The Issue The issue in the case is whether the termination of Petitioner's employment by Respondent constituted discrimination against Petitioner on the basis of gender.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female, a member of a protected group under applicable law, and was at all times material to this case, employed by Respondent until the termination of employment that is the subject of this dispute. Respondent is an employer as the term is defined by relevant sections of the St. Petersburg Municipal Code and the applicable Pinellas County Ordinance. During the period of time relevant to this dispute, Sam Obinwa owned Respondent. During the period of Mr. Obinwa's ownership, Respondent was a business engaged in providing health care supplies, including pharmaceuticals to customers. Beginning in July 1996, Petitioner was employed as a courier by Respondent. Petitioner was primarily assigned to make deliveries of supplies to Respondent's customers. Respondent also employed a second courier, a male, during this period. At some point during Petitioner's employment, Mr. Obinwa hired an office manager, Kim Henderson. Ms. Henderson became Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Henderson was responsible for the operation of the office, including receiving customer complaints and resolving employee disputes. Mr. Obinwa testified that he received information related to the office operations from Ms. Henderson and relied upon it in making the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. According to Mr. Obinwa's testimony, he received complaints regarding Petitioner's job performance and behavior from both customers and Ms. Henderson. Mr. Obinwa testified that he discussed the complaints with Petitioner during her employment. On December 14, 2003, Mr. Obinwa met with Petitioner and explained that her employment was being terminated. As grounds for the termination, Mr. Obinwa, in a termination letter provided to Petitioner, cited complaints about her behavior from both customers and work associates. The complaints included lack of cooperation, abusiveness, failure to follow instructions or to adhere to the delivery schedule, and missed or late medication deliveries. Petitioner asserts that she was terminated on account of gender. There is no credible evidence, direct or indirect, that Respondent's termination of Petitioner's employment was on account of gender. At the time of Petitioner's termination, Respondent employed eight to nine persons, including six to seven females. The employee most similarly situated to Petitioner (the male courier) was not terminated; however, there is no evidence that there were complaints regarding his behavior from either customers or work associates. At the hearing, Petitioner asserted that the male courier generally received the same treatment as did she. The evidence establishes that Petitioner received an additional benefit that was not provided to the male courier. Petitioner was permitted to use a company delivery vehicle for occasional personal transportation. There is no evidence that the male courier was permitted to take the company vehicle for personal use. Petitioner testified that another male employee identified as Herman Jones was hostile towards her and towards other women working for Respondent. Petitioner claimed that Mr. Jones was somehow responsible for her termination. Mr. Jones was a pharmacy technician. Mr. Jones was responsible for imputing prescription information into the computer system and for preparing the medications according to the prescriptions. Prior to being delivered to the customers by the couriers, the medications were checked by a pharmacist. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Jones had any supervisory duties related to Petitioner. There was testimony suggesting that there were personality conflicts between Petitioner and Mr. Jones. There is no evidence that Mr. Jones was involved in Mr. Obinwa's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment, other than the general consideration Mr. Obinwa gave to the complaints from Petitioner's co-workers related to her behavior in the office. At the hearing, Petitioner presented supportive letters from five customers who were apparently pleased with Petitioner's performance. Petitioner made between 100-200 deliveries each week to Respondent's customers. Mr. Obinwa testified that some of the customers to whom Petitioner made deliveries were happy and that others were not. No evidence related to damages to Petitioner was presented during the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's complaint be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie N. Rugg City of St. Petersburg Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-2842 Suzanne M. Mucklow, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street, Sixth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Willie Mae Curry 2702 4th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33705-3641 Donna J. Buchholz, Esquire D. J. Buchholz, P.A. 4320 El Prado Boulevard, 15 Tampa, Florida 33629
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was terminated from her employment with Respondent for a discriminatory reason.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sharon Singleton, was employed by Respondent in the Information Technology (IT) Department. Petitioner served, as did other IT employees, under an annual contract. Respondent is the administrative government entity for the public schools of Escambia County, Florida. Contracts of employment are with the Escambia County School Board. Mr. Johnnie Odom supervised Petitioner until the last eight months of her employment. Her supervisor was Kathy Cooper during the last eight months of her employment. For many years, Petitioner and the other technicians used a software program that supported the management of school records that was known as “TERMS.” During the last few years of Petitioner’s employment, the District changed the supporting software program from TERMS to a program known as “FOCUS.” This was a major conversion of software programs that took place over an extended period of time. When the FOCUS program was initiated, Respondent hired three additional technicians to support FOCUS. Petitioner disagreed with the hiring of new technicians to support FOCUS, but acknowledges she was not treated any differently from the other Tech III support staff. Her disagreement was over the hiring of the new technicians, rather than allowing the existing ones to serve as primary support for FOCUS. Petitioner sought a promotion to a higher level position in 2011. The promotion process was administered by a selection committee that interviewed and evaluated candidates. As a result of the competitive selection, Petitioner was not recommended or selected for the promotion. On two prior occasions, Petitioner had sought a promotion, and on both occasions a selection committee ranked and evaluated the candidates. Petitioner was not successful in being selected or promoted on those two prior occasions. For the 2011-2012 school year, Petitioner received unsatisfactory ratings for her administrative/professional techniques and skills, as well as for her professional relationships with staff. The evaluation contained a note stating that Petitioner has difficulty in resolving conflicts with her co-workers and that her supervisor would like to see her resolve conflicts with her co-workers in a more diplomatic manner. Petitioner had received some unsatisfactory or needs improvement marks in her previous years’ evaluations, so 2011- 2012 was not the first time she had received less than satisfactory marks. Nevertheless, following the 2011-2012 annual evaluation, Petitioner received an annual employment contract for the next school year. At the end of the next school year, Petitioner again received an unsatisfactory mark for her professional techniques and skills. She also was cited for needing improvement in other areas. The notes to that evaluation stated Petitioner had improved her relationships with co-workers, but was still having problems adjusting to the new programs that required modernizing her skill set. Despite a few negative marks on her evaluation, Petitioner received an annual contract for the 2013-2014 school year. Petitioner did not dispute the fact that her evaluator and supervisor, Mr. Odom, believed her performance was unsatisfactory. She disagreed, however, with his assessment of her performance. Petitioner believed she had been demoted in the 2013-2014 school year and testified she signed a paper acknowledging a demotion in a disciplinary meeting with the IT department director, Tom Ingram. She did not receive a reduction in salary or benefits, however. Mr. Ingram classified the action taken against Petitioner as a restriction of her duties to Level I telephone support, rather than the more challenging Level II telephone support duties that she had performed in the past. He did not consider this a demotion, but more of a recognition of assigning Petitioner to duties that he believed she could better handle with her skill set. Petitioner testified that Ms. Cooper told her on several occasions she should consider retirement. Petitioner took this as evidence of Ms. Cooper’s belief she was too old to perform her job. Ms. Cooper testified she made the suggestion because Petitioner had an elderly mother who lived in a nursing home and needed assistance. Ms. Cooper was responding to Petitioner having told her she was left with little time to care for her mother when she finished with work. Petitioner acknowledged that her mother was elderly and needed help and that she had told this to Ms. Cooper. During Petitioner’s final eight months of employment, she worked mainly telephone support under the direction of Ms. Cooper, the support manager for the District. Ms. Cooper manages the help desk and IT support staff. She manages two levels of support. Level I support involves matters that can be resolved by telephone, while Level II support is for matters that cannot be resolved in five minutes or less and require more expertise to cure. Ms. Cooper developed concerns about Petitioner’s support performance. She took her concerns to the Director of IT, Mr. Ingram. Similar concerns with Petitioner’s performance had been raised by another support technician, as well. That technician reported that one of the schools to which he and Petitioner had both been assigned, asked that Petitioner not be allowed to return there for support in the future. When Ms. Cooper brought her concerns about Petitioner to Mr. Ingram, he asked that she bring him documentation of her concerns evidencing recent issues concerning Petitioner’s performance. Mr. Ingram met with Petitioner on September 3, 2013, to review her performance. Mr. Ingram’s notes from that meeting document his concern with Petitioner’s performance and he restricted her duties at that time to telephone support because he did not believe she could independently provide on-site support to more schools. His notes further indicate that Petitioner was not satisfied with his conclusions regarding her performance. Mr. Ingram conducted a follow-up interview with Petitioner on September 4, 2013, because Petitioner wanted to share with him the evaluation she had received from Mr. Odom for the 2012-2013 school year. Mr. Ingram told Petitioner he agreed with the evaluation conducted and recorded by Mr. Odom. Mr. Ingram had yet another meeting with Petitioner in March 2014 regarding her performance. With Ms. Cooper present, Mr. Ingram reviewed documentation concerning Petitioner’s unsatisfactory performance. The meeting was held pursuant to a Notice of Consideration of Disciplinary Action served on Petitioner. As a result of the meeting, Mr. Ingram was not confident Petitioner could satisfactorily improve her performance. He believed that Petitioner refused to accept the representative examples he gave her of her unsatisfactory performance. After concluding at the March meeting that Petitioner’s performance would not sufficiently improve, Mr. Ingram decided not to renew Petitioner’s annual contract when it expired in June 2014. Petitioner believed she had been marginalized by her perceived demotion to a Level I telephone support technician. She also was removed from ZENworks, a scheduling program she had previously been involved with over the years, becoming the only employee on the support team that was not allowed to participate in that program. Petitioner believed that all the criticisms of her work by management were hyper-technical, and that she received little, if any, feedback or training during the period for which she was evaluated when the unsatisfactory findings were made. She also attempted to show that others who made errors similar to hers were given promotions. The evidence presented on this point was insufficient to support her claim of disparate treatment. Several retired or long-serving District employees testified that their interaction over the years with Petitioner resulted in responsive and high-quality service from Petitioner. None of these witnesses testified about specific support they received from Petitioner during the last three years of her employment, employing the new FOCUS system, which served as the basis for the non-renewal of her contract. Petitioner testified she should receive damages in the amount of $384,000 as the result of her employment being terminated while she was a participant in the midst of D.R.O.P.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the “unlawful employment practice” alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner’s employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Ryan M. Barnett, Esquire Whibbs and Stone, P.A. 801 West Romana Street, Unit C Pensacola, Florida 32502 (eServed) Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire The Hammons Law Firm, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race.
Findings Of Fact In February 2006, Respondent hired Petitioner, an African-American male, knowing that he had a criminal record. Respondent employed Petitioner as a porter. Respondent employed other African-American and Caucasian people as porters, housekeepers, and janitors. Initially, Respondent paid Petitioner $7.25 per hour. Respondent was impressed with Petitioner's enthusiasm and willingness to perform physically demanding work. Respondent gave Petitioner a reward for always being on time and not being absent. Respondent eventually raised Petitioner's salary to $10.00 per hour or $400 per week. Respondent gave Petitioner the promotion so that he and his wife could qualify for a mortgage. Respondent helped Petitioner pay off his wife's credit card debt for the same reason. After Petitioner and his family moved into their new home, Carol Collett, Respondent's Caucasian General Manager, helped Petitioner furnish the house. Ms. Collett also attended the christening of Petitioner's new baby. Ms. Collett tried to help Petitioner as much as she could because she believed that everyone deserves a second chance. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked the night shift when there was no supervisor on the premises. Petitioner's position required Ms. Collett's trust because his duties included taking care of the front desk. From approximately June 2007 through November 2007, Petitioner worked an average of 62 hours per week with no overtime compensation. There is no persuasive evidence that the other porters, Caucasian and/or African-American, were paid more than Petitioner or for overtime work. Petitioner never requested a raise, but he did request to work as a janitor. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that a janitor's position was available. More importantly, Petitioner lacked the skills to perform janitorial/maintenance work for Respondent. In time, Ms. Collett noticed a change in Petitioner's behavior. On one occasion, Petitioner's wife informed Ms. Collett that Petitioner had not come home with his pay check. On or about November 3, 2007, Ms. Collett confronted Petitioner about his declining job performance and his suspicious activities involving hotel guests. Petitioner denied that he was using or selling drugs or that he brought hookers to the job site. During the conversation, Petitioner began to cry, stating that he had let Ms. Collett down. Petitioner said that he "would rather to go back jail where life was easier and he would not have the pressure of daily life." Ms. Collett did not have a chance to terminate Petitioner because he left voluntarily. Petitioner came back to the hotel one time to pick up his last pay check. At that time, Ms. Collett confronted Petitioner about some money that was missing from the front office. The office had been locked the night before, but someone had entered it through the ceiling from the adjoining room. Petitioner could not find another job. He is now in prison.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth W. Johnson, DC #646344 Gulf Correctional Institution 699 Ike Steele Road Wewahitchka, Florida 32465 Jerome D. Mitchell, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 1326 South Ridgewood Avenue Suite 8 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Handi House of Starke, Inc. ("Handi House") committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race by subjecting him to different terms and conditions than similarly situated employees outside of his protected classification, and by discharging Petitioner from his employment after a dispute with a similarly situated employee outside of his protected classification.
Findings Of Fact Handi House is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Handi House sells and delivers portable storage buildings. Handi House is a family owned business. It is currently owned by Christina Hewes, who took over the company from her father, John Curles, in 2003. Handi House pays its employees in a variety of ways, including hourly wages, salaries, and commission, depending on the work performed. Ms. Hewes and Mr. Curles are white. Petitioner, a black male, worked off and on at odd jobs and manual labor for Handi House and for Mr. Curles personally for more than 20 years. Ms. Hewes conceded that Petitioner has been affiliated with the family business for as long as she can remember. Petitioner testified that he worked for Handi House for 28 years, but was never formally placed on the company payroll. He stated that he never received a W-2 from the company and that Social Security taxes were never deducted from his pay. Petitioner testified that he was paid roughly $7.00 per hour and received a check every week. He placed into evidence two checks that he had received from Handi House. The first check was dated October 9, 2009, and was for $236.00. The second check was dated November 25, 2009, and was for $198.00. Ms. Hewes could not testify as to the business arrangement that existed between Petitioner and her father, but she knew her father always tried to find something for Petitioner to do when he needed work. Petitioner worked at other jobs as well as at Handi House. Ms. Hewes stated that since she has taken over the company, Petitioner has worked for her intermittently between arrests, time in jail, and probation. Petitioner did not have a driver's license, which limited his value to Handi House, as he could only act as an assistant on deliveries. Petitioner worked as an unskilled laborer whenever Ms. Hewes had work for him to do and he was available to do it. Ms. Hewes testified that when Petitioner was sober and willing, he worked better and harder than 90 percent of the people she had ever hired. However, Petitioner was unreliable. Ms. Hewes testified that there were many occasions when Petitioner came in to bail her out of a tough spot, but just as many occasions when his failure to show up as scheduled or his showing up drunk left the business "high and dry." Docket sheets from the Bradford County Clerk of Court from 2006 through 2009 show that Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (guilty plea), aggravated battery (nolle prosequi), and possession of drug paraphernalia (guilty plea), as well as for procedural violations such as failure to appear in court. Petitioner conceded that Ms. Hewes has bailed him out of jail on several occasions since she took over Handi House. Despite Petitioner's unreliability, Ms. Hewes continued to find work for him at Handi House. Petitioner lived directly behind the business, which helped to make him available on short notice. Ms. Hewes continued to use Petitioner even after Petitioner's stepson, who lived with Petitioner, was arrested for breaking into Ms. Hewes' office and stealing checks from the company checkbook. Ms. Hewes disputed Petitioner's contention that Handi House never properly paid him or deducted payroll taxes from his paychecks. In fact, it was Petitioner who insisted on payment as an independent contractor rather than an employee. Ms. Hewes testified that in 2008, her accountant advised her that if she was going to pay Petitioner more than $5,000 per year, she either had to place him on the payroll and have him work regular hours, or give him a Form 1099 if he was going to continue with piecemeal work. Ms. Hewes offered to place Petitioner on the Handi House payroll as a full-time employee. Petitioner declined the offer because he owed back child support and feared that it would be deducted from his pay if he became a regular employee. At the hearing, Ms. Hewes presented a Form 1099 for Petitioner showing that Handi House paid Petitioner $13,211.25 in nonemployee compensation during the year 2009. Ms. Hewes' testimony that Petitioner was always paid for his work, that he was paid in the manner of his choosing, and that Handi House properly reported the payments, is credited. The events that precipitated the dispute in this case began on a Friday in November 2009, when Petitioner went out on a delivery with Terrell "Peanut" Odom, a full-time employee of Handi House who drove the delivery truck. Mr. Odom is white. Ms. Hewes' undisputed testimony was that Petitioner and Mr. Odom were friendly with each other. They spent time together away from work, and had sold cars to each other. On the day in question, Petitioner and Mr. Odom had an argument on the way to make a delivery. Petitioner declined to describe the subject matter of the argument, but it so angered Mr. Odom that he turned the truck around and drove back to Handi House. Mr. Odom told Ms. Hewes that he did not want to work with Petitioner, and drove off alone to make the delivery. On the following Monday, Mr. Owens continued to refuse to take Petitioner with him on deliveries. Because Mr. Odom was a solid, reliable employee, Ms. Hewes declined to force him to work with Petitioner. Rather, she found work for Petitioner to do on the company's lot in Starke. She hoped that with time, tempers would cool and matters would return to normal. Petitioner worked around the Handi House lot for five days. On the fifth day, Petitioner's wife, Barbara Fraizer, left an abusive voicemail message for Ms. Hewes, who testified that Ms. Fraizer sounded drunk. Ms. Fraizer made threats of violence against Ms. Hewes, Ms. Hewes' mother, and employees of Handi House. Ms. Hewes testified that this was the final straw. She advised Petitioner that he was not to set foot on the Handi House lot again. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner ever complained or even mentioned harassment or discrimination on the basis of race to anyone at Handi House. At the hearing, when Petitioner was asked whether he believed Ms. Hewes' motive in dismissing him was racial, he responded, "Not really." Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Handi House discriminated against him because of his race in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes. In an attempt to show disparate treatment between himself and similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class, Petitioner testified that a white secretary named "Rebecca" was dismissed by Ms. Hewes on much more generous terms than was Petitioner. Petitioner testified that Rebecca received several checks at the time of and even after her dismissal, whereas Petitioner received only a few days of "piss work" after Mr. Odom refused to work with him. Ms. Hewes testified that Rebecca was not a secretary but a salesperson, and that the checks she received at the time of her dismissal and shortly thereafter were for commissions that she had earned. Ms. Hewes' testimony on this point is credited. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Handi House for his dismissal.2/ Partly out of loyalty to her father, and partly because of her genuine affection for Petitioner, Ms. Hewes continued to find work for Petitioner long after most business owners would have sent him packing. This is clearly not a case of racial discrimination, but something in the nature of a family argument that got out of hand. The evidence established that Petitioner was considered a good employee when he was sober and not in trouble with the law, and that Handi House made every good faith effort to keep him on the job. Ms. Hewes testified that she would have offered to bring Petitioner back to work at Handi House if not for his insistent pursuit of what she considered an unfounded and insulting claim of racial discrimination. The fact that Handi House had a long history of forbearance in regard to Petitioner's erratic behavior did not oblige it to continue that forbearance in perpetuity. When Ms. Hewes finally became fed up with Petitioner, she was not motivated by considerations of race, as Petitioner himself candidly admitted at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Handi House of Starke, Inc., did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s (“Dillard’s”), discriminated against Petitioner based upon his national origin or disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).2/
Findings Of Fact Dillard’s is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Dillard’s is a department store chain. Petitioner, a Mexican male, was hired as a sales associate in the men’s department of Dillard’s store at Tallahassee’s Governor’s Square Mall on May 13, 2014. Petitioner’s job was to sell men’s fragrances directly to customers at the store. Allen Gustason was manager of the Dillard’s store at Governor’s Square Mall during the time Petitioner was employed there. Dee Thomas was the assistant store manager. Mark Kronenberger, who testified at the final hearing, was the men’s department sales manager and was Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the entire time that Petitioner worked at Dillard’s. Petitioner started at a salary of $12.00 per hour as a sales associate. His job performance and pay increases were assessed primarily on the basis of sales. On January 6, 2015, Petitioner received a raise to $12.60 per hour. On April 14, 2015, Petitioner was promoted to the position of fragrance specialist and received a raise to $14.50 per hour. Petitioner’s promotion did not change his basic duties, i.e., direct sales to customers. Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s ended on November 28, 2015. Dillard’s did not dispute Petitioner’s testimony that he was a good and effective salesperson. Petitioner developed a regular clientele of Spanish-speaking customers who liked his ability to communicate with them in their native language. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received, read, and agreed to abide by Dillard’s Associate Work Rules and General Policies, which among other things forbade insubordination by sales associates. “Insubordination” was defined to include failure to follow lawful instructions from a supervisor and engaging in contemptuous or taunting conduct that undermines the authority of management. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Petitioner claims that he is a Mexican male with a disability. The claimed disability is the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Dillard’s did not dispute that Petitioner has HIV. Petitioner claims that he was harassed by fellow employees because of his Mexican national origin. Petitioner claims that he complained to his supervisors, Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Gustason, about the harassment. Petitioner claims that no effective action was taken to curb the harassment. Petitioner described a pervasive sense of discrimination at Dillard’s of which he became conscious only after about a year of working there. He testified that he is from California and had no real concept of being discriminated against because of his Mexican heritage. It took some time for him to realize and acknowledge to himself that it was happening. However, Petitioner was unable to describe many specific instances of discriminatory behavior by fellow employees. People were “mean,” or “picked on me,” or “didn’t like me,” but few of Petitioner’s complaints pointed toward racial discrimination as opposed to personal dislike. He complained that co-workers planned parties and get-togethers away from work but never asked him along, even for Mr. Kronenberger’s birthday party, but could only speculate as to the reason for his exclusion. Petitioner testified that he was an aggressive and successful salesperson. While its salespeople are assigned to specific departments, Dillard’s allows them to cross-sell in other departments. Several of the incidents described by Petitioner began when he took customers to other departments to sell them something. The undersigned infers that at least some of the bad feelings toward Petitioner were due to his perceived “poaching” of sales from other sections of the store. Petitioner testified that an employee named Carol would yell at him, apparently without provocation, so consistently that he went out of his way to avoid crossing her path. Petitioner stated that one day Carol screamed that he was good-for-nothing and was a “damn Mexican,” in front of customers and co-workers. Petitioner testified that he had no idea why she did this because he had done nothing to provoke her. He walked away, covering his ears from her abuse. Petitioner testified that he went upstairs and spoke to Mr. Gustason about the incident but that nothing was done. Petitioner stated that he returned to the sales floor. Other employees told him that Carol had worked for Dillard’s for many years and was a friend of Mr. Gustason and that he should not expect anything to be done about her behavior. Petitioner testified that an employee named Eric, who worked in the men’s department, made fun of his accent, particularly Petitioner’s difficulty in pronouncing “Saturday.” Petitioner testified that another fellow employee, a white woman named Amber who also worked in fragrance, was constantly rude and mean to him. In front of customers, Amber would say that she did not know why Petitioner was there, that he was only good for cleaning the counters. Petitioner repeatedly complained to Mr. Kronenberger about Amber. Mr. Kronenberger told him to continue doing a good job and not to focus on Amber. Petitioner stated that Mr. Kronenberger directed Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter, but she ignored the order and continued to harass him. Petitioner stated that matters came to a head when he was helping some female customers and went to Amber’s counter one day. He reached behind her to get the fragrance the customers wanted and Amber struck him with her elbow. The customers were aghast and complained to Dillard’s management despite Petitioner’s entreaties that they let the matter drop. Petitioner and Amber were called to the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Yami Yao, the manager of women’s cosmetics. Amber denied everything. The supervisors told Petitioner and Amber to get along. They told Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter. Petitioner testified that Amber ignored the instruction and continued to harass him. Petitioner testified that on another day he was approached by a customer who wanted to pay Petitioner for a pair of shoes. Petitioner testified that he asked Mr. Kronenberger about it, because he did not want to steal a sale or anger anyone. Mr. Kronenberger told him that he was there to sell and that cross-selling was fine. As Petitioner was completing the sale, an older white man working in the shoe department threw a shoe at Petitioner and said, “You damn Mexican, I’m going to raise hell against you.” Petitioner testified about an altercation with Risa Autrey, a fragrance model who worked in Dillard’s and who Petitioner stated was another longtime friend of Mr. Gustason. One day, Ms. Autrey approached Petitioner--again, with zero provocation, according to Petitioner--and began berating him, saying that she had no idea why Dillard’s kept Petitioner around. This occurred in front of co-workers and customers. The customers went upstairs and complained to Mr. Gustason, who followed up by admonishing Petitioner to stop telling people to complain to him because nothing was going to come of it. Petitioner testified that a day or so after the incident with Ms. Autrey, he met with Mr. Gustason and Mr. Thomas.4/ During the course of this meeting, Petitioner disclosed his HIV status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Gustason’s attitude towards him changed immediately, and that Mr. Gustason had him fired two weeks later on a pretextual charge of stealing and insubordination. Petitioner testified that he got sick a few days before Black Friday, which in 2015 was on November 27. When he returned to work on November 25, he attempted to give Mr. Gustason a doctor’s note that would have entitled Petitioner to paid leave, but Mr. Gustason would not talk to him. Petitioner worked a long shift on Black Friday. On Saturday, November 28, 2015, he was called to Mr. Thomas’s office about an altercation he had on November 25 with Ms. Yao, the woman’s cosmetics manager. Mr. Kronenberger was also in the office. Petitioner testified that Mr. Thomas accused him of stealing, as well as insubordination to Ms. Yao, and fired him. Two mall security officers, the Dillard’s security officer, and Mr. Kronenberger escorted Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner testified that he was given no paperwork to memorialize his firing or the reasons therefor. Mr. Kronenberger testified at the final hearing. He testified that Petitioner constantly complained about someone not liking him or picking on him. Petitioner never gave him specifics as to what happened. Mr. Kronenberger stated that Petitioner never complained about racial slurs or that any of his alleged mistreatment had a discriminatory element. It was always, “This person doesn’t like me.” Petitioner had issues with tardiness and absenteeism throughout his employment with Dillard’s. Mr. Kronenberger testified that there would be days when Petitioner simply would not show up for work, or would send a text message to Mr. Kronenberger saying that he had things to do or someone he had to meet. Employment records submitted by Dillard’s supported the contention that Petitioner was frequently late for, or absent from, work. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner was erratic in his communications. Petitioner would send a text message saying he could not come in. Then he would send a text telling Mr. Kronenberger how happy he was to have the job. Mr. Kronenberger recalled once receiving a text from Petitioner at midnight that read, “I know I’ve been bad.” In November 2015, Petitioner had six unexcused absences, including four consecutive days from November 21 through 24. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner finally admitted that he needed to cut his hours in order to qualify for some form of public assistance. Mr. Gustason told Petitioner that something could be worked out to cut his hours, but that just not showing up for work was unfair to Mr. Kronenberger and the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Dillard’s would normally terminate an employee with six unexcused absences in one month under the heading of job abandonment. He stated that Mr. Gustason bent over backward to work with Petitioner and keep him on the job. When Petitioner was absent, Mr. Gustason would leave messages for him, asking him to call and let him know what was going on. During the string of November absences, Mr. Kronenberger phoned Petitioner, who said that he was afraid to come into work for fear that Mr. Gustason would fire him. Mr. Kronenberger assured Petitioner that Mr. Gustason had no such intent, but that in any event no one would have to fire him because he had not been to work in a week. Petitioner was effectively “firing himself” by abandoning his position. Petitioner showed up for work on November 25, 2015, at 4:50 p.m. He had been scheduled to come in at 9:45 a.m. Mr. Kronenberger testified that he was not present for Petitioner’s altercation with Ms. Yao, but that Ms. Yao reported she had attempted to counsel Petitioner about gifts with purchases. The promotional gifts were to be given away only with the purchase of certain items, but Petitioner was apparently disregarding that restriction and giving the gifts with non-qualifying purchases. Ms. Yao told Mr. Kronenberger that Petitioner quickly escalated the counseling into a shouting match in front of customers and co-workers. He yelled, “You’re not going to talk to me that way.” Ms. Yao told Petitioner that she worked in another department and did not have to deal with his antics. She told him that she was going to report the matter to Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas.5/ Mr. Kronenberger testified that his conversation with Ms. Yao was brief because there was no need to give many particulars. He was used to getting reports of employee run-ins with Petitioner and did not need much explanation to get the gist of what had happened. Mr. Kronenberger decided not to raise the issue with Petitioner on Black Friday, the busiest day of the year at the store. On the next day, November 28, Petitioner was called into the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas. Mr. Kronenberger testified that this meeting was not just about the incident with Ms. Yao but also Petitioner’s absences. In Mr. Kronenberger’s words, “[I]t was to follow up with the incident with Yami, and it was to follow up with, ‘Hey, you’ve just missed a week, you’ve been back a day, and you’re having this blow-up with a manager on the floor.’ Like, ‘What’s going on?’” Mr. Kronenberger testified that neither he nor Mr. Thomas went into this meeting with any intention of terminating Petitioner’s employment. However, two minutes into the conversation, Petitioner was on his feet, pointing fingers, and shouting that he knew what they were trying to do and he was not going to let them do it. He was quitting. Petitioner walked out of the office. Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Kronenberger to walk Petitioner out of the store so that there would be no incidents on the floor with the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger accompanied Petitioner to the fragrance area, where Petitioner retrieved some personal items, then walked him to the door. They shook hands and Petitioner left the store. Mr. Kronenberger was firm in his testimony that no security personnel were involved in removing Petitioner from the store. Petitioner was not accused of stealing. His parting with Mr. Kronenberger was as cordial as it could have been under the circumstances.6/ After Petitioner left his office, Mr. Thomas prepared a “Separation Data Form” confirming Petitioner’s dismissal for “violation of company work rules.” The specific ground stated for Petitioner’s dismissal was violation of the Associate Work Rule forbidding insubordination. Mr. Kronenberger testified that in his mind the “insubordination” included not just the scene with Ms. Yao, but the explosion Petitioner had in the meeting with Mr. Thomas. At the time of Petitioner’s dismissal, Mr. Kronenberger was unaware of Petitioner’s HIV status. Mr. Kronenberger credibly testified that Petitioner’s HIV status had nothing to do with his dismissal from employment at Dillard’s. Mr. Gustason, who apparently was aware of Petitioner’s HIV status, was not at work on November 28, 2015, and was not involved in the events leading to Petitioner’s dismissal. Mr. Thomas, the assistant store manager, made the decision to treat Petitioner’s situation as a dismissal for cause.7/ Mr. Kronenberger’s testimony is credited regarding the circumstances of Petitioner’s dismissal and as to the general tenor of Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s. Petitioner was constantly in the middle of conflicts, but never alleged until after his termination that these conflicts were due to his national origin or disability. Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was extremely emotional. He cried frequently and seemed baffled that Mr. Kronenberger was disputing his testimony. The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s version of events was genuine in the sense that it conveyed Petitioner’s subjective experience of his employment as he recollected it. However, the undersigned must also find that Petitioner’s subjective experience did not conform to objective reality. However, Petitioner internalized the experiences, it is not plausible that Dillard’s employees were yelling at Petitioner without provocation, hitting him, throwing shoes at him, and calling him a “damn Mexican” in front of customers. It is not plausible that Petitioner’s superiors would ignore such flagrant discriminatory behavior when it was brought to their attention. Petitioner’s feelings about the motives of his co-workers and superiors cannot substitute for tangible evidence of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner offered the testimony of two Dillard’s customers, neither of whom saw behavior from Petitioner’s co- workers that could be attributed to anything beyond personal dislike or sales poaching. Santiago Garcia testified that he noted other Dillard’s employees rolling their eyes at Petitioner, but he thought the reason might be that Petitioner talked too loud. Mr. Garcia also saw “bad looks” from other employees and believed that the atmosphere among Dillard’s employees was “tense,” but did not offer a reason for the tension. Claudia Pimentel testified, through a Spanish language interpreter, that she always went directly to Petitioner because she speaks only Spanish and Petitioner was able to help her. Ms. Pimentel noted that a female Dillard’s employee got mad at Petitioner because he sold Ms. Pimentel a cream from her counter. During the years 2015 and 2016, the Dillard’s store in Governor’s Square Mall terminated two other sales associates for insubordination. Neither of these sales associates was Mexican. One was a black female and the other was a black male. Neither of these sales associates had a known disability at the time of termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by Dillard’s for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s national origin or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s discriminated against him because of his national origin or his disability in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s, did not commit any unlawful employment practices, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, race, and/or national origin.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's race is black and her nation of origin is Jamaica. She was born on January 12, 1933. Petitioner completed a State of Florida employment application on August 7, 2002, for the position of Human Services Worker II at the Department's Gulf Coast Center in Fort Myers. The state employment application does not require an applicant to list her age or date of birth. All applicants for the Human Services Worker II position were required to sign a "willingness survey" indicating the applicant's willingness to work beyond the hours of a normal shift and/or willingness to work on an assigned day off, if such was required, in order for the facility to meet its minimum staffing requirements. Petitioner read and signed the willingness survey. The Department hired Petitioner for the Human Services Worker II position on September 13, 2002. Her letter of appointment informed Petitioner that she was required to complete a 12-month probationary period before attaining permanent status. Petitioner is a certified nursing assistant ("CNA"), and the job for which she was hired involved the provision of direct care, supervision, and assistance to residents of the Gulf Coast Center. Gulf Coast Center is a 24-hour licensed intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled, primarily the mentally retarded. Gulf Coast Center's license requires that a minimum number of direct care staff be present and on duty 24 hours per-day, every day of the year, for each residential unit. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.430(d)(3). Petitioner was assigned to the second shift (2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), with Mondays and Tuesdays as her days off. She worked in the Madison Cottage, which houses 16 profoundly retarded adult females exhibiting a variety of extreme behaviors, including self-injury and aggression towards facility staff. The third shift in Madison Cottage began at 10:45 p.m. and ended at 6:45 a.m. The minimum staff required for the second shift was six persons. The minimum staff required for the third shift was three persons. To ensure that the minimum staff requirements were met, Gulf Coast Center promulgated a "holdover policy," which was in effect at the time Petitioner was hired and throughout her employment. The policy provided that staff persons on one shift could not leave the facility until the next shift met the minimum staffing requirement. In practice, the holdover policy was most commonly invoked when an employee from an incoming shift called in sick. The supervisor of the outgoing shift would first invoke the "pull policy," contacting other cottages in Gulf Coast Center to ascertain whether they could pull an employee from their incoming shifts to fill the slot of the absent employee. If no one was available from another unit, the supervisor would then seek a volunteer from her own cottage to work the incoming shift. If no one volunteered, the supervisor was then required to "hold over" an employee from the current shift. Having signed the "willingness survey," this employee was required to work the extra shift, later receiving compensatory leave to ensure that she did not work more than 40 hours in a given week. Employees were given the opportunity to choose which day of the week they would be available for holdover. If the employee failed to choose a day, then her supervisor would assign a day. Petitioner failed to choose a day and was assigned Wednesday as her holdover day. Prior to May 21, 2003, Petitioner had worked at least one holdover shift without incident. On Wednesday, May 21, 2003, Laurie Whidden was the acting supervisor of Madison Cottage for the second shift. She was informed that a third-shift employee had called in sick. Ms. Whidden attempted to pull an employee from another cottage to cover the shortage, but no one was available. She asked for volunteers to work the third shift, but received no response. Ms. Whidden then informed Petitioner that she would be required to hold over and work the third shift. Petitioner responded that she could not work the third shift, because she could not leave her sick husband at home alone for 16 hours. Petitioner's husband suffered from heart disease, and at that time, his condition was precarious. Petitioner testified that she frequently had to take her husband to the emergency room. However, Petitioner gave Gulf Coast Center no prior notice that she could no longer work a holdover shift, nor did she make any arrangements for the care of her husband on Wednesday, which she knew was her potential holdover day. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner made no effort to ask a fellow second-shift employee to cover for her that night. Petitioner simply went home at the end of the second shift. There was some dispute as to whether Petitioner answered, "Hell, no," when Ms. Whidden asked her to hold over for the third shift. The weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's assertion that her statement was directed at another employee's remark that Petitioner could sue the state if she came home after working the third shift and found her husband dead on the floor. Petitioner was indicating to the other employee that she wanted her husband alive, not money from the state. Petitioner and Beverly Morgan, another second-shift employee, testified that another employee was sent over from another cottage to work the third shift on May 21, 2003, meaning that Petitioner's refusal to stay had no real impact on the staffing of Madison Cottage. Ms. Whidden testified that no one came from another cottage to cover the shortage and that Ms. Whidden herself stayed to work the third shift. Ms. Whidden's testimony is credited on this point. Ms. Whidden informed Colette Fritts, the residential services supervisor of Madison Cottage, that Petitioner refused to hold over for the third shift on May 21, 2003. Ms. Fritts forwarded the report to Gulf Coast Center's human resources division with a recommendation for disciplinary action against Petitioner. The superintendent of Gulf Coast Center terminated Petitioner's employment. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her age was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. Ms. Morgan claimed that one night she overheard Ms. Whidden and Leoncia Trevino, another Human Services Worker II in Madison Cottage, discussing Petitioner's age, saying that if she was too old to hold over, she should quit. Given that Petitioner only once refused to hold over, on the night of May 21, 2003, this testimony is not credible. Further, the evidence established that in March and June 2003, probationary employees in their twenties were terminated for refusing to hold over at the end of their shifts. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her national origin played a role in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner, Ms. Morgan, and Carmel Henry, another Madison Cottage employee, all testified that Ms. Whidden, the acting supervisor, wanted to "get rid" of the Jamaican employees in Madison Cottage before the regular supervisor, Monica Franks, herself a Jamaican, returned from sick leave. However, none of them could point to any action by Ms. Whidden to put such a plan into effect or even any statement by Ms. Whidden that would indicate an animus toward Jamaicans. Ms. Whidden testified that at the time of the events at issue, she knew Petitioner was from an island, but didn't know which one. The source of the rumors regarding Ms. Whidden's intention to get rid of the Jamaicans appears to have been Leoncia Trevino. The other workers in Madison Cottage believed that Ms. Trevino had the ear of management. Ms. Whidden credibly testified that she had no special friendship with Ms. Trevino, who was moved out of Madison Cottage on June 24, 2003, after a confrontation with Ms. Henry, and then resigned her employment at Gulf Coast Center the next day. Petitioner produced no evidence that her race played any part in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of her dismissal, meaning that she could be dismissed "at will." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3). At the time of her hiring, Petitioner received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook, which informed her that she could be dismissed at will as a probationary employee. Petitioner was aware of the holdover policy and consented to abide by that policy at the time of her employment. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner refused the lawful order of her duly-delegated supervisor to hold over. This refusal constituted insubordination, which would provide cause for dismissal even for a permanent career service employee. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3)(d). The evidence produced at hearing demonstrated that the sole reason for Petitioner's termination was her direct refusal to follow the lawful order of her supervisor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Department of Children and Family Services did not commit any unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on his national origin (Hispanic), by limiting, segregating, or classifying employees in a discriminatory fashion, or by retaliating against Petitioner for his opposition to unlawful employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent is a family owned company based in Winter Park that installs residential and commercial insulation and acoustical ceilings and tiles. The company is divided into two divisions. The Insulation Division is headed by William Aldrich. The Acoustic/Ceiling Division is headed by Dale Aldrich, Jr., who was Petitioner's ultimate supervisor. Subsequent references to "Mr. Aldrich" are to Dale Aldrich, Jr. Petitioner, a Hispanic male originally from the U.S. Virgin Islands, was hired by Respondent in February 2006 to work in the Acoustic/Ceiling Division. He was hired as a tile installer, the entry-level position in the Acoustic/Ceiling Division. A tile installer drops ceiling tiles into the gridwork installed by a ceiling mechanic. With experience, a tile installer may work his way up to ceiling mechanic. "Ceiling mechanic" is not a licensed position, and there is no formal progression through which an employee works his way up to this more skilled, higher paid position. Advancement depends on management's recognition that an employee's skills have advanced to the point at which he can be entrusted with the mechanic's duties. Three to four years' experience is generally required to advance from tile installer to ceiling mechanic. By all accounts, including those of the ceiling mechanics who supervised him at job sites and that of Mr. Aldrich, Petitioner was more than competent as to his actual job skills. During the approximately thirteen months he worked for Respondent, Petitioner received four pay raises. He was making $14.00 per hour at the time of his termination in August 2007. The evidence produced at the hearing demonstrated that Petitioner had problems controlling his temper on the job. He was generally negative and quick to take offense at perceived slights, especially when he inferred they were due to his national origin. During his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was involved in at least three altercations with fellow employees and/or general contractors for whom Respondent worked as a subcontractor. The earliest incident occurred in October 2006. Petitioner was working on a job site at which Respondent was a subcontractor for Harkins Development Corporation. Petitioner testified that a Harkins supervisor named Harley was "commanding" him to perform tasks on the job site. Petitioner was affronted, because he was not Harley's employee and because Harley, who was white, did not appear to be giving commands to the white employees of Respondent. After lunch, Harley feigned that he was about to throw a soft drink at Petitioner. In fact, the Wendy's cup in Harley's hand was empty, though a drop or two of condensation from the outside of the cup may have landed on Petitioner. In Petitioner's version of the story, Petitioner then stood up and asked Harley if he would enjoy being on the receiving end of such treatment. Petitioner then phoned Mr. Aldrich and asked to be sent to a different job site. Mr. Aldrich refused, and instead scolded Petitioner. Petitioner believed that Mr. Aldrich was retaliating for his complaint. Petitioner walked off the job site for the rest of the day, and worked at a different site the next day. Petitioner entered into evidence the written statement of his co-worker, Eddy Abud. Mr. Abud is Hispanic, with a national origin in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Abud witnessed the confrontation between Petitioner and Harley. Mr. Abud stated that Harley shook his cup and a "couple drops" of water splashed on Petitioner, who "went ballistic." Petitioner used obscenities against Harley and invited him to fight. Harley threw Petitioner off the job, an action with which Mr. Abud agreed. Petitioner entered into evidence the written statement of his co-worker, Robert "Pappy" Amey. Mr. Amey is white, and wrote that Petitioner "acted like a man all the time" except for the incident with Harley. Mr. Amey's statement reads as follows, in relevant part: Harley had a big drink cup and he turned around and flipped it, playing, nothing came out. Justo lit up [and] called him a mother fucker a dozen times. He said if I find you on the street, I'll kill you. I leaned to him and I said, "Justo, shut up." He did not, he cussed Harley out the door. It was Harley's job. This was unprofessional behavior by Justo. It was just horseplay and it was empty. No reason to act like that. Despite his overall respect for Petitioner, Mr. Amey stated that Petitioner should have been fired for his actions. Mr. Aldrich testified that Harley called him and told him that Petitioner had threatened him. Petitioner told Harley that he would not do anything on the job, but would "kick his ass" if he saw him away from the job. Mr. Aldrich stated that Harkins was one of Respondent's largest, longest-standing accounts, and that he knew Harley as a "stand up guy" who would have no reason to lie about such an incident. The second incident occurred later in the same month, on October 31, 2006. Petitioner was working for Respondent on a project at the University of Central Florida. A ceiling mechanic named Adam Sorkness was in charge of the project. Petitioner testified that Mr. Sorkness had already angered him in September 2006 by making racial jokes about black employees, and that Mr. Aldrich had separated Petitioner from Mr. Sorkness on subsequent jobs up to October 31, 2006. At first, there were no problems on the University of Central Florida job. Petitioner accepted his assignment from Mr. Sorkness. On this day, every man on the job was installing ceiling tile, which involved wearing stilts. According to Petitioner, two white employees arrived later in the morning and decided to work together, leaving Petitioner to work with Isaiah Fields, a black employee whom Petitioner alleged was the butt of Mr. Sorkness' earlier racial jokes. Petitioner became agitated because it appeared the two white employees were doing no work. Mr. Fields testified that he and Petitioner were working around a corner from Mr. Sorkness. They heard loud laughter from around the corner. Mr. Fields said that the laughter was not directed at him or Petitioner, but that it appeared to anger Petitioner, who said, "Wait a minute," and headed around the corner on his stilts. Mr. Fields stayed put and thus did not see the subsequent altercation. Petitioner approached Mr. Sorkness, who was also on stilts. Petitioner complained about the job assignments. Mr. Sorkness replied that everyone was doing the same job and that Petitioner could leave if he didn't like it. Petitioner became more incensed, calling Mr. Sorkness a "sorry white faggot." Petitioner took off his stilts, then confronted Mr. Sorkness at very close range. Mr. Sorkness pushed Petitioner away. Petitioner then charged Mr. Sorkness and they engaged in a brief fight. Ben Davis, a white ceiling mechanic who witnessed the altercation, called it a "scuffle."3 Mr. Aldrich investigated the matter and determined that Petitioner was the instigator of the fight. He suspended Petitioner for three days, and gave Mr. Sorkness a verbal warning. Mr. Aldrich issued a "written warning" to Petitioner cautioning him that he was subject to termination. Mr. Aldrich wrote the following comments: "Justo has been given 3 days off without pay. Normally an employee would be fired for this action. Justo has NO MORE chances. Next offense will result in immediate termination of employment with Energy Savings Systems." The document was signed by Mr. Aldrich and Petitioner.4 Petitioner claimed that Mr. Aldrich cut his hours in retaliation for the UCF incident, and it took several months for his hours to come back up to 40 per week. The time sheets submitted by Petitioner showed fluctuations in his work hours before and after the incident, which is consistent with Mr. Aldrich's testimony that he only cuts hours when work is slow for the company. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner's hours were reduced at times because he would refuse to take certain jobs, either because of their location or because Petitioner did not want to work with certain people, such as Mr. Sorkness. The third and final incident occurred on August 20, 2007. Petitioner was working on a job for which Respondent was a subcontractor to Alexander-Whitt Enterprises, a general contractor. Alexander-Whitt's superintendent on the job was Dan Alexander. Mr. Alexander asked Petitioner to clean up. Petitioner resented either the order itself or Mr. Alexander's method of delivering it, in light of a brief altercation between the two men on the job site three days earlier. Petitioner threatened to slap Mr. Alexander. Mr. Aldrich testified that he received several calls from Mr. Alexander complaining about Petitioner over the course of this job. Petitioner had an "attitude" about Mr. Alexander's instructing him on the job. Mr. Aldrich apologized. After Petitioner's threat, Mr. Alexander called yet again and told Mr. Aldrich that he wanted Petitioner off the job. After this call, Mr. Aldrich fired Petitioner. Aside from his own suspicions and resentments, Petitioner offered no evidence that his termination had anything to do with his national origin or was retaliation for his complaints about the company's discriminatory practices. In fact, Petitioner never made a formal complaint while he was employed by Respondent. His only "complaints" were to certain co-workers that he was being discriminated against because he was Hispanic. Andy Weatherby, a ceiling mechanic who at times was Petitioner's field superintendent, recalled Petitioner telling him that he felt disadvantaged on the job for being Hispanic, but that Petitioner described no specific incidents of discrimination. Julio Oliva, a junior ceiling mechanic with Respondent, is of Puerto Rican descent. Mr. Oliva testified that he saw no discrimination at the company. He worked often with Petitioner, whom he described as having a negative attitude. Mr. Oliva testified that it was difficult to merely pass the time in conversation with Petitioner, because Petitioner always had something negative to say. Edgar Mullenhoff, also Puerto Rican, has worked for Respondent since 1982 and is the field superintendent for the insulation side of the company. Mr. Mullenhoff described the company as "like a family" and stated that he never felt a victim of discrimination. Mr. Abud's written statement attests that he has had no problems working for Respondent, and that "we have great bosses." Petitioner noted what he termed a discriminatory pattern in the ethnic diversity of the Insulation Division versus the Acoustic/Ceiling Division. While conceding that most of Respondent's employees are Hispanic, Petitioner notes that the great majority of the Hispanics work in the lower paying, less skilled Insulation Division. Petitioner further argued that those few Hispanics hired in the Acoustic/Ceiling Division are given no opportunity to advance to the position of ceiling mechanic. William Aldrich, the head of the Insulation Division, testified that there is a much higher turnover in insulation, and that for the last four years or so the only applicants for the positions have been Hispanic. He credibly testified that he hires anyone who appears capable of doing the job. As to Petitioner's lack of advancement, it must be noted that he worked for Respondent for just a little over one year. Mr. Oliva testified that he has worked for Respondent for five and one-half years. He spent the first two years performing menial tasks and learning on the job. Mr. Oliva stated that Respondent's ceiling mechanics were helpful to him in learning the trade, and he felt no barriers due to his national origin. Mr. Sorkness testified that it took him between four and five years to become a mechanic. Mr. Davis testified that it took him between three and four years to work his way up to ceiling mechanic. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was terminated from his position with Respondent due to misconduct on the job. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Respondent has not discriminated against Petitioner or any other employee based on national origin.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Energy Savings Systems of Central Florida, Inc. did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, City of Ocala (“the City”), retaliated against Petitioner, Nyleah Jackson (“Petitioner” or “Ms. Jackson”), for exercising her right to file a claim of employment discrimination against the City pursuant to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018).1/
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Petitioner, an African American female, was hired by the City as an Administrative Specialist II on May 2, 2016. She worked in that job position until her resignation on February 7, 2018. Petitioner initially worked in the City’s Electric Utility Department and then transferred to the Public Works Department. Her duties were primarily secretarial, clerical, and administrative. Petitioner testified that when she started in Public Works, her direct supervisor was Tom Casey, but that at some point Judy Wade appeared to take over at least some of those supervisory duties. In her telling, Petitioner never recognized Ms. Wade as her direct supervisor except as to specific tasks delegated by Mr. Casey. Ms. Wade was the Fiscal Administrator for Public Works. She testified that Tom Casey and Darren Park are her superiors in Public Works. Ms. Wade credibly testified that she was Petitioner’s direct supervisor for the entire time that Petitioner worked in Public Works. Ms. Wade’s supervisory duties included monitoring Petitioner’s attendance at work and her leave requests. Petitioner’s testimony that she was unaware Ms. Wade was her direct supervisor for all purposes is not credited. On or about August 25, 2017, Petitioner presented a formal grievance to the City alleging that she had been discriminated against because of her race when she was not hired for a vacant Administrative Assistant III position. On or about August 31, 2017, Human Resources and Risk Management Director Jared Sorensen spoke with Petitioner and asked her to clarify whether she was pursuing a formal grievance under the City’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers or under the City’s Employee Handbook. Petitioner responded that she wished to file her grievance under the CBA. On September 13, 2017, Petitioner sent an email to Mr. Sorensen, with copies to Mr. Casey and Mr. Park. The email stated as follows, in relevant part: Both the City of Ocala Employee Handbook and Collective Bargaining Agreement allows [sic] a response in writing within 10 business days of receipt of the grievance. I spoke with Tom Casey and Darren Park as well as sent my grievance, via interoffice to Human Resources, on August 25, 2017. From my meeting, I gathered that classification matters, discriminatory/biased hiring decisions and equal pay issues is [sic] in the Human Resource jurisdiction. I received a call last week from Jared stating that the target response date was September 8th, 2017 but I would have a definitive response by September 11th, 2017. I plan to hold my employer/HR accountable and liable to this deadline as promised. It is now September 13th with no response. The email concluded with a demand for a response regarding Petitioner’s remedies no later than September 14, 2017. The record evidence indicates that the City’s response was delayed for two reasons. First, Petitioner had indicated that she wished to pursue her grievance through the CBA, and Mr. Sorensen’s conversations with Petitioner’s union representative led him to believe that Petitioner’s grievance was going to be refiled to clearly establish a starting date for the CBA process. Second, Hurricane Irma had just passed through the state, causing significant damage in Marion County and delaying the City’s ability to respond to non-emergency matters such as Petitioner’s grievance. Of greater significance to this retaliation case, Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Ms. Wade, was not copied on any of the correspondence regarding Petitioner’s discrimination claim or her grievance. The only way Ms. Wade would have known of these matters was through word-of-mouth in the office. Ms. Wade credibly testified that she was unaware of any of these matters at the time they were occurring. Petitioner believed that Ms. Wade knew of her complaints, but provided no direct evidence of Ms. Wade’s knowledge. One week after her email to Mr. Sorensen, on September 20, 2017, Petitioner interviewed for an open position in the City’s Fleet Department. The Fleet Department is separate from Public Works and is located in a different building. Ms. Wade testified that Petitioner did not inform her that she would be absent from the Public Works office or that she would be interviewing for a position in the Fleet Department. Ms. Wade stated that she checked Petitioner’s office and saw that she was not present. Ms. Wade asked a co- worker about Petitioner’s location and was informed that Petitioner was out at a job interview. Petitioner testified that she told Ms. Wade that she would be out of the office. She did not tell Ms. Wade why she was going out. Petitioner testified that she believed Ms. Wade was not her supervisor and had no reason to know that she was going out on a job interview. Petitioner stated that she told Mr. Casey why she would be out of the office. Petitioner did not call Mr. Casey as a witness to corroborate her version of events. As indicated above, the undersigned does not credit Petitioner’s assertion that she did not believe Ms. Wade was her direct supervisor. When Petitioner returned to the office, Ms. Wade informed her that she was required to use paid time off (“PTO”) for personal business such as job interviews. Ms. Wade sent a request through “Kronos,” the City’s payroll software system, to dock Petitioner for 30 minutes of PTO for the time she was not in the office. Within a few days of making the Kronos request, Ms. Wade discussed the matter with Mr. Sorensen, who told her that City policy provided that employees could interview for other open positions within the City without using any PTO. The time used for such internal interviews was to be treated as regular work time. Evidence produced at the hearing indicated that Petitioner had gone out on such internal interviews previously and not been charged with PTO. Ms. Wade, having learned that she was mistaken regarding City policy, took steps to restore Petitioner’s PTO. On September 26, 2017, Ms. Wade submitted a payroll correction to adjust Petitioner’s pay to her full regular hourly rate. On October 3, 2017, Ms. Wade informed Petitioner of her mistake and that she had reversed the docking of Petitioner’s PTO. Petitioner contended that Ms. Wade’s docking of her pay was in retaliation for her complaint of discrimination and filing of a grievance. Petitioner stated that Ms. Wade’s reversal of the PTO decision was due solely to the fact that Petitioner contacted her union representative about the matter. Petitioner conceded that the only evidence connecting her discrimination complaint to Ms. Wade’s action on September 20, 2017, was their proximity in time. Ms. Wade credibly testified that she did not know about Petitioner’s discrimination complaint on September 20, 2017, and that no one working for the City ever instructed her to take any adverse action against Petitioner. On October 2, 2017, the FCHR received Petitioner’s initial Employment Complaint of Discrimination. The FCHR sent a Notice of Filing of Complaint of Discrimination to the City. The Notice was dated October 3, 2017, but was not received by the City until October 6, 2017. Ms. Wade testified that she was unaware of any potential claim of discrimination by Petitioner prior to October 6, 2017. Petitioner claimed that Ms. Wade was aware of Petitioner’s intention to file the discrimination complaint when Ms. Wade originally docked Petitioner’s PTO in September 2017. To support this claim, Petitioner first testified that one of the emails she sent regarding her potential discrimination complaint was copied to Ms. Wade. When the actual emails were produced by the City and showed that Ms. Wade was not copied on any of them, Petitioner testified that she had told Ms. Wade of her discrimination complaint at a meeting that included Ms. Wade and Mr. Park. Ms. Wade credibly testified that she had no memory of discussing the discrimination complaint with Petitioner at a meeting. Petitioner did not produce Mr. Park as a witness to corroborate her testimony regarding a meeting. Ms. Wade’s testimony is credited on this point. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Ms. Wade’s actions on September 20, 2017, were in retaliation for Petitioner’s discrimination complaint. On November 20, 2017, the City hired Erica Wilson as the new Administrative Specialist III to work in Public Works. She assumed the duties of the previous Administrative Specialist III, Melinda Day, who had retired. Petitioner and Ms. Day had worked cooperatively in preparing payroll reports for Public Works. Petitioner would summarize the payroll cards for the stormwater division, and Ms. Day would summarize the payroll cards for the streets and traffic divisions. Once the summaries were completed, either Petitioner or Ms. Day would transmit them by email to the Payroll Department. Petitioner and Ms. Day alternated the task of sending the email to Payroll, with each employee transmitting the information every other week. After Ms. Day retired, Public Works was shorthanded for a time. During this period, Petitioner began summarizing all of the payroll cards for the stormwater, streets, and traffic divisions, and transmitting all of that information to Payroll on a weekly basis. After Ms. Wilson was hired at Public Works, Petitioner continued to perform her new duties while Ms. Wilson came up to speed on her new job. In January 2018, Ms. Wade convened a meeting with Petitioner and Ms. Wilson to discuss the transition for Ms. Wilson to take over the payroll duties formerly performed by Ms. Day. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Wade announced that Ms. Wilson would be in charge of sending all the emails to Payroll and Petitioner would continue summarizing all of the pay cards for all three divisions of Public Works.2/ In other words, the work would be divided more or less as it was before Ms. Day retired. At the meeting with Ms. Wade and Ms. Wilson, Petitioner voiced no dispute or concerns with the division of duties ordered by Ms. Wade. Neither Ms. Wade nor Ms. Wilson recalled Petitioner’s being upset by or objecting to the plan outlined by Ms. Wade. Petitioner herself conceded that she said nothing to indicate her disagreement with the re-assignment. Petitioner contends that Ms. Wade’s decision to take some of Ms. Day’s former duties from her and assign them to Ms. Day’s successor was a retaliatory reduction of her job duties. Again, Petitioner’s only evidentiary support for her contention is that the alleged retaliatory action occurred after she made her discrimination complaint with the FCHR. Ms. Wilson testified that she considered the entire matter of payroll duties to be a minor part of her job. Ms. Wade testified that her only intention in redistributing duties was to restore the status quo ante from before Ms. Day retired. Also in January 2018, another event caused Petitioner to believe that Ms. Wade was retaliating against her. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Wade further reduced her job duties by forbidding her to contact vendors used by the City or to contact City employee John Long, who was the City’s Vendor Relations Manager. The specific issue concerned Petitioner’s contacts with UniFirst, the vendor who laundered uniforms for every department of the City. Petitioner’s routine job duties included taking delivery of uniforms for Public Works employees from UniFirst drivers. She discussed with those drivers any issues regarding the number of uniforms delivered, the condition of the uniforms, and the amount of the invoice. Petitioner had no responsibility for dealing with UniFirst’s management on behalf of the City as a whole. In April 2017, Petitioner inserted herself into a quality of service dispute with UniFirst. Uniform shirts were coming back from UniFirst in a soiled and threadbare condition. At first, Petitioner followed protocol and addressed her complaints to Mr. Long, who conveyed them to Jeff Peterson, UniFirst’s district service manager. However, after some back- and-forth between Mr. Long and Mr. Peterson, Petitioner elected to send an email of her own to Mr. Peterson. Ms. Wade considered this action unprofessional and counseled Petitioner about it. Ms. Wade did not believe further discipline was necessary because the situation was unlikely to recur. However, in January 2018, a similar quality control issue arose with UniFirst. Mr. Long and Petitioner exchanged emails that indicated Mr. Long believed Petitioner was the City’s point person regarding UniFirst, based on her handling of the previous issue in 2017. However, Ms. Wade directed Petitioner not to contact UniFirst management directly because the City employed Mr. Long to handle citywide vendor relations. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Wade had instructed her to have no contact with anyone from UniFirst, and that this instruction amounted to a retaliatory reduction of her assigned duties. At the hearing, Ms. Wade made it clear that her order was meant only to stop Petitioner from contacting UniFirst’s management, an action that was never in Petitioner’s scope of duties. Petitioner was still expected to deal with the UniFirst driver who delivered uniforms to Public Works. Her job duties were unchanged. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Wade retaliated against her by denying her leave to which she was entitled. On February 5, 2018, Petitioner requested that she be allowed to use 2.5 hours of accrued “safety time”3/ that afternoon, and her “floating holiday”4/ on the following day, February 6, 2018. Ms. Wade denied the request. Petitioner nonetheless left work early on February 5, 2018, and did not come into work on the following day, missing 10.5 hours of work in total. The City applied Petitioner’s accrued PTO time, 6.2 hours, to the time she missed work. For the remaining 4.3 hours, Petitioner was charged for leave without pay. Ms. Wade testified that she denied the leave request because the Public Works Department has a written policy stating that if an employee is requesting fewer than five days off, the request should be made no less than 48 hours prior to the employee’s absence.5/ Ms. Wade stated that the policy’s purpose was to ensure that enough employees were present to perform needed work. Supervisors have discretion to deviate from the policy, but only where the employee shows good cause for the failure to provide sufficient notice. In this case, Petitioner provided Ms. Wade with no reason for her request. Petitioner testified that she was never made aware of the policy, and suggested that the City invented the policy after the fact as a response to her claim of discrimination. Petitioner presented documents showing that she had previously been allowed to take time off with less than 48 hours’ notice. Ms. Wade reviewed Petitioner’s documents at the hearing. She did not recall the specific details of any particular leave request, but testified as to her general practice in granting leave with less than 48 hours’ notice. Ms. Wade stated that in some cases, Petitioner had likely made an oral request more than 48 hours prior to the leave, but did not submit the written request into the Kronos system until later. In such cases, Petitioner’s leave request would have been granted. In other cases, Petitioner had likely presented Ms. Wade with extenuating circumstances justifying the short notice. Ms. Wade demonstrated her department’s even-handed application of the policy by producing contemporaneous records showing that other Public Works employees had been denied the use of safety hours and floating holidays when they failed to give 48 hours notice to their supervisors. Petitioner failed to establish that Ms. Wade’s denial of her leave request was retaliatory. Petitioner offered evidence on two issues that were beyond the scope of her Employment Complaint of Discrimination regarding retaliation. First, she claimed that the City retaliated against her by denying her the ability to use “flex time” to work an extra hour on February 1, 2018, so that she could leave an hour early on February 2, 2018. Petitioner claimed that this denial was in derogation of the City’s policy and prior practice. Second, Petitioner claimed that the City retaliated against her by denying her request to attend a training class. The City objected to Petitioner’s presentation of this evidence because these matters were not covered in Petitioner’s second Employment Complaint of Discrimination regarding retaliation. Petitioner conceded that these matters were not mentioned in her retaliation complaint, but maintained that she had submitted materials on these issues to, and discussed them with, the FCHR. She also raised the issues in her subsequent Petition for Relief. The undersigned allowed Petitioner to present her evidence because of the ambiguity of the procedural situation. It appears that during its investigative phase, the FCHR accepted evidence from Petitioner as to issues outside the four corners of Petitioner’s retaliation complaint. However, the FCHR ultimately issued no finding as to probable cause. Thus, it is unclear which issues the FCHR formally considered. While finding persuasive the City’s argument that Petitioner should be held to the issues raised in her Employment Complaint of Discrimination, the undersigned decided that if he were to err, it would be on the side of allowing Petitioner to present all of her evidence at the hearing. As to the first issue outside the Employment Complaint of Discrimination, Petitioner testified that, on February 1, 2018, she requested that she be allowed to work an extra hour and then use the “flex time” to take an hour off work the next day. Petitioner presented an email chain between Ms. Wade and her regarding this request. Ms. Wade ultimately denied the request on the ground that the City does not allow employees to “flex ahead,” i.e., work extra time now in anticipation of taking time off later. Ms. Wade told Petitioner that she would be allowed to flex an hour on February 1, 2018, and then work through her lunch hour on February 2, 2018. Petitioner testified that the City had always allowed her and other employees to flex ahead, and that the denial in this instance could only be explained as retaliation by Ms. Wade for her discrimination complaint. Petitioner did not offer evidence of the City’s written policy on flex time or evidence that the City even had such a policy. She offered exhibits purporting to demonstrate that she and other employees had been allowed to work extra time on one day to take time off on a later date. However, the coding on these documents was not clear and Petitioner did not adequately explain them. The City declined to offer evidence on this issue because of its contention that it was outside the scope of Petitioner’s Employment Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner failed to establish that Ms. Wade’s stated view of the City’s flex time policy was incorrect or that Ms. Wade deviated from past policy and practice by declining to allow Petitioner to flex ahead on February 1, 2018. As to the second issue outside the Employment Complaint of Discrimination, Petitioner testified that on October 12, 2017, she submitted a request to Ms. Wade to take two training courses being offered by the City: “Attitude Means Everything” and “Communicating with Diplomacy and Tact.” Ms. Wade gave Petitioner permission to take the first class but denied her permission to take the second. Ms. Wade testified that the “Communicating with Diplomacy and Tact” course was designated as a “leadership” course, meaning that only supervisors are generally approved to take it. Petitioner’s position with the City was not supervisory. Petitioner showed Ms. Wade a document that Petitioner stated was a list of employees who had attended the “Communicating with Diplomacy and Tact” course. Petitioner asked Ms. Wade whether all of the listed people were supervisors. Ms. Wade testified that she could not answer the question because she did not know the people on the list, none of whom were employed by Public Works. Petitioner herself did not identify the employees on the list. In the absence of any evidence to demonstrate that Ms. Wade did anything more than follow City policy on training course participation, it cannot be found that Ms. Wade retaliated against Petitioner by denying her request to take the “Communicating with Diplomacy and Tact” course. On February 7, 2018, Petitioner voluntarily resigned her employment with the City. Petitioner alleged that her resignation was a “constructive discharge” due to the City’s denial of paid leave time for February 6, 2018, as well as the other allegedly adverse retaliatory actions taken by the City since the filing of her discrimination complaint. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that the City retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity. The only employee specifically cited by Petitioner as allegedly retaliating against her was her direct supervisor, Ms. Wade. The evidence established that Ms. Wade became aware of Petitioner’s discrimination complaint no earlier than October 6, 2017, after she allegedly retaliated against Petitioner by requiring her to use PTO for an internal job interview. Additionally, Ms. Wade rectified the situation as soon as Mr. Sorensen corrected her understanding of City policy. None of the later allegations of retaliation were credible. In January 2018, Ms. Wade gave Petitioner some minor Administrative Assistant III duties at a time when Public Works was shorthanded, then gave those duties back to the Administrative Assistant III position after the new person was hired and learned the job. There was no reason for Petitioner to take offense at this routine reshuffling of minor job duties. Also in January 2018, Ms. Wade directed Petitioner not to contact UniFirst’s management regarding citywide vendor performance issues. Such contacts were not part of Petitioner’s job duties and Ms. Wade had already counseled Petitioner against taking it upon herself to send emails to UniFirst’s management. Petitioner’s actual job duties in relation to UniFirst’s delivery of uniforms to the Public Works Department never changed. Ms. Wade’s denial of Petitioner’s February 5, 2018, leave request was in keeping with the express policy of the Public Works Department that leave requests be made at least 48 hours prior to the employee’s absence from work. The evidence established that this was not a rigid policy, but Petitioner failed to show that she presented Ms. Wade with the kind of extenuating circumstances that historically have been the basis for granting leave requests less than 48 hours before the employee’s proposed absence. There was nothing retaliatory about Ms. Wade’s following the stated policy of Public Works. Petitioner was allowed to raise two issues that were not included in her Employment Complaint of Discrimination regarding retaliation. As to these issues, Petitioner failed to offer proof sufficient to establish that either Ms. Wade’s denial of her request for flex time or Ms. Wade’s denial of Petitioner’s request to attend a “leadership” training course was an incident of retaliation. Petitioner failed to prove any incidents of retaliation. Because she voluntarily resigned her position with the City, Petitioner did not establish that the City took an adverse employment action against her in any form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the City of Ocala did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (Respondent or the Agency), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by discriminating against Petitioner, Sharon Douse (Petitioner), during her employment with the Agency and then by terminating her employment, based upon her disability, marital status, sex, color, race, age, and the national origin of her spouse, and by illegally retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Sunland Center in Mariana, Florida, is operated by the Agency as an intermediate-care facility for developmentally- disabled individuals. Connally Manor is a residential setting within Sunland Center for 16 developmentally-disabled individuals with significant behavioral and medical involvement. Petitioner began her employment with the Agency on July 15, 2011, until her dismissal on January 5, 2012. During her employment, she was classified as career-service employee, Human Services Worker II, assigned to provide direct care for residents in Connally Manor. As a career-service employee, Petitioner was required to serve a one-year probationary period, during which she was subject to termination at will. While employed with the Agency, Petitioner had a number of performance deficiencies and conflicts with her co-workers and supervisors. On July 22, 2011, Petitioner attended training for the treatment and care of residents. Shortly thereafter, however, Petitioner mishandled residents on at least two occasions. As a result, Joe Grimsley, a senior human services support supervisor for the Agency, suspended Petitioner from working independently with residents, and asked Petitioner to work closely with her peers to learn appropriate care procedures. On August 25, 2011, because of excessive absences and failure to perform duties in a timely manner, Petitioner received counseling from Mr. Grimsley and Agency behavior program supervisor Scott Hewett. Petitioner was counseled for excessive absences because, from July 18 through August 22, 2011, Petitioner took a total of 48 hours of leave time, which was greater than the Agency's policy of no more than 32 hours in a 90-day period. Although Petitioner discussed most of those absences with her supervisor prior to taking the time off, as a result of her absences, Petitioner missed some of her initial training, including professional crisis management training. During the August 25, 2011, counseling session, Mr. Grimsley and Mr. Hewett also discussed other issues of concern with Petitioner, including resident care, following chain of command, team work, proper parking, and data collection sheets. As a follow-up, on the same day as the August 25th counseling, Petitioner received some in-service training regarding proper log book documenting, proper use of active treatment sheet, and unauthorized and excessive absences. Mr. Grimsley permitted Petitioner to go back to her duties of working directly with residents after she received additional training on August 27, 2011. On September 8, 2011, Petitioner's supervisors once again found it necessary to counsel Petitioner regarding resident care, chain of command, teamwork, parking, and data collection, as well as to address two incidences of unsafe handling of residents, and Agency policy regarding food in the bedrooms, and class and work schedules. Because of Petitioner's continued performance deficiencies, on October 5, 2011, Mr. Grimsley wrote an interoffice memorandum to his supervisor, Agency residential services supervisor, Julie Jackson, recommending Petitioner's termination. The memorandum stated: Mrs. Jackson: I am writing to you in regard to Mrs. Sharon Douse HSW II Second Shift Connally Manor Unit 3. Mrs. Douse came to us July 15, 2011, since then she has had three employee documented conferences, due to poor work habits, resulting in corrective action, including retraining. These deficiencies include and are not limited to data collection, excessive absences, and unsafe handling of residents. This past week she was insubordinate to her immediate supervisor by refusing to answer the phone after being requested to do so twice, and being directed that it is part of her job. [Mr. Hewett] as well as my self [sic] has made every effort to help Mrs. Douse achieve her performance expectation; however these attempts have been met with resistance as Mrs. Douse openly refuses to take direction from her supervisors and also to seek the assistance of her peers, who have many years of experience working with the Connally Manor population. Mrs. Douse has not met probationary period. Her continual resistance to positive mentoring and her confrontational attitude and demeanor towards her supervisors and coworkers is creating an increasingly difficult work environment, not only on Connally Manor, but also on the other houses within the unit. It is apparent that Mrs. Douse lacks the willingness to improve her overall poor work performance. I am formally requesting Mrs. Douse to be terminated from her employment here in Unit 3. Mr. Grimsley's testimony at the final hearing was consistent with the above-quoted October 5, 2011, interoffice memorandum, and both his testimony and memorandum are credited. Upon receiving Mr. Grimsley's memorandum, Ms. Jackson submitted a memo dated October 26, 2011, to the Agency's program operations administrator, Elizabeth Mitchell, concurring with the request for Petitioner's termination. In turn, Ms. Mitchell agreed and forwarded her recommendation for termination to Sunland's superintendent, Bryan Vaughan. Mr. Vaughan approved the recommendation for termination, and, following implementation of internal termination proceedings, Petitioner was terminated on January 5, 2012, for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period. Petitioner made no complaints to Mr. Grimsley or anyone else in the Agency's management until after Mr. Grimsley's October 5, 2011, memorandum recommending Petitioner's termination. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination filed with the Commission on March 29, 2012, after her termination, charges that she was "discriminated against based on retaliation, disability, marital status, sex, color, race and age." The evidence adduced at the final hearing, however, failed to substantiate Petitioner's allegations. In particular, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination2/ alleges that Mr. Grimsley discriminated against her because of her age by "not providing [her] with the same training as offered the other employees -- [professional crisis management training] was offered to the younger employees who were hired at or around the same time [as Petitioner]." The evidence at the final hearing, however, showed that Petitioner was scheduled for, but missed professional crisis management training, because of her absences early in her employment. The evidence also showed that professional crisis management training was not necessary for the position for which Petitioner was hired. Nevertheless, the evidence also demonstrated that, if Petitioner had not been terminated, the Agency intended to provide her with that training. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination also asserts that Mr. Grimsley discriminated against her by "[n]ot allowing [her] to have . . . scheduled time off . . . [and taking away her] scheduled time off August 12th & 13th and [giving it to a] Caucasian female." The evidence did not substantiate this allegation. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner had extraordinary time off during her first two months of employment. Next, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination states that Mr. Grimsley did not follow up on her written concerns and verbal complaints to the "depart[ment] head" regarding the welfare of the disabled residents. Petitioner alleges that she was terminated as a result of her complaint that Mr. Grimsley "sat in the kitchen and baked cookies with the staff who were neglecting disabled residents." Petitioner, however, failed to present any evidence at the final hearing with regard to this allegation. Rather, the evidence showed that, while employed, Petitioner never reported any instances of abuse, neglect, or exploitation to the Florida Abuse Registry, as required by her training. And, there is no evidence that she reported any such concerns to any outside agency prior to her Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner otherwise presented no evidence suggesting that she was terminated in retaliation for engaging in any protected activity. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination further states that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability because Mr. Grimsley did not allow her to be properly monitored by her physician, and that when she would bring in her doctor's notes, Mr. Grimsley would refuse to put them in her personnel file. The only support for this claim were two medical reports on Petitioner, one prepared in April 2011, and one prepared in October 2011. According to Petitioner, she gave the reports to someone at the Agency's human resources office. She could not, however, identify the person to whom she gave the reports. Also, according to Petitioner, it was in November 2011, after she was recommended for termination, that she gave her medical reports to the Agency to be filed. Considering the circumstances, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's testimony regarding this allegation is not credible. In addition, the evidence did not show that Petitioner ever asked the Agency for an accommodation for her alleged disability. Rather, based upon the evidence, it is found that Petitioner never advised the Agency, and the Agency was unaware, that Petitioner had a disability. It is also found that Petitioner never asked the Agency for an accommodation for her alleged disability. Petitioner, in her Charge of Discrimination, further contends that part of the employee counseling session documented on employee-documented conference forms dated August 25, 2011, and all of the counseling session documented in a September 8, 2011, employee-documented conference form, were held without her, and that some of the concerns expressed on those documents were fabricated. There were two forms documenting discussions from the August 25th session that were submitted into evidence — - one was signed by Petitioner, the other was not. The employee-documented conference form from the September 8, 2011, session was signed by Petitioner's supervisors, but not Petitioner. Mr. Grimsley, who was present for all of the counseling discussions with Petitioner documented on the forms, testified that the documented discussions occurred, but that he just forgot to get Petitioner's signatures on all of the forms. During the final hearing, Petitioner acknowledged most of the documented discussions, including two incidents of mishandling residents and the resulting prohibition from working with residents imposed on her until she received additional training. Considering the evidence, it is found that all of the counseling discussions with Petitioner documented on the three forms actually took place, and that they accurately reflect those discussions and the fact that Petitioner was having job performance problems. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination also alleges that a fellow employee discriminated against her because of her age and race based on an incident where, according to Petitioner, a co-worker screamed and yelled at her because Petitioner had not answered the house telephone. At the hearing, Petitioner submitted into evidence affidavits regarding the incident from the co-worker and another worker who observed the incident. Neither of the affidavits supports Petitioner's contention that she was discriminated against. Rather, they both support the finding that Petitioner had trouble getting along with co-workers and accepting directions from Agency staff. Further, according to Petitioner, after she talked to Mr. Grimsley about the incident, he spoke to both Petitioner and the co-worker, and their conflict was resolved. The incident occurred after Mr. Grimsley had already recommended that Petitioner be terminated. Finally, Petitioner alleges in her Charge of Discrimination that Mr. Hewett discriminated against her based upon her marital status, race, and the national origin of her spouse. In support, Petitioner contends that Mr. Hewett "made rude comments about art work on my locker that Scott knew my husband had drawn[,]" asked, "[do] blacks like classical music?" and, upon seeing Petitioner's apron that was embroidered with a Jamaican flag, Mr. Hewett said, "You can't trust things from overseas," when he knew that her husband was Jamaican. Petitioner also stated that Mr. Hewett "bullied her" about answering the telephone. While Petitioner testified that she wrote to Agency management regarding these comments and the alleged bullying by Mr. Hewett, she did not retain a copy. The Agency claims that Petitioner never complained about these alleged comments or Mr. Hewett's alleged bullying while she was an employee. Considering the evidence presented in this case, and Petitioner's demeanor during her testimony, it is found that Petitioner did not raise these allegations against Mr. Hewett until after her termination from the Agency. It is further found that if Mr. Hewett made the alleged comments, as described by Petitioner during her testimony, Mr. Hewett's comments were isolated and not pervasive. Further, Petitioner's testimonial description of Mr. Hewett's comments did not indicate that his comments were overtly intimidating, insulting, or made with ridicule, and the evidence was insufficient to show, or reasonably suggest, that Mr. Hewett's alleged comments made Petitioner's work environment at the Agency hostile or intolerable. In sum, Petitioner failed to show that the Agency discriminated against Petitioner by treating her differently, creating a hostile work environment, or terminating her because of her disability, marital status, sex, color, race, age, or her spouse's national origin. Petitioner also failed to show that the Agency retaliated against her because of any complaint that she raised or based upon Petitioner's engagement in any other protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
