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LEO JOSEPH BERGER vs. JEEMAN, INC., 88-001293 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001293 Latest Update: May 27, 1988

The Issue Should the Respondent, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, grant the applicant, JEMAAM, INC., a dredge and fill permit pursuant to the Notice of Intent dated March 2, 1988, in File No. 361414445?

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, JEMAAM, INC., is the owner and the developer of real property contiguous to state waters in Lee County, Florida. The condominium project on the property is known as Island's End Condominiums. As part of Phase III of the condominium project, Respondent JEMAAM built a dock. This dock is the subject of this administrative hearing because the Respondent JEMAAM wants to reconfigure and relocate portions of the dock structure. Respondent JEMAAM filed an application for a dredge and fill permit with the Respondent DER in order to modify the exiting dock. The Respondent JEMAAM seeks to modify the dock by relocating a 3.92' x 61' section of the existing dock to a more waterward location. This area of the dock is the southerly extension, which fronts the Petitioners' condominium unit. The application process was begun on November 3, 1987, and completed on February 26, 1988. A Notice of Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit for the proposed project was issued on March 2, 1988, by the Respondent DER. The dock is subject to the Respondent DER's permitting requirements because the construction activity is to take place in state waters and the dock structure exceeds 1,000 square feet in size. In addition, the Respondent JEMAAM has agreed not to undertake further dredge or fill work or any other construction in wetland areas under the Respondent DER's jurisdiction unless a valid permit had been obtained for such activities. The Petitioners, LEO J. BERGER and KATHLEEN D. BERGER, are the owners of Condominium Unit Number 102 in Phase III of Island's End Condominiums in Lee County, Florida, which is adjacent to Respondent JEMAAM's dock. The Petitioners filed an administrative complaint in which they disputed the appropriateness of the Intent to Issue dated March 2, 1988. In support of their position, the Petitioners identified a number of areas of controversy and alleged that the Respondent JEMAAM's application did not meet the "reasonable assurances" required for permit issuance. The Petitioners' allegations, which are properly before the Hearing Officer, are as follows: Shallow water in the area where the new dock configuration is to be located would result in propeller dredging of littoral shallows. The proposed waterward relocation of a portion of the dock would present a navigational hazard in the channel as well as in the shallows and around the dock. The proposed relocation would cause harmful shoaling in the area, which would affect boating safety as well as the habitat. The dock relocation and associated boat traffic will disrupt and harm bird and fish habitats. The dock may be within the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve. Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, I find as follows as to the allegations raised by the Petitioners in their administrative complaint: There are sufficient water depths, based upon the Bathymetric profile and a number of reviews by the Respondent DER in the proposed relocation area, to prevent harmful propeller dredging by boats using the dock. However, to assure that harmful turbidity and propeller dredging does not occur, the dock extension arm can be completely handrailed in the shallow, landward area. The addition of a shielded, steady burning light and navigational markers should minimize any impediment to navigation caused by the dock relocation. The main channel is not far from this area, and most boating traffic in the general area is confined to the main channel. The additional markers and lighting requirements combine with the current conditions to alert all reasonable and prudent boaters to the hazards and challenges of the area. The evidence is inconclusive as to the extent to which the dock structure has increased shoaling in the area. Much of the shoaling is attributed to the natural conditions of the area, a back-bay coastal zone. The shoaling which has occurred is thought to be beneficial by the experts who testified at hearing because the development of grasses has increased. This creates a positive habitat for Cuban shoalweed, brittle starfish, and several species of crab. Relocation of a portion of the dock will not substantially affect the shoaling activity in the area. The bird and fish habitats in the area do not appear to be adversely affected by the current dock. It is not anticipated that the relocation of a portion of the dock will change the ongoing development of the habitats. The bird roosting area on the sandbar includes a larger variety of species now than it did before the current dock was built, according to studies done by James W. Beever III. The installation of the additional channel markers was suggested by Beever, an expert witness in the case, as a means to enhance the viability of the sandbar as a habitat. The markers aid in steering boat traffic away from the area and prevent the beaching of boats on the sandbar. James W. Beever III is the current resource and research coordinator of the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve. Based upon his testimony, the proposed dock relocation is not within the aquatic preserve. The areas of controversy raised by the Petitioners in their administrative complaint were sufficiently met by the reasonable assurances of the Respondent JEMAAM that the purported harms would not occur. The project is not contrary to the public interest under the criteria set forth in Section 403.918, Florida Statutes, as represented by the Respondent DER in the Notice of Intent to Issue and proved at hearing.

Florida Laws (1) 409.913
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GROVER RYAN AND MARGARET B. RYAN vs. JOHN SPANG AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 86-000992 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000992 Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1986

The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.

Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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LEO J. AND RENATE HAGEMAN vs ROBERT M. CARTER AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 94-006794 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Dec. 07, 1994 Number: 94-006794 Latest Update: Feb. 26, 1996

Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.57120.6826.012267.061373.414403.031 Florida Administrative Code (4) 18-21.00318-21.00418-21.00562-312.050
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MICHAEL M. SINGER vs TIMOTHY AND HOPE DELONG AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 01-003327 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 21, 2001 Number: 01-003327 Latest Update: Oct. 28, 2003

The Issue This issue in this case is whether the private Respondents are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Because the undersigned is not required or authorized to recommend a disposition on the merits of Singer’s Petition, the fact-findings that follow are limited to those necessary to determine the narrow issue whether an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is proper under Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. In addition, as written, the findings below assume the reader’s familiarity with the preceding Preliminary Statement. On July 22, 1999, the Owners submitted an application to the Department seeking approval to build a dock. In a letter dated January 21, 2000, which is included in File 2, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the proposed dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This January 21, 2000, letter constituted the first agency action (“First Action” or “FA”) concerning the Owners’ dock. The First Action comprised three distinct determinations (for short, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3”), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: FA-D1: The dock is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”). FA-D2: The dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. FA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the dock is deemed consistent with the State Programmatic General Permit (“SPGP”) program. As originally designed, and as approved by the Department on January 21, 2000, the Owners’ dock will be referred to herein as the “Approved Dock.” After receiving notice of the First Action, the Owners caused a “Notice of Determination of Exemption” to be published in the February 1, 2000, issue of the Palm Beach Daily Business Review. In pertinent part, this public notice stated: The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the [Owners’] project to construct a 125-foot by 4-foot access dock and a 40-foot by 8-foot terminal platform has been determined to be exempt from the requirements to obtain an environmental resource permit. . . . . A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department’s action may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. . . . . * * * Complete copies of all documents relating to this determination of exemption are available for public inspection during normal business hours . . . at the [Department’s regional office]. (Owners’ Exhibit No. 4). Following the publication of this notice, an individual named Karrie Webb timely filed a petition with the agency challenging the Department’s approval of the Approved Dock. Her Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing was filed with DOAH on February 17, 2000, initiating Webb. v. Timothy and Hope Delong and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 00-0761 (the “Webb case”). The Webb case proceeded through final hearing, but before a Recommended Order was issued, the petitioner, on January 9, 2001, filed a Stipulation for Dismissal. Consequently, on January 12, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order closing the file.1 Not long after the conclusion of the Webb case, the Owners submitted a second application to the Department for authorization to build a dock. As described in this second application (which gave rise to File 3), the newly proposed dock (hereafter, the “Redesigned Dock”) differed somewhat from the Approved Dock. Most noticeably, the terminal platform of the Redesigned Dock faced north, towards Singer’s property, whereas the terminal platform of the Approved Dock had faced south. Singer and the Owners disagreed sharply as to whether the differences between the Approved Dock and the Redesigned Dock should be considered “substantial” (as Singer claims) or merely “minor” (as the Owners claim). For present purposes, however, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, to resolve that particular dispute. What is significant and should be emphasized, however, is that whether or not the Redesigned Dock differed substantially from the Approved Dock, the Owners submitted a new application respecting the Redesigned Dock as if it were a new project, and the Department acted upon the Owners’ second application as if the first one had neither been made nor approved. Thus, in a letter dated February 28, 2001, which is included in File 3, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the Redesigned Dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This February 28, 2001, letter constituted the second agency action (“Second Action” or “SA”) concerning the Owners’ dock (though it was, of course, the first agency action on the Redesigned Dock). Like the First Action of the previous year, the Second Action was composed of three distinct determinations (again, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3” for short), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: SA-D1: The re-designed dock is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. SA-D2: The re-designed dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. SA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the re-designed dock is deemed not consistent with the SPGP program.2 The Owners did not cause notice of the Department’s Second Action to be published in a newspaper of general circulation. Armed with the Second Action, the Owners proceeded to have the Redesigned Dock constructed, and it now exists in fact. The existing structure will be referred to herein as the “As- Built Dock,” which, to be clear, was constructed according to the blueprint of the Redesigned Dock. After the construction began, Singer initiated this administrative litigation, the procedural history of which is summarized in the Preliminary Statement. In the course of the litigation, on May 17, 2002, the Department filed both a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction. As the basis for its request that the undersigned relinquish jurisdiction over File 3——that is, the Department’s file supporting the Second Action, which had approved the Redesigned Dock——the Department relied upon a letter dated May 16, 2002, from the Owners’ counsel to the Department’s counsel, which contained the following pertinent text: Please accept this notice as the withdrawal of the application filed by Timothy and Hope Delong in the above matter [namely, File 3]. The Department (with the Owners’ concurrence) contended that because the Owners had voluntarily withdrawn their application, the agency had lost jurisdiction to enter a final order implementing, modifying, or rescinding the Second Action, which had preliminarily approved that application. See, e.g., City of North Port, Florida v. Consolidated Minerals, Inc., 645 So. 2d 485, 486-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The undersigned agreed that, by withdrawing their application for approval of the Redesigned Dock, the Owners had divested the Department of jurisdiction in the matter. Accordingly, the undersigned relinquished jurisdiction over File 3. In withdrawing their second application, the Owners materially changed their position and substantially modified the outcome of the most relevant preliminary agency action at issue, namely, the Second Action approving the Redesigned Dock. Indeed, by nullifying the Second Action, the Owners forfeited the only express authorization, albeit a preliminary one, that they had ever obtained from the Department for the Redesigned Dock. Thus, in other words, rather than defend the Department’s preliminary approval of the Redesigned Dock in this proceeding, the Owners elected to rely upon the First Action as a defense against any future claim that the As-Built Dock is an illegal, unpermitted project.3 The Owners’ withdrawal of their second application was intended to resolve, and in fact did resolve, matters raised in Singer’s Petition. The undersigned specifically finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Owners’ change of position was substantial for purposes of Section 120.595(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.59557.111
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GEORGE R. LANGFORD, ET AL. vs. BEN C. BOYNTON AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 82-001982 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-001982 Latest Update: Nov. 01, 1991

Findings Of Fact Parties Mr. Boynton has applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock to allow him access to an island which he owns in Lake Iamonia in Leon County, Florida. Petitioners Wilkinson, Frye, Gary, Pennington, Dunlap and Buford 1/ are riparian landowners who use the waters of Lake Iamonia for recreation, fishing and duck hunting. The Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the state statutes and rules regulating water quality and dredging and filling in the waters of the State of Florida. Nature of Project According to his application (as amended at the final hearing) Mr. Boynton requests a dredge and fill permit to construct a boat dock which will be 150 feet long and 10 feet wide. It will be strong enough to support a motor vehicle. Mr. Boynton owns a parcel of land on the west shore of Lake Iamonia just north of what is known as the North Meridian Road Bridge. He also owns Island #33, known locally as Live Oak Island, which is 300 feet east of the mainland. Between the mainland and the island is a neck of the lake which is a shallow slough. As proposed the dock will extend from the west side of the island toward Mr. Boynton's mainland parcel at approximately the narrowest portion of the slough. The dock will be constructed of creosoted pilings and planks. The pilings are to be sunk into the lake bottom by jetting to a depth of 10 to 12 feet. Mr. Boynton plans to construct a hunting cabin on his island. The purpose of the dock is to allow him to transport supplies to the cabin from the mainland by means of a small boat. In order to supply electric power to the planned cabin Mr. Boynton also applied for a permit to construct a subaqueous cable crossing between the mainland and the island. No objection to the cable crossing has been raised by Petitioners. In 1981 Mr. Boynton filed an application with both the Department of Environmental Regulation and the Department of Natural Resources for permits to construct a 300 foot long bridge from the mainland to his island in the same location as the proposed dock. The bridge application generated considerable opposition from adjacent landowners on the lake and as a result, Mr. Boynton stayed his application. In November 1981 he wrote a letter to the Department of Natural Resources which stated: November 2, 1981 Ted Forsgren Department of Natural Resources Tallahassee, Florida 32303 RE: Case #81-1910 Dear Ted: Please do not submit a report to the Cabinet for the bridge permit I had requested. I would prefer there be no position stated either pro or con about this project. Sincerely, /s/ Ben C Boynton Mr. Boynton later stated in a letter dated April 8, 1982 to Mr. William Williams at the Department of Natural Resources that: I have stopped the bridge application. This is not to be construed as a withdrawal of the application. I plan to resume the re- quest at a later date. I have earlier sent a letter to Mr. Ted Forestgren, permitting, DNR, stating the same. Should there be any other information requested, please let me know. Much of the opposition from Petitioners to the proposed dock application is founded in a fear that the dock is just a first step in later constructing a bridge. This fear is reasonable. The proposed dock is precisely half of the original proposed bridge. At the final hearing Mr. Boynton was unable to provide a reasonable explanation of why he needs such a large dock to service a simple hunting cabin. Water Quality and Wildlife Impact The impact of the proposed dock on water quality in Lake Iamonia is insignificant. Lake Iamonia is a Class III water of the State of Florida. The proposed placement of pilings in the lake bottom will cause some turbidity for a short duration. This turbidity can be adequately controlled by the use of turbidity curtains at the time of construction. Petitioners have raised no objection in their Petition for Formal Hearing to the dock on the basis of water quality and it did not became an issue at the final hearing. Some impact by the dock on wild ducks was alleged by Petitioners. Lake Iamonia is a wintering area for certain migratory waterfowl most notably, the ringneck duck. Most of the Petitioners are hunters who are concerned about preserving their recreational interest in killing the ringnecks. As with water quality, the impact of the dock on waterfowl will be de minimis. Ducks are wary of any new man-made structure and a dock of the size proposed here is certain to be noticed by them. They will initially be "blind shy" of the dock, but will readily adapt to its presence. Were there to be constant human activity on the dock, it would have a noticeable effect on the ducks' flight paths. The occasional off-loading of supplies for a hunting cabin will frighten few, if any ducks. There are other structures, such as the residences of other riparian owners, and docks along the lake shore which have not frightened the ducks away. The fearless ringnecks even tolerate being shot at, yet return to the lake annually. At the final hearing Petitioners recognized the de minimis impact of the proposed dock on wildlife and water quality. Their concern is that the dock is the first step toward constructing a bridge and that the permitting of such a bridge will unleash an avalanche of additional permit applications for the development of the numerous islands in Lake Iamonia. With respect to Lake Iamonia no evidence was presented at the final hearing of a significant number of dock permit applications or of any bridge applications before the Department of Environmental Regulation. If enough structures were permitted by the Department to begin serious consideration of cumulative impact on the lake, the precedent of having permitted the first few docks would not be binding upon the Department because the facts on which the first permits were based would be different from those facts before the Department on consideration of the later applications. Navigation The slough between the mainland and Live Oak island is navigable by only small craft such as johnboats and canoes. There is a "channel" which runs north-south through the slough at a depth of several feet. Even though the proposed dock projects halfway to the mainland it will not block the channel. DNR Consent The submerged land over which the proposed dock will be constructed belongs to the State of Florida. Mr. Boynton has requested permission from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to use the land. Permission for the construction of a dock longer than 100 feet long was conditionally granted by DNR in a letter dated June 4, 1982 which said in part: We recognize that the lake is very shallow in the proposed dock location and the length was designed to avoid dredging. However, we can not recommend approval of a 200 foot long dock across this 300 foot wide area of the lake. We would have no objections to a 100 foot long dock. Additionally, should you ob- tain written statements of no objection from the adjacent landowners currently living on Lake Iamonia for a 150 foot long dock, we would then have no objections to a dock of that length. Our approval of a docking facility does not in any way indicate a favorable Position to- wards your previous bridge easement request which you have withdrawn. The use of state owned lands to construct a bridge would be in conflict with current rules and policies. Our intent in approving the docking facility is to allow you to have reasonable ingress and egress to your island. Consider this the authority sought under Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, to pursue this project upon our receipt of the revised drawings indicating a reduced length of 100 feet or the no objection statements for a re- vised length of 150 feet. This letter in no way waives the authority and/or jurisdiction of any governmental entity nor does this letter disclaim any title in- terest that the State may have in this project site. Sincerely, /s/ Henry Dean Interim Director Division of State Lands (Emphasis added)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order issuing a permit to Ben C. Boynton for the construction of a 150 foot by 10 foot dock and subaqueous cable crossing in Lake Iamonia as requested in his permit application, subject however, to obtaining a letter from the Department of Natural Resources indicating that Mr. Boynton has satisfied the terms outlined in the letter dated June 4, 1982 granting consent to use state owned submerged lands. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1982.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57253.77403.087
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JOHN K. AND PATRICIA S. HOLZBAUER vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 82-001947 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-001947 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1984

The Issue Whether petitioners have timely availed themselves of a clear point of entry into administrative proceedings on Mr. and Mrs. Rankin's application for a permit to build a dock and, if so, whether the permit application should be granted?

Findings Of Fact On April 12, 1982, Frederick W. Rankin applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock six feet wide and 300 feet long in the waters of Bayou Chico in Escambia County, Florida. Paralleling the dock on either side of the outboard end, two rows of mooring pilings 19.5 feet distance from the dock were proposed in the application. On April 20, 1983, Mark N. Snowdon, an employee of the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) inspected the site, and, in an official DER permit application appraisal dated April 23, 1982, reported: Two large support vessels (crew boats) are moored at a small pier immediately east of the site. A commercial marina facility i[s] located directly across the bayou (north) from the project site. Bayou Chico is approximately 0.25 mile wide at this point. DER Exhibit No. 4. Between the crew boats' dock (Gulfwater Marine) and the site proposed for the Rankins' dock is the mouth of a small embayment (the bayouette). The Holzbauers own a house and lot, separated from the Rankins' lot by a parcel less than 75 feet wide, that fronts on the bayouette. PERMIT ISSUES DER issued a permit on June 9, 1982, and work began on the Rankins' dock on June 12, 1982. On the same day, Mr. Holzbauer inquired of the men putting in pilings whether DER had issued a permit for the work, then telephoned DER and asked DER's Mr. Fancher the same question. Mr. Fancher told Mr. Holzbauer that a permit had been issued, which was the first Mr. Holzbauer was told of issuance of the permit. As far as the evidence revealed, no notice of intent to issue preceded issuance of the permit. On June 26, 1982, the Holzbauers received a letter from W. Richard Fancher on behalf of DER, dated June 24, 1982, in which he stated: It is my understanding that, until recently, you had no knowledge of this private dock project. If this is correct, you may consider this formal notice of the activity. Should you object to this permit, including any and all of the conditions contained therein, you may file an appropriate petition for administrative hearing. This petition must be filed within 14 days of the receipt of this letter. Further, the petition must conform to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 17-1 and Section 28-5.201, Florida Administrative Code (copies enclosed). The petition must be filed with the Office of General Counsel, Department of Environmental Regulation, Twin Towers Office Building, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. If no petition is filed within the prescribed time, you will be deemed to have waived your right to request an administrative hearing on this matter. DER Exhibit No. 1. A copy of Mr. Fancher's letter to the Holzbauers was also sent to Mr. Rankin. On July 8, 1982, a letter from the Holzbauers to Ms. Tschinkel reached DER's Office of the Secretary, protesting issuance of the permit and alleging that the dock did not conform to permit conditions. 1/ This letter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, whose Director entered an order, sua sponte, on July 28, 1982, that "[t]his matter is dismissed without prejudice." No. 82-1947. An amended petition dated August 4, 1982, reached DER's Office of the Secretary on August 9, 1982, and the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 20, 1982. No. 82-2314. NO PERMIT RELIANCE The dock has been continued to completion, at a cost of $11,000.00. As built, the dock veers out from shore at a more easterly angle than the permit purported to allow. Whereas the permit contemplated construction at an angle several degrees west of north, the dock has in fact been built at an angle about 15 degrees east of north. One result is that the end is some 90 feet east of the point contemplated by the permit. Although a DER employee testified that this deviation was "within reason," it is clearly a significant departure from what the permit putatively allowed. The Rankins only own 86 feet of bayou frontage. The mouth of the bayouette is no more than 110 feet across. The mooring pilings, moreover, have been set in two rows parallel to the dock not 19.5 feet on either side, but 40 feet from the west side of the dock and 30 feet from the east side. If any of the landowners on the bayouette (with one exception) tried to build a pier perpendicular to their shore line extending even half the length of the Rankins' dock, it would intersect the Rankins' dock. NAVIGATION While the dock does not seal off the bayouette, it makes access considerably more difficult, especially for Mr. Holzbauer who sails in and out in his 14 foot boat. The dock juts out from the point at the western edge of the entrance into the bayouette at such an angle that it comes within 70 feet of the eastern edge of the entrance into the bayouette. Petitioner's Exhibit No. The crew boats moored to the east of the Rankins' dock have overall lengths ranging from 65 to 85 feet and there were three of them moored at Gulfwater Marine last summer. When the crew boats are docked, the distance between the westernmost one and the most inboard mooring piling next to the Rankins' dock is 81.5 to 103 feet. Where traffic from Bayou Chico to Pensacola Bay passes under a bridge, the channel is only 80 feet wide and the crew boats sometimes hit the bridge. The greatest problem the Rankins' dock has caused the crew boats is making docking more difficult. It is not always easy to turn an 85 foot boat around in the wind. The root of the problem, according to Mr. Kingry, who owns the crew boats, is that a patch of slightly deeper water in this generally shoaled area has been cut or blocked by the Rankins' dock. Sooner or later, Mr. Kingry predicted, a crew boat will "wipe out" the Rankins' mooring pilings.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation deny the application for a dredge and fill permit for a dock located and aligned as this dock is. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1983.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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OLD PELICAN BAY III ASSOCIATION, INC. vs TERRY CARLSON AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 08-000510 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jan. 28, 2008 Number: 08-000510 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Terry Carlson's application to construct and install a single-family dock in Lee County, Florida, is exempt from the need for an Environmental Resource Permit.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: On April 27, 2007, Mr. Carlson filed with the Department an application to modify a single-family dock in a man-altered waterbody in Section 13, Township 46 South, Range 23 East, Lee County (County), Florida. In geographic terms, the property is located at 18570 Deep Passage Lane, which is at the base of a peninsula which extends for around one-half mile south of Siesta Drive, a roadway that appears to be in an unincorporated area of the County between the Cities of Fort Myers and Fort Myers Beach. See Carlson Exhibits 10A and 10B. Although Respondents have not stipulated to the facts necessary to establish Petitioner's standing, that issue is not identified in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation as being in dispute. Because no member of the Association testified at final hearing, the number of members in the Association, the number who operate boats and their size, and the nature and purpose of the organization are not of record.5 It can be inferred from the record at the final hearing, however, that at least one member of the Association, Mr. Kowalski, who lives at 12228 Siesta Drive, operates a boat on the affected waterway. Carlson Exhibits 10A and 10B are maps of the general area and reflect that Siesta Drive begins at an intersection with San Carlos Boulevard (also known as County Road 865) to the east and terminates a few hundred yards to the west. (County Road 865 is a major roadway which connects Fort Myers and Fort Myers Beach.) On the south side of Siesta Drive are three man- made, finger-shaped canals, which extend to the south and provide access for boaters to the Gulf of Mexico. According to one expert, the finger canals are between one-fourth and three- quarters of a mile in length. The canals run in a straight line south for perhaps two-thirds of their length, then bend slightly to the southwest at "elbows" located a few hundred feet north of their outlets. Basins are located at the northern end of each canal. The third canal is the western most of the three canals and is at issue here. Carlson Exhibit 9 (an aerial photograph) reflects that a number of single-family residences, virtually all of whom have docks, are located on both sides of two peninsulas which lie between the three canals. Mr. Carlson owns property on the southern end of the peninsula between the second and third finger canals. It can be inferred from the record that Mr. Kowalski resides in or close to the basin in the third canal. Boaters wishing to depart the third canal must travel south to the end of the canal, make a ninety-degree turn to the east, pass through a channel which lies directly south of Mr. Carlson's proposed dock, head slightly northeast for a short distance, and then make another ninety-degree turn to the south in order to gain access to a channel (directly south of the second finger canal) leading into Pelican Bay and eventually the Gulf of Mexico, approximately one mile away. Boaters entering the third finger canal would travel in a reverse direction. At the point where the dock will be constructed, the channel appears to be around two-hundred fifty feet wide (from the applicant's shoreline to a cluster of mangrove trees to the south), but much of the channel, as well as the three canals themselves, have a soft bottom consisting of sand and silt, which limits the speed and accessibility of vessels. The original application requested authorization to construct a floating dock anchored by concrete pilings at the southern end of the finger canal in front of Mr. Carlson's property. (The proposed dock replaces an older wooden dock which has now been removed.) That application represented that the dock is private and less than 1,000 square feet; it is not located in Outstanding Florida Waters; it will be used for recreational, noncommercial activities associated with the mooring or storage of boats and boat paraphernalia; it is the sole dock constructed pursuant to the requested exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of sixty- five feet; no dredging or filling will occur except that which is necessary to install the pilings necessary to secure the dock in place; and based upon the depth of the water shown in accompanying documents and the dock's location, the dock will not substantially impede the flow of water or create a navigational hazard. These representations, if true, qualify the dock for an exemption from permitting by the Department. See § 403.813(2)(b), Fla. Stat.6; Fla. Admin. Code R. 40E- 4.051(3)(b)1.-4. Based upon the information supplied in Mr. Carlson's application, Mark R. Miller, Submerged Lands and Environmental Resource Program Manager in the Department's South District Office (Fort Myers), issued a letter on May 8, 2007, advising Mr. Carlson that his application qualified for an exemption from Department permitting requirements and that the letter was his "authorization to use state owned submerged land (if applicable) for the construction of [his] project." After receiving the Department's first letter, Mr. Carlson elected not to publish notice of the Department's decision or provide notice by certified mail to any third parties.7 Therefore, third parties were not barred from challenging the Department's decision until after they received actual notice. The parties no longer dispute that after the Association received actual notice of the construction activities, it filed a request for a hearing within twenty-one days, or on December 26, 2007. Therefore, the request for a hearing is deemed to be timely. Section 403.813(2)(b)3., Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)3. are identical in wording and provide that in order to qualify for an exemption, a dock "[s]hall not substantially impede the flow of water or create a navigation hazard." In its Petition, the Association contended that this requirement had not been satisfied. It also contended that the documents used in support of the initial application may not be valid. In the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the Association clarified this objection by contending that the exemption may have expired because site conditions have materially changed from those initially reviewed by the Department. This allegation is presumably based on the fact that during the course of this proceeding, Respondent submitted two revisions to its original construction plans. Sometime after the first letter was issued, new information came to light and on May 16, 2008, Mr. Miller issued a Revised Letter which stated that the Department had "determined that the proposed project as described in the above referenced application . . . does not involve the use of sovereignty submerged lands[,]" and that "no further authorization will be required from the Submerged lands and Environmental Resources Program." See Department Exhibit 2, which is a disclaimer for the relevant waters issued by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The effect of the disclaimer was to render Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-21 inapplicable to this proceeding. By the time the Revised Letter had been issued, the original application had been revised twice, the last occurring sometime prior to the issuance of the Revised Letter. Among other things, the size of the dock has been increased to 997 square feet, and the dock will be placed nineteen feet landward and westward (or twenty-five feet east of Mr. Carlson's western property boundary) of the initial dock design for the purpose of improving navigation and creating less of an inconvenience to other boaters. The dock will now be located twenty-five feet from the seawall and is approximately seventy feet long and eight feet, five inches wide. A gangplank and floating platforms provide a walkway from the seawall to the proposed dock. On the western edge of the dock, running perpendicular to the seawall, will be pilings that will accommodate a boat lift for one of Mr. Carlson's boats. (The record reflects that Mr. Carlson intends to moor a forty-eight-foot Viking with a width of approximately sixteen feet, six inches, on the outside of the dock, parallel to the seawall, while a second boat will be stored in the boat lift.) A floating platform is located seaward of the main dock to allow access to the boat on the boat lift. After reviewing these changes, Mr. Miller reaffirmed his earlier determination and concluded that all criteria had still been met. In conjunction with the initial application, a Specific Purpose Survey of the channel dimensions was prepared by a professional surveyor, Mr. Timothy Mann, which reflects the bottom elevations of the channel in front of Mr. Carlson's property. The bottom elevations were calculated by taking manual and electronic readings using the national geodetic vertical datum (NGVD) of 1929. This method is accepted in the surveying and mapping industry to calculate bottom elevations. The survey was signed and sealed by Mr. Mann. The updated applications relied upon the same survey. In calculating the water depth, Mr. Mann subtracted the mean low tide in the Pelican Bay area from the bottom elevation survey. Mean low tide is an elevation of the average low tide over a nineteen year period. Mr. Mann obtained these average low tide records from the State. Mean low tide for the Pelican Bay area was determined to be approximately -0.5 NGVD. Therefore, if Mr. Mann's survey showed a depth of -7.77 feet, the water depth would be -7.27 feet. The survey reflects that there is at least a sixty-foot wide area beyond the proposed dock with depths at mean low water of between four and five feet. See Carlson Exhibits 7A and 7B. The mean low water survey adds further justification for the Department's determination because it is not required by the Department, and applicants do not normally submit one. It should be noted that although the Department has no rule for how deep a channel needs to be, a three-foot depth is typically used. To satisfy the navigation concern raised by Petitioner, Mr. Carlson engaged the services of two long-time licensed boat captains, both of whom were accepted as experts. Besides reviewing the dock design, on May 13, 2008, Captain Joe Verdino navigated the entire length of the third finger canal using a thirty-foot boat with a five-foot beam and twenty-four inch draft. The boat was equipped with a GPS sonar calibrated at the hull of the craft to verify the depth of the water shown in the Specific Purpose Survey. Based upon his measurements, Captain Verdino determined that there is at least another sixty feet beyond the proposed dock for other vessels to safely travel through the channel and that vessels with a draft of four to five feet would be able to safely navigate the area. Therefore, he concluded that a fifty-five-foot boat with a sixteen to eighteen-foot beam could safely navigate on the channel. Even though the measurements were taken when the canal was closer to high tide than low tide, the witness stated that this consideration would not alter his conclusions. He further opined that wind is not a major factor in this area because the channel is "well-guarded" by Fort Myers Beach, which essentially serves as a large barrier island to the southwest. He discounted the possibility of navigational concerns during nighttime hours since boats have lights for night travel. Significantly, he noted that the tightest navigable area in the third canal is at an elbow located several hundred feet north of Mr. Carlson's property, where a dock extends into the canal at the bend. Therefore, if vessels could navigate through a narrower passageway further north on the canal, then vessels would have no difficulty navigating safely in front of Mr. Carlson's proposed dock. After reviewing the plans for the proposed dock, Captain Michael Bailey also navigated the third canal and concluded that the canal can be safely traversed by a fifty-two- foot boat. This is the largest boat presently moored on the third canal. After Mr. Carlson's dock is constructed, he opined that there is at least "fifty plus" feet and probably sixty feet of width for other boats to navigate the channel, even if a forty-eight-foot boat is moored at Mr. Carlson's dock. In reaching these conclusions, Captain Bailey used a PVC pipe and staked out depths in the channel beyond the proposed dock to verify the figures reflected in the Specific Purpose Survey. PVC pipes provide the most accurate measurement of the actual distance from the water's surface to the bottom of the channel. Like Captain Verdino, he noted that the narrowest point on the canal was at the elbow several hundred feet north of the proposed dock where boats must navigate between a private dock on one side and mangrove trees on the other. Captain Bailey discounted the possibility of navigational hazards during nighttime hours since a prudent mariner always travels slowly and would not enter a finger canal at nighttime unless he had lights on the boat. Mr. Mark Miller also deemed the navigation issue to be satisfied. He did so after reviewing the Specific Purpose Survey, the aerial photograph, the location of the dock, the results of a site inspection, and other dock applications for that area that had been filed with his office. Based upon all of this information, Mr. Miller concluded that there is an approximate sixty-foot distance to the south, southeast, and southwest beyond Mr. Carlson's dock before the waters turn shallow (less than four to five feet deep), and that the dock would not pose a navigational hazard. In response to Petitioner's contention that the third set of drawings was not signed and sealed by a professional surveyor, Mr. Miller clarified that drawings for dock applications do not have to be signed and sealed. (The third set of drawings was based on the first set submitted to the Department, and which was signed and sealed by a professional surveyor.) He also responded to an objection that the Department's review did not take into account the size of the boat that Mr. Carlson intended to dock at his facility. As to this concern, Mr. Miller pointed out that the Department's inquiry is restricted to the installation of the dock only, and not the size of the boat that the owner may intend to use. Finally, even though the County requires that a building permit be secured before the dock can be constructed, and has its own standards, that issue is not a statutory or rule concern in the Department's exemption process.8 Petitioner further alleged that site conditions have materially changed since the original application was filed and that the exemption determination should automatically expire. (This allegation parrots boilerplate language used in the Rights of Affected Parties portion of the Department's two letters.) As to this contention, the evidence shows that the applicant revised its dock plans twice after its initial submission. The Association does not contend that it was unaware of these changes or that it did not have sufficient time to respond to them prior to final hearing. The third (and final) revision is attached to Respondents' Joint Exhibit 2 (the Revised Letter) and indicates that the dock will be 997 square feet, which is larger than that originally proposed, but is still "1000 square feet or less of surface area," which is within the size limitation allowed by the rule and statute. It will also be further west and closer to Mr. Carlson's seawall. These revisions do not constitute a substantial change in site conditions, as contemplated by the Department in its exemption process. In order to have materially changed site conditions, Mr. Miller explained that there must be an event such as a hurricane that substantially alters the nature of the channel. Therefore, there is no basis to find that a material change in site conditions has occurred and that the original determination of exemption, as revised, should automatically expire. Petitioner presented the testimony of Captain Marcus Carson, a licensed boat captain, who moved to the Fort Myers area in 2000. He noted that the three canals (known as "the three finger area") have always been a "little hazardous" and because of this he cautioned that only residents familiar with the waters should use them. On May 12, 2008, he accompanied Mr. Kowalski on a "brief trip" in Mr. Kowalski's boat up and down the third canal. Using a dock pole to measure depths, he found the deepest areas of the channel below Mr. Carlson's home to be between 4.6 and 5.0 feet. However, he conceded that a dock pole is not as accurate as a PVC pipe, which Captain Bailey used to take the same type of measurements. Based upon the first set of plans, which he used in formulating his opinions, Captain Carson criticized the dock as being "out of place," "overbearing," and not aesthetically pleasing. He also opined that once the dock is constructed, the channel would be too small for two fifty-foot boats to pass through the channel at the same time. However, these conclusions are based upon the assumption that the original dock plans and pilings would be used. The witness agreed that if the original plans have been modified, as they have, and the dock moved further west and closer to the seawall, he would have to reevaluate his opinions.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order determining that Mr. Carlson's project is exempt from its permitting requirements. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57403.813 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40E-4.051
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SEA ISLES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION OF BONITA BEACH, INC. vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, 92-001077 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Feb. 20, 1992 Number: 92-001077 Latest Update: Apr. 15, 1993

Findings Of Fact Sea Isles Condominium Association (Petitioner) is the riparian owner of lands at 25714 Hickory Boulevard, Bonita Springs, Florida 33923. The Petitioner's lands lie along the Broadway Channel connecting the Gulf of Mexico to Estero Bay. There are 84 upland units in the condominium. Some condominium residents without docking slips have requested that the Petitioner apply for expansion of the existing facility. The waters adjacent to Petitioner's upland property are located within the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve (pursuant to Section 258.39(28), Florida Statutes) and are designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). At some point in approximately 1982, the condominium developer sought approval for the construction of docking facilities. By letter of January 25, 1982, Richard P. Ludington, then Director of the Division of State Lands of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), indicated that there was no objection to the proposed dock project. The parties to this case have jointly stipulated that the Ludington opinion was based on the fact that the proposed project was a private non-income producing facility (a lease therefore not being required) and was not in conflict with any existing rules. The DER issued permit number 36-42521-5E, dated February 9, 1982, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued general permit number SAJ-33, both approving and authorizing the construction of the docking facility. Although the water body had been designated as an aquatic preserve, there were no adopted administrative rules regulating such projects at the time of the initial dock construction. The approved sixteen slip docking facility was constructed along the margin of the shoreline in 1983 by the developer of the condominium. Due to extremely shallow water depths, only two of the slips were accessible. At some point thereafter, the Petitioner began efforts to remedy the unusable slip situation. Initially, the Petitioner desired to dredge the area, but was unable to secure approval to dredge from regulatory agencies. The Petitioner then began to consider additional solutions. The solution upon which the Petitioner decided was removal of the existing slips and construction of an extended boardwalk and dock located in navigable water. On March 28, 1985, the DNR notified the Petitioner that the project would require approval in the form of a submerged land lease from the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board"). On August 20, 1985, the DER issued permit number 361011295, authorizing the removal of the existing structure and the construction of a 22 slip docking facility as proposed by the Petitioner. On behalf of the Board, the DNR reviews applications for leases of sovereignty submerged lands. In reviewing such requests, the DNR calculates the maximum amount of sovereignty submerged lands which may be preempted by a proposed facility. According to administrative rule, the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by a private residential multi-slip docking facility may not exceed the total square footage equal to ten times the riparian waterfront footage of the affected waterbody. DNR's calculation of the affected shoreline indicated that the Petitioner's riparian waterfront measured 433 feet. Application of the 10:1 ratio would indicate that the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by the proposed multi-slip docking facility could not exceed 4330 square feet. As early as 1986, a surveyor employed by the Petitioner believed the DNR shoreline calculation to be erroneous and determined the Petitioner's riparian shoreline to be 601 feet. After discussing the discrepancy between measurements, the DNR representative informed a representative of the Petitioner that Sea Isles could obtain a mean high waterline survey to determine the actual shoreline footage if it disagreed with the DNR calculation. Although there is testimony that a survey provided to the DNR established the mean high waterline, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the survey was not identified as a mean high waterline survey, but as a safe upland line survey. No credible mean high waterline survey was provided to the DNR by the Petitioner at that time. Abutting the Petitioner's property to the south is a man-made channel which results in an unnatural extension of the shoreline. Such extensions are not included in computing the allowable square footage of sovereign submerged lands because the man-made shoreline does not abut sovereign submerged lands. It is unclear whether the calculations of shoreline were affected by this consideration. Despite the discrepancy, the Petitioner reduced the size of the requested docking facility to include a boardwalk and dock of ten slips totalling approximately 4300 square feet and extending 208 feet into the waterbody (approximately 35 percent of the waterbody's width). The length of the extension violates administrative rule provisions governing extension into a waterbody which are addressed elsewhere herein. On July 23, 1986, Lee County passed a resolution of approval for the proposed docking facility land lease and granted a variance to Lee County Ordinance 85-25. The resolution of approval contained additional requirements, included a provision restricting the approval to not more than ten slips. The Petitioner asserts that the determination of shoreline was incorrect and was the result of "mutual mistake". The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's acceptance of the DNR's shoreline determination was based upon "mutual mistake." The evidence establishes that the Petitioner's representatives were aware of the discrepancy. The fact that the Petitioner agreed to deed a 575 foot conservation easement to the Board (to offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat as discussed elsewhere herein) would suggest that the parties were aware that the 433 foot measurement was inaccurate. For whatever reason, the Petitioner agreed to the DNR shoreline and dock calculation which formed the basis for the lease approved by the Board. Prior to approval of the lease, the Board reviewed a written "public interest" assessment which indicates that the length of the boardwalk to the proposed docking facility exceeded standards set by administrative rules. Pursuant to rule, exceptions to length restrictions may be made only where the applicant demonstrates that such exception is necessary to insure reasonable riparian ingress and egress. The Petitioner apparently demonstrated that, given the location of the existing sand flat, such exception was necessary to provide ingress and egress. According to the written analysis, the proposed project adversely impacted the manatee habitat located in the aquatic preserve. The analysis states that 575 foot conservation easement to the Board would offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat. The Petitioner committed to the conservation easement in order to meet the public interest test required of all docking facilities within an aquatic preserve. Special lease condition paragraph 5 requires the Petitioner to record a conservation easement for approximately 575 linear feet of shoreline in perpetuity to run with the land. The provision requires that documentation of the recording of the easement be provided to the Board within thirty days of the Board action and prior to execution of the lease. The lease conditions clearly indicate that the Petitioner will not seek authority to expand the docking facility. Special lease condition paragraph 5 prohibits any additional docking facilities or any other such development along the lessee's shoreline. Review of proposed special lease condition paragraph 6 (as compared to the staff recommendation and a subsequent affidavit executed by the Petitioner's representative on June 6, 1987) indicates that the paragraph appears to contain a typographical error in deleting the word "not" from the condition. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Petitioner agreed not to request authorization to dredge the docking area or channel or to request additional expansion of the facility. On April 21, 1987, the Board, apparently acting against the staff recommendation, voted to grant to the Petitioner a submerged land lease for the construction of a ten slip facility. Representatives of the Petitioner appeared before the Board during consideration and approval of the lease. On June 6, 1987, a representative of the Petitioner executed an affidavit on behalf of the Petitioner which sets forth the language of special condition paragraph six as originally proposed. In the affidavit, the Petitioner's representative agrees not to apply for authorization to dredge the dock or access channel, or to request expansion of the facility. A deed of conservation easement dated October 21, 1985, and signed by a representative of the Petitioner, was attached to the materials submitted to the Board for the April 21, 1987 meeting. Contrary to the lease requirement, the attached deed of conservation easement was never recorded. In 1986 or 1987, a conservation easement was recorded by the Petitioner in favor of the Board, but the easement contained no legal description of the subject property. However, the recorded easement does prohibit additional docking facilities and waives the Petitioner's rights of ingress or egress related to any such additional facilities. In early 1991, the Petitioner requested approval to expand the existing dock from 10 to 14 slip. The expanded structure would preempt 5620 square feet of sovereign submerged land. On May 15, 1991, the DER granted approval of the four slip expansion. On November 27, 1991, the DNR, by letter signed by Michael E. Ashley, Chief of the Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, denied the requested four slip expansion. The letter was prepared at the direction and with the approval of the Director of the Division of State Lands. Mr. Ashley cites two reasons for the denial. First, the request violated the terms of the existing lease which provides that there will be no expansion requested. Second, the Petitioner had failed to record the 575 foot conservation easement which was required by the terms of the original lease. The request for extension was not presented to the Governor and Cabinet for consideration, but was reviewed by the "agenda review committee" of the DNR. The committee includes the Deputy Director, two Deputy Assistant Executive Directors, the General Counsel, and the Cabinet Coordinator for the DNR. The committee reviews matters which are identified as potentially requiring Board action to resolve. Where issues exist related to existing sovereignty submerged land leases, the DNR attempts to resolve the matter without referral to the Board. The authority to conduct business in this manner has not been reduced to writing, but is based on verbal direction from the Board and from Cabinet assistants. Subsequent to the letter of denial issued by Mr. Ashley, the Petitioner on or about December 30, 1991, filed a conservation easement granting to the Board, a perpetual interest in a parcel of land lying ten feet landward of the Safe Upland Line as described in the deed recorded in the records of Lee County, Florida, (OR 2268, Page 0401) with the Clerk of Court for Lee County. The parcel of land identified in the deed runs along the shoreline for a distance of 601 feet. The easement provides for modification by the signed agreement of the parties. Because the Petitioner seeks to expand an existing lease, it is required to demonstrate an additional public benefit would result from approval of the request. The Petitioner has proposed to plant an area of mangroves in the shallow "sand bar" area located behind the existing slips. There is no additional public benefit related to the request. The evidence fails to establish that granting the request to expand the docking facility is in the public interest.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a Final Order denying the request of Sea Isles Condominium Association to modify the existing sovereignty submerged land lease to provide for four additional boat slips to their existing ten slip docking facility. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1077 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 19. Rejected as to comments by Miller, irrelevant. 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected as to 6,010 square feet of permissible preemption. Based upon shoreline calculation which is not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, irrelevant. The manatee information was required under the conditions of the existing lease, and do not constitute a benefit to be considered in addressing the request to modify the lease. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 16. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund c/o Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Robert Routa, Esquire Post Office Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 L. Kathryn Funchess, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (6) 120.57253.002253.03253.77258.37258.39 Florida Administrative Code (1) 18-20.004
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JAMES M. PETERS vs. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, 88-004387 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004387 Latest Update: May 17, 1989

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the owner of upland property immediately adjacent to state-owned submerged lands. The Petitioner seeks permission to use the submerged land in order to construct an extension of his residential dock. The proposed project will extend the current dock by seventy-six feet. The Petitioner applied for all of the applicable federal, state, and local permits in order to extend his dock. He has received approval or an exemption from approval from all of the necessary agencies. The Petitioner's permit application was approved by James M. Marx on behalf of the Department on December 29, 1987, pursuant to Section 253.77, Florida Statutes. On April 12, 1988, James M. Marx sent a memorandum to his superior, Casey Fitzgerald, the Chief of the Bureau of State Lands Management, recommending that the proposed dock extension not be authorized by the Department. On June 6, 1988, the Department sent a letter to the Petitioner to inform him that the Department was unable to authorize the proposed project. The letter stated that the determination was based upon the following: The proposed extension would disrupt historical patterns of localized navigation. The extended dock, together with a 12- foot wide vessel moored at the terminal end, would preempt greater than 50 per cent of the distance between the shoreline and the offshore shoal. The length of the proposed dock is inconsistent with the lengths of existing docks in the immediate area. During hearing, the evidence presented demonstrated that the proposed dock extension would have no effect upon navigation or navigational patterns in the area. The dock extension would cause the Petitioner's dock to be substantially longer than the two adjacent docks. The dock extension is not located in an Aquatic Preserve or Manatee Sanctuary. It is exempt from Department of Environmental Regulation permitting requirements under Section 403.813(2)(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(g),(h),(i),and (k) , Florida Statues, and the extension is no more than the length necessary to provide reasonable access to navigable water.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57253.002253.03253.77403.813 Florida Administrative Code (1) 18-21.005
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JAMES E. WILLIAMS vs. CHARLES R. MOELLER, JULIA MOELLER, AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 86-001095 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001095 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1986

Findings Of Fact On March 10, 1986, Respondents, Charles R. Moeller and Julia Moeller (Applicants) entered into a consent order with Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (Department) pursuant to which their request for an "after the fact" permit to construct an 5-slip docking facility in Florida Bay, Upper Matecumbe Key, Monroe County, Florida, was granted. Petitioners, James E. Williams and Charles W. Causey (Protestants) filed a timely request for formal administrative review of the Department's action. The Applicants are the owners of a 2.2 acre parcel of property situated on the northwestern side of central Upper Matecumbe Key, with approximately 280' frontage on Florida Bay. Since 1983, the Applicants have sought authorization to construct a multi-family dock facility for use in conjunction with their plans to develop the uplands as a condominium community. Protestants, James E. Williams and Charles W. Causey, are neighbors of the Applicants. Mr. Williams' property abuts the north boundary of Applicants' property, and extends northerly with 230' frontage on Florida Bay. Mr. Causey's property abuts the north boundary of Mr. Williams' land, and extends northerly with 230' frontage on Florida Bay. Protestants have used, and use, the waters adjacent to their residences, the project site, and Florida Bay for fishing, swimming, boating and other recreational pursuits. Protestants have standing to maintain this action. Background On February 28, 1983, Applicants filed their first request with the Department and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for authorization to construct a docking facility to serve their proposed uplands development. That application sought authorization to construct a 10-slip docking facility, roughly "L" shaped, with a main pier extending into Florida Bay in a westerly direction and measuring 90' by 5', and the terminal section of the dock running southerly parallel to the shore line and measuring 100' by 5'. A row of 11 mooring piles spaced 10' apart, 20' landward of the terminal section of the dock, formed the 10 boat slips. As proposed, the facility was less than 1,000 square feet (sq. ft.), and exempt from the Department's permitting requirements. 1/ The Corps declined, however, to permit the facility as proposed. Noting that "a mixture of lush vegetation including mixed searasses and the hard corals" was located in the 2' to 3' MLW (mean low water) docking area, the Corps requested that the Applicants extend their pier further offshore to create dockage in waters of no less than -5' MLW depth. Consistent with the Corps' request, Applicants modified their proposal by extending their pier 170' offshore. In all other respects, their proposal remained unchanged. On August 12, 1983, Applicants received Corps' approval for their modified docking facility; however, their extension of the pier increased the docks' square footage to over 1,000 sq. ft., and subjected the project to the Department's permitting requirements. Accordingly, on October 7, 1983, Applicants filed a request with the Department for authorization to construct the dock facility approved by the Corps. On November 7, 1984, the Department issued its intent to deny the requested permit predicated on its conclusion that, inter alia, degradation of local water quality was expected, as well as destruction of marine habitat and productivity to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest. Although advised of their right to request formal administrative review of the Department's proposed action. /2 Applicants took no action. On December 13, 1984, the Department entered a final order, which adopted the reasons set forth in its notice of intent to deny, and denied the Applicants' requested permit. The current application On January 24, 1985, Applicants filed their request with the Department for authorization to construct the docking facility which is the subject matter of these proceedings. The application sought permission to construct an 8-slip 3/ docking facility of the same configuration as previously applied for, but with a main pier measuring 170' by 4', and a terminal section of 79' by 4'. A row of 9 mooring piles spaced 10' apart, 20' landward of the terminal section of the dock, formed the 8 boat slips. Applicants still proposed the same wood construction, and wood dock piles, as well as using the terminal section of the dock as a batterboard type breakwater by attaching heavy boards to the waterward side of the dock. 4/ As proposed, the dock facility was less than 1,000 sq. ft. and exempt from the Department's permitting requirements. Accordingly, on January 30, 1985, the Department issued the Applicants a copy of their application marked "EXEMPT FROM DER D/F PERMITTING PER FAC RULE 17-4.04(9)(c)," and apprised the Applicants of the need to secure approval from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for use of state-owned submerged lands. Applicants promptly applied for DNR approval. On February 22, 1985, they received their first completeness summary, which was responded to on April 26, 1985, and on September 4, 1985, they received their second completeness summary, which was responded to on October 15, 1985. Finally, on December 5, 1985, Applicants received DNR approval conditioned upon Applicants execution and recording of a 10' conservation easement along the shoreward extent of Applicants' property to prevent the construction of any further dock facilities. Applicants duly executed and recorded the conservation easement. On December 24, 1985, Applicants received their Monroe County building permit, and commenced construction on January 22, 1986. On January 23, 1986, Protestants contacted the Department's local environmental specialist, David Bishof, to complain of the construction. Mr. Bishof promptly telephoned the applicant, Mrs. Moeller, and advised her that the subject waters had been designated Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW), and that docks in excess of 500 sq. ft. were no longer exempt. 5/ At this point in time, only 6-8 pair of pilings had been set. Notwithstanding Mr. Bishof's advice, Applicants continued to construct the dock facility until all pilings were in place and 500 sq. ft. of the main pier area was decked. On March 10, 1986, the Department and Applicants entered into the consent order which is the subject matter of these proceedings. That order granted the Applicants an "after the fact" permit to construct their 8-slip docking facility, and granted substantially affected persons the right to petition for formal administrative review. The project site The waters of Florida Bay which abut the Applicants' 280' shoreline are classified as Class III waters and have, since May, 1985, been designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW). At Applicants' shoreline, erosion has cut an escarpment into the limestone such that the land's elevation drops abruptly from approximately 1' above MH to 2'-3' below MHW. Along much of the shoreline, erosion has undercut the limestone, forming small cliffs with an overhang of up to 5'. Very little vegetation exists on the exposed edge of the solution-faced limestone which forms the Applicants shoreline. What does exist consists of a few moderate to small red and black mangrove trees. On the face of the shoreline escarpment a rich biota is found, which includes star arene, bearded periwinkles, and star coral. A narrow band of turtlegrass, with some Cuban shoalweed, is found at the base of the escarpment. At 50' from shore along the path of the proposed pier, 6/ the depth is 4+- MHW and the bottom consists of gently sloping bedrock, with a thin layer of sediment. Sparse vegetation, consisting of patches of turtlegrass and Bataphora are found at this point, along with a healthy fauna community consisting of numerous sponges and moderate sized colonies of star coral. At a distance of 100' along the proposed dock route, the bottom is covered by a thin layer of sediment which allows for a fairly constant growth of turtlegrass. Depths at this point are approximately 6' MHW. The turtlegrass bed continues to the end of the proposed dock and generally covers the entire proposed docking area. Depths in the proposed docking area range between 6'-7' MHW. Lobster frequent the area, together with fish common to the Florida Keys. Areas of concern The only permit application appraisal conducted by the Department was done in connection with the Applicants' October 7, 1983 permit request, and at a time when the waters of Florida Bay did not carry the OFW designation. At that time, the Department's environmental specialist, David Bishof, found that: The proposed dock, along with the boats moored to it, when it is complete and in use, can be expected to shade approximately 2,000 ft 2 of seafloor. Much of the area that will be shaded, is covered by seagrass. A general decline in the quantity of seagrass in the shaded areas, can be expected to result from the project. With the loss of seagrass vegetation in the marina area, will also be the loss of the functions of habitat, sediment stabilization, primary production and pollution filtration. Activities that can normally be expected to be associated with the use of the proposed dock will result in the discharge of toxic metals, hydrocarbons, organic debris, detergents and miscellaneous trash. With a dock of the size being proposed, the above discharges are expected to be moderate in magnitude, but will probably not lower water quality below class III standards. These findings were not disputed in this proceeding. Although the dock area has been reduced from 100' to 79' in length, from 5' to 4' in width, and the number of boat slips from 10 to 8, the proposed dock, with the boats moored to it, can still be expected to shade approximately 1,900 sq. ft. of seafloor. 7/ This shading effect will result in the general decline in the quantity of seagrass in the dock area, and the consequent loss of habitat, sediment stabilization, primary production, and pollution filtration. Loss of seagrass in the dock area and surrounding area will be intensified by "prop dredging" and "scaring" due to seasonal tidal fluctuations of 1-3 feet. As sited, the proposed docks are located in waters of 6'- 7' NHW depth, as opposed to the 5' NLW depth recommended by the Department and the Corps. Other environmental consequences associated with the proposed facility include the discharge of hydrocarbons, toxic metals, detergents and organic debris into the surrounding waters. Mr. Bishof described these discharges as "moderate in magnitude" in his November, 1983 appraisal and concluded that they "will probably not lower water quality below class III standards." At hearing, with Florida Bay now designated OFW, Mr. Bishof again characterized the discharges as "moderate in magnitude" and opined that OFW standards would not be violated. While Florida Bay is a vast body of water, which offers the opportunity for pollutant dilution, the waters in the area of the proposed facility are relatively shallow and lacking in strong currents; conditions- conducive to pollutant buildup. There has been no appraisal of the proposed project since November, 1983, 8/ and no substantive evidence that the hydrography of the waters in the area is adequate to control pollutant buildup. Consequently, Mr. Bishof's opinion cannot be credited. Under the circumstances, Applicants have failed to provide reasonable assurances that the proposed facility will not violate state water quality standards. Public interest In considering whether a project is clearly in the public interest, Section 403.918(2)(a), Florida Statutes establishes seven criteria which must be considered and balanced. That subsection provides: In determining whether a project is not contrary to the public interest, or is clearly in the public interest, the department shall consider and balance the following criteria: Whether the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. The proposed project was not shown to promote any of the seven criteria. It would not, however, adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare or the property of others; adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; or adversely affect significant historical and archaeological resources. The relative condition of the vegetation and marine life in the area was shown to be good. Overall, the project was shown to be permanent and to have an adverse impact on the conservation of fish, habitat, marine productivity and recreational values. On balance, the proposed project is not clearly in the public interest, and no evidence was presented to mitigate its adverse impacts. Cumulative impact Section 403.919, Florida Statutes, mandates that the Department consider the cumulative impact of the proposed project in deciding whether to grant or deny a permit. Currently, there are no other projects existing, under construction, or for which permits or jurisdictional determinations have been sought, nor are there any projects under review, approved or vested, within one mile of the project site. Accordingly, cumulative impact is a neutral factor in the evaluation of the proposed project.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.57120.68267.061376.303403.1616.03
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