The Issue The issue in this case is whether Limited Edition Interiors, Inc. (Respondent), committed an act of unlawful employment discrimination and an act of retaliation against an employee, Arlene Matvey (Petitioner), in violation of Pinellas County Code sections 70-53(a) and 70-54(1).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was an interior furnishings retailer located in Largo, Florida, and owned by William S. Miller (Mr. Miller) and Judith L. Miller (Mrs. Miller), a married couple. Mrs. Miller was the president of the company. Mr. Miller was the secretary/treasurer of the company. Both Mr. and Mrs. Miller were generally present at the business. The Respondent was an "employer" pursuant to the definition of the term set forth within the applicable Pinellas County Code provision. On October 31, 2005, the Respondent hired the Petitioner to work as the office manager and bookkeeper in a full-time, salaried position. The Petitioner's duties included tracking various accounts, preparing sales invoices, preparing the payroll, preparing certain tax records, and general office filing. The Petitioner, a single mother, had been unemployed for an extended period prior to being hired by the Respondent. Both Mr. and Mrs. Miller knew that the Petitioner needed the financial support provided by her job. Mr. Miller was the Petitioner's supervisor. Their work areas were in relatively close proximity, with Mr. Miller occupying an office space with a door and the Petitioner occupying a workstation immediately outside Mr. Miller's office. There was a second workstation also located outside Mr. Miller's office, and, on occasion, a third employee was present in the area. A few months after the Petitioner began employment at the Respondent, Mr. Miller began to make remarks about the Petitioner's physical appearance, particularly her "derriere." The remarks were frequent and were heard by other employees. The Petitioner was offended by the remarks and routinely told Mr. Miller to stop. On more than one occasion, Mr. Miller asked the Petitioner to sit on his lap. The Petitioner objected to Mr. Miller's requests and told him so. On at least one occasion, the exchange between Mr. Miller and the Petitioner was overheard by another employee. At various times, Mr. Miller called male employees and the Petitioner into his office to view sexually-suggestive photographs on his computer, some of which were described as pornographic. The Petitioner and other employees objected to the display of photographs and told him that they objected to his showing them the photos. At other times, Mr. Miller called the Petitioner into his office and showed her pornographic images on his computer screen. She felt disturbed by his behavior and told him of her objection. At times during the Petitioner's employment by the Respondent, Mr. Miller made purposeful and inappropriate physical contact with the Petitioner's body. Such contact included attempts to grab the Petitioner by her waist and to rub his clothed genital area against the Petitioner's clothed buttocks. The Petitioner consistently objected to Mr. Miller's behavior and told him of her objections. Other employees observed Mr. Miller's conduct and the Petitioner's objections to his behavior. On one occasion, Mr. Miller called the Petitioner into his office and told her a joke that included his displaying the outline of his penis through his pants, at which time the Petitioner voiced her objection to Mr. Miller. In September 2007, Mr. Miller appeared at the Petitioner's home, and, while there, he exposed his penis to the Petitioner and attempted to entice the Petitioner into sexual activity. He had not been invited to come to her home, and he left the premises when she directed him to do so. At various times during her employment, Mr. Miller asked the Petitioner to expose her breasts to him, and she objected and declined to do so. She eventually complied with the request on one occasion, because she feared losing her job if she refused. Subsequently, Mr. Miller told a male employee that the Petitioner had acceded to his request to see her breasts. The male employee relayed the conversation to the Petitioner, who felt humiliated by the incident. There was no evidence presented at the hearing to suggest that the Petitioner invited or encouraged Mr. Miller's inappropriate behavior. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that the Petitioner routinely told Mr. Miller of her objections to his conduct at the time it occurred. Because the Petitioner had been unemployed prior to being hired by the Respondent and was afraid of losing her job, she did not complain to Mrs. Miller about Mr. Miller's conduct. At the beginning of 2008, the Petitioner advised Mr. Miller that she felt he was "sexually harassing" her. Mr. Miller thereafter began to engage in a pattern of verbal harassment directed towards the Petitioner's job performance. He began to assign tasks to the Petitioner unrelated to her prior bookkeeping or office manager duties. She was assigned to monitor the store inventory, prepare sales tags and attach them to floor samples, dust the store, and clean the kitchen. Mr. Miller routinely criticized the Petitioner's work skills, argued with her about the performance of her duties, and called her "stupid." Prior to January 2008, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Miller had expressed any significant dissatisfaction with the quality of the Petitioner's work as office manager or bookkeeper. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the Petitioner was unable or unwilling to perform the office manager and bookkeeper tasks for which she was hired. Indicative of Mr. Miller's general attitude towards the Petitioner, he used a parrot that was kept at the store to intimidate the Petitioner, who was afraid (perhaps irrationally) of the bird. Mr. Miller clearly knew that the Petitioner was fearful of the bird, yet he would stand behind the Petitioner while she was working and hold the bird near the Petitioner's head, terrifying her. In early 2009, Mr. Miller again called the Petitioner into his office and showed her pornographic images on his computer screen. She again advised him of her objection to his conduct. Prior to 2009, the Petitioner had not talked with Mrs. Miller about her husband's conduct, because the Petitioner remained concerned about losing the job. However, in February 2009, while the two women were both in the store's lunchroom area, the Petitioner advised Mrs. Miller of Mr. Miller's conduct and asked Mrs. Miller to intervene. Mr. Miller had been out of the store for much of February 2009. He returned to work on February 23, 2009, and the Petitioner testified that he left her alone for a few days after his return. However, on March 2, 2009, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner's employment as a salaried, full-time employee, transferred her into an hourly wage position, and reduced her employment hours. She was partially relieved of her bookkeeping responsibilities and was assigned additional store tasks such as moving old boxes and cataloging their contents. The Respondent asserted that the March 2, 2009, action was the result of deteriorating business conditions. The Respondent asserted that the store revenues had declined and that they were required to reduce payroll costs by reducing personnel. The Respondent failed to provide any credible evidence supporting the assertion that deteriorating sales and income were the rationale behind the alteration of the Petitioner's work responsibilities. After March 2, 2009, Mr. Miller routinely continued to criticize the Petitioner's work performance. On July 23, 2009, Mr. Miller and the Petitioner became engaged in a heated discussion in the office area, during which he referred to her as a "fucking c-nt." Although Mr. Miller testified that he did not intend for the Petitioner to hear his insult, he said it loudly enough to be overheard by another employee who was also in the office area. Mr. Miller had previously used the same phrase to refer to other women, including Mrs. Miller. The Petitioner immediately reacted, screaming at Mr. Miller that he could not use the phrase and stating that she would be filing "a complaint" against him. The Petitioner left the office area and went into the store area, loudly protesting Mr. Miller's insult and intending to advise Mrs. Miller of the incident. Because there were customers in the store at the time, Mrs. Miller focused more on calming the Petitioner and not disrupting the store. After speaking briefly with Mrs. Miller, the Petitioner returned to the office area to collect her possessions. Mr. Miller approached the Petitioner and placed his hands in the area of her neck, which caused the Petitioner to feel physically threatened. The Petitioner took her possessions and left the store. The Petitioner next returned to work on July 27, 2009, at which time she was told that she was no longer the office manager and bookkeeper. At the hearing, Mr. Miller testified that the Petitioner was removed from the office because the situation had become volatile. Mrs. Miller testified that, because the Petitioner was argumentative, a decision had been made to remove her from the office. On July 27, 2009, when the Petitioner asked Mrs. Miller why she was no longer the office manager, Mrs. Miller said the Petitioner's job had been changed "because of Bill," meaning Mr. Miller. As of July 27, 2009, the Petitioner had no further office management responsibilities and retained only janitorial and store tasks. The Petitioner was also directed to call the store before coming in to see if she was needed on that day. On some days, the Petitioner was told there was no work for her. On August 14, 2009, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner's employment. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the termination of the Petitioner's employment was related to dissatisfaction with her performance as the Respondent's office manager and bookkeeper, or to the performance of the other tasks that were subsequently assigned. The Respondent asserted that economic conditions caused them to terminate some employees, including the Petitioner, but there was no credible evidence presented to support the assertion. The evidence presented during the hearing established that employees who were terminated were fired for non-performance of their job duties. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the Petitioner's termination or the reduction in her work hours was related to the Respondent's economic condition. At the hearing, employees (both current and former) described Mr. Miller's treatment of women as degrading and humiliating. Employees who worked for the Respondent concurrently with the Petitioner were aware that she was being humiliated by Mr. Miller's behavior. In addition to the Petitioner, Mr. Miller previously assigned janitorial duties to an employee whom he disfavored when he wanted the employee to quit. After the Petitioner's employment was terminated by the Respondent, the Petitioner attempted to obtain another job. During the period of unemployment, the Petitioner received $300.00 per week in unemployment compensation benefits. As of November 9, 2006, the Petitioner earned a bi- weekly salary of $1,600.00 from the Respondent. As of February 1, 2006, the Respondent provided health insurance coverage for the Petitioner as a benefit of her employment and continued such coverage after her termination and through December 31, 2009. As of April 29, 2010, the Petitioner became employed by Gentry Printing Company as a full-time bookkeeper earning $15.00 per hour and working a 40-hour week. On July 17, 2010, the Petitioner received a raise from Gentry Printing Company to $16.00 per hour for the 40-hour week. Gentry Printing Company withholds $22.50 from the Petitioner's weekly income as her contribution to the medical insurance program. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented testimony related to damages. The evidence established that the Petitioner was entitled to an award of $32,745.00 in back pay. The Respondent presented no corresponding evidence or testimony related to damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that the Respondent violated Pinellas County Code sections 70-53 and 70-54 and ordering the Respondent to pay the sum of $32,745.00 plus interest at the prevailing statutory rate to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street, Sixth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esquire Robert G. Walker, P.A. 1421 Court Street, Suite F Clearwater, Florida 33756 Sherri K. Adelkoff, Esquire 1159 South Negley Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15217 Leon W. Russell, Director/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Peter J. Genova, Jr., EEO Coordinator Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756
The Issue Whether Respondent, McDonald's Corporation, discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Hadley, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who worked at the Cocoa Beach, Florida, McDonald's restaurant from October 1, 2000, until March 17, 2001. She voluntarily terminated her employment. Respondent owns and operates restaurants and is subject to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2000). Respondent has an extensive, well-conceived, "Zero Tolerance" policy which prohibits unlawful discrimination. This policy is posted in the workplace, is distributed to every employee at the time he or she is employed, and is vigorously enforced by management. There are published procedures which can be easily followed by an employee who believes that he or she has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner did not avail herself of Respondent's "Zero Tolerance" policy. Petitioner complains of two isolated instances of what the evidence clearly shows to be workplace "horseplay" as the basis of her unlawful employment discrimination claim. On one occasion, a shift manager placed a promotional sticker on Petitioner's forehead. The second involved ice cream being placed on Petitioner's face. The evidence reveals that the "horseplay" complained of was typical of this workplace and not race or sex based. Practical jokes, food fights, ice down shirt backs, and similar activities, while not encouraged by corporate management, were a part of the routine at this restaurant. Petitioner was not the singular focus of the "horseplay"; it involved all employees. There is no evidentiary basis for alleging that it was racial or sexual in nature, as it involved employees of differing races and sexes. Approximately a month after the latest of the incidents complained of, on March 17, 2001, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment. Six months later, in September, 2001, Petitioner complained to Dexter Lewis, an African-American corporate employee who is responsible for investigating claims of unlawful workplace discrimination, about the two incidents. She claimed that she had been embarrassed by the incidents but did not suggest to him that they had been racially or sexually motivated. Mr. Lewis investigated the alleged incidents; he confirmed that the incidents had occurred and that similar incidents were widespread, but not racially or sexually motivated; he reprimanded the store manager and shift manager for their unprofessional management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Hadley 135 Minna Lane Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia Brennan Ryan, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802-1526 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36-151 ("IHOP"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011),1/ by discharging Petitioner from her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding racial and religious discrimination in the workplace.
Findings Of Fact IHOP is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. IHOP is a restaurant in Leesburg. IHOP is owned by Pritesh Patel, who owns and operates a total of four International House of Pancakes stores in the Leesburg area through his corporation, Pritesh, Inc. Petitioner is a black female who is an observant Jew. Because of her religious beliefs, Petitioner does not work on the Sabbath, from sundown on Friday until sunset on Saturday. Petitioner was hired to work as a server at IHOP on March 19, 2012. She made it clear that she did not work on the Sabbath, and IHOP agreed to respect her religious beliefs. There was some difference in recollection as to the notice Petitioner gave to IHOP. Petitioner testified that she made it clear she could not work until sundown on Saturdays. The store manager, Brian Jackson, also recalled that Petitioner stated she could only work Saturday evenings. Mr. Patel testified that Petitioner said that she could work on Saturday "afternoon." Petitioner's version is credited as being more consistent with her stated beliefs, though there is no doubt that Mr. Patel was testifying honestly as to his recollection. Petitioner was the only black server working at IHOP at this time. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson credibly testified that IHOP has had many black servers through the years. Mr. Jackson noted that Petitioner only worked for IHOP for a period of two weeks and therefore was in no position to judge IHOP's minority hiring practices. Petitioner testified that assistant manager Hemanshu "Shu" Patel, a relative of the owner, created a hostile working environment for her from the time she started on March 19. She complained that Shu would alter the seating chart so that she would have fewer tables to cover, meaning a reduction in her tips. Petitioner also stated that Shu was disrespectful and rude, in a manner that caused her to believe there was a racial motivation behind his actions. Despite the fact that Shu was subordinate to Mr. Jackson, Petitioner believed that Shu was really in charge because he was a relative of Mr. Patel and therefore "untouchable" as an employee of IHOP. Petitioner's main complaint was that Shu, who was in charge of work schedules for the restaurant, scheduled her to work on Saturdays. Petitioner testified that on the first Saturday of her employment, March 24, Shu called her to come into work at noon. She replied that she could not come in until after sundown. This problem was apparently worked out to Petitioner's satisfaction, and she was not required to report to work on Saturday afternoon. However, when Shu posted the next week's schedule on the following Tuesday, Petitioner saw that she had been scheduled to work on the morning of Saturday, March 31. Petitioner complained. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson testified that Shu had merely made an error in scheduling that was rectified as soon as Petitioner notified them of the problem. Petitioner did not deny that the problem was resolved mid-week, well before any Sabbath conflict could arise. Mr. Patel testified that he wanted Petitioner to work from 4 p.m. until midnight on Saturday, March 31, so that she would not lose a day's work due to the scheduling error. Shu phoned Petitioner early on Saturday afternoon and asked her to come in. Petitioner told Shu that she could not come in until 8 p.m. Mr. Patel testified that he did not need someone to work a four-hour shift, and that Petitioner was told not to come in. As a further reason for declining to work on Saturday evening, Petitioner testified that she had only been trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson testified that the only distinction between the dayshift and the nightshift is that the latter is less busy. All servers are trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson stated that, once trained for the morning shift, a server would find the night shift "a piece of cake." Petitioner's reason for not working in the evening was not credible in this respect. Mr. Patel testified that he had no problem with Petitioner's not working on that Saturday, provided that she understood she was going lose a day. Mr. Patel stated that from his point of view the problems began when Petitioner insisted that he give her weekday hours to make up for the lost Saturday hours. Mr. Patel declined to cut another employee's hours for Petitioner. Petitioner came in to work on the morning of Sunday, April 1. Sunday morning is a busy time for IHOP. According to head server Bernadine Hengst, Petitioner stood near her at the register and voiced her complaints about Shu, who was working in the kitchen. Shu heard Petitioner and stepped into the dining room, asking her, "You got something to say to me?" Petitioner and Shu became loud, and their argument was moved outside for fear of disturbing a restaurant full of people. Petitioner finished her shift then went home and composed a letter to Mr. Patel. She made copies of the letter for every employee at IHOP. Ms. Hengst was the first to see the letter. She phoned Mr. Jackson at home to tell him about it, and Mr. Jackson phoned Mr. Patel. The letter read as follows: On March 19, 2012, I was hired to work as a server. I am a professional, pleasant, respectful, prompt and dutiful individual. As the only African-American server, it is imperative that you know since I have arrived at IHOP, I have faced fierce blatant hostility from a manager ("Shu") and co- workers ("C.C., Misti and Cherish"). I feel Shu has deliberately created a divisive and hostile working environment. It is my understanding Shu is a family member yet his behavior is definitely bad for business. On two separate occasions, Shu altered the seating chart that Brian originally created and took two tables from me. He lacks proficient management skills and is totally unprofessional, disrespectful and rude. On Sunday, April 1, 2012, Shu spoke to me in a loud, impolite manner in front of staff and customers. Shu communicated in a very bellicose fashion and for a moment, it felt as though he would physically attack me. You must take it serious that Shu's conduct is detrimental to your business. When Shu hired me I made it clear that I am Jewish and do not work on the Sabbath ("Saturday"). Nevertheless, Shu called me to come into work on Saturday about noon; I told him I would come in after the Sabbath at 7:00 p.m. The following week I was scheduled to work a Saturday, which in turn caused me to lose a day of work. Also on April 1, 2012, Shu assigned me only two booths for the whole day; when I spoke up about it he threatened to take another booth from me. This type of attitude and his unfair behavior cannot be tolerated in the United States of America in 2012. Shu is outwardly mean, discriminative, and racist towards me. He acts like a tyrant, a bully and he feels he is untouchable. On Sunday, April 1, I was only assigned two booths while my co-workers had four to six tables. This was unfair seating arrangements. At the end of the day, Bernie [Hengst] told all the servers to tip out the busboy, yet I did not because I was unjustly treated by only being assigned two tables. This was one-sided and insulting. I am an exceptional waitress and I depend on this job to pay my bills. During my first week, I was scheduled to work 36.10 hours and this week I was only given approximately 23.0 hours. Everyone should be treated fairly and equally. I ask that you continue to give me a full schedule each week. This letter officially informs you of the battles I have dealt with in your establishment and I have not worked here for one whole month. All Americans have the right to work without being harassed. I urge you to intervene and equitably resolve this issue. Ms. Hengst testified that Shu is a loud person who "talks with his hands," but she saw nothing that gave her the impression that Shu would "physically attack" Petitioner. She did not detect that Shu treated Petitioner any differently than he treated other servers. Ms. Hengst saw Petitioner as an equal participant in the April 1 confrontation. As to Petitioner's complaint about the number of tables to which she was assigned, Mr. Jackson testified that servers are always trained on two booths and then moved to four booths after training is completed. He stated that Petitioner was doing a "terrible" job working four booths, which caused Shu to move her down to two. Mr. Jackson stated that it is counterproductive to overwhelm a new server, and that the server must demonstrate the ability to perform the basics before taking on more tables. On the morning of April 2, after reading Petitioner's letter, Mr. Patel went to the IHOP and sat down for a meeting with Petitioner in hopes of addressing her complaints. Mr. Patel testified that the first thing Petitioner asked him was, "Do you know how many black employees you have?" Though he had been willing to discuss Petitioner's grievances concerning scheduling, Mr. Patel decided to fire Petitioner when she started "threatening us" based on claims of "black and white discriminating." He decided to fire Petitioner for the future of his business, because he did not want the problems associated with allegations of discrimination. Mr. Jackson was also at the April 2 meeting, and testified that Petitioner claimed she was being singled out because of her race. Based on all the testimony, it is found that Petitioner had little basis for claiming that IHOP was discriminating against her based on her race or religion during the actual course of her job. She was mistakenly scheduled to work on Saturday, but was not required to come in to the store once she made management aware of the error. She did lose one shift's worth of work for March 31, but that was partly due to her declining to work the evening shift. The evidence established that Shu Patel was loud, somewhat hotheaded, and perhaps not the ideal choice for managing a busy restaurant, but did not establish that he singled out Petitioner for particular abuse because of her race or religion. The evidence established that Petitioner's poor job performance was the cause of at least some of the friction between her and IHOP management. However, Mr. Patel's own testimony established that he dismissed Petitioner in direct retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory employment practices. IHOP offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Petitioner's dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36- 151 committed an act of unlawful retaliation against Petitioner. It is further recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary proceeding to establish the amount of back pay/lost wages owed to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on December 27, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who at all times material to this case was employed with Respondent as a production worker. Respondent, Hamilton Products, Inc., manufactures various animal related products such as horse tack and pet collars and is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Allegations of Race Discrimination Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination alleged discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation and reads in pertinent part: I believe that I have been discriminated against based on race, Black, which has resulted in discipline, unfair terms and conditions, and denial of promotion. Since 2003, I have noticed disparate treatment between White and Black employees. One example of this is that Black employees are rarely if ever promoted to management positions. Another example of this is that a Black coworker of mine, Deloise, would often harass me and when I complained to my supervisor Mrs. Robinson, she took the matter to Mrs. Lake. Mrs. Lake merely asked the woman to not do that again. This harassment continued and I repeatedly complained about it so that finally, I was moved to a different location. A similarly situated White female, Elaine, experienced similar treatment from Deloise but when she complained Deloise was stopped from repeating the behavior almost immediately. I was very upset about this obvious disparity that I contacted Mrs. Benfel and explained to her what was transpiring. She asked me to gather together my complaints and those of others which I did and submitted it to her in a letter. Almost immediately after I began to receive retaliation for my complaint. I was disciplined, verbally harassed and moved away from the other employees. Martha Robinson is a supervisor employed by Respondent for over 16 years. She was Petitioner's direct supervisor for some of the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. Ms. Robinson is a white female. A coworker, Delores,1/ who sat near Petitioner would tap her foot on a wooden box while working. Petitioner found this annoying and complained to Ms. Robinson. Ms. Robinson asked Delores to stop tapping her foot and had fleece put on the box. However, Delores continued to tap her foot. After three or four employees complained about Delores' foot tapping, Ms. Robinson took the box away from Delores and put it in Ms. Lake's office. Karen Benfield is the office manager for Respondent, where she has been employed for 19 years. Petitioner went to Ms. Benfield's office to complain about working conditions. Ms. Benfield described the complaints made by Petitioner as vague and broad-based, consisting of general assertions that employees were unhappy at work. Petitioner's complaints to Ms. Benfield did not include any allegation of racial discrimination about her or anyone else. Ms. Benfield asked Petitioner for specifics, to put her complaints on paper and she would make sure management saw it. She did not ask Petitioner to solicit comments from other employees and told Petitioner she could only speak for herself. Petitioner collected written complaints from her co- workers and delivered them to Ms. Benfield. Petitioner received a Warning Notice dated October 26, 2004, for disruptive influence on the workforce. It read as follows: The purpose of this warning is to make sure that you understand the structure of Hamilton Products and the parameters of acceptable behavior at work. Lately, you have brought a number of suggestions and grievances to the management of Hamilton Products on behalf of yourself and others. There is no single employee representative to management at Hamilton Products. You do not and may not speak on behalf of other employees. Every employee at Hamilton Products, including yourself, enjoys the right to share ideas, suggestions or grievances with management. Such communication is encouraged as long as it is made properly. There is a clear chain of command at Hamilton Products, and you must follow that chain of command when communicating with management. You must speak to your immediate supervisor or place a suggestion in the box provided for suggestions at the north end of the nylon department. It is not acceptable to go around the chain of command to a higher supervisor, as this disrupts the operations of Hamilton Products. In the future, you must follow the chain of command or use the suggestion box, and speak only for yourself. Failure to follow the procedure outlined herein will result in further disciplinary actions up to and including discharge. After the hurricanes of 2004, Petitioner's entire department was reprimanded by the plant manager for missing work. This was upsetting to Petitioner because Ms. Robinson had told these employees not to call in. She felt that Ms. Robinson should not have let him "talk trash" to the employees. There is no evidence that Petitioner or anyone else was singled out in any way by the plant manager regarding this incident. Petitioner believes that white employees were given opportunities for promotion and resulting raises. However, no employees on the production floor were promoted during the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. There is no competent evidence in the record to support Petitioner's claim that white employees received promotions and black employees did not. At some point, Petitioner was moved when the production department was reorganized. Petitioner was placed in the center of the plant, facing the rest of her department. She had no one on either side of her which resulted in her not being able to talk to coworkers while working.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2007.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was not re-employed as a "mechanic-carpenter" by the Respondent school board based upon the Petitioner's age.
Findings Of Fact James W. Jones was employed from 1983 to 1993, as a mechanic-carpenter by the school board. In early 1993 he traveled to the Bicentennial Youth Park (BYP) to deliver supplies from his shop to Mr. Evans, the teacher assigned to the BYP. At that time Mr. Evans informed Jones of an upcoming opening at the BYP for a carpenters position and asked him if he would be interested in filling the position. The Petitioner replied that he would be interested. The position in question was posted and advertised as two part-time carpenter positions. Mr. Jones did not wish a part-time position and eventually the administration of BYP gained authorization and funding for a temporary, full-time position at the BYP. Mr. Jones, had been trying to leave the facilities maintenance department because of personality conflicts with his supervisor, Buel Lee. He consequently accepted the temporary, full-time position at the BYP on April 23, 1993. Prior to accepting the temporary position at BYP, the Petitioner was informed by Mr. Al Evans, Billy Wiesneski, and Terry Ellis that the position was temporary and would only last as long as funding for the position was available. In fact, Mr. Jones signed a letter, dated May 3, 1993, confirming his understanding that the position at BYP was temporary and that its duration was dependent upon the duration of funding allocated by the school board. He signed that letter in the presence of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Lee on May 4, 1993.1 Additionally, Mr. Jones admits that he signed a Notice of Personnel Action form on April 23, 1993, describing the job as temporary from April 23, 1993, to June 30, 1993, and stating that "annual re-appointment will be based on availability of project funds. . .". Mr. Jones also told a co-worker, John Driggers, that he knew the position could end in a year but that he was going to take the position anyway because by that time he would have the 10 years of service required to be vested in the pension plan. Mr. Driggers was also aware that Mr. Jones wished to transfer out of the facilities maintenance department at that time. In summary, although Mr. Jones denies that he knew the position was temporary, that is not the case, as shown by the preponderant evidence discussed in the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact on this subject matter. In any event, the only issue properly before the Division and the undersigned Judge, is whether Jones was not hired into a mechanic-carpenter position in the facilities maintenance department at a later date because of his age. His knowledge regarding the temporary nature of the position at the BYP is wholly irrelevant to a decision in this case because of the issues pled and noticed to the opposing party in the Petition. In any event, after voluntarily accepting that position he knew to be temporary, the funding finally ran out on March 31, 1994.2 Because funding no longer existed to support the carpenter position at BYP, the Petitioner was not re-appointed to that position and therefore his employment with the Volusia County School Board ended on March 31, 1994. Subsequently, on May 20, 1994, a mechanic-carpenter position became available in a the facilities maintenance department under the supervision of Buel Lee, for whom Jones had worked prior to taking the position at BYP. The Petitioner applied for that position. He was interviewed by Mr. Lee and considered for employment as a new applicant who had never before worked for the Respondent, as opposed to a laid-off employee under the applicable collective bargaining agreement arrangement concerning re-hire of laid-off personnel. The Petitioner was not entitled to preference in hiring normally given to laid-off employees because he had not been "laid-off." The lay-off provision in the collective bargaining agreement defines "lay-off" as "the separation of employee for lack of work or funds without any fault or delinquency on the employee's part." The lay-off provision applies only to employees who have been given an appointment for a definite duration and the funding for the position is cut by the government before the appointment naturally expires by its own terms. Since Jones was simply not re-appointed upon the natural expiration of his appointment, the lay-off provisions would not be applicable to his situation. Jones was not entitled to nor was he given preference over other applicants for the 1994 mechanic-carpenter position based on seniority because he was not the most senior applicant for the position. In fact, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, he lost all seniority when he terminated from employment or was not re-appointed on March 31, 1994. Therefore, when he applied for the mechanic-carpenter position 1994, he as not entitled to any more consideration than is given to a new applicant. When he applied for that position in 1994, Mr. Lee, the hiring supervisor, interviewed all applicants and made the ultimate decision to hire Walter "Ed" Hayman for the position, instead of the Petitioner. Mr. Lee interviewed every applicant for that position. He treated Jones as a new applicant rather than a laid-off or senior employee, consistent with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, Mr. Lee was required by the collective bargaining agreement to give Hayman preference over Jones since Hayman had worked for the Respondent on an uninterrupted basis since 1991. Lee had received a letter of reference from a Mr. Frye, an independent contractor and Hayman's previous employer, indicating that Hayman had worked as a journeyman for 5 years. Mr. Lee thus believed that Hayman met the qualifications for the job. Lee felt that both Hayman and Jones were skilled in carpentry and did not make his decision based upon his judgment of their respective skills in their profession. Rather, Mr. Lee made a determination that Hayman was the best qualified for the position based on his knowledge of how each of them got along with others in the work place. Mr. Lee knew, and Jones admits, that during the time that he previously worked for Lee, Gary Gallencamp requested that he not have to work beside Jones any longer. Jones admits that in fact he had a lot to do with the reasons Gallencamp did not want to work with him anymore. Lee also knew, and Jones admits, that during the time that he previously worked for Lee, another employee, Ed Owensby, requested that he not have to work with Jones any longer. In fact, he stated that he would be forced to quit if he were required to continue working with Jones. Finally, Mr. Lee called Mr. Evans, Mr. Jones' most recent supervisor, to ask him for a reference regarding Jones' performance at the BYP. Mr. Evans told Mr. Lee that Jones had trouble getting along with the maintenance man, Earl Green, when working at the BYP. Even Jones admits that he had problems with Mr. Green's work. Contrarily, Mr. Lee had observed Hayman getting along well with the co-workers during the time he performed work in conjunction with the facilities maintenance department when he was working for the Respondent as a "grounds man." Therefore, based upon personal experience and the information he received from others, Mr. Lee made the decision to hire Mr. Hayman instead of Mr. Jones. Lee never even considered the ages of Hayman or Jones when making that hiring decision. In fact, Lee himself was approximately 48 or 50 years old when he hired Hayman. Lee does not have a history of hiring younger workers. In fact, the very person Lee hired to replace Jones, when Jones transferred to the BYP, was Mr. Fred Jacobs, who was then aged 57. The only three applicants hired by Lee after Jones transferred to the BYP and before Hayman was hired, were approximately 40 years old. During that time frame, Lee hired Eric Hoffman, who was 43 or 44 years old. Jeff Straker was in his late thirties or forties, and Fred Jacobs was 57. Thus, in their totality, Mr. Lee's hiring practices do not reflect any-age related bias. In addition, neither the Respondent's pay plan, nor its pension plan, set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, are related to age. The Respondent's pay ranges are based upon job classification (i.e., mechanic-carpenter) and years of service. Upon being separated from his employment, Jones was being paid at a level commensurate with 11 years of service. Had he begun his employment with the school board immediately upon completion of his vocational training, he would have been 34 or 35 years old and earned the same salary he was making in March 1994, when he was separated from employment. Likewise the pension plan provides that every employee, regardless of age, vests after having provided 10 years of service.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That for all of the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not established that the school board discriminated against him because of his age in making the subject re-hiring decision. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed for approximately five years with Respondent as a salesman. RF Group, LLC, is a limited liability company, doing business as Respondent, McGowan's Heating and Air Conditioning, and is a company engaged in the heating and air conditioning business. Petitioner was a successful salesman for four and one- half years with the company until a new salesman was hired. According to Petitioner, the new salesman was given most of the sales leads and Petitioner was cut out. Eventually, Petitioner's salary was reduced due to a decrease in his sales performance. He attributes his decrease in sales production to Respondent choosing the new salesman over him. Although he claimed age discrimination in his initial complaint, Petitioner offered no evidence or testimony that he was not given the sales leads due to his age and that the younger salesman received the leads because Respondent considered Petitioner too old to conduct his business. Petitioner resigned his position with Respondent because he was not making enough salary. After his resignation, Petitioner went to work with Total Air Care, but his employment was terminated due to company lay-offs in October 2010.
Recommendation it is Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 G. Alan Howard, Esquire Milam, Howard, Nicandri, Dees & Gilliam, P.A. East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Luis G. Arias 3526 Laurel Leaf Drive Orange Park, Florida 32065 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a hostess with Respondent because of her handicap, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, a 47-year-old female, was hired by Respondent on or about July 15, 2003, as a part-time hostess at Respondent's restaurant in Cocoa Beach, Florida. The understanding at that time was that she would be called in to work three to four hours a day, three to four days a week, as a leased, at-will employee from SkilStaf. SkilStaf would be the employer of record for wage and payroll reporting purposes. Respondent, BB & D of Cocoa Beach, Inc., is a franchisee of Perkins Restaurant and Bakery and is an employer under the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner first reported for work on July 17, 2003, and received training as a hostess/cashier by Debra Russell, associate manager, and received the same information about the job requirements, duties, and benefits given to all new hires. During her training, Petitioner was advised that in addition to seating guests and operating the cash register, a hostess would be required to bus tables when the restaurant was busy and the other staff was in need of help, although this requirement was not listed on the printed job description. Petitioner did advise Respondent that she had a disability and that she required a reasonable accommodation in order to perform her job. She stated that several years before she had undergone back surgery as a result of an injury that was not job related and could not perform a job that required heavy lifting. Petitioner advised Russell that she could not bus tables because it would require heavy lifting. Russell asked Petitioner to provide Respondent with a doctor's note advising them of the nature of her disability and what accommodations she required. Petitioner continued to work as a hostess at the Perkins Restaurant through July 22, 2003, and performed the job satisfactorily. She was not asked to bus tables during this period. Petitioner was not called back to work as a hostess after July 22, 2003, and did not receive any notification that she was terminated. Petitioner obtained a note from her physician dated July 28, 2003, which indicated that she was capable of working four to five hours a day as a hostess. This evidence is hearsay. In addition, it is not convincing that Petitioner turned in a copy of the note to management anytime after that date. She tried to talk to management about her status, but was unsuccessful. Although Petitioner did not prove that she is a disabled person, she was perceived to be disabled by her employer. Petitioner testified that she talked to Russell some time in early August. Petitioner claimed that Russell said that she had talked to the owner who said that he did not think Petitioner should be working as a hostess, but should get a desk job sitting down. Russell denied making such a statement. No other evidence was offered to support this statement. Therefore, said statement is uncorroborated hearsay and unreliable, and will not be relied upon as a finding of fact. Petitioner presented evidence that since July 2003, she has been unemployed, in spite of her making reasonable efforts to obtain suitable part-time employment. Respondent demonstrated that Petitioner sought to have several days in a row off after working only three days. Petitioner worked six shifts total during her employment with Respondent. Respondent needed two other part-time hostesses for the other shifts because the restaurant was open seven days a week, 24 hours a day, for a total of 21 shifts per week. Respondent demonstrated that the summer business that year was slower than projected and never picked up. The restaurant business is labor-intensive and accounts for 30 to 40 percent of overhead costs. In order for management to control costs, it must cut back on employees. Petitioner was involuntarily terminated because sales were underperforming projections and labor costs were being controlled by a reduction in force. Petitioner was unable to prove that her termination was the result of her disability or perceived disability and that Respondent's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Shahrooz Banapoor BB & D of Cocoa Beach, Inc. 5590 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Anne E. Dorfler 700 North Courtney Parkway Apartment 524 Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Eden Cabaret (“Respondent” or “Eden Cabaret”), is liable to Petitioner, Terry Doss (“Petitioner”), for employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01 through 760.11, Florida Statutes (2019).1 1 Except as otherwise noted, all references to the Florida Statutes herein, are to the 2019 version, which was in effect when the actions complained of in Petitioner’s Complaint occurred.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male who currently resides at 12 Adkinson Drive in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner holds a certification in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (“HVAC”) repair and maintenance. The evidence is unclear whether Petitioner is a licensed HVAC contractor. Respondent is an entertainment club in Pensacola, Florida, owned by Timothy McEvoy. The evidence is insufficient to establish how many employees are employed by Respondent. Mr. McEvoy came to know Petitioner through Mr. McEvoy’s girlfriend, Rachel Johnson, in June 2019. At that time, Petitioner had full-time employment, but needed rental housing and was available for extra part-time work. Mr. McEvoy owned a rental home at 7490 Rolling Hills Road in Pensacola and informed Petitioner that he could rent a room from him there for $150.00 per week. The rental home was partially occupied by Mr. McEvoy’s cousin, Kent Leyonmark, but another room was available in the home. Mr. McEvoy took Petitioner to the Rolling Hills property and showed him around. Mr. McEvoy introduced Petitioner to Mr. Leyonmark, suggesting that Petitioner may rent a room there. The rental arrangement at Rolling Hills did not work out, however, because, as Mr. McEvoy testified, Mr. Leyonmark is a racist and would not allow Petitioner to move into the house.2 Feeling obliged to Petitioner, Mr. McEvoy suggested Petitioner could rent a room at the five-bedroom home he and Ms. Johnson were then renting. Sometime in early June 2019, Petitioner moved into Mr. McEvoy’s rental home, occupying a bedroom with a private bath. No formal rental agreement, written or otherwise, was ever reached. Mr. McEvoy then hired Petitioner to do some HVAC work for him. Petitioner performed a number of jobs for Mr. McEvoy at Marcone Supply, a commercial business located in a building owned by Mr. McEvoy. Petitioner worked on the AC duct system, installed an air return, and completed an insulation job. Petitioner further found an airflow problem at the front of the store and repaired a restriction causing the problem at Marcone Supply. Over the next few weeks, Petitioner performed work for Mr. McEvoy at Eden Cabaret, as well as other rental properties owned by Mr. McEvoy, and at his beach house on Pensacola Beach. No formal employment agreement was reached between the two men. Typically, Petitioner sent a text to Mr. McEvoy informing him that Petitioner was finished with his regular job and asking if Mr. McEvoy needed him for any work. After Petitioner informed Mr. McEvoy that he had worked approximately 20 hours, Mr. McEvoy told Petitioner, “It would be best if you 2 Mr. McEvoy’s testimony is entirely hearsay, but is not being used to prove that Mr. Leyonmark is a racist, and no finding is made in that regard, but is limited to show that, for whatever reason, Petitioner did not take a room at the Rolling Hills property. keep a sheet with start and stop time and [a] brief description of what you worked on by day.” When Petitioner had worked 37 hours, he texted Mr. McEvoy, “Didn’t know when you was [sic] going to pay me the hrs. I work [sic].” He also stated, “I also old [sic] y’all some rent.” Later, Petitioner sent a text asking Mr. McEvoy, “Did u need money for rent[?]” The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. McEvoy responded to that text message. Mr. McEvoy never paid Petitioner for the hours he worked. Petitioner never paid Mr. McEvoy any rent. In addition to staying at Mr. McEvoy’s home rent-free, Petitioner had the use of a car owned by Mr. McEvoy. Petitioner used the car to get to and from work—both his first job and the second part-time work he did for Mr. McEvoy. Mr. McEvoy testified that he allowed Petitioner to use the car because the rental house was not near a public bus route. At Petitioner’s prior residence he took the bus to work. Petitioner purchased gas for Mr. McEvoy’s car. Petitioner also inquired about buying the car from Mr. McEvoy. But, Petitioner never paid anything to Mr. McEvoy for using the car. In early July, Mr. McEvoy informed Petitioner that the house they were all living in had been put on the market for sale by the owner. Mr. McEvoy and Ms. Johnson, who was pregnant at the time, planned to move before the baby was born. In July, Mr. McEvoy informed Petitioner, “[W]e have committed to be out of here by the end of this month so you should plan accordingly.” Petitioner lived with Mr. McEvoy and Ms. Johnson for four to six weeks. During that time period, Petitioner worked a total of 73.5 hours on repairs and maintenance at several properties owned by Mr. McEvoy, including Eden Cabaret. When Petitioner requested, via text message, to be paid for the hours worked, Mr. McEvoy asked Petitioner to call him to discuss the issue. Mr. McEvoy did not contest the number of hours Petitioner worked, but wanted to discuss “where we stand for the work you did vs. the housing and transportation we provided.” The two men never discussed the issue face-to-face, and never came to an agreement in a series of text messages either. When asked by the undersigned how Mr. McEvoy’s failure to pay him was related to his claim of discrimination, Petitioner explained that he was the only black man that worked for Mr. McEvoy and that Mr. McEvoy paid all his other employees. Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of particular individuals employed by Respondent, what type of work they performed, or their rate of pay. Mr. McEvoy claims Petitioner was never Respondent’s employee. Rather, Mr. McEvoy testified that he engaged Petitioner, as he does many workers, as an independent contractor to work on any number of properties he owns.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commission issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Terry Doss, failed to prove that Respondent, Eden Cabaret was his employer, and dismiss Petition for Relief No. 2021-26984. protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position held: (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) other similarly-situated employees, who are not members of the protected group, were treated more favorably than Petitioner. See McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Petitioner met the first two elements: he is a member of a protected class; and is qualified to work in maintenance of HVAC systems. However, Petitioner is unable to prove the third element, that he suffered an adverse employment action. The evidence was persuasive, and is accepted, that Petitioner was compensated for the work he performed in the form of lodging and transportation, and not monetarily. Assuming, arguendo, Petitioner was subjected to an adverse employment action, he failed to prove the fourth element, that similarly-situated employees, who are not members of the protected class, were treated more favorably. For purposes of proving disparate treatment, a comparator must be similar to Petitioner in “all material respects.” See Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019). Similarity among comparators is required for the comparisons to be meaningful. Petitioner testified generally that other white employees were paid by Mr. McEvoy for their work. However, he did not introduce any specific comparators who were similarly- situated. Petitioner did not introduce evidence of the treatment of any non-black workers who had the use of rooms at Mr. McEvoy’s rental home or use of Mr. McEvoy’s personal vehicle. Petitioner failed to prove discrimination in compensation based on his race. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Timothy McEvoy Eden Cabaret 4001 North Davis Highway Pensacola, Florida 32503 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Terry Lynn Doss 12 Adkinson Drive Pensacola, Florida 32506 Timothy McEvoy Post Office Box 32562 Gulf Breeze, Florida 32562
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, on the basis of Petitioner's age, Respondent (a staffing agency) unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by having him terminated from his position with Respondent's client, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent inSync Staffing, Inc. ("inSync"), is a company that recruits for, and supplies employees to, its clients, including, as relevant here, NBTY, Inc. ("NBTY"). inSync is an "employment agency" as that term is used in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). See ¶ 13, infra. inSync does not meet face-to-face with most of the candidates it places with clients. On or around August 19, 2015, a recruiter at inSync forwarded the résumé of Petitioner Adalberto Lopez ("Lopez"), then 75 years old, to NBTY in hopes that NBTY might hire Lopez to fill the position of "QA Floor Inspector – Shift 1," a job that paid $13.50 per hour. About a week later, NBTY interviewed Lopez, and, on September 2, 2015, inSync informed Lopez that NBTY was offering him the job. Lopez accepted the offer. NBTY, not inSync, made the decision to hire Lopez. At all times, inSync acted essentially as a go-between, introducing Lopez to NBTY and helping him apply for the job, informing Lopez of NBTY's training and drug test requirements for new employees, and providing him with documents that NBTY wanted completed and returned in the ordinary course of new-hire onboarding. One of the documents that Lopez was required to sign and submit was the Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I-9), which is used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, administrator of the federal E-Verify program, to determine whether an employee is authorized to work in the United States. The E-Verify program provided NBTY with a result of Tentative Nonconfirmation ("TNC"), meaning that there was, at a minimum, some discrepancy between the information provided in Lopez's Form I-9 and that available in other public records. A TNC does not necessarily disqualify an employee from continuing to work, but it does need to be resolved to avoid the possibility of termination. In this instance, there is no persuasive evidence that the TNC led NBTY to take any adverse action against Lopez. There is, moreover, no evidence that inSync took any adverse action against Lopez as a result of the TNC. Lopez's first day of work at NBTY was September 14, 2015. The next day, NBTY terminated Lopez's employment. Nevertheless, Lopez showed up for work on September 16 and was told, again, that he no longer had a job. There is no persuasive evidence that inSync played any role in NBTY's decision to fire Lopez. inSync did, however, communicate this decision to Lopez, telling him that he had "been terminated due to not catching on fast enough." This was the reason for the termination given to inSync by NBTY. There is no persuasive evidence that this was not, in fact, NBTY's reason for firing Lopez. There is no persuasive evidence that NBTY eliminated Lopez's job, but there is, likewise, no evidence that NBTY filled the vacant position after Lopez's termination, nor (it obviously follows) any proof regarding the age of Lopez's successor (assuming NBTY hired someone to replace Lopez). There is no evidence concerning the candidates, if any, that inSync referred to NBTY after Lopez had been fired. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of inSync's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Lopez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that inSync did not discriminate unlawfully against Lopez on the basis of his age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding inSync not liable for age discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for employment discrimination in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018).1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 63-year-old female, who was employed by Respondent in its Child Support Program in the Tallahassee Service Center from June 9, 1997, to April 5, 2010. In 1997, Petitioner became employed as a Revenue Specialist II (“RS II”) in the Payment Processing and Funds Distribution (“PPFD”) section, where she performed financial reviews and audits of client financial accounts. On January 28, 2005, Petitioner was promoted to RS III in that section, where Petitioner continued to perform financial reviews and audits, and assumed supervisory duties, including interviewing candidates and training new employees. In that position, Petitioner was considered a PPFD team expert. At her request to “learn something new,” Petitioner was transferred to the Administrative Support section in April 2009. She was assigned half-time to the Administrative Paternity and Support (“APS”) team, and half-time to support the PPFD team. The split-time arrangement was terminated in July 2009, and Petitioner was assigned to APS full-time. On December 7, 2009, Petitioner received her first performance evaluation for her new position. The evaluation covered the time period from April 17, 2009, to January 29, 2010.2/ Petitioner’s supervisor, Katherine Osborne, rated Petitioner’s overall performance at 2.11. Petitioner was placed on a Corrective Action Plan (“CAP”) concurrent with her December 7, 2009 performance evaluation. The CAP period ended on February 8, 2010. On February 16, 2010, Petitioner was notified, in writing, that the Department intended to demote her to the position of RS II because she did not successfully complete the expectations during the CAP period, or “failed the CAP.” Petitioner exercised her right to an informal hearing to oppose the intended demotion. On March 2, 2010, Petitioner was notified, in writing, that she was being demoted to the position of RS II because she failed the CAP. Petitioner resigned from her position with the Department, effective April 5, 2010. On September 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), challenging her demotion as illegal employment discrimination. On February 12, 2011, the EEOC issued its determination, stating that it was “unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the [requisite] statutes.” Petitioner’s 2017 Applications On August 16, 2017, the Department advertised 20 openings for an RS III (position 4372) in customer service administration. Petitioner applied for the position, met the screening criteria, took and passed the skills verification test, and was interviewed for the position. Petitioner was interviewed by a selection committee composed of Tiffany Clarke, Janeen Evans, and Jonathan McCabe. Each of the three committee members rated Petitioner’s interview as “fair” on a scale which ranged from “poor,” “fair,” and “good,” to “excellent.” Petitioner was not considered for the position following her interview. While the Department made some offers to candidates, ultimately the Department did not hire any candidates for position 4372. On October 2, 2017, the Department advertised 30 openings for an RS III (position 6380) in customer service administration. The main difference between the screening criteria for positions 4372 and 6380 was in education and experience. Position 4372 required applicants to have child support experience, while position 6380 gave a preference to applicants with child support experience. The Department’s goal in revising the requirements was to increase the applicant pool in response to the advertisement for position 6380. Petitioner applied for position 6380, met the screening requirements, passed the skills verification test, and was interviewed for the position. Petitioner was interviewed by a selection committee composed of Tiffany Clarke, Lance Swedmark, and Taronza Robinson. All three committee members rated her interview as “good,” and recommended advancing Petitioner’s application for reference checks. Mr. Swedmark conducted reference checks on Petitioner’s application. During that process, he was informed of Petitioner’s prior CAP failure, demotion, and resignation. Based on that information, the selection committee determined Petitioner would not be considered for the position. Hires for Position 6380 The Department hired 30 applicants from the pool for position 6380. Of the 30 hires, 10 were over age 40. Specifically, their ages were 56, 50, 49, 49, 48, 46, 44, 43, 42, and 41. Petitioner was 61 years old when she applied for position 6380. None of the members of the selection committee were aware of Petitioner’s age when she applied, or was interviewed, for the position. The ages of the 30 new hires were compiled from human resources records specifically for the Department’s response to Petitioner’s March 2018 charge of discrimination. None of the members of the selection committee were aware of Petitioner’s 2010 EEOC complaint against the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Jacquelyn James, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2018-04904. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2019.