The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to place Respondent, a classroom teacher, on administrative leave without pay from November 20, 2013, through the remainder of the 2013- 2014 school year due to Respondent’s excessive absenteeism, as alleged in the December 19, 2013, Statement of Charges.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty of operating, controlling, and supervising all free public schools within St. Lucie County, Florida, pursuant to article IX, section 4(b), Florida Constitution, and section 1001.32, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a teacher at PSLHS, a public school in St. Lucie County, Florida. Respondent has been employed by the District for approximately 20 years. Respondent has a professional services contract pursuant to section 1012.33. As a classroom teacher, Respondent is charged with instructing high school students. Regular attendance is considered by Petitioner to be an essential function of the position of classroom teacher. Pursuant to Board Policy 6.549(1)(a), Respondent was entitled to four days of sick leave as of the first day of employment of each school year and thereafter earned one sick day for each month of employment, for a maximum of ten sick days per school year. 2012-2013 School Year During the 2012-2013 fiscal year, Respondent was assigned to teach intensive math classes to students who struggle to pass required state exams required for graduation. Hargadine, in coordination with Petitioner’s Human Resources Department, directed Assistant Principal April Rogers (Rogers) to meet with Respondent on October 2, 2012, to address Respondent’s pattern of absenteeism and the impact it was having on students, and to explore the possibility of accommodations if his frequent absences were caused by a health condition. At least one student asked to be removed from Respondent’s class due to the frequency of Respondent’s absences. As directed, on October 2, 2012, Rogers met with Respondent and discussed Petitioner’s concerns that Respondent’s absences resulted in his students missing math instruction for 39 percent of their scheduled classes. Respondent was notified that he had already exhausted his available sick leave and he had not properly filled out leave requests in a timely manner. During this meeting, Respondent acknowledged that his absences had a negative impact on students. This conference was memorialized in a Summary of Conference dated October 2, 2012, issued to Respondent from Rogers. After the October 2, 2012, meeting, Respondent was also absent on October 16 through 19, 2012. On October 23, 2012, Rogers issued a Letter of Concern to Respondent detailing his continued excessive absenteeism and failure to timely request leave. The letter advised that Respondent’s absenteeism amounted to 17 of 42 instructional days and equated to 40 percent of lost instructional time for Respondent’s students. This letter reiterated that Respondent’s absences directly affect his students’ educational success. In addition to Respondent disrupting the continuity of the classroom by failing to attend work, Respondent also failed to supply adequate lesson plans and/or provide for student instruction while he took unapproved leave. On several occasions, Hargadine or her assistant principal had to create or add to the lesson plans to enable a substitute to teach Respondent’s classes. Respondent’s absenteeism and lack of proper notice of his absences resulted in his students being “taught” by individuals who did not have a college degree in mathematics, or even education, as some of these individuals were substitutes (who only need a high school diploma), para-educators, and even clerical workers. When staff members were required to provide coverage for Respondent’s classes, it negatively impacted both students and co-workers. For example, if a clerical worker or para-educator was called to provide coverage for Respondent’s classes, their own work would have to wait and they would not be able to complete their own specific job duties in order to ensure coverage for Respondent’s students. After receiving the October 23, 2012, Letter of Concern, Respondent was also absent on October 31, November 1, November 2, November 5, and November 6, 2012. As the assistant superintendent for Human Resources, Ranew assists site-based administrators (principals and assistant principals) concerning staff discipline and adherence to policies and procedures. Rogers requested Ranew’s assistance in addressing Respondent’s absenteeism. On November 6, 2012, Ranew issued a letter to Respondent regarding his excessive absenteeism. This letter from Ranew reminded Respondent of the importance of him submitting leave requests because his school would not know of his absence even if he properly requested a substitute teacher using the AESOP (computerized) system. By this letter, Ranew also attempted to initiate the “interactive process” required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Although Respondent had not identified himself as a “qualified individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA, his excessive absenteeism suggested that he might need an accommodation if his absenteeism was being caused by a medical condition. The November 6 letter stated, “to the extent that your absenteeism is being caused by medical condition, the District may be agreeable to allowing you to take a leave [of absence] to accommodate such a condition, if that would help. In the event you realize that you are unable to regularly be at work due to a medical condition, you should consider promptly requesting an extended leave of absence (e.g., for this semester or the school year), and the District would be willing to consider such a request.” To determine Respondent’s potential eligibility for an accommodation pursuant to the ADA, Ranew specifically requested that Respondent’s doctor provide documentation clarifying: “a) any specific condition/impairment that Respondent has, as well as the cause; b) any restrictions/limitations on Respondent’s work duties as a teacher; c) the expected duration for each limitation or whether it is permanent; d) whether the condition is controllable with the use of medication, and if yes: what is the mitigating effect of this medication; and whether Respondent could fully perform his job duties, with the aid of such medication.” In response to Ranew’s letter, Respondent provided the District with a doctor’s note from Dr. Kenneth Palestrant dated November 7, 2012, stating that the majority of Respondent’s visits to the clinics occur between the months of January through May and September through December (effectively during the calendar school year) and speculated that Respondent “may” be exposed to allergens in the school building or in his classroom. Dr. Palestrant explained that Respondent was being treated with antibiotics and allergy medications and recommended Respondent receive an allergy test from an allergist to identify the specific allergens. Dr. Palestrant found that other than the potential environmental exposure to an allergen, he found “no reason [Respondent] cannot perform his full duties as a school teacher as he has no impairment and the medications he has been given have no mitigating effect upon his performance.” After receiving Dr. Palestrant’s November 7, 2012, note, and after receiving an e-mail from Respondent in which he wondered if something in his classroom might be causing his medical condition, Ranew asked Sanders to inspect Respondent’s classroom. Sanders’ job duties would require him to facilitate any remedial action with regard to Respondent’s classroom, should one be needed. In response to this request, Respondent’s classroom was inspected but nothing of concern was discovered within the room. Nonetheless, the classroom was sanitized using two methods: with an ozone machine to kill bacteria and other germs, including mold, and also with a fogger using disinfectant that kills microorganisms, bacteria, and mold, as a precaution. On November 15, 2012, Respondent sent an e-mail to Ranew, informing her that he was “being evaluated by an Allergist, and will be setting up a colonoscopy per doctor’s orders Tuesday, [November 20, 2012].” On November 15, 2012, Ranew sent an e-mail to Respondent requesting that he provide her with an allergist report when complete. On November 16, 2012, Respondent sent an e-mail to Ranew in which he discussed beginning to take a new allergy medicine, and promised to fax the allergist report to her. Ranew issued a letter to Respondent dated December 21, 2012, advising him that she had yet to receive an allergist report, again requesting such a report or medical clarification. Ranew’s December 21, 2012, letter also reminded Respondent that regular, consistent, punctual attendance, and working a full assigned workday are essential functions of his position as a classroom teacher. Although Respondent did not request leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), when he failed to provide the requested allergist report five weeks after Ranew requested it, and Respondent continued his pattern of excessive absenteeism, the District advised that it intended to designate his absences as FMLA-qualifying. Ranew’s December 21, 2012, letter to Respondent again requested clarification from Respondent’s doctor/allergist, with a focus on “whether there is a modification or adjustment to the work environment that will enable you to perform the essential functions of [your] position (classroom teacher).” Respondent was told, “[i]n the event that you believe that something such as trees, grass, or something else near your current classroom/school may be causing your condition, which has resulted in many absences, the [School] District is willing to consider a request to transfer you to another location.” Notably, Respondent did not provide any information from a health care provider which suggested any work modification would enable him to perform the essential functions of his job, nor did he take advantage of Petitioner’s offer of a transfer to another location. In response, Respondent emailed Ranew on December 29, 2012, advising that his allergy test would be conducted on January 3, 2013, and he would provide the results to her as soon as he received them. Respondent also expressed interest in obtaining information regarding short-term disability leave. On January 8, 2013, Ranew advised Respondent that if he desired to take leave in connection with his private insurance company’s short-term disability policy, she requested that he advise her “as soon as possible as the [School] District may be able to accommodate you with an extended leave.” There is no evidence that Respondent pursued Ranew’s offer for an accommodation in connection with short-term disability. By letter dated January 8, 2013, Ranew advised Respondent that she still had not received a copy of his allergist’s report, and she “had been trying to accommodate [Respondent], but it is difficult to do when the information [the School District] need[s] is still not provided.” Ranew again reminded Respondent that his students needed continuity in the classroom and, if he was unable to provide that, other arrangements would need to be made for the upcoming semester. Respondent provided Ranew with an allergist report dated January 18, 2013. The report explained that Respondent tested positive for multiple allergens, and recommended treatments, including immunotherapy (allergy injections), prescribed medications (nasal sprays), and surgery (balloon sinuplasty). Respondent’s allergist identified Respondent being allergic to 42 antigens, including cats, dogs, various grasses, weeds, trees, dust mites and cockroaches, and mold. Respondent’s allergist recommended Respondent undergo surgery, and Petitioner permitted Respondent to take FMLA leave for such surgery. Respondent was also permitted to intermittently use all remaining FMLA leave available to him, which he exhausted and which expired on March 28, 2013, due to the conclusion of his FMLA designated 12-month period. In addition to utilizing all FMLA leave available, the District also provided an additional 21 days of unpaid leave during the remainder of the 2012-2013 school year to Respondent, which was above and beyond his allotted sick leave, as well as above and beyond the 60 days of FMLA leave to which he was entitled. During the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent was absent 89 out of 191 possible work days, which accounts for an absenteeism rate of 48 percent. During the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent only worked 772.50 hours. Although Petitioner designated additional unpaid days as FMLA, Respondent was not eligible for additional FMLA leave beginning in March 2013 through March 2014 because he had not worked the requisite number of hours in the preceding 12- month period to be eligible for FMLA leave. 2013-2014 School Year On August 9, 2013, prior to the beginning of the 2013- 2014 school year, Ranew sent a letter to Respondent regarding his excessive absenteeism; explaining that his regular attendance was expected during the upcoming 2013-2014 school year; that his students need continuity in the classroom and if he was unable to provide that continuity, that other arrangements needed to be made for the next school year; that he should not expect to be automatically extended any additional unpaid leave during the 2013-2014 school year; and he would only receive the sick leave to which he was already entitled. Ranew advised Respondent that when he returned for work at the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year he would have four days of permitted sick leave advanced to him, and would accrue one additional day at the end of each month from August through February. In this letter, Ranew also told Respondent that it was her understanding that the sinus surgery that he underwent was part of his treatment plan to resolve the sinus and allergy issues which seriously impacted his attendance (during the 2012- 2013 school year) and that his chronic sinusitis was expected to improve post operatively. Respondent did not challenge or correct Ranew’s understanding on these issues and did not indicate that additional absences were anticipated. Ranew had serious concerns about the lack of consistent instruction for Respondent’s students due to Respondent’s absenteeism. Only 11 of Respondent’s 94 students passed the standardized math examination required for graduation in the 2012-2013 school year, which is approximately a 12 percent pass rate. This was significantly lower than the 50 percent pass rate of Respondent’s colleagues who also taught the same type of “struggling” math students. In order to minimize the potential disruption to students caused by excessive absenteeism, Respondent was assigned to teach accounting classes for the new school year which are not courses required for graduation. Respondent was also assigned to a different classroom, in a different building, for the 2013-2014 school year. As of October 3, 2013, Respondent was absent on August 27, 28, 29, 30, and September 5, 9, 20, 23, 25, 26, and October 2, 2013, well in excess of the sick leave that he was permitted to take in accordance with Board policy. By letter dated October 3, 2013, Ms. Ranew wrote to Respondent advising him that his pattern of absenteeism has a direct negative impact on an orderly learning environment and referring to her August 9 correspondence wherein she directed Respondent to advise the District if he needed leave above and beyond the sick days that he was permitted to take. Ranew advised Respondent that he had not provided the requested medical documentation that would support that he had a medical condition necessitating leave from his job, but that the District was continuing its attempt to engage Respondent in an interactive process concerning his medical condition, and again requested documentation from Respondent’s doctor addressing his recent absences and his current condition. In response to Ranew’s October 3, 2013, letter, Respondent submitted a doctor’s note dated October 9, 2013, which advised that Respondent’s condition “can be treated with nasal sprays and intermittent antibiotics” but raised the potential for future treatment to include additional surgical procedure(s). Importantly, the doctor’s note clearly explained that Respondent “can perform as a teacher with [his medical conditions], though he may notice hearing loss changes whenever he has middle ear fluid.” The October 9, 2013, doctor’s note Respondent submitted accounted for four of his absences in August and two of his absences in September, but failed to address the other eight absences which he incurred during September and October 2013. Even after receiving Ms. Ranew’s October 3, 2013, letter, Respondent was absent on October 9, 21, and 22, 2013. As of October 24, 2013, Respondent was absent 14 days out of 46 instructional days for the 2013-2014 school year. Ranew worked with Yost in the decision to recommend to the Board that Respondent be placed on administrative leave without pay. The basis for that recommendation was Respondent’s excessive absenteeism and failure to follow protocol for sick leave. By letter dated October 24, 2013, Yost advised Respondent that she was recommending his placement on a leave of absence specifically because of his continual excessive absenteeism, which had been a constant disruption to the classroom and directly impacted an orderly, continuous learning environment for his students. Yost believed that recommending Respondent be placed on leave without pay was not disciplinary in nature, but rather done to provide him an accommodation to resolve any issues which had caused his excessive absenteeism. On October 24, 2013, Yost placed Respondent on “home assignment” with pay through November 19, 2013, at which time the Board voted to accept Yost’s recommendation to place Respondent on leave without pay for the remainder of the school year. The Charges Against Respondent In its Statement of Charges in Support of the Placement on Administrative Leave Without Pay filed on December 19, 2013, the District advanced four theories for Respondent’s leave without pay: incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, and misconduct in office. “Incompetency” is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(3) as, “the inability, failure or lack of fitness to discharge the required duty as a result of inefficiency or incapacity.” “Gross insubordination” is defined in rule 6A-5.056(4) as “the intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority; misfeasance, or malfeasance as to involve failure in the performance of the required duties.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-5.056(2)(c). “Willful neglect of duty” is defined in rule 6A-5.056(5) as the “intentional or reckless failure to carry out required duties.” “Misconduct in Office,” according to rule 6A-5.056(2), is satisfied by a showing of one or more of the following: a violation of the adopted school board rules, a violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida (as adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.001), or behavior that disrupts the student’s learning environment. The Board’s Policy 6.301(3)(b) identifies a variety of terminable offenses including: Insubordination * * * (x) Failure to follow a direct order in normal performance of employee’s job * * * Failure to notify supervisor and receive permission for one or more consecutive workdays’ absence Unsatisfactory work performance Excessive absences or tardiness Neglect of duty Unauthorized absences * * * (xix) Violation of any rule, policy, regulation, or established procedure * * * (xxix) Any violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession, the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession, the Standards of Competent and Professional Performance, or the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees * * * (xxxiv) Failure to correct performance deficiencies The finding that Respondent violated one and/or multiple Board policies relating to his excessive absenteeism necessarily shows that he is guilty of “misconduct in office.” Respondent’s Defenses Reason for Absences Respondent does not dispute his record of absenteeism or the District’s record of communicating its concern regarding his chronic absenteeism and its effect on his students. Rather, Respondent asserts that his absenteeism was related to the environmental conditions at PSLHS. Respondent believes that he suffered from chronic sinus problems, headaches, and repeated scratchy throats due to possible exposure to mold or other allergens at the school which caused many of his absences. According to Respondent, PSLHS suffered storm damage in 2008 that resulted in mold growing around his classroom door. After school authorities were notified by Respondent of the mold issue, the door and mold was removed. Respondent has not worked in that classroom in more than three years. Respondent admitted that some of his absences during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years were not related to sinus problems. For example, Respondent missed work when he stayed up late with a new puppy. Respondent also missed work to get massage therapy on several occasions. Several of Respondent’s absences were attributed to stomach issues. None of Respondent’s doctors identified any need for Respondent to be extensively absent from work due to any medical condition, other than his recommended sinus surgery which occurred in early 2013 and was covered by FMLA. No evidence was introduced at the hearing that any of Respondent’s doctors actually determined that anything either at PSLHS or within Respondent’s classroom caused Respondent’s excessive absenteeism, or that Respondent could not work at PSLHS due any medical reason. To the contrary, during the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent provided 30 doctor’s notes returning him to work with no restrictions. During the 2013-2014 school year, Respondent provided four doctor’s notes returning him to work with no restrictions. Respondent admitted he was allergic to various grasses and trees common to Florida, and even admitted he was allergic to the grass in his own yard. When Respondent was asked if anything changed in his home environment between the 2011-2012 and 2012- 2013 school years where his absences skyrocketed, he testified that he had just gotten a puppy. During the relevant time period, approximately 70 percent of Respondent’s absences occurred on days when the proceeding day was not a school day, which suggests it was unlikely that Respondent’s absences were due to the environment at his work site. Although Respondent claimed his school environment exacerbated his allergies, his absences at issue are full-day absences where he called in sick for the entire day rather than leaving work during the workday. At no time did Respondent or his healthcare providers suggest that PSLHS or Respondent’s classroom should have air quality testing. Respondent admitted, on the days he was absent, he felt worse when he woke up at home than when he was at work in his classroom and when he was too sick to come to work he would wake up “hacking.” Further, while on administrative leave without pay, Respondent showed up to PSLHS in January 2014 to oversee a wrestling tournament that he previously helped organize. It is illogical that Respondent would voluntarily return to the very place which he now suggests made him so sick that he needed to continuously take days off without available leave or sick time. No credible evidence was presented to suggest that Respondent’s chronic absenteeism was as a result of the District’s failure “to provide a suitable working environment,” as alleged by Respondent.1/ Use of Administrative Leave Rather Than Discipline The Board asserts that Respondent’s chronic pattern of absences during the 2012-2013 school year and the first few months of the 2013-2014 school year resulted in “just cause” for termination. However, in lieu of termination, Ranew proposed, and the Board accepted, her recommendation for administrative leave without pay. Ranew credibly testified that she believed this would give Respondent the opportunity to take care of any problems that were causing his absenteeism and allow him to successfully return to the classroom in the 2014-2015 school year. There is no provision under any statute, rule, or policy specifically providing the Board with the authority to place an employee on administrative leave without pay instead of a suspension without pay or termination.2/ Because of this, Respondent argues that he was deprived of due process by the Board and that the Board’s action constitutes the improper use of an unpromulgated rule. A “rule” is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as an: agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of rule. § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. No evidence was presented regarding any alleged Board “statement of general applicability” regarding the use of administrative leave without pay as a substitute for disciplinary action. Further, it is clear from the record that Respondent received all the process to which he was entitled--notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the implementation of the leave without pay. Respondent was provided a letter by hand delivery on October 24, 2013, from Yost in which he was advised that he was being placed on temporary duty assignment until the next Board meeting and that she intended to recommend he be placed on administrative leave without pay through the remainder of the school year due to his excessive absenteeism. He was notified that he had exhausted all paid leave yet continued to be absent. It was also noted that Respondent’s physician indicated he could perform as a teacher but may have a hearing loss when middle ear fluid is present. Notably, his physician’s letter accounted for four of his absences in August and two of his absences in September 2013, but did not address the other eight absences which he incurred during September and October 2013. This letter advised Respondent that if he had any information to provide regarding why this action should not be taken, he could do so in a meeting or in writing. Accordingly, Respondent had notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the implementation of the leave without pay. Additionally, the Statement of Charges issued on December 19, 2013, and the formal administrative hearing before DOAH constituted notice and an evidentiary hearing-–the post adverse employment action due process to which Respondent was entitled. The undersigned has no doubt about the sincerity of the Board’s desire to see Respondent take time to address whatever was resulting in his absences and return to work successfully. However, to call Respondent’s “administrative leave without pay” a non-disciplinary action is an exercise in form over substance. While on leave, Respondent was not receiving his normal wages for teaching. He was not allowed to return to the school to teach for the balance of the school year.3/ Understandably, Respondent does not perceive his leave as beneficent. For all intents and purposes it is, in fact, a “suspension” without pay which, pursuant to the Board’s policies, applicable rules, and statutes, can only be imposed for “just cause.”4/ Determinations of Ultimate Fact The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Respondent engaged in a pattern of excessive and chronic unexcused absenteeism during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years, despite the District’s repeated reminders regarding the disruption caused by Respondent’s absences and its multiple attempts to accommodate any medical condition that might have been causing the absences.5/ This pattern resulted in a variety of terminable offenses as described in Board Policy 6.301(3)(b). It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of incompetency, as defined by rule 6A- 5.056(3)(a)5. by virtue of his excessive absenteeism--a pattern which was not resolved after FMLA leave, 21 additional days of leave without pay during the 2012-2013 school year, and which continued into the new school year of 2013-2014. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of gross insubordination by virtue of his failure to perform his required duties, excessive absenteeism despite having no paid leave available, and failing to return to work on a consistent and regular basis after repeated and extensive counseling by the District regarding the consequences of his actions. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent engaged in willful neglect of duty by failing to regularly report to work or to properly request time off from work or make arrangements to have lesson plans available for substitute teachers. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent engaged in misconduct in office by virtue of his violation of School Board policies and disrupting his students’ learning environment by his chronic absenteeism.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, St. Lucie County School Board, enter a final order upholding Respondent’s suspension without pay from November 20, 2013, through the end of the 2013- 2014 school year; denying back pay for the full period of his suspension; and reinstating Respondent’s employment as a teacher at the start of the 2014-2015 school year. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on an alleged disability in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent initially hired Petitioner as a legal secretary in 1997. At that time, Petitioner worked in Respondent's office in Chipley, Florida. Petitioner suffered no continuing medical problems in 1997. In a memorandum dated April 17, 2001, Respondent's staff advised Petitioner that employees using more leave than they had earned would have to be place on "leave without pay" for the time used in excess of time earned. In a letter dated May 14, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she intended to resign her position as a legal secretary effective May 25, 2001. Petitioner wrote the letter because she was moving to Apalachicola, Florida. Instead of accepting Petitioner's resignation, Respondent offered and Petitioner accepted a transfer as a legal secretary in Respondent's office in Port St. Joe, Florida. Petitioner was able to continue working for Respondent without a break in service. In the summer of 2002, Petitioner began to suffer from an unexplained shortness of breath. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent knew the cause for the symptoms Petitioner was experiencing. By letter dated October 9, 2002, Respondent once again advised Petitioner that she could not use more leave time than the amount she earned. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's excessive time-off caused a reduction in her salary for "leave without pay." In a memorandum dated October 11, 2002, Respondent's staff documented concerns about Petitioner's attendance and performance. One of the concerns was Petitioner's chronic failure to file reports in a timely manner. Petitioner was late in filing the reports even though Respondent allowed her to prepare them at home and send them to Respondent by facsimile transmission from her husband's place of business. In February 2003, Petitioner still did not have a medical diagnosis to explain why she was sick and unable to work. On or about February 13, 2003, Petitioner and her supervisor agreed that Petitioner would take leave without pay pending an excuse from a doctor that she was unable to work. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent offered to let Petitioner have an indefinite leave of absence is not persuasive. On March 12, 2003, Petitioner provided Respondent medical documentation, excusing her from work due to unspecified illness through March 17, 2003. On or about March 14, 2003, Petitioner was admitted to the hospital. Subsequent medical tests revealed blood clots in Petitioner's lungs. Petitioner was eventually released from the hospital with prescriptions for blood thinning medication and oxygen. On or about March 20, 2003, Petitioner sent Respondent a doctor's excuse by facsimile transmission. The doctor's note, dated March 18, 2003, excused Petitioner from work for two weeks. On or about April 2, 2003, Petitioner sent Respondent a doctor's excuse by facsimile transmission. The doctor stated that Petitioner had been hospitalized with a serious condition called pulmonary embolus and that she continued to have significant symptoms of shortness of breath and fatigue. The doctor's note stated that Petitioner would not be able to work for six weeks. On May 5, 2003, Jackie Pooser, Respondent's Administrative Director, talked to Petitioner by telephone. Ms. Pooser advised Petitioner that she needed to provide another doctor's excuse by May 8, 2003, if she was still under a doctor's care and unable to return to work. Otherwise, Respondent expected Petitioner to resume her duties in Respondent's office in Port St. Joe, Florida. Petitioner was Respondent's only secretary in Port St. Joe, Florida. That office was in dire need of a performing secretary. However, apart from her illness, Petitioner was not anxious to return to work in the Port St. Joe office because she had a personality conflict with the only full-time attorney who worked there. During the May 5, 2003, telephone conversation, Petitioner did not tell Ms. Pooser that she was disabled or request any on-the-job accommodation. Instead, she led Ms. Pooser to believe that she intended to return to her job when authorized to do so by her doctor, hopefully in June 2003. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that she never requested that Respondent provide her with any type of accommodation. In a letter dated May 6, 2003, Ms. Pooser confirmed the May 5, 2003, phone conversation. In the letter, Ms. Pooser further reminded Petitioner that her medical excuse expired on May 8, 2003. The letter referred to the Public Defender Classification & Pay Plan requirements for a doctor's excuse without which an employee is considered to have abandoned his or her employment position. Petitioner's medical excuse expired on May 8, 2003. Petitioner did not return to work or provide Respondent with further medical documentation. On May 16, 2003, Respondent verbally terminated Petitioner by telephone. A follow-up letter dated May 19, 2003, stated that Petitioner's work performance had not been satisfactory for some period of time. The letter also stated that Petitioner had abandoned her position by failing to provide Respondent with a doctor's excuse. Petitioner's testimony that she requested her physician to send the medical excuse directly to Respondent by facsimile transmission is not persuasive. Petitioner did not call Respondent to inquire whether Respondent received the excuse or to offer any other explanation for failing to send medical documentation to Respondent. Petitioner's doctor subsequently released her to return to work. Petitioner received unemployment compensation for at least one month. In August 2003, Petitioner began working for a real estate company, checking guests into resort rentals. She resigned that job after working for one month. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she was not disabled when she worked for Respondent. According to Petitioner, she was diagnosed as being disabled in October 2003, after experiencing further medical problems. However, Petitioner has provided no competent (non-hearsay) evidence of that diagnosis. Respondent's attendance and leave policy states as follows in relevant part: STATEMENTS OF POLICY * * * The granting of any leave of absence with or without pay shall be in writing and shall be approved by the proper authority within the Public Defender Office. An employee who is granted leave of absence with or without pay shall be an employee of the Public Defender while on such leave and shall be returned to the same position or a different position in the same class and same work location upon termination of the approved leave of absence, unless the Public Defender and the employee agree in writing to other conditions and terms under which such leave is to be granted. Any leave of absence with or without pay shall be approved prior to the leave being taken except in the case of an emergency where the employee must be absent prior to receiving approval from the proper authority for the absence. * * * (b) If an employee's request for leave of absence is disapproved and the employee takes unauthorized leave, the Public Defender may place the employee on leave without pay and after an unauthorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays may consider the employee to have abandoned the position and resigned from the Public Defender's Office. * * * 3.14 FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE In accordance with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) regulated by the U.S. Department of Labor, eligible employees can receive up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period for the following reasons: . . . taking care of one's own serious health condition. Employees are not required to take all 12 weeks at once. The employee may request a few days or weeks off at a time (referred to as intermittent leave) or continue to work on a part-time basis (reduced leave). Unless written medical justification deems it necessary, the Public Defender is not required to grant intermittent or reduced leave. * * * (4) Employees must provide reasonable notice (30 days if possible) and make an effort to schedule their leave so as not to unduly disrupt agency operations. The Public Defender may request progress reports from the employees regarding leave status. * * * (7) The Public Defender may require certification from a healthcare provider regarding the need for medical leave, as well as certification of an employee's fitness to return to work. From August 1, 2002, through May 16, 2003, Respondent approved 518 hours or 12 weeks and 38 hours of leave without pay. During the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she received the leave without pay. Her testimony that she was not familiar with the above-referenced policies is not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Florida, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Herman D. Laramore, Esquire Public Defender, Fourteenth Circuit Jackson County Courthouse Post Office Box 636 Marianna, Florida 32447 Christian C. Griggs 130 25th Avenue Apalachicola, Florida 32320
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent has been a permanent full-time employee of petitioner's for over 22 years and at the time of the alleged abandonment was employed as a Engineer Technician III in petitioner's Second District and is subject to the Career Service rules of Chapter 22A, Florida Administrative Code. Walter Henry Skinner, III, is the District Engineer, Second District, with offices in Lake City, Florida, covering a 16 county area over northeast Florida. In this instance, directly below Mr. Skinner in the chain of command is Raymond O. Humphreys, Resident Construction Engineer. His is a supervising position as contract administrator for road and bridge contracts let by the petitioner to private contracting firms for construction of roads and bridges within 9 counties of the second district. Respondent has worked within Mr. Humphreys' jurisdiction since March, 1976. The record is not clear, but apparently there is at least one other supervisor between Mr. Humphreys and respondent, the position of survey crew chief. Respondent was granted leave of absence without pay on Humphreys' recommendation on May 1, 1983 through July 12, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit 9); October 3, 1983 through April 2, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8); and again on April 3, 1984 for 6 months (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4). Respondent returned to work before the end of this 6 months leave of absence without pay. The record does not reflect when respondent returned to work but apparently he returned to work sometime after his release from the Hamilton County Jail on July 9, 1984. The record shows that respondent was working on September 21, 1984 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). Respondent was granted 4 hours annual leave on September 24, 1984, 8 hours of annual leave on September 25, 1984 and 8 hours annual leave on September 26, 1984. On September 27, 1984 petitioner placed respondent on unauthorized leave of absence without pay. On September 27, 1984 petitioner was advised by Roger Tanner, respondent's probation officer, that respondent had bean incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail on September 26, 1984. Petitioner knew that respondent had 78.2 hours of accrued annual leave and 524.0 hours of accrued sick leave. Petitioner did not notify respondent that he had been placed on unauthorized leave without pay on September 27, 1984 until October 4, 1984 when petitioner delivered to respondent a letter from Skinner advising him that he had abandoned his position with the petitioner. Respondent had been incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail on: (1) April 22, 1983 to July 5, 1983; (2) July 23, 1983; (3) August 11, 1983 to August 12, 1983; (4) September 22, 1983 to July 9, 1984; and (5) September 26, 1984 to October 6, 1984. The evidence reflects that respondent had a "drinking problem" of which petitioner was aware but did very little "counseling" with respondent in this regard. On October 1, 1984 Mr. Markham, Humphreys Resident Office Manager, contacted Judge John Peach's office and was informed by his secretary, after she discussed the matter with Judge Peach, that respondent's "problem would be resolved in a few days" or at least "by the weekend." Respondent worked with a survey crew taking final measurements and checking work in the field completed by the contractors. Respondent was assigned to this survey crew by Humphreys because respondent did not have a valid driver's license. Walter H. Skinner had been delegated authority to take this type action against respondent by Mr. Pappas, Secretary of the Department of Transportation and such delegation was in effect at all times material herein.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that it be found that respondent did not abandon his position and resign from the Career Service as contemplated under Rules 22A-7.1O(2)(a) and 22A-8.O2, Florida Administrative Code and that respondent be reinstated to his position of Engineer Technician III as of September 27, 1984. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald K. Hudson, Esquire Post Office Box 948 Jasper, Florida 32052 Daniel C. Brown Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel 562 Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Seamless, at its Ocala, Florida plant from January 9, 1985 to June 21, 1985. At the time she was employed, she was furnished an employee handbook which outlines, among other things, the procedures for applying for and receiving leaves of absences. Mrs. Lanham had also been employed by Becton-Dickinson, a company owned by Dart & Kraft, Inc., the company which owns Seamless as well. Becton-Dickinson was the forerunner to the Seamless operation at the same plant site. During this previous period of employment, Mrs. Lanham applied for a four day leave of absence extending from March 7, 1984 through March 10, 1984 for medical reasons. The form application for a leave of absence prepared by the Petitioner and bearing her signature as well as those of the additional individuals in her chain of supervision reflects that the form was submitted subsequent to Mrs. Lanham's return from leave. Mrs. Lanham contends that she was discriminated against because of a physical handicap (rheumatoid arthritis) yet the employment application she executed on November 1, 1984, some two months before she was hired and approximately 7 months prior to the leave of absence which resulted in her termination, reflected that she did not have any physical condition which would limit her ability to perform the job applied for. Mrs. Lanham took an administrative leave on June 10, 1985 and remained absent until June 21, 1985. On June 10, Mrs. Lanham's husband delivered a disability certificate signed that date by Mrs. Lanham's physician, Dr. Panzer, to Mrs. Lanham's supervisor, Mrs. Kibler. This disability certificate was in turn transmitted to Mrs. Reese, the personnel specialist, by Mrs. Kibler. On June 12, Mrs. Reese talked by telephone with Mr. Lanham, advising him that Mrs. Lanham had to come in to fill out a form for a leave of absence. Later in the day, Mr. Lanham called back to say that Petitioner would be in the next morning. Mrs. Lanham did, in fact, come in on June 13. In a meeting in Mrs. Reese's office, Mrs. Reese gave Mrs. Lanham a form for a leave of absence request. At the time, Mrs. Lanham objected to coming in to fill out the form indicating she did not think it was necessary because she had a doctor's statement which she understood would make a leave of absence request unnecessary. In response, Mrs. Reese explained that the leave of absence request was necessary because the doctor's statement, previously submitted on June 10, showed no diagnosis and was, therefore, inadequate. In response Mrs. Lanham indicated she would not fill out or sign any form without first taking it to her attorney. The completed leave of absence form was received by Mrs. Reese that same day, after lunch, when Petitioner's husband brought it in and dropped it off at the reception desk. This leave of absence form is dated by Mrs. Lanham on June 12, 1985, and indicates in the explanation portion thereof that the reason for the requested leave of absence is "job related injury." When Mrs. Reese saw this entry, she immediately called Mrs. Lanham's home leaving word for Mrs. Lanham to return the call. This call was not returned, and, later in the day, Mrs. Reese again called Mrs. Lanham, this time leaving word for her to report to the Oakbrook Clinic for an examination of the job related injury the first thing the next day. Mrs. Lanham at no time reported to the clinic for the examination as directed either that day or any time thereafter. Repeated phone calls to the Lanham residence failed to result in Mrs. Lanham being reached. In addition, repeated requests by mail, telegram, and phone for her to come into the office and explain her absence were met with no response. In fact, Mrs. Lanham was on vacation during a substantial portion of the time of her absence a vacation which, she contends, her doctor advised her to take. There was no independent evidence in any form of the nature of Mrs. Lanham's condition or her doctor's prescribed course of treatment for it. Since, therefore, her leave of absence had not been approved, it was thereafter determined that she had abandoned her job and on June 21, 1985, she was notified by certified mail that a determination was made that she had voluntarily resigned her position with the company. Mrs. Lanham contends that she felt it was perfectly all right for her to wait until she returned from her leave of absence to submit the leave of absence request basing this conclusion on the fact that when she worked for Becton-Dickinson, some two years previously, that was the procedure followed. Though that might have been the procedure at the earlier time with the other company, it is clear that that was not the procedure followed by Seamless at the time in question and Mrs. Lanham's reliance on the earlier procedure, especially in light of the repeated contacts with her and the additional attempted contacts, result in the clear conclusion that she declined to comply with the company rules at her own peril. Mrs. Lanham indicates that the reason the diagnosis was not in the initial disability certificate submitted by her was that the lab work had not been completed at the time it was submitted and she failed to go to Oakbrook Clinic notwithstanding the repeated requests by Mrs. Reese because she understood that it was up to her to go at her convenience. She intended to go to Oakbrook when she got back from her vacation. 9. Subsequent to all the above, Mrs. Lanham settled a Workmen's Compensation claim in her case for some financial award. The terms of the settlement are not relevant to the issues herein. It is evident, however, that the award was based on compromise rather than liability and no firm determination of compensability was made. Mrs. Lanham was absent for three days prior to submitting the absence request form for this June 1985 absence. When the form was submitted, it contained information relating to a job related injury, which entry was placed there by Mrs. Lanham's attorney. This raised legitimate questions in the Respondent's personnel officials' minds to require further contact with Petitioner since there had been no previous notification of injury. By this time, however, Petitioner had either gone on vacation or for some other reason, refused to respond to the requests of the personnel people to either come into the plant or go to the clinic for evaluation. Mrs. Lanham may have had a valid disability, but it was not the disability for which she was terminated. It was the extended unexcused or unapproved absence from June 13 through June 21, a period of more than three days, which, under the guidelines set out in the employee manual, resulted in a legitimate conclusion by management that Petitioner had abandoned her position and it is clear that her termination was based on that rather than any reference to her handicap. All other information relating to Mrs. Lanham's complaints about job working conditions and her request to be reassigned have little if any bearing on the issue of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Gladys L. Lanham be denied. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gladys L. Lanham. 4631 SW 87th Terrace Ocala, FL 32674 John L. Johnson, Esq. Labor Counsel Dart & Kraft, Inc. 211 Sanders Rd. Northbrook, IL 60062 Susan K. McKenna, Esq. 57 W. Pine Street Suite 202 Orlando, FL 32801 Betsy Howard Clerk of the Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 - Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303 Aurelio Durana General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 - Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 - Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondent in this case. 1. Incorporated in finding of fact 1. 2. Incorporated in finding of fact 1 and 2. 3-4. Incorporated in finding of fact 4. 5. Incorporated in finding of fact 2 and 4. 6. Incorporated in finding of fact 5. 7. Incorporated in finding of fact 1. 8. Treated in finding of fact 9. 9-11. Incorporated in finding of fact 6. 12. Incorporated in finding of fact 6 and 7. 13. Incorporated in finding of fact 6. 14. Incorporated in finding of fact 10 and 11. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS GLADYS L. LANHAM, EEOC Case No. n/a Petitioner, FCHR Case No. 85-3099 DOAH Case No. 85-4345 SEAMLESS HOSPITAL PRODUCTS, FCHR Order No. 86-032 Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Respondent resigned his position of employment with Petitioner and, if not, whether Respondent's position of employment with Petitioner should be terminated for cause, specifically, the Respondent's alleged absence without leave, his alleged abuse of sick leave, and his alleged theft of school property.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a painter pursuant to an annual contract from January 17, 1983, until January 29, 1993. Respondent was not a member of the instructional staff, a principal, or a supervisor. Respondent did not submit to the Petitioner a formal resignation of his employment, nor did he ever intend to do so. A School Board employee with an annual contract may be dismissed during the term of his contract for cause. Respondent had frequently taken leave during his term of employment with the Petitioner and he was aware of the School Board's policies pertaining to leave. Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1277, AFL-CIO (IBFO). The collective bargaining agreement between the IBFO and the School Board contains terms and conditions of employment pertinent to this proceeding. Article IV, Section F pertains to "Return from Leave" and provides as follows: Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal. This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent. Article IV, Section A of the collective bargaining agreement pertains to sick leave and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 3. Sick Leave Charged -- Sick leave shall be charged in no less than half-day segments. Each school or Department shall record absences on an hourly basis. When the appropriate half-day increment is reached, based upon the assigned employee workday, the employee shall have 1/2 day of accumulated sick leave deducted. . . . * * * 10. False Claim -- False claim for sick leave shall be grounds for dismissal by the School Board. Petitioner's Administrative Directive D-3.47(3) is a rule of the School Board and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (3) District employees shall not convert School Board property, including any equipment and supplies, for personal business or activity. CONVERSION OF SCHOOL BOARD PROPERTY In November 1992, Warren Haan, the paint supervisor for the Petitioner's Department of Maintenance and Operations, was told by Jacques Brisson, Respondent's foreman, that it appeared to him that Respondent was taking school property for his own use. Mr. Haan investigated the allegations and went to the area in the maintenance department where the employees parked their vehicles. Mr. Haan looked into Respondent's personal vehicle and discovered that Respondent had placed inside of his vehicle property of the School Board. The evidence established that Respondent intended to convert this property to his own use. The property, which was taken from the Respondent before he could remove it from school grounds, consisted of an empty paint bucket, painter's rags, a small quantity of caulk, and a caulking gun. Mr. Haan referred this matter to the school security department on January 4, 1993. Respondent had not been disciplined at the time of his alleged resignation because the matter was still under investigation at that time. Respondent testified that other painters regularly took items such as empty paint buckets and paint rags. This self-serving testimony does not establish that Petitioner routinely permitted painters to violate the clear school policies pertaining to unauthorized use of school property. To the contrary, the testimony of Mr. Brisson established that theft had been a problem that he had tried to stop. ABUSE OF SICK LEAVE The Respondent occasionally was employed as a painter by individuals and entities other than the Petitioner. Such employment was permissible, but an employee was not permitted to perform services for private individuals while out on sick leave. The Respondent reported to work on December 3, 1992, and left his employment in the late morning using sick leave for the remainder of the day. That same day, Mr. Haan received information that led him to believe that Respondent had taken sick leave, but that he was working as a painter at a house under construction in an area referred to as Boca Grove in Boca Raton, Florida. Mr. Haan went with Dave Traill, another school board employee, to this private residence at approximately 2:30 p.m. on December 3, 1992, where he observed Respondent's automobile. He went to the residence under construction and asked to see the Respondent. The Respondent thereafter came out of the house and talked with Mr. Haan and Mr. Traill. Mr. Haan and Mr. Traill did not see what Respondent had been doing inside the residence. Respondent testified that he had seen his doctor for a brief appointment earlier that day and had gone from his doctor's office to the residence at Boca Grove. Respondent admitted at the formal hearing that he had agreed to paint the house for the owner, but asserted that he had gone to the house to tell the owner that he would not be working that day. Respondent testified that he had taken vacation leave when he actually worked on the private residence. Respondent admitted that he had spent approximately two hours on December 3, 1992, while on sick leave going over with the owner items of work that he was to perform. This meeting was a necessary part of the painting job he was to do for the owner. From the evidence presented, it is found that on December 3, 1992, the Respondent performed services unrelated to his duties as a school board employee for his personal gain at this house in Boca Grove while absent from his employment with the Petitioner pursuant to sick leave. Respondent abused Petitioner's sick leave policy. ABSENCES WITHOUT LEAVE In January 1993, Petitioner took time off from his work to attend to his wife, who continued to experience physical problems resulting from a heel fracture on August 28, 1992. Respondent contacted his foreman, Jacques Brisson, at approximately 7:30 a.m. on Monday, January 25, 1993, to request that he be allowed to take that week off as vacation time. Mr. Brisson approved that leave, but he informed Respondent that he would have to contact Warren Haan, the painting supervisor, if he wanted to take any additional time off. Respondent was absent from his employment without approved leave on Monday, February 1, 1993; Tuesday, February 2, 1993; Wednesday, February 3, 1993; and Thursday, February 4, 1993. Friday, February 5, 1993, was not a scheduled work day since the paint department was on a four day work week. Respondent testified that he contacted Mr. Haan during the last week of January 1993 and told him he may need to be off work for a week or longer. Respondent also testified that Mr. Haan authorized his leave during the last week of January 1993. Mr. Haan testified at the formal hearing, but he was not questioned about this conversation or whether he authorized leave for the Respondent during any part of February 1993. Mr. Haan testifed that Respondent's employment was terminated because he was absent without authorization for the days in February and that Respondent would have contacted Mr. Brisson to obtain authorization for leave. Respondent later testified that he did not know why he had not contacted anyone prior to being absent on February 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1993. The apparent conflicts in Respondent's testimony are resolved by finding that while Respondent may have told Mr. Haan at some time during January 1993 that he needed to take some time off, he did not seek and he was not given authorization to be absent from his employment on February 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1993. On February 5, 1993, Warren Page, Coordinator of Petitioner's Department of Maintenance and Plant Operations, sent to Respondent by certified mailing a letter which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: This is to confirm that you have not reported to work since January 29, 1993. You have not contacted this office as required to report your intended absences. You have not requested or received approval for a short term leave of absence. Therefore, you are currently absent without approved leave. In the absence of any correspondence from you, I can only assume that you have decided not to continue working as a Painter for the Palm Beach County School Board. Please be advised that your name will be submitted to the Palm Beach County School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting for acceptance of your resignation from employment. Should you have any questions, feel free to contact this office. Respondent received the certified mailing on Saturday, February 6, 1993. On Monday, February 8, 1993, Respondent contacted Lawrence G. Zabik, the Petitioner's Assistant Superintendent for Support Services, and asked him what he should do about the certified mailing that he had received. Mr. Zabik told Respondent that he should meet with Mr. Page to see if he could work things out. Respondent did not contact Mr. Page, and he did not report to work. During a regularly scheduled meeting in February, 1993, the School Board voted to accept his resignation with an effective date of January 29, 1993. January 29, 1993, was the effective date of the acceptance of Respondent's "resignation" and the date his employment with the School Board was terminated because it was the last day Respondent was out on authorized leave. This action was taken pursuant to Petitioner's Administrative Directive D- 3.27(2)(c), which provides as follows: (c) When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employees stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. By notice dated March 2, 1993, Respondent was notified that the School Board had accepted his resignation as a painter with an effective date of January 29, 1993. The notice dated March 2, 1993, contained an old address for the Respondent. Consequently, he did not receive a copy of the notice until May 24, 1993, when he was officially informed that his employment had been terminated effective January 29, 1993, the last day on which Respondent had been on approved leave. Respondent thereafter requested a formal hearing to contest his termination, and this proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order which terminates the employment of the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4233 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The greater weight of the evidence established that the incident involving conversion of school board property occurred in November 1992, but that it was reported to Mr. Sapyta on January 4, 1993. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2, 3, and 10 are rejected as being unnecessary as findings of fact, but the proposed findings are adopted either as preliminary matters or as conclusions of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since there is no contention that Respondent had exhausted his sick leave. The proposed findings in the second sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected. Specifically, Mr. Haan's credibility was not eroded as asserted by Respondent. The other findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 14 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since this is a de novo proceeding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Hazel Lucas, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board Office of the General Counsel 381 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Glen J. Torcivia, Esquire One Clearlake Centre 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1504 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Isidro M. Garcia, Esquire 3501 South Congress Avenue Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Dr. C. Monica Uhlhorn, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869
The Issue Whether or not the School Board of Madison County, Florida may terminate Respondent as one convicted of a crime of mortal turpitude in 1988 or 1989:, pursuant to Section 231.36(4)(c) F.S. [The Petition for Discharge also alleges that a "pattern" of issuing worthless checks over a period of years has been engaged in by Respondent but the "prayer" or charging portion of the Petition is silent as to whether the Petitioner intends this allegation to constitute a specific, separate charge.] Whether or not the School Board of Madison County, Florida may, pursuant to Section 231.44 F.S., terminate Respondent for absence without leave during the period he was incarcerated for passing worthless bank checks.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Gene Stokes, is the duly elected Superintendent of Schools of Madison County, Florida. Respondent, Doctor Randall Choice, III, is a member of the instructional staff of the district School Board of Madison County, Florida, employed by the Board under a continuing contract entered into on May 7, 1981. The Respondent was charged in an information filed by the State Attorney of the Third Judicial Circuit on June 27, 1988 with passing a worthless check, the payee being the Madison Inn, drawn upon The North Florida Education Credit Union, Tallahassee, Florida, in the sum of $106.00. There were not sufficient funds in the account to cover the payment of this check, and it was dishonored when presented to The North Florida Education Credit Union for payment. The Respondent was charged in an information filed by the state attorney of the Third Judicial Circuit on September 12, 1988 with passing a worthless check, the payee being Perry Coca Cola, drawn upon The North Florida Education Credit Union, Tallahassee, Florida, in the sum of $61.60. There were not sufficient funds in the account of the Respondent to cover the payment of this check, and it was dishonored when presented to The North Florida Education Credit Union for payment. The check given to the Madison Inn was for lodging and the check to Perry Coca Cola was for products which the Respondent had received. Neither transaction had anything to do with Respondent's professional activities as a school teacher. The Respondent appeared before the Honorable Wetzel Blair, County Judge of Madison County, Florida, on November 2, 1988 and entered a plea of "guilty" to the two informations noted above. The court at that time gave the Respondent the opportunity to make restitution on the two checks and to pay court costs of $46.00 within 30 days. If the Respondent made the restitution and paid the court costs within the prescribed time, the court agreed to withhold adjudication. The Respondent executed the offer of a plea of "guilty", but nonetheless, the court set the matter for trial on December 2, 1988 upon a plea of "not guilty." This "Order Setting Trial" was signed by the judge on November 2, 1988, and stated: Order setting trial date upon the above and foregoing plea of not guilty, trial of this case is set for non-jury trial, on `Friday, December 2, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. [Tr-51-72]. The Respondent did not pay the restitution or court costs within the 30-day period as directed by the Court, and, accordingly, the Respondent was ordered to appear before the Court on January 4, 1989. At that time, the court entered another order reciting that the Respondent had entered a plea of "guilty" on November 2, 1988 and had been directed to pay restitution for the checks in the cases within 30 days. The latter order further recited the fact that the Respondent had paid the restitution, but not within the stipulated time, and that Respondent was therefore sentenced to 30 days in the Madison County Jail. Upon the testimony of Madison County Judge Wetzel Blair, it is found that as of the date of formal administrative hearing, September 20, 1989, Respondent had not been adjudicated guilty of the crime of passing a worthless bank check, even though he was incarcerated in the Madison County Jail from January 4, 1989 until about 4:00 p.m. on January 23, 1989. (TR- 78) On January 4, 1989, the Respondent teacher immediately notified his principal, Mrs. Colleen Campbell, by telephone that he was in jail and that he needed to be granted leave for the period he would be incarcerated, predicted at 30 days. She informed Respondent that he had six days of accrued leave due him and agreed to sign she form requesting/approving that period of leave. She also informed Superintendent Stokes that Respondent was in jail, but she provided no written request for leave for Respondent beyond tee six days to which he was entitled. The superintendent did not know of Respondent's oral request for additional leave until Respondent was released from jail. The principal and superintendent have the authority to approve personal leave up to a teacher's accrued limit, but if insufficient personal leave time has been accumulated, the school board must approve the overage. It is unclear from the record whether preprinted forms are provided for this purpose, but apparently such requests must be made in writing. It is also unclear whether such requests are always submitted directly to the school board or if principals and the superintendent act as conduits for such requests to the school board. However, such written leave requests are usually taken up at each monthly school board meeting, which is often "after the fact" of the requesting teacher's physical absence. Sometimes, the applicant appears at the school board meeting in person. Respondent was released from jail or January 23, 1989 at 4:00 p.m.. On January 24, 1989, the Respondent reported personally to the superintendent, reported his release from jail, and sought to determine his leave status, At that time, the superintendent informed the Respondent that the superintendent was suspending the Respondent with pay until the next school board meeting. Also, the superintendent then informed the Respondent that the superintendent was reporting Respondent's conduct to the Education Practices Commission. The superintendent did then specifically inform the Respondent that he had been absent without leave, as it was presumed the Respondent had been incarcerated for passing worthless bank checks, and that was the thrust of their conversation. At all times during his incarceration of 19 days, the Respondent believed that he had taken the necessary steps to obtain authorized leave, and he assumed, without any affirmative action by the principal, superintendent, or school board that he had been approved for leave with pay up to his accrued six days and for leave without pay for the remainder of the incarceration period. Respondent was incarcerated January 5-23, 1989, inclusive. Resort to a calendar reveals that only 12 of Respondent's 19-day incarceration were week days or work days (One was Martin Luther King's Birthday Holiday.) Respondent was, in fact, approved for his six accrued leave days. Therefore, the balance that Respondent was actually absent without leave amounted to only six days. Neither Superintendent Stokes nor the school board, as a collegiate body, approved Respondent's oral request for leave without pay during the six days in question. Indeed, the school board did not convene until February, when, at the superintendent's request, it altered his suspension of Respondent with pay to a suspension without play. Respondent did not file any after-the-fact written request for leave without pay and present it to the school board when it met in February 1989 to consider the suspension request, although it may be inferred that the school board's suspension of Respondent had the retroactive effect of denying his oral leave request. The citizens of Madison County believe that the passing of a worthless check is morally wrong. The incarceration of the Respondent was not reported in any of the newspapers in the circulation area. There is evidence in the record that Respondent's absence created administrative problems for the superintendent and school board and interfered with the orderly education of students, although most of this disorder relates to the period after the Respondent's suspension, not during his short incarceration period.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that: The school Board of Madison County enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not violated Section 231.36(4)(c) F.S., in that he has not been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, and that Respondent has violated Section 231.44 F.S., by being willfully absent from duty without leave, and suspending him without pay from the first day of his absence without leave until the conclusion of the current school year. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of January 1990 at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearing this 2nd day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-1445 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2, 6 and 7 are accepted as modified to more closely conform to the record evidence as a whole and to eliminate subordinate and/or unnecessary-material. is rejected as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Further, this has not been established as set forth in FOF 17- 19. is rejected as mostly legal argument. Otherwise the record differs as set out in FOF 6-10. is rejected as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Further, this has not been established as set forth in FOF 6-10 and COL 4. 8 is rejected as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Respondent's PFOF: 1-16 and 18-24 are accepted as modified to more closely conform to the record evidence as a whole and to eliminate subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative material. 17 is rejected because it is contrary to the record as stated. COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin B. Browning, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32340 John R. Weed, P.A. 605 South Jefferson Street Perry, Florida 32347 Gene Stokes, Superintendent Madison County Schools 213 North Duval Madison, Florida 32340
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Respondent, Joseph F. Connolly, II, was licensed as a teacher in the State of Florida under Certificate Number 393556, in the areas of public service and E.M.R. medical technology. On May 25, 1982, Respondent was employed as a teacher by Mid-Florida Technical Institute (MFTI), a part of the Orange County, Florida, School District. For a period of time prior to late 1981 or early 1982, Respondent had been teaching at an off-campus facility of this school, but at about that time he was brought onto the main campus and assigned to clerical duties not related to teaching. He was, however, on the rolls as a teacher and paid as such, and maintained his teacher credentials and license. On January 22, 1982, Respondent submitted a request for military leave in order to engage in Army Reserve training to extend from January 29 through February 15, 1982. Attached to this request was a set of military orders signed by a Captain Decker. Due to illness, this leave was not taken by Respondent. On May 25, 1982, Respondent again submitted a request for leave for military duty for the period June 7-16, 1982. This request was given to Respondent's supervisor, Chester F. Dalton, who asked that Respondent wait while he checked with the school director concerning the need for military orders to accompany the request. This second request was not, at the time, supported by military orders. The director, Mr. Stephens, indicated that orders were required, which information Mr. Dalton passed on to Respondent. Within two or three days, Respondent brought in a set of orders bearing the signature of Captain Deck and personally handed them to Mr. Dalton. Mr. Dalton gave them to his secretary, Mrs. Zimmer, to process. Mrs. Zimmer, who has been married to a military member for many years and is familiar with the basics of military orders, was not comfortable with these. They appeared to her to have been altered, and, when she held these and the orders which accompanied the January leave request up to the light, she observed that they were identical except for the dates and the last two letters in the signing official's name. Mrs. Zimmer brought her suspicions to the attention of Mr. Dalton, who, in turn, took them to Mr. Stephens, who, in turn, took them to Dr. James L. Scaggs, Associate Superintendent for Employee Relations of the Orange County Schools. Dr. Scaggs suggested the school officials verify the orders and, in the interim, notify Respondent that his pay would be held up pending verification. When the inquiry, outlined above, revealed the orders were invalid, Dr. Scaggs forwarded a report of the circumstances to Petitioner. Inquiry of Captain Raymond K. Carter, executive Officer of Respondent's Reserve unit, revealed the orders were invalid. There was no Captain Deck assigned to the unit, nor was there any training period scheduled for the period June 7-16, 1982. After a brief inquiry, the Reserve organization determined to take no action against Respondent, but to leave action to his employers. In the interim, on June 7, 1982, Mr. Dalton received another leave request for the period June 7-16, 1982, dated June 3, 1982, this time not for military training, but for Red Cross training to retain certification in his field of teaching. Attached to this request was an unsigned note requesting that the May 25 leave request be retrieved and returned in the attached envelope and this latter one substituted. Because, however, it is school board policy not to pay teachers to take certification training during school session time, this June 3 request was disapproved. By this time, also, the May 25 request had been approved by Mr. Stephens and had been forwarded to the superintendent's office for approval. Consequently, the May 25 leave request, which had false orders attached to it, was approved, and the June 3 request was denied. When the June 3 request was received on June 7, Respondent had presumably departed on leave which, under either request, was to begin on June 7, and no effort was made to contact him. There is no evidence to indicate other than that when Respondent submitted the orders to go with the May 25 leave request he knew they were false and that, therefore, his application was false, and it is so found. School officials consider the filing of false documents as definitely reducing Respondent's future effectiveness as a teacher, since it would render all future documents he might submit, of whatever nature, suspect. A teacher whose reports and communications cannot be accepted as true within the school system cannot function effectively within the system. Respondent urged in argument that his utilization as a file clerk at the time the leave request was submitted, and not as a teacher, takes him outside the issue of his effectiveness as a teacher. Without determining that legal issue here, it is nonetheless determined that while he was not, on March 25, 1982, being utilized by MFTI as a teacher, he was under contract as a teacher, had been employed as a teacher, was being paid as a teacher, and was licensed as a teacher. Under these conditions, therefore, he was a teacher and may be considered as such for the purposes of this hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license to teach in the State of Florida be suspended fob two years. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 15th day of October, 1983. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esq. Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph F. Connolly, II 4218 Arajo Court Orlando, Florida 32812 The Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Donald L. Griesheimer Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue : The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Hernando County School Board (Board), the Petitioner, has just cause to terminate the Respondent's employment, related to alleged excessive absences, during the 2007-2008 school year.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Board is charged with operating and administering the Hernando County School District. Through its principals and human resources personnel the Board is charged with operating and regulating all personnel matters, including the monitoring of attendance for all employees at each school operated by the Board. Mr. Charles Johnson was the Principal at Westside Elementary School (WES) for the 2007-2008 school year at issue in this case. He had been the principal at that school since 1988 and it was his duty, among other personnel matters, to monitor the attendance of his employees at the school. The Respondent was employed at WES during the 2007-2008 school year. She had been hired to work there for the first time that year. She had, however, been employed by the Board as a teacher since 1997. Prior to the school year in question, the Respondent had a very favorable record as a teacher for the Board. Soon after the Respondent came to work at WES for the 2007-2008 school year she began to exhibit a pattern of frequent absences. The principal, Mr. Johnson, became concerned with Respondent's absences in late September of 2007 because a parent-teacher conference was imminent and report cards or progress reports were due for the first nine-week grading period around that time. The principal maintained a record of the teachers' attendance, including the Respondent. He created a log documenting the Respondent's absences from August 2007 through January 2008. The Respondent was absent five days in August and present for ten days. She was present for ten days and absent for nine days in September. The Respondent was absent on both October 1 and 2, 2007, as well. The Respondent called the principal's secretary on October 2nd to advise that she had a doctor's appointment on the third and would return to work on the fourth. The Respondent did not return to work on October 4th, however. The principal thereupon sent the Respondent a letter advising her that her absences were excessive and she needed to report to work by October 10th. He gave her some lead time in getting back to work because he was unaware of the reasons why she was missing so much work. He also wanted to allow for any delays due to mailing time for his letter, which was mailed on October 4th. The Respondent called the principal and spoke with him on October 8th and advised him that she had been sick and had been "beaten-up." She assured him that she would return to work the next day. The Respondent, however, did not return to work the next day and also failed to come to work on October 10, 2007, as directed in the principal's letter. She did call the school office and leave a voice mail on the principal's phone that morning assuring him that she would be at work the next day, which was October 11th. The Respondent did not return to work on October 11th as promised. Because of her failure to return to work, the principal sent a letter to her dated October 15, 2007, advising her that he had scheduled a "pre-disciplinary hearing" for October 19, 2007, which she should attend. The purpose of that hearing was to give her an opportunity to explain her "excessive absenteeism." The Respondent thereupon was absent from work every day during the week of October 15th, and then failed to attend the scheduled hearing or meeting on October 19th. Moreover, she did not call or otherwise communicate with the principal that week to explain her absences or why she had missed the meeting. Thereafter, the Principal sent the Respondent a letter dated October 23, 2007, again scheduling a pre-disciplinary hearing. The hearing was scheduled for October 30th. The letter was both mailed and personally delivered to the Respondent. Upon receipt of the hand-delivered copy of the letter, the Respondent phoned the principal and spoke to him. According to Mr. Johnson, the Principal, the Respondent told him in this conversation that she had not opened his previous letters, but she assured him she would be at work the following day. The Respondent, however, did not return to work on the following day, which was October 25, 2007, nor did she attend the pre-disciplinary hearing on October 30th, which Mr. Johnson had scheduled. Mr. Johnson, therefore, sent a letter to the Respondent on October 31st advising her that he was recommending to the Superintendent that she be suspended with pay. He sent a letter to the School District office of Labor Relations and Professional Standards on the same day referring the matter to that office, along with copies of all the relevant documents he had which evidenced what be believed were excessive absences. Because of her 10 days or more of consecutive absences, under Board policy, the Respondent was administratively placed on unpaid leave of absence, instead of being suspended with pay as recommended by her principal. The unpaid leave of absence had an effective date of October 15, 2007. Such a leave of absence is designed to enable a principal to replace a teacher in the situation of the Respondent with a permanent certified teacher, to assure continuity of effective instruction. The Respondent was sent instructions regarding her leave of absence by mail on October 15, 2007, from the Human Resources Department of the District. She was thus informed that she could elect to go on extended personal leave or on family medical leave. No information was received from the Respondent in response to this communication, however. The Respondent maintains that she provided a document concerning family medical leave. That form, however, was merely a medical certification statement and not an actual application or request for family medical leave. Moreover, the evidence shows that the Respondent was not qualified for family medical leave, even had a proper application been submitted, because she had not worked a sufficient number of hours in the preceding school year to establish her entitlement to family medical leave under the relevant rules and policies. An employee conference was held with the Respondent on November 2, 2007. The Respondent, the principal, and Ms. Barbara Kidder, who is the Director of Labor Relations and Professional Standards for the School District, were in attendance at the meeting. The Respondent assured them at the meeting that she would return to work the following Monday, November 5th and thereafter maintain satisfactory attendance. She also agreed to seek assistance through the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and agreed to advise the school when she had appointments with that program. It was not unusual for Mr. Johnson to have continued the disciplinary process and communication with the Respondent about her absenteeism throughout the month of October, even though she was on a leave of absence. She had been placed on that leave of absence by the District so that it could hire a replacement teacher. It was not a leave she had voluntarily requested. Moreover, even without considering the days of absence while she was on her administrative leave of absence, the principal had a basis for pursuing disciplinary action for the absences she had previously incurred. November 5, 2007, was approved by the District as the Respondent's "early return date" from that leave of absence, which had started on October 15th. Indeed, the Respondent came to work on Monday, November 5th. She was, however, absent for the rest of that week. She did not contact either the principal or his secretary concerning those absences. She called the automated system for assigning substitute teachers (SEMS), which does not constitute nor grant any excuse for an absence. It is merely a means of scheduling or assigning substitute teachers. School did not meet on November 12th, a Monday. On Tuesday, November 13th the Respondent called and left a voice mail message for the principal advising that she had been to the doctor on the Friday before for strep throat and a respiratory infection. She assured him that she would be back the following day November 14, 2007. The Respondent, however, did not report to work on November 14th, but instead called and spoke with the principal around 10:00 a.m., advising him that she just left the doctor's office. She advised him that she had a note indicating she would be clear to report to work on the following Monday. The Principal reminded her that the next week was Thanksgiving week and no school met that week. The Respondent then agreed to come to work on Monday, November 26th and advised that she would have the doctor's note with her at that time. The Respondent failed to report to work on November 26th, as she had promised and did not contact the Principal or his secretary concerning that absence. She also missed work November 27th through the 30th, and did not call the principal or his secretary to explain those absences. The principal accordingly sent her another letter on November 29th advising her that a pre-disciplinary meeting was again scheduled for December 4th to discuss her absences. She did not attend the pre-disciplinary meeting on December 4th nor did she report to work that entire week. She failed to contact the principal or his secretary and explain her absences from work that week and her absence from the scheduled meeting. On December 5, 2007, the principal sent another letter to the Respondent advising her that he was referring her case or situation to the labor relations office. On that same date he sent a memorandum to the director of the labor relations office enclosing all the relevant documentation he had regarding the absences. That office then sent the Respondent a letter on December 5th which advised her that a pre-disciplinary meeting was scheduled for December 12th. The pre-disciplinary meeting was held on December 12th and the Respondent and Ms. Kidder were in attendance. Ms. Kidder gave the Respondent information on the EAP and advised her that she would be reviewing the Respondent's case with the Human Resources Office and the Petitioner's attorney. On December 14th the Respondent met with Ms. Kidder and the principal. The Respondent on this occasion was given a "letter of direction," advising her that she would be assigned a "mentor" and advising her of procedures for absences. The procedures she was directed to follow for absences included a stipulation that a doctor's note would be required for all future absences. The letter of direction given to the Respondent on December 14th contained the following requirements or procedures for the Respondent to follow with regard to her work and her absences: She was be assigned a "mentor" teacher to assist her with transitioning back to work. She was to report to administration each day before reporting to her classroom. She was to meet weekly with administration to review her attendance and her progress. She was expected to be in attendance each day starting Monday, December 17, 2007, and was to follow the Principal's specific directions regarding the process for obtaining approval for sick leave. She was to contact the principal if she had any questions concerning working hours, timesheets, absences, tardiness, sickness at work, leaving the building or related employee issues. She was being placed on probationary status for one year and any future violations of Petitioner's policies or procedures or any administrative directives would constitute "just cause" for disciplinary action up to and including termination. She was expected to contact EAP and attend counseling sessions as recommended by the staff. She was then to document the completed counseling sessions to her principal. During the December 14, 2007, meeting, the Respondent agreed to return to work as directed. She gave no indication that she would be unable to return to work or perform her duties or that there would be any restrictions on her ability to return to work. The Respondent provided no doctor's notes explaining illnesses or absences during either the December 14th meeting or the November 2nd meeting with the Principal. In fact, the Respondent did not return to work the following Monday, December 17th. She also missed the rest of that week and did not contact administration directly about her absences as she had been directed to do on December 14th and as the "letter of instruction" had directed her to do. The Respondent produced phone records at the hearing and testified that certain calls represented conversations with either the Principal or his secretary. This was in an effort to show that she had properly explained her absences. She did not, however, provide corroborating testimony as to which of the calls on the records were specific to a person as opposed to simply leaving a voice mail for that number or receiving no answer at all. In any event, Ms. Kidder sent the Respondent a letter on December 20th reminding her that it was her responsibility to provide a doctor's note in explanation of her absences and that she was supposed to return to work on December 17, 2007. The letter reminded the Respondent that her attendance was critical. The last week of December 2007 and the first week of January 2008, constituted the District's school Christmas Break. The first day of school following Christmas Break was Monday, January 7, 2008. The Respondent did not return to work that day, even though she later presented notes from Doctors Khalil and Alshaar indicating that she was able to work that day. The Respondent did report for work on January 8th, but then was absent for January 9th and 10th. She reported for work on January 11th, but later produced a note from Dr. Alshaar indicating that she should be excused for that day. Ms. Kidder sent the Respondent another letter on January 25, 2008, advising her that a "pre-determination hearing" had been scheduled for February 1, 2008, to again review her absences since January 7, 2008. The Respondent acknowledges that she received the correspondence from the Petitioner referenced above. She was also aware of the Petitioner's polices and procedures on attendance and leaves of absence. She signed a receipt indicating that she had received the Staff Handbook which outlines specific policies and references the School Board Policy Manual in general. Additionally, the Respondent acknowledged to the Principal that "time and attendance" were reviewed during her "new employee orientation" at the school. Teacher absences have a negative impact on the classroom, the students and the school. The principal had to ask other teachers to cover the Respondent's classroom and to use substitutes. A teacher's credibility and the trust of students is impaired when the teacher is constantly absent or alternately appearing or being absent from the classroom on a frequent basis. Mr. Johnson established that the Respondent had the worst attendance record he had experienced with a teacher in his 20 or so years as a principal. Her absences for the 2007-2008 school year far exceeded that of any other teacher at the school. The Collective Bargaining Agreement covering teachers in Hernando County, including the Respondent, provides that sick leave is allowable without loss of pay as provided for by Florida Law and that personal leave should be approved by work site administrators, except in cases of substantial emergency. The Hernando County Staff Handbook is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 24. It provides the details of the Board's policies and procedures on absences, leaves of absence, sick leave and leaves made necessary by sudden emergencies, etc. The general information concerning leaves of absence, the policies and procedures concerning family medical leave, notification of absence, absence without leave, sick leave, depicted in that exhibit are incorporated in these Findings of Fact by reference. Those policies and procedures include the requirement that where there is any doubt as to the validity of a sick leave claim, the superintendent may require the filing of a written certification of illness from a licensed physician or other supporting evidence if personal illness is not involved. It then provides the consequences of false claims for sick leave, proceeding to list cancellation of a teacher's contract or for action seeking revocation of a teaching contract. It also includes a provision that an application for sick leave due to extended illness shall have attached to it a statement from a practicing physician certifying that such leave is essential and indicating the probable duration of the illness and the needed leave. There is no question, given the pattern of extensive absences, and given the Respondent's lack of communication with the principal, or even the principal's secretary, concerning the reason for her absences or the legitimacy of any illness, that the Principal could have doubts as to the validity of any sick leave or illness claims. He was thus proceeding within the appropriate policies contained in the Manual and Handbook in requiring physician certification or proof concerning illness or absences, which mostly was not provided by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the School Board of Hernando County Florida terminating the Respondent from her position as a teacher with that School District. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 J. Paul Carland, II, Esquire Hernando County School Board 919 North Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34601 Jennifer M. Gallagher 1223 Sanger Avenue Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Wayne S. Alexander, Ed.D. Superintendent Hernando County School Board 919 North Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34601
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has just cause to terminate the employment of the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the School Board of Lake County, Florida (Board)(Petitioner). It is charged with operating and managing the public school system in Lake County, Florida, otherwise known as the Lake County School District. The Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, was employed by the Board as a school guidance counselor at Sawgrass Elementary School. Her principal was Rhonda Hunt. During the 2005-2006 school year, the Respondent missed 71 days from her job. In the 2006-2007 year, she missed 97 days. In the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent missed 87 days from work. The contract for a guidance counselor requires that they work for 221 days per school year. During these times, especially in the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent had been making repeated requests for leave. Ms. Hunt, her principal, became concerned and in May of 2008 reported the situation about extensive absences, and leave requests, to Ms. Rebecca Nelsen, the Board's Supervisor of Compensation, Benefits and Employee Relations. In the 2007-2008 school year, when Ms. Hunt brought the issue to Ms. Nelsen's attention, the Respondent had missed work the number of days found above, which represented all the days in the school year from February 13th through the end of the school year. In the previous year, she had missed work from the middle of January through the end of the school year. Ms. Nelsen prepared a memo to Deke DeLoach, the Board's Chief of Human Resources, apprising him of the situation regarding the Respondent's absences. She explained to him the situation involving the excessive absences over a 5-year period. She explained to Mr. DeLoach that when an employee has been on extended unpaid leave that, according to Board policy 6.50, her return to employment is dependant upon a position being available. Therefore, while an individual is on extended leave, which is approved, their position becomes available to be filled at the decision of an individual school administrator. Moreover, unpaid leave, the status applicable to the Respondent's situation, must be approved in advance. An employee may not go off-duty on unpaid leave and then get approval for it at a later time. Approval must be requested in advance. A formal request must be made to the Superintendent, for the Superintendent's recommendation to the Board. Extended Illness Leave is a leave category that is required to be approved by the Board as well. Ms. Nelsen therefore explained to Mr. DeLoach that the Respondent had been on extended unpaid leave and, according to the above-referenced Board policy, her return to employment was dependent upon a position being available. Employees are required to have approval for some form of leave before they take leave or miss time from work. If an employee does not have approval for some form of leave and does not come to work, then under Board policy they are deemed to be absent without leave. If that is the situation, the employee can be terminated under Board policy. The School Board must have a recommendation from the Superintendent in order to be able to act on any sort of leave request. Under Board policies, an Extended Illness Leave is required to be approved by the Board. The school fiscal year ends June 30th. July 1, 2008, therefore, was the beginning of the new fiscal year for the 2008-2009 school year. The regular school session then began near the end of August 2008. Ms. Nelsen wrote to Ms. Chavous on August 19, 2008, explaining to her that she had been on unpaid sick leave numerous days, and giving her options to consider. Ms. Nelsen informed her that she must report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, that she could explain to her supervisor any accommodations that she may need, or that she could request Extended Illness Leave. That communication, from Ms. Nelsen to Ms. Chavous, references a July 29, 2008, request for sick leave. Ms. Chavous completed the July 29, 2008, request for sick leave on a Request for Leave of Absence form, which is the form required to be completed by employees who are requesting any kind of leave from the School Board. The July 29, 2008, leave form depicted a request for leave from August 4, 2008, through August 19, 2008. The reason for the leave requested was indicated as "Illness of self.” The Respondent did not have any sick leave available to her at that time. In the 2008-2009, school year, the Respondent was not eligible for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. This was because she had not worked enough days in order to trigger eligibility under that law. This leave request was denied because the Respondent was on unpaid sick leave the prior year, had missed 87 days, and had never offered an explanation for her need to use sick leave. Therefore, the Board had no basis on which to approve the additional leave request and the Respondent's approved leave ended June 30, 2008. Any leave that the Respondent would have received for any extended illness would have been for the previous school year which was over at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 2008. Ms. Nelsen gave the Respondent two options in her August 19, 2008, letter: To report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, or To submit a leave request form asking for extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. On August 28, 2008, a request was faxed from the Respondent seeking extended illness leave. The attached doctor's note did not explain the nature of the medical situation or condition, in terms of providing justification for the leave requested. The Respondent submitted a leave request form with that August 28, 2008, request. It did not confirm that she was asking for extended illness leave for the school year. Instead she requested leave from August 4, 2008, until October 30, 2008. Since School Board policy required the Respondent, in this situation, to request leave for the remainder of the school year, Ms. Nelsen sent an e-mail to the Respondent telling her that she had no available sick leave to use and again telling her that she had the option to either report to work or to request an extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. That communication was sent on August 29, 2008, the day after the Respondent faxed the form requesting leave through October. The Respondent then sent Ms. Nelsen another leave request form in response to the August 29, 2008, e-mail. It again requested leave from August 4, 2008, through October 30, 2008. On September 9, 2008, a letter was sent from the Superintendent to the Respondent, explaining that the Respondent had not reported to work and that she had not requested extended illness leave. Consequently she was informed that she was now considered “absent without approved leave” and would be recommended to the School Board for termination of employment. When the Superintendent sent the letter to the Respondent, on September 9, 2008, the Respondent was not on approved leave. She was absent without leave under the terms of the School Board policy. Pursuant to that policy she was therefore subject to being terminated. Ms. Nelsen received three leave request forms from the Respondent, none of which requested leave for the remainder of the school year, and none of which gave an explanation for the basis of the medical condition. The Respondent's response to these facts was her statement to the effect that "[I]t was just always told to me that you can't request for more leave than what your doctor has put on the form. So, therefore, that's why I put the dates there." She also acknowledged that sometimes she does not remember some things or doesn't respond as fast as she should. Therefore she simply stated that she believed, in effect, that she had submitted everything that she could and had explained her situation to the best of her ability at the time. The collective bargaining agreement between the Lake County School District and the Lake County Education Association includes the position of guidance counselor. That contract references the Board policy which makes it a terminable offense to be absent without leave. The recommendation to the Board, prior to the Respondent making a Request for Hearing, was that she be terminated for being absent without leave. The Respondent's prior leave had expired at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. When the first day of school started in the current school year of 2008-2009, the Respondent did not report to work. The Respondent probably would have been unable to work because of her illness before January 2009. She would therefore have missed all of August, September, October, November, and December.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Lake County School Board finding that the employment of the Respondent, Latonya Chavous, be terminated for just cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire McLin & Burnsed Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Latonya Chavous 136 Desiree Aurora Street Winter Garden, Florida 34787 Dr. Susan Moxley, Superintendent Lake County Schools 201 West Burleigh Boulevard Tavares, Florida 32778-2496 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Graham is employed by USF as a police officer at the Tampa campus and was so employed on December 18, 1976, at 1:30 a.m. On that date it was the policy of the campus police department that prior authorization be obtained from immediate supervisors prior to the taking of any time off from scheduled duties. Graham was fully aware of this policy. Graham was scheduled to appear for duty at 1:30 a.m., on December 18, 1976. At 8:46 p.m., December 17, 1976, Graham telephoned the dispatcher on duty and advised him to relate to Graham's supervisor that he would not be in for work at 1:30 a.m., the following day. Graham then failed to appear at the appointed hour and performed no duties during that scheduled shift. During his employment with USF, Graham has been disciplined five (5) previous times for being absent without authorized leave.
