The Issue Whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against the Petitioner on the basis of national origin,1 in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes (2005).2
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., owns and operates specialty retail stores. Its headquarters are located in Dallas, Texas. In the summer of 2005, Neiman Marcus began hiring personnel to work in a new store that would open in the fall of 2005 in the Town Centre mall in Boca Raton, Florida. Ms. Jean-Pierre is a permanent resident alien in the United States. She was born in Haiti in 1970 and entered the United States in 1983. In September 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre was employed as a sales associate in the accessories section of the Nordstrom department store in the Town Centre mall when she was approached by two women who inquired about Chanel sunglasses. They requested her business card and later called to tell her that they were very impressed with her sales skills. They asked if she was interested in working as a sales associate at the new Neiman Marcus store. Ms. Jean-Pierre applied for a position with Neiman Marcus, went through an interview and a drug test, and was hired to begin work on October 24, 2004. Hurricane Wilma hit South Florida on October 24, 2005, and the Neiman Marcus employees were not able to go to the hiring site during the week following the hurricane. As a result, the newly-hired employees who were to begin work on October 24, 2005, including Ms. Jean-Pierre, were told to report to work on November 1, 2005. Ms. Jean-Pierre's group of newly-hired employees joined the group of newly-hired employees that were to report to work on October 31, 2005. Because there were a large number of people, they were split in two groups. Ms. Jean-Pierre's group went to the store site to begin training on the first day they reported for work, while the other group reported to the hiring center to receive training and to complete the paperwork required of newly-hired employees. Ms. Jean-Pierre's group went to the hiring center on November 3, 2005, for training and to complete their paperwork. All newly-hired employees of Neiman Marcus are required to complete an Immigration and Naturalization Service Employment Eligibility Verification form, known as the "I-9 Form." The I-9 Form consists of three pages. The first page is divided into three sections, two of which must be completed for newly- hired employees. The second page consists of the instructions for completing the I-9 Form, and these instructions "must be available during completion of this form." The third page is headed "Lists of Acceptable Documents" and consists of List A, List B, and List C. Section 1 on the front of the I-9 Form, Employee Information and Verification, must be completed and signed by the employee. The employee must include his or her name, address, maiden name (if applicable), date of birth, social security number, and an attestation, given "under penalty of perjury," that the employee is either a "citizen or national" of the United States, a "Lawful Permanent Resident," or an "Alien authorized to work" in the United States. Section 2 of the I-9 Form, Employer Review and Verification, must be completed and signed by the employer. The employer is required to examine one document from List A ("Documents that Establish Both Identity and Employment Eligibility"), or one document from List B ("Documents that Establish Identity") and one document from List C ("Documents that Establish Employment Eligibility"). The document or documents provided by the employee must be listed in Section 2, and the employer or a representative of the employer must sign the form, attesting, "under penalty of perjury," that he or she has "examined the document(s) presented by the above-named employee, that the above listed document(s) appear to be genuine and to relate to the employee named, that the employee began employment of (month/day/year) and that to the best of my knowledge the employee is eligible to work in the United States." The "Instructions" sheet that must be available during completion of the I-9 Form directs the employee to complete Section 1 of the form "at the time of hire, which is the actual beginning of employment." The instructions direct the employer, in pertinent part, to complete Section 2 by examining evidence of identity and employment eligibility within three (3) business days of the date employment begins. If employees are authorized to work, but are unable to present the required document(s) within three business days, they must present a receipt for the application of the document(s) within three business days and the actual document(s) within ninety (90) days. . . . Employers must record document title; 2) issuing authority; 3) document number; 4) expiration date, if any; and 5) the date employment begins. Employers must sign and date the certification. Employees must present original documents. Employers may, but are not required to, photocopy the document(s) presented. These photocopies may only be used for the verification process and must be retained with the I-9. (Emphasis in original.) When newly-hired employees report to the hiring site for training, they are placed at a computer to type in the information required in Section 1 of the I-9 Form. It is Neiman Marcus's policy to provide all newly-hired employees, at the time they are completing Section 1 at the computer, a copy of the page setting forth the "Lists of Acceptable Documents," with a copy of the "Instructions" page stapled to that document. When the information required in Section 1 is complete, the I- 9 Form prints out of the computer with the employee's information included. The employee signs the form, and the Neiman Marcus representative examines the documents presented by the employee and completes and signs Section 2 of the I-9 Form. Neiman Marcus requires all newly-hired employees to present original documents from List A or List B and List C for verification within 72 hours of the beginning of employment. If an employee fails to provide the necessary original documents or a receipt for the application of the documents within the 72- hour timeframe, it is Neiman Marcus's policy to suspend the employee's employment with Neiman Marcus and to allow them a week to provide documents required for identification and employment verification. If the newly-hired employee is unable to produce the necessary documents, the employee is terminated, but the employee is advised that they are welcome to re-apply for a job when they are able to produce the original documents that satisfy the requirements on the I-9 Form. It is not Neiman Marcus's policy to specify the documents a newly-hired employee must present to verify his or her identity and employment eligibility. Rather, Human Resource Managers at the various Neiman Marcus stores have been told not to specify any document that must be produced to satisfy the identification and employment verification requirements on the I-9 Form. Donna Bennett is, and was at the times pertinent to this proceeding, the Human Resource Manager for the Neiman Marcus store in Boca Raton. Amy Wertz was the Human Resources Coordinator and worked for Ms. Bennett at the times pertinent to this proceeding. When Ms. Jean-Pierre reported to the hiring center on November 3, 2005, she completed Section 1 of the I-9 Form on the computer provided by Neiman Marcus and, to verify her identity, presented her Florida driver's license to Ms. Wertz, who was the Neiman Marcus representative verifying employment eligibility for the newly-hired Neiman Marcus employees in Ms. Jean-Pierre's group. Ms. Jean-Pierre advised Ms. Wertz that her "Green Card"3 and her Social Security card had been in her car, which was stolen from the parking lot of her condominium building after the Hurricane Wilma. Ms. Jean-Pierre did not provide Ms. Wertz an original document from either List A or List C to verify her employment eligibility on November 3, 2005. She did give Ms. Wertz her Social Security number and a copy of her Permanent Resident Card, income tax return, and pay stub from her previous employment. Ms. Wertz would not accept these documents for purposes of satisfying the I-9 Form requirement of verification of employment eligibility. On November 3, 2005, Ms. Wertz advised Ms. Bennett that Ms. Jean-Pierre had failed to produce the original document from List A or List C required to verify her employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett directed Ms. Wertz to send Ms. Jean- Pierre home to look for an original document that would satisfy the requirements for establishing her employment eligibility. Ms. Jean-Pierre reported for work on November 4, 2005, without an original document from List A or List C. Ms. Bennett went to the official website of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to verify the government policy on the production of documentation to establish employment eligibility. After reviewing the information on the website, Ms. Bennett advised Ms. Jean-Pierre that, if she produced a receipt showing she had applied for a replacement document among those on List A or List C, she could have an additional 90 days in which to produce the original document. Ms. Bennett did not contact Neiman Marcus's corporate legal department with regard to this information before she passed it on to Ms. Jean-Pierre. On November 5, 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre provided either Ms. Wertz or Ms. Bennett a document printed from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services website entitled "I-90 Form: Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card" and told them that she had an appointment with the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the end of November 2005.4 Ms. Bennett believed that this document was an acceptable receipt for an application for a replacement document, and she advised Ms. Jean-Pierre that she had 90 days from November 5, 2005, in which to produce the original document. A notation was made on the I-90 Form that "[y]ou have 90 days from today." Ms. Bennett did not consult with anyone at Neiman Marcus corporate headquarters regarding the sufficiency of the document provided by Ms. Jean-Pierre or receive authorization to allow Ms. Jean-Pierre an additional 90 days in which to produce the original document. In late November 2005, Ms. Wertz told Ms. Bennett that Ms. Jean-Pierre had missed her appointment with the Immigration and Naturalization Service because of a death in her family. Ms. Bennett became concerned that Ms. Jean-Pierre did not take seriously the requirement that she provide original documents to establish her employment eligibility within the 90-day grace period, which, according to Ms. Bennett's understanding, began to run on November 5, 2005. Ms. Bennett called Ms. Jean-Pierre into her office and spoke with her about the importance of providing the necessary original documentation. Ms. Jean-Pierre told her that she would take care of the matter. On or about December 15, 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre produced to Ms. Bennett a document identified as a Citizens and Immigration Services form I-797C, Notice of Action. The "Case Type" specified on the document was "I-90 Application to Replace Alien Registration Card"; the "Receipt Number" noted on the document was "MSC-06-800-46861" the date on which the application was received was noted as December 14, 2005; the applicant was identified as "A37 888 854 Jean-Pierre, Nita"; and the "Notice Type" specified on the document was "Receipt Notice." When she gave Ms. Bennett this document, Ms. Jean- Pierre told Ms. Bennett that it would take between six months and one year to receive the replacement card because of September 11, 2001. Ms. Bennett became concerned that Ms. Jean- Pierre would not be able to provide the required original document within the 90-day grace period. At this time, she contacted Susan Moye, a manager in Associate Relations at Neiman Marcus's corporate headquarters in Dallas, Texas, and arranged to have the I-797C form faxed to Ms. Moye. Ms. Moye consulted with Neiman Marcus's legal department about the sufficiency of the I-797C Form Ms. Jean- Pierre had provided on December 15, 2005. Ms. Moye was advised that this document was not sufficient to meet the I-9 Form requirement that the employer examine the original of one of the documents included on List A or List C to verify employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett was absent from work for a period of time due to the illness and death of her father. During her absence, Ms. Wertz was in communication with Ms. Moye regarding Ms. Jean- Pierre's employment status. Ms. Moye directed Ms. Wertz to notify Ms. Jean-Pierre that the I-797C form she had provided was not sufficient to verify her employment eligibility and that she was suspended from employment for one week to give her the opportunity to obtain an acceptable original document. Ms. Jean-Pierre did not provide the required documentation by the end of the one-week period of her suspension. Ms. Bennett returned to work on December 27, 2005. Ms. Bennett spoke with Ms. Moye about the matter on December 27, 2005, and Ms. Moye told her that Ms. Jean-Pierre needed to provide an original document in order to establish her eligibility for employment and that the document Ms. Jean-Pierre had provided on December 15, 2005, was not an acceptable original document. Ms. Moye advised Ms. Bennett that she would need to terminate Ms. Jean-Pierre. At the time she directed Ms. Bennett to terminate Ms. Jean-Pierre, Ms. Moye was not aware of Ms. Jean-Pierre's race or national origin.5 Ms. Bennett called Ms. Jean-Pierre into her office and explained to her that it was Neiman Marcus's policy to require original documentation of identification and employment eligibility within three days of beginning employment; that the document she provided on December 15, 2005, was unacceptable; and that she was terminated. During this meeting, Ms. Jean-Pierre argued that the document she had provided on December 15, 2005, was acceptable. Ms. Bennett explained to Ms. Jean-Pierre that, in accordance with Neiman Marcus's policy, she needed to produce the original document, not the receipt for an application for a replacement document. When she terminated Ms. Jean-Pierre, Ms. Bennett told her that she was welcome to re-apply for a job when she was able to produce the appropriate documents to establish her employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett did not tell Ms. Jean-Pierre that a "Green Card" was the only acceptable document to establish her employment eligibility. Nor did she tell Ms. Jean-Pierre that she needed to provide more documentation than others because she was Haitian. In January 2006, Ms. Jean-Pierre returned to the Neiman Marcus Boca Raton store and provided Ms. Bennett with a receipt showing that she had applied for a Social Security card on January 10, 2006. Ms. Bennett faxed this document to Ms. Moye, who responded that the receipt was insufficient and that Ms. Jean-Pierre needed to produce an original document. On January 5, 2006, Ms. Jean-Pierre obtained a stamp on her passport indicating that employment was authorized for her, which authorization would expire on January 4, 2007. Ms. Jean-Pierre received her replacement Social Security card on January 16, 2006. Ms. Jean-Pierre did not present an original Social Security card to Neiman Marcus or her stamped passport to Neiman Marcus as verification of her employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett has previously terminated newly-hired employees who failed to timely provide the documents required to establish employment eligibility. Those employees were invited to re-apply when they received their original documents. Several re-applied, provided their original documents, and were re-hired. Of the more than 59 newly-hired employees reporting to work on or about November 1, 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre was the only employee who failed to produce to Neiman Marcus the required original documentation verifying her employment eligibility. Summary The direct evidence presented by Ms. Jean-Pierre is not sufficient to establish that Neiman Marcus discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin. Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett were aware that Ms. Jean-Pierre was from Haiti residing in the United States, but the evidence establishes that both Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett were concerned about her failure to produce any original documents as required for verification of employment eligibility and that Ms. Bennett talked to her about the seriousness of the issue and urged her to get the necessary document. Ms. Jean-Pierre's testimony that Ms. Bennett told her she needed more documentation because she was a Haitian is unsupported by any other testimony or documentary evidence. Finally, Ms. Moye, the person who directed Ms. Bennett to terminate Ms. Jean-Pierre, was not aware that she was born in Haiti. Ms. Jean-Pierre's testimony that both Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett insisted she must provide a "Green Card" to verify her permanent residence is, likewise, unsupported by any other testimony or documentary evidence. In any event, this evidence would not, of itself, establish that either Ms. Wertz or Ms. Bennett was motivated by the intent to discriminate against Ms. Jean-Pierre because she is Haitian. The evidence presented is sufficient, however, to support an inference that Ms. Jean- Pierre misunderstood the information she received from Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett and assumed that they were referring to an original Permanent Resident Card rather than an original document included on the "Lists of Acceptable Documents."6 Ms. Jean-Pierre acknowledged in her testimony that, when Ms. Wertz told her she needed to verify her permanent residence, she interpreted this to mean that she needed to get a replacement copy of her Permanent Resident Card. Similarly, Ms. Jean-Pierre may have interpreted Ms. Bennett's statements that she needed to produce an original document as requiring that she produce a Permanent Resident Card. The evidence presented by Ms. Jean-Pierre is sufficient to establish that Ms. Jean-Pierre is entitled to protection from employment discrimination on the basis of her national origin; that she was qualified for the position of sales associate with Neiman Marcus; and that she was subjected to an adverse employment action because she was terminated from her employment. Ms. Jean-Pierre stated unequivocally in her testimony, however, that she did not know of any other person who failed to verify their employment eligibility that was allowed to work at Neiman Marcus. She has, therefore, failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Nita Jean-Pierre on September 20, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as an Accountant II on December 1, 1987 and in December of 1993, was promoted to Tax Auditor II. In September of 1991, the Respondent received a complaint regarding Petitioner from a taxpayer. The taxpayer alleged that the Petitioner had accused the taxpayer of attempting to sabotage the Petitioner's van. When questioned about the complaint, the Petitioner stated that the taxpayer had attempted to damage his van because the Petitioner had denied the taxpayer's refund claim. The Petitioner's supervisor investigated Petitioner's claims, counseled him and suggested that the Petitioner participate in the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The Petitioner declined assistance. In October and November of 1992, the Petitioner began making bizarre allegations about his co-workers and supervisors engaging in outrageous and deviant sexual conduct and activities, and began to behave strangely. The Petitioner told his supervisors that his co-workers were engaging in sex with his mother, aunt, uncle and other members of his family. According to the Petitioner, these sexual activities were taking place in the office. The Petitioner was upset particularly at one co-worker, who Petitioner stated had moved in next door to him or into his neighborhood in order to spy on Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner stated that the "sex police" were observing him at Walmart. The police would get on top of his van to spy on him according to Petitioner. During this time, the Petitioner filed a "sexual harassment" complaint with the Respondent's Inspector General. Petitioner's statement to the investigators repeated the bizarre accusations outlined above regarding his co- workers. After investigating the Petitioner's claim, the Respondent's Inspector General found no evidence to substantiate these allegations and statements. Because the Petitioner's increasingly bizarre behavior, the Respondent became concerned about the Petitioner's ability to perform his duties as a Tax Auditor I. Therefore, the Respondent requested that the Petitioner go to a psychiatrist for an evaluation. The Petitioner agreed and went to the Apalachee Center for Human Services, where he was examined by Dr. Terence Leland, a psychologist and Dr. Inez Bragado-Spence, a psychiatrist. The evaluation consisted of three, one- hour interviews and various written tests. It was understood that the results of this examination would be shared with Respondent. Dr. Leland reported to the Respondent that the Petitioner had made delusional statements of the type made to and investigated by the Inspector General and found to be baseless. The Petitioner reported that co-workers and others were spying on him. The Petitioner reported alleged sexual liaisons at the office between various employees and supervisors. The Petitioner reported plots against him by various conspirators and "hit men" of the Respondent. Dr. Leland's diagnosis was that the Petitioner suffered from a delusional (paranoid) disorder, persecutory type. It was Dr. Leland's opinion that the Petitioner clearly needed treatment. Dr. Leland felt that the Petitioner could not perform his duties without treatment, and recommended requiring treatment as a condition of the Petitioner's continued employment. During this period, the Petitioner's job performance suffered. Based upon Dr. Leland's reports, the Respondent required that the Petitioner obtain treatment as a condition of continued employment. The Petitioner and the Respondent entered into an agreement which required the following as a condition of continued employment: Seeking psychiatric treatment within 40 days. Furnishing documentation that treat- ment had commenced and was continuing for as long as treatment was recommended. Following the prescribed treatment so long as it was recommended. The Petitioner commenced treatment in June of 1993, Dr. Prasad, a psychiatrist, prescribed medication for the control of Petitioner's illness and Suzan Taylor, a counselor associated with Dr. Prasad, held regular counseling sessions with Petitioner. As a result of his treatment, the Petitioner was asymptomatic, his work improved, and he was promoted to Tax Auditor II in December of 1993. In the summer of 1994, approximately one year after commencing treatment, Dr. Prasad and Suzan Taylor began to suspect that the Petitioner was no longer taking his medication when he again began making delusional statements. At the same time, the Petitioner's supervisor began to notice the reoccurrence of Petitioner's prior conduct. When confronted by his doctors in November of 1994 about the failure to take his medication, the Petitioner stated that he had quit taking it. He was given the option of getting shots of the same medication on a regular basis, but he declined. On November 18, 1994, the Petitioner had an altercation with a co- worker and received a one-day suspension. Dr. Prasad had diagnosed the Petitioner as having major depression with psychotic features of persecution and delusion. Dr. Prasad's opinion was that the Petitioner could not perform his essential job functions without treatment. On or about November 21, 1994, the Petitioner told his supervisor that his last visit to Dr. Prasad was on November 16, 1994. Dr. Prasad was contacted by Petitioner's employer, and Dr. Prasad issued a final report dated November 23, 1994, in which she stated that the Petitioner refused to take any further medication or follow her directions; therefore, there was nothing further she could do to help him if he refused her recommended treatment. She did not release Petitioner from treatment. The Respondent issued its proposed letter of termination based upon the Petitioner's refusal to continue treatment contrary to his agreement and the Petitioner's behavior on the job. In a response to the letter of termination, the Petitioner made bizarre statements about the co-worker with whom he had had the altercation with on November 18, 1994. At a pre-determination conference conducted by William Fritchman, the Respondent's Chief of Personnel and Training (at the time), it was suggested that the Petitioner go to another doctor for evaluation and treatment, if necessary. The Petitioner stated that he would not seek further medical help and stated that he would not take any drugs. The Respondent had real concerns about the Petitioner's ability to perform his job duties, his interaction with taxpayers, and potential harm to fellow employees. Based upon Dr. Prasad's diagnosis and opinion that Petitioner required continuing treatment and Petitioner's declining job performance, Mr. Fritchman issued the Final Action Letter of Termination citing the Petitioner's breach of the conditions of employment, as agreed in the letter of April 30, 1993, which constituted insubordination. Petitioner offered no evidence showing he was sexually harassed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's claim be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Franklin Post Office Box 572 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0572 Gene T. Sellers, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32311-6668 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from January, 1986, until March 7, 1988. Petitioner worked as a tailor and performed alterations at Respondent's store located in Altamonte Springs. In the latter half of 1987, Mr. Pease became the manager of the Altamonte Springs store and thus became Petitioner's supervisor. As had the prior manager, Mr. Pease and Petitioner worked out a schedule that did not require Petitioner to work in violation of his religious principles. However, relations between Petitioner and Mr. Pease were not good. Shortly after becoming manager, for independent business reasons, Mr. Pease decided to reduce the amount of fitting done in the store. The effect of this decision was to reduce the amount of work available for Petitioner. At about this time, Petitioner suffered an accident unrelated to employment. The accident resulted in an extended absence from work. Petitioner received his physician's approval to return to work on February 16, 1988, but failed to do so. Without prior notice, Petitioner showed up at the store on March 7, 1988, and informed Mr. Pease that Petitioner was ready to return to work. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the work schedule had already been arranged for the week. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the only days he could work were Saturday, March 12, and Sunday, March 13. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that he could not work Sundays due to his religious beliefs. Mr. Pease reiterated that no other time was available that week. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that Petitioner understood that he was being fired. Mr. Pease told him that he was not being fired; rather, he was quitting if he left Respondent's employment. Two days later, Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation benefits. He never reported to work with Respondent again. Consistent with his Petition for Relief, Petitioner offered no evidence of discrimination due to national origin. Nothing in the record suggests the existence of any such discrimination. Petitioner has also failed to prove the existence of any religious discrimination. There is no evidence that Mr. Pease refused to try to accommodate Petitioner's religious beliefs with respect to work schedules after the weekend of March 12-13. The only evidence is that when Petitioner suddenly reported to work, the only days immediately available were the weekend days. The record does not even disclose whether Mr. Pease linked the two days, so as to prevent Petitioner from working the Saturday without working the Sunday. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Mr. Pease told Petitioner that if he failed to work the coming Sunday, he would lose his job. In sum, Petitioner has left it entirely to conjecture whether Mr. Pease would have failed to make reasonable accommodation for the religious beliefs of Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Pease was never presented with that opportunity. In addition, Petitioner has produced no evidence that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. There is no evidence of the number of employees working for Respondent at the relevant time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5689 Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted in substance. 4-5. (first sentence) Adopted. 5. (second sentence) Rejected as irrelevant. 6-10. Adopted. s 11. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Weceslao Lugo Palermo 7505 Armstrong Road Lockhart, FL 32810 Richard D. Pease 590 West Highway 436 Altamonte Springs, FL 32714
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1996)1 by allowing a greyhound with a drug, medication, stimulant, depressant, hypnotic, narcotic, or local anesthetic, in its system to enter and complete a race and, if so, what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's pari-mutuel wagering occupational and business licenses.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the pari-mutuel industry in the state, including the regulation and discipline of licensees such as Respondent. Respondent holds an Unrestricted "U1 " Professional individual pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, number 0526562-1081, and a business occupational pari-mutuel wagering license, number 1364008-1080, for Ron Runge Kennel. Respondent is the trainer of record for Prunella Scales ("Prunella"), a greyhound. On February 22, 1997, the Respondent entered Prunella in the thirteenth race at Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club (the "race") and allowed Prunella to complete the race. Prior to the start of the race, urine sample number 267912 was taken from Prunella. The urine analysis conducted by the Bureau of Laboratory Services revealed the presence of ecgonine methyl ester in sample number 267912. Ecgonine methyl ester is a metabolite of cocaine. Cocaine is a topical anesthetic and a class 1 drug. Respondent violated Section 550.2415(1)(a) by entering Prunella in the race with an impermissible drug in its system and allowing Prunella to complete the race in such a condition. As the trainer of record, Respondent is responsible for of the condition of a greyhound that he or she enters in a race. Respondent has an extensive disciplinary history. In August 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent $25.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug and redistributed the purse money. In September 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent a total of $50.00 for racing two greyhounds on an impermissible drug. In one instance, Petitioner redistributed the purse money. In November 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent $25.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug. Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license was suspended until he paid the fine. In September 1995, Petitioner fined Respondent a total of $50.00 for racing two greyhounds on an impermissible drug. In one instance, the purse money was redistributed. In January 1996, Petitioner fined Respondent $100.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug and suspended Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license until Respondent paid the fine. In March 1996, Petitioner fined Respondent $50.00 for racing a greyhound on procaine, an impermissible substance. In March 1997, Petitioner summarily suspended Respondent's licenses and denied Respondent all access to pari-mutuel grounds during the period of suspension. In addition to the foregoing drug violations, Respondent was found guilty of improperly using rabbits in the training of racing greyhounds in November 1991. He was fined $250.00 for that violation. On March 11, 1995, Respondent was fined $50.00 for presenting the wrong greyhound at the weigh-in, and on July 30, 1996, he was fined $50.00 for failure to present the proper greyhound at the weigh-in. Prior disciplinary action has been ineffective in rehabilitating Respondent. Respondent persists in the prohibited practice of racing animals on impermissible substances. License suspension and fines have no deterrent effect on Respondent. Respondent is not a viable candidate for rehabilitation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order and therein find Respondent guilty of violating Section 550.2415(1)(a) by racing an animal with an impermissible drug in its system and revoke Respondent's licenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 9th day of January, 1998.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed for approximately five years with Respondent as a salesman. RF Group, LLC, is a limited liability company, doing business as Respondent, McGowan's Heating and Air Conditioning, and is a company engaged in the heating and air conditioning business. Petitioner was a successful salesman for four and one- half years with the company until a new salesman was hired. According to Petitioner, the new salesman was given most of the sales leads and Petitioner was cut out. Eventually, Petitioner's salary was reduced due to a decrease in his sales performance. He attributes his decrease in sales production to Respondent choosing the new salesman over him. Although he claimed age discrimination in his initial complaint, Petitioner offered no evidence or testimony that he was not given the sales leads due to his age and that the younger salesman received the leads because Respondent considered Petitioner too old to conduct his business. Petitioner resigned his position with Respondent because he was not making enough salary. After his resignation, Petitioner went to work with Total Air Care, but his employment was terminated due to company lay-offs in October 2010.
Recommendation it is Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 G. Alan Howard, Esquire Milam, Howard, Nicandri, Dees & Gilliam, P.A. East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Luis G. Arias 3526 Laurel Leaf Drive Orange Park, Florida 32065 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1992, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the date, time, and place for the formal administrative hearing. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner and his counsel at the addresses listed in the Petition for Relief and accompanying information. Petitoner's attorney appeared at the hearing. However, even though Petitioner received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Petitioner did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Respondent was present at the hearing. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned or his attorney that he would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. Petitioner was allowed fifteen minutes to appear at the hearing. As a consequence of Petitoner's failure to appear, no evidence was presented to support Petitioner's case. Specifically, no evidence of discrimination based on handicap or race was forthcoming. Therefore, Petitioner's attorney was advised that the Petition for Relief would be dismissed and a Recommended Order entered recommending the Commission do likewise.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Allen, Esquire 322 West Cervantes Street P.O. Box 12322 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Margaret A. Jones Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based upon mental disability.
Findings Of Fact The final disputed-fact hearing began on time. Petitioner was present, as was the attorney for Respondent. Petitioner appeared pro se and responded clearly and affirmatively to the undersigned's questions, stating that she knew that she could be represented by an attorney but for reasons of her own she chose to represent herself. After explaining the duty to go forward, the burden of proof, and the order of proof, the undersigned inquired of both parties whether any further explanation was necessary; whether they had any questions; and whether the undersigned could do anything to make the process easier on either of them. At that point, Petitioner gestured to a piece of paper and requested to meet with Respondent's counsel for purposes of negotiating a settlement. A brief recess was granted for that purpose, and the undersigned left the hearing room. Upon returning to the hearing room, the undersigned inquired whether a settlement had been reached and was informed that one had not been reached. Petitioner then announced that, "Since they won't settle, I have no more to say." The undersigned inquired at length to be certain Petitioner understood that: she could call witnesses; she could testify on her own behalf; and she could present documents, either through her own testimony or that of others. Petitioner stated that she understood but did not want to call witnesses or testify. She gestured at what appeared to be her proposed settlement document, but which could have been something else, stating that she only had a document. The undersigned explained that very few documents could be called "self-authenticating" and gave a brief explanation of what type of testimony is necessary to lay a predicate to put any document into evidence. Petitioner said she did not wish to testify. She did not offer her piece of paper. The undersigned explained that if Petitioner did not testify and did not offer her single document, she could not prevail, and that based upon the allegation in her Petition that she has a "mental disability/handicap," the undersigned needed to be assured that Petitioner understood that unless she testified to something, called witnesses to testify, or offered some exhibits, the undersigned would have no choice but to enter a recommended order of dismissal. Petitioner assured the undersigned that she understood and refused to proceed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michele B. Brown, pro se 2634 North Point Circle, Apt. B Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda S. Bennett, Esquire Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett Foster & Gwartney, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by reason of national origin.
Findings Of Fact From October 5, 1997, through October 4, 1998, Santiago was employed by Eckerd's as a Front End Associate and a Drug Clerk. During that time, Santiago worked in two of Eckerd's Miami stores under the supervision of store managers Paul Harris (Harris) and Susanna Peralta (Peralta). Santiago was a difficult employee to schedule in that she limited the hours during which she was available to work. For that reason it was necessary for her to work in two different stores; still Eckerd had trouble finding enough work hours for her at times when she was available. In a final effort to secure adequate hours for Santiago, in July 1998 Eckerd placed her in its store managed by Peralta. At that time, 17 of 29 store employees (approximately 59 percent) were Hispanic, including store manager Peralta. During the time Petitioner worked at the Eckerd from which she transferred, 18 of 44 associates (approximately 41 percent) were Hispanic. Santiago claims that Harris was hostile towards her because she is Hispanic. Harris and Peralta unequivocally denied any discriminatory actions or intent with respect to Santiago. Their demeanor under oath was serious and straightforward, and the undersigned credits their testimony. Santiago expressed her strong view that she was the victim of a vendetta by Harris rooted in discrimination, but there was no evidence or exhibits which would provide the type of corroborating detail one would expect to find if a retail manager in fact ran his store in a manner prohibited by law. Unrebutted testimony presented by Eckerd establishes that Santiago was terminated in good faith because she failed to report to work for three consecutive days. Her testimony suggests that Santiago may have been genuinely confused regarding whether she was in fact scheduled to work on those days. Assuming Santiago had made an honest error in not reporting for work, such a misunderstanding would not furnish a basis to conclude that she was terminated on account of her national origin.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing this case with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Danielle R. May, Esquire Eckerd Corporation, d/b/a Eckerd Drugs 8333 Bryan Dairy Road Largo, Florida 33777 Adda Santiago Carlton Bay Condo 2821 Northeast 163rd Street Apartment 2T, Sunny Isle Boulevard Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice pursuant to chapter 760, Florida Statutes, by terminating Petitioner for allegedly using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Preston Pamphile ("Petitioner") worked for Respondent as a driver/courier at its Tallahassee station from 2006 until his termination in May 2010. Petitioner is African- American. Respondent, Federal Express Corporation ("Respondent" or "FedEx") is an express delivery company. The Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner alleges discrimination based upon race/color. Specifically, the Discrimination Statement reads as follows: I am an African American. I was subjected to different terms and conditions and discharged because of my race. I worked for Fedex as a Driver. I was falsly accused of talking/texting on my cell phone while operating a company vehicle. I tried to tell my supervisor (Tony Henderson) that I was not using my phone. I offered to show him my phone bill. Mr. Henderson said “I know what I saw.” On May 6, 2010, I was terminated. However, a white employee (Robert Fitzsimmons) was reported by another employee for talking on his cell phone while operating a company (vehicle) and he was not disciplined. I believe I was terminated because of my race. In addition to the claim of race discrimination, the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission also asserts a claim of retaliation. In Petitioner's written statement accompanying the Petition for Relief, Petition explains the basis for the retaliation claim: I feel that he retaliated because when I came to work at 2:50 a.m., I saw him in the back of the building with a female employee. The same female employee I saw him in back of the building with is his employee that is under his management. And I feel that Tony Henderson is trying to protect his marriage because of me seeing him in back of the building with the female employee. FedEx's "Three-Strikes You're Out" Policy At all relevant times during his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was aware of FedEx's Acceptable Conduct Policy. Under this policy, an employee who receives any combination of three warning letters and/or performance reminder letters during a twelve-month period is subject to termination. Petitioner conceded that this policy was uniformly applied by Respondent, and Petitioner did not contend that Respondent committed any unlawful conduct in applying this policy. On February 5, 2009, Petitioner received a warning letter for failing to report traffic citations he received while operating his personal vehicle. The warning letter reminded Petitioner that "3 notifications of deficiency (i.e., any combination of warning letters and/or reminders) received within a 12-month period" would result in his termination. On September 1, 2009, Petitioner received a second warning letter for crossing a moving conveyor belt during a morning sorting operation. This letter stated: "This is your second deficiency notification within 12 months. If you receive a third notification within 12 months, regardless of the type, you will be terminated." On January 6, 2010, Petitioner received a third warning letter for failing to report a traffic citation he received while operating a FedEx vehicle. Petitioner was informed that this was his "third disciplinary letter within 12 months." Petitioner acknowledged that he could have been terminated at that point pursuant to the “Three Strikes” policy without issue. However, rather than immediately terminating his employment, Petitioner was given another opportunity by Respondent. In Petitioner's words, two managers "stuck their necks out" for Petitioner and gave him "another shot." Petitioner was clearly warned in the January 6, 2010, warning letter, however, that "If you receive another [disciplinary letter], whether a warning letter or performance reminder, within 12 months, you will be terminated." The letter went on to state that Petitioner's employment with FedEx was "precarious," and that one more warning letter or performance reminder at any time during the next 12 months would result in his termination. FedEx's Prohibition on Use of Cell Phones Respondent's Safety Manual Policy 4-5 strictly prohibits drivers/couriers from using electronic devices while operating a FedEx vehicle. Petitioner acknowledged he was fully aware of Respondent's policy about using electronic devices while operating a vehicle. Indeed, Petitioner received and signed an Electronic Devices Memorandum, authored by the district manager responsible for the Tallahassee station. The memorandum specifically lists cellular telephones as a type of electronic device that may not be used while a driver is operating a FedEx vehicle. The memorandum further provides: "If you carry a cellular phone or Nextel with you when you are on the road, you MUST keep it in the rear cargo area of your vehicle so that you are not tempted to use it while operating the vehicle," and "You are NOT to have your phone on your person while on the clock." (Emphasis in original) The memorandum also prohibits the use of "I-POD type products" and "any other device or activity that would cause distraction while operating a vehicle." The memorandum concludes with the admonition that: "Violations of this policy will be addressed by management using Policy 2-5 of The People Manual (Acceptable Conduct). Violations may result in disciplinary actions up to and including termination." The Mahan Drive Delivery On May 6, 2010, Petitioner made a delivery to the building complex at 2727 Mahan Drive in Tallahassee. Petitioner had his cell phone with him in the FedEx vehicle, and was using the phone to listen to music. Respondent's operations manager, Tony Henderson ("Henderson"), was present at the complex that morning and was parked in the parking lot. As Petitioner was pulling into the complex, Henderson personally observed Petitioner operating his cell phone while driving the FedEx vehicle. Petitioner pulled up to a building in the complex, delivered his packages, and then left the complex. Henderson attempted to follow Petitioner in his vehicle, but was unable to keep up with him. Henderson then proceeded to the Tallahassee station, where Petitioner arrived approximately one hour later. Upon his arrival at the station, Henderson confronted Petitioner and asked whether he had been using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. Petitioner responded that he was not talking or texting on his cell phone, but rather had been changing the radio station on the phone. Petitioner was thereafter placed on paid suspension pending an investigation into whether he had violated Respondent's policy by using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. Two days later, on May 8, 2010, Henderson issued a warning letter to Petitioner for violation of the policy prohibiting the use of electronic devices while operating a FedEx vehicle. This was, again, Petitioner's third warning letter within a 12 month period. Consistent with Respondent's Acceptable Conduct Policy, as well as the prior warning to Petitioner, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. On May 17, 2010, Petitioner wrote a statement concerning the events of May 6, 2010. In that statement, Petitioner admitted to using his cell phone to listen to music while operating a FedEx vehicle.1 Allegations of Disparate Treatment Petitioner has alleged that he was subjected to different terms and conditions because of his race, and that white employees that violated Policy 4-5 were treated less harshly than he. Petitioner cited two instances of cell phone usage by FedEx employees in support of this claim. On or about January 29, 2010, Henderson personally observed FedEx courier Dan Workman operating a FedEx vehicle. Workman is white. Judging by what he saw, Henderson believed Workman might have been engaged in a conversation on a cell phone while operating the FedEx vehicle. Henderson contacted another FedEx operations manager, Sam Karvelas, and asked him to confront Workman about using a cell phone while operating a FedEx vehicle. When confronted by Karvelas, Workman admitted that he had been talking on his cell phone while operating the vehicle. On February 1, 2010, Workman received a warning letter for using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. On October 15, 2008, Henderson personally observed FedEx courier Elizabeth Christian talking on a cell phone while operating a FedEx vehicle. Christian is white. On that same day, Christian received a warning letter for using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. At hearing, Petitioner testified that a white FedEx employee, Blake Fitzsimmons, had recounted to Petitioner that he had been observed by Henderson using a cell phone while operating his FedEx vehicle, and had not received any form of discipline. However, Henderson's testimony on this issue was that prior to Petitioner's termination from FedEx, Henderson had never personally observed Fitzsimmons using a cell phone or electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. On cross- examination, Petitioner admitted he had no personal knowledge of whether Henderson has ever shown preferential treatment to white employees over black employees. Basis for the Retaliation Claim Approximately three to four months before Petitioner received the warning letter for using his cell phone while operating a FedEx vehicle, Petitioner claims he saw Henderson alone with a female FedEx employee. Petitioner testified he arrived at the Tallahassee station at 3:00 a.m., and saw Henderson leaning over the driver's side door of a truck. Petitioner testified "I can't say what I saw, but I saw him -- when they saw me, they parted ways." Petitioner further testified, "Pretty much he leaned over in the driver's side door and whatever they did, if they kissed, they kissed. I'm not sure what they did, but, yes, that's what I saw at three in the morning." Petitioner told several of his friends and co-workers what he had seen but did not report the incident to anybody in management or Human Resources.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 2011.
