Findings Of Fact Chapter 402, Florida Statutes, provides for licensing of child care facilities by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "HRS"). It mandates minimum standards for personnel, physical facilities, sanitation and safety, nutritional practices, admissions and record keeping, transportation safety, child discipline, and plans of activities. Section 402.306, Florida Statutes, allows counties whose licensing standards meet or exceed state minimum standards to perform child care facility licensing in that county rather than HRS performing that activity. Chapter 402, Florida Statutes, was originally enacted in 1974 to provide minimum standards for the growing number of commercial day care facilities. In the definitional section of that Chapter, the legislature specifically defined a child care facility and further specified those programs and facilities exempted from the child care facility licensing laws. Section 402.302(4), Florida Statutes, provided as follows: "Child care facility" includes any child care center or child care arrangement which provides child care for more than five children unrelated to the operator and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, wherever operated, and whether or not operated for profit. The following are not included: public schools and non- public schools which are in compliance with the Compulsory School Attendance Law, chapter 232; summer camps having children in full-time residence; summer day camps; and Bible Schools normally conducted during vacation periods. [Emphasis supplied.] Due to extensive publicity involving certain abuse incidents by personnel at child care facilities and public opinion, the child care facility licensing laws were revisited in 1984. In a special session, the Legislature strengthened some requirements of Chapter 402 and provided for screening and background checks of personnel in child care facilities and for reasonable parental access to children in those facilities. Chapter 84-551, Laws of Florida. Due to the insistence of HRS and certain counties performing their own child care facility licensing that pre- kindergarten programs in schools required those schools to obtain licensure as child care facilities, Chapter 402 was further amended in 1985 to clarify the exclusion of schools. As amended, the statutory definition of child care facility now provides: "Child care facility" includes any child care center or child care arrangement which provides child care for more than five children unrelated to the operator and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, wherever operated, and whether or not operated for profit. The following are not included: public schools and non- public schools and their integral programs; summer camps having children in full-time residence; summer day camps; and Bible Schools normally conducted during during vacation periods. [Emphasis supplied.] Section 402.302(4), Florida Statutes 1985. The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement regarding the amendment of Chapter 402 provides that this change is a "Technical amendment which clarifies that public and non-public school programs are not subject to licensure as child care facilities." Respondent's Exhibit numbered 6. Following the 1985 amendments to Chapter 402, HRS and the Palm Beach County Health Department (which was responsible for child care facility licensing in Palm Beach County) jointly requested a legal opinion from the Attorney General regarding the scope of the statutory exclusions from child care licensing laws for public and nonpublic schools and their integral programs. The specific question posed was as follows: Do the exemptions under s. 402.302(4), F.S., as amended, and s. 9, Ch. 77-620, Laws of Florida, apply to public and nonpublic schools which offer: Prekindergarten classes during regular school hours in the same physical plant or in an adjoining structure? Infant care during regular school hours in the same physical plant or in an adjoining structure? School age child care services before and after school hours in the same physical plant or in an adjoining structure? In a lengthy analysis of the statutory exclusion of schools from child care facility licensing requirements, the Attorney General concluded: In sum, then, and unless and until legislatively or judicially determined otherwise, it is my opinion that the exemptions under s. 402.302(4), F.S., as amended by Chs. 84-551 and 85-54, Laws of Florida, and s. 9, Ch. 77-620, Laws of Florida, apply to public and nonpublic schools which offer prekindergarten classes or infant care during regular schools hours or school age child care services before and after school hours. . . . AGO 55-74, p. 7. Attorney General Opinion 85-74 also provides at page 3 as follows: Thus, public schools and nonpublic schools and their integral programs are not "child care facilit[ies]" for purposes of ss. 402.301-402.319, F.S., as amended. The term "integral programs" is not defined within ss. 402.301-402.319, F.S., as amended, or Oh. 85-54, Laws of Florida; however, the word "integral" has generally been defined as "[c]onstituting a completed whole; . . . lacking nothing of completeness." See, 46 C.J.S. Integral p. 1100; Ballentine's Law Dictionary 645 (3rd ed. 1969). And see, Random House Dictionary of the English Language Integral p. 738 (unabridged ed. 1967) (pertaining to or belonging as a part of the whole; constituent or component; necessary to the completeness of the whole); Webster's Third International Dictionary Integral p. 1173 (1966) (composed of constituent parts; making up a whole). Of., Matezak v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 299 F.Supp. 409, 413 (D.C.N.Y. 1969)("integral" means part of constituent component necessary or essential to complete the whole). Whether a particular child care center or arrangement constitutes an integral program for purposes of s. 402.302(4), FS., as amended, would appear to present a factual question which can only be reached on a case-by-case basis. [Emphasis supplied.] During the special session in 1984 and the regular session in 1985, the Legislature increased funding for HRS' child care facility licensing activities and also created 48 additional staff positions for those licensure activities. Several HRS employees determined that (1) the Attorney General's Opinion was confusing, (2) it was too difficult to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a program was an integral part of a school or a child care facility, and (3) the exclusion of schools from child care facility licensing requirements was inconsistent with legislative intent of protecting children. Accordingly, HRS drafted an amendment to Rule 10M-12.001, Florida Administrative Code, to define the term "integral program". The "rule package" prepared by HRS in compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, commences with the following language: Reason rule is being filed or amended: Chapter 402.302(4), Florida Statutes, provides the definition of a child care facility. Public and non public schools and their integral programs are precluded from this definition as a child care facility and therefore are not subject to licensure. . . . The term "integral programs", which is not defined by statute, is ambiguous and has been the subject of various interpretations by public and non public schools. For purposes of licensure, this rule amendment is necessary in order to clarify which specific child care programs in the public and non public schools are required to be licensed. Without the rule amendment, some schools will continue to interpret their "integral programs" as meaning their infant and preschool programs, or before and after school programs, thereby avoiding licensure and resulting in no regulation by the department . . . Rule 10M-12.001, Florida Administrative Code, as proposed, would provide as follows: (1) Child Care Standards and Licensure. Child Care Standards included in this chapter were adopted by the department to protect the health, safety and well being of the children of the State who receive child care in child care facilities as defined in Section 402.302, Florida Statutes, and to promote their emotional and intellectual development and care. Public and nonpublic schools and their integral programs are not child care facilities as defined in Section 402.302(4) Florida Statutes, and are not subject to licensure. The term "integral programs" includes school activities which are directly related to the educational component of the school for 5 year old kindergarten programs through grade 12, and extra curricular activities, such as sport teams, school yearbook, school band, meetings, and service clubs. The term also includes child care programs administered directly by the school to care and supervise children from 5 year old kindergarten through grade 12 before and after the school day. The term "integral program" does not include child care programs for children below 5 year old kindergarten, such as infants and preschoolers, and child care programs which are contracted by the school to provide care and supervision for children from 5 year old kindergarten through grade 12 before and after the school day. The proposed rule as published and noticed by HRS, although defended by HRS vigorously in this proceeding, is not in fact the rule that HRS intends to adopt. HRS now admits that it has no authority to regulate any program in a public school since only the Florida Department of Education can regulate public schools. HRS intends, therefore, to delete the reference to public schools in its proposed rule and to only regulate nonpublic schools although it admits that such regulation of only nonpublic schools would therefore be discriminatory. HRS further intends to amend its proposed rule so as to clarify that those nonpublic schools which are religious in affiliation will continue to enjoy the additional exemption from child care facility licensure given to them by Section 402.316(1), Florida Statutes, which provides: The provisions of ss. 402.301-402.319, except for the requirements regarding screening of child care personnel, shall not apply to a child care facility which is an integral part of church or parochial schools conducting regularly scheduled classes, courses of study, or education programs accredited by, or by a member of, an organization which publishes and requires compliance with its standards for health, safety, and sanitation. However, such facilities shall meet minimum requirements of the applicable local governing body as to health, sanitation, and safety and shall meet the screening requirements pursuant to ss. 402.305 and 402.3055. Failure by a facility to comply with such screening requirements shall result in the loss of the facility's exemption from licensure. Petitioner Florida Association of Academic Nonpublic Schools (hereinafter "FAANS") is comprised of approximately 25 associations of schools. Additionally, archdioceses, which are separate corporate entities, and which own and operate schools, are direct members as are county organizations and the Florida Catholic Conference. The organization itself represents nonpublic schools in the state of Florida before state agencies, including the Legislature which it actively lobbies. It has a direct relationship as a state representative, one of only five in the country, with the United States Department of Education. It is involved in accreditation and has a code of ethics with which all schools (both direct members and indirect members) must comply. FAANS presently represents 943 schools with approximately 230,000 students, out of the approximate 1,750 nonpublic schools in the state of Florida. A majority of the schools represented by FAANS operate educational programs for children under 5 years of age. For the most part, these school programs are not licensed as child care facilities although some of the schools have licensed their programs under duress rather than have their programs closed by the child care facility licensing agencies. All of the nonpublic schools represented by FAANS comply with the Florida Department of Education requirement that they annually submit statistical information including the number of students and faculty in their prekindergarten programs for the Department of Education's Nonpublic School Data Base. Petitioner Jacksonville Country Day School presented no evidence in this proceeding. Petitioner The Cushman School is a nonpublic school in Miami, Florida, and is an indirect member of FAANS. It has been in operation for 62 years and has operated educational programs for children under 5 since it was founded. It begins enrolling students at the age of 3 years (and on rare occasion 2 years) and offers education through grade 6. It is not presently licensed as a child care facility. Under the proposed rule as published in the June 6, 1986, Florida Administrative Weekly, The Cushman School would be required to obtain a child care facility license, the economic impact of which would be significant. First, it would lose its exemption from property taxes as an educational institution at a speculated cost of approximately $10,000. Structural modifications would need to be made to the school for bathing and sleeping facilities. Additional requirements, such as fencing and child-staff ratios, would come into play imposing more costs on the school. The Cushman School possesses historic site status which means even minor repairs, let alone structural modifications, have extensive restrictions imposed as to how they can be done and the materials that can be used. The end result is that if the proposed rule goes into effect, The Cushman School will have to discontinue its educational programs for children under 5 years of age. The economic impact of compliance with child care facility licensing requirements by schools is not unique to The Cushman School. Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, requires each agency proposing or amending a rule to provide a detailed economic impact statement. The purpose of an economic impact statement is to promote informed decision-making by ensuring an accurate analysis of economic factors, and those factors an agency must consider are clearly specified. An agency must also consider the impact of a proposed rule on small businesses as defined in the Florida Small and Minority Business Assistance Act of 1985. There are nonpublic schools throughout Florida which fit the statutory definition of small business. It is clear from the economic impact statement for proposed rule 10M-12.001 that HRS did not consider the impact of the rule on small business nonpublic schools. Also to be considered is the cost to an agency of implementing the rule. According to HRS' impact statement, actual implementation statewide will only cost $31. There is no consideration of additional staff time and paperwork to process applications, issue additional licenses, or conduct additional inspections. There is no comment in the economic impact statement of the impact on competition and the open market for employment, or any indication that such an analysis is inapplicable; rather, the agency's estimate of effect on competition speaks to potential cost savings from deregulation of before and after school care programs. Similarly, the required analysis of the costs or economic benefits to all persons directly affected by the proposed rule speaks in terms of deregulation and substantial savings and is, accordingly, deceptive. An agency is also required to provide a detailed statement of the data and method used in making each of the estimates required in the economic impact statement. The only detailed statement in HRS' economic impact statement refers to the costs of printing and mailing, publication of the proposed rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and conducting a public hearing on the proposed rule. There is no hint of the data and method used, if any, in reaching other conclusions contained within the economic impact statement. The economic impact statement accompanying proposed rule 10M-12.001 is inadequate. Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes, further requires that an agency proposing a rule give notice of its intended action and the specific legal authority under which its adoption is authorized. As set forth above, the rule proposed by HRS does not reflect its intended action since the rule purports to apply to both public and nonpublic schools and HRS intends to further amend the rule so as to exclude its application to public schools and its application to religious nonpublic schools. As to the specific legal authority under which the proposed rule is authorized, HRS cites, at the end of the proposed rule, as its rulemaking authority Section 402.301, Florida Statutes. That section is entitled "Child care facilities; legislative intent and declaration of purpose and policy". Nowhere in that legislative intent section is HRS authorized to promulgate rules. The proposed rule thus fails to fulfill that requirement.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Department of Children and Families’ (the Department), intended action to cite Respondent, Kids Village Early Learning Center, with a Class I violation and impose a fine in the amount of $500, is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department is responsible for licensing and monitoring “child care facilities,” as that term is defined in section 402.302(2), Florida Statutes. Kids Village is a child care facility licensed by the Department. Kids Village is operated by Angela Mitchell and is located at 1000 West Tharpe Street, Suite 24, Tallahassee, Florida. Kids Village is located in a shopping area commonly referred to as a “strip mall,” a series of retail and office establishments located along a sidewalk with exterior entrances. A Dollar General store is located across the parking lot from the strip mall. On November 2, 2017, L.C., a two-year-old child enrolled at Kids Village, exited the facility unaccompanied and on his own volition. A stranger spotted the child in the parking lot near the Dollar General store and left her vehicle to pick up the child. A parent of a former student at Kids Village, who works in the strip mall, recognized L.C. and returned him to the facility. L.C. was absent from the facility for approximately four minutes. Teresa Walker, a teacher at Kids Village, who was working on the day of the incident, called and reported the incident to Ms. Mitchell, who was not working at the facility that day. Both Ms. Walker and Ms. Mitchell completed required incident reports and filed them with the Department. The incident was also the subject of an anonymous complaint received by the Department’s child abuse hotline the same day. Elizabeth Provost, a Department family services counselor, received both the incident reports and the complaint and began an investigation. As part of her investigation, Ms. Provost interviewed the child protective investigator who received the complaint from the abuse hotline, as well as Ms. Mitchell and Ms. Walker. Ms. Provost also viewed the facility’s security camera footage from the day of the incident. Based on her investigation, Ms. Provost determined that L.C.’s mother arrived at the facility on the morning of November 6, 2017, signed the child in at the reception desk, engaged in conversation with another employee of the facility, looked around the corner where a gate separates the reception area from a hallway leading to classrooms, then exited the facility. Afterward, security video shows L.C. exiting the facility without supervision. Based upon her investigation, Ms. Provost concluded that the facility was in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.001(5), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Direct supervision means actively watching and directing children’s activities within the same room or designated outdoor play area, and responding to the needs of the child. Child care personnel at a facility must be assigned to provide direct supervision to a specific group of children at all times. Ms. Provost also determined the violation was a Class I violation of Department rules, which is described as “the most serious in nature, [which] pose[s] an imminent threat to a child including abuse or neglect and which could or does result in death or serious harm to the health, safety or well- being of a child.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-22.010(1)(d)1. At hearing, Ms. Mitchell admitted that, on November 2, 2016, L.C. was indeed faced with a serious or imminent threat to his safety which could have resulted in injury or death. As such, Ms. Mitchell admitted the Department properly determined the incident was a Class I violation of rule 65C-22.001(5). Ms. Mitchell’s contention was that Kids Village was not completely at fault, and that the penalty assessed should be reduced to account for the mother’s negligence. L.C. was known to the staff at Kids Village as a “runner.” He experienced separation anxiety and would frequently try to follow his mother when she left the facility after dropping him off for school. Ms. Mitchell testified that L.C.’s mother had been instructed to walk L.C. to his classroom and hand him over to his teacher before leaving the facility. Ms. Mitchell faults the mother for having signed the child in on the morning of the incident, but leaving the facility without walking the child all the way to his classroom. The evidence adduced at hearing did not support that version of the facts. Ms. Walker was the only witness who testified at the final hearing who was actually at the facility on the day in question. Her recollection of the events was clear and her testimony was credible. Ms. Walker works in the “baby room,” which is located to the left of the reception area past the reception desk. The gate separating the reception area from the hallway to the classrooms is to the right of the reception desk. Ms. Walker testified that after his mother signs L.C. and his older brother in on most mornings, L.C. comes to stay with her in the baby room. Ms. Walker gives him hugs and extra attention to help overcome his anxiety, then walks him to his classroom when he is calm. On the morning in question, L.C.’s mother came into the facility and signed the children in at the reception desk. Signing a child in requires both completing a physical sign-in sheet, and an electronic interface with a computer system. While his mother was signing in the children, L.C. went to the baby room where Ms. Walker greeted him and hugged him. L.C.’s mother finished signing in the children and talking to the staff, then she turned to find both children gone. The mother “hollered out” to Ms. Walker something to the effect of “Where did the children go?” Ms. Walker replied that they had gone “to the back.” L.C.’s mother walked over to the gate separating the reception area from the classroom hallway and peered around it down the hallway. She then exited the facility. Shortly thereafter, L.C. came back through the gate, into the reception area, and exited the facility through the front door unaccompanied. L.C. was alone outside the facility in a crowded parking lot of a retail strip mall for almost five minutes. He had crossed the parking lot during morning traffic to almost reach the Dollar General store. L.C. was spotted by a stranger who got out of their own vehicle to pick up the child. L.C. was recognized, and returned to the facility, by someone who worked at a nearby store. One does not need an overactive imagination to list the dangers that could have befallen the child during that brief time period. Kids Village has taken corrective action since the incident and installed a security system on the front door which requires a person to push a button on a panel next to the door in order to exit the facility. There was no testimony regarding any prior citations against Kids Village for violation of child care licensing standards. The investigative summary prepared by Ms. Provost states, “Kid’s Village has one prior with the Department earlier in 2016[;] there were no indicators of inadequate supervision.” Rule 65C-22.010(2)(e) provides appropriate disciplinary sanctions to be imposed for Class I violations, as follows: For the first and second violation of a Class I standard, the department shall, upon applying the factors in Section 402.310(1), F.S., issue an administrative complaint imposing a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500 per day for each violation, and may impose other disciplinary sanctions in addition to the fine. Section 402.310(1)(b) provides: In determining the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken for a violation as provided in paragraph (a), the following factors shall be considered: The severity of the violation, including the probability that death or serious harm to the health or safety of any person will result or has resulted, the severity of the actual or potential harm, and the extent to which the provisions of ss. 401.301-402.319 have been violated. Actions taken by the licensee or registrant to correct the violation or remedy complaints. Any previous violations of the licensee or registrant. In determining to impose a $500 penalty, Ms. Provost considered the subsequent remedial action taken by Kids Village to prevent future escapes by children in its care. She also considered the serious threat of harm or death posed to L.C. due to inadequate supervision by Kids Village. Imposition of the maximum fine for the Class I violation is supported by the record in this case. Neither the statute nor the rule direct the Department to consider the negligence of persons other than the licensee in determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed for a Class I violation.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the evidence presented at final hearing, and based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Children and Families, finding Kids Village Early Learning Center committed a Class I violation of child care facility licensing standards and imposing a monetary sanction of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa M. Eilertsen, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Camille Larson, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road, Room 231 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Angela Mitchell Kids Village Early Learning Center Suite 24 1000 West Tharpe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Michael Andrew Lee, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road, Room 231 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Mike Carroll, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Windwood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Rebecca Kapusta, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
The Issue Is Petitioner eligible for Developmental Services from the Department of Children and Family Services?
Findings Of Fact Audrey Smith is the natural mother of Petitioner Chester (Charlie) Smith. She filed an application with Respondent Department of Children and Family Services Developmental Services Program on behalf of her son. The application was denied, and this case followed. Chester Smith did not appear for formal hearing. Audrey Smith represented that she had a power of attorney to act on her son's behalf and that she was his payee for federal SSI benefits, arising from Petitioner's disability and his father's death. Neither of these instruments was offered in evidence, but because she had applied to the agency on Chester's behalf and had requested formal hearing, Mrs. Smith was accepted as Petitioner's "next friend" and qualified representative. The Developmental Services Program, administered by Respondent, provides services to persons with specific developmental disabilities, including mental retardation, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, autism, and Prader-Willi Syndrome, pursuant to Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, born October 18, 1953, had originally been turned down for services as not meeting the statutory and rule requirements of "mental retardation." During the informal hearings following that denial and preceding referral of the disputed issues of fact to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal hearing, Mrs. Smith asserted Petitioner's entitlement to services on the basis of "autism." She also asserted this entitlement in her request for formal hearing. In determining Petitioner's eligibility for services, agency staff psychologist Fe Ripka reviewed four psychological evaluations previously performed on Petitioner. Ms. Ripka did not testify, but her January 27, 1997, report was placed in evidence. She only reviewed evaluations done in May 1965, July 1966, February 1995, and April 1996. Ms. Ripka's degrees and titles show "M.A.," "LMHC," and "Psychologist." No specific education, training or experience on her part was related. Her report emphasized Petitioner's verbal IQ and full scale IQs as controlling of eligibility. She concluded, on the basis of her review, that Petitioner did not suffer from mental retardation. Her report made no determination on the basis of autism. Petitioner's mother related that Petitioner was deprived of oxygen at birth and never developed normally. She has presumed him "brain damaged." Petitioner has required special classes and other remedial help throughout his life. He is now 45 years old. From 2 ½ to 8 ½ years of age, Petitioner was treated at the Putnam Children's Clinic. Not much is known about the treatment. Petitioner's Exhibit 9 (also part of Respondent's Exhibit 4) contains records from the Devereux Foundation Schools of Devon, Pennsylvania, including an August 22, 1967, "Exit Interview and Discharge Diagnosis Form" with a discharge diagnosis of "ooo-x28 Schizophrenic Reaction, Childhood Type . . . autism and possible mental retardation." The "Initial Psychiatric Evaluation" of November 5, 1965, by Robert Ewalds, M.D., a psychiatrist, related that Petitioner's manner was "generally autistic," with borderline intellectual functioning, "a history of autism," and a thinking disorder/chronic schizophrenic process, and that Petitioner would require custodial care indefinitely. The January 7, 1966, "Psycho- Educational Evaluation" of F. Howard Buss, Ph.D., and W.S. Holloway, B.A., of Devereux's Psychology Department, made an "Educational Diagnosis" of Petitioner as "achieving academically at a level below measured intellectual functioning and well below chronological age expectations." Henry Platt, Ph.D., of the Psychology Department performed a July 30, 1966, "Psychological Evaluation" which related the following critical matters: Intelligence: Current intellectual functioning, as measured by the WISC, was at a low average level in the verbal area (IQ 86), submarginal in the performance area (IQ 62), with a marginal level for the full test (IQ 72). * * * . . . findings were in line with those reported on the WISC about a year ago, despite the slight drop in scores on present testing. VIQ2 PIQ3 FSIQ4 May 1965 89 68 77 July 1966 86 62 72 After Pennsylvania, Petitioner lived in Minnesota with his adult married sister until recently. He received developmental disability benefits from the State of Minnesota until he moved to Florida to live with his mother in 1997. Petitioner was tested February 14, 1995, by Scott County, Minnesota, Human Services agency (Petitioner's Exhibit 10). The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale tests were administered. In a written opinion, April Leaveck, Psy.D., opined that Petitioner had scored a verbal IQ of 82; performance IQ of 67 and full scale IQ of 74, with a percentile ranking of four, which constituted a "borderline range of intellectual functioning." The Vineland testing showed a low-deficit adaptive level in each of the three domains and overall low-deficit adaptive level with an age equivalent score of seven years, eight months. Petitioner was 42 years old at the time. In the evaluator's opinion, a significant discrepancy in his verbal and performance scores reflected "brain damage at birth." All of the foregoing reports also attest to Petitioner's lifelong impairment in reciprocal interpersonal relationships and social interaction. All of them indicate he was hard to test because of distractibility. An April 1996 evaluation, performed when Petitioner was 43, showed a Stanford-Binet IQ of 59. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) Approximately April 16, 1998, and subsequent to Ms. Ripka's review, Petitioner was tested by Larry Neidigh, Ph.D., Licensed Psychologist and Diplomate of the American College of Forensic Examiners. His Weschler test scoring when Petitioner was 45, showed a Verbal IQ of 69, a Performance IQ of 62, and a Full Scale Select IQ of 63. He opined that, applying all variables, a valid estimate of Petitioner's intellectual functioning was between 60 and 68. Petitioner is currently being seen at the Clay County Florida Behavioral Services Day Treatment Program by Russell Findley, M.D. Dr. Findley is a Florida-licensed medical physician. He is treating Petitioner for Bipolar Disorder, using a variety of modalities, including psychotropic drugs. He has concluded that Petitioner's medical history, including the historical facts of birth trauma and initiation of mental health treatment when Petitioner was only 2 ½ years old, is suggestive that Petitioner's "primary process is best described as developmental, not [a] mental health problem;" and that Petitioner has significant intellectual impairment, not consonant with BiPolar Disorder. Dr. Findley testified that Petitioner is "mildly mentally retarded," (TR 76-77) and again, "In my clinical impression, it is mental retardation." (TR 77) He did not consider "schizophrenia" to be a valid current diagnosis. Petitioner's Bipolar Disorder is in remission due to the drugs currently being administered to him. With the Bipolar Disorder in remission, what Dr. Findley sees in Petitioner is consistent with mental retardation. It is possible that the new medications render Petitioner's more recent IQ tests more accurate than the earlier ones because he is less distractible and more easily tested. With a standard deviation of two, Dr. Findley is aware of the prior IQs of 72 and 74. He has administered no IQ tests himself. He considers modern testing to be more accurate. Within the DSM-IV standards of medical/psychiatric diagnosis, he considers Petitioner to be "Axis I, bipolar disorder in remission with mild MR5 " extending over the whole of Petitioner's life. (TR 84) Dr. Findley was not asked about autism. The parties agreed to the admission of an excerpt from "Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support," published by the American Association of Mental Retardation which reads: Mental Retardation Diagnostic Features The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criteria A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system. General intellectual functioning is defined by the intelligence quotient (IQ or IQ-equivalent) obtained by assessment with one or more of the standardized, individually administered intelligence tests (e.g., Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children -- Revised, Stanford-Binet, Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children). Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is defined as an IQ of about 70 or below (approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean). It should be noted that there is a measurement error of approximately 5 points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from instrument to instrument (e.g. a Wechsler IQ of 70 is considered to represent a range of 65-75). Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with . . . [remainder missing] To sum up, Petitioner's documented assessments, by year and age, are as follows: Exhibit No. Date Age Full Scale IQ P-9 5/65 11 ½ 77 Other Diagnosis, if any P-9 11/5/65 12 ½ generally autistic; a history of autism; P-9 7/30/66 13 72 P-9 8/22/67 14 000-x28 schizophrenic reaction, autism and possible mental retardation P-10 2/14/95 42 74 P-2 4/96 43 59 P-6 4/16/98 45 63 true IQ between 60-68 Also, the current diagnosis of Dr. Findley, pursuant to the generally recognized authority of DSM-IV, may be summed up that Petitioner suffers from mild mental retardation, previously camouflaged by his Bipolar Disorder. Petitioner has never met the standards of personal independence and social responsibility of his chronological age. He has never held other than a protected job. He has never solely cared for his own person. Since infancy, he has been under the care and supervision of either his family in Pennsylvania, his adult sister in Minnesota, where he has long received developmental benefits, or his mother since 1997. He has suffered from impairment in reciprocal social interaction continuously since infancy.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order determining Petitioner eligible for "autism" benefits and denying him retardation benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1999.
The Issue Whether Respondent, in November 2006, violated child care facility licensing standards relating to supervision set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.001(5), as alleged by the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) in its December 15, 2006, letter to Respondent. If so, whether Respondent should be fined $1,000.00 for this violation, as proposed by the Department in the aforesaid December 15, 2006, letter.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, including Thursday, November 16, 2006, Respondent operated a child care facility located at 780 Fisherman Street in Opa Locka, Florida (Facility) pursuant to a license issued by the Department, which was effective June 10, 2006, through June 9, 2007. On November 16, 2006, J. D. was one of nine children between the ages of 12 and 23 months in the Facility's Wobbler/Toddler class. Two properly credentialed Facility staff members, Charnette Muldrow and Barry Thompson, were assigned to oversee the children in the class that day. Cheryl Smith is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, including November 16, 2006, the Facility's office manager. Among her various responsibilities is to make sure that state-mandated staff-to-child ratios are maintained in each of the Facility's classrooms. To this end, she has placed posters in the classrooms indicating what these "appropriate ratios" are and that they "must be maintained at all times." In addition, she "do[es] counts [of staff and children in each classroom] every hour on the hour." She did these "counts" in J. D.'s Wobbler/Toddler classroom on November 16, 2006, and each time found the staff-to-child ratio to be "correct" (one staff member for every six children). Sometime around noon on November 16, 2006, a Facility staff member brought J. D. to Ms. Smith's office. J. D. was not crying, although she had a roundish red mark on her right cheek that she had not had when her mother had dropped her off at the Facility earlier that day. "It looked like ringworm to [Ms. Smith] at first." There were no discernible "puncture wounds," nor was there any blood. The staff member who had brought J. D. to the office explained to Ms Smith that J. D. had "bumped her face" on the "corner cabinet in the classroom." After administering first-aid to J. D., Ms. Smith attempted to contact J. D.'s mother, J. F., by telephone. She was unable to reach J. F., but left a message at J. F.'s workplace. J. F. returned Ms. Smith's call at 12:54 p.m. and was told by Ms. Smith that J. D. had "bumped her head on a cabinet while playing, and she ha[d] a little bruise," but was "doing fine." J. F. left work at 4:30 p.m. and went directly to the Facility to pick up J. D. Upon arriving at the Facility, J. F. first went "upstairs" to see Ms. Smith, who told her "about the incident and what [had] happened." J. F. then went to retrieve J. D. (who was "downstairs"). It did not appear to J. F., when she examined the mark on J. D.'s cheek, that the mark was "from the cabinet." In her opinion, it looked like J. D. had been bitten by "somebody,"4 a view that she expressed upon returning to Ms. Smith's office. Ms. Smith replied, "There's no biters in here.5 Nobody bit J." Before leaving the Facility with J. D., J. F. signed an Accident/Incident Report that Ms. Smith had filled out. According to the completed report, on "11/16/06 at 12:00 noon," J. D. "was playing with . . . toys and bumped her face on the corner cabinet," leaving a "red mark on the right side of her face"; Mr. Thompson was a "[w]itness[] to [the] [a]ccident/[i]ncident"; the injured area was treated with "antiseptic spray[,] triple antibiotic ointment and a cold compress"; and a message was left with J. F. "to call school." J. F. took J. D. directly from the Facility to the Skylake office of Pediatric Associates, a pediatric group practice to which J. D.'s regular pediatrician belonged. J. D.'s regular pediatrician was unavailable that evening, so J. D. saw someone else,6 who gave her a signed and dated handwritten note, which read as follows: To whom it may concern The injuries on [J. D.'s] cheek and back are consistent with a human bite. Please investigate.[7] Thank you. J. F. reported to the local police department, as well as to the Department, that J. D. had been injured at the Facility. J. F. provided this information to Ian Fleary, the Department's childcare licensing supervisor for the north area of the southeast zone, during a visit that she made to Mr. Fleary's office late in the afternoon on Friday, November 17, 2006. J. F. brought J. D. with her to Mr. Fleary's office and showed Mr. Fleary the red mark on J. F.'s cheek, as well as three other, less visible marks on J. F. (one on her cheek, beneath the red mark; one on her lower back; and one on her right forearm).8 Mr. Fleary took photographs of all four marks.9 Mr. Fleary asked one of his subordinates, Linda Reiling, to "address [J. F.'s] complaint as soon as possible." Ms. Reiling, accompanied by Mr. Fleary, went to the Facility on Monday, November 20, 2006, to investigate J. F.'s complaint. Ms. Reiling and Mr. Fleary interviewed Facility staff members, including Ms. Muldrow and Mr. Thompson.10 Ms. Muldrow stated that she had gone to the restroom, having asked another staff member "to watch the children" in her absence, and first "saw the mark on [J. D.'s] cheek" upon her return to the classroom. Mr. Thompson advised that he was "on lunch break at the time the incident occurred."11 No one to whom Ms. Reiling and Mr. Fleary spoke at the Facility "admitted seeing [J. D.] being bitten." Based on her investigation, Ms. Reiling was unable to determine, one way or another, whether the staff-to-child ratio in J. D.'s classroom was "correct" on "[t]he day of the incident," but she did find that there was a "lack of supervision." Ms. Reiling prepared a written complaint documenting this finding and provided it to Ms. Smith. Meloni Fincher, a child protective investigator with the Department, also investigated the matter. She was assigned the case on November 17, 2006, after the incident had been reported to the Florida Abuse Hotline. Ms. Fincher began her investigation by visiting J. F. and J. D. at their home that same day (November 17, 2006), some time after 4:00 p.m. During her visit, Ms. Fincher observed that J. D. had "bruises to her cheek, her back, and [also] her arm." Ms. Fincher was unable to determine the nature or cause of these injuries, so she made arrangements for J. D. to be seen on November 21, 2006, by a University of Miami Child Protection Team physician. Ms. Fincher went to the Facility on November 21, 2006, but was unable to speak to any staff members about the incident at that time. She returned to the Facility on December 7, 2006. This time, she interviewed Ms. Muldrow, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Smith, and Dawnise Mobley.12 None of the interviewees claimed to be an eyewitness to the incident, having personal knowledge of what happened to J. D. After receiving a copy of the Child Protection Team's "medical report," which contained the team's determination that J. D. had "bite marks at different stages [of] healing [which were] consistent with another child [having] bit[ten] [her]," Ms. Fincher, on December 12, 2006, "closed the case" finding "[v]erified indicators of inadequate supervision."13 The evidence received at the final hearing does not allow the undersigned, applying a clear and convincing competent evidence standard, to reach the same conclusion that Ms. Fincher and Ms. Reiling did regarding the adequacy of the supervision J. D. received at the Facility on November 16, 2006. While the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that J. D. suffered a single (red) mark on her right cheek while at the Facility that day, it does not clearly and convincingly establish that she was being inadequately supervised at the time. Inferring that Respondent failed to provide J. D. with adequate supervision based on the mere fact that she received this mark while in Respondent's care is unwarranted, absent a clear and convincing showing (enabling the undersigned to conclude, with a firm belief and conviction and without hesitancy) that a toddler would not receive such a mark while at a child care facility in a classroom setting like J. D. was in unless there was a lack of adequate supervision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the "inadequate supervision" charge made in its December 15, 2006, letter to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Fischer is a child under commitment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service who on May 24, 1978, was granted the privilege of transferring to a community placement under the direct supervision and authority of the Bureau of Fields Services, Division of Youth Services. The transfer was the subject of a furlough agreement entered into by Fischer with HRS on the same date. On May 31, 1978, Fischer was furloughed from the Alyce D. McPherson School, Ocala, Florida, and released to the custody of Mr. Rolf Fischer, the brother of Fischer's natural father who had raised her since she was sixteen (16) months old. On June 6, 1978, Fischer was placed on a contract with her counselor, Francine Nelms, for the week of June 6, 1978, to June 13, 1978. The contract provided that Fischer could not leave her residence without her stepfather being with her, that she was to do all her chores and that she was to maintain an attitude of respect toward her stepfather. Fischer did not sign the contract although she read it and indicated that she understood it. On June 7, 1978, Fischer left her stepfather's place of residence without permission and travelled around the State of Florida by hitchhiking and riding the bus. She was apprehended in Venice, Florida, by the Venice Police Department. Pursuant to a hearing conducted by Mr. Arrie Owens, Youth Services Program Specialist of HRS, on June 21, 1978, Fischer had her furlough revoked because she failed to abide by her furlough agreement by virtue of her leaving her place of residence without permission. Fischer subsequently commenced this appeal.
The Issue Whether Respondent, YouthFit by BodyZone Fitness, conducts activities that constitute "child care," so that it must obtain a child care facility license in order to conduct these activities.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner DCF is the state agency responsible, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, for regulating providers of "child care," as that term is defined in section 402.302(1). Respondent YouthFit is a Florida limited liability company. It is located at, and its business address is, 2827 North Roosevelt Boulevard, Key West, Florida. YouthFit is owned and managed by Calvin Paquette. Paquette also owns BodyZone Fitness, LLC ("BodyZone"), a Florida limited liability company that operates a fitness facility located at 2740 North Roosevelt Boulevard, Key West, contiguous to YouthFit. Information Submitted in Questionnaire On July 13, 2018, Paquette submitted a Child Care Licensure Questionnaire ("Questionnaire") to DCF on behalf of YouthFit, requesting a determination whether YouthFit conducts "child care." The Questionnaire was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. The Questionnaire provided information regarding the nature and location of YouthFit's operation; the types of activities that YouthFit provides to children; the ages of the children participating in YouthFit's activities; the type of supervision that YouthFit provides to participants; and the payment/fee arrangements to participate in YouthFit's activities. According to the Questionnaire, YouthFit is a youth fitness program consisting of instructor-led classes offered to children ranging in age from preschool to high school. The classes identified in the Questionnaire were tumbling classes; strength, conditioning, and flexibility classes; and ninja classes. A YouthFit Class Pricing Schedule attached to the Questionnaire showed that, at the time the Questionnaire was submitted, YouthFit also offered "open gym" and "parents' night out" activities. Both of these activities entailed parents dropping children off at, and picking them up from, YouthFit. The Questionnaire stated that YouthFit offered classes from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., seven days a week. Per the Questionnaire, participation in these classes is limited to one to two hours of class per day for each child. Attendance is not required, and the same children do not necessarily attend YouthFit's classes on a regular basis. The Questionnaire stated that parents are not required to remain on the YouthFit premises at all times, although they are permitted to do so. Parents may drop children off at the YouthFit facility to participate in classes and are expected to pick them up after class is over. The Questionnaire stated that children are not permitted to enter and leave the YouthFit classes or premises unless they have permission pursuant to prior arrangement or have adult supervision. Parents are required to sign their children in and out of the YouthFit classes and premises. According to the Questionnaire YouthFit supervises all children who are participating in its classes, including the children whose parents remain on the premises. Prepackaged snacks and drinks are offered to the participants of each of YouthFit's classes. Payment for participation in YouthFit's activities is made two ways: payment through adult membership at BodyZone Fitness, and payment of a drop-in fee for persons who are not members of BodyZone Fitness. YouthFit is not operated by a public or nonpublic school and is not located on a school site. YouthFit is not affiliated with a national non-profit organization created for the purpose of providing youth service and youth development. Based on the foregoing information, DCF determined that YouthFit provides "child care," as defined in section 402.302(1); therefore, it is required to be licensed as a "child care facility" pursuant to section 402.305, unless it falls within a statutory or rule exemption from the licensure requirement. Based on its review of the Questionnaire, DCF also determined that YouthFit did not qualify for any statutory or rule exemption from licensure as a child care facility. Accordingly, DCF notified Paquette of its decision that YouthFit was required to obtain a child care facility license in order to provide its youth fitness program activities. Facts Stated in YouthFit's Request for Hearing As noted above, Paquette timely requested a hearing challenging DCF's decision that YouthFit must obtain a child care facility license. In the letter requesting a hearing, Paquette provided additional information regarding the YouthFit fitness program. This letter was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit C. According to the letter, YouthFit classes will be offered in BodyZone's expanded premises, which accommodate both YouthFit classes and adult fitness activities. Per the letter, children ages two through 18 may take the YouthFit classes. The letter clarified that a parent must be present at all times for children ages four and under, and YouthFit may require a parent to be present for children up to age five. The letter also clarified that each child would be limited to one class per day, which may range from 45 minutes to two hours in duration. The letter stated that YouthFit would not offer "child care" services, but, instead, would "operate no different [sic] than a local gymnastics center (or martial-arts dojo) offering tumbling classes (or ju-jitsu classes)." The letter explained that the "intent is fitness activities, not child care services." Other Evidence Presented at the Final Hearing DCF presented evidence at the final hearing that included screenshots of YouthFit's website, Facebook page, and Twitter account. At the time the screenshots were taken, YouthFit's Facebook page and Twitter account advertised a range of YouthFit classes and activities, including tumbling, Zumba kids, yoga kids, ninja class, boot camp, open gym, parents' night out, and day camps. Paquette testified that the hours associated with YouthFit's program recently have changed, so that classes and activities are now offered from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Additionally, YouthFit no longer offers parents' night out, open gym, or day camps. Paquette also testified that YouthFit no longer advertises its activities on Facebook and Twitter. However, at the time of the final hearing, he had not been able to access these accounts, so the advertisements had not been removed from the internet. Paquette testified that the sole means by which information on YouthFit's classes and activities is disseminated is by "word-of-mouth."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Families, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Youthfit by BodyZone Fitness, LLC, currently provides a program of classes and activities that constitute "child care," so that it is required to obtain a "child care facility" license to provide this program. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2019.
