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MICHELE B. BROWN vs APALACHEE CENTER, 08-001605 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 01, 2008 Number: 08-001605 Latest Update: Sep. 18, 2008

The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based upon mental disability.

Findings Of Fact The final disputed-fact hearing began on time. Petitioner was present, as was the attorney for Respondent. Petitioner appeared pro se and responded clearly and affirmatively to the undersigned's questions, stating that she knew that she could be represented by an attorney but for reasons of her own she chose to represent herself. After explaining the duty to go forward, the burden of proof, and the order of proof, the undersigned inquired of both parties whether any further explanation was necessary; whether they had any questions; and whether the undersigned could do anything to make the process easier on either of them. At that point, Petitioner gestured to a piece of paper and requested to meet with Respondent's counsel for purposes of negotiating a settlement. A brief recess was granted for that purpose, and the undersigned left the hearing room. Upon returning to the hearing room, the undersigned inquired whether a settlement had been reached and was informed that one had not been reached. Petitioner then announced that, "Since they won't settle, I have no more to say." The undersigned inquired at length to be certain Petitioner understood that: she could call witnesses; she could testify on her own behalf; and she could present documents, either through her own testimony or that of others. Petitioner stated that she understood but did not want to call witnesses or testify. She gestured at what appeared to be her proposed settlement document, but which could have been something else, stating that she only had a document. The undersigned explained that very few documents could be called "self-authenticating" and gave a brief explanation of what type of testimony is necessary to lay a predicate to put any document into evidence. Petitioner said she did not wish to testify. She did not offer her piece of paper. The undersigned explained that if Petitioner did not testify and did not offer her single document, she could not prevail, and that based upon the allegation in her Petition that she has a "mental disability/handicap," the undersigned needed to be assured that Petitioner understood that unless she testified to something, called witnesses to testify, or offered some exhibits, the undersigned would have no choice but to enter a recommended order of dismissal. Petitioner assured the undersigned that she understood and refused to proceed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michele B. Brown, pro se 2634 North Point Circle, Apt. B Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda S. Bennett, Esquire Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett Foster & Gwartney, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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VALERIE MILLER-MOSKOWITZ vs. TOM JAMES CO., 89-003194 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003194 Latest Update: Apr. 10, 1990

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of race or sex.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Valerie Miller-Moskowitz. She was employed by Respondent from August 4, 1987 until termination of her employment on September 9, 1987. Respondent is the Tom James Company, an interstate mail order clothing business based in Brentwood, Tennessee with an area sales office in Tampa, Florida. Respondent sells garments through its salespersons as opposed to operation of a retail store. These salespersons, including the office manager, are generally in the office only in the late afternoon in order to make telephonecalls and arrange appointments with customers for the following day. The manager of Respondent's Tampa office, with authority to fire, hire and impose disciplinary actions upon employees at all times pertinent to these proceedings, was Mark Dunphy. Through a process of interviews, Petitioner became a finalist for Respondent's vacant position of "operations manager" in the Tampa office. In the final interview, Petitioner went to Dunphy's home where he and his wife observed Petitioner's operation of a personal computer. Skill in the usage of the personal computer was important to Dunphy since he expected the new operations manager to prepare letters for mass mailing to potential customers through the use of a software program on the computer. The letters, extolling the company's products, would be mailed to potential customers after preparation by the operations manager. Following completion of all interviews, including a psychological evaluation of Petitioner conducted over the telephone with Petitioner by an individual hired by Respondent for that purpose, Dunphy formally hired Petitioner. This occurred sometime around the first of August of 1987. Petitioner's duties as operations manager consisted of being a "jack of all trades" with responsibility for typing, telephone answering and meeting with customers in the absence of salespersons in the office. She was also expected to operate the computer, now moved to the office from Dunphy's home, and to prepare mass mailings. Petitioner initially reported for work on August 4, 1987. At the conclusion of Petitioner's first day on the job, Dunphy went by Petitioner's home at her request. Petitioner was upset as the result of a telephone call from her husband and talked with Dunphy regarding her martial problems. After some discussion, Dunphy, who was growing hungry, asked Petitioner to have a drink and dinner at a local Mexican restaurant. Petitioner consented. The two went to the restaurant, had dinner and continued to discuss their personal backgrounds and experiences. Petitioner, who is black, related her disappointment with her present separation from her husband, who is white. Dunphy is also white. At the conclusion of the dinner, both left for their respective homes in their separate automobiles. As her employment progressed in the following days, Petitioner experienced some difficulty operating the personal computer at the office and called Dunphy's wife on several occasions for guidance in the effective use of the machine. While she managed accounting matters in the office quite well, Petitioner was unable at any time during her brief employment to produce mass mailing letters in a quantity sufficient to meet Dunphy's expectations. Although he was becoming aware that Petitioner's computer skills were not as proficient as he desired, Dunphy continued an amicable relationship with Petitioner. On August 6, 1987, he again invited Petitioner to go out for drinks, but she refused. There were subsequent invitations from Dunphy during thenext week to go out for drinks, to go jogging, and to go dancing. Petitioner declined all these invitations from Dunphy. Approximately two weeks after beginning her employment, Petitioner went to Jacksonville, Florida, for a job related training session sponsored by Respondent. Upon conclusion of the training session on or about August 14, 1987, she and Dunphy agreed in the course of a telephone conversation that Dunphy would meet her at the airport and give her a ride to her home. Dunphy complied and upon arriving at Petitioner's residence, Dunphy escorted her inside where he attempted to embrace and kiss her. Petitioner told him "you shouldn't do this to your wife." Dunphy did not attempt to press his affections further and left Petitioner's home. One day during the next week, in the course of conversation, Petitioner told Dunphy that the day, August 18, 1987, was her birthday. Dunphy proceeded to give her a birthday card in which he inscribed the following: Happy B. Day Val- you inspire me with your attitude toward life, and what life throws at us from time to time. Your[sic] tough in your determination to make a success of your self even in tough personal times. I know you will help me in achieveing[sic] my goals while we are associated together. I know I will be helpful to you in achieveing[sic] your dreams & goals. --This good for one marguerita. Mark In the ensuing days, Petitioner began to be late for work at various times, although Dunphy did not formally document this deterioration of Petitioner's attendance in any time records. Petitioner's car was burglarized during the week of August 24, 1987, and she took time from work to replace her driver's license, credit cards and other documents that were stolen from the vehicle. Dunphy became concerned about Petitioner's attendance at work and the two of them quarreled. Petitioner's husband contacted her in the early part of September, 1987. He was ready to conclude their separation and needed her to come to New York and assist in his move to Florida. Petitioner met with Dunphy on the morning of September 9, 1987, and informed him of her intention to take the following two work days (Thursday and Friday) off in order to go to New York to deal with family business matters. When Dunphy expressed reluctance to authorize the time off for Petitioner, she became angry and declared that she would be taking the time off anyway because her "family came first." Dunphy, already disappointed with Petitioner's failure to meet expectations regarding operation of the personal computer and preparation of mass mailing materials, also became angry and told Petitioner to leave since she was going anyway. Petitioner took Dunphy's response to mean that she was fired and left the business premises. Later in the day, Petitioner contacted an accountant in the company's home office for assistance in persuading Dunphy to reconsider and continue her employment. Those efforts were unsuccessful. After conclusion of her trip to New York, Petitioner wrote to Respondent's president at the company's home office on September 16, 1987, and complained of Dunphy's verbal abuse and unprofessional displays of anger. In the letter, she opined that Dunphy was a good salesman, but needed additional training in order to become a "people oriented supervisor." Notably, she made no specific reference to racial discrimination or sexual harassment in the letter, although she noted Dunphy's attempts "to pressure the Operations Manager into going out for drinks, when both parties are married."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my ruling on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. Rejected, a mere restatement of Petitioner's position. To the extent that this proposed finding seeks to establish that Petitioner rejected advances of Mark Dunphy, the proposed finding has been substantially adopted with regard to one occasion, but not verbatim. Adopted in substance. Rejected, argumentative as to legal conclusion regarding burden of proof rather than proposed finding of fact. 6 Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected, relevancy, conclusion of law. Adopted in substance as to firing and date of same. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence, legal conclusion and argumentative. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-3. Rejected, unnecessary. Modified to extent that Dunphy operated Respondent's Tampa office. Addressed in substance as to Respondent Tom James Company. 6.-10. Adopted in substance, but not verbatim. Petitioner's hiring found to have occurred on August 4, 1987, otherwise this proposed finding is adopted in substance. Adopted by reference. Not supported by weight of the evidence with regard to lack of capability of Petitioner, adopted in substance with regard to Dunphy's disappointment with her performance abilities. Adopted in substance. Petitioner's version that August 4, 1987, was her first day of work is adopted on the basis of the witness' credibility as opposed to Dunphy's testimony on this point. 16.-19. Adopted in substance. 20. Rejected, relevancy. 21.-23. Rejected, relevancy. 24. Adopted by reference. 26. Rejected, relevancy and cumulative. 27.-28. Adopted in substance. 29.-30. Rejected, relevancy. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, cumulative. 33.-34. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted in substance. Rejected as to Dunphy's version of these events on the basis of the comparative creditability of the witnesses on this particular point. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. 38.-41. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. 42.-44. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. 45.-48. Rejected, unnecessary. 49.-66. Rejected as argumentative of proposed findings postulated by Petitioner. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executi

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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ALAN D. JIMENEZ vs WHOLE FOODS MARKET, 07-001114 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 08, 2007 Number: 07-001114 Latest Update: Aug. 22, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed employment discrimination against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Peruvian South American Indian and Hispanic. He is also a Spanish speaker, although he speaks English fluently. Respondent owns and operates a chain of grocery stores. Petitioner worked at Respondent's store in Fort Lauderdale from December 1992 until he was terminated in August 2005. Petitioner started as a produce clerk and, at the time of his termination, he had worked his way up to produce manager. He had been employed as a produce manager of the Fort Lauderdale store since April 2002. Petitioner enjoyed a good reputation among his coworkers. He was fair and a good manager. He enjoyed good rapport with customers and employees. Petitioner's employment record was unblemished except for one incident prior to the subject incident. On February 17, 2005, Petitioner received an Unsatisfactory Work Warning for misuse of Respondent's email system and inappropriate communication. Petitioner was one of several employees disciplined at this time for this offense. Under well-established and uniformly enforced rules, Respondent maintained a policy of terminating any employee who received any discipline within six months after receipt of an Unsatisfactory Work Warning. On August 3, 2005--which is within six months of February 17, 2005--Petitioner was approached by an employee whom he supervised. The employee asked Petitioner for an evaluation. Petitioner complied, informing the employee that his work merited a raise, but no money was available at the time for raises. The employee took his request to Petitioner's supervisor, who conducted a meeting with the employee and Petitioner. During the meeting, she explained Respondent's policy about raises, correcting the mistaken understanding of Petitioner that raises were not presently available. She approved the employee for a raise. The meeting was amicable and ended in this fashion. Later in the day of the meeting, Petitioner approached the employee, playfully tapped him with a small bundle of wire wraps used to bind produce, and asked him, jokingly, why he was trying to get Petitioner into trouble. The employee felt intimidated about the incident and reported it to Respondent's supervisor. Respondent has no tolerance for workplace behavior that may be perceived as intimidating to its employees. Based on this policy, Respondent determined that it was necessary to discipline Petitioner for the incident with the employee. But for the prior incident involving the company email system, Respondent would not have terminated Petitioner. However, because the second incident occurred within six months of the earlier warning, Respondent, consistent with its policy, terminated Petitioner. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent terminated Petitioner due to his race or national origin. Although the reason for terminating him does not withstand much scrutiny, it is abundantly clear that the cited reason for termination does not mask an unlawful basis for termination.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan D. Jimenez 820 Northeast 19th Terrace Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jennifer L. Price, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 2100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.10760.11
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WENCESLAO LUGO PALERMO vs. KUPPENHEIMER MANUFACTORING, 88-005689 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005689 Latest Update: May 02, 1989

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from January, 1986, until March 7, 1988. Petitioner worked as a tailor and performed alterations at Respondent's store located in Altamonte Springs. In the latter half of 1987, Mr. Pease became the manager of the Altamonte Springs store and thus became Petitioner's supervisor. As had the prior manager, Mr. Pease and Petitioner worked out a schedule that did not require Petitioner to work in violation of his religious principles. However, relations between Petitioner and Mr. Pease were not good. Shortly after becoming manager, for independent business reasons, Mr. Pease decided to reduce the amount of fitting done in the store. The effect of this decision was to reduce the amount of work available for Petitioner. At about this time, Petitioner suffered an accident unrelated to employment. The accident resulted in an extended absence from work. Petitioner received his physician's approval to return to work on February 16, 1988, but failed to do so. Without prior notice, Petitioner showed up at the store on March 7, 1988, and informed Mr. Pease that Petitioner was ready to return to work. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the work schedule had already been arranged for the week. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the only days he could work were Saturday, March 12, and Sunday, March 13. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that he could not work Sundays due to his religious beliefs. Mr. Pease reiterated that no other time was available that week. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that Petitioner understood that he was being fired. Mr. Pease told him that he was not being fired; rather, he was quitting if he left Respondent's employment. Two days later, Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation benefits. He never reported to work with Respondent again. Consistent with his Petition for Relief, Petitioner offered no evidence of discrimination due to national origin. Nothing in the record suggests the existence of any such discrimination. Petitioner has also failed to prove the existence of any religious discrimination. There is no evidence that Mr. Pease refused to try to accommodate Petitioner's religious beliefs with respect to work schedules after the weekend of March 12-13. The only evidence is that when Petitioner suddenly reported to work, the only days immediately available were the weekend days. The record does not even disclose whether Mr. Pease linked the two days, so as to prevent Petitioner from working the Saturday without working the Sunday. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Mr. Pease told Petitioner that if he failed to work the coming Sunday, he would lose his job. In sum, Petitioner has left it entirely to conjecture whether Mr. Pease would have failed to make reasonable accommodation for the religious beliefs of Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Pease was never presented with that opportunity. In addition, Petitioner has produced no evidence that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. There is no evidence of the number of employees working for Respondent at the relevant time.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5689 Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted in substance. 4-5. (first sentence) Adopted. 5. (second sentence) Rejected as irrelevant. 6-10. Adopted. s 11. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Weceslao Lugo Palermo 7505 Armstrong Road Lockhart, FL 32810 Richard D. Pease 590 West Highway 436 Altamonte Springs, FL 32714

Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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DEBRA A. LARSON vs. DRACUT CORPORATION, D/B/A KINGS INN RESTAURANT AND LAWRENCE F. JUDGE, 88-003098 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003098 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1989

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed with the Respondent from August 3, 1985 until May 10, 1986, as a waitress in the dining room of the Kings Inn Restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. In March, 1987, the Petitioner became pregnant. She then informed her employer, Mr. Judge of her pregnancy. He told her initially that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to. Shortly thereafter, he told her that she could not work after five months of pregnancy. On another occasion, his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, told her that she could not work after she "started showing." Once the Respondent, Mr. Judge, learned of the Petitioner's pregnancy, he began a regime of harassing treatment. For instance, Mr. Judge made her do the "side work," filling up all the salt and pepper shakers and sugar bowls for all of the waitresses and waitress stations. It had always been uniform policy that each waitress had the responsibility to do her own side work for her own station and tables. Mr. Judge also began yelling and cursing at her in front of her workers and customers, causing her great humiliation and embarrassment. He criticized her publicly about her posture and the way she serviced customers, although she had always had an excellent record as a competent waitress and had no complaints from customers or former employers, before announcing that she was pregnant. Mr. Judge also began a practice of constantly questioning other employees about the Petitioner's job performance, although he apparently learned of no substandard performance in both her duties and her attitude toward her customers. He also took her to task about her "charge tips" being less than other employees, apparently the measure he used to determine if a waitress was serving her customers appropriately and adequately. This situation, however, was caused by his discriminatory conduct toward her in giving her fewer tables to serve and thus, reducing her tip income. Mr. Judge additionally assigned her to clean up a portion of the kitchen area, particularly the "bread shelves" when normal policy had been for kitchen personnel to perform all kitchen clean-up duties, with any clean up of the bread shelf area being rotated amongst the dining room personnel. The Petitioner, however, was singled out for this duty exclusively after it became known that she was pregnant. The Petitioner was also required to stay late and perform certain closing duties at the end of business late at night, much more often than other waitresses. In addition to performing restaurant closing duties, she was frequently required to wait on cocktail tables as late as 2:00 in the morning on many of the "late duty" occasions, even though she was hired as, and until she became pregnant worked exclusively as, food waitress. Petitioner's testimony and Petitioner's exhibit 2, in evidence, establishes that, although Petitioner was only scheduled to stay late three times in March, three times in April and once in May that, in fact, she worked late, that is, after all other employees or waitresses had been released for the evening seven out of nine days that she worked in March; nine out of twelve days she worked in April; and six out of the seven days she worked in May. Indeed, on May 10, 1986, the last day she worked for the Respondent, Mr. Judge required her to stay late and to "bus" all the tables, that is clean all the tables, in the dining room, allowing the waitress who was scheduled to stay late that night to leave early. The Petitioner became quite upset at this turn of events and resigned her position, due to the repeated pattern of harassment as described herein. Although Mr. Judge initially told the Petitioner that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to during her pregnancy, in fact, on April 11, 1986, Mr. Judge hired the Petitioner's replacement. He hired Pamela Modes and had the Petitioner train her in her waitress duties. He stated to Ms. Modes privately when hiring her "that he needed a food waitress" because "he's got a girl that's pregnant." Additionally, he told the Petitioner that he objected to her working because of her pregnancy and claimed his insurance would not allow him to employ her after she was five months pregnant. These statements, coupled with the statement by his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, to the effect that she would not be employed there "once she started showing" reveal an intent by the employer to terminate the employee, the Petitioner, because of her pregnancy. Instead of terminating her outright, the Respondent chose to put sufficient pressure on the Petitioner through extra, unscheduled work duties and the other above-mentioned forms of harassment, so as to coerce her into leaving the Respondent's employ. The Petitioner thus made a prima facia showing that she was forced to terminate employment due to her sex and her pregnancy, and no countervailing evidence was adduced by the Respondent.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice has occurred through the Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner because of her sex (pregnancy) and that she be accorded all relief allowed under the above- cited section, including backpay and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson, Pro Se 9742 Aileron Avenue, Apt. 606 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Dracut Corporation d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. Owner/General Manager 1309 Maldonado Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561-2323 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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KENNETH TERRELL GRAHAM vs PIER 1 IMPORTS, 01-003323 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 21, 2001 Number: 01-003323 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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THERESA L. DAWSON vs BANK OF AMERICA, 06-003788 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Oct. 04, 2006 Number: 06-003788 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner by terminating her employment in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes,1 the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Theresa Dawson, is a 47-year-old, African- American woman. At all times pertinent to this matter, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a personal banker at Rosemont. As a personal banker, Petitioner was responsible for, inter alia, opening new accounts for customers of Bank of America (the "Bank"). Petitioner had worked for the Bank (including its predecessor entities) for almost 25 years, beginning her employment in 1981 as a bank teller. She served at a number of Bank branches until being transferred to Rosemont in 1998. Petitioner was a valued employee of the Bank and was considered to be one of the best workers at Rosemont. She was nominated for and received bonuses almost every quarter. She received annual salary increases well in excess of the average for her peers. During a certain period when Bank headquarters directed managers to limit all raises to two percent, Petitioner was given a six-percent raise due to her substantial performance record. Petitioner had never been disciplined or reprimanded by the Bank concerning her employment activities until the actions leading to this administrative proceeding. Personal bankers were paid a base salary and could earn additional compensation based upon performance. To obtain bonuses or extra compensation, the employee must first meet all of their objectives (as predetermined by the Bank). Once those goals were met, more income in the form of incentives could be earned. Incentives were based on productivity: A personal banker would receive credit for opening new accounts in excess of his or her stated goals. In addition, the employee could accumulate points which could be used to purchase consumer goods such as televisions, stereos and other household goods. Each Bank employee was assigned a NBK number, which is essentially an internal employee number. Each employee was also asked to select a private, confidential password for use in logging on to the Bank computer system. Bank policy forbade employees from sharing their password with anyone, even with Bank computer technology personnel. Passwords had to be changed on a regular basis (usually every 90 days) as an added measure of security. All employees were charged with understanding and following the policy concerning passwords. In order for a personal banker (or other authorized employee) to open a new account for a customer, the employee must log onto the Bank computer using their NBK and password. The account would then be electronically opened using the Bank computer system. Once the electronic process was complete, a signature card would be printed for the customer's signature. Sections of the signature card would be manually filled in by the Bank employee who opened the account; that person would theoretically be the same employee who had electronically opened the account. On Saturday, April 30, 2005, Marcia Clark, the bank manager for Rosemont, was at work. It was a busy day at the banking center. Dorothy Faulk, a long-time employee of the Bank, was also working on that day. Faulk was a customer service specialist who had authority, among other things, to open new accounts for customers. On that day Faulk was filling the role of personal banker (in name only; she was not included in the personal banker's incentive program while filling the role in that limited basis). Towards the end of the workday (1:00 p.m. because it was Saturday), Clark found a new account signature card on the office copy machine. The signature card indicated that Petitioner had opened the account, but Clark knew Petitioner had not been working on that day. Since it was almost time to close for the day, Clark opted to deal with the apparent discrepancy during the next business week. On the following Tuesday, May 3, 2005, Clark asked Petitioner about the signature card she had found the previous Saturday. Petitioner indicated that Faulk must have logged on to the Bank computer system using Petitioner's password. In response to further inquiry by Clark, Petitioner admitted giving her password to Faulk for that purpose. The next day, Clark asked Faulk about the signature card and whether she had logged on using Petitioner's password. Faulk said that she had indeed used the password, but that it had been a one-time occurrence. Clark then discussed the situation with her supervisor, Debbie Nelson, the Bank's consumer market manager. Nelson was concerned about what Clark told her, and she told Clark to contact the Bank's senior investigator, Roy Gonzaque, so that he could look into the matter. Meanwhile, Clark pulled internal bank documents known as PMRRs (the Performance Measurement Rewards and Recognition tool) in an effort to determine whether there were other instances where Petitioner's password had been used when she was not actually at work.3 Within a week, Gonzaque came to Rosemont and interviewed a number of employees, including Petitioner and Faulk. He also examined the documents which had been reviewed by Clark and which showed the following: December 18, 2004--four new accounts were opened under Petitioner's password; March 5, 2005--three new accounts were opened under Petitioner's password; March 19, 2005--three new accounts were opened under Petitioner's password; and April 30, 2005--three new accounts were opened under Petitioner's password. Each of those days was a Saturday on which Petitioner was not at work. A signature card was found for each of those days as well; each of the cards had Faulk's handwriting on it.4 Gonzaque questioned Petitioner and obtained a voluntary written statement in which Petitioner admitted giving her password to Faulk, but said she believed prior managers had known about and condoned the practice. Petitioner then admitted her wrong-doing and apologized for engaging in that activity. Faulk was also questioned and wrote a statement saying that she had been opening accounts using personal bankers' passwords for about one and a half years.5 Faulk said she opened accounts under the personal banker number in order to make sure customers would not have to wait to long. That statement is not credible because Faulk had the authority to open new accounts under her own number. Further, the statement contradicts what Faulk said to Clark on the day she was first confronted. Faulk also wrote that she didn't know Petitioner would benefit financially as a result of the action. Again, this statement is not credible because Faulk had been a personal banker and knew how the incentive bonuses were calculated. Faulk stated that Clark not only knew about this practice, but that Clark inquired why Faulk was not opening accounts for other personal bankers as well in order to be "fair."6 Gonzaque, Nelson, and Clark met to discuss the situation further. They called the Personnel Office at the Bank's headquarters during their meeting. The Personnel Office recommended that upon those facts, both Petitioner's and Faulk's employment should be terminated. Despite the fact both employees had exemplary work histories, a consensus was reached by the three management personnel to terminate employment. It was a difficult decision to make and, actually, was detrimental to Rosemont because Faulk and Petitioner were well known by bank customers. Clark was responsible for informing Petitioner about the termination of employment. When Clark did so, Petitioner did not raise any objection. Without saying a word Petitioner turned over her keys and other Bank property in her possession and then walked out of the bank. She showed no emotion and made no comments to Clark or anyone else. Petitioner had earned performance and incentive bonuses on a regular basis. Her earned bonus for the quarter preceding her termination from employment was to be in excess of $8,300. That was significantly larger than average bonuses earned by other employees.7 The Bank opted not to pay that bonus to Petitioner on the basis that she had gained it fraudulently, i.e., by allowing someone else (Faulk) to open accounts for her. As Gonzaque described it, Petitioner had "lied, cheated and manipulated the system" to get the bonus. Each Bank employee must read and understand the "Code of Ethics and General Policy on Insider Trading" (the "Code"). The Code is available both on-line and in hard copy format. Petitioner acknowledged in writing annually that she had read, understood, and agreed to comply with the Code. The Code requires employees to abide by the Associate Handbook, to abide by all Bank policies, and to seek counsel concerning any questions about ethical issues that might arise. The Bank's Associate Handbook includes information concerning passwords. It states unequivocally that "Associates must not share their passwords, including e-mail passwords, with any other person-- not even technical support personnel." Further, passwords were not to be stored under keyboards or other unsecured places. Two former Rosemont employees remembered isolated incidences of password sharing. Sherri Nichols remembers an assistant manager asking each teller for their passwords on one occasion so that he could take some sort of test for them. The assistant manager (Jeremy Barkley) does not remember doing so, and his testimony is credible. Carmita Kelly remembers Barkley using her terminal--where she had logged on--for a short period of time while she stood nearby. Even if those instances did occur, they did not involve use of a personal banker's password to open new accounts. There was no other competent evidence that employees had been sharing passwords in the manner alleged by Petitioner. Petitioner has not found suitable employment since the date of her termination from Rosemont. She has applied to a number of places without success. In some of her employment applications, she misrepresented her departure from Rosemont, indicating that she had not been terminated from employment. Her explanation for that false statement was that "I was trying to get employment." Petitioner seemed devoid of remorse or guilt and appeared to believe that the end justified the means, thus diminishing her credibility at final hearing. Unlike Petitioner's failure, Faulk was able to obtain employment with another lending institution only a couple of weeks after being let go by Rosemont. She now works with yet another bank. After Petitioner's and Faulk's employment was terminated, Rosemont hired new employees. It appears the two positions held by Petitioner and Faulk (personal banker and customer service specialist, respectively) were not filled by persons with the same level of experience as the terminated employees. Rather, persons were hired who could be trained to fill those positions upon further training. A number of persons were hired, but it is unclear from the evidence at final hearing whether any one person was hired to directly fill Petitioner's position. Two white males were hired, as was a Hispanic woman, but no witness could provide a clear history of when each was hired and for what specific job. At no time during her employment with the Bank or Rosemont did Petitioner hear anyone make a discriminatory remark to her based on her race or age. Employees described the Rosemont employees as a "team" who all worked together for the common good. Both the Bank and Rosemont had a history of diversity in hiring practices. One of the three persons making the decision to terminate the employment of Petitioner was African-American. The evidence at final hearing was conclusive that race was not a factor in the decision to terminate Petitioner (and Dorothy Faulk).8 It is clear that Rosemont did not hire or fire employees on the basis of race and that every employee was given the opportunity for advancement regardless of race. In the case of Petitioner, she had been regularly promoted, honored, and financially rewarded for her work. She suffered no adverse actions on the basis that she was African-American.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, finding Respondent not guilty of an unlawful employment practice and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that each party's request for an assessment of attorney's fees and costs in this matter is DENIED. Although Petitioner acknowledged that no one at the Bank had ever made any remarks concerning her race, she nonetheless alleged and attempted to prove that the issue resulting in her termination from employment was motivated by race. The facts did not support her allegation, but it was not a frivolous charge in and of itself. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2007.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.10760.11
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CLYDE WALKER vs. WACKENHUT SERVICES, INC., 82-000478 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000478 Latest Update: Jun. 10, 1983

The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are whether or not the Respondent discriminatorily discharged the Petitioner, at least in part, based on race or other unlawful considerations, and whether or not the Respondent's employment policies, as practiced against the Petitioner herein, have an adverse impact upon blacks and/or other minorities. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, the proposed memoranda and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found:

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from March 12, 1979 to May 29, 1979. Petitioner was notified of his termination by Respondent's agent, Captain James McRaven, on May 29, 1979. Petitioner's efforts to be employed by Respondent commenced with his completing an application during 1978. In this regard, Industrial Relations' Manager, Earle Patrick, sought out Petitioner for employment with Wackenhut as part of his duties of recruiting qualified minority employees for positions. Patrick's effort included personal contacts, advertising, and other recruiting methods, including the use of service organizations in Brevard and the immediate surrounding counties. Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick advised Petitioner that a background investigation is conducted on each employee hired by Wackenhut. Petitioner's knowledge of Respondent's background investigations is further verified by a review of the application, completed by Petitioner, which provides in pertinent part: I . . . agree that if, in the judgment of the company . . . the results of such investigation are not satisfactory, any offer of employment made by the company may be withdrawn, or my employment with the company may be terminated immediately without any obligation or liability to me . . . Respondent has a policy of not extending offers of employment to applicants with convictions involving penalties in excess of a $25.00 fine, except minor traffic violations. Petitioner indicated on the first page of his application for employment that he had never been convicted of a violation of any law. Additionally, this fact was again admitted by the Petitioner during the subject hearing herein. Further, on two separate occasions prior to the Petitioner's commencement of employment with Respondent, Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick inquired of Petitioner whether or not his back ground investigation would reveal anything, aside from convictions, that he (Patrick) should be made aware of. On both occasions Petitioner replied "I am clean." Background investigations of the Petitioner indicated that Petitioner had been placed on one(1)year probation on April 10, 1978, for unemployment compensation fraud. That background investigation revealed further that other counts of unemployment compensation fraud had been withdrawn, and a further charge of issuing worthless checks in Kentucky had been dismissed. Petitioner pled guilty to the first count of unemployment compensation fraud and was placed on supervised probation for one (1) year. The court withheld adjudication of guilt. While a probationer, Petitioner was not allowed to carry a gun. Further, the Petitioner did not apply for any modification of the terms of his probation which would allow him to carry a firearm. Respondent maintains a rigid requirement for employee conduct and integrity for its security guard employees. (Respondent's Exhibit 15, Section 4.6.2.3 and Respondent's Exhibits 6 and 16.) The decision to discharge Petitioner was based on the results of the Respondent's background investigation of Petitioner and following consultation with its labor counsel, its Industrial Relations Manager, and the Chief of Security. Although the Petitioner contends that the Respondent was aware of his criminal background prior to employment, the documentary and other evidence introduced herein fails to support his claim in that regard. Further, the evidence reveals that the Petitioner does not employ, or even consider for employment, applicants who have pled guilty to a felony charge. This policy consideration is based on the Respondent's concern for high standards of integrity among its security guards due to the sensitive nature and other security considerations involved in its contract with NASA. In addition to the unlawful discharge allegation, Petitioner also alleged that he was unlawfully discriminated against in his employment with Respondent based on his failure to be selected for the SWAT Team; the fact that he as discriminatorily assigned to a remote and difficult security job assignment; the failure of Respondent to award him overtime work assignments, and finally, a claim that he was "grilled" by Captain McRaven. As to his non-selection to be a member of the SWAT Team, the Respondent bases its selection to the SWAT Team on employees who demonstrate a high proficiency in weapons, prior SWAT Team experience, and other factors, including length of employment. As to Petitioner's claim that he was discriminatorily assigned to a remote and difficult security job assignment, evidence reveals that Respondent attempts to assign employees to all of the possible job locations in an effort to acquaint them as much as possible so that they can be assigned to any and all post assignments as needed. Respondent selects employees for overtime assignments based on job seniority as set forth in its contract with the employee's job representative. Finally, no evidence was introduced herein to substantiate Petitioner's claim that he was "grilled" by Captain McRaven as charged. Petitioner acknowledged that there was a problem with his carrying a firearm while he was a probationer; however, he failed to mention his concern to any of Respondent's agents. Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick related that had the results of Petitioner's background investigation only revealed the disorderly conduct charge in Kentucky, Petitioner would still have been in Respondent's employ. The decision to terminate Petitioner was promoted by his guilty plea to a felony charge. Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick made a conscious effort to increase the number of minority employees with the Respondent. As example, during the month of April, 1978, Respondent's minority employees amounted to less than 1 percent of its total complement of employees, and during the course of the hearing, the complement of minority employees approximates 12 percent of the Respondent's total work force. Further, the number of minority employees shows a steady increase since the Respondent was awarded the subject contract with NASA in 1978. Richard G. Fritz, an associate professor who has earned a doctorate degree in economics, was received as an expert in statistics in this proceeding. 2/ Following a review of the "cause determination" introduced herein by the Intervenor, Dr. Fritz rendered his expert opinion that that determination was informational but not relevant herein, inasmuch as the reference groups were too small to be statistically accurate. Dr. Fritz reviewed several samples to determine a 50 percent accuracy rate and statistically determined that a sample size would need to number at least 102.18 in order to be valid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the PETITION FOR RELIEF filed herein. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1983.

USC (1) 42 USC 2000 Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ARTHUR R. JONES vs PROGRESS RAIL SERVICES, INC., 96-002768 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Jun. 11, 1996 Number: 96-002768 Latest Update: Oct. 16, 1997

The Issue The issue is whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the petition for relief filed on April 19, 1996.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, petitioner, Arthur R. Jones, alleges that in October 1993, when he was fifty-four years of age, he was unlawfully terminated from his position as a welder with respondent, Progress Rail Services, Inc. (PRS), on account of his age. After conducting a preliminary investigation of the claim, the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred. Petitioner then filed his petition for relief realleging the same disparate treatment. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of refurbishing railroad cars and is located in Green Cove Springs, Florida. Although there is no direct evidence as to the number of persons employed by PRS, through representation of its counsel in his opening statement, it can be inferred that PRS employed fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the year when the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or in the preceding calendar year. After taking a welding test, petitioner began employment with PRS in April 1992. Initially, he worked as a carpenter, but he was later transferred to a "weld out" position. The latter position involved physically demanding work and required petitioner and a co-worker, working as a team, to weld steel tops onto railroad car frames. During petitioner's tenure as a PRS employee, PRS had a progressive discipline policy which provided that an employee would receive a verbal warning, followed by a written warning, which was then followed by placement on probation. The fourth and final step was termination of employment. PRS's absenteeism and tardy policy was based on a point system. Employees received one point for tardy or early leave, and two points for absences. When the employee reached eight points, a verbal warning was given in accordance with the progressive discipline policy. A total of twelve points resulted in a written warning while sixteen points resulted in a period of probation. Eighteen points resulted in termination. On November 17, 1992, petitioner was given his first verbal warning regarding absenteeism. On March 24, 1993, petitioner again received a verbal warning for failing to report to work on time. On the March 24 disciplinary action form, petitioner was admonished by his supervisor to "come to work on time." On May 12, 1993, petitioner was given a written warning for absenteeism. On the disciplinary action form, the supervisor noted that petitioner "need(ed) to improve on come (sic) to work all work day." As of May 24, 1992, petitioner had accumulated seventeen points, and thus he was placed on probation for excessive absenteeism. His supervisor again warned him in writing "not (to) be late or absent," and if he was, "(i)t will result in your termination at (PRS)." All of the foregoing disciplinary actions were taken by supervisor O'Bryant. Sometime after May 24, 1992, petitioner began working under a new supervisor, Thomas M. Martin. On December 12, 1992, petitioner was given a verbal warning by Martin for "not wearing safety shoes." The warning was justified since petitioner was not wearing lace-up safety shoes as required by company policy. In May 1993, petitioner was transferred to a "weld-out" position under the supervision of Randy Cochran. On September 3, 1993, Cochran gave petitioner a written warning for "not doing (the) job assign(ed) to him!" Petitioner had been instructed to clean out a storage boxcar but was found reading a newspaper. He was advised in writing that he "need's (sic) to perform the job assign(ed) to him!" On October 1, 1993, petitioner was placed on probation for poor "work performance" due to not meeting established time standards for a particular job. Specifically, he was charged with "taking too long to do the work" by "spend(ing) 5.0 hours on (a job that) should have taken 2.0 hours to complete." He was told in writing to "(d)o (his) job within the time standards," or face possible "termination." After observing petitioner continually failing to meet established time standards during the next few days, on October 6, 1993, Cochran verbally warned petitioner that unless he "made the time standard" on the job he was working that morning, he would be terminated. When Cochran later observed petitioner "way behind" on his job, petitioner was terminated for poor "work performance." According to the disciplinary action form, petitioner was "not able to complete work within time standards." These time standards were uniformly applied to all welders regardless of age, and the dismissal was in conformity with PRS's progressive discipline policy. There is no credible evidence that PRS was motivated by discriminatory animus when it made this employment decision. Whether petitioner was replaced by another person, and if so, the age of that person, is not of record. When an employee leaves employment with PRS, an exit interview is conducted to identify any problems with employment policies and procedures, including management practices. Complaints made by the employee regarding unfair treatment, such as discrimination, are recorded on the exit interview form. When petitioner was discharged, an exit interview was conducted. During the interview, petitioner made no complaints regarding suspected age discrimination. Petitioner was not employed from the time of his discharge until November 16, 1994. On that date, he began collecting Social Security disability benefits. During the years 1991 through 1994, PRS discharged eighty-one employees. Of those, twenty-four were age forty or over. In 1995, respondent had one hundred fifty-seven employees, of which sixty-one were age forty or older. At hearing, petitioner contended that Randy Cochran, his supervisor from May 1993 until his termination, made discriminatory comments regarding his age. Specifically, petitioner contended that, on more than one occasion, Cochran called him an "old man" and threatened to fire him on account of his age. These allegations, however, are not deemed to be credible and are hereby rejected.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the the Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Arthur R. Jones Post Office Box 8 Satsuma, Florida 32189 Charles F. Henley, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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KENNETH W. JOHNSON vs DAYTONA INN BEACH RESORT, 09-001592 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Wewahitchka, Florida Mar. 27, 2009 Number: 09-001592 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race.

Findings Of Fact In February 2006, Respondent hired Petitioner, an African-American male, knowing that he had a criminal record. Respondent employed Petitioner as a porter. Respondent employed other African-American and Caucasian people as porters, housekeepers, and janitors. Initially, Respondent paid Petitioner $7.25 per hour. Respondent was impressed with Petitioner's enthusiasm and willingness to perform physically demanding work. Respondent gave Petitioner a reward for always being on time and not being absent. Respondent eventually raised Petitioner's salary to $10.00 per hour or $400 per week. Respondent gave Petitioner the promotion so that he and his wife could qualify for a mortgage. Respondent helped Petitioner pay off his wife's credit card debt for the same reason. After Petitioner and his family moved into their new home, Carol Collett, Respondent's Caucasian General Manager, helped Petitioner furnish the house. Ms. Collett also attended the christening of Petitioner's new baby. Ms. Collett tried to help Petitioner as much as she could because she believed that everyone deserves a second chance. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked the night shift when there was no supervisor on the premises. Petitioner's position required Ms. Collett's trust because his duties included taking care of the front desk. From approximately June 2007 through November 2007, Petitioner worked an average of 62 hours per week with no overtime compensation. There is no persuasive evidence that the other porters, Caucasian and/or African-American, were paid more than Petitioner or for overtime work. Petitioner never requested a raise, but he did request to work as a janitor. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that a janitor's position was available. More importantly, Petitioner lacked the skills to perform janitorial/maintenance work for Respondent. In time, Ms. Collett noticed a change in Petitioner's behavior. On one occasion, Petitioner's wife informed Ms. Collett that Petitioner had not come home with his pay check. On or about November 3, 2007, Ms. Collett confronted Petitioner about his declining job performance and his suspicious activities involving hotel guests. Petitioner denied that he was using or selling drugs or that he brought hookers to the job site. During the conversation, Petitioner began to cry, stating that he had let Ms. Collett down. Petitioner said that he "would rather to go back jail where life was easier and he would not have the pressure of daily life." Ms. Collett did not have a chance to terminate Petitioner because he left voluntarily. Petitioner came back to the hotel one time to pick up his last pay check. At that time, Ms. Collett confronted Petitioner about some money that was missing from the front office. The office had been locked the night before, but someone had entered it through the ceiling from the adjoining room. Petitioner could not find another job. He is now in prison.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth W. Johnson, DC #646344 Gulf Correctional Institution 699 Ike Steele Road Wewahitchka, Florida 32465 Jerome D. Mitchell, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 1326 South Ridgewood Avenue Suite 8 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (4) 120.569760.01760.10760.11
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