The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged by Petitioner in her Employment Charge of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact During all times material to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a park ranger at Alafia River State Park in Lithia, Florida. On January 1, 2010, Petitioner became a full- time park ranger, and from this date through June 5, 2014, Petitioner was supervised by Coy Helms, the manager for Alafia River State Park. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment for “poor performance and conduct unbecoming a public employee.” The events that led to Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent occurred on March 28, 2014. Petitioner is a 40-plus-year-old Christian female, who identifies as being of Greek and Native American origin. Petitioner describes her skin color as “olive.” Background Information On November 18, 2013, Petitioner received a written reprimand from Coy Helms, who at the time served as park manager at Alafia State Park and Petitioner’s immediate supervisor. Petitioner was reprimanded for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public employee. According to the reprimand, Petitioner had interactions with certain park volunteers that resulted in complaints being filed with Mr. Helms. The written reprimand advised that “THIS IS AN OFFICIAL WRITTEN REPRIMAND [and that] FUTURE VIOLATIONS MAY RESULT IN FURTHER OR MORE SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, UP TO AND INCLUDING DISMISSAL.” Petitioner refused to sign the reprimand when the same was presented to her by Mr. Helms. In early December 2013, a few weeks after receiving the written reprimand, Petitioner verbally reported to Valinda Subic that during the summer of 2011, Petitioner was inappropriately touched on the ear by her co-worker, Ronald Stevens. Ms. Subic advised Rae Kelly, from Respondent’s bureau of human resource management, of Petitioner’s complaint, and on December 6, 2013, Ms. Subic and Ms. Kelly contacted Petitioner to get a statement from her about the incident. Petitioner advised that she did not wish to make a statement about the incident but would provide follow-up documentation in support of her harassment allegations at a later time. After several unsuccessful attempts to secure from Petitioner information supporting her harassment allegations, Ms. Kelly informed Petitioner that if the information that Petitioner promised was not received by March 12, 2014, the harassment allegation investigation would be closed. There is no evidence of record indicating that Petitioner ever provided additional information to Respondent in support of her allegation of harassment by Mr. Stevens. Termination of Employment On March 28, 2014, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Petitioner met with Mr. Helms to discuss work plans for the day. It was understood that Petitioner would be doing yard maintenance work at the park’s north gate. In addition to the yard maintenance work, Mr. Helms assigned Petitioner an additional work-related task of placing an out-of-order sign on the restroom facility near the north gate. In order to perform her work-related tasks, Respondent assigned Petitioner a DEP-owned Ford Ranger pick-up truck. Mr. Helms, within a few hours of assigning tasks to Petitioner, went to the north gate area to verify that Petitioner had completed her assignments. When Mr. Helms arrived at the north gate, he did not see Petitioner. Mr. Helms noted that the out-of-order sign had been placed on the restroom as directed, but that Petitioner had failed to perform the yard maintenance work. Seeing that Petitioner had not completed her work assignment, Mr. Helms then searched for Petitioner throughout the park but was unable to locate her. Mr. Helms then exited the park and went to a nearby Circle K convenience store in a further attempt to locate Petitioner. After waiting for some period of time at the Circle K, Mr. Helms observed Petitioner, while driving her assigned Ford Ranger pick-up truck, enter the convenience store parking lot. Petitioner parked the truck, exited the vehicle, walked towards the store, and then returned to the vehicle without entering the store. Upon reentering the vehicle, Petitioner drove back to the state park. Respondent’s email records show that on April 3, 2014, Mr. Helms submitted a written narrative to Ms. Subic wherein he outlined what he observed on March 28, 2014, with respect to Petitioner, her whereabouts, and her use of DEP’s vehicle. On April 7, 2014, Ms. Subic directed Mr. Helms to speak with Petitioner about what he observed on March 28, 2014. On April 10, 2014, Mr. Helms met with Petitioner to discuss her actions of March 28, 2014. Petitioner testified that during this meeting with Mr. Helms, she explained that on the morning of March 28, 2014, after placing the out-of-order sign on the restroom near the north gate, she left the park in her assigned DEP vehicle to go to the Mobil station to get gas for the vehicle. Petitioner also testified that although she did drive to the Mobil station, she did not purchase gas for the vehicle, but instead went to the Sweetbay market located next to the Mobil station where she filled a personal prescription and purchased a sympathy card for the family of a deceased friend. Petitioner further testified that after leaving Sweetbay, she went to Ace Hardware. Petitioner has no specific recollection of why she stopped at Ace Hardware and did not present any evidence indicating that the visit to the store was for work-related reasons. Finally, after leaving Ace Hardware, Petitioner then drove to the home of the bereaved to deliver the sympathy card that she purchased from Sweetbay. In explaining her actions on March 28, 2014, Petitioner claims that Mr. Helms allowed employees to conduct personal business if the personal business did not cause the employees to deviate from their authorized travel route related to DEP official business. Petitioner’s statement regarding Mr. Helms may generally be true; however, under the facts of the present case there is no credible evidence that Petitioner left the park on March 28, 2014, for anything other than reasons related to the handling of her personal affairs. Succinctly stated, Petitioner put 50 miles on DEP’s vehicle on March 28, 2014, and none of these miles were related to the operation of Alafia River State Park. By correspondence dated April 28, 2014, Scott Robinson, on behalf of Respondent, informed Petitioner that it was the intent of Respondent to terminate her employment with the agency for reasons related to her actions of March 28, 2014. Following Petitioner’s predetermination conference, Mr. Robinson, by correspondence dated June 5, 2014, informed Petitioner that her employment was being terminated due to her actions of March 28, 2014. Mr. Robinson also informed Petitioner that the written reprimand she received on November 18, 2013, was a factor in Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner did not offer any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that in any way establishes that she was subjected to discriminatory animus, or that Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment was motivated by reasons related to her allegation of sexual harassment by Mr. Stevens.1/ Respondent had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner’s employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, did not commit unlawful employment practices as alleged by Petitioner, Catherine M. Lecas, and denying Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on sex/gender, race, religion or disability.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a chain of retail stores/service stations, some of which include a deli. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2008). Petitioner is an African-American female. She began working for Respondent sometime in 2006. In January 2008, Petitioner's job responsibilities included cleaning and stocking shelves during the night shift at Respondent's store located on Cervantes Street, Pensacola, Florida. The Cervantes store did not have a deli. Alvin Philyaw, a white male, was the manager at the Cervantes store. Bill Fuller, a white male, was the store's assistant manager. Robert Wensel, another white employee at the Cervantes store, took care of the trash. On or about January 2, 2008, Petitioner and Mr. Wensel were in the store’s cooler. Petitioner was unloading a shopping cart when Mr. Wensel, who was subject to panic attacks, fell towards Petitioner. Petitioner reached with one arm to catch Mr. Wensel. After the incident, Petitioner returned to work. On or about January 15, 2008, Petitioner told Mr. Fuller that she had injured her shoulder when Mr. Wensel fell on her. Mr. Fuller told Petitioner to discuss it with Mr. Philyaw. Petitioner then talked to Mr. Philyaw. He told Petitioner that, pursuant to store policy, she should have immediately reported the accident. After finding nothing on the video tape about the fall, Mr. Philyaw told Petitioner and Mr. Wensel to file written reports about the accident. The injury was eventually treated pursuant to Florida’s workers’ compensation law. Petitioner subsequently filed a formal workers' compensation grievance about her dissatisfaction with the medical care she received for her alleged shoulder injury. Petitioner claimed that the accident involving Mr. Wensel occurred as a result of a satanic spell cast on Petitioner by one of her co-workers. This claim was not established by the evidence in this case and was found not credible in Petitioner’s earlier action against Circle K. Petitioner did testify about her doctor’s evaluation and treatment of her arm/shoulder. However, even with this testimony, the evidence in this case did not establish that Petitioner suffered any significant impairment that would constitute a disability/handicap under Chapter 760, Florida Statute. Around January 18, 2008, Mr. Philyaw learned that the Cervantes store was losing employee hours. Mr. Philyaw asked Petitioner if she would like to transfer to the store on Bayfront Street, Pensacola, Florida, where she could get more hours, work in the deli, and keep her benefits. Petitioner agreed. Petitioner went to Respondent's main office to speak with Jackie Ridgeway. Petitioner requested the transfer to the full-time position in the Bayfront store's deli. At the Bayfront store, Petitioner worked in the deli with Amy Williams, a white female, and Channel Pritchett, a black female. Ms. Williams was the deli supervisor. Ms. Pritchett was the deli cook. Petitioner’s duties included cleaning and waiting on customers. Ms. Williams did not know about Petitioner's alleged shoulder injury. One day at the Bayfront store, a cooking pan fell and hit Petitioner in the face. Petitioner's glasses were broken when the pan fell. The incident was an accident and not the result of witchcraft or any malicious intent. Again, there was no evidence of any discrimination based on race, religion or disability. Petitioner and Ms. Pritchett also worked together in the deli at the store in Cantonment, Florida. Felicia Williamson, who is also African-American, was Petitioner's manager/supervisor. While at the Cantonment store, a black customer asked Petitioner if she was Muslim and would she marry a Muslim man. There was nothing in this conversation or the evidence that indicated Circle K was involved in this man’s inquiries. Likewise, there was nothing in this conversation or the evidence that demonstrated any discrimination by Circle K based on Petitioner’s race, religion or disability. After working at the Cantonment store, Petitioner was transferred to the deli at the store on Barrancas Street, Pensacola, Florida. One day around October 30, 2008, a piece of sandwich paper caught fire under the steam box. Petitioner reached in with tongs, picked up the paper, and put the fire out in the deli sink. Petitioner was slightly burned by the fire, but continued to work her shift. Petitioner’s burns eventually healed. Again, the evidence demonstrated that this incident was an accident. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that this incident resulted in any significant injury to Petitioner or that her injury constituted a disability/handicap under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. At some point, Petitioner returned to the Cantonment store. Petitioner alleged that around November 6, 2008, Ms. Williamson fired Petitioner for moving too slowly. Ms. Williamson claims she did not terminate Petitioner, but that Petitioner walked out of the store and did not return. Petitioner admitted that Ms. Williamson was dissatisfied with Petitioner's work performance. However, there was no substantial evidence to determine whether Petitioner was terminated or whether she quit. Likewise, there was no substantial evidence to determine the reason for Petitioner separating from her employment. Petitioner attributed her termination to the fact that Ms. Williamson was mean and abusive. However, Petitioner also testified that Ms. Williamson was “mean and abusive” to everyone. This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate any discrimination on the part of Ms. Williamson or Circle K. Given these facts, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner was physically handicapped/disabled or suffered an adverse employment action because of her race, religion or disability. For the same reasons, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner was retaliated against based on her earlier action against Circle K. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S S. Diane Cleavinger Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Johnson Post Office Box 4671 Pensacola, Florida 32507 Joyce Clemmons Circle K 25 West Cedar Street, Suite 100 Pensacola, Florida 32502 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), when Respondent failed to hire Petitioner, and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the FCRA, when Respondent issued Petitioner a trespass warning and later notified law enforcement of Petitioner's presence on Respondent's property, resulting in Petitioner's arrest for Trespass After Warning.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Tyler is hearing impaired. Prior to moving to Florida in October 2005, Mr. Tyler had worked for Disneyland in California for over two years. On October 14, 2005, Mr. Tyler submitted an application for employment with Disney in Orlando. Mr. Tyler met with an employee of Disney with a sign language interpreter present. Mr. Tyler was advised that he had been "red flagged" as a result of his previous employment with Disneyland. Being red flagged meant that Mr. Tyler was considered to be a restricted rehire. Because he had left the employ of Disneyland a few weeks before he applied for employment at Disney, there was a question of his employment stability. He was told that he needed to provide an employment history of at least six months after he left Disneyland's employ. On April 25, 2006, Mr. Tyler submitted a second application for employment with Disney. On the application, Mr. Tyler stated that he currently held two jobs. He had been working at Macy's since November 2005 and at a 7-11 store beginning in March 2006. However, Disney personnel concluded that his current employment did not demonstrate employment stability. Mr. Tyler was given an interview by Disney with a certified sign language interpreter present and was advised that his rehire status was still restricted. Mr. Tyler was given a rehire petition to complete so that his rehire status could be reviewed by Disney. The rehire petition requested Mr. Tyler to state the reasons for his termination from the company and the reasons why Mr. Tyler thought he should be rehired. Additionally, Mr. Tyler was required to provide employment verifications from his employers to demonstrate job stability. Mr. Tyler did not provide a completed rehire petition to Disney. Mr. Tyler claims that he did provide the necessary paperwork to Disney at Christmastime to an unknown older man, who was at the Disney casting office1/ and who advised Mr. Tyler that the employees were on Christmas break. Mr. Tyler further testified that he later overheard the older man at a 7-11 store tell another person that he had thrown Mr. Tyler's application in the trash. Mr. Tyler's testimony is not credible. First, the next time that Mr. Tyler applied for a job with Disney was in November 2006, prior to Christmastime. Obviously, he did not supply the information needed for a rehire petition between the second and third applications. Additionally, it defies credulity that Mr. Tyler would overhear the older man at a 7-11 store tell someone that he had thrown the paperwork away. The likelihood that Mr. Tyler would see the older man again is slim, and there would be no reason for the older man to be confessing that he had thrown Mr. Tyler's paperwork away. Mr. Tyler tried to see Kelly Frank (Ms. Frank), the senior vice president of Disney's human resources office, after he was told that he was not eligible for rehire. Ms. Frank had been employed at Disneyland prior to transferring to Disney. While she was at Disneyland, she and Mr. Tyler had met concerning some disciplinary issues that Mr. Tyler had while working at Disneyland. Mr. Tyler felt that Ms. Frank had been helpful with his situation at Disneyland and thought that she could run interference for him concerning his applications for rehire at Disney. Mr. Tyler would show up unannounced at Ms. Franks' office and ask to meet with her. Mr. Tyler's method of dealing with such situations was to bypass the chain of command and go to someone higher in management. Ms. Frank was aware of Mr. Tyler's attempts to see her. Ms. Frank never spoke to Mr. Tyler about his applications for employment at Disney; instead her assistant asked Robin King (Ms. King), from Disney's human resources department, to talk with him. Ms. King and Bekki Musee (Ms. Musee), who was a team leader for Disney's casting operations support, set up a meeting with Mr. Tyler with a sign language interpreter present. They tried to explain to him that he had to follow the procedures and submit a rehire petition to have his rehire status reviewed and that he would need six months of stable employment to be considered for a rehire. Additionally, they told him that he should take his complaints to the casting office, where the employment decisions were made and not to try to see Ms. Frank. They further told Mr. Tyler that he should make an appointment when he needed to speak to someone rather than show up unannounced. Disney needed advance notice so that a sign language interpreter could be present to assist Mr. Tyler. On November 11, 2006, Mr. Tyler filled out a third application for employment with Disney. He stated on the application that he had been employed by Macy's from November 2005 to May 2006. He stated that he became employed by Gaylor Entertanment [sic] Suite Hotel in November 2006. No mention was made of his employment at the 7-11 store. When Ms. Musee became aware that Mr. Tyler had submitted a third application, she assigned a senior recruiter, Clayton Kirkland (Mr. Kirkland), to interview Mr. Tyler. Ms. Musee wanted to have someone who had not interviewed Mr. Tyler before to perform the interview to give Mr. Tyler a fair opportunity. Mr. Kirkland interviewed Mr. Tyler, and a sign language interpreter was present during the interview. Mr. Tyler told Mr. Kirkland that he had been terminated from Disneyland because of attendance. At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Tyler acted professionally. Mr. Kirkland asked Mr. Tyler about Mr. Tyler's employment at the 7-11 store, which had been listed on a previous application. Mr. Tyler denied ever having worked at a 7-11 store and claimed that Ms. Musee had put that on his previous application. When questioned about his employment history at the 7-11 store, Mr. Tyler's demeanor changed, and he became angry and appeared to be frustrated. Mr. Kirkland told Mr. Tyler that he was not qualified for the job and would not be hired. This decision was based on gaps in Mr. Tyler's employment history, the restricted rehire placed by Disneyland, the lack of job stability, his failure to provide documentation for his rehire status when asked to do so, and his aggressive behavior. Mr. Tyler became angry and upset, stood up, leaned over Mr. Kirkland's desk, and slammed his hand down on the desk. At that point, Mr. Tyler was not relying on the sign language interpreter, but was verbally talking to Mr. Kirkland. Mr. Tyler became upset and left the interview. As he was leaving, he saw Ms. Musee. He walked hastily toward her, yelling and screaming at her and saying that she had put some notations in his file. He got in front of her face and started pointing his finger at her. She felt uncomfortable and threatened by his actions. Mr. Tyler did not have his hearing aids on at the time; therefore, he could not tell if his voice was loud when he spoke to Ms. Musee. However, whether he was wearing his hearing aids does not excuse his getting in front of Ms. Musee's face and pointing his finger at her. On December 27, 2006, Mr. Tyler showed up at the casting office unannounced and requested a sign language interpreter so that he could talk with Ms. Musee. Mr. Tyler's testimony that the only reason that he went to the casting office was to set up an appointment with Ms. Musee in the future is not credible. The greater weight of the evidence is that he showed up expecting to talk to Ms. Musee when he arrived at the casting office, just as he had done when wanted to speak to Ms. Frank. Ms. Musee was notified that Mr. Tyler had come to the casting office unannounced. Ms. Musee agreed to talk with Mr. Tyler in her office, but alerted security because, after her last interaction with Mr. Tyler, she did not feel comfortable meeting with him alone. Two security personnel stayed just outside of Ms. Musee's office while she was talking to Mr. Tyler. There was no sign language interpreter present during the meeting because Mr. Tyler's visit was unannounced, and there was insufficient time to get an interpreter. Mr. Tyler verbally questioned Ms. Musee about his attempts at employment, and Ms. Musee again explained to Mr. Tyler the reason that he was not rehired was because of his restricted-hire status. Mr. Tyler was verbally responding to Ms. Musee's statements, which indicated to Ms. Musee that he was understanding what she was telling him. Several times Ms. Musee tried to end the conversation, but Mr. Tyler did not leave. Finally, Disney security stationed outside Ms. Musee's door intervened and asked Mr. Tyler to leave. Patricia Bryant (Ms. Bryant), who at the time was the area manager of security operations for the downtown Disney area, arrived on the scene, and she asked Mr. Tyler to leave. She asked Mr. Tyler if he understood what she was telling him, and he indicated that he did. Mr. Tyler failed to leave. Deputies from the Orange County Sheriff's Office showed up. Mr. Tyler was issued a trespass warning by Ms. Bryant and a deputy sheriff. The trespass warning is dated December 27, 2006. Mr. Tyler verbally acknowledged to Ms. Bryant that he understood the trespass warning, which advised him that he was not to go on Disney property. The trespass warning is in writing and states: "Your are hereby warned that you are not authorized, licensed or invited to be in these premises and may be arrested if you refuse to leave or return at any time in the future." There was nothing on the trespass warning showing an expiration date. Once the trespass warning is issued, it stays in place until it is lifted. In October 2007, Mr. Tyler and his roommate, Arden Bird (Mr. Bird), who is deaf, went to a kennel club located on Disney property. There was some dispute concerning the charges for the dogs that Mr. Tyler and Mr. Bird had boarded at the kennel. Mr. Tyler went to assist Mr. Bird with the communications. Mr. Tyler was aware that the kennel was located on Disney property. He and Mr. Bird discussed whether Mr. Tyler should go to the kennel club because of the trespass warning, and they concluded that it would not be in violation of the trespass warning.2/ Staff at the kennel club called Disney security to come to the kennel club because Mr. Tyler previously had been given a trespass warning. Carolyn Truluck (Ms. Truluck), who, at that time, was an investigator for Disney security, came to the kennel club. She requested a copy of the trespass warning from security. When she confirmed that a trespass warning had been issued, she called the Orange County Sheriff's Office and requested a deputy to come to the scene. A deputy arrived and placed Mr. Tyler under arrest for trespassing. Ms. Truluck was unaware of any claims of discrimination by Mr. Tyler, and she was not directed by anyone in the human resources department of Disney to call for a deputy. Her actions were based on the prior issuance of a trespass warning and Mr. Tyler's appearance on Disney property despite the trespass warning. On October 15, 2008, Mr. Tyler filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, alleging Disney discriminated against him based on his disability in the following ways: On or about October 27, 2007, I was retaliated against by being issued a Trespass Warrant. On or about September 20, 2007, I was denied employment. * * * The position of Houseman was an open and available position which I was qualified for and I applied. I was denied employment and the position. I complained to Ms. Bekki Musee, Team Leader, Casting Operation Support[,] about my disability and the need for an interpreter, she refused to provide this assistance. In October 2007, I was subsequently issued a Trespass Warrant by the company. I believe that my Disability and the fact that I complained of what I believed to be discriminatory treatment led to the retaliatory actions taken against me.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Mr. Tyler's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent meets the definition of an employer within the meaning of section 70-51, Code of Ordinances, and, therefore, is subject to the discrimination ordinance enacted by Pinellas County (County).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a small tire company located at 5582 66th Street North, St. Petersburg, Florida. Richard Newberry is the owner of the business. This case began after Petitioner filed with the Office a Charge of Discrimination alleging that Respondent rejected her employment application on the basis of her religion. If proven, this action would be a violation of section 70-53(a)(1)a. of the County discrimination ordinance. The narrow issue to be resolved at this stage of the case is whether Respondent "employs five or more employees for each working day of 13 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." § 70-51, Code of Ord. If Respondent did not reach that threshold, the discrimination ordinance does not apply and Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination must be dismissed. Because the alleged discrimination occurred on March 22, 2016, by definition, only the years 2015 and 2016 are relevant in making this determination. Id. To support its contention that it had less than five employees for each working day during any 13-week period in 2015 and 2016, Respondent submitted copies of its 2015 and 2016 reemployment (unemployment) wage/tax quarterly reports filed with the Department of Revenue. Resp't Ex. 1. Among other things, the reports reflect the number of employees that performed services for Respondent during each quarter. In addition, Respondent submitted its payroll journals for both years. Pet'r Ex. 5; Resp't Ex. 2. The journals were prepared by Respondent's accountant, Mr. Boylan, who verified their accuracy. Respondent's 2016 quarterly reports reflect that, excluding Mr. Newberry, Respondent had no more than three employees at any time during that year. Respondent's payroll journals for the same time period corroborate this information. Respondent's 2015 quarterly reports reflect that it had no employees during the first three quarters of the year, and only one person on the payroll during the last quarter. The payroll journals for the same time period corroborate these facts. Through the testimony of Mr. Boylan, this information was shown to be reliable and accurate. Through cross-examination of Mr. Boylan, Petitioner sought to establish that Mr. Newberry may have been paying employees "off the books" (by cash), without Mr. Boylan's knowledge, and these employees would not be shown on the reports or journals. She also suggested that when preparing the reports and journals, Mr. Boylan may have relied on false or incomplete information given to him by the owner. However, these assertions are mere speculation without evidentiary support and have not been credited. Petitioner also contended that Jessica Belt, the person who was hired by Respondent to fill the position, is not shown on the payroll journal until the first week of October 2016, or after she was offered the position at an earlier date. Pet'r Ex. 1. However, Ms. Belt's actual date of hire and first day of work are unknown, and Mr. Boylan's explanation that she may not have begun work until October 2016 has been accepted as being credible. Importantly, even if Ms. Belt began work several months earlier, Respondent still would have had no more than three employees in the second quarter of 2016 and two employees during the third quarter of that year. Respondent had less than five employees during any 13-week period in calendar years 2015 and 2016.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Charge of Discrimination by Petitioner against Respondent be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on February 5, 2007.
Findings Of Fact On February 5, 2007, Petitioner, Cynthia D. Smith, filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). On September 6, 2007, FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause and a Notice of Determination: No Cause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with FCHR on or about September 17, 2007. FCHR transmitted the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (Division) on or about September 19, 2007, for the purpose of conducting a formal administrative hearing. A Notice of Hearing and Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions were issued on October 16, 2007, setting the case for hearing on December 18, 2007, in Leesburg, Florida, where Petitioner resides. Respondent filed an unopposed Motion for Continuance which was granted. An Order Granting Continuance and Re- Scheduling Hearing was issued on December 3, 2007, rescheduling the hearing for January 10, 2007, in Leesburg. The undersigned traveled from Tallahassee to Leesburg, Florida, to conduct the hearing. The hearing commenced as scheduled. Respondent and its witnesses were present and ready to proceed. Petitioner was not present when the hearing commenced. The undersigned recessed the hearing to give Petitioner every opportunity to arrive. The undersigned checked the reception area and the parking lot of the building where the hearing was located to see if Petitioner was anywhere in or around the building. In addition, the undersigned called her assistant in Tallahassee to determine if any pleading had been filed on the docket of the Division or any telephone call received indicating Petitioner was delayed. No such communication had been received. While waiting for Petitioner to arrive, the undersigned examined the address for Petitioner on the Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing. The address matched the address on all orders mailed from the Division as well as the address furnished by FCHR to the Division. The hearing was reconvened approximately 35 minutes after the time the hearing was scheduled to begin. However, Petitioner did not appear and the hearing was adjourned. There is nothing on the docket of the Division that indicates that the Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing, or any other order, mailed to Petitioner was returned as undeliverable.1/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 2008.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Glenn Dorsey, Inc., d/b/a My Home Spot, is liable to Petitioner, Tamela Alisha Landrum, for employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the Act”).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in real estate property management which provides management services to homeowners’ associations (“HOA”), including managing the sale, lease, and maintenance of association property; organizing and staffing association board meetings; and enforcing association covenants and restrictions. Mr. Glenn Dorsey is Respondent’s owner. Petitioner is an African-American female and is a licensed Community Association Manager (“CAM”). Petitioner became employed by Respondent on May 23, 2016, as an Assistant HOA Manager.2/ Mr. Dorsey described Petitioner’s position as “the person responsible for how our communities appear.” She was handling contracted services such as pool maintenance, gate access, and landscaping “from writing the RFP, soliciting bids, comparing quotes to managing the vendor performance.” As her employer described, “A major portion of her job is managing the CCR [community covenants and restrictions] inspection schedule, performing the inspections and maintaining our database for CCR enforcement.” The description concludes that “Alisha is a licensed CAM and will soon be managing her own community association portfolio as the HOA Assistant Managers and Accounting Department are returned to full strength.” (emphasis added). According to Petitioner, she did not want to handle HOA board meetings, which occur in the evening and require the employee to stay for the duration of the meeting, which can be lengthy. In early September 2016, Petitioner was asked to cover an evening HOA meeting because Mr. Dorsey was double-booked for two different association meetings that evening. Petitioner was subsequently asked to cover additional evening HOA meetings. Between September 7, 2016, and August 22, 2017, Petitioner handled no less than 64 HOA regular and annual meetings for several different HOAs. On or about January 18, 2017, Mr. Dorsey transferred the responsibility for CCR inspections and enforcement to another employee. Petitioner complained that she was not compensated for working overtime to handle the HOA meetings. Petitioner repeatedly testified the company had no protocol for overtime. After-hour meetings created a personal hardship for Petitioner because they required her to incur additional childcare expenses. Apparently, a member of Petitioner’s family was initially providing childcare, but the arrangement broke down due to the inability to predict the length of HOA board and annual meetings. Petitioner testified that she verbally complained to both her direct supervisor and Mr. Dorsey about the hardship of after-hour duties and requested to be compensated with a salary increase and other benefits. Petitioner complained that her role and hours were changed significantly without any change in compensation. Mr. Dorsey scheduled a mandatory staff meeting for July 6, 2017, and included an agenda in the calendar invitation to staff. One of the agenda items is “meeting makeup time (next am come in late).” On August 16, 2017, Petitioner met with Mr. Dorsey and his assistant, Rachel Ward. At that meeting, they discussed renewal of her employment contract, and she addressed her concerns regarding her hours and compensation. Petitioner complained to Mr. Dorsey that she was not afforded a phone stipend, which was afforded to white managers, to compensate her for use of her personal cell phone for after-hour business. On August 18, 2017, Mr. Dorsey sent a letter to Petitioner “confirming” the August 16 meeting. In the letter, Mr. Dorsey acknowledged that Petitioner’s employment duties were “significantly different” than the duties she was hired for in May 2016. However, in the letter Mr. Dorsey justified the change in duties because of Petitioner’s poor performance of the original assigned duties, including estoppels, maintenance, and other administrative tasks, which he characterized “quickly became disorganized, delinquent, or incomplete.” Mr. Dorsey explained the change in duties as an attempt to “modify your role as to find a position in which you could succeed.” The letter concluded that Mr. Dorsey declined to change Petitioner’s compensation and benefits, or even enter into a new employment contract. Instead, Mr. Dorsey informed Petitioner that her employment would continue on a month-to-month basis, and that either party could terminate the agreement with 30 days’ notice. On August 21, 2017, Mr. Dorsey sent Petitioner the following electronic mail message: Alisha, Per your advisement today regarding your inability or decision not to attend HOA after-hour meetings, myHomeSpot.com will begin to cover those shifts without your participation effective immediately. Every other assistant is attending their portfolio meetings as this is a requirement of the position. We do not have a position at your rate of pay to provide you any extended exception. This is our advanced notice to you to terminate our employment arrangement on Oct. 14, 2017 as you are unable to meet the requirements of the current position. I provide you this date at the current pay rate to allow a smooth transition with someone who can perform the required duties, but, we can end with a 30-day notice to accommodate any changes if you notify us of this within 14 days from 8/22/17. On August 22, 2017, Petitioner sent Mr. Dorsey a letter which notified him she would no longer be available to work “beyond the published business hours” and requested she be returned to an 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. work schedule. However, the letter ended with notice of her immediate resignation. Petitioner’s Allegations In her Petition, Petitioner alleges that her change in job duties and hours, without appropriate compensation, was based upon her sex and race. She complains that she was not given a phone stipend afforded to white managers for use of their personal cell phones after business hours, and was forced to work after hours without overtime pay based on her race. Further, Petitioner alleges that Respondent unlawfully retaliated against her by responding to her complaints “with a write-up and termination notice.” Disparate Treatment Petitioner testified generally that she was paid less than, or denied benefits afforded to, white managers. Petitioner introduced no evidence on which to base a finding of the race of any employee, other than herself, in order to compare salary and benefit information. The record contains no documentation of which employees, if any, received a phone stipend. Absent this information, the undersigned cannot make a factual determination that Petitioner was denied the stipend which was afforded to male employees. Between the dates of May 23, 2016, and June 30, 2017 (slightly less than one month before her termination), Petitioner received the second highest amount of total wages of all Respondent’s employees during that timeframe. Petitioner received a total of $37,377.55 based on 2,051.25 total hours worked and 84.61 “absence hours.” An employee identified as AJ Ward was the only employee with higher total wages at $49,032.66. During that period, Petitioner worked fewer hours than employee Ward and incurred more “absence pay” than employee Ward. Petitioner further alleged that Mr. Dorsey manipulated her time entries in the company time management system, thereby artificially reducing her hours worked. The screenshots of time entries introduced by Petitioner are not sufficient evidence to support that allegation. Retaliation Only two days elapsed between Petitioner’s meeting with Mr. Dorsey, at which she voiced her concerns about uncompensated overtime and use of her personal cell phone after hours, and Mr. Dorsey’s letter giving Petitioner “advance notice” of her termination. Number of Employees The number of Respondent’s employees is a material issue in dispute. Respondent introduced its Department of Revenue Employer Quarterly Report (Form RT-6) for three separate quarters. For the quarter ending June 30, 2016, Respondent reported 15 employees in April and May 2016, and 14 employees in June 2016. For the quarter ending December 31, 2016, Respondent reported 13 employees in October, November, and December 2016. For the quarter ending March 31, 2017, the report identifies 15 employees in January, 14 in February, and 13 in March 2017. Respondent introduced a payroll details report for the pay periods between January 1 and August 31, 2017. The details report identifies only five employees. Petitioner did not challenge the reliability of the documents. Instead Petitioner argued that Respondent employed more than 15 employees when it was fully staffed. The evidence does not support a finding that Respondent employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during either 2016 or 2017.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2019.
The Issue Whether the City of Milton failed to accept an employment application from Sydney McCray on the basis of race or national origin, thereby committing an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Mr. McCray is a male African-American, and he is a member of a protected class. In his complaint, Mr. McCray claims that on April 4, 1994, the City discriminated against him by failing to hire him for the position of laborer (maintenance worker). Specifically, Mr. McCray alleged that in response to a newspaper advertisement for a laborer's position, he and his sister, Alice Larkins, contacted the City Manager's office for the purpose of submitting their employment applications. Both Mr. McCray and Ms. Larkins asserted that they arrived at the office of Mr. Whitson, the City Manager, at the appointed time, and that they waited over an hour to see Mr. Whitson. After waiting an hour, both Mr. McCray and Ms. Larkins left without ever meeting Mr. Whitson. Mr. McCray asserts that Mr. Whitson failed to meet with him or receive his employment application because of his race. The City disputes Mr. McCray's claims for several reasons. First, the City provided evidence to contradict Mr. McCray's position that he first learned of the laborer position through an advertisement. Several city employees testified that the City only advertises skilled positions and that the unskilled positions, such as maintenance positions, are handled through the Public Works Department without advertisement. With regard to the Public Works Department, testimony was also received that indicated the process for receiving applications for laborer positions. In particular, it was stated that applications for laborer positions are processed by the Public Works Department and that once the applicant has been interviewed, all qualified applicants are placed on a list for future vacancies. The record is clear that Mr. McCray never applied for a laborer position through the established procedure. Second, even if the position was advertised as stated by Mr. McCray, the City disputes that Mr. Whitson's office would have ever made an appointment for Mr. McCray. As indicated above, the prospective laborers are processed by the Public Works Department. Mr. Whitson testified that he plays no role in screening laborer applicants and that he is purposefully insulated from the hiring process. Therefore, it makes no sense that his office would have arranged an interview as asserted by Mr. McCray. Third, in addition to Mr. Whitson's lack of involvement in the employment process for prospective laborers, all the testimony received at the hearing supports a finding that Mr. McCray did not have an appointment with the City manager. Specifically, several City employees, including Mr. Whitson's personal secretary, testified that neither Mr. McCray nor his sister ever had an appointment with Mr. Whitson. They also testified that neither person appeared at Mr. Whitson's office on April 4, 1994. When pressed on the date and time of the alleged appointment with Mr. Whitson, Mr. McCray was unable to articulate consistently when the meeting was to take place. Mr. McCray appeared confused and his answers varied from his earlier deposition testimony and the testimony of his sister. Furthermore, based on the records maintained by the City of Milton, Mr. McCray never submitted an application for the position of "Laborer" with the Public Works Department of the City of Milton. Mr. McCray attempts to supplement his claim of discrimination by establishing that the City of Milton has systematically discriminated against him by failing on more than one occasion to hire him. Specifically, Mr. McCray stated that prior to April 4, 1994, he applied for other positions with the City of Milton, and he was denied such positions. In particular, Mr. McCray stated that he applied for the position of mechanic and technician. In both instances raised by Mr. McCray, however, it appears, based on the record, that he either failed to adequately complete his job application or he failed to possess the minimum qualifications for the positions sought. As further evidence supporting his claim, Mr. McCray offered the testimony of his sister, Alicia Larkin. Ms. Larkin testified that she, like her brother, was the subject of discrimination by the City. The undersigned dismissed her testimony as lacking relevancy and more importantly lacking credibility. First, Ms. Larkin has a claim pending against the City alleging similar discriminatory practices and she appears to have a bias against the City. Second, Ms. Larkin's testimony lacked consistency and lacked credibility. No evidence was presented to indicate that the City of Milton discriminated in its employment practices. Furthermore, the City presented testimony that it has and continues to develop fair employment practices relating to minorities. Specifically, the City of Milton, through Mr. Whitson, has met with the NAACP for the purpose of continuing to improve race relations between the City and the African-American community in Milton. In summary, the City has effectively rebutted the allegations raised by Mr. McCray. The City offered a series of witnesses that had personal knowledge of the employment policies and hiring practices of the City and each corroborated the other. Those witnesses collectively support a finding that the City did not discriminate against Mr. McCray.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing this claim with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committee, Esquire 8870 Thunderbird Drive Pensacola, Florida 32514-5661 Roy V. Andrews, Esquire Post Office Box 586 Milton, Florida 32572 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, Coastal Properties (“Respondent” or “Coastal Properties”), discriminated against Petitioner, Harry (Hal) Hingson (“Petitioner”), based upon his age and race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Caucasian male who was 60 years old in May of 2014, when Respondent allegedly discriminated against him by terminating his employment because of his age. Respondent is a management company for third-party owners of apartment communities, home owners associations, and condominium associations. Respondent employed Petitioner as a maintenance worker at the Twin Oaks apartment complex, a 242-unit apartment complex in Tallahassee, Florida. On May 6, 2014, after work, Petitioner and his supervisor, Clint Creel, were involved in a physical altercation off the job site, while fishing together on a boat. After the boat returned to the dock, Petitioner went inside his home. Rather than securing himself in his residence and calling law enforcement, Petitioner retrieved a gun from his residence, exited his residence, and fired the gun multiple times at Mr. Creel. Mr. Creel was struck in the back of the leg by a bullet and received medical treatment for his gunshot wound. Although he was shot, Mr. Creel returned to work the next day. Petitioner did not return to work the day after the incident as he was seeking medical treatment for the injuries he sustained during the physical altercation. Two days after the shooting, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. The decision to terminate Petitioner was made by the Respondent's Vice-President, Ray Allen, in consultation with the President, Dennis Fuller, after Mr. Allen spoke to both Mr. Creel, and Petitioner, about the shooting. Respondent presented the undisputed testimony of Mr. Allen and Mr. Ray that Petitioner's employment was terminated to protect the safety of the other employees and the residents at the Twin Oaks property. Mr. Creel expressed concern about his safety to Mr. Allen if he had to continue working with Petitioner. Mr. Allen and Mr. Fuller also were concerned about the safety of Mr. Creel, as well as the other employees and residents, if Petitioner and Mr. Creel continued to work together. Petitioner's Discrimination Complaint alleges that Petitioner was discriminated against based on race and age. In particular, Petitioner alleges that he was discriminated against because he was terminated after the off-the-job altercation, but his younger supervisor was not. The evidence adduced at the final hearing, however, failed to substantiate Petitioner's claim of discrimination. Other than testifying that he at one time, prior to the incident, was told that he was moving slow and at another time was told he was acting feeble, Petitioner did not present any direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to reasonably suggest that Respondent discriminated against him in employment because of his age. Even if Petitioner had presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Respondent provided a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner's employment. Petitioner admitted that Mr. Allen advised him that he was being terminated because he no longer wanted Petitioner and Mr. Creel to work together. Petitioner admitted Mr. Allen told him that he would have continued to employ Petitioner by moving him to another property, but there were no other openings. Respondent’s evidence demonstrated that the day after Petitioner was terminated, of its 59 employees, 25 were over the age of 40, 11 were over the age of 50, and one employee was older than Petitioner. The evidence also showed that 54 days after Petitioner was terminated, of Respondent’s 64 employees, 25 were over the age of 40, 10 were over the age of 50, and one employee was older than Petitioner. Petitioner failed to establish Respondent's reason for terminating his employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Petitioner's Discrimination Complaint further alleges he was discriminated against based on his race because another employee, a younger African-American, was arrested for DUI but was not terminated. Petitioner presented no evidence at the final hearing to substantiate that allegation, and Petitioner failed to present any evidence whatsoever to show that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his race. In sum, Petitioner failed to show that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner by treating him differently, or terminating his employment because of his race or age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Corrections (Respondent or the Department) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by discharging Petitioner Theresa Williams (Petitioner) in retaliation for her participation as a witness during the investigation of an alleged discrimination claim brought by another employee.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Corrections is a state agency as defined in chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a nurse at the Department's Lake Correctional Institution (“the Institution”) in Clermont, Florida. She was hired by the Department as a Licensed Practical Nurse effective July 12, 2007. Petitioner was terminated from her position with the Institution in May 2013. At the time of Petitioner's termination, her official title was “Senior Licensed Practical Nurse.” Prior to her termination, the Department provided Petitioner with a letter dated April 16, 2013, advising her of her proposed dismissal and scheduling a meeting (“termination conference”) with the Institution's Warden to discuss the reasons why Petitioner was being considered for termination. The letter was excluded from evidence because it was not timely disclosed as an exhibit by the Department as required in the Order of Prehearing Instructions in this case. Nevertheless, Respondent testified that she attended the termination conference and that, during the termination conference, she was provided, and they discussed, three incident reports against her that she had previously seen. The termination conference was attended by the Institution's Warden, the Assistant Warden, and Dr. Virginia Mesa, the Institution's Chief Health Operator. The incident reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference included Petitioner's alleged violation on February 8, 2013, of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) for which Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner’s dismissal; Petitioner's alleged failure on February 8, 2013, to carry out an assignment to log walking canes provided to inmates; and an alleged argument on February 18, 2013, with a supervisor regarding Petitioner's reassignment to process transferred inmates known as "new gains." There is no indication that the termination conference changed the Department's proposed decision to terminate Petitioner. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified and presented evidence designed to prove that the incidents outlined above did not occur. However, following her termination in 2013, Petitioner timely filed a career service system appeal with the State of Florida, Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), contesting her termination. Following an evidentiary hearing and a PERC hearing officer's recommended order in that proceeding, PERC entered a final order on November 6, 2013, providing in its pertinent part: The relevant facts found by the hearing officer relate three separate incidents that led to [Theresa] Williams' dismissal. On February 8, 2013, Dr. Virginia Mesa observed Williams showing Captain Reed, who was the security officer-in-charge of the shift, something in a green file. A green file is the type of medical file kept for each inmate. The green file was open in Williams' hand and Reed and Williams were looking into it. Mesa observed Williams flipping through the file with Reed in the public hallway. The Agency's policy and federal law strictly prohibit prison medical personnel from allowing non-medical staff to see inmate medical records. That same day, Debra Elder, who was a senior health services administrator and new manager, asked Williams to record various information about canes that were issued to inmates and to label each cane with an identifying mark. Williams turned to a co- worker and told her to do it. Elder considered Williams' attitude insubordinate and wrote an incident report as soon as she returned to her office. On February 18, Williams was assigned to be the "sick call" nurse when she reported for her shift at 6:45 a.m. However, she was informed that, if the prison received a significant number of "new gains," she would be re-assigned to assist the two nurses doing that work. "New gains" is the Agency's term for the processing of inmates transferred to the institution from another facility. Around 8:00 a.m., Williams' supervisor, Joyce Isagba, arrived at work. Isagba reviewed the assignments and directed a subordinate to assign Williams to new gains that day. Williams believed Isagba, a relatively new supervisor, had a pattern of changing her assignment from sick call nurse to new gains and did not like it. Williams approached Isagba and questioned why she was being reassigned. Williams and Isagba became loud and argumentative. Other nurses were present in the room. The conversation lasted some time and Williams repeatedly stated that the change of her assignment was unfair and repeatedly wanted to know why she was being reassigned. Isagba told her she was more qualified to do that work and that she did not have to give her reason for her decisions. The dispute lasted several minutes and Williams reluctantly assisted with new gains. Later that day, Williams was sent to sick call to finish that duty. Isagba considered Williams to have been insubordinate and wrote an incident report. Based on these factual findings, the hearing officer concluded that the Agency had grounds to discipline Williams for poor performance, violating the Agency's medical information privacy, and insubordination in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. He recommended that [PERC] adopt his recommended order and dismiss Williams' appeal. * * * Upon review of the complete record, including the transcript, we conclude that all of the hearing officer's facts are supported by competent substantial evidence received in a proceeding that satisfied the essential requirements of law. Therefore, we adopt the hearing officer's findings. § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. Furthermore, we agree with the hearing officer's legal analysis of the disputed legal issues, his conclusions of law, and his recommendation. Accordingly, the hearing officer's recommendation is incorporated herein and Williams' appeal is DISMISSED. The hearing officer's Recommendation and PERC's Final Order in the PERC Proceeding, Williams v. DOC, 28 FCSR 284 (2013), were submitted by both parties and received into evidence without objection in this case as Exhibits P-4 and P-5, respectively, and Exhibits R-B and R-C, respectively. The PERC Proceeding involved the same parties as in this case and the allegations in the incident reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference were actually litigated and determined in the PERC Proceeding. In other words, whether the incidents outlined in those incident reports occurred and are sufficient to support the Department's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment has already been determined.2/ Moreover, Petitioner failed to show, in this case, that the incidents did not occur. Although Petitioner testified that she did not show Captain Reed the inmate's medical chart in violation of HIPAA and introduced Captain Reed's written statement stating that Petitioner did not show him the chart, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that when she met with Captain Reed during the incident, she was flipping through papers with the medical chart in her hand. As found in the PERC hearing officer's Recommended Order: Williams violated the Agency's privacy policy when she held an open inmate medical file so a security staff officer could see the inmate's writing and signature. This was not a reasonable procedure to accomplish the task of notifying the officer of a potential security threat to other inmates. There was a real possibility that the sick call slip had been forged. It was unnecessary to show Captain Reed an inmate's medical file to determine if the slip was forged. Williams could have done that herself with the same accuracy as Reed, since neither is a handwriting expert. Williams v. DOC, 28 FCSR 284 (Recommended Order, 08/26/13). Dr. Mesa's testimony in this case was consistent with the hearing officer's finding and is credited. Regarding the other two incident reports, while Petitioner denied asking another to perform her assigned task of logging inmates' canes, she admitted that she delayed performing the task. Petitioner also admitted that she questioned her supervisor, Ms. Insagba, as to why she was being assigned "new gains," that during the incident Ms. Insagba raised her voice, and that they "were both talking at the same time and I guess she was trying to get a point across and I was just trying to ask her why." In addition to the incidents addressed in the three incident reports, during cross examination in this case, Petitioner revealed that she was also disciplined twice in 2012. In August 2012, Petitioner received a record of counseling for insubordination. And in December 2012, Petitioner received a written reprimand for failure to follow instructions. In sum, the record supports a finding that, by May 2013, the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner. Although it has been determined that the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner's employment at the Institution, in this case Petitioner asserts that the real reason for her dismissal was her participation as a witness in a discrimination charge brought by another employee against the Department and Dr. Mesa. The disciplinary incidents supporting Petitioner's dismissal occurred in February 2013, and before. The investigation in which Petitioner participated began in March of 2013 and Petitioner provided testimony in that investigation on April 23, 2013, after Dr. Mesa had already recommended Petitioner’s dismissal and after Petitioner had been notified by the Department that she was being considered for dismissal. Petitioner was dismissed in May 2013. In finding probable cause, the Commission stated in its summary of the Investigative Memorandum: Complainant did not demonstrate that she was harassed or disciplined because of participation in the internal investigation. Complainant provided no evidence of harassment, and she was not disciplined after her protected activity occurred. Respondent admitted that Complainant was disciplined for the alleged HIPAA violation, but this occurred prior to her protected activity. Based on the information received during the investigation, it does appear that Complainant was terminated in retaliation for her participation in the internal investigation. If the alleged HIPAA violation was a true terminable offense, Complainant should have been terminated in February of 2013 when it occurred. Instead, Respondent waited nearly three months to terminate her, which was about three weeks after her protected activity. Additionally, Respondent has a progressive disciplinary policy which it did not follow. The alleged HIPAA violation is Complainant's only documented incident. Respondent also claimed that Complainant was terminated after she was disciplined several times prior to the HIPAA event, yet it could provide no evidence that she had a disciplinary record prior to February of 2013. Unlike the limited information available to the Commission in its probable cause determination, the evidence in the de novo proceeding conducted in this case demonstrated that Petitioner had a number of disciplinary offenses in February that were found by PERC to support her dismissal, and that Petitioner had been written up for two other disciplinary infractions in 2012. Moreover, the showing necessary for a probable cause determination is less than Petitioner's burden to prove discrimination. While there was a delay in Petitioner's termination, the evidence showed that Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner for dismissal when she wrote up the incident report for the HIPAA violation in February 2013. Although it is evident that management, including the Warden and Dr. Mesa, was generally aware that Petitioner had participated as a witness in another employee's discrimination claim in April of 2013, Petitioner did not show that she was terminated because of that participation. And, while the Department's delay in dismissing Petitioner remained unexplained at the final hearing,3/ that delay, in light of the other facts and circumstances of this case, including Petitioner's numerous disciplinary infractions outlined above, is an insufficient basis to support a finding that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for her participation in a protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2015.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Micheline Verello, timely filed a Petition for Relief in connection with a claim filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 15, 2003, the Petitioner, Micheline Verello, submitted an Amended Employment Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Such complaint alleged that the Respondent, United States Cellular Corporation, had discriminated against the Petitioner in an employment action based upon the Petitioner's age. On April 21, 2004, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered a Determination: No Cause regarding the Petitioner's claim. That determination set forth that there was "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The Notice of Determination: No Cause was also entered and mailed to the Petitioner on April 21, 2004. The notice provided, in pertinent part: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Determination has been made on the above referenced complaint that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. A copy of the Determination is attached. Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial for Complainant to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an administrative hearing with (sic) 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes. The Notice of Determination: No Cause was dated April 21, 2004. The Petitioner received the Notice of Determination: No Cause on April 26, 2004. Based upon the date stated on the face of the Determination: No Cause, the Petitioner was required to file a Petition for Relief not later than May 26, 2004. The Petitioner did not mail her Petition for Relief until June 1, 2004. The Florida Commission on Human Relations received the Petition for Relief on June 3, 2004. Thereafter, the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and filed for formal proceedings on June 9, 2004.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the claim filed by this Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Andrew DeGraffenreidt, III, Esquire Powers, McNalis & Torres Post Office Box 21289 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416 Adrianne Mazura, Esquire Piper Rudnick, LLP 203 North Lasalle Street, Suite 1800 Chicago, Illinois 60601-1293
