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JENNIFER L. LANDRESS vs FORT WALTON BEACH MEDICAL CENTER, 21-001408 (2021)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Navarre, Florida Apr. 27, 2021 Number: 21-001408 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2025

The Issue Whether Respondent, Fort Walton Beach Medical Center (FWBMC), engaged in employment discrimination and, thus, violated the Florida Civil Rights Act(FCRA), section 760.10, et seq., Florida Statutes, by: (a) failing to accommodate Petitioner, Jennifer L. Landress, because of her alleged disability; (b) subjecting Ms. Landress to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex; (c) constructively discharging Ms. Landress from employment; and (d) retaliating against Ms. Landress, and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact FWBMC hired Ms. Landress on October 31, 2005, and employed her for approximately 14 years as a Cardiovascular Services Specialist. Ms. Landress resigned her employment with FWBMC on October 4, 2019. During her employment with FWBMC, Ms. Landress reported to either Ms. Ristom, Vice President of Quality and Risk Management, or Rob Grant, the former Director of Cardiovascular Services. Between August 30, 2018, and October 4, 2019, FWBMC also employed Ms. Sanders, Human Resources Business Partner, and Ms. Clark, Cardiovascular Tech. FWBMC never employed Dr. Al-Dehneh (or the other physicians who testified at the final hearing—Dr. Sandwith and Dr. Chen). Dr. Al-Dehneh has privileges to use FWBMC to provide services to the patients who come to FWBMC to receive care. Neither Dr. Al-Dehneh nor any of the physicians who testified at the final hearing were supervisors of Ms. Landress. Further, Dr. Al-Dehneh: never had a role in Ms. Landress’s discipline or schedule; never evaluated her performance; and did not exercise any control over Ms. Landress or affect the terms or conditions of her employment with FWBMC. FWBMC’s Policies Concerning Discrimination and Sexual Harassment FWBMC has a policy entitled “Equal Employment Opportunity/Harassment,” which is included in the employee handbook, as well as on its “HR Answers” online portal and intranet. The “Equal Employment Opportunity/Harassment” policy states, in part: Equal employment opportunities are provided to all employees and applicants for employment without regard to race, color, religion, gender, gender identity, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, genetic information, or protected veteran status with applicable federal, state and local laws. This policy applies to all terms and conditions of employment, including, but not limited to, hiring, placement, promotion, termination, layoff, transfer, leaves of absence, compensation and training. * * * Any form of unlawful employee harassment based on race, color, religion, gender, gender identity, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, protected veteran status or any other status in any group protected by federal, state or local law is strictly prohibited. Improper interference with the ability of employees to perform their expected job duties is not tolerated. Each member of management is responsible for creating an atmosphere free of discrimination and harassment, sexual or otherwise. Further, employees are responsible for respecting the rights of their co- workers. The following is prohibited: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and all other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual or otherwise offensive nature …. Behaviors that engender a hostile or offensive work environment will not be tolerated. These behaviors may include, but are not limited to, offensive comments, jokes, innuendos and other sexually oriented or culturally insensitive/inappropriate statements, printed material, material distributed through electronic media or items posted on walls or bulletin boards. FWBMC also has a policy entitled “Complaint Procedures,” which is contained in the employee handbook, as well as on its “HR Answers” online portal and intranet. The “Complaint Procedures” policy states, in part: If you experience any job-related harassment based on race, national origin, religion, gender, gender identity, color, disability, age or other factor prohibited by federal, state or local statute, or you believe you have been treated in an unlawful, discriminatory manner, promptly report the incident to your manager or Human Resources, who will investigate the matter and take appropriate action. If you believe it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter with your manager or Human Resources, you may bypass your manager or Human Resources and report it directly for investigation at The Ethics Line at [phone number]. Ms. Landress testified that she received a copy of the employee handbook, read the policies contained in it—including the policy concerning “Equal Employment Opportunity/Harassment” and “Complaint Procedures”—and knew of and utilized them. Ms. Sanders testified that if FWBMC, after investigation by its human resources department, substantiates a claim of harassment or discrimination by a physician, it would provide its investigative findings to the medical staff office, who would then refer the physician to a peer review process that could culminate in an appropriate action with respect to that physician’s hospital privileges. The undisputed evidence at the final hearing revealed that Ms. Landress reported to FWBMC’s human resources department that she was subjected to discrimination and harassment in August 2018, and again in March 2019. Allegations of Harassment and Hostile Work Environment Ms. Landress testified that Dr. Al-Dehneh began sexually harassing her starting in 2013. On August 30, 2018, she met with Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom and discussed this allegation. Ms. Sanders testified of the allegations made by Ms. Landress at the August 30, 2018, meeting: That Dr. Al-Dehneh had asked Rob to find women for him and to get Ms. Landress to sleep with him. She also indicated that Dr. Al-Dehneh was listening to her conversations via some sort of recording or monitoring device in her computer. She felt that Dr. Al-Dehneh had bugged her home through Siri and had accessed her medical records here at the facility. She was afraid for her life and had a gun. She also felt that Dr. Al-Dehneh was watching her home and that she told us a story about a lady on a bike who said that she was dead to her. She was afraid to go to the police about Dr. Al-Dehneh because she had been told that he was a mobster. And then she did admit to us at one point that she had started developing feelings for Dr. Al-Dehneh. Ms. Ristom also testified concerning the allegations made by Ms. Landress at the August 30, 2018, meeting: She said that Dr. Al-Dehneh had said to her to let him know when she was ready to get married. She said that Rob was tasked with getting women and obtaining sex for Dr. Al-Dehneh. And, you know, during that time Jennifer told me that – told Julie Sanders and I that she had started developing feelings for him, for Dr. Al-Dehneh. And in addition, she felt like her neighbor was watching her and providing information back to Dr. Al-Dehneh about her activities at home. Also, she said that she was afraid to report him because she felt like she – she understood him to be a mobster. She said he was listening to her through a listening device when she was at home through, like, a Siri, a radio kind of device because he would say things that he would only know if he was able to hear her at home. She told us about a heavyset lady on a bicycle who told her that she was a dead lady, that Jennifer was a dead lady, but that that woman was not going to be the one to kill her because Jennifer had been nice to her. She said that she was afraid to go to the police because she believed Dr. Al-Dehneh to be a mobster and that he owned the police and the hospital as well. She said that she was defending herself – felt like she needed to defend herself and had been carrying a gun and keeping it on her nightstand as well. She told us that she hadn’t slept in months, that she was taking medication to help her but that she was having difficulty concentrating. The testimony of Ms. Landress more or less confirmed that she made those allegations that Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom testified were made at the August 30, 2018, meeting, and that those allegations formed the basis for her Petition for Relief. She added that Dr. Al-Dehneh “constantly” harassed her, that she believed he started a rumor at the hospital that she had herpes, and that he had her “followed” to a local mall. Ms. Landress denied that she had romantic feelings for Dr. Al-Dehneh, but stated that she “had a great working relationship with him for a long time.” Dr. Al-Dehneh testified and denied all of Ms. Landress’s allegations, including: asking Ms. Landress to let him know when she was ready to get married; offering to “buy” Ms. Landress from her husband; threatening to have Ms. Landress fired; having Ms. Landress followed; putting a “hit” out on Ms. Landress; making comments about Ms. Landress to other physicians; spreading a rumor that Ms. Landress had herpes; calling Ms. Landress’s treating physician, Dr. Chen, for information about her; and accessing Ms. Landress’s medical records. According to Ms. Landress, Dr. Sandwith and Ms. Park were witnesses who could corroborate many of her allegations concerning Dr. Al-Dehneh. Both denied each and every allegation. Dr. Sandwith testified that he never saw Ms. Landress and Dr. Al-Dehneh together; denied talking to Dr. Al-Dehneh about Ms. Landress; denied ever seeing or hearing Dr. Al-Dehneh harass or act inappropriately with Ms. Landress or any other hospital staff; and denied hearing rumors concerning Ms. Landress, Dr. Al-Dehneh, their alleged relationship, or that Ms. Landress had herpes. Ms. Park, who worked with Ms. Landress: testified that she never heard any rumors that Dr. Al-Dehneh was having sexual relationships with other women; denied witnessing Dr. Al-Dehneh tell Ms. Landress that he was going to call Ms. Landress’s husband and offer $5,000 for her; denied talking with Ms. Landress about being sexually harassed; denied hearing rumors about Ms. Landress and Dr. Al-Dehneh; denied hearing rumors that Ms. Landress had herpes; and denied telling Ms. Landress to stay away from Dr. Al-Dehneh. According to Ms. Landress, she also discussed her allegations of sexual harassment with her orthopedic physician, Dr. Chen, on numerous occasions. Dr. Chen testified that during one of Ms. Landress’s appointments, I recall you telling me just occurrences at home, of what happened in the workplace between yourself and a certain physician on staff at the – at the Walton Beach Medical Center. Yeah, and there was situations or there were occurrences that were – upsetting to you and they were providing some sorts of distress. He further testified that Ms. Landress “spoke … about the herpes.” Dr. Chen testified that he may have heard FWBMC staff discussing the alleged herpes rumor, but could not recall from whom he heard those rumors, and admitted that the rumors could have come from Ms. Landress herself. Dr. Chen testified that he never witnessed Dr. Al-Dehneh acting inappropriately towards Ms. Landress, and that he never heard any other physician at FWBMC discuss any rumors concerning Ms. Landress or Dr. Al-Dehneh. FWBMC Investigation of Complaint of Harassment and Hostile Work Environment At the conclusion of the August 30, 2018, meeting, Ms. Sanders immediately investigated Ms. Landress’s claims by interviewing Dr. Al-Dehneh that same day, and by interviewing other employees who could potentially substantiate Ms. Landress’s claims. However, Ms. Sanders was unable to find any witness who corroborated any of Ms. Landress’s allegations. Ms. Sanders testified, as part of her investigation, that she determined that Dr. Al-Dehneh did not have any remote access or log-in capabilities to access Ms. Landress’s computer. Ms. Sanders further testified, as part of the investigation, that she confirmed that Dr. Al-Dehneh never had access, nor tried to access, Ms. Landress’s medical records. During the investigation, Ms. Ristom testified that she offered to move Ms. Landress’s office to distance her from the individuals allegedly involved, including Dr. Al-Dehneh. Ms. Landress declined this offer. Ms. Sanders completed her investigation of Ms. Landress’s claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment on September 18, 2018, and informed Ms. Landress that FWBMC could not substantiate her claims. Subsequent Events On September 20, 2018, Ms. Landress suffered an anxiety attack and went home from work early. When Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom learned of the anxiety attack, they attempted to speak with Ms. Landress in her office and told her to take the weekend off to deal with her anxiety. Both Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom testified that Landress did not attribute her anxiety attack to the alleged past sexual harassment incidents with Dr. Al-Dehneh, nor any new incidents of harassment. Ms. Landress’s testimony concerning the anxiety attack and subsequent leave was as follows: Predominately because I really wanted to come home and take medication because I couldn’t stand – I – I just couldn’t get past people in the hospital constantly talking about me having herpes. I mean, it’s kind of like if you were walking in the building and that’s all you heard, you want to get out of there. As previously noted, the FWBMC investigation did not substantiate Ms. Landress’s allegation concerning hospital rumors that she had herpes. Further, there was no testimony or evidence presented at the final hearing, outside of Ms. Landress’s testimony, that confirmed this allegation. Ms. Landress soon returned to work and did not report another incident of harassment until March 2019. On March 1, 2019, Ms. Landress reported that a nurse practitioner, who she claimed worked for Dr. Al-Dehneh, took a photo of Ms. Landress on her cellphone when she walked by Ms. Landress’s office. Ms. Landress testified that she “assumed” the nurse practitioner took the photo for Dr. Al-Dehneh. Ms. Landress further testified that she never saw the photo. Ms. Ristom and Ms. Sanders met with Ms. Landress concerning this allegation, and Ms. Sanders investigated it. Ultimately, FWBMC was unable to substantiate this claim or that she was being harassed by Dr. Al-Dehneh or his nurse practitioner. Ms. Landress did not report any other incidents of harassment after March 1, 2019. Leave(s) of Absence FWBMC approved Ms. Landress for a paid leave of absence from June 10, 2019, until she resigned on October 4, 2019. FWBMC granted this leave for two separate reasons: for an orthopedic condition, and for a mental health condition. Initially, Ms. Landress was placed on leave for her claims of stress, anxiety, and post traumatic stress disorder related to the alleged harassment. Then, on September 9, 2019, Ms. Landress submitted a separate claim because of pain in her right elbow. Dr. Chen, Ms. Landress’s treating orthopedic physician, informed FWBMC that her anticipated return work date was October 7, 2019, with restrictions, such as “no repetitive use of right arm to include typing, mouse use, [and] writing.” After Dr. Chen cleared Ms. Landress to return to work, with restrictions, Ms. Sanders reminded Ms. Landress that she could not return until her mental health counselor also cleared her. Ms. Landress’s mental health counselor never cleared her to return to work. In July 2019—during her leave of absence for a mental health condition—Ms. Landress requested, to Ms. Ristom, the opportunity to work from home. FWBMC denied Ms. Landress’s accommodation request; Ms. Sanders testified: At that time we weren’t able to accommodate the work from home request. There was concerns around protecting patient medical records and her ability to work with the staff and the physicians when she needed to ask questions. On September 20, 2019, while Ms. Landress remained on leave, Ms. Ristom received an email from Q-Centrix, a third-party data management provider that collaborates with healthcare providers, such as FWBMC. The September 30, 2019, email requested that FWBMC terminate Ms. Landress as an employee so that Q-Centrix could employ Ms. Landress in a full-time position. Ms. Ristom forwarded this email to Ms. Sanders to investigate and did not reply to the September 20, 2019, email from Q-Centrix until FWBMC could confirm from Ms. Landress that it was her intention to resign her position with FWBMC. On September 27, 2019, Q-Centrix emailed another request to FWBMC to terminate Ms. Landress. Ms. Sanders testified that she spoke with Ms. Landress about this request. On October 4, 2019, Ms. Landress—who still had not received clearance to return to work at FWBMC from her mental health counselor— submitted a letter of resignation to Ms. Sanders. Her letter of resignation stated that she and her mental health counselor agreed that her “PTSD is too great to return.” Her letter further stated that because FWBMC denied her request to work from home, she had accepted a position with “another company.” The October 4, 2019, letter of resignation attached four additional pages of what Ms. Landress contends were the events that led her to resign. The first page listed the allegations of sexual harassment by Dr. Al-Dehneh that Ms. Landress discussed with Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom during the August 30, 2018, meeting. The remaining three pages listed various allegations that Ms. Landress did not report to FWBMC and did not include in her charge of discrimination with FCHR. Findings of Ultimate Fact Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC’s decisions concerning, or actions affecting, her, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by sex-based or disability-based discriminatory animus. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful sex-based or disability-based discrimination. Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC’s actions subjected her to harassment based on sex. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful sexual harassment. Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC discriminated against her because she opposed an unlawful employment practice, or because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the FCRA. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful retaliation. Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC’s actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to create a hostile work environment. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of hostile work environment. Finally, Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that her working conditions at FWBMC were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her condition would have been compelled to resign. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of constructive discharge.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Jennifer L. Landress 7758 Ramona Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 For Respondents: Cymoril M. White, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Jennifer L. Landress’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Tracey K. Jaensch, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jennifer Lynn Landress 7758 Ramona Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cymoril M. White, Esquire Ford & Harrison, LLP 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Suite 900 Tampa, Florida 33602

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SUSHON S. DILLARD vs INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES, 12-003379 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lee, Florida Oct. 15, 2012 Number: 12-003379 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36-151 ("IHOP"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011),1/ by discharging Petitioner from her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding racial and religious discrimination in the workplace.

Findings Of Fact IHOP is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. IHOP is a restaurant in Leesburg. IHOP is owned by Pritesh Patel, who owns and operates a total of four International House of Pancakes stores in the Leesburg area through his corporation, Pritesh, Inc. Petitioner is a black female who is an observant Jew. Because of her religious beliefs, Petitioner does not work on the Sabbath, from sundown on Friday until sunset on Saturday. Petitioner was hired to work as a server at IHOP on March 19, 2012. She made it clear that she did not work on the Sabbath, and IHOP agreed to respect her religious beliefs. There was some difference in recollection as to the notice Petitioner gave to IHOP. Petitioner testified that she made it clear she could not work until sundown on Saturdays. The store manager, Brian Jackson, also recalled that Petitioner stated she could only work Saturday evenings. Mr. Patel testified that Petitioner said that she could work on Saturday "afternoon." Petitioner's version is credited as being more consistent with her stated beliefs, though there is no doubt that Mr. Patel was testifying honestly as to his recollection. Petitioner was the only black server working at IHOP at this time. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson credibly testified that IHOP has had many black servers through the years. Mr. Jackson noted that Petitioner only worked for IHOP for a period of two weeks and therefore was in no position to judge IHOP's minority hiring practices. Petitioner testified that assistant manager Hemanshu "Shu" Patel, a relative of the owner, created a hostile working environment for her from the time she started on March 19. She complained that Shu would alter the seating chart so that she would have fewer tables to cover, meaning a reduction in her tips. Petitioner also stated that Shu was disrespectful and rude, in a manner that caused her to believe there was a racial motivation behind his actions. Despite the fact that Shu was subordinate to Mr. Jackson, Petitioner believed that Shu was really in charge because he was a relative of Mr. Patel and therefore "untouchable" as an employee of IHOP. Petitioner's main complaint was that Shu, who was in charge of work schedules for the restaurant, scheduled her to work on Saturdays. Petitioner testified that on the first Saturday of her employment, March 24, Shu called her to come into work at noon. She replied that she could not come in until after sundown. This problem was apparently worked out to Petitioner's satisfaction, and she was not required to report to work on Saturday afternoon. However, when Shu posted the next week's schedule on the following Tuesday, Petitioner saw that she had been scheduled to work on the morning of Saturday, March 31. Petitioner complained. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson testified that Shu had merely made an error in scheduling that was rectified as soon as Petitioner notified them of the problem. Petitioner did not deny that the problem was resolved mid-week, well before any Sabbath conflict could arise. Mr. Patel testified that he wanted Petitioner to work from 4 p.m. until midnight on Saturday, March 31, so that she would not lose a day's work due to the scheduling error. Shu phoned Petitioner early on Saturday afternoon and asked her to come in. Petitioner told Shu that she could not come in until 8 p.m. Mr. Patel testified that he did not need someone to work a four-hour shift, and that Petitioner was told not to come in. As a further reason for declining to work on Saturday evening, Petitioner testified that she had only been trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson testified that the only distinction between the dayshift and the nightshift is that the latter is less busy. All servers are trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson stated that, once trained for the morning shift, a server would find the night shift "a piece of cake." Petitioner's reason for not working in the evening was not credible in this respect. Mr. Patel testified that he had no problem with Petitioner's not working on that Saturday, provided that she understood she was going lose a day. Mr. Patel stated that from his point of view the problems began when Petitioner insisted that he give her weekday hours to make up for the lost Saturday hours. Mr. Patel declined to cut another employee's hours for Petitioner. Petitioner came in to work on the morning of Sunday, April 1. Sunday morning is a busy time for IHOP. According to head server Bernadine Hengst, Petitioner stood near her at the register and voiced her complaints about Shu, who was working in the kitchen. Shu heard Petitioner and stepped into the dining room, asking her, "You got something to say to me?" Petitioner and Shu became loud, and their argument was moved outside for fear of disturbing a restaurant full of people. Petitioner finished her shift then went home and composed a letter to Mr. Patel. She made copies of the letter for every employee at IHOP. Ms. Hengst was the first to see the letter. She phoned Mr. Jackson at home to tell him about it, and Mr. Jackson phoned Mr. Patel. The letter read as follows: On March 19, 2012, I was hired to work as a server. I am a professional, pleasant, respectful, prompt and dutiful individual. As the only African-American server, it is imperative that you know since I have arrived at IHOP, I have faced fierce blatant hostility from a manager ("Shu") and co- workers ("C.C., Misti and Cherish"). I feel Shu has deliberately created a divisive and hostile working environment. It is my understanding Shu is a family member yet his behavior is definitely bad for business. On two separate occasions, Shu altered the seating chart that Brian originally created and took two tables from me. He lacks proficient management skills and is totally unprofessional, disrespectful and rude. On Sunday, April 1, 2012, Shu spoke to me in a loud, impolite manner in front of staff and customers. Shu communicated in a very bellicose fashion and for a moment, it felt as though he would physically attack me. You must take it serious that Shu's conduct is detrimental to your business. When Shu hired me I made it clear that I am Jewish and do not work on the Sabbath ("Saturday"). Nevertheless, Shu called me to come into work on Saturday about noon; I told him I would come in after the Sabbath at 7:00 p.m. The following week I was scheduled to work a Saturday, which in turn caused me to lose a day of work. Also on April 1, 2012, Shu assigned me only two booths for the whole day; when I spoke up about it he threatened to take another booth from me. This type of attitude and his unfair behavior cannot be tolerated in the United States of America in 2012. Shu is outwardly mean, discriminative, and racist towards me. He acts like a tyrant, a bully and he feels he is untouchable. On Sunday, April 1, I was only assigned two booths while my co-workers had four to six tables. This was unfair seating arrangements. At the end of the day, Bernie [Hengst] told all the servers to tip out the busboy, yet I did not because I was unjustly treated by only being assigned two tables. This was one-sided and insulting. I am an exceptional waitress and I depend on this job to pay my bills. During my first week, I was scheduled to work 36.10 hours and this week I was only given approximately 23.0 hours. Everyone should be treated fairly and equally. I ask that you continue to give me a full schedule each week. This letter officially informs you of the battles I have dealt with in your establishment and I have not worked here for one whole month. All Americans have the right to work without being harassed. I urge you to intervene and equitably resolve this issue. Ms. Hengst testified that Shu is a loud person who "talks with his hands," but she saw nothing that gave her the impression that Shu would "physically attack" Petitioner. She did not detect that Shu treated Petitioner any differently than he treated other servers. Ms. Hengst saw Petitioner as an equal participant in the April 1 confrontation. As to Petitioner's complaint about the number of tables to which she was assigned, Mr. Jackson testified that servers are always trained on two booths and then moved to four booths after training is completed. He stated that Petitioner was doing a "terrible" job working four booths, which caused Shu to move her down to two. Mr. Jackson stated that it is counterproductive to overwhelm a new server, and that the server must demonstrate the ability to perform the basics before taking on more tables. On the morning of April 2, after reading Petitioner's letter, Mr. Patel went to the IHOP and sat down for a meeting with Petitioner in hopes of addressing her complaints. Mr. Patel testified that the first thing Petitioner asked him was, "Do you know how many black employees you have?" Though he had been willing to discuss Petitioner's grievances concerning scheduling, Mr. Patel decided to fire Petitioner when she started "threatening us" based on claims of "black and white discriminating." He decided to fire Petitioner for the future of his business, because he did not want the problems associated with allegations of discrimination. Mr. Jackson was also at the April 2 meeting, and testified that Petitioner claimed she was being singled out because of her race. Based on all the testimony, it is found that Petitioner had little basis for claiming that IHOP was discriminating against her based on her race or religion during the actual course of her job. She was mistakenly scheduled to work on Saturday, but was not required to come in to the store once she made management aware of the error. She did lose one shift's worth of work for March 31, but that was partly due to her declining to work the evening shift. The evidence established that Shu Patel was loud, somewhat hotheaded, and perhaps not the ideal choice for managing a busy restaurant, but did not establish that he singled out Petitioner for particular abuse because of her race or religion. The evidence established that Petitioner's poor job performance was the cause of at least some of the friction between her and IHOP management. However, Mr. Patel's own testimony established that he dismissed Petitioner in direct retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory employment practices. IHOP offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Petitioner's dismissal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36- 151 committed an act of unlawful retaliation against Petitioner. It is further recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary proceeding to establish the amount of back pay/lost wages owed to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2013.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.02760.10760.11
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ANGELA WIGGINS vs HEALTH CENTER OF PENSACOLA, 15-006277 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Nov. 10, 2015 Number: 15-006277 Latest Update: May 05, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was sexually harassed and constructively discharged contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013), and if so, what remedy should be ordered.

Findings Of Fact Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing HPC was a rehabilitation and long-term care facility with 180 beds.1/ Petitioner is a female who was employed at HCP as a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”). Petitioner was working at HCP during the evening of Friday, March 21, 2014. She had finished assisting with the transfer of residents from the dining area and was standing at a nurses’ station. Three other HCP employees (Derrick Hahn, Atrice Jones, and Erica Russell) were engaged in a conversation about seven feet from Petitioner. Mr. Hahn was a nurse supervisor. While he was in a position in which he could have supervised Petitioner, there was no testimony that he ever did so. Petitioner was standing with her back against a computer, and she was not participating in the conversation. Mr. Hahn turned to leave Ms. Jones and Ms. Russell. As he was doing so, he collided with Petitioner, and his chest made contact with her chest. At the final hearing, Mr. Hahn and Ms. Jones testified that the collision resulted from Mr. Hahn tripping over a wheelchair and losing his balance. Petitioner testified that there was no wheelchair, thus implying that Mr. Hahn intentionally collided with her. An unidentified person who witnessed the collision immediately asked aloud if Mr. Hahn was trying to run over the CNAs. Mr. Hahn replied by stating that the collision was a “love bug” or a “love bump” and walked away. Petitioner was disturbed by this incident went outside to compose herself. At some point, Petitioner continued with her duties. However, after 15 to 20 minutes, she decided to report the incident to her direct supervisor, Carrie Harper. Ms. Harper immediately called HCP’s facility supervisor, Tonya McAteer. After Petitioner described the incident to her, Ms. McAteer called the Director of Nursing, Holly Henry. Mr. Hahn did not return to work until Monday, March 24, 2014. When he did so, Ms. Henry and Joseph Ballay (the lead administrator of HCP) met with him to discuss the incident. Mr. Hahn told them that he had tripped over a wheelchair and that the collision with Petitioner was accidental. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry also met with Petitioner on March 24, 2014. Petitioner reported to them that Mr. Hahn intentionally collided with her. Mr. Ballay told Petitioner that an investigation would be initiated and that Petitioner would not be required to have any additional contact with Mr. Hahn. In order to maintain separation between Mr. Hahn and Petitioner, Ms. McAteer assumed full responsibility for supervising Petitioner. During their investigation, Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry talked to Atrice Jones, one of the nurses who were present when the incident occurred. Ms. Jones stated that the incident was accidental and that Mr. Hahn was embarrassed that he had collided with Petitioner. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry also conferred with other HCP employees but found no evidence that this incident was part of a continuing pattern of inappropriate conduct by Mr. Hahn. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry completed their investigation by Friday, March 28, 2014, and concluded that Mr. Hahn unintentionally collided with Petitioner. At the conclusion of their investigation, Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry admonished Mr. Hahn for describing the incident as a “love bug” or “love bump” after a bystander asked him if he was trying to run over the CNAs. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry also advised Mr. Hahn that an apology to Petitioner immediately after the incident would have been appropriate. Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry spoke to Petitioner about the outcome of their investigation, but Petitioner did not agree with their conclusion. Over the next three months, there were no further incidents between Petitioner and Mr. Hahn. During her testimony, Petitioner cited no other instances of alleged misconduct by co-workers or supervisors. Petitioner’s employment with HCP ended in late July or early August of 2014. Petitioner testified that she voluntarily separated from HCP after concluding she could no longer work for an organization that did not care about her feelings. In contrast, Mr. Ballay testified that Petitioner was dismissed after she failed to report to work on July 30 and July 31, 2014. During the final hearing, the testimony differed as to what HCP’s management did immediately after the incident. Petitioner testified that three weeks passed before HCP’s management initiated its investigation. In contrast, Mr. Ballay testified that he and Ms. Henry completed their investigation within one week following the incident. As a matter of ultimate fact, the undersigned finds that the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Ballay and Ms. Henry completed their investigation by Friday, March 28, 2014. As noted above, the testimony also differed as to whether Mr. Hahn tripped over a wheelchair prior to colliding with Petitioner. In light of what Mr. Hahn said immediately after he collided with Petitioner and his failure to apologize, it is not surprising that Petitioner concluded that Mr. Hahn intentionally collided with her. However, even if Petitioner’s recollection were to be found more credible than that of the other witnesses, Petitioner’s allegations do not demonstrate that she was subjected to a hostile work environment or that she was constructively discharged.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2016.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.110
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JONI M. BARKLEY vs REPUBLIC PARKING SYSTEM, INC., 14-006143 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Dec. 30, 2014 Number: 14-006143 Latest Update: Oct. 14, 2015

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Republic Parking System, Inc., operates paid parking lots and facilities at a variety of public and private locations. One of its locations is at the Northwest Florida Beaches International Airport in Panama City, Florida. As part of its operations, Republic maintains an equal- employment opportunity, anti-sexual harassment and non- discrimination policy. The policy also prohibits harassment at work by anyone, including supervisors, co-workers or customers. The evidence showed that the policy is disseminated to its employees in its Employee Handbook and is consistently enforced by the company. Under its Employee Handbook the company generally follows a progressive-disciplinary policy for violations of company policy, with increasing penalties ranging from reprimands to dismissal. However, certain violations of policy, such as use of abusive language or being discourteous to customers, supervisors or fellow employees, may result in immediate dismissal. In October of 2010, Petitioner, Joni Barkley, an African-American, was employed by Respondent as a parking booth cashier at the international airport in Panama City. Upon employment, Ms. Barkley received a copy of Republic Parking System, Inc.’s Employee Handbook and signed an acknowledgement of her receipt of that handbook. She was aware of the company’s policy regarding discrimination and harassment. During her tenure and prior to the end of December 2013 or early 2014, Ms. Barkley had no complaints of racial discrimination or harassment towards her. On the other hand, she had been verbally counseled about a remark she made that co- employees had interpreted as racially motivated. Respondent also had been disciplined for repeated tardiness. Additionally, during her employment, Ms. Barkley was known for misinterpreting statements of others and believing innocent statements or actions by others were directed at her. Towards the end of December 2013 or early January of 2014, one of Ms. Barkley’s co-workers, Eva Bishop, a Caucasian, showed her co-workers, including Ms. Barkley, several photographs and a video of her trip to Alaska. Among the photos she showed to everyone was a picture of a Ketchikan Native American clan house. The picture depicts a rustic blue wooden structure with several Alaskan Native American symbols painted on it to form a face with an open mouth for the front entry. Three large Native American totem poles dominate the front of the structure and are placed at the front corners and in the middle over the front entry way to the structure. When Ms. Barkley was informed that the photo was of a clan house, she mistakenly believed that the photo was related to the Ku Klux Klan and thought Ms. Bishop was referring to a “Klan” house. Unfortunately, Ms. Barkley maintained the correctness of her mistaken belief even though several co- workers who had seen the same picture tried to explain the picture to her. Through January of 2014, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop had several arguments and animated discussions. Ms. Barkley insisted that Ms. Bishop was a member of the Ku Klux Klan and accused her of the same, with her rank in the Klan growing from member to president of the local chapter. She also insisted that the picture Ms. Bishop had shown Petitioner was related to the Ku Klux Klan. Due to her mistaken beliefs, Ms. Barkley became very anxious and fearful of Ms. Bishop. On February 5, 2014, Ms. Barkley first reluctantly complained about Ms. Bishop to Kim Hall, Republic’s Assistant Manager and Ms. Barkley’s immediate supervisor. She complained that Ms. Bishop had used racial slurs in talking with her and had discussed with her the Ku Klux Klan. Ms. Hall immediately took Ms. Barkley to Kelly Blum, Republic’s General Manager at the Panama City airport. Ms. Barkley made the same complaint, but indicated that she “loved” Ms. Bishop and did not want to see her fired. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Blum met with Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop together, and told them that they could not fight with each other at work. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop hugged, apologized to each other, said they loved each other and told Ms. Blum they could work together. There was no evidence that demonstrated the manner in which Ms. Blum investigated or handled Ms. Barkley’s complaint was intimidating, harassing or discriminatory. Ms. Blum also stated that she would try to avoid scheduling Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop on the same shift. However, due to limitations in personnel, Ms. Blum could not ensure that the two employees would not be on the same shift. Unfortunately, sometime after this conversation, Ms. Barkley worked two hours with Ms. Bishop because Ms. Bishop’s replacement for the next shift was late or couldn’t make it in to work due to bad weather. The manager that day offered to stay with Ms. Barkley, but Ms. Barkley said it would be alright and that she could work with Ms. Bishop present. The evidence did not demonstrate that the one-time, unanticipated shift overlap was in retaliation for Ms. Barkley’s earlier complaint. Over the next several days and notwithstanding their mutual apologies, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop continued to argue with each other, create a hostile work environment and use abusive, profane language. Eventually, Ms. Barkley called the F.B.I. and continued to accuse Ms. Bishop of being a racist and a member of the Ku Klux Klan. At some point, Ms. Barkley insisted on showing Ms. Bishop some books about the Ku Klux Klan, again accused Ms. Bishop of being a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and indicated that Ms. Bishop’s connection to the Klan scared her. Ms. Bishop told Ms. Barkley, in essence, that the KKK hung niggers, and asked why Ms. Barkley thought she would take a similar action. Ms. Barkley responded and, in essence, referred to Ms. Bishop as a white cracker bitch who would hang niggers from trees and that she better hang her with her pearls on. As a consequence, Ms. Blum looked into the continued behavior and reported her concerns about Ms. Barkley’s and Ms. Bishop’s behavior to her supervisor, Regional Manager Linda Kelleher. Ms. Kelleher requested that Republic’s human resources department investigate the matter. Again, there was no evidence that demonstrated this inquiry was intimidating, harassing or discriminatory towards Ms. Barkley. Jan Veal, Republic Parking System, Inc.’s Director of Human Resources, interviewed all witnesses, including Ms. Barkley, Ms. Bishop, Ms. Williams, Ms. Hall, Ms. Blum, and Ms. Kelleher. During the investigation, Ms. Bishop admitted using racial epithets towards Ms. Barkley. Based upon Ms. Bishop’s admission, Ms. Bishop was suspended, with pay, pending the conclusion of the investigation. Shortly thereafter, following Ms. Veal’s interview with Ms. Barkley and the other witnesses’ report of the racial remarks of Ms. Barkley, Ms. Barkley also was suspended with pay, pending the conclusion of the investigation. Such actions were reasonable since both Ms. Bishop and Petitioner were at fault in their behavior towards each other. On February 25, 2014, Republic Parking Systems, Inc., terminated Ms. Barkley’s employment, having concluded that she used offensive and threatening language of a racial nature including the use of profanities and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of company policies. Republic Parking System, Inc., terminated Ms. Bishop’s employment on the same day for the same reasons. As such, the evidence was clear that both employees engaged in similar behavior and were disciplined in the same manner. Both were terminated. Based on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against her based on race or retaliation when it terminated her from employment. As such, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Joni Marie Barkley 15221 Banks Drive Southport, Florida 32409 (eServed) Jan Veal Republic Parking System, Inc. Suite 2000 633 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37450 James Scott McDearman, Esquire Grant Konvalinka and Harrison, P.C. 633 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37450 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.10760.11
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MARGARITA COLL vs MARTIN-MARIETTA ELECTRONICS, INFORMATION AND MISSILES GROUP, 93-001558 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Mar. 22, 1993 Number: 93-001558 Latest Update: May 30, 1995

The Issue Whether the Respondent intentionally committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner on the basis on her national origin/Hispanic (Puerto Rican) or gender/female (sexual harassment). Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was removed from her position with the Respondent in retaliation for her filing of a sexual harassment complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 12, 1992.

Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these proceedings and the parties involved. All procedural prerequisites and requirements have been duly accomplished or satisfied. Respondent, Martin-Marietta Electronics Information and Missiles Group, is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Florida which employs more than fifteen employees. Respondent is an "employer" within the definition found in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Margarita Coll, is a female, hispanic, citizen of the United States who resides in the State of Florida. Petitioner is a member of a protected class. Petitioner was an employee of Hi-Tec Associates, Inc., during all relevant periods, and was a de facto employee of Respondent for approximately four and one-half years. Petitioner was employed at Respondent company through a temporary agency called Associated Temporary Services and placed with the Respondent on January 5, 1987 as a receptionist/secretary in Martin-Marietta's Fleet Administration Department off Sand Lake Road, Orlando, Florida. Her responsibilities included record keeping, filing and helping Respondent's employees with company vehicles. Petitioner reported to the Respondent's Fleet Manager, Linda Reilly. Her day to day work assignments and supervision were received exclusively from the Fleet Manager. Petitioner worked in her position at the pleasure of the Respondent. She was assigned a "buyer" at Martin- Marietta who worked with the requesting department to fashion a position to meet the department's needs. The work was bidded out and awarded to the temporary employment agency who best met Respondent's criteria, on an annual basis. Over time, Petitioner assumed additional job responsibilities and in June, 1988 received a commendation for exceptional performance from Respondent's supervisors. In an effort to reward her efforts, Reilly successfully upgraded her position, first to Administrative Assistant and then to Fleet Analyst. When she was reclassified as a Fleet Analyst, the contract for her position was awarded to Hi-Tec Associates, Inc., since Associated Temporary Services did not provide technical employees under their contract with Respondent. Petitioner always worked at Martin-Marietta as a temporary employee and was never employed as a regular employee of the company. As such, she had no company benefits; she was classified as a contract laborer and her services were purchased by purchase order. Petitioner completed no company employment application, was not subject to Martin-Marietta performance appraisals and had no Martin-Marietta employment records or personnel file, other than her contract labor time slips. Petitioner received her pay from Hi-Tec. In June, 1990, Marilyn Quinonez was placed in the Fleet Administration Department as a Fleet Administrative Assistant by a temporary employment agency. Friction quickly developed between Petitioner and Quinonez. Petitioner believed that Quinonez was hired to assist her and became upset when she would not follow Petitioner's supervision or directions. Quinonez understood that she was to report to the Fleet Manager, and objected to the way Petitioner treated her. On November 15, 1990, Reilly was laid off by Respondent as part of a reduction in force and was replaced by Joseph LaPak. LaPak observed the bickering between Petitioner and Quinonez and that it continued to escalate over time. In December, 1990, the temporary positions in the department were reevaluated and the contract requirements for both positions were rewritten. The titles of both Petitioner and Quinonez were changed to that of Fleet Administrative Assistant. Any language in the contract which called for Petitioner to direct the clerical duties of the department were eliminated. In the fall of 1991, Quinonez met with LaPak and Wally DuBose to clarify her reporting responsibilities. It was confirmed that Quinonez and Petitioner were to report to the Fleet Manager, and that Petitioner did not have supervisory authority over Quinonez. Nevertheless, disputes between Petitioner and Quinonez continued. Attempts by management to resolve the problems were unsuccessful. On February 17, 1992, during the normal lunch hour, an altercation occurred between Petitioner and Quinonez. When Quinonez returned from lunch, she found Petitioner at her computer terminal. Quinonez asked for it back. Petitioner refused and an argument ensued. The two women became so angry and loud that a neighboring supervisor had to come over and separate them. Wally DuBose sent both Petitioner and Quinonez home for the day. Petitioner's immediate supervisor, LaPak was not in the office at the time. DuBose then discussed the matter with his supervisor, Paul Smilgen, and it was decided that Petitioner would be removed from the contract for her failure to work with fellow employees and management, and for general insubordination. LaPak was not involved in the decision to remove Petitioner. The decision was communicated to Hi-Tec. They, in turn, notified Petitioner that same evening that she was being replaced on the contract and not return to the Fleet Administration Department. Hi-Tec offered to attempt to place Petitioner elsewhere at Martin-Marietta but Petitioner refused because the openings available at the time paid less that the Fleet Administrative Assistant position. When LaPak first became the Fleet Manager in November of 1990, Petitioner and Quinonez worked in a very small work space. While Petitioner was training LaPak and working on the computer, LaPak's body was frequently close to Petitioner's and she felt pinned in a corner by him. After the initial working relationship was established and LaPak came into Petitioner's work area, he would touch her on her arms or shoulder in order to get her attention. In December, 1990, Petitioner complained to DuBose about LaPak touching her and making her uncomfortable. Both Petitioner and DuBose talked to LaPak about the fact that Petitioner did not want LaPak to touch her. LaPak honored that request and did not touch her again. He made every reasonable effort to get her attention when he needed to talk to her without touching her. In October, 1991, Petitioner complained to the Martin-Marietta EEO office that LaPak was sexually harassing her by inappropriate touching. Respondent then conducted an immediate investigation into the allegations and attempted to resolve the matter through internal mediation. Petitioner's testimony and other witnesses' testimony concerning sexual comments, innuendoes or propositions and inappropriate touching allegedly made by LaPak that occurred between December, 1990 and October, 1991 were inconsistent and are not credible. Petitioner presented no relevant or material evidence to show that Petitioner was the victim of national origin discrimination. Respondent's articulated reason for its decision to remove Petitioner from her contract labor position was not based on gender discrimination or national origin discrimination, nor was it pretextual. Petitioner failed to prove that her termination of employment at the Respondent's company was in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment or national origin discrimination.

Recommendation Based upon the testimony and evidence submitted on the record in the formal hearings on this matter and by application of the relevant or governing principles of law to the findings of facts established on such record, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be issued in which the Charge of Discrimination is DENIED and the Petition for Relief is DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(in part), 6(in part), 7(in part), 8(in part), 9(in part), 10(in part), 13, 14(except as to date of hire), 15(in part), 16(in part), 18(except as to the date of the counseling session), 19(except as to the date of the counseling session), 20, 21(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 5(in part: Petitioner was first a contract employee with Associated Temporary Services), 6(in part), 7(in part), 8(in part), 9(in part), 10(in part), 15(in part), 16(in part), 17. Rejected as immaterial, irrelevant or subsumed: paragraphs 11, 12, 21(in part). Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4(in part), 5, 6(in part), 7, 11(in part), 12, 13, 14(in part). Rejected as argument or a conclusion of law: paragraphs: 9, 10, 15, 16, 17. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or subsumed: paragraphs 4(in part), 8, 11(in part), 14(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 6(in part). COPIES FURNISHED: Kay L. Wolf, Esquire John M. Finnigan, Esquire GARWOOD, MCKENNA & MCKENNA, P.A. 815 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 James Sweeting, III, Esquire 2111 East Michigan Street Suite 100 Orlando, Florida 32806 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (3) 29 CFR 1604.11(a)(3)(1985)42 U.S.C 200042 USC 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-4.016
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GEORGIE BREVILLE vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, 13-001642 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida May 03, 2013 Number: 13-001642 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 2013

The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO or Department), discriminated against Petitioner, Georgie Breville, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the Act), sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, based upon her national origin, age, disability, or in retaliation.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 64-year-old female from Mauritius, a French island nation off the coast of Africa. As such, she falls within a protected class based on age and national origin. Respondent, DEO, is the successor State agency to the former Agency for Workforce Innovation (AWI) with the responsibility to implement the FloridaWorks program. FloridaWorks is organized into Regional Workforce Boards which oversee the delivery of employment services in their local jurisdictions. Employment services delivered at local One-Stop Centers include job searches, job counseling, and resume drafting, among others. Petitioner was employed at the FloridaWorks Alachua County One-Stop Career Service Center in Gainesville, Florida, from 2001 through 2010. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was an employee of AWI in the position of Customer Service Specialist. In her capacity as Customer Service Specialist, Petitioner met with job seekers, assessed their needs, and referred them for assessment testing and community services. She also conducted workshops on resume writing, interviewing skills, and job search skills. In February 2009, Betty Holmes, an AWI employee, became Petitioner’s supervisor. By letter dated September 17, 2010, Petitioner was terminated from her employment with AWI effective October 1, 2010. The termination letter was hand delivered to Petitioner on September 20, 2010, by Ms. Holmes in her office at the One-Stop Center. The letter stated that Petitioner’s termination was due to loss of funding for the Regional Workforce Board. On October 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission alleging that Florida Management Solutions, Inc. (FMS), had discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin, age, and in retaliation by giving her unfair negative evaluations, harassing and demeaning her, assigning her a larger workload than other employees, and ultimately unfairly terminating her.3/ The Commission issued a Determination of No Cause on May 16, 2011, finding there was no cause to find that Respondent had committed an unlawful employment action. Petitioner timely filed with the Commission a Petition for Relief against FMS, which was forwarded to DOAH for assignment of an administrative law judge (ALJ) to conduct a fact-finding hearing. Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the ALJ entered a Recommended Order finding that FMS was not Petitioner’s employer during the time period in which the alleged acts of discrimination occurred. Rather, the ALJ found that AWI was Petitioner’s employer. The Recommended Order was entered on September 14, 2011. On September 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination against AWI alleging unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of her race, national origin, age, and in retaliation. Again, the Commission issued a Determination of No Cause and Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief, which was forwarded to DOAH and assigned to the undersigned for conduct of an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner’s Complaint of Discrimination alleges that she was discriminated against by being assigned a larger caseload and being held to different performance standards than similarly situated non-classified employees; denied training; given unmerited negative performance evaluations; harassed, demeaned, and threatened, resulting in negative health issues; and unlawfully terminated, resulting in loss of benefits and future employment opportunities. As such, Petitioner’s complaint raises both individual discrete acts of discrimination, as well as an ongoing hostile work environment. Petitioner’s complaint and testimony are largely focused on the treatment she received from Ms. Holmes, her supervisor from February 2009 to October 1, 2010. Petitioner alleges that when Ms. Holmes became her supervisor, Ms. Holmes removed Petitioner from her usual duties and assigned Petitioner a caseload of 150 cases in a program with which she was not familiar. Petitioner argues that the assignments were unreasonable and, perhaps, even unauthorized by the agency. Petitioner further alleges that Ms. Holmes was critical of Petitioner’s inability to complete the cases in a timely manner, and that Petitioner was denied the training she requested to better perform on the job. Ms. Holmes’ assignment of job duties to Petitioner, as well as Petitioner’s request for training, occurred more than 365 days prior to the date on which Petitioner filed her Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner alleges that the employee evaluations Ms. Holmes performed, completed, and signed in April 2009 and April 2010 were unmerited.4/ The evaluations complained of were completed more than 365 days prior to the date on which Petitioner filed her Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner alleges that Ms. Holmes unnecessarily contacted 9-1-1 on May 18, 2010, when Petitioner fainted in Ms. Holmes’ office, and allegedly told the paramedics that Petitioner was acting erratically prior to fainting, allegations which Petitioner denies. The incident during which Petitioner fainted and was taken to the hospital by the paramedics occurred more than 365 days prior to the date on which Petitioner filed her Compliant of Discrimination. Petitioner alleges that Ms. Holmes spoke harshly to her, yelled at her, told her to “shut up,” and made demeaning comments about Petitioner’s French accent. Petitioner testified that Ms. Holmes made Petitioner repeat after her, and on at least one occasion said, “This is how Americans speak.” All the statements alleged to have been made by Ms. Holmes occurred more than 365 days prior to the date on which Petitioner filed her Complaint of Discrimination. On May 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a grievance with AWI Human Resources regarding Ms. Holmes’ alleged harassment of Petitioner as well as her unmerited negative evaluation. After filing the grievance, Petitioner met with Ms. Holmes and her direct supervisor, Arelis Rosario, to discuss her performance evaluation and other issues raised in Petitioner’s grievance. A written summary of the meeting was made and signed by Petitioner, Ms. Rosario, and Ms. Holmes on June 2, 2010. Petitioner disagrees with the substance of the summary and maintains that her grievance was not satisfactorily resolved. Petitioner alleges that she was terminated, in part, in retaliation for filing the grievance against Ms. Holmes. The grievance filed against Ms. Holmes, as well as the resolution meeting between Petitioner, Ms. Holmes, and Ms. Rosario, occurred more than 365 days prior to Petitioner’s Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner was notified of her termination on September 20, 2010, which was a Monday. At hearing, Petitioner did not testify with certainty whether, or on which days, she was absent from work following notice of her termination. Petitioner had enough accumulated leave to take the two weeks off between termination and effective date. However, Petitioner chose not to. Petitioner was uncertain about the days that Ms. Holmes was in the office during either the week of her termination or the following week. At final hearing, Petitioner seemed confused about various events she related. On the whole, Petitioner’s testimony was inconsistent and equivocal. The evidence was clear that Petitioner was assigned no work during the period of September 20, 2010, through October 1, 2010. Petitioner had little, if any, interaction with Ms. Holmes during that same time period. She testified that her co-workers avoided her and barely spoke to her. Petitioner spent most of her time cleaning out her office and packing her belongings. In what must have been an awkward situation, Petitioner gave away many of her personal belongings to her co-workers during the time period between September 20, 2010, and October 1, 2010. Petitioner gave Ms. Holmes a vase from her office as a gift, although the exact date was not established. Petitioner introduced no evidence of any discrete acts of discrimination by Ms. Holmes, or any other AWI employee, between September 29, 2010, and October 1, 2010. Petitioner has been diagnosed with breast cancer and has been under treatment for several years. Petitioner did not take sick leave when employed at AWI. Instead, she took annual leave for her treatments or attended doctor’s visits during her lunch hour. The evidence did not support a finding that her employer knew of either her diagnosis or treatment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 2013.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11
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DEBORAH PATE vs HOMES OF MERIT, 07-001973 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 08, 2007 Number: 07-001973 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 2008

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner based upon her race or sex and whether she was subjected to retaliation after complaining to the Respondent concerning the alleged harassment.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner became employed on October 10, 2005, at HOM. She worked as a general laborer and finisher at times pertinent to this case. HOM is a manufacturer of mobile and modular homes at its Lake City, Florida, plant. It has in excess of 15 employees and is therefore a statutory employer with the meaning of Section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes (2006). The Petitioner has a number of blemishes on her employment record with the Respondent. She had performance problems prior to the events leading up to the termination of her employment. She was disciplined for an incident occurring on December 21, 2005, for failure to report to required overtime work, as well as for insubordination. Steve Weeks, the Respondent's Production Manager, deemed the failure to report for required overtime work to be insubordination and a violation of the company's attendance policy. She received an employee warning notice on May 3, 2006, regarding a perceived need for her to "pickup the pace and for her attendance." Mr. Weeks told Ms. Pate that she needed to increase her production pace and needed to work on her attendance and work quality. The Petitioner was given to understand that her employment could be terminated for further violations. The Petitioner maintains she has been subjected to "harassment." Specifically, she complains that her co-workers in the finishing department harassed her by "bumping into me and playing threatening songs, threatening, talking about they were going to beat my behind, you know, just constantly threatening." Her complaints concern Priscilla Berry, Katherine Belford, and Melody Adkins. Melody Adkins is a white female, Priscilla Berry and Katherine Belford are African-American females. Most of the Petitioner's complaints concern Katherine Belford and Priscilla Berry. The Petitioner admits that these individuals never indicated they were committing any alleged harassing acts because of the Petitioner's race or gender. She further acknowledges that the harassment "may not have been for my race" and that the harassment "might have been because I was a female and I was doing my job and I didn't hang with that certain group" of females. No male employees are alleged to have threatened or harassed the Petitioner and she never complained to her direct supervisor, Tommy Smith, concerning any problems related to her race or gender. Ms. Pate spoke to Supervisors Weeks and Smith in an effort to stop the harassment and threats. In response to her complaints Mr. Weeks talked to the supervisors and employees involved in the incidents Ms. Pate complained about and told them they were not to bring personal problems to the work place. Mr. Smith separated the Petitioner from Ms. Belford and Ms. Berry because of the antagonism that had developed between them. He directed her to perform her duties in a different location in order to alleviate the hostilities. The Petitioner called the HOM corporate office on June 27, 2006, and spoke to Mr. Jeff Nugent. Mr. Nugent directed the Regional Human Resources Director, William Allen, to investigate the Petitioner's complaints. Mr. Allen spoke to the Petitioner by phone on June 29, 2006, and arranged a meeting with her for July 11, 2006. The Petitioner told Mr. Allen during that phone conversation that she was being harassed and threatened and that the supervisor was not doing anything to alleviate the matter. She told him that "they" were discriminating against her because she was a black woman and the supervisors were still doing nothing to alleviate her harassment, in her view. The Petitioner met with Mr. Allen on July 11, 2006. Mr. Allen also met with other employees. The plant had been shut down during the first week of July and immediately thereafter on July 11, 2006, the Petitioner had the meeting with Mr. Allen. She found him responsive to her complaints. He took notes during the meeting with the Petitioner and with the other employees he interviewed. The Petitioner complained that she was being harassed and threatened by the above-referenced women on the job, that she "went up the chain of command" to get the harassment to stop but that it had not stopped. She did not complain to Mr. Allen that she was being harassed based on her gender or her race, however. Mr. Allen determined that the problem between Ms. Pate and the other employees was based upon difficulties in "getting along well" or, in effect, personality differences. He also determined that the Respondent had responded to the prior complaints by separating Ms. Pate from working with the employees about whom she had complained. On July 13, 2006, Mr. Smith observed Ms. Pate out of her assigned work area while using a cell phone. The use of a cell phone during working hours, and in working areas, violates company policy. Mr. Smith asked Ms. Pate to report to the plant office to speak to Mr. Weeks. Upon arriving at the office, the Petitioner told Mr. Smith and Mr. Weeks that she was leaving because she did not feel well. Mr. Weeks told Ms. Pate that she could leave the premises, but she would have to bring in a physicians note to prevent the absence from being unexcused. She returned to work the next scheduled work day and did not bring in a physician's note as directed. The previous work day's absence was thus an unexcused absence. Mr. Weeks decided to terminate the Petitioner's employment for her attendance problems and for her failure to submit a doctor's note justifying her absence of July 13, 2006. Her unexcused lack of attendance caused her to have excessive absences in violation of the Respondent's adopted attendance policy. The Petitioner's employment was terminated on July 17, 2006. The Petitioner never told Mr. Weeks that she felt her employment was being terminated in retaliation for her having called the corporate office to complain, or that she was being harassed because of her race and gender.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Pate 862 Northeast Coldwater Street Lake City, Florida 32055 Kevin E. Hyde, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP One Independent Drive, Suite 1300 Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 32201-0240 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000E Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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RONALD J. CLARDY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 06-002815 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 04, 2006 Number: 06-002815 Latest Update: Jun. 06, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on gender or handicap.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed Registered Nurse. He was hired by Respondent on April 4, 1997, in its medical facility at Gulf Coast Correctional facility. In 2000, Petitioner's supervisor was Pamela Spears, R.N. At some point, Nurse Spears became friends with Chris Miles, a Licensed Practical Nurse, who worked on Petitioner's shift. Nurse Spears would sometimes talk with this L.P.N. in her office. Somehow, Petitioner felt his authority as the shift nurse was undermined by this relationship. It was not clear from the record what the basis of Petitioner's belief was, but his belief seemed to be related to the fact that Petitioner had to wait to speak with Nurse Spears. On May 5, 2000, Petitioner complained to Nurse Miles that he felt she was being treated with favoritism by Nurse Spears. Apparently, the discussion caused an uproar at the shift change and there was some agreement to swap shifts among the nurses to allow things to cool off. Around May 10, 2000, Nurse Odom filed sexual harassment charges against Petitioner for alleged comments and jokes of a sexual nature ("spanking the monkey", "choking the chicken", cross-dressing inuendos, use of handcuffs during sex, going to naked bars). In addition Nurse Miles filed a hostile work environment complaint against Petitioner because he allegedly threatened to spread rumors about her. Nurse Miles’ complaint did not involve sexual harassment. Nurse Nowak filed a sexual harassment complaint against Petitioner, but withdrew her complaint, indicating that she did not have a complaint with Petitioner and that she felt pressure to file her complaint. Nurse Spears did not file any complaint against Petitioner. Petitioner testified these nurses had been pressured into filing their complaints. However, he had no independent personal knowledge of such pressure and other than hearsay, offered no evidence of such pressure. Respondent, also did not offer any evidence demonstrating that such behavior was sexually harassing, as opposed to simply vengeful and petty behavior by a supervisor. On August 15, 2001, Dr. Gilo in front of co-workers and staff, called Petitioner, who is obese, a “fat lazy bum.” Petitioner filed a hostile work environment complaint against Dr. Gilo and an incident report was filed. The evidence demonstrated that Dr. Gilo was known for demeaning or belittling everyone and having a harsh manner. The comment was not related to any of the earlier complaints of the nurses, but to Dr. Gilo's irritation towards Petitioner for calling him at home. There was no evidence that demonstrated this comment constituted discrimination or harassment based on Petitioner's obesity. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner's obesity was a handicap or viewed as a handicap by his employer. Respondent pursuant to its policy on sexual harassment complaints investigated the complaints. Several witness/co- worker statements were taken during the investigation that indicated Mr. Clardy, along with other employees, had made some statements or jokes of a sexual nature. The investigation took a considerable period of time. Again the record was not clear as to what caused the length of the investigation or whether the length of the investigation was unusual. However, on February 8, 2002, as a result of the investigation, Petitioner received a written reprimand for unspecified sexual jokes or comments. Petitioner filed a grievance regarding the reprimand. The grievance was denied in both Step 1 and Step 2 of the grievance process. There was no evidence that demonstrated either the undertaking of this investigation or the investigation itself constituted sexual harassment. However, on June 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a sexual harassment complaint against Respondent, the complaining nurses and Dr. Gilo for gender and disability discrimination. As with the nurses' complaints, the Respondent, pursuant to its policy, investigated Petitioner's complaints.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order affirming its decision that Petitioner is not eligible for services. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald J. Clardy 115 Sioux Trail Crawfordville, Florida 32327 Joshua E. Laws, Esquire Florida Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399

CFR (2) 29 CFR 163034 CFR 104.3(j)(1) Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.60760.11
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ANGELLA WILLIAMS vs CROWN WINE AND SPIRITS, 09-007035 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Dec. 24, 2009 Number: 09-007035 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 2010

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on Petitioner's pregnancy and sexual harassment, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business engaged in the retail sales of wine, spirits, cigars, specialty gourmet foods, and party favors. Respondent operates about 28 stores, mostly in south Florida. Respondent employs at least 225 employees. Its chief executive officer is Paul (Bubba) Kassal. Other executive officers, superior to Bubba Kassal, are his brother Michael, who also serves as vice-president of personnel, and their father, who, with his father, started the company in 1955. Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 2003, as a human resources manager. As such, Petitioner reported to the human resources director. At the time of hiring Petitioner, Bubba Kassal informed her, presumably secretly, of his intent to fire the existing human resources director. Six months later, after the termination of the human resources director, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position. As human resources director, Petitioner's primary duties were to ensure that all of Respondent's employees were paid, file all reports with the appropriate agencies, prepare internal employment policies, train managers in good hiring practices, run background checks, ensure compliance with all safety, workers' compensation and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) issues, terminate employees, counsel employees, file unemployment compensation reports, and participate in the strategic planning for new stores. The Kassals were satisfied with Petitioner's work performance during her entire employment with Respondent. Respondent's main offices are located in Ft. Lauderdale. While working for Respondent, Petitioner commuted over one hour each day from her home in Port St. Lucie to her office in the corporate headquarters. The issues in this case divide neatly into the claims of a hostile work environment and sex discrimination due to pregnancy. The claim of a hostile work environment pertains to Petitioner's first two years with Respondent, which were from late 2003 through late 2005. The claim of discrimination due to pregnancy pertains to Petitioner's last months with Respondent, which were from spring 2008 through fall 2008. As noted below, there is evidence supportive of a claim of a hostile work environment, although this evidence fails to establish such a claim for the reasons explained below. However, the limited evidence of a hostile work environment is in no way linked to the termination of Petitioner's employment in 2008 while she was pregnant. This termination, which was due to complications associated with her pregnancy, was essentially by mutual agreement and in no way was due to some form of quid pro quo sex discrimination or retaliation for her failure to reciprocate Michael Kassal's flirtation or infatuation. Petitioner's version of events for 2003-05 is credited because Michael Kassal did not testify. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is largely uncredited due to some inconsistencies in her testimony where she implies, for instance, that she understood that Respondent might not keep open her existing job until after she delivered. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is less than the more plausible testimony of Bubba Kassal and Respondent's outside counsel, Amy Galloway. Shortly after starting work, Petitioner began receiving unwelcome attention from Michael Kassal, whose office was near Petitioner's office. Michael Kassal, who was married at all material times, routinely complimented Petitioner's hairstyle, teeth, shoes, and clothes. When Respondent sponsored a wine tasting at its Port St. Lucie store, Michael Kassal invited Petitioner to attend. Michael Kassal repeatedly asked Petitioner to lunch or dinner. Petitioner went to lunch with Michael Kassal only a couple of times because she was uncomfortable with the level of attention that she was receiving. During her first year of employment, Petitioner was preoccupied with the demands of her job and largely ignored the uninvited attention that Michael Kassal directed toward her. During her second year of employment, Petitioner initiated corporate-wide training sessions in sexual harassment. She used these occasions to remind Michael Kassal, when he made her uncomfortable with his comments or behavior, that he knew better and he needed to stop such inappropriate behavior. Undeterred, Michael Kassal instead confided in Petitioner that he felt trapped in his marriage, could not leave his wife due to their two children, and believed that he would have been much happier if he had met Petitioner a couple of years earlier because they would have been so good together. Michael Kassal said that his wife, who was, at times, an employee of Respondent, was an alcoholic. Petitioner suggested that Michael Kassal or his wife take advantage of Respondent's employee assistance program. Michael Kassal rejected this advice and instead stated that, if Petitioner would not go out with him, he would go out with a woman at the gym where he worked out. On Petitioner's birthday, Michael Kassal routinely gave her a card. Petitioner kept only two of the cards and could not identify the years that they were received. One card contains a handwritten note: "And I need you more than want you[,] and I want you til the end of all time." Michael Kassal printed his name at the bottom of the note, adding a heart- shaped symbol in place of the dot over the "i." The other birthday card states: Dear Angella, It[']s presently July 10th and you are in India and I am wishing I were with you riding on Elephants and protecting you from the dangers so far from home. I must tell you we all miss you and only have kind thoughts about how professionally you have with us with Cami and Johanna. You have always blessed us with organization and administrative magic. I sit here and count the days before I can smell Victor[i]a's Secret Rapture perfume. Thank you for your intervention. You have been a breath of fresh air. I know it[']s been a whirlwind to some of us to catch up but it[']s worth the effort. I always have your back. I hope this year[']s birthday brings happiness and fills your heart with songs and sunshine. I hope you get a new pair of shoes and a toothbrush. Thanks again for all your loyalty and dedication. Sincerely, Michael Kassal. The "i" in "Michael" bears no dot or other symbol. Bubba Kassal testified that Michael sent birthday cards to all of the employees of the company and that this was part of the family atmosphere that characterizes the company, which continues a tradition of family picnics, employee fitness programs, and comprehensive fringe benefits. Bubba Kassal also testified that he and his brother kiss each morning. However, Bubba Kassal did not testify that the contents of the birthday cards quoted above resemble the contents of the birthday cards that Michael Kassal sends to, say, the company truck drivers or warehouse workers. The thoughtfulness that Michael Kassal extends daily to his brother and annually to his employees is distinct from the intimacies inherent in the shorter birthday card and the reference to smelling Petitioner's perfume again. These intimacies corroborate the portion of Petitioner's testimony that describes an inappropriate level of emotional attachment from Michael Kassal toward Petitioner; the inference easily follows that this level of emotional attachment is atypical of the conventional employer-employee relationship at Respondent. Three omissions loom large in Petitioner's proof of her claim of a hostile work environment. These omissions are considered in ascending order of significance. First, at no time during her employment with Respondent did Petitioner complain to anyone about Michael Kassal's behavior. She testified that she believed a complaint would be futile because Michael Kassal was the boss. Respondent countered with evidence that complaints about Michael Kassal's wife led to her termination and argument that Petitioner's complaints would likewise have received a fair hearing. Respondent's contention overlooks the fact that Michael's wife was convicted of driving under the influence, and her continued operation of a company vehicle presented an insurance problem for Respondent that could not be ignored. Petitioner is right on this point--her complaint would have been futile. Bubba Kassal was not in a position to control his brother, and, on this record, their father does not seem to have been playing a prominent role in the business during the time in question. Factually, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes undermine the credibility of the complainant. This is not the situation here, though, because, as noted above, Petitioner's version of events from 2003-05 is unrebutted and confirmed by two birthday cards. Legally, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes preclude a finding of notice to the employer, so as to preclude a conclusion of vicarious liability. This is not the situation here, though, because, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Michael Kassal was Respondent for purpose of establishing notice and concluding vicarious liability for his behavior. The second omission is that nothing in the record establishes that the behavior of Michael Kassal impeded Petitioner's work performance. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, this omission is not outcome-determinative, but, as noted above, Petitioner's work was always satisfactory, at least until her health deteriorated during her pregnancy, which is discussed below. The third omission is that the evidence fails to establish that Michael Kassal continued to lavish inappropriate attention on Petitioner after the end of 2005. The record is silent as to the nature of the relationship between Michael Kassal and Petitioner for the two and one-half years from the end of 2005 until the disclosure of her pregnancy in the spring of 2008. It is at least as plausible that, unfueled by any encouragement from Petitioner, Michael Kassal's infatuation with her tapered off after a couple of years, rather than burned with the same intensity for four and one-half years. The behavior of Michael Kassal from late 2003 through late 2005 suggests nothing more than an infatuation with Petitioner, which, however inappropriate, excludes the sexually charged actions of offensive touching or sexually explicit invitations or comments. The behavior in this case is limited to unaccepted invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates, inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, and transparent attempts at flattery that, at their best, suggest a failure to recognize boundaries and, at their worst, wander between the narcissistic and infantile. The record is not especially rich in detailing Petitioner's response to the inappropriate attention lavished on her by Michael Kassal, except that there is no indication whatsoever that Petitioner welcomed the attention, reciprocated in any fashion, or was in any way flattered by Michael Kassal's two-year infatuation. There is some evidence that the attention made Petitioner embarrassed and somewhat uncomfortable, but this evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner's subjective reaction took the form of a feeling that she was physically threatened or personally humiliated or that she was laboring under an alteration of her working conditions. Such reactions, if they had occurred, would have been disproportionate to the level of attention that Michael Kassal directed toward Petitioner. Except for the frequency of comments about attire or appearance, which may have occurred on a daily basis, the record fails to establish the frequency of the invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates or the inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, but these occurrences were probably infrequent. Objectively considered, none of Michael Kassal's behavior was physically threatening or humiliating, none of his behavior was so pervasive or severe as to alter the conditions of Petitioner's employment, and none of his behavior could reasonably have adversely affected Petitioner's work performance. Based on these findings and the Conclusions of Law below, Petitioner has failed to prove a hostile work environment from 2003-05. The inception of the claims arising out of Respondent's treatment of her pregnancy is March or April 2008, when Petitioner learned that she was pregnant and due to deliver in November. In June, Petitioner decided to reveal her pregnancy to family, friends, and Respondent. On the morning that Petitioner had decided to inform Respondent of her pregnancy, the first person who came to her office was Bubba Kassal. He congratulated Petitioner, laughingly saying, in a manner that did not offend Petitioner, that he did not know that she had a boyfriend. Bubba Kassal then spoke of his two boys and added that he was sorry that Petitioner's mother was no longer alive to support her at this time. Bubba Kassal called his mother and told her, and she called Petitioner the next day and congratulated her. The record does not disclose whether Petitioner told Michael Kassal at this time, or, if she did, the nature of his response. A short while later, on June 13, Petitioner had an office visit with her physician, who became concerned about her high blood pressure. The physician asked if Petitioner could work at home, and Petitioner assured him that she could. The physician wrote a note to this effect. Driving back to the office, Petitioner called Ms. Galloway, with whom Petitioner had worked on human-resource issues. Petitioner told Ms. Galloway about her pregnancy, the health risks, and the support that she had already received from "the Kassals." Ms. Galloway advised Petitioner just to go in and tell them that she needed to work at home. Toward this end, Petitioner arranged a meeting with Michael and Bubba Kassal on June 18. At the meeting, Petitioner gave the Kassals a copy of her physician's note. Petitioner acknowledged that she had been with Respondent a long time, and she thanked them for the work that she had been allowed to do. She mentioned her pregnancy complications, which included blacking out and falling--these made the long drive between work and home especially dangerous. Petitioner offered to recruit someone to replace her, but she wanted to be kept on the payroll in return for performing various human resource duties as best as she could, mostly from home. Michael Kassal reacted to the request poorly. He replied that it had not been his idea to purchase a house so far from the office in Port St. Lucie, and the human resources director needed to be onsite. Notwithstanding Michael Kassal's reaction, Respondent accepted Petitioner's request, as Bubba Kassal and Petitioner generally agreed to an arrangement in which Petitioner would continue to be paid her normal salary through delivery in return for working on human resources matters on a limited basis. An important component of the understanding reached at the June 18 meeting was its term, which was through the birth of the baby. Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if, after baby was born, Petitioner decided not to return to work. Petitioner was unable to promise that she would return to work, but replied that she needed to work, and she could bring her aunt from Jamaica to watch the baby. Bubba Kassal asked when the work-at- home arrangement would go into effect, and Petitioner replied it was intended to go into effect right away, but she would try to work with them and offered to help find someone to perform her duties in her absence. Bubba Kassal replied that he had someone in mind. Petitioner herself testified that Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if they liked the replacement, and Petitioner replied that she understood that they had a business to run, implying that, consistent with this understanding, they might not have a position for her after the baby were born, just as she might not want to return to work with Respondent. Bubba Kassal promised to memorialize the understandings reached at the meeting. Despite the doctor's orders, Petitioner continued to report to the office until the July 4 weekend. At that time, she asked Bubba Kassal about the document to memorialize their understandings, and he said that Amy Galloway was working on it. On July 7, Ms. Galloway emailed to Bubba Kassal a draft letter agreement, which, among other things, confirmed that neither party was committing to Petitioner's ongoing employment after the birth of the baby. On July 8, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal and Ms. Galloway advising them that she was on bed rest and would submit FMLA paperwork as soon as possible. For some reason, the recipients did not receive this email, so they were unaware in early July of the status of Petitioner, who, understandably, did not undertake any unnecessary communications during her period of bed rest in order to save the baby. On July 11, Petitioner visited the doctor, who found that her blood pressure had soared to 200/100. Petitioner talked him out of ordering an ambulance to take her to the hospital, but the doctor ordered bed rest for Petitioner. By this time, Petitioner realized that, for the remainder of her pregnancy, she would not be able to perform even at the limited level that she had said she would work at the June 18 meeting. From this point forward, the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's medical issues. On July 11, Petitioner returned to the office briefly to advise her staff that she would be going home for the time being. While at the office, she saw an invoice from Ms. Galloway's law firm that reflected legal research conducted a couple of days after the June 18 meeting and concerned the Title VII ramifications of Petitioner's situations. Petitioner assumed that Respondent was terminating her and began to cry. On the same day, Petitioner returned to the doctor's office and had him complete the FMLA paperwork, which Petitioner had previously thought was unnecessary. The necessity for FMLA paperwork was as much Petitioner's realization, on July 11, that she could not perform even the limited duties contemplated by the June 18 understanding as her discovery, also on July 11, that Respondent had ordered its counsel to research Title VII. Later on July 11, Petitioner returned to the office with the completed FMLA paperwork and left it for Bubba Kassal. Pursuant to this paperwork, the FMLA period, during which Respondent would have to keep open her job, expired before the projected delivery date. On July 14, Petitioner returned a telephone call of Ms. Galloway and updated her on her condition. As Ms. Galloway confirmed in an email of the same date to Bubba Kassal, Petitioner wanted to take her FMLA time and understood that she would not be able to perform the transitioning tasks contemplated in the June 18 understanding. Ms. Galloway promised Petitioner that she would discuss with Bubba Kassal a reworking of her benefits, including maintaining present health benefits and obtaining disability benefits. On August 5, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal advising that she had not received her paycheck on August 2 and stating that she "continued" to be available to perform her end of the June 18 understanding. This is an attempt to document a fact that was untrue: Petitioner had not been able to perform her responsibilities under the June 18 understanding at any time after July 11. Ten minutes after receiving the email, Bubba Kassal emailed Ms. Galloway stating that they would proceed by paying Petitioner disability benefits through the birth, paying the company's portion of the health insurance until the birth, and giving Petitioner access to her company laptop computer and cellphone until October 1 in return for a release, presumably from any employment-related liability claims. It is impossible to infer that Bubba Kassal was miffed at Petitioner's misstatement, but it is likely that the misstatement motivated Bubba Kassal to define the status of Petitioner's employment relationship. By letter dated August 5 from a human relations employee to Ms. Galloway, the position of Respondent was documented, at least internally. This letter states that Petitioner's FMLA start date is July 11, 2008, and end date is October 4, 2008. This letter restates the undertakings that Bubba Kassal detailed in his August 5 email and notes that Petitioner has exhausted all of her sick and vacation time. The letter notes that the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's subsequent incapacitation. On August 14, Ms. Galloway emailed a letter to Petitioner reiterating much of the contents of the August 5 email and noting that, due to Petitioner's emergent health needs, Respondent had hired an acting human resources director on July 28. Ms. Galloway's letter restates the conditions set forth in Bubba Kassal's email of August 5, adding only that there is no expectation that Petitioner can perform any human resource duties and omitting the request for a release. A couple of weeks later, Petitioner emailed a brief message to Ms. Galloway acknowledging receipt of the letter and thanking her for all that she "does," but not otherwise responding to the letter. On October 8, Ms. Galloway sent another letter to Petitioner noting that the FMLA period had expired and that Respondent continued to perform the conditions detailed in the August 14 letter. The letter asks for the return of the laptop computer and cellphone. On November 5, Petitioner delivered her baby. One month later, she spoke with Ms. Galloway exploring, in Ms. Galloway's opinion, the possibility of returning, if her replacement were not working out, or obtaining additional severance pay. Ms. Galloway explained the company's view that the termination was voluntary, not involuntary. Eventually, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner another week's salary, through July 18, and extended her insurance through December 31, so that Petitioner would have another chance to exercise her COBRA rights. Respondent advised that it was treating Petitioner's termination date as October 4, which was when the FMLA period had expired. There is no evidence of discrimination in Respondent's handling of Petitioner's pregnancy. Respondent assigned no role of substance in the 2008 events to Michael Kassal, whose objections to the June 18 understanding were completely ignored. There is no evidence that the company's actions in 2008 were influenced in any way by Michael Kassal's 2003-05 infatuation. Petitioner testified to a 4-6 week period during which she had previously worked at home. However, this earlier period of working at home was when Petitioner was engaged in the solitary task of converting payroll systems on the computer, and she needed a quiet place to work. Working at home under these conditions is entirely appropriate. During this period, Petitioner was working exclusively on this task, leaving her other human resources duties to others or deferring them until the conversion was finished. Any insistence by Respondent in 2008 that Petitioner work in the office is justified because Petitioner's duties generally required her to be in the office, where she would be available for, among other things, drop-in visits by corporate management needing assistance in the wide range of personnel matters that arise daily in a business of this size. However, Petitioner's claim of discriminatory treatment regarding working at home misses the larger point that, in the June 18 understanding, Respondent allowed her to work at home for the duration of her pregnancy. This understanding was defeated, not by Respondent's insistence that she work in the office, but by Petitioner's deteriorating medical condition. Petitioner also testified that Respondent allowed other managers to work at home. Again, this proof overlooks the fact that Respondent also allowed Petitioner to work at home under the June 18 understanding, and her subsequent inability to do so was due to her deteriorating health, not the demands of Respondent. Also, the other situations are distinguishable, even if Respondent had prohibited Petitioner from working at home. While one district manager's wife recovered from a broken leg and another district manager recovered from a heart attack and stroke, they worked in some fashion, either with reduced hours in the office or reduced hours from home. Petitioner's situation was different in the nature of her duties, which were corporate-wide, not district-wide; the fact that she was completely unavailable for an extended period of time; and probably for the fact that, for a substantial period of time, she failed or was unable timely to communicate her situation to Respondent. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove any form of sex discrimination in Respondent's handling of her pregnancy in 2008.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2010 . COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Bogdan, Esquire Robert Anthony Bogdan, P.A. 410 Southeast 1st Terrace Pompano Beach, Florida 33060-7108 Salvatore H. Fasulo, Esquire Trip Scott, P.A. 110 Southeast Sixth Street, 15th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.10760.11
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LESA BURKAVAGE vs PARRISH MEDICAL CENTER, 09-006221 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 13, 2009 Number: 09-006221 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2010

The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment and/or retaliation while employed with Respondent in violation of Subsections 760.10(1)(a) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2008).1

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired as an employee of Respondent in July 1993, as an X-ray technologist ("tech") in the Radiology Department. She is an adult female and, as such, is a member of a protected class. During her employee orientation, Petitioner received and read a copy of Respondent's Employee Handbook. Among other things, Respondent's Employee Handbook addresses the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. Respondent's policy strictly prohibits sexual harassment and states that Respondent "will not tolerate such action by employees." Respondent's policy also encourages any employee who feels that he/she is being subject to sexual harassment to discuss and/or make a complaint with the Human Resources Department. Any such complaint is handled according to Respondent's Policy No. 9510-17, in order to ensure appropriate investigation and action. Respondent's employees also receive computer-based training regarding sexual harassment and Respondent's policy prohibiting the same, every year. Petitioner received this computer-based training regarding sexual harassment. In October 2006, Petitioner started training to be a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") tech. Petitioner was chosen to be cross-trained from an X-ray tech to a MRI tech by Greg Phillips, who was then the manager of Diagnostic Imaging. Phillips became her unofficial "mentor" at Respondent's facility. Petitioner received on-the-job training for an MRI tech from Chris Depelteau, Amy Brantly, and Lucinda Swales, all of whom were MRI techs at the time. In December 2006, Petitioner received a secondary job code which allowed her to work independently as an MRI tech part-time. Essentially this meant that she could "take call." That same month, Paul Licker was hired by Respondent as lead MRI tech. Depelteau had also applied for this job, but had not been chosen. Upon being hired by Respondent, Licker was also made aware of its policy regarding sexual harassment. As lead MRI tech, Licker was responsible for scheduling the MRI techs, ordering supplies, working on protocols, ensuring that patients were being properly scanned and treated, and following up with the MRI techs as they cared for patients. Therefore, Licker became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Like all the other MRI techs, Licker also trained Petitioner in MRI. In training Petitioner, Licker often taught her different techniques or ways of doing things than the way she had been taught by the other MRI techs. Licker, on several occasions, sought to teach Petitioner his way of doing things on the computer, which was different from the others. In doing so, Licker invaded Petitioner's workspace and engaged in inappropriate touching, particularly by covering her hand with his while manipulating the mouse, to the point that she became uncomfortable. Licker also started implementing changes and different ways of doing things throughout the MRI department. As lead MRI tech, Licker had the authority to implement such changes. Also, during this same period, if Licker added patients or made other changes to her schedule, Petitioner would argue with or complain to him. In fact, Petitioner did not like Licker and also told Depelteau and other employees that Licker was a "bad supervisor." Licker himself recognized that Petitioner did not like the way he was supervising the department. A few weeks after Licker started working for Respondent, Petitioner approached Phillips complaining that Licker was calling her, other female employees, and patients, "Babe." For instance, Licker would say, "Babe, I need you to do this for me," when asking Petitioner to complete a task. Petitioner indicated that she thought that the use of this term was inappropriate and demeaning and that it made her uncomfortable. In fact, other employees who were friendly with Petitioner understood that Licker was using the term "Babe" the way another person might use the terms "Sweetie," or "Honey," i.e., in a non-sexual or non-derogatory way. However, understanding that Licker was a new supervisor who may not have understood that the term suggested something sexual in using the term "Babe," Phillips suggested to Petitioner that she speak directly with Licker to resolve this issue. Phillips also spoke to Licker directly regarding his use of the term "Babe." Specifically, Phillips advised Licker that he "needed to carefully choose his words around patients and employees." Phillips also advised Licker that some people did not like being addressed by "Sweetie or Hun or Babe," and that he should refrain from using these terms in the workplace. Licker understood Phillips' suggestion and tried to refrain from calling Petitioner, or anybody else, "Babe" or any word similar to the term. Petitioner did not complain about any other alleged inappropriate conduct by Licker to Phillips, or any other manager, until February 1, 2007. However, shortly after he started working for Respondent, Licker made an inappropriate comment in the cafeteria to Petitioner. Licker stated to other employees that he could not sit next to Petitioner because they were sleeping together. Licker made a similar inappropriate comment to Dana Keach when he first started employment at Parrish. He suggested that there was a lesbian relationship between Keach and another woman. This conduct was not reported until much later. Prior to February 1, 2007, it became readily apparent that the MRI department was suffering serious setbacks because the department employees were not working cooperatively together. The biggest problem in the MRI department appeared to be a lack of teamwork resulting from the staff's inability to communicate effectively with one another. Licker advised Gallacher that he was struggling in his "daily interactions" with Depelteau and Petitioner and that he simply "could not make the group happy, whether it was scheduling or time off or just getting through the day." MRI's problems grew to the point that Phillips and Gallacher both stepped in to try to improve communications and teamwork among Licker, Petitioner, Depelteau, and Shelly Hugoboom, the MRI CT assistant. The entire MRI department engaged in team-building meetings and even worked with the medical center's chaplain in an attempt to learn to work together. These department meetings were intense and discussion often became heated among the MRI staff members. In addition to these team-building meetings, Gallacher met with staff members individually to discuss their concerns. Gallacher also addressed the interpersonal skills issues between Petitioner and Hugoboom. Specifically, Gallacher met with the two employees together "to see if they could put [their issues] to rest and move on." In the midst of these efforts to improve the department, Petitioner came to Phillips on February 1, 2007, complaining that Licker was continuing to call her "Babe," and that he had also offered her some concert tickets. Phillips observed that Petitioner was extremely upset and immediately contacted Human Resources Manager Roberta Chaildin to start an investigation in regard to Licker's alleged behavior. Phillips and Chaildin spoke with Petitioner and Licker, individually, regarding Petitioner's claims. When questioned regarding the concert ticket, Licker explained that he had been looking to sell an extra ticket that he had. Licker advised Phillips and Chaildin that Petitioner had taken his offer to sell her the extra ticket "out of context," when she assumed that he was asking her to the concert on a date. Licker specified that he had asked Petitioner if she wanted to buy his extra ticket and "tag along" with him and his friends to the concert. Licker also offered his extra ticket to other people besides Petitioner. After speaking with Petitioner and Licker, Phillips and Chaildin determined that they were dealing with a "he-said- she-said situation and a misunderstanding." "He said, I was trying to sell the ticket or give it away. She said, he had asked me out on a date to a concert." Phillips and Chaildin determined that this was not a case of "sexual harassment" by Licker. They did, however, warn Licker that as a supervisor, he had to be "extremely careful" in how he spoke to his subordinate employees. Phillips and Chaildin advised Petitioner that they had investigated her claim and concluded that there was no evidence of sexual harassment. They encouraged her, however, to file a report if she continued to have issues with Licker. Over five months passed without a complaint or incident. Then on July 11, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner regarding her having accumulated nine tardy appearances ("tardies") at work since January 1, 2007. In speaking with Petitioner, Licker wanted to ensure that Petitioner understood that she needed to be on time in the future, as she had exceeded the number of tardies deemed acceptable by Respondent. To ensure that nothing said during the verbal counseling session was misconstrued by Petitioner, Licker had another supervisor, Boyd Wallace, serve as a witness. The tardies cited in Licker's verbal counseling to Petitioner were unrelated to instances when he would excuse her from work due to slower volume in the MRI department. On August 21, 2007, Licker observed Petitioner on the telephone being advised by security that she had parked in a "no parking" zone. During the conversation, Petitioner became agitated. Licker documented and filed the incident. Phillips personally addressed this incident with Petitioner. On October 10, 2007, the MRI department was working an already full schedule when Licker had to add a patient to the schedule due to an emergency situation. Petitioner objected to Licker adding another patient to the day and became withdrawn and resentful. Licker instructed Petitioner that she needed to change her attitude and become more cooperative. The evidence is not persuasive that Licker assigned Petitioner "menial tasks" after she complained about his having offered her the concert tickets in February 2007. In October 2007, Gallacher, Phillips and Chaildin met Petitioner and issued her a Decision Day disciplinary letter. A "Decision Day" meeting and letter is a management tool in which the employee is given a paid day off to contemplate whether they wish to remain an employee of Respondent. This resulted from Respondent's concerns regarding her "interpersonal skills." This was an issue that had been continuously addressed by Licker and other supervisors or managers at Respondent. The incident which prompted the progressive disciplinary action involved Debbie York, a relatively new employee who resigned from the MRI department, claiming that Petitioner and her interactions with other employees and with Licker was the reason for her leaving. During the Decision Day meeting, Petitioner stated that she was the "victim" and brought up the previous incidents of allegedly being sexually harassed. Petitioner was reminded that she had not complained of any other instances of alleged sexual harassment since she complained of Licker's offering her concert tickets in February 2007 and that the matter was investigated and resolved. From the point of view of management, the Decision Day meeting was intended to address Petitioner's on-going issues with her co-workers and her supervisor. However, Petitioner did not bring up any new incidents of alleged sexual harassment by Licker during the Decision Day meeting. Following the meeting, Petitioner took her Decision Day letter and returned to work. The Decision Day letter called for the creation of an Action Plan, which Respondent uses to help a struggling employee "become invested with the organization and with [his or her] team." Thereafter, Petitioner met with Gallacher to discuss what should be included in her Action Plan. On November 7, 2007, an Action Plan was drafted and signed. It included a number of initiatives designed to assist Petitioner in being "re[-]engaged" with the MRI department. Despite being placed on an Action Plan, Petitioner continued to have issues with Licker being her supervisor. On November 20, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner for her failure to discuss changes in her weekly schedule with him. Licker specifically identified Petitioner's "communication skills" as a continuing issue. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner was suspended without pay for two days for stating that Licker was being an "asshole," or something to that effect, in front of a co-worker. Petitioner accepted responsibility for her comment. Along with her suspension, Petitioner was also issued a written warning stated in pertinent part, "Upon your return [from suspension], you will be expected to demonstrate a high level of interpersonal skills towards your co-workers, management and this organization and work on completion of your Action Plan items. Any reports of less than acceptable behavior or performance or deviation from a Diagnostic Imaging or PMC policy or procedure will result in immediate termination." As a result of the written warning, Petitioner also lost 50 percent of her annual merit increase. In January 2008, management considered that the MRI department was still very "dysfunctional." Scott Hazelbaker, the new executive director of Diagnostics/Cardiovascular, met with all of the MRI employees as a group to discuss his "expectations of working together as a team." Hazelbaker also discerned that Licker lacked leadership skills to be an effective supervisor. In fact, none of the MRI employees had much respect for Licker's management style. On April 10, 2008, Hazelbaker, Gallacher, and Chaildin met with Petitioner to discuss her progress under the Action Plan. During the meeting, Hazelbaker reviewed Petitioner's history toward Respondent, explaining that her negative attitude could not be tolerated. Specifically, her negativity, failure to be a team player, and refusal to embrace or become engaged in Respondent's culture were detrimentally affecting the work of MRI as a whole. Hazelbaker continued by advising Respondent that as a result of her "track record," she could either resign from her employment or be terminated. Petitioner was advised that if she resigned, Respondent would pay her for two weeks in lieu of having her work through her notice period, pay her the balance of her personal leave bank, extend her health benefits for two weeks so that she could fill her prescriptions, and even designate her eligible for rehire in its system. At the end of the meeting, Petitioner tendered her resignation notice to Respondent. At no time during the meeting did Petitioner ask to leave the room or make a call in order to seek advice or legal counsel. Further, at no time during the meeting did Petitioner raise her past issues regarding Licker and the alleged sexual harassment she suffered. The evidence is persuasive that Licker did not influence the decision to terminate Petitioner. He had not asked for her to be terminated. In August 2009, more than one year after Petitioner resigned, Respondent received a complaint regarding Licker from then-X-Ray Tech Dana Keach, who claimed that Licker made sexually suggestive comments to her. Following an investigation, Licker was terminated, effective September 24, 2009, for "communication unsuitability between care partners." It does not appear that Licker was terminated for engaging in sexual harassment. The evidence is not persuasive that during the time he was employed by Respondent that Licker had inappropriate discussions in the workplace on numerous occasions in front of both male and female employees; nor that Licker would also discuss pornography in the workplace.

Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lesa Burkavage's, claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation against Respondent, Parrish Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2010.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569760.02760.10760.11
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