within a range of from one half to two times the actual mortality rate for the fish. The independent review panel determined that it was likely that the estimate for mullet of .58 using Pauly's method would be on the high side, i.e., closer to the twice than to one-half of the actual mortality rate. Dr. Mahmoudi then calculated an M value with a different method, Alagaraja's method 5/, which provides a stronger estimate, but requires knowing the maximum age of the fish attained in an unfished environment. This is somewhat difficult because black mullet have been fished in Florida waters for more than 50 years. Other experiments in the scholarly literature showed mullet have been found that were at least ten old, so an age of at least ten years was appropriate and when used in Alagaraja's method yielded a value for M of .4. The consensus of scientists on the independent review panel was that the maximum age of mullet in an unfished population was probably closer to 15 years of age, and using that value, the Alagaraja's method yielded a M value of .3, which was consistent with the M value generated in the tag/recapture study, and reasonably close to the .4 value computed for M under Alagaraja's method using a maximum age of ten years for mullet. The third method was to calculate M based on the values of F and Z determined from the tag/recapture study. Summary of Biological Data For Z there were two independent estimates derived from catch curve analyses (one using gill nets and the other purse seine net catches) and the determination from otolith rings. There were two separate calculations of M using Pauly's and Alagaraja's methods. F was calculated from the tag/recapture study. Independent estimates for Z and M were derived from Dr. Mahmoudi's tag/recapture data, and all were consistent. There are number of reasons, therefore, to have great confidence in the values for the significant variables Z, F and M used by Dr. Mahmoudi in running the DSPOPS model. As with the values for other parameters loaded into the DSPOPS model, which have no statistical confidence intervals associated with them, it is not possible to say that the value of 1.5 for Z is correct within plus or minus X thousandths of a point, at the .05 level of confidence, as is commonly done with parametric statistics, such as reports of opinion polling data. For this reason, separate computer runs were done using high and low estimates of significant variables such as Z (total mortality), F (fishing mortality), and M (natural mortality), paying special attention to the estimates likely to produce the highest SPR value. Effects of Cold Fronts on Catchability and the Effect of Effort-shifting by Fishermen. The more cold fronts which occur during the closure season, the more likely it is that a higher proportion of fish will escape, and conversely if many cold fronts occurred during the open weeks, a larger proportion of fish ready to spawn would be caught. Dr. Mahmoudi ran simulations using data from 17 years on the occurrence of cold fronts, and using what is similar to a random number generator, performed a Monte Carlo simulation for likely occurrences of cold fronts based on the 17 years of data. This data was incorporated into the projections of likely SPRs for different regimes. Net Limitations The Petitioners attack the 600-yard net limitation found in the rule as arbitrary. At the time the rule was being considered, the average net length used in the fishery was about 1,000 yards. The reduction in the maximum net length would have an effect on the catch, but while catch may vary inversely with maximum net length, it does not vary directly with a reduction in net length. Consequently, Dr. Mahmoudi estimated that the 40 percent reduction in the maximum net length would result in an approximately 15 percent reduction in catchability. While this assessment of the effect of the reduction in gear is judgmental rather than statistical, it is reasonable, and not arbitrary, i.e., a judgment unsupported by fact or logic. Regulatory Options For the option proposed of two-week closures during the roe season of October through January of each year, coupled with the 600-yard net limitation and a 500-pound catch limit per vessel, the estimation of SPR mullet would achieve would be from 30 percent to 39 percent. This was the management option discussed at the Commission's August 1992 meeting which led it to the publication of the first iteration of the rule in the August 28, 1992 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly. After that publication and before the legislative-type public hearing on the rule which had been noticed for adoption, Dr. Mahmoudi ran the DSPOPS biological model to consider four more management options, three of which were suggested by commercial fishermen or their representatives. The option which suggested the highest SPR range was not necessarily the best option, however, because the Commission also had to consider what the escapement rate would be for roe-bearing mullet during the roe season for that option, and how enforceable that option was likely to be. The commercial fishermen made it clear at the pubic hearing that they would prefer a one week open/one week closed regime, as opposed to the published text of the rule which would have closed the fishery for alternating two week periods. In addition, the rule was amended to allow two licensed fishermen on a single vessel to catch 1,000 pounds of mullet per boat trip during roe season. Fishermen believed that by fishing together when fish were more valuable they could lower their expenses and thus achieve a higher profit margin during the open weeks. The Petitioners argue that had the Commission chosen option 1, a 72- hour-per-week closure during roe season, with one 10 day closure, the predicted SPR would be approximately 32.3 percent (with a range of 27.9 to 36.7 percent), while option 4, the proposal for week one/week off closures, would produce an average SPR of 34.2 percent (having a range of 29.8 to 34.2 percent). They see the options as essentially identical in the SPR but would find option 1 much easier to live with, since it would be easier for fish processors to maintain their labor forces with shorter closures. Option 1 would also make it less likely that there would be many periods when no mullet would be available to retail consumers of fresh mullet since with a four-day shelf life, week long closures could produce periods when fresh mullet could not be found and 72-hour closures do not. The longer the closure period, the more likely closures will coincide with cold fronts; it is closures during these frontal periods which permit the escapement of the most fish. The significant differences between option 1 and option 4 are that under option 1, approximately 20 percent more spawning females would survive the roe season, but under option 4 (which is essentially the option the Commission adopted), the increase in the number of spawning females surviving through the roe season would be 48 percent. Option 4 intuitively is a better management option if the goal is to reach spawning potential ratio of 35 percent, the minimum ratio to sustain stock abundance over time. The Commission did adjust the closure period to help the commercial fishermen by switching the closures periods from a two-week on/two-week off regime to a one-week on/one- week off regime. The Economic and Small Business Impact Statement As is often the case with legislation, the goals stated in Section 370.025(2), Florida Statutes (1991), can be harmonized, but only with some difficulty. Section 370.025(2)(b) requires the Commission to base its conservation and management measures upon "the best information available, including biological, sociological, economic and other information deemed relevant by the Commission." Section 370.025(2)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that those measures "shall permit reasonable means and quantities of annual harvest, consistent with maximum practicable sustainable stock abundance on a continuing basis." The Petitioners interpret this to require the Commission to achieve its biological goals with the least possible negative impacts on the economics or social conditions in the fishery. This is simply not what the statute says. No doubt those regulated would hope that the Legislature would require the least possible impact on them. But what was enacted was the mandate that the Commission's primary goal is to insure the continuing health and abundance of the species, and after doing so, then to permit reasonable quantities of annual harvest which can be sustained over time. The economic impact statement (EIS) was prepared by an economist, using data from a variety of sources. The statement itself is 16 pages long, it contains three pages of references, five figures to illustrate points, and six pages of tables of data to support its conclusions. Much of the important information was derived from a 1989 study published by the Institute of Food and Agriculture Science at the University of Florida by Robert Degner and others entitled "An Analysis of Potential Regulatory Changes on the Economic Structure of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico Finfish Industry Centered in Florida" (Reference 11). Section 3 of the EIS estimates the economic benefits and costs to persons directly affected by the proposed amendments. It analyzes who are the persons directly affected (Section 3.20); the costs and benefits of having no regulation, of maintaining current regulations, or of imposing the new regulations published in the August 28, 1992 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly (Section 3.30); the result of changes in net lengths (Section 3.40); the result of the seasonal closures (Section 3.50), and of trip limits (Section 3.60). It contains as well an analysis of the impact of the proposed rules on competition in the open market for employment in Section 4.00, a small business impact statement in Section 5.00, and an analysis of alternatives in Section 6.00. Section 7.00 evaluates costs to the agency and to local governments. Section 8.00 describes the data and methods used by the Commission in making its estimates. The Petitioners presented testimony at final hearing of an economist that many of the views expressed in the economic impact statement are misinterpretations of economic data or are in error. It is essential to remember that the purpose of rulemaking is not to produce assessments of potential economic impact which can withstand the intense scrutiny of a Ph.D. dissertation. Rather, the EIS is required to insure that the agency considers each of the topics required in the statutory economic impact analysis before settling on a policy which will be embodied in its rule, and to give affected persons the opportunity to bring to the attention of the Commission information which could lead to other regulatory choices, if the Commission is persuaded by that economic evidence or argument. Basically, Mr. Murray's testimony at final hearing argued that the Commission's economic impact analysis focused on macro-economic results of the proposed regulations, but not enough on micro-economic results, that is, impacts on individual households and business (Tr. 458). The EIS concentrated on such things as estimates of total dollar losses caused by the regulation proposed. In Section 3.20 the EIS defines the persons directly affected by the rules as "those engaged in the directed harvest of mullet for commercial purposes;" and commercial harvesters (fishermen) were estimated to be between 455 and 3,150 persons, based on estimates in two sources (EIS at 5). The fishermen generally work alone, as two-man crews, and in a few instances in six to eight fishermen groups. These estimates of those directly affected appear to have an adequate basis. While a broader number of people will feel the pinch of the rule (for instance consumers wishing to buy fresh mullet at retail) they are indirectly rather than directly affected, since there is no prohibition against possession of mullet purchased at retail for home consumption during closure periods. The statute requires the analysis of the effect on those persons who will be prevented from harvesting mullet during closure periods and the EIS is not deficient for limiting its analysis to those whose actions would be directly regulated by the Commission. The section of the EIS dealing with the impact on competition and the open market for employment acknowledged that the rule would have seasonal affects on employment and the incomes of persons in roe mullet fishing and processing businesses (EIS Section 4.00 at 9). Most all of the fishermen are small businesses, so there is no effective way to tier the rules to impose lesser restrictions on small businessmen and ultimately achieve the impact the Commission intends to achieve. If small businesses were exempted, no regulation could be effective. EIS has an analysis of the effect on the standing stock of fish and the dollar value of that stock under four scenarios, (1) under equilibrium conditions with no regulation, (2) the then current weekend closure and net size regulations, (3) under the proposed rule as published and (4) under the assumption that the rule would result in an increased recruitment to the fishing stock of an additional 10 percent. The dollar value for the fish used in the these evaluations is probably inappropriate (the value is $6.70 for each fish, which is the ecological value the Department of Environmental Regulation was considering establishing for fish killed through violations of ecologic regulations). What is significant is the comparison of the increase in standing stock in each scenario, as well as the dollar value ascribed to that stock. Commissioners, legislators, or anyone else could interpret the dollar value by making different dollar assumptions for the stocks levels projected. Mr. Murray's written comments pointed out to the Commission that a better value might be 60 per pound. The EIS does provide a means of comparing the benefits of not adopting the rule to the benefits of adopting the rule, at least as far as an increase in the size of the fish stock is concerned. Proper notice of the proposed rule was sent to the Director of Economic Development, the Bureau Chief of Minority Business, and the Small and Minority Business Advocate, as well as to the Joint Administrative Procedure Committee. The Marine Fisheries Commission received neither a response nor an objection from any of these agencies. The Commission amended the proposed rules in significant ways in an attempt to relieve the burdens which the fishermen argued they would suffer if the rules were adopted with no changes. The one week on/one week off closure periods were substituted for the two week closure periods originally proposed, and the trip limit was amended to permit two licensed fishermen to fish in a single boat and bring in 1,000 pounds of fish during the roe season. The agency thus seriously considered alternatives to achieve their management goals while ameliorating the economic impact on those regulated. This shows that the economic information contained in the economic impact statement was seriously considered by the Commissioners. The only economic objection actually voiced to the Commission on September 25, 1992, during public testimony by Mr. Murray was that the EIS did not ascribe sufficient value to mullet flesh taken during roe season, but concentrated on the value of the roe. He informed the Commission that for some sellers, fresh mullet flesh was 80 percent of their sales, and that two week closures could put them out of business. (Ex. 12, at 57-58). This error in the EIS was remedied by Mr. Murray's testimony.
