The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004); Whether Respondent, Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), has inherent authority to reconsider a Final Order it has issued; and Whether FCHR should adopt a rule which would permit the granting of a motion to reconsider a Final Order.
The Issue The issues are whether, in violation of sections 120.54(1)(a) and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Respondent has made an agency statement that is an unadopted rule in implementing a 2017 statutory amendment broadening the category of first-time test-takers to be counted when calculating the passing rate of the graduates of Petitioner’s prelicensure professional nursing education program (Program) and whether, pursuant to section 57.111, Petitioner may recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Respondent. At Petitioner’s request, the parties presented evidence concerning constitutional challenges that Petitioner intends to present to a district court of appeal.
Findings Of Fact The Program is a prelicensure professional nursing education program that terminates with an associate degree. Respondent approved the Program in 2013, thus authorizing Petitioner to admit degree-seeking students into the Program, as provided in section 464.019. As provided by section 464.019(5)(a)1., the passing rate of the Program’s graduates taking the NCLEX for the first time must meet or exceed the minimum passing rate, which is ten points less than the average passage rate of graduates taking the NCLEX nationally for the first time. Until June 23, 2017, the passing rate of a Florida program was based only on first-time test-takers who had taken the exam within six months of graduating (New Graduates). Chapter 2017-134, sections 4 and 8, Laws of Florida, which took effect when signed into law on June 23, 2017 (Statutory Amendment), removes the six-month restriction, so that the passing rate of a Florida program is now based on all first-time test-takers, regardless of when they graduated (Graduates). The statutory language does not otherwise address the implementation of the Statutory Amendment. For 2015 and 2016, respectively, the minimum passing rates in Florida were 72% and 71.68%, and the Program’s New Graduates passed the NCLEX at the rates of 44% and 15.79%. As required by section 464.019(5), Respondent issued the Probationary Order. The Probationary Order recites the provisions of section 464.019(5)(a) specifying the applicable passing rate, directing Respondent to place a program on probation if its graduates fail to pass at the minimum specified passing rates for two consecutive years, and mandating that the program remain on probation until its passing rate achieves the minimum specified rate. The Probationary Order details the 2015 and 2016 passing rates of Petitioner’s relevant graduates and the minimum passing rates for these years. The Probationary Order makes no attempt to describe the condition of probation, which might have included a reference to New Graduates, other than to refer to section 464.019(5)(a)2., which, unchanged by the Statutory Amendment, specifies only that a program must remain on probation until and unless its graduates achieve a passing rate at least equal to the minimum passing rate for the year in question. For 2017, the minimum passing rate for a Florida program was 74.24%. If, as Respondent contends, the new law applies to all of 2017, six of the fifteen of the Program’s Graduates failed the NCLEX, so the Program’s passing rate was inadequate at 60%. If, as Petitioner contends, the old law applies to all of 2017, twelve of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates, and only three of them failed, so the Program’s passing rate was adequate at 75%. Respondent clearly applied the Statutory Amendment retroactively to January 1, 2017, in the Order Extending Probation because the order states that that the passing rate of the Program’s Graduates for 2017 was only 60% and therefore extends Petitioner’s probationary status for 2018. The Order Extending Probation provides Petitioner with a clear point of entry to request an administrative hearing. Each party applies the Statutory Amendment without regard to the effective date of June 23, 2017, but Respondent reaches the correct conclusion: the passing rate of the Program’s graduates for 2017 was inadequate. The NCLEX is administered throughout the year, and the dates of graduation are available for Petitioner’s Graduates taking the NCLEX in 2017, so it is possible to calculate a combined passing rate, using only New Graduates under the old law for testing dates through June 22 and all Graduates under the new law for testing dates after June 22. From January 1 through June 22, 2017, five of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates and they all passed. From June 23 through December 31, 2017, four of the eight Graduates taking the NCLEX passed the test. Combining these results for all of 2017, the Program’s passing rate was nine divided by thirteen, or 69%, which was inadequate for 2017.
The Issue Whether this cause is barred by a release of all claims.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioner, Jessica Miles', Petition for Relief from employment discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2010.
Findings Of Fact On January 16, 2019, on her last day of employment with Respondent, Petitioner executed a General Release. Petitioner does not dispute that she signed the General Release, which states, in pertinent part: I knowingly and voluntarily release and forever discharge [Respondent] of and from any and all claims, known and unknown, anticipated and unanticipated, asserted and unasserted, which I have or may have against the [Respondent] as of the date of execution of this General Release. These released claims include, but are not limited to, any alleged violation of ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Family and Medical Leave Act; ... [and] the Florida Civil Rights Act[.] * * * By signing below, I am knowingly and freely waiving and releasing all claims I may have against the [Respondent]. I further affirm I have been given a sufficient amount of time to consider whether to sign this General Release. The subject complaint of discrimination was brought by Petitioner, after she signed the General Release, pursuant to the FCRA, which is specifically referenced as a released claim in the General Release. By executing the General Release, Petitioner released Respondent from the claims that were the basis for her complaint of discrimination. Petitioner asserts that the General Release was signed under duress, she did not give up her rights because she had not yet received her final paycheck or belongings, and that there is no proof that she received consideration for signing the general release.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Kathy L. McKethan’s Petition for Relief due to a lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Keith L. Hammond, Esquire Law Office of Keith L. Hammond, P.A. Post Office Box 547873 Orlando, Florida 32854 (eServed) Kathy McKethan Post Office Box 953304 Lake Mary, Florida 32795 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 1075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes for costs and attorney's fees, if a decision of a case on appeal to the District Court of Appeal has not been rendered. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has subject matter jurisdiction for petition for attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, if a decision of a case on appeal to the District Court of Appeal has not been rendered.
Findings Of Fact On December 29, 1994, the undersigned Hearing Officer issued a Recommended Order in the underlying case of Preferred Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Wekiva Center Partnership, DOAH Case No. 94-4890BID, a bid dispute matter in which the Petitioner was not the prevailing party. The decision in the Recommended Order, which upheld the Department's action, was adopted by the Secretary in a Final Order, dated January 23, 1995. Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal of the Final Order to the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, under the provisions of Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1993). The court, in the matter of Preferred Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DCA Case No. 95-0461, has not rendered a decision as of the date of this Order. On May 17, 1995, Petitioner filed its Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking reimbursement under the alternate provisions of Sections 57.111 and 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs in Case No. 95-2537F is DISMISSED without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction, and this case is closed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrence William Ackert, Esquire Post Office Box 2548 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Eric D. Dunlap, Esquire Assistant District 6 Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
