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ROBERT CHEESEMAN vs. LINCOLN CONSTRUCTION, 89-001917 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001917 Latest Update: May 31, 1994

Findings Of Fact On February 9, 1988, Petitioner saw an advertisement in a local newspaper for a trim carpenter at Respondent's job site in Palm Harbor, Pinellas County, Florida. He travelled from south Pinellas County to the job site, and arrived at approximately 8:00 a.m. on February 9, 1988. The job superintendent, Bill Blanc, talked with Petitioner about the job, and explained that no applications were available for him to complete. He told Petitioner that the applications were being brought by messenger from the Respondent's office in south Pinellas County, and that when they arrived he would have to fill one out. However, because Petitioner was extremely anxious to start work, and because Blanc was desperately in need of a trim carpenter on the job, Blanc violated Respondent's established policy by allowing Petitioner to begin work at approximately 8:00 a.m. on February 9, 1988, without first completing an application or being interviewed by Gary W. Lincoln, Respondent's Vice- President. Blanc did not have the authority to hire anyone. Petitioner worked on the job until approximately 12:00 p.m.. (Noon) on February 9, 1988, when the applications arrived. Blanc gave Petitioner the application, and told him to fill it out. While Petitioner was completing the application, Blanc called Gary Lincoln to tell him that he was going to send Petitioner to him for an interview. When Lincoln heard that Petitioner was already on the job, he ordered Blanc to have him leave the job site, and come to his office right away for an interview. Blanc was subsequently reprimanded for allowing Petitioner to begin work without filling out an application, and without an interview. He admits that he acted hastily, and without authority. When Blanc told Petitioner he would have to go for an interview at Respondent's office in south Pinellas County, Petitioner exploded in anger, and left the job site. Blanc testified that he was anxious and concerned for his own safety due to Petitioner's reaction. Petitioner admits he was upset when told he would have to be interviewed. Petitioner left the job site in anger without finishing the application papers, and failed to appear for an interview with Gary Lincoln. Petitioner claims he was discriminated against by the Respondent due to his handicap in their failure to hire him, or in their actions terminating him on February 9, 1988, since he was already on the job. However, at the time Blanc talked with Lincoln on the telephone on February 9, 1988, Blanc had not seen Petitioner's application since he was still completing it, and Lincoln did not know of any handicap Petitioner may have had. Lincoln was simply following the normal policy of the Respondent, which was to require a completed application and an interview before any persons were hired. Petitioner testified he has a 17 percent disability rating due to a prior back injury. He correctly completed a Medical Questionnaire (Form 7/86), which was included with the application, by disclosing he had a prior surgical disc removal in 1962, but that he did not have any permanent physical condition with a 20 percent impairment rating. However, although Petitioner claims that Respondent's actions resulted from the answers he gave on this form, there is no evidence that Respondent was even aware of these answers when the telephone conversation between Blanc and Lincoln took place on February 9, 1988. Although he left the job at approximately 12:30 P.M., Respondent paid Petitioner for seven hours work on February 9, 1988. This was done since Respondent's superintendent had erred by allowing Petitioner to begin work on that day, and Lincoln felt it was only fair to pay him for the rest of the day since Petitioner had been prevented from finding work at some other job that day due to Blanc's unauthorized actions. It was established that Respondent has hired many employees with disabilities similar to, or more severe, than Petitioner's. In fact, Blanc has a 15-20 percent disability rating due to an impairment of his left foot. On February 25, 1988, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination based on handicap with the Clearwater Office of Community Relations. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Pinellas County Ordinance 84-10.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the City of Clearwater, Office of Community Relations, enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent based upon handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Cheeseman 1404 River Road Orange Park, FL 32073 Denise L. McCain, Esquire P. O. Box 3542 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Ronald M. McElrath, Director Office of Community Relations P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 34618 Miles Lance, Esquire P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 34618

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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NATASHA TULLOCH vs WAL-MART SUPER CENTER, 00-004935 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 08, 2000 Number: 00-004935 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 2001

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on March 26, 2000.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner first interviewed for the position of Assistant Manager Trainee with Respondent on March 17, 1999. Her first interview was with Traci Dickerson, Assistant Manager for Operations. Ms. Dickerson was impressed with Petitioner's presentation and recommended that she be interviewed a second time by Mitchell Day, District Manager. After the interview, Petitioner was offered a position as Assistant Manager Trainee to begin work at Wal-Mart Super Center on Apalachee Parkway in Tallahassee, Florida, on May 10, 1999. The Assistant Manager training program is a seventeen- week program conducted at selected Wal-Mart stores throughout the country. The Wal-Mart store in question in the present case is one of just a few stores in Florida that were utilized for this training program. Ms. Dickerson was the person responsible for administering the program in the store in question during the relevant time frame. Another Assistant Manager Trainee, Sean Mitchell, began the training program on the same date as Petitioner. Mark Whitmore, another Assistant Manager Trainee, began the training program sometime prior to Petitioner. Mr. Whitmore was a long- time employee of Wal-Mart who transferred from management in the home office into the retail sales side of the business. Because of his prior experience with Wal-Mart, his training program was handled differently from the training administered to Petitioner in that it was accelerated. Mr. Mitchell's training was the same type as Petitioner's although each trainee may have been given various assignments on different days and in different sequence. Sometime during the training process, certain members of management with Respondent became concerned about Petitioner's attitude toward the training program, her willingness to take constructive criticism, and her communication/people skills. Sometime around the second week of Petitioner's employment with Respondent, she was observed by Assistant Manager Wendy Rhodes, to be engaged in a conversation with Sean Mitchell during working hours. It appeared to Ms. Rhodes that the two individuals were socializing rather than working. Mr. Rhodes approached the two and instructed them to begin the workday. Later, Ms. Dickerson, in her role as the Program Supervisor, provided constructive criticism to Petitioner that she should concentrate on her work and not socialize during work hours. On or about May 29, 1999, while Petitioner was working in lay-away, she was asked to come to the front of the store to assist Brenda Meyers, a front-end manager, because of an increase of customers at the various cash registers. As an Assistant Manager Trainee, Petitioner was expected to "pitch in" and assist throughout the store where needed. Petitioner responded to Ms. Meyers' request by indicating that she was intending to go on her break and refused to come and assist at that time. Because of Petitioner's refusal, George Wilkins (a co-manager and directly below the store manager in the chain of command of the store) took a turn working at a cash register. Every manager at Wal-Mart is expected to be a team player and assist when the need arises. Mr. Wilkins arranged to meet with Petitioner to discuss the incident and general concerns he had as result of feedback he received from other members of management about her unwillingness to do certain tasks, and to give counseling advice on how to conduct herself as an Assistant Manager. Petitioner immediately became defensive and asserted that because she had a bachelor's degree, she did not have to "take this." Mr. Wilkins attempted to explain to Petitioner that her degree was important, but her attitude toward her work and her willingness to do her fair share were more important. Petitioner was not receptive to Mr. Wilkins' efforts to provide constructive criticism. Sometime in late-July 1999, Petitioner traveled with Mike Odum, an Assistant Manager and Lisa Green, who at the time was Personnel Manager at the store in question, to Georgia to attend a new store opening. On the return trip, Petitioner became upset because she was concerned that the group would not return to Tallahassee in time for her to pick up her child from daycare. She confronted Mr. Odum, very upset about the possibility of returning to Tallahassee after 5:00 p.m. However, he returned to Tallahassee prior to the time that Petitioner needed to be back in Tallahassee. On or about August 20, 1999, Petitioner was assigned to the 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift to assist the Customer Service Manager (CSM) in closing the store. The function of the "closing CSM" is important, and Petitioner was needed to assist in that regard. Because the store manager and other members of management were out of town at a meeting, Mr. Odum was in charge of the store. Instead of coming in at 2:00 p.m., Petitioner arrived at the store at 9:00 a.m. She clocked in on the time clock and proceeded to the break room where she warmed her meal and sat down to eat. After she completed her meal, she proceeded to the front of the store to assist the Customer Service Manager. Not long after Petitioner arrived at the store and assumed her position, she was called to the Manager's office to discuss her work schedule for the day. At that time, Mike Odum and Traci Dickerson (Ms. Dickerson participated by phone) reminded Petitioner that her scheduled shift was from 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The importance of this was that if she had worked too many hours without prior approval, she would have been in an unauthorized overtime situation. Additionally, it is important to have a "closing CSM" at the appropriate time. Petitioner left work to return in the afternoon as originally scheduled. Petitioner returned to work in the afternoon. She reported to the front temporarily but became frustrated with one of the assistant managers. Feeling that what she was doing was a waste of time, she proceeded to the training room where she reviewed her training materials. She was paged to the front of the store on numerous occasions but did not respond to the calls. Mike Odum went to the training room and told Petitioner to come to the front of the store to assist. Petitioner refused and stated that she would remain in the back of the store and continue reading her manual. When Petitioner refused, Mr. Odum instructed Petitioner to clock out and to come back when the District Manager would be available for a conference. Petitioner left the store shortly thereafter. Petitioner arranged to meet with Mitchell Day, the District Manager who oversees nine stores and approximately 4,800 employees, on August 25, 1999. Mr. Day understood the meeting to be for the purpose of resolving concerns about the issues involving Petitioner and giving Petitioner an opportunity to express her concerns. Management saw this meeting as an opportunity to "get everything out on the table" so that Petitioner could continue with her training program. Accordingly, Mr. Day scheduled the meeting with Todd Peterson, Store Manager; Mike Odum; George Wilkins and Traci Dickerson. All of these individuals expressed concern about Petitioner's performance, her attitude toward the training program, her willingness to accept constructive criticism, as well as their willingness to assist her in completing the training program. There is no evidence that Mr. Day or any other member of management intended that the meeting be conducted for the purpose of terminating Petitioner. Petitioner entered the room and walked past other members of management and approached Mr. Day in a confrontational manner. She was upset at the presence of the various members of management. Despite being asked to be seated, she refused to sit down and begin the meeting. Every participant in the meeting who testified at hearing gave consistent testimony that she raised her voice to an inappropriate level, was hostile and explosive. All recalled her using profanity, with the exception of Mr. Day who did not specifically recall her use of profanity. Every person in the room was stunned at her demeanor, in particular that it was addressed to an upper level management person. Based upon the unprofessionalism of this outburst, Mr. Day advised her that her employment was terminated. The formal reason given for her termination was insubordination. There is nothing in the evidence presented at final hearing to indicate that any of the actions taken by Respondent or members of Respondent's management were based on Petitioner's gender or on any other form of discrimination.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission for Human Relations enter a final order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2001.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JANICE E. HODGSON, 01-003867 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 04, 2001 Number: 01-003867 Latest Update: Jul. 30, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent's employment by the Petitioner should be terminated.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this case, Hodgson was employed by the School Board as a custodian. She has been so employed since 1981. In 1999, Hodgson became deficient in the most basic element of a custodian's job--the duty to show up for work at her assigned school, in this case Miami Park Elementary (Miami Park). By July 1, 1999, Hodgson had accumulated ten unauthorized absences, enough to draw the attention of Principal Henry N. Crawford, Jr. (Crawford), and enough, standing alone, to justify termination under Petitioner's contract with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) the bargaining unit to which Hodgson belongs. At this time Crawford did not seek to terminate Hodgson's employment, although he could have. Instead, he counseled her regarding the School Board's reasonable and lawful requirement that she, like all employees, had the responsibility to inform the school's administration in advance of an absence, or as soon as practicable in an emergency. Nevertheless, on July 30, 1999, Hodgson left work at 6:46 p.m. instead of at the end of her shift at 11:30 p.m. Her area of the building was not cleaned properly and she was docked one half day's pay. For a considerable time after that incident, Hodgson's attendance improved. But in March 2000, her attendance again became a problem. Hodgson was absent 13 times between March 3 and March 20. Crawford again attempted to work with Hodgson, authorizing six of those absences. At the same time, he informed her of the obvious: that this level of absenteeism impeded the effective operation of the worksite. Crawford encouraged Hodgson to consider taking advantage of the School Board's generous leave-of-absence policy in order to preserve her good standing at work while taking the time necessary to deal with the issues which were causing her to miss work. Respondent neither replied to Crawford's proposal that she consider a leave of absence nor improved upon her by now sporadic attendance. Thereafter, Crawford requested assistance from OPS. On April 11, 2000, OPS wrote to advise Hodgson that she was absent without authority and that her absences were deemed abandonment of position. She was directed to provide written notification to OPS to review her situation or her employment would be terminated by the School Board. For a short time, Hodgson took this threat seriously enough to improve her attendance, but by now Crawford had a much shorter fuse with respect to Hodgson's disregard for workplace policies regarding attendance. When, on May 11, 2000, Respondent was an hour and a half late to work, Crawford sent her a memorandum the next day, again reminding her that she must report to work on time and that she was to report any absences or tardiness to school administration in a timely manner. Crawford wrote two additional warning memos to Hodgson in June 2000, but was unsuccessful in persuading her to improve her attendance or to discuss her situation, including the advisability of a leave of absence, in a forthright manner. Finally, Crawford directed Respondent to attend a disciplinary conference known as a Conference for the Record (CFR) on July 3, 2000, to discuss her absenteeism. At the CFR, Crawford again gave Respondent face-to-face directives to be present at work and when absences were unavoidable, to call the school in a timely manner. Two additional formal disciplinary conferences were held between the July 3 CFR and Respondent's termination. Crawford, having been unsuccessful in his efforts to generate honest communication with Hodgson about why a 20-year employee had stopped fulfilling her most basic job requirement, attempted to refer her to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). EAP offers employees assistance in resolving personal problems in a manner which allows the employee to also fulfill work obligations. If such accommodations cannot be made, EAP counselors assist in helping the employee separate from his employment in a manner which does not blemish his resume. Supervisors such as Crawford may make referrals to the EAP whenever they feel an employee can and should be helped, and EAP services are also available for the asking to any School Board employee who wishes to take advantage of those services. No one is required to use EAP services, and Hodgson declined to do so. Hodgson's by now chronic absenteeism persisted. Her colleagues on the custodial staff tried, some more graciously than others, to cover her assigned duties, but Crawford was fielding an increasing number of complaints from teachers regarding their classrooms not being serviced. Morale among custodians declined in the face of the administration's seeming inability to control Hodgson. During the last two years of Hodgson's employment, she had 175 unauthorized absences. Eighty-one of those occurred in the last 12 months prior to her termination. By way of defense, Hodgson said that she developed diabetes in the past three years and that most of her absences were medically necessary. She offered voluminous stacks of paper which she claims document legitimate medical problems which made it impossible for her to work. Additional exhibits relate to a young relative she felt obligated to drive to medical appointments during her work hours. These exhibits prove little, if anything. Individually and collectively they are neither self-authenticating nor self-explanatory, and many had not been previously provided to Crawford in connection with her failure to appear for work, nor disclosed to the School Board in compliance with the pre-hearing order in this case. But even if these documents had been properly authenticated and would have in fact justified an extended medical and/or family hardship leave of absence, the evidence fails to establish that they were tendered to Crawford at the time Hodgson was absent. Hodgson did not seek medical or disability leave, either individually or through her collective bargaining unit. Hodgson offered no testimony to contradict the School Board's evidence regarding the dozens of occasions on which she failed to show up for work. Neither did she offer any evidence that her repeated failure to comply with attendance policies was justified due to any misconduct on the part of any of Petitioner's employees. At all times material to this case, the School Board was in compliance with applicable statutory and contractual provisions concerning employee discipline and termination with respect to Hodgson.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered, sustaining Respondent's suspension without pay and terminating her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice E. Hodgson 14020 Northeast 3rd Court, No. 5 North Miami, Florida 33161 Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Merrett R. Stierheim, Interim Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 912 Miami, Florida 33132 Honorable Charlie Crist, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57447.209
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KENNETH BOWE vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 77-002077 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002077 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1978

Findings Of Fact Respondent employs petitioner as a youth counselor II in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Petitioner attained permanent career service status in May of 1972. In addition to "carrying a normal caseload," i.e., supervising 85 to 88 youngsters in the customary fashion, petitioner met four times weekly with children who had been referred by courts or school authorities for intensive counseling. These groups counseling sessions began at six o'clock in the evening and lasted from one to one and a half hours. John B. Romano became petitioner's immediate supervisor on March 18, 1977. With the acquiescence of Mr. Romano's immediate predecessor, Ben Robinson, petitioner ordinarily reported for work between half past nine and half past ten in the morning. The week Mr. Romano started as petitioner's supervisor, he noticed that petitioner arrived for work between half past nine and ten in the morning. When he spoke to petitioner about this, petitioner told him of an accommodation that had been reached with Mr. Robinson, on account of petitioner's staying at work late to conduct group counseling. Mr. Romano told petitioner that he should report for work at half past eight in the morning, until a youth counselor's vacancy that then existed in the office could be filled. Subsequently, on at least one occasion before May 31, 1977, Mr. Romano spoke to petitioner about being late for work. On May 31, 1977, by which time another counselor had been hired, petitioner reported for work at approximately half past ten. On June 7, 1977, after petitioner had been suspended, Mr. Romano issued a written reprimand to petitioner, characterizing petitioner's arrival at half past ten on May 31, 1977, as "an insubordinate offense." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. One Harry Greene told Earl Stout, a service network manager for respondent and Mr. Romano's superior, that a boy whom petitioner had supervised had accused petitioner in open court of selling drugs and smoking marijuana. Messrs. Greene, Stout and Romano visited the facility at which petitioner's accuser was incarcerated and interrogated him. On May 13, 1977, a Friday, Mr. Romano told petitioner to meet him at nine o'clock the following Monday, but did not explain why. Present at the meeting on May 16, 1977, were petitioner, Mr. Romano, Mr. Greene and Mr. Stout. Petitioner was told of the accusations against him, but the accuser's identity was withheld. Mr. Stout gave petitioner the choice of resigning his position or taking annual leave for the duration of a formal investigation. Petitioner refused to resign. Mr. Stout instructed petitioner to tell no one that he had been asked to take leave or that he would be the subject of an investigation. When petitioner left this meeting he promptly told his fellow youth counselors that the had been suspended. For this petitioner received a written reprimand dated June 7, 1977. Respondent's exhibit No. 6. Petitioner subsequently availed himself of grievance procedures to raise the question whether he should have been permitted to take administrative leave instead of annual leave; and it was decided that he was entitled to take administrative leave. On June 8, 1977, Earl Stout wrote petitioner a letter which began "On June 1, you were advised by me that effective June 2, you were being suspended for insubordinate acts . . . ." This letter was sent to petitioner by certified mail. Mr. Stout testified without contradiction that blanket authority had been delegated to him to suspend employees under him.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the suspension be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Wayne Jennings, Esq. 2871 Forth-Fifth Street Gifford, Florida 32960 Mr. K.C. Collette, Esquire Forum 3, Suite 800 1665 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

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STEWART R. GILLMAN vs SAINT LEO UNIVERSITY, 06-001242 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 12, 2006 Number: 06-001242 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his disability by refusing to renew Petitioner’s contract for employment.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a private university located in Pasco County, Florida (Saint Leo or the university). Respondent employed Petitioner as an assistant professor from sometime in January 2000 until the end of the 2005-2006 school year in May 2006. Petitioner initially taught sports management courses in the Business Department of Saint Leo and, following the university reorganization, taught sports management courses in the Sports Management Department of the School of Business (the Department). The Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief allege, in relevant part, that Respondent violated Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004), when Respondent allegedly discriminated against Petitioner because of Petitioner's handicap. Neither the Charge of Discrimination nor the Petition for Relief expressly allege that Respondent violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Sections 12101-12213 (2000). However, judicial decisions discussed in the conclusions of law instruct the trier of fact to make findings in a manner that is consistent with the ADA.1 Petitioner is a person with a handicap within the meaning of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). Petitioner was paralyzed in an automobile accident on December 19, 2001, and is a disabled person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 12112 (2004). Petitioner is a qualified person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 12111(8) (2004). Petitioner is a person with a disability who can perform the essential functions of a tenured employee. Petitioner was qualified for the position for which Respondent employed Petitioner in January 2000. Petitioner received his doctorate of education in sports management from the United States Sports Academy in 1990. Although Petitioner had no prior experience teaching at the college level, Petitioner was the only doctorate teaching sports management courses in the Business Department of the university when Respondent employed Petitioner in January 2000. At the time, Respondent needed a doctorate to teach sports management courses in order to satisfy the accreditation requirements of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). Respondent does not allege that Petitioner is not qualified to perform the requirements of a tenured employee. Respondent argues, and submitted evidence intended to prove, that Petitioner either lacked the motivation to perform the required job duties or simply refused to perform those duties. On November 12, 2004, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent would not renew Petitioner’s teaching contract at the end of the 2005/06 school year. The refusal to renew Petitioner's teaching contract was an adverse employment action. There is no direct evidence that the adverse employment action was motivated by discrimination. However, the circumstantial evidence, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable inference by the trier of fact that the adverse employment action was motivated by both legitimate non-discriminatory and discriminatory reasons. Legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, in part, motivated the adverse employment action against Petitioner. When a third-year review of Petitioner's job performance began on August 26, 2004, Petitioner had not prepared sufficient papers for conferences, had not demonstrated consistency in presenting papers at conferences, and had not served on any conference panels. Petitioner had not published a sufficient number of articles or books and had not engaged in sufficient scholarly research. Petitioner did not submit any paper or abstract to present at a conference until June 2004. The first paper was accepted for publication in November 2004. In September 2004, Petitioner had his first test bank accepted for inclusion in a textbook published by another author. Petitioner utilized at least one course syllabus that was below grade level. The syllabus included some grammatical errors and inaccurate information. Petitioner episodically cited incorrect facts during class. Petitioner was occasionally late to class for up to five minutes. Petitioner frequently read from the textbook when lecturing students. Petitioner sometimes did not give prior notice to his supervisor of his unavailability for a class. The supervisor was unable to arrange for a substitute. Petitioner sometimes cancelled classes without providing class notes for the substitute. Petitioner failed to maintain consistent office hours for academic advice of students. One faculty member in an adjacent office provided academic advice to Petitioner's students in Petitioner's absence. Petitioner failed to attend a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, as a reviewer on a national council chaired by Petitioner's supervisor. Petitioner did not ascertain the correct starting time or location of the meeting. The failure to attend the meeting in Atlanta caused the council to be short a reviewer for one year. The inclusion of Petitioner as a reviewer on the council would have provided Petitioner with an opportunity to improve his national reputation and meet many influential people in his field of employment. Record evidence supports a reasonable inference that discriminatory reasons, in part, motivated the adverse employment action against Petitioner. Two of four evaluators in the third-year review of Petitioner's job performance that began on August 26, 2004, referred to Petitioner's disability in their formal evaluations. The two evaluators testified at the hearing that Petitioner's disability did not influence their evaluations. Their testimony is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The testimony of the two evaluators, among other considerations, is not plausible. The testimony does not adequately explain why the evaluations address Petitioner's disability if the evaluators disregarded the disability in evaluating Petitioner.2 The immediate supervisor of Petitioner commented on Petitioner's disability in her third-year evaluation of Petitioner. The supervisor stated she was "extremely disappointed" during the previous academic year when Petitioner declined her request to "be a role model and show our students what individuals with handicaps could achieve." The supervisor further explained in her evaluation that "disability sport has - become a major segment of - our sport business industry - and there are many career opportunities for students in this area." The supervisor further stated in her third-year evaluation of Petitioner that she could not "fully understand what it is like to have [Petitioner's] disability." However, the supervisor stated that she had "worked with physically challenged individuals for approximately 16 years, and they never ceased to amaze [her] at what they could do." One of three outside evaluators also included references to Petitioner's handicap in the third-year evaluation of Petitioner. The evaluator devoted approximately one-third of the evaluation to a discussion of his experience working with one disabled colleague who had been seriously injured in a motorcycle accident and was, like Petitioner, wheelchair bound. After recounting the many laudable accomplishments of the evaluator's disabled colleague after becoming disabled approximately 12 years ago, the evaluator stated that his disabled colleague did not consider himself disabled. The evaluator explained that his disabled colleague "never makes excuses for his special challenge nor does he ask or demand special considerations due to his situation." The evaluator went on to compare Petitioner's paralysis with the evaluator's self-proclaimed "disability" following open heart surgery. The evaluator stated that he had undergone open heart by-pass surgery and did not let his "disability" prevent him from achieving performance standards. After recounting numerous professional accomplishments after his surgery, the evaluator explained: The reason I have provided this information is not to brag but rather to illustrate that if one has a positive attitude about life he/she can do anything he/she wishes whether or not they are disabled. A disability is an extra challenge in life not a sentence to do less. I have not let my disability negatively affect my career. Respondent's Exhibit 44 at 4. When prima facie evidence shows that an adverse employment action is motivated by both non-discriminatory and discriminatory considerations, an employer does not escape liability under the ADA on the ground that the adverse employment action was not motivated "solely" by prohibited discrimination. Rather, judicial decisions discussed in the conclusions of law require the trier of fact to apply a so- called motivating-factor standard, or mixed-motive standard.3 The motivating-factor standard requires the trier of fact to determine whether the prohibited discriminatory motive made the difference in the decision to take the adverse employment action.4 The motivating factor standard has been judicially explained as a "but-for" standard.5 Liability for prohibited discrimination requires the trier of fact to find that Respondent would not have taken the adverse employment action but-for the prohibited discrimination. The but-for standard requires the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Petitioner's failure to comply with performance standards for tenure was caused by his handicap.6 If the evidence supports such an inference, the adverse employment action would not have been taken but-for the prohibited discrimination. The record evidence supports a reasonable inference that Petitioner's failure to comply with performance standards for tenure by the beginning of the third-year review on August 26, 2004, was caused by his handicap. The inference is supported, in relevant part, by comparing the record evidence of Petitioner's performance during his employment before his disabling accident on December 19, 2001, with Petitioner's performance from the date of the accident until the beginning of the third-year review on August 26, 2004. Prior to the accident on December 19, 2001, Petitioner taught classes at Saint Leo for four semesters.7 Petitioner received four evaluations by three different evaluators. Even though it was Petitioner's first teaching experience at the college level, all but one of those evaluations rated Petitioner's job performance as "outstanding." The one exception rated Petitioner's job performance in his first year as "satisfactory." In the second year, however, the same evaluator rated Petitioner's job performance as "outstanding." The supervisor for Petitioner during the first and second academic years of employment was the acting chair of the Business Department at Saint Leo. The supervisor rated Petitioner's job performance during the first year as "satisfactory." However, a second-line evaluator who was also a dean at Saint Leo rated Petitioner's job performance during the first year as "outstanding." In the second academic year, the supervisor rated Petitioner's job performance as "outstanding." The supervisor found that Petitioner was "developing into a highly competent and effective classroom teacher." An outside evaluator retained to evaluate Petitioner during the second academic year found that Petitioner had made "positive contributions to [the] sport management program." The evaluator recommended that Respondent retain Petitioner based on Petitioner's academic background, sport management experience, and teaching performance. Prior to the accident, Petitioner was selected to serve on the Panel of Reviewers for the Sport Management Program Review Council (SMPRC) to review institutional portfolios. The selection provided Petitioner with an opportunity for professional development, an improved national reputation, and enhanced professional relationships. However, the opportunity was postponed due to the accident that paralyzed Petitioner. On January 29, 2002, Petitioner received a fifth evaluation by a fourth evaluator. The dean of the School of Business (the Dean) evaluated Petitioner's job performance for the four academic semesters that Petitioner worked before the accident. The Dean found that Petitioner was: cademically competent and very committed to Saint Leo University and the well being of his students. Stewart is relatively new to university level teaching and the expectations associated with this level of performance. His classroom manner is casual yet he holds the students to high performance standards. Stewart will need to identify an area of research interest and begin to prepare papers for the conferences in his discipline. I approached him with an idea and a willingness to co-author a paper. Unfortunately, due to his accident, Stewart will be involved full-time for the next six months in rehabilitation and relearning. Stewart has excellent potential to develop into an effective senior faculty member. Respondent's Exhibit 10. After the accident on December 19, 2001, Petitioner taught three academic semesters before his third-year review that began on August 24, 2004, and led to the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004. During the semester that began in January 2002, Petitioner was on medical leave to undergo surgery and recover. Petitioner worked during the semester that began in August 2002, but returned to medical leave during the semester that began in January 2003 in order to undergo additional surgery. Petitioner worked the two semesters that began in August 2003 and January 2004. On August 24, 2004, at the start of the fourth semester of work after the accident, Respondent began the third-year review that led to the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004. During the three semesters that Petitioner worked between the accident and the start of the third-year review, the Dean, who evaluated Petitioner on January 29, 2002, did not pursue the idea he had described for co-authoring a paper with Petitioner. Petitioner was learning to adjust to life in a wheel chair. Petitioner experienced, and continues to experience, a great deal of pain unless Petitioner takes pain medication. Petitioner has also had to learn new toileting skills and has expressed embarrassment over his condition. Petitioner did not attend the council meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, because he became confused over the correct time and location of the meeting. Petitioner did not make a volitional choice not to attend the meeting. On December 5, 2003, Dr. Michael Moorman was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Dr. Moorman found that the quality of Petitioner's classroom teaching was "outstanding." After December 5, 2003, Respondent changed the job performance standards for employees teaching sports management courses at Saint Leo.8 While Petitioner was on medical leave, each school at Saint Leo designated a program as a "flagship" program. Each flagship program would be funded and supported in an effort to enable the program to grow into a nationally recognized program that would serve as a paragon for other Saint Leo programs to emulate. The job performance requirements in each flagship program were also intended to establish a standard for emulation by other programs. The School of Business designated the Sport Management Program as its flagship program and reorganized the program into the Sport Management Department. In February 2003, Respondent commissioned an outside study of the Department. The study concluded that the Department lacked academic rigor, failed to challenge students, and was poorly organized for the purpose of becoming a flagship program for Saint Leo. Respondent searched for a nationally known professor to chair the Department. Respondent wanted someone who could make the necessary curriculum changes, improve the Department's national recognition, increase the academic rigor of the Department, and enhance the national reputation of its professors, including Petitioner. In August 2003, Respondent selected a person to chair the Department. After December 5, 2003, the new chair succeeded Dr. Moorman as Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The new chair found, during the academic semester that began in January 2004, Petitioner did not meet the job performance requirements of the new flagship Department of Sport Management. One deficiency the chair described in her third- year evaluation of Petitioner pertained to errors in a syllabus used by Petitioner. For example, the syllabus continued to use the title "Saint Leo College" instead of "Saint Leo University." The new chair confided to an associate in the Department that the vice president of Academic Affairs (Vice President) had told the new chair in so many words that Petitioner would have been fired long ago if Petitioner had not been in a car accident. The associate testified to the statement she attributed to the new chair, and the associate's testimony is found to be credible and persuasive. The Vice President denied making the statement to the new chair during his testimony, and that portion of his testimony is found to be credible and persuasive. The statement attributed to the Vice President that he would have fired Petitioner but-for the accident conflicts with the predominantly "outstanding" job performance of Petitioner prior to his accident. The testimony of the new chair also conflicts with two evaluations of Petitioner's job performance by different deans on January 29, 2002, and December 5, 2003. Both of those evaluations occurred after the accident, but before the new chair became the immediate supervisor of Petitioner sometime after December 5, 2003. It is more likely that the new chair expressed her own view that the university was holding Petitioner to a lower standard of job performance because of his disability. When the third-year review process began on August 26, 2004, Petitioner was no longer the only doctorate employed in the Department. However, he was the only disabled doctorate employed in the Department. The record evidence supports a reasonable inference that Respondent required Petitioner to comply with standards exemplified by unidentified disabled persons described in two of the four third-year evaluations of Petitioner.9 Respondent did not require non-disabled employees to comply with similar standards. The Vice President testified that the references in the evaluations to standards exemplified by other disabled persons did not influence his decision to take the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004. That portion of the testimony of the Vice President is neither credible nor persuasive. The Vice President, in relevant part, relied on the third-year evaluations. His denials of influence conflict with other relevant evidence. Before the Vice President began the third-year review process on August 26, 2004, he conferred with the new chair and reviewed Petitioner's record, including Petitioner's record of "outstanding" performance on or before December 5, 2003. In a letter to Petitioner dated August 26, 2004, the Vice President told Petitioner, in relevant part, that he had "serious concerns regarding your performance." The Vice President instructed the Dean and the new chair to "carefully monitor" Petitioner's "teaching and professional development activities in the fall semester of 2004." However, neither the Dean nor the chair monitored Petitioner's activities, and the Vice President initiated the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004, prior to the conclusion of the fall semester. Respondent applied a different timeline to Petitioner's tenure track than the timeline that Respondent generally applied to the tenure track of other employees. Tenure track employees may apply for tenure after their fifth year of employment, but may apply no later than their seventh year of employment. Most tenure track employees apply for tenure during their sixth year of employment. Employees on tenure track at Saint Leo receive annual contracts for their first, second, and third years of employment. Tenure track employees that receive a favorable third-year review are given a two-year employment contract after the third and fifth years of employment. Petitioner began his tenure track in January 2000. The seventh year of his tenure track would have expired at the end of the academic semester in December 2006.10 The third year of Petitioner's tenure track would have expired at the end of the academic semester in December 2002. Due to the accident on December 19, 2001, however, Respondent extended the time for the third-year review until August 26, 2004. The extension provided Petitioner with seven academic semesters, rather than six, before the third-year review began.11 Although Respondent extended the time for beginning the third-year evaluation, Respondent did not extend the seven- year limit for tenure. Respondent thereby reduced the time after the third-year evaluation in which Petitioner had to correct his deficient job performance to a period less than that enjoyed by non-disabled employees. Other tenure track employees normally have 14 academic semesters in which to complete their seven-year tenure track. Upon the expiration of six academic semesters, Respondent conducts a third-year evaluation. A tenure track employee then has eight more academic semesters, or four academic years, in his or her tenure track. Respondent reduced Petitioner's tenure track by a semester when Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment at the end of the academic semester in May 2006, rather than at the end of the academic semester in December 2006. By extending the third-year evaluation by a semester and reducing the remaining tenure track by an additional semester, Respondent reduced by one year the period that non-disabled tenure track employees have after their third-year review to complete their tenure track requirements. The Vice President has conducted third-year reviews on approximately 20 tenure track employees at Saint Leo since 1997. He has terminated the employment of two of those candidates. Petitioner is one of the two terminated from employment. The Vice President acknowledged in his testimony that he may have given Petitioner more time if the adverse employment decision were based solely on research and acceptable publication levels. Petitioner's teaching performance on and before December 5, 2003, was predominantly "outstanding." Moreover, one of the outside evaluators found that syllabi deficiencies were nothing that could not be easily corrected. Another evaluator found the syllabi "are consistent with guidelines established by NASSM/NASPE." It is unlikely, therefore, that the adverse employment action was motivated by job performance deficiencies in teaching, research, and syllabi. The Vice President relied on findings of evaluators that evaluated Petitioner, in relevant part, on Petitioner's inability to comply with standards exemplified by other disabled persons. The Vice President articulated no intelligible standards he used for discerning whether, or to what degree, the disability of Petitioner influenced the negative opinion of the evaluator. Moreover, the Vice President did not undertake an independent determination of whether Petitioner's handicap prevented Petitioner from complying with applicable job performance requirements by August 26, 2004. The job performance requirements for tenure are prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and a Faculty Handbook (FHB). The CBA provides, in relevant part: Promotion and tenure decisions at Saint Leo University are made on the basis of documented and evaluated performance in three areas: (1) teaching; (2) scholarly growth [sic] (3) institutional and community service. (a) Tenure and Promotion: The primary criteria for decisions regarding reappointment, tenure and promotion are excellence in classroom teaching and in facilitating student learning. Teaching Faculty must demonstrate excellence in teaching, a part of which is academic advising. Teaching faculty must demonstrate excellence in either (1) scholarly growth or (2) institutional and community service. Scholarly growth may be demonstrated through professional development and/or research. The definition of professional development and scholarly research will be determined by the relevant School. The University will recognize both traditional and non- traditional means of demonstrating professional development and/or research. Respondent's Exhibit 1 at 44. The FHB describes guidelines for promotion and tenure applications in terms similar to those in the CBA. The FHB provides, in relevant part: Promotion and tenure decisions at Saint Leo University are made on the basis of documented and evaluated performance in three areas: teaching; professional development, research, and scholarly growth; and institutional and community service. For teaching faculty excellence in teaching and demonstrated student learning are essential to tenure and promotion. Either professional development, research and scholarly growth or institutional and community service must be judged excellent for tenure. Respondent's Exhibit 2 at 73. The School of Business does not provide written job performance requirements that determine the tenure requirements for scholarly research and professional development. Testimony at the hearing suggested tenure requires at least two publications or presentations each year. However, that testimony is belied by predominantly "outstanding" job performance evaluations of Petitioner during his first two academic years in which Petitioner published no articles and made no presentations. In the three complete academic semesters that Petitioner had available to him after the accident to pursue his scholarly research, one article authored by Petitioner was accepted for publication and a test bank authored by Petitioner was included for publication in a text book. Petitioner also attended three conferences.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief for the reasons stated herein, and reinstating Petitioner to his position of employment with back pay and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th of December, 2006.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 12112 Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs PAUL SHELTON, 03-003451 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 22, 2003 Number: 03-003451 Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2024
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PATRICIA DAVIS vs. YOUNG WOMEN`S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF WEST PALM BEACH, 82-003094 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003094 Latest Update: Feb. 14, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Respondent YWCA is a nonprofit corporation that sponsors educational, social, and recreational programs. The YWCA's purpose states that it is a "movement rooted in the Christian faith"; however, expressed belief in Christianity is not required for membership in the YWCA or for employment by the YWCA. Its membership is comprised of adult women seventeen years of age and older. The personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action will be applied in recruitment, hiring, compensation, fringe benefits, staff development, and training, promotion, and any other condition of employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, age, national origin, or any other nonperformance factors." (Emphasis added.) Regarding termination, the personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Reasons for staff termination must be carefully documented. They should be based upon objective performance appraisals, which in turn are based upon job descriptions, work plans, and performance standards. Except in cases of reorganization/retrenchment or termination for cause, a probationary period for work improvement must be provided, followed by another performance appraisal." The YWCA of West Palm Beach operates three facilities: Central and Residence, the Mamie Adair Branch, and the Recreation Center. The Mamie Adair Branch primarily serves the black community in West Palm Beach and includes a day-care facility. The Petitioner, Davis, was hired as the Branch Executive of the Mamie Adair Branch of the YWCA, effective July 21, 1980, at a starting salary of $12,000.00. The Petitioner was given copies of the YWCA's personnel policy, affirmative action plan, and job description. She was not given notice of particular standards of behavior to which she was required to conform away from the job. As branch Executive she was supervised by the Executive Director, Jo Prout. The Petitioner successfully completed her initial 90-day probationary period, and her annual salary was increased by five percent to $12,600.00. In October 1981, however, the Petitioner received her annual evaluation and was again placed on three months probations due primarily to an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Branch Committee. The Petitioner had a bad attitude and was antagonistic. The Petitioner became pregnant but did not immediately disclose the fact of her pregnancy. In approximately December, 1981, the Petitioner confided to a coworker that she was pregnant and the coworker, in turn, told the YWCA's Executive Director, Jo Prout, that the Petitioner was pregnant. The YWCA's Executive Director was concerned that the Petitioner's relationship with the Branch Committee would be severely adversely affected if the Committee found out the Petitioner was pregnant and unmarried. Because of this concern, the Executive Director removed the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, effective December 31, 1981. The Petitioner would not have been removed from her position on December 31, 1981, but for the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried. Prior to removing the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, the Executive Director did not attempt less drastic alternatives such as asking the Petitioner not to discuss or disclose her marital status or asking the Petitioner to take a leave of absence. Prior to her removal, the Petitioner had not discussed the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried with members of the Branch Committee or with the YWCA membership in general. At no time had the Petitioner advocated unwed motherhood as an alternative life- style or otherwise advocated or espoused principles contrary to her understanding of Christianity. In the past, certain employees of the YWCA whose on-the-job behavior was contrary to Christian principles received job discipline but were not removed from their positions. A desk clerk at the YWCA's residence, for example, who was found to have stolen property from residence guests was not discharged. The removal of the Petitioner from her position by the YWCA because she was pregnant and unmarried was not justified by the business necessity rule because: A requirement to conduct one's life, including one's off-the-job activities, according to Christian principles, was not disclosed to the Petitioner or to other employees; The YWCA did not discipline or discharge other employees for conduct which conflicted with the YWCA's alleged requirement to conduct one's life by Christian principles; and The YWCA did not show that a requirement of all employees to conduct their lives by Christian principles has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Then the Petitioner was removed from the Branch Executive position, she was transferred to the position of center consultant for gymnastics. The position of the center consultant for gymnastics to which the Petitioner was transferred was a demotion in that the Petitioner went from an administrative to a non-administrative position. The transfer also changed the Petitioner's employment status from full-time employee to part-time employee with a 25 percent decrease in earned income and a lunch "hour" reduced to 30 minutes. The petitioner's new position as center consultant was a temporary one designated to last no longer than five months. Petitioner was removed from probationary status as a result of the transfer. The position of center consultant to which the Petitioner was transferred was not a legitimate position. The position did not exist prior to December 31, 1981, the date the Petitioner was transferred. No job description was ever written for this position, despite the fact that the YWCA personnel policy required job descriptions. The Petitioner was verbally assigned job tasks inconsistent with her title of center consultant, including cleaning toilets at the gymnastics center. The position was eliminated on February 16, 1982, approximately six weeks after it was created, allegedly due to financial streamlining. The YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, discriminating against her on the basis of sex and marital status by removing her from her position as Branch Executive because she was pregnant and unmarried. Moreover, this transfer was not justified by business necessity. Because the YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, the Petitioner could be entitled to be reinstated to her former position or to a comparable position and could also be entitled to recover lost wages and fringe benefits, plus interest thereon, from the date of the wrongful act, December 31, 1981, to November 31, 1982, the date she was hired by the Lutheran Ministries, set off by any interim earnings and reduced by the Petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits plus her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Regarding reinstatement, the Petitioner has been and is now willing and able to be reinstated to her former position as Branch Executive or to a comparable administrative position. The employer's argument that the Petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement because she was an unsatisfactory employee is rejected for the following reasons: The employer's allegations that the Petitioner will not satisfactorily perform her job if reinstated are too speculative and any doubts about the Petitioner's entitlement to reinstatement should be resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination; and In the event that the Petitioner's job performance upon reinstatement is not satisfactory, the employer may avail itself of the procedures set forth in its personnel policy to improve the Petitioner's performance or discharge her for unsatisfactory job performance. However, reinstatement may not be feasible in this case due to the fact that another employee has been placed in the Petitioner's former position. If the Petitioner is not reinstated to a comparable administrative position, then she should be compensated by the award of six months front pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Petitioner is entitled to damages in the amount of $13,551, which represents a back pay award of $11,000 plus 10 percent interest, six months front pay in the amount of $6,000, minus $1,575 for salary paid from January 1, 1982 - February 16, 1982, including two weeks severance pay and $2,974 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs of $232.65 and attorneys fees totaling $5,000.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs RON CARDENAS, 00-002353 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jun. 05, 2000 Number: 00-002353 Latest Update: Aug. 25, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment on grounds alleged in the Civil Service Notice of Disciplinary Action of May 10, 2000.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent in Petitioner's maintenance department as a Carpenter I. Respondent was a non-probationary educational support employee as defined in Section 1012.40, Florida Statutes (2003), which is substantially similar to Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes (2001), and its predecessors. In October 1995, Respondent's fishing boat collided with a commercial barge. As a result of the accident, Respondent's father and uncle were killed and Respondent's son suffered serious bodily injury. Respondent had a history of poor attendance at work. Sometime prior to October 1998, Respondent's supervisor counseled him and recommended discipline due to unexcused and excessive absences from work. Respondent was arrested in October 1998 as the result of the boating accident. Respondent initially was charged with one count each of vessel homicide, culpable negligence, and boating under the influence (BUI) severe bodily injury, and two counts of manslaughter. On April 28, 2000, a jury found Respondent guilty as charged. It is undisputed that Respondent was absent from work without authorization or approved leave from April 17, 2000 through May 17, 2000. Petitioner terminated his employment effective May 17, 2000. Respondent was sentenced on August 22, 2000, for the following offenses: causing serious bodily injury to another, culpable negligence in the death of another, vessel homicide, and two counts of BUI manslaughter. On appeal, some of Respondent's felony convictions were discharged. However, the Court affirmed Respondent's BUI manslaughter convictions. See Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The court in Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), certified a question of great public importance involving a jury instruction to the Florida Supreme Court. See Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, Case No. SC02-1264, Rev.gr. 832 So. 2d 103 (Table) (Fla. November 19, 2002). At the time of the hearing, the Florida Supreme Court continued to have jurisdiction over Respondent's criminal case. Therefore, Respondent's convictions for BUI manslaughter remain in effect. Petitioner's Rule 2.24 provides that personnel absent from work without approved leave shall forfeit compensation and be subject to discipline, including termination. Unavailability for work due to incarceration does not constitute a basis for approved leave and is an unauthorized absence.

Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Cardenas Department of Corrections No. 202263 Reception and Medical Center Post Office Box 628 Lake Butler, Florida 32054 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons, Longoria & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 Jim Paul, Superintendent Escambia County School Board 215 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Honorable Jim Horne Commissioner of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 323299-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (6) 1012.391012.401012.67120.569120.57327.35
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ESTHER C. REEDY vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 80-001346 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001346 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact On or about January 30, 1979, Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Education (hereinafter "Department") issued an Announcement of Position Vacancy for Position number 00533 for an Educational Data Analyst I (hereinafter "EDA-I"). The deadline for filing applications was February 20, 1979. The minimum qualifications were: Graduation from an accredited four-year college or university and two years of experience in school administration, teaching or experience directly related to the specific school service program. Professional or technical experience in one of the above areas may be substituted for the required college training on a year-for-year basis. These qualifications, known as class specifications, are issued by the Department of Administration. The advertised position was in the Teacher Certification Section. John Stables was the Administrator for the Teacher Certification Section during all times material hereto. The first step in the selection process begins with the request for announcement of position vacancy. When this is approved, the Department issues an Announcement of Position Vacancy. The Announcement contains a closing date by which all those interested in the position must file their applications. The applications are received in the Department's Personnel Office and are screened to determine whether or not the applicant meets the minimum qualifications as set forth in the Announcement. As the applications are received, they are forwarded to the section where the vacant position is available. After the applications are received by the section that has the vacant position, the applications are reviewed, interviews are conducted, and the top candidates are designated. A specific recommendation is made by the section head, approved by the Division Director, and then reviewed by the Personnel Office for compliance with appropriate rules and to verify that all paperwork has been properly completed. The recommendation is then forwarded to Francis N. Millett, Jr., the Deputy Commissioner of Education, who is also the Department's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, who reviews it. The recommendation then goes to Commissioner Turlington, who makes the final decision and signs the appointment letter. In the Teacher Certification Section, Patricia Wortham had the duty of receiving all applications and compiling a list of the applicants. It was also her duty to make arrangements for interviews of any applicants that requested an interview. In addition, when the Section had made its recommendation, she typed the Department's form containing statistical information and returned the form with the applications of those who had not been selected to the Personnel Office. In the Teacher Certification Section, Myra Burkhalter, an Educational Consultant III, had the duty of conducting interviews with the applicants in the first instance. Burkhalter had been employed in the Section for approximately ten years and had served as an Educational Consultant III for the last three or four of those years. The Educational Data Analysts I and II were under her general supervision. She was the highest ranking employee in the Section, outranked only by Staples, and was specifically given the task of interviewing applicants. After Burkhalter completed her interview with a particular applicant, she would introduce the applicant to Staples if he were available. The EDA-I position is a meticulous job that requires from one to one and a half years of training before the individual is capable of performing the job. There is contact between the EDA-I and persons in educational institutions outside the Department. The analysts review transcripts of persons applying for a teaching certificate in the State of Florida. The duties require counseling and interviewing with teacher-applicants and further require an almost instant recall of all the statutes and State Board of Education teacher certification rules. The analyst reviews the courses and experience of the teacher-applicant and applies the course work and credits against the rules to determine whether the person applying for a certificate meets the minimum qualifications. Some 1,600 to 1,700 institutions from which the certification applicants obtained schooling have to have their accreditation status verified by the analyst in order to determine whether or not that institution meets the standards set by the State of Florida. Additionally, many applicants have degrees from institutions in countries other than the United States, and the analyst must either know or be able to find information regarding the schools in those foreign countries. Staples and Burkhalter considered the interview process of an applicant for an EDA-I position to be imperative. Burkhalter explained to the applicant in some detail the preciseness required in performing the job and the pressures of the job, since there were always teacher certification requests to be analyzed. The year's training procedure, the amount of knowledge that must be acquired by the analyst in order to perform the required functions, and the importance of the screening process of the certification applicants in order to assure that only qualified teachers are certified were explained to the interviewee. Additionally, Burkhalter talked with the EDA-I applicant to determine how that person's reaction would be (as near as possible in an interview) to the type of work and duties of the position. The communicative skills of the job applicant were discussed. It is absolutely essential that the EDA-I have the ability to communicate both orally and in writing. The reason for the high degree of communication ability is that an EDA-I, after the training period, writes letters to educational institutions concerning transcripts and talks to and corresponds with persons requesting certification. Part of the duties involve contact with the public. An analyst spends one week out every six or eight weeks at the front desk working with office visitors. Good communicative skills are required in order that the EDA can answer questions posed by applicants for teacher certification. The interviewing process is thus required in order to ascertain the applicant's communicative skills. Another purpose of the interview is to determine as nearly as possible the applicant's attitude in interpersonal relationships, since there are approximately eighteen analysts doing the same thing, and it is essential that they work as a team. The job places the EDA-I under considerable pressure in working closely with other people, especially during the training period. The training period, by necessity, requires close supervision of the EDA-I and involves frequent correction of the trainee's work. Since the Department invests over a year in the training of an EDA-I, it is essential that an applicant's future plans be discussed, particularly the applicant's intentions concerning how long the applicant intends to remain in Tallahassee, the job location, and how long the applicant intends to remain in the position. Inasmuch as the information to be given to and received from the interviewee can only be communicated and evaluated in a face-to-face meeting, it is essential that those applying for the position be interviewed. The Department has no established policy regarding the conducting of employment interviews. The method utilized is left up to the particular section doing the interviewing. Furthermore, the Department of Administration has promulgated no rules or guidelines requiring that interviews be conducted in a certain manner, that an agency interview a certain number of applicants, or that an agency interview any applicants. Since there were no state or department rules for conducting interviews, it was the practice of the Section to interview those applicants requesting an interview. Since there were many applicants for each EDA-I position, and since most of the applicants met the minimum qualifications, experience had shown that there would be a sufficient number of applicants that requested an interview from which the top four or five names would be submitted to Staples for his recommendation. Staples believed that the fact that a person would call and ask for an interview was indicative of the person's enthusiasm and interest in the job itself. He believed it was a further indication of the person's self-confidence and desire to obtain employment. Burkhalter and Staples endeavored to evaluate whether the applicant would fit into the EDA-I job during the interview process. Staples and Burkhalter never refused to interview anyone who requested an interview. Additionally, no one was hired who had not been interviewed. On or about February 16, 1979, Petitioner filed an application with the Personnel Office for the EDA-I Position number 00533. She was born in Puerto Rico, where the main language is Spanish. Her family spoke French and Spanish while she was growing up, and Petitioner speaks English with an accent and Spanish. Petitioner's application was forwarded to the Teacher Certification Section. Twenty-five applications were received for Position number 00533. Eight persons were interviewed by Burkhalter for Position number 00533--five were interviewed in February and March, 1979, and three had been interviewed on previous occasions. Approximately two weeks after Petitioner filed her application at the Personnel Office, she called the Teacher Certification Section inquiring as to what action had been taken with her application. Since the person answering the telephone had no information regarding the applications for the position, Petitioner requested that Staples return her phone call. When she did not receive a return call from Staples, she again called the Teacher Certification Section, again spoke to someone with no information regarding the pending applications, and again requested that Staples return her call. When she did not receive a return phone call from Staples, Petitioner called the Teacher Certification Section a third time. Patricia Wortham, the person in charge of scheduling interviews of applicants, took the third phone call and distinctly remembers her conversation with Petitioner. Petitioner asked if the position had been filled and why she had not been called for an interview. Wortham explained that the Section did not call applicants to schedule interviews, but rather waited until an applicant requested an interview. Wortham asked Petitioner if she would like to come in for an interview, and Petitioner replied that she did not want an interview. Wortham was surprised by Petitioner's refusal to come in for an interview since in the seven years that Northam had worked in that position, she had never had an applicant decline to come in for an interview. Petitioner's telephone conversation with Wortham concerning an interview occurred before anyone had been selected to fill the position. Petitioner was informed that the position had not been filled, and that an interview was available. Although Petitioner denies that she was offered an interview, she does admit that during her third phone call to the Teacher Certification Section an interview was discussed. By the time Petitioner called the Section for the fourth time, the position had been filled, and she was so advised by Burkhalter. Shortly thereafter, she received a letter officially notifying her that a selection had been made. Margaret Goforth filled an application and met the minimum qualifications for the position. She requested and was granted an interview. Since she was believed to be the best applicant of those interviewed, she was selected. Staples signed the recommendation to hire Goforth on March 16, 1979, and she began work on April 24, 1979. After Ralph Turlington became Commissioner of Education in 1974, he determined that the Department needed to have an Equal Employment Opportunity (hereinafter "EEO") policy committee and EEO officer. The Department subsequently instituted an EEO policy. The purpose of the policy is to provide people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds a greater opportunity to apply for and be selected for positions in the Department. To implement the policy, the Department began to advertise widely positions that became open so that people meeting the qualifications would have an opportunity to apply. An EDA-I is considered a professional position. The Department sends position vacancy announcements for professional positions to approximately six hundred locations, including universities, community colleges, school districts, minority groups, affirmative action groups, and also distributes the announcement within the Department. The purpose of the EEO policy is to ensure that all applications for positions are given equal treatment. The policy sets forth target areas such as minorities, handicapped persons, and affirmative action groups in order for these persons to be notified and have the opportunity to apply for positions. The EEO policy does not specify how job applicants are to be interviewed or selected for interviews. The procedure for conducting the interviews and making the final selection is left up to the individual section, provided the procedure used does not discriminate against an applicant.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding that Esther C. Reedy was not discriminated against on the basis of her age or national origin and dismissing her Petition for Relief with prejudice. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Scanlan, Esquire Post Office Box 10311 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gene T. Sellers, Esquire State Board of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Aurelio Durana, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Richard Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ALANA HOLLEY, 03-002438 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jul. 02, 2003 Number: 03-002438 Latest Update: Aug. 08, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent may be terminated for gross insubordination.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Holley was a kindergarten teacher assigned to Frontier Elementary School. The evidence established, and Holley does not dispute, that at all times material to this case, Holley and Petitioner were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided that Petitioner may terminate an employee for gross insubordination, which is defined as a "willful disregard or constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature and give by and with proper authority." At the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, Holley exhibited behavior which constituted reasonable grounds to question her present ability to perform her job. In such circumstances, the collective bargaining agreement authorizes Petitioner to direct the employee to cooperate in obtaining what is known as a fitness for duty evaluation. The facts supporting the need for such an evaluation were appropriately documented during the first weeks of the school year, and Holley was assigned to her residence with pay on October 24, 2002. Thereafter, on three separate occasions, Holley was directed in writing by Respondent's duly-designated representative, chief personnel officer, Marcia Andrews (Andrews) to report for and to complete the evaluation. The first of Andrews' letters was dated November 18, 2002. It advised Holley that failure to comply with this directive "will be viewed as insubordination." Holley went to the fitness evaluation which had been scheduled for her at a reasonable time upon reasonable notice. However, Holley refused to fully cooperate with the examiner, rendering it impossible for the examination to be completed. Andrews sent Holley a second letter, dated December 13, 2002. In this letter, Andrews reprimanded Holley for insubordination, and again directed her to cooperate in a fitness for duty evaluation. Again Holley did not comply. By letter dated March 20, 2003, Andrews advised Holley that she would be given "one last opportunity" to fully cooperate and complete a fitness for duty evaluation. Again, Holley was advised that her failure to cooperate would be deemed insubordination and "will result in a recommendation to the School Board for your termination." The aforementioned correspondence was punctuated by at least a half dozen conversations between Holley and Andrews in which Andrews implored Holley to cooperate with the evaluation. Andrews maintained Holley on the payroll long past the time it would have been justified to terminate Holley for insubordination. Throughout the period of time she was assigned to home and again at the final hearing, Holley attempted to defend her failure to complete the fitness evaluation by leveling accusations of discriminatory and in some cases criminal behavior against various individuals employed by or otherwise affiliated with Petitioner. At least one of Holley's accusations of wrongdoing was made for the first time at her deposition, which was taken shortly before the final hearing in this matter. At all times material to this case, Respondent's staff acted in good faith in giving Holley unlimited opportunity to corroborate her charges. She received a similar opportunity in these proceedings. Holley made no effort to corroborate her charges. Instead, the record provides clear and convincing evidence that Holley was, in fact, grossly insubordinate. For months she disregarded, with no legitimate cause, a direct and entirely reasonable order to complete a fitness for duty examination. There is no evidence to suggest that Holley was treated any differently than any other teacher or employee would be treated in similar circumstances.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Marie Nelson, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Alana Holley 2381 Southeast Federal Highway, Suite 6 Stuart, Florida 34994 Dr. Arthur C. Johnson, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Honorable Jim Horne Commissioner of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 315 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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