The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jerry McCoy, is an African American and is a member of a class protected by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner worked as a tanker truck driver for Florida Rock from 1980 until October, 1993. During his employment, he was assigned to Florida Rock's terminal in Panama City, Florida. Respondent, Florida Rock & Tank Lines, Inc., is a transportation company engaged in the hauling of liquid and dry bulk commodities throughout the United States. Respondent transports gasoline, diesel fuel, asphalt, chemicals and other hazardous and corrosive materials. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, during his 13-year employment with Florida Rock, was generally considered a good truck driver. Over the years, Petitioner received several compliments from customers, safety bonuses and emblems, and a set of his and her watches after 10 years of maintaining a good safety record. On the other hand, Petitioner also received several customer complaints, committed some safety violations, and was banned from two customers' terminals. The trucking industry is heavily regulated. As such, Respondent must obey federal, state, county and city traffic, and transportation laws. In addition, Respondent must follow federal and state environmental laws and regulations because it transports toxic and hazardous substances. The transportation and environmental laws and regulations are strictly enforced. Minor violations can result in substantial penalties. Respondent or the driver, or both, can be fined for violations of any of these laws. To ensure compliance with the federal, state, county, and city laws, and to satisfy requirements of its customers, Respondent established a safety program. Respondent's safety policies were developed as a result of experience in tank truck transportation and, when followed by drivers, have resulted in safe loading, transportation, and unloading of products that Respondent transports. To enforce the safety program, Respondent adopted a points system. Under the points system, a driver is assessed points for preventable violations of a safety policy or procedure. A driver who accumulates 24 points within one year is automatically terminated. On a driver's anniversary date, all points assessed during the previous year are removed from the driver's record and the driver begins the year with a clean company driving record. The rules, policies, and procedures of the safety program are contained in the driver's safety manual. All drivers receive a copy of the safety manual when hired. All drivers also receive safety training before being allowed to operate a truck transporting hazardous materials. In addition, to maintain driver awareness of safety rules and regulations, Respondent conducts monthly safety meetings at each terminal. The meetings are conducted by the terminal manager or safety supervisor, or both, and consist of a review of safety rules, policies, procedures, and equipment and recent changes in relevant laws. The safety program is administered by the safety department of Respondent. Luc Cleyman, Director of Safety, directs the daily operations of the safety department. When a spill, mixture, or other violation of the safety program occurs, the driver's terminal manager initiates a review of the incident to determine whether it was preventable or non-preventable. If the terminal manager determines that the violation was preventable, the driver is assessed points and/or subjected to other discipline based on the type and severity of the violation. A driver is not assessed points for a non- preventable violation of safety rules and procedures. In certain situations, Mr. Cleyman may instruct the terminal manager to assess a number of points greater or less than the amount specified in the safety manual, and to administer further disciplinary action for safety violations. Under the safety program, management has the authority to administer further disciplinary action for a safety violation, if in their opinion it is warranted. In addition, management has the authority to impose less discipline than that which is set forth in the safety manual. The safety department reviews all citations issued to verify that the correct number of points was assessed. An employee's race is not referenced in the files maintained by the safety department. Consequently, in disciplinary actions, management does not know the race of an employee unless the individual in management knows that particular employee. In this case, unlike most terminal managers, Nancy Dinnes, the terminal manager at the Panama City Terminal, always consulted with the safety department before her initial assessment of points against a driver for a safety violation. Respondent's safety program includes an appeal procedure by which a driver may appeal the determination that an incident was preventable and/or the assessment of points. The safety manual provides: The driver has the right of appeal, without prejudice. The appeal must be made to the Safety Department, in writing, within ten working days after the driver receives his/her notification. Once the appeal is received in the Safety Office, the incident facts will be reviewed by the Accident Review committee and/or the Violation Review Committee. Each committee will be comprised of the Vice President, Division Vice President, and the Director of Safety. The Committee's decision regarding work- related injury claims and spillages, mixtures, and contaminations will be final in all cases. In the event a driver does not agree with the committee's decision regarding a traffic accident, then he/she must submit, in writing, his/her disfavor to the Safety Department within ten (10) days after his/her receipt of the committee's decision. The accident facts will then be submitted to the National Safety Council Accident Review Committee for their review and decision. Their determination will be final in all cases. To encourage drivers to follow the safety program's policies and procedures, Respondent pays substantial quarterly and annual safety bonuses to eligible drivers. An eligible driver receives a quarterly safety bonus of four percent of his previous quarter's earnings and an annual safety bonus of two percent of his previous annual earnings. A driver is eligible to receive a quarterly safety bonus unless he or she is assessed six or more points during the quarter. A driver who accumulates 21 or more points during the year is not eligible to receive an annual safety bonus. Quarterly bonuses are paid in the month following the end of the quarter. Annual safety bonuses are paid in January of the following year. The amount of quarterly and annual safety bonuses is substantial. Drivers always know when they are due a bonus and whether that bonus has been paid. If a driver does not receive a quarterly or annual safety bonus he or she has a right of appeal. The safety manual provides: It is Florida Rock and Tank Lines, Inc.'s desire to pay all earned Quarterly and Annual Safety Bonuses. Any driver that does not qualify for the quarterly or annual bonus has the right of appeal, without prejudice. The appeal must be made to the Safety Department, in writing, within ten working days after the quarter in question has ended or the year in question has ended. Once the appeal is received in the Safety Office, the case will be reviewed by the Bonus Review Committee. The Bonus Review Committee consists of the Vice President, Division Vice President, and Director of Safety. Their findings and recommendations will be final. Petitioner was hired as a driver of tractor-trailer trucks at Respondent's Panama City Terminal on February 28, 1980. His duties included loading petroleum products at distribution terminals and transporting them to gas stations and other facilities in the southeastern part of the United States where he would unload the product into storage tanks. Petitioner was aware of the company's safety policies and procedures. In particular Petitioner was aware of the safety policies and procedures involved in this action. On April 13, 1993, Petitioner delivered resin, a very thick material, to the Georgia-Pacific facility in Albany, Georgia. The hose used for unloading resin is two inches in diameter. The hose was in bad shape. It's end blew off while Petitioner was pumping resin into the storage tank. A spill, which is a potential violation of the company's safety policy, occurred. The violation carries an assessment of twelve points. Petitioner brought the failed hose back to the terminal and showed it to Nancy Dinnes. Upon investigation, Mr. Cleyman was told by a representative of Georgia-Pacific that Petitioner was pumping the resin too fast and blew the end of the hose off. The same Georgia-Pacific representative also complimented Petitioner for his help in containing and cleaning up the spill. Both Ms. Dinnes and Mr. Cleyman were of the opinion that hoses did not fail unless Petitioner was forcing too much product into the hose by pumping the product too fast. However, both conceded that Petitioner's claim that the hose failed while he was properly unloading the resin could have occurred. Both gave Petitioner the benefit of the doubt. Therefore, no points were assessed against Petitioner since the spill was deemed unpreventable due to the unpredicted failure of the hose. On April 28, 1993, Petitioner was dispatched to deliver ethanol no-lead regular fuel to Sunshine Jr. Store No. 28 in Springfield, Florida. When he arrived at the store, Petitioner testified that he was unable to determine into which tank to dispense the ethanol unleaded regular fuel because the storage tanks were not properly marked for ethanol fuel. Likewise, the pumps were not marked for ethanol fuel because the store had not sold ethanol fuel for several months. There were separate storage tanks marked for regular unleaded fuel, mid- grade fuel and premium fuel. Because he was unable to determine the correct tank into which to drop his load, he asked the store manager to identify the correct tank. The store manager did not know and called Sunshine Jr.'s corporate offices. After the store manager contacted someone at the corporate office, the store manager told Petitioner to unload the no-lead regular fuel into the premium fuel tank. Without calling the terminal, Petitioner unloaded regular gasoline in with premium gasoline causing a mixture of the two fuels and downgrading the premium fuel to a lesser octane fuel. Petitioner did not draw a diagram of the storage tanks with their markings on the Bill of Lading for the delivery. In instances where the storage tanks are not clearly marked, a driver is required to diagram the location of the storage tanks and the type product each contains so that the information will be on record at the terminal. Petitioner admits that he was aware of the requirement of a diagram under such circumstances. His failure to diagram the storage tanks at Sunshine, Jr. Store No. 28 demonstrates that Petitioner was not confused by the markings on the storage tanks. Indeed he had been disciplined for unloading fuel into the wrong storage tank the previous year at Rice's Grocery. The mixture resulted in the loss of over 1,500 gallons of fuel and caused a hazardous situation. Eventually, the fuel was removed and transported to another location. Because of the dangers to the public from a mixture of hazardous materials and the substantial penalties resulting from such a violation of environmental laws and regulations pertaining to the transportation of petroleum products, Respondent's safety program includes a policy imposing 12 points, or further discipline up to discharge, for preventable mixtures of fuel and other hazardous materials. Respondent's load/unload procedures in the driver's safety manual require a driver before unloading to: Check the fill pipe identifications to be sure they are labeled properly and indicate the same product you intend to unload. Do not depend on identification by others. If fill pipes are not properly identified and you are unable to personally identify the contents of the tank, call your terminal for instructions. Failure to do so may endanger lives, property and the environment. Thus, a driver who cannot determine the correct tank in which to unload may not rely on others for identification of the proper storage tank, but must contact the terminal manager for instructions. A driver who contacts the terminal for instructions does not violate safety rules and procedures if a mixture results. As indicated, Petitioner did not call the terminal for instructions. Petitioner's very confusing testimony to the contrary is not credible. Petitioner admits the above procedure is correct. On April 29, 1993, the day after Petitioner's delivery, Sunshine Jr., Stores contacted terminal manager Dinnes to inform her that Petitioner had unloaded ethanol unleaded fuel into the premium fuel storage tank causing a mixture of the two fuels. Ms. Dinnes investigated the report. As part of her investigation, Respondent sent Fernando Berrios, mechanic, to the site to conduct a visual inspection of the storage tanks. Mr. Berrios found that the tanks were properly marked. Additionally, a diagram identifying the layout of the store's storage tanks with their markings was displayed in the store's window. Mr. Berrios drew a diagram showing the layout of the storage tanks with their markings at Sunshine Jr. Store No. 28 on the face of the Truck Bill of Lading pursuant to which Petitioner had delivered the fuel. After her investigation, Ms. Dinnes contacted the safety department and informed Mr. Cleyman that Sunshine Jr. Stores had reported a mixture and to discuss the appropriate discipline. Mr. Cleyman and Ms. Dinnes determined that Petitioner had failed to follow written company procedures pertaining to the unloading of products and mixed two different fuels together by unloading one fuel into the incorrect storage tank. Specifically, they concluded that Petitioner failed to follow written company safety procedures requiring a driver to contact the terminal if the driver is uncertain about which storage tank to unload into or the storage tanks are not properly marked and deliberately mixing two different grades of gasoline together. The mixture was clearly preventable. The points schedule in the safety manual provided that a driver who mixes product should receive twelve points. Accordingly, Mr. Cleyman instructed Ms. Dinnes to assess 12 points against Petitioner's driving record in accordance with the schedule contained in the safety manual. As a result of this violation, Petitioner did not receive his quarterly safety bonus. Petitioner did not appeal the assessment of points on his record or the disqualification for a quarterly safety bonus. Petitioner's claim that he did not receive the Sunshine, Jr. citation is not credible. Moreover, this fact is irrelevant since there was no evidence that the incident was contrived or that Petitioner was harmed if he had not received the Sunshine, Jr. citation. Petitioner admits that contacting the terminal manager is the procedure he should have followed. He did not follow that procedure. Petitioner, also admits he mixed two different grades of fuel. On October 6, 1993, Petitioner delivered diesel fuel to Diamond Sand Company at Mossy Head, Florida. Petitioner returned to the terminal with 510 gallons of diesel fuel in his trailer. Petitioner did not notify the terminal of the left- over fuel. The next day, the tanker trailer containing the diesel fuel was assigned to another driver, David Wood (white), who loaded gasoline into the tank containing the diesel fuel resulting in a mixture of petroleum products. Admittedly, Wood violated Company safety policy by failing to check his trailer for fuel prior to loading it. However, relevant to Petitioner, Respondent's safety policy also required Petitioner to verify that all product had been unloaded from his tanker. A tanker like the one involved here unloads from the bottom of the compartment. Even if the product is not being pumped, gravity causes the product to flow out of the tanker. To determine whether product remains in a tank after unloading, a driver is trained not to open the trailer dome lids, but to open the valve of a tank slightly and to drain the tank's contents into a bucket. If the tank is empty, little or no product will drain into the bucket. If the tank contains product, it will continue to drain into the bucket and the driver will have to close the tank's valve to cut-off the flow. The process is known as the bucket test. If the tank is not empty, the driver is required to contact the terminal to obtain further instructions regarding the disposal of the remaining product. The bucket test is not part of a driver's pre- or post-inspection. The pre-or post-inspection is a term of art which refers to a particular type of DOT required inspection. Petitioner testified that he performed the bucket test, drained the diesel fuel in a bucket until the flow stopped. He gave the fuel to a man in charge of unloading to pour into the storage tank. Petitioner also testified that a man on top of the tanker told him the compartment was empty. Petitioner did not reference this other man in his appeal letter or his FCHR affidavit. Ms. Dinnes did not recall Petitioner telling her about the man on top of the tanker. The safety manual provides that a driver must always call [the terminal] for instructions when a customer cannot take all of the load or does not want all of the load the customer has ordered and owns. Respondent instituted this policy because an extremely hazardous situation is created when petroleum products are stored in a tanker trailer at the terminal without the implementation of appropriate safety precautions. In addition, management needs to be informed about the presence of the product in a tanker trailer, so the next driver using the tanker can be informed to minimize the chance of a mixture. On October 7, 1993, during loading, Mr. Wood discovered that the tank he was loading gasoline into was not empty when the pump cut-off before depositing the amount of gasoline he had entered into the system. He immediately contacted the terminal manager, Ms. Dinnes, to report the mixture. Ms. Dinnes was also contacted by D & H Oil Company and informed the customer did not receive all of the fuel it had ordered. Ms. Dinnes contacted the safety department and informed Mr. Cleyman of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident. Petitioner failed to notify the terminal that he did not unload 510 gallons of diesel fuel at Mossy Head, Florida. If Petitioner had reported to the terminal that he had leftover product, the terminal manager or dispatcher would have provided instructions to Petitioner for its distribution or recorded its presence in the tanker trailer so that the next driver using the tanker would be informed of its presence thereby preventing a mixture. Mr. Cleyman and Ms. Dinnes concluded that Petitioner violated written company safety policy by failing to notify the terminal that diesel fuel remained in the tanker trailer after his last delivery which created a hazardous situation at the terminal and contributed to the creation of a mixture by the next driver to be given the truck to drive. They also concluded that Mr. Wood violated safety rules by failing to check the tanker trailer to verify it was empty before loading gasoline into it. Mr. Cleyman instructed Ms. Dinnes to assess twelve points against both Petitioner and Mr. Wood in accordance with the safety manual. The contaminated product was sold by Respondent to Davis Oil Company in Dothan, Alabama. Respondent lost an estimated $1,988.56 as a result of the safety violations by Petitioner and Mr. Wood. Importantly, using the same tanker trailer that Petitioner used to transport the diesel fuel, Mr. Wood delivered the product to Davis Oil Company without any malfunction of the tanker trailer's equipment, including its emergency and unloading valves. These were the same valves which would have had to malfunction to cause Petitioner to believe the tanker was empty when he allegedly performed the bucket test at Mossy Head. After Petitioner received a Notice of Termination, Petitioner appealed to Respondent's safety review committee the assessment of points for the Sunshine, Jr. store and the Mossy Head violations. In his appeal letter, Petitioner contended that he did not violate safety policy because he did not "stick the tank before and after" unloading since "it was unsafe for [him] to climb on top of [the trailer] and there are no guard rails." "Sticking the tank" is where a driver inserts a measuring stick into a compartment to see if any product is left or to measure the amount of product remaining. Petitioner further contended that he was directed by Respondent not to open the trailer dome lids because someone had been killed in an explosion by doing so. Irrespective of the issue of climbing on the tanker to check to see if it was empty, the evidence was uncontroverted that the valves involved in unloading the tanker and performing the bucket test do not malfunction intermittently, but continue to malfunction until repaired. If the valves had not been working, the valves would not have been functioning when the mixture was later unloaded by Mr. Wood. The only conclusion is that Respondent either did not perform the bucket test or performed it improperly. Both conditions violate the company's safety policy. The returned product and the resultant mixture were clearly preventable. Pursuant to Respondent's policy, an investigation of the incident based on Petitioner's appeal letter by the safety review committee was initiated. After review of the incident and all contentions made by Petitioner in his appeal letter, the safety review committee upheld the point assessment against Petitioner. It was reasonable for Respondent to rely on the functioning of valves in analyzing the veracity of Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner was discharged on October 8, 1993, for violations of Respondent's safety program. Respondent's safety program specifies that the accumulation of 24 points in one year by an employee results in the dismissal of the employee. In 1993, Petitioner violated the company's safety policies on two separate occasions. The two violations caused Petitioner to accumulate 24 points within one year. The safety policies Petitioner violated were: (1) mixture of petroleum products on April 28, 1993; and (2) failure to notify the terminal of undelivered product left in the tanker trailer he brought back to the terminal after his last delivery which later resulted in a mixture on October 7, 1993. Each violation of the safety program was reported by Nancy Dinnes, Terminal Manager, to Luc Cleyman, Director of the company's safety department. The safety department reviewed the facts of each infraction as given to them by the terminal manager. In each case the infractions were preventable. In each case, the point assessment against Petitioner's driving record was in accordance with the point schedule contained in the driver's safety manual. In each case, the number of assessed points was reasonable. However, Petitioner contends that white drivers were treated differently than black drivers. Much of Petitioner's accusations are based on rumor. For instance, Petitioner contends in his Affidavit that Clayton Vaughn (white) had a major spill at Sunshine Jr. Store No. 214, cleaned up by Dave Garner, that was not reported. Petitioner testified that he had no evidence to support this allegation or first-hand knowledge of this incident. He stated that he learned of it through "driver talk," although he could not remember the name of the driver he had heard it from. Mr. Vaughn, Ms. Dinnes, and Ms. Cleyman each state that no such incident occurred and that Petitioner's claim is not true. Petitioner also contends that in July 1991, Lane Corbin (white)and Tommy Jordan (white) could not pass a random drug test, so Ms. Dinnes told them to purchase a bottle of Murine eye drops to put into the urine specimen bottle. Again Petitioner admits that he has no evidence, only hearsay, to support this allegation. Ms. Dinnes denies Petitioner's allegation. Mr. Cleyman states that the drug testing of urine specimens utilized by Respondent would have detected an adulterated specimen, therefore, Murine eye drops would not have concealed the use of illicit substances by a test subject. In his Affidavit, Petitioner contends that Tommy Jordan was assessed six points instead of 12 points for a mixture. The citation referred to by Petitioner clearly indicates that 12 points were assessed against Mr. Jordan's driving record. In his Affidavit, Petitioner asserts that Mr. Vaughn had a spill at Citgo. Again, Petitioner has no evidence, only hearsay, to support this assertion. Mr. Vaughn, Ms. Dinnes, Mr. Cleyman, and Gail Williams (dispatcher) state that no such incident took place. Petitioner contends in his Affidavit that Mr. Vaughn tried to load 1,500 gallons of gas into a 1,000 gallon tank, which caused a spill. Petitioner admittedly has only hearsay to support this contention. Mr. Vaughn, Ms. Dinnes and Mr. Cleyman state that no such incident occurred. In his Affidavit, Petitioner states that Mr. Vaughn and Dave Oyler (white) received speeding citations and were not assessed points. Petitioner testified that he had no first-hand knowledge of this allegation. Ms. Dinnes and Mr. Cleyman state that they are unaware of any instance where Mr. Vaughn or Mr. Oyler received points for speeding violations. Moreover, each year, Respondent obtains a Division of Motor Vehicle (DMV) report on all drivers and other employees who operate company vehicles. The DMV report does not list infractions. Petitioner also asserts that in November 1992, Tommy Jordan, in violation of company rules, drove through a tunnel in Mobile, Alabama with a placarded trailer. Ms. Dinnes and Mr. Cleyman state that the incident referred to by Petitioner was thoroughly investigated by the safety department and determined to be nonpreventable. The investigation showed that the exit ramp for trucks carrying hazardous materials was not properly marked. As a consequence, Jordan did not have sufficient notice to safely exit the roadway before entering the tunnel. Therefore, the incident was determined to be nonpreventable. Petitioner contends in his Affidavit that Tommy Jordan delivered product to the wrong location which caused a mixture. Petitioner has only hearsay to support this contention. No evidence exists showing that such an incident occurred. Petitioner contends that Mr. Vaughn had a large spill at A.W. Herndon Convenience Store. Petitioner has no first-hand knowledge of this incident. Mr. Vaughn, Mr. Fernando, Mr. Berrios, Ms. Dinnes, and Mr. Cleyman state that a spill occurred; however, the amount spilled was not large, only two gallons. After a thorough investigation of this incident, the safety department determined that the spill was nonpreventable. The investigation showed that the spill was caused by a malfunctioning lock-down fitting, and that the size and severity of the spill was minimized by Mr. Vaughn's quick response. At hearing Petitioner presented evidence of some racial slurs in the workplace. In February, 1993, Petitioner testified that Ms. Dinnes told Tommy Jordan that she had to fire that nigger J.J. (John Jordan) because he is influencing that nigger Sheffield and that nigger McCoy. Again, Petitioner testified that he had no first-hand knowledge of this alleged incident. Petitioner learned of the comment from John Jordan. Ms. Dinnes and Tommy Jordan both state that no such statement was made by Mr. Dinnes. John Jordan testified that he overheard the statement. The statement was raised in John Jordan's charge of racial discrimination to FCHR against Respondent. However, the evidence showed that John Jordan was legitimately discharged for deliberately dumping hazardous material at the terminal. Around December 18, 1992, Tommy Jordan delivered product to Tyndall Air Force Base. A black sergeant had instructed Mr. Jordan to deliver the product differently than had been done before. After the sergeant walked away, Mr. Jordan stated in front of a white airman, "Who does that nigger think he is?" The airman informed the sergeant of Mr. Jordan's comment. Ms. Dinnes received a telephone call from the Air Force sergeant. He informed her of Tommy Jordan's conduct. Ms. Dinnes informed the sergeant that Mr. Jordan would be terminated immediately. The sergeant told Ms. Dinnes that he did not want Mr. Jordan to be discharged, but would be satisfied if he was never assigned to deliver product to the base again. Ms. Dinnes called Florida Rock's main office and believes she spoke with Bob Jackson, then president of Florida Rock. She informed him of the incident and the sergeant's desire. Both took the sergeant's request into consideration when making a decision regarding disciplinary action. Ms. Dinnes confronted Tommy Jordan about his conduct. He admitted he made the statement. She told him that he would be terminated immediately if he ever made such a comment again. Ms. Dinnes also told him that if it were not for the sergeant's request that he not be fired, he would have been discharged. Mr. Jordan did not use another racial slur in the workplace again. Mr. Jordan was not assigned to haul another load to Tyndall Air Force Base. Tommy Jordan was later terminated for accumulating too many points for safety violations. Numerous other minority and non-minority employees employed at the Panama City Terminal during 1991 through 1993 testified that they had never heard Ms. Dinnes or any other of Respondent's manager or supervisor make a derogatory comment based upon race. Mr. Harrison, a black driver, testified that the only derogatory comments relating to race he heard at the terminal from any employee of Respondent were made by Petitioner. Every time Petitioner "got a chance to get close to Harrison" since 1985, Mr. Harrison testified that he called him an "Uncle Tom" and a "bootie kisser" because Harrison refused to get "up in the white folks' face." Mr. Miller a black driver also testified that the only derogatory comments relating to race he heard at the terminal from Respondent's employee were made by Petitioner. Mr. Miller testified that Petitioner called him an "Uncle Tom," a "suck ass," and a "suck butt" because Petitioner said he "liked white people." When Mr. Miller asked Petitioner to stop calling him these names, Petitioner told Mr. Miller that he would "get a gun and shoot [him]." The record clearly indicates that use of racial slurs in the workplace were few and far between. Respondent's policy was to attempt to prohibit such conduct. The company president, Mr. Mabbett, personally investigated Petitioner's claims. In this case, the sporadic racial slurs which occurred are not a sufficient basis to infer an intent to discriminate against Respondent. The terminal manager of Whitaker Oil Company (Whitaker), Jerry Watkins, testified that he barred Petitioner for over two years beginning in late 1990 from hauling loads for Whitaker. Mr. Watkins decided to bar Petitioner after Petitioner said that he could deliver Whitaker loads any time he wanted. Mr. Watkins believed that Petitioner's attitude jeopardized Whitaker's reputation with its customers. Mr. Watkins testified that Whitaker's reputation was its most important asset. He also testified that Petitioner's race had nothing to do with his decision. Three drivers (all white) other than Petitioner also were barred by Mr. Watkins from hauling Whitaker loads during the more than 15 years he has been Whitaker's terminal manager. Only one of these three drivers was employed by Respondent. Pud Parker, a white driver, was barred by Mr. Watkins because he refused to clean his truck. During the time Mr. Parker was barred, Ms. Dinnes did not call Mr. Watkins attempting to have the prohibition lifted as she did for Petitioner. During the time Petitioner was barred, Ms. Dinnes contacted Mr. Watkins repeatedly asking him to allow Petitioner to haul Whitaker loads again. Mr. Watkins refused Ms. Dinnes' request. In defiance of Mr. Watkins' orders, Ms. Dinnes formulated a plan to permit Petitioner to haul Whitaker loads without Mr. Watkins' knowledge. Ms. Dinnes arranged to have Mr. Berrios and other drivers load tanker trailers for Petitioner. Mr. Berrios would go to the Whitaker terminal, load the tanker trailer, and bring it back to the Panama City Terminal where Petitioner would take over the transportation duties. Ms. Dinnes instituted this plan to permit Petitioner to earn a living during a time when business was slow. He had complained to her about not being able to make enough money to support his family. This practice continued until Mr. Watkins discovered that Petitioner was hauling Whitaker loads without his permission. When he found out, Mr. Watkins contacted Ms. Dinnes who admitted to him that she had arranged for Petitioner to haul Whitaker loads clandestinely. He directed Ms. Dinnes that Petitioner was barred from transporting any Whitaker loads until further notice. After approximately two years, Mr. Watkins decided to lift the ban. Petitioner had also been barred from hauling loads from the Chevron terminal. Again, Ms. Dinnes repeatedly attempted to have the prohibition lifted. After approximately two years, Petitioner was permitted to transport Chevron loads. Reports pertaining to the compensation of drivers at Respondent's Panama City Terminal from 1991 through 1996 show no discrimination toward black drivers in the area of compensation or load assignments. The compensation reports show that the drivers receiving the most compensation in 1991 were Petitioner and Michael Davis, both black drivers. For 1992, 1993 and 1994, Mr. Davis was the second most highly compensated driver. For 1995 and 1996, Mr. Davis was the most highly compensated driver. As discussed below with respect to Petitioner's disparate impact claim, an evaluation of driver discharges from 1990 to August 1997, shows no adverse effect on black drivers in terminations for safety violations. During this period, 18.7 percent of the drivers employed by Tank Lines were black and 74.4 percent were white. Of the drivers discharged for safety violations 18.9 percent were black and 77.5 percent were white. The percentage of white drivers terminated for safety violations actually exceeded the percentage of white drivers employed by the company. In comparison, the percentage of black drivers discharged for safety violations was nearly identical to the percentage of black drivers employed by Respondent. The undisputed evidence establishes that Respondent applied its safety policies equally to all drivers regardless of their race. A total of 20 white drivers were identified in the discovery process, where according to the safety manual, they could have received 12 points but received less points for creating or contributing to mixtures. With the exception of Roderick Miller, a black driver, all drivers receiving six points for a mixture. For each white driver that was assessed less than the minimum 12 points for the mixture, an explanation of "extenuating circumstances" was offered by Florida Rock to justify the assessment. The white drivers assessed less than the minimum 12 points for a mixture and the explanation for "extenuating circumstances" that justified the assessment of less points as testified to by Luc Cleyman, the safety director, is as follows: Dan Butow, a white driver at the Panama City terminal, along with James "Pud" Parker received six points on January 10, 1991. The citation issued described the incident as failed to check trailer and loaded on top. The safety department determined that extenuating circumstances existed. The investigation of the incident established that it was caused by a faulty internal valve which failed to open when the handle was pulled. Consequently, the drivers thought that the tanker trailer was empty because when they pulled the handle to open the valve to determine whether the tank was empty, no product came out of the pipe. The bucket test was performed. The tanker trailer used by Parker and Butow had to be repaired before it could be used to transport product again. Ms. Dinnes was directed by the safety department to assess six points against the driving records of Parker and Butow because it was felt the drivers should have recognized the odd feel of the cable when it was pulled and should have known something was wrong. However, it was not clear if the cable felt strange when it was pulled. James Parker, a white driver at the Panama City terminal, received six points. The citation issued described the incident as failed to check trailer and loaded on top. This is the same incident described above. Lane Corbin, a white driver at the Panama City terminal, failed to unload number 3 compartment of supreme gas and loaded 96 gallons of no lead gas on top of it in 1989. Mr. Cleyman advised he had no knowledge of any extenuating circumstances since it was prior to his time as safety director. Archie Trull, a white driver at the Panama City terminal, downgraded a product and blended mid-grade in August, 1991. He was given six points. The "extenuating circumstances" justifying the six points was because it was a blending error constituting driver error, not a mixture. The evidence showed that there is a difference between mixing or blending products to purposefully obtain a certain grade of product and the mixtures involved in this case. There is no category in the safety manual specifically referring to blending errors. The error falls in the general or other category of safety violations. A blending error typically results in the assessment of six points. Daniel Webb, a white driver at the Panama City terminal, received six points for a mixture on March 24, 1990. The "extenuating circumstances" justifying Mr. Webb receiving six points was because this was a training situation. Webb removed the tags which identified the product, the trainee mixed the product, and because there was some comparative negligence with him and the trainee, Roderick Miller (black), only six points were assessed. The incident occurred five days after Miller was hired. Miller was being trained by Webb at the time of the incident. Because Miller was a new driver in training at the time of the mixture, the safety department directed Ms. Dinnes to assess six points against both drivers. William White, a white driver at the Panama City terminal, brought back 595 gallons to the yard and did not completely unload the no-lead product in October, 1990. Six points were assessed because there was no indication of a mixture. Kenneth Albritton, a white driver at another terminal, received zero points for a spill. The original point assessment was voided. The "extenuating circumstances" justifying assessing zero points is unknown. Mr. Cleyman testified that to void points it must be deemed unpreventable. Barry Sanders, a white driver at another terminal, had a spill. The cause of the spill was an equipment malfunction because the drop pipe coupling was egg-shaped and did not fit the hose. Ricky Brannen, a white driver at another terminal, received six points for a mixture where he brought product back on the trailer and then loaded other product on top (no- lead on top of premium). Brannen four months earlier had a spill which was deemed preventable in which he got 12 points. If Brannen would have received 12 points for the mixture he would have been terminated. Mr. Cleyman was on vacation and did not have sufficient knowledge regarding the assessment. Rosemary Crossman, a white driver at another terminal, had a spill which was voided. The "extenuating circumstances" justifying zero points was because she was not properly trained and therefore, not able to "pump off". Lou Dostal, a white driver at the Atlanta terminal, was given 12 points for a spill in 1991. Ultimately, the 12 points were reduced to six points by Cleyman. However, Mr. Cleyman did not know the reasons for the reduction. James Garner, a white driver at the Ocoee terminal, had a mixture and received six points in 1991. The mixture resulted in an upgrade of fuel to a higher octane. There is no rationale set forth in the file. Cleyman believes that he spoke with the terminal manager or had some reason to give six points instead of 12. However, he could not recall the reason for the point assessment. Dennis Lee Hall, a white driver at the Albany terminal received six points for a mixture around July 1993. The six points was [sic] issued for failing to follow procedure which is less harsh than mixture. The point assessment was based on a conversation between Cleyman and the terminal manager. The terminal manager felt that no points should be assessed. The mixture occurred at a tank farm with confusing tanks and pipes. The driver simply hooked to the pipe he thought correct. However, he had traced the wrong connection. Ronnie Harrison, a white driver at the Tampa terminal, who initially received 12 points for a spill in November 1995. In January of 1996, Cleyman removed the points. Steve Cassell, regional manager, requested Cleyman take action on behalf of the driver based on a deceased terminal manager's alleged agreement. Before he died, Fred Tatum, the terminal manager, gave Mr. Harrison three days off, when no pay can be earned, and 12 points, but according to the driver, he intended that he would still get his safety bonus. In trying to honor the deceased terminal manager's alleged arrangements, Cleyman, two months after the incident, removed the 12 points and gave Harrison his safety bonus. Additionally, the tanks were not properly marked and the delivery was made to a commercial private account which controlled the delivery. Robert Holland, a white driver at the Tampa terminal, received three days off and six points for failure to unload all of the product at the site. No mixture was involved. Cleyman did not recall the incident in detail. Ray E. Kersey, a white driver at the Tampa terminal, received six points for a spill in March 1990. Cleyman cannot recall the reason for the six-point assessment because it was a difficult drop process at Respondent's terminal and Mr. Kersey could have received zero points. If Cleyman did not believe Kersey, he could have given him 12 points. Cleyman did not totally believe the narrative written by the driver accurately reflected what happened, but gave him the benefit of the doubt. Michael Koester, a white driver at the Atlanta terminal, received six points for a mixture in 1991. Chevron assumed responsibility for the occurrence because the tag and identification cover did not match. The tag was under muddy water and could not be seen. Mr. Mabbett and Cleyman deemed it unpreventable but still assessed six points. Kee Wayne Laurendine, a white driver at the Jacksonville terminal, received six points for a mixture in 1994. He dropped premium into no-lead fuel. Also, he cross-dropped a kerosene tank with diesel and received 12 points. On July 4th, thousands of people who had been watching fireworks, began to converge on the gas station where the driver was loading product. The people were flipping cigarettes, shooting off fireworks and sparklers, etc. Mr. Laurendine became excited, confused, tense and scared that he was going to be blown up. He made an error. Robert Remillard, a white driver at the Atlanta terminal, received six points for a mixture. Luc Cleyman stated that the "extenuating circumstances" were that unloading paint thinner in a tank containing only alcohol residue was not a mixture. Remillard received six points because he was supposed to check and see if the tank was clean and he failed to do so. He had been told the tank was clean. On August 15, 1990, Mr. Remillard wrote a narrative describing spilling product on the grass. Luc Cleyman offered no "extenuating circumstances". Elvin Roe, a white driver at the Ocoee terminal, received six points for a mixture in September 1990. Mr. Higgins, a vice president, was sent a memorandum to review the incident on September 23, 1990, for Mr. Roe. Mr. Bob Jackson and Mr Higgins agreed Roe should get six points rather than 12 points and Cleyman issued six points. An alternative disciplinary approach was proposed which included suspension, probation, and forfeiture of a yearly bonus. David Trimmel, a white driver at the Tampa terminal, received six points for failure to unload. There was no mixture. Trimmel also received only 12 points for a spill that he did not report, clean up, notify DEP or the fire department. Mr. Trimmel quit before he could be terminated by the terminal manager. After reviewing all of the above records, the record shows that each case turned on facts different from those of Mr. McCoy. Some were treated more harshly than hindsight would have warranted. Some were not. Insufficient facts were presented to show that the facts and circumstances were similar to those of Petitioner. No expert testimony was offered as to the validity of the sampling of employees or that these employees constituted a statistically significant group. Indeed if the exercise of judgment by management is the objectionable policy of Petitioner, then a larger sample constituting the entire safety program would be appropriate since the exercise of judgment is present throughout the company's disciplinary process. The only evidence presented in this regard was the statistical evidence presented by Respondent. That evidence did not demonstrate an adverse impact or treatment of Petitioner or other minorities. Petitioner's statistical evidence was not shown to be reliable or sufficiently valid. Therefore, the sample referenced above cannot form the basis for an inference of discriminatory intent or disparate impact. At the time of his termination on October 8, 1993, McCoy had earned $26,291.99 for approximately 40 weeks of work in 1993. Therefore, McCoy's annualized earnings in 1993 would have been approximately $34,000. In 1992, McCoy earned $30,254.28 from Florida Rock. In 1991, McCoy earned $26,549.38 from Florida Rock. Based on these earnings, McCoy's gross wages from Florida Rock increased in 1992 by 14 percent and in 1993 by 12.3 percent. Therefore, based on McCoy's increase from 1991-1993 and the exemplary models above, it is more than reasonable to assume that McCoy's earnings as a driver at Florida Rock would have continued to increase at a minimum of five percent per year. Florida Rock also provides significant fringe benefits to its employees that include health benefits, life, and accidental death insurance, dental insurance, profit sharing, a 401K deferred earning plan, disability benefits, holiday, and vacation days, a flexible spending account plan, and payroll taxes. According to Florida Rock, these employee benefits represent an "additional 40 percent of compensation" to Florida Rock's employees. Florida Rock's benefit plan is significantly better than the typical employer. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was 50 years of age. After Petitioner was terminated, he could not find comparable employment and filed for and received unemployment benefits. The State of Florida, Department of Labor, required Petitioner to make a "thorough and continued effort to obtain work" in order to receive unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner's family goal regarding his re- employment was for him to get a job in the Panama City area. Petitioner continued to look for employment with out- of-town employers that hired in the Panama City area so he would not be away from his family at night. He either was not hired by these employers, or in order to be considered for the positions, he was told he would have to relocate out of state. Petitioner's educational background was limited to high school and he had never received any specific education or training on job searches or job placement. Petitioner attempted to get retrained at Haney Vocational Technical School; however, the company, JTPA, went out of business. Despite not having the background or this knowledge, McCoy attended job fairs and sought training in the communications field from a friend (Robert Alford) who had been in the business for 18 years. Since Petitioner could not locate a truck-driving job similar to or of a like nature with his Florida Rock position, he decided after approximately five to six months to start his own lawn care and telephone communications business. Petitioner reasonably believed that both businesses could be very successful in the Panama City area. Because Petitioner had limited income after being terminated, he used his pension money from his Florida Rock 401K plan both for living expenses and for capital to start his businesses. Petitioner withdrew $102,556 of his 401K savings during this time. Petitioner's telephone communications business was very successful in the beginning. His first bid was accepted and a lucrative contract was obtained to install the phone system for a new hotel in Panama City. At the same time, while the communications business was just starting Petitioner continued to operate a lawn care business after having observed the financial success of others, including family members. Margie McCoy took care of all of the bills and invoices associated with the businesses, as well as provided the information to the accountant for the preparation of the income tax returns. At times, Petitioner's lawn care business was seasonal, but for each season, McCoy would provide different types of services for his client as opposed to not working at all. There was at lease one six-month period in which McCoy could not work because he had a stroke on March 21, 1995. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner's stroke or high blood pressure was caused by his termination from Florida Rock. Petitioner's high blood pressure did contribute to his stroke. However, Petitioner demonstrated symptoms of elevated blood pressure prior to his discharge from Florida Rock. Notwithstanding his health restrictions, Petitioner continued to try to make his lawn care and telephone businesses successful. Petitioner would work in the sun trying to make the lawn care business successful in violation of his doctor's orders. Petitioner's earnings/losses from his communications and lawn care businesses are as follows: 1994 - $878; 1995 - $6,722; 1996 - $7,055; 1997 - $739; 1998 - $1,689. Petitioner currently works for the Bay County School Board driving a school bus. He was hired in 1998. He continues to work his lawn care and communications businesses. He took a night class to become certified as a bus driver, while at the same time operating his lawn care business during the day. The evidence did not show that Petitioner is currently physically able to work for Florida Rock because his blood pressure was not under control as late as January 2000. Therefore reinstatement would not be appropriate. Petitioner earned $7,086 as a school bus driver in 1998, and $12,554.89 in 1999. Based on the circumstances presented to Petitioner after he was terminated from Florida Rock in October 1993, Petitioner used reasonable efforts to seek employment of a like nature compared to his driver's position at Florida Rock. Also, he used reasonable efforts to earn income by starting his own businesses. Following his stroke, McCoy continued to use reasonable efforts to obtain a bus driver position with the Bay County School Board that provided insurance benefits, while at the same time, continuing to operate his lawn care business. There is no indication that Petitioner failed to use reasonable efforts to earn income following his termination from Florida Rock. Moreover, Petitioner's pension/401K savings of $102,556 that was lost and used to start the businesses and for living expenses (as well as additional amounts that would have been contributed to the 401K plan), would have continued to grow and compound during this period. Petitioner's damages from lost earnings and benefits, lost earnings on his 401K plan (assuming 10 percent simple interest), and total back pay damages less mitigated earning from October 1993 to the present is as follows: Date Lost Wages Lost Benefits (40%) Lost Earnings To 401K2 Less Mitigated Earnings Total Loss Oct. 93- Dec 93 $8,000 $3,200 $10,255 $11,200 1994 $35,700 $14,280 $10,255 <$4,250> (unemploy -ment) $55,985 1995 $37,485 $14,994 $10,255 0 $62,734 1996 $39,359 $15,743 $10,255 0 $65,357 1997 $41,327 $16,530 $10,255 <$739> $67,373 1998 $43,393 $17,357 $10,255 <$7,086> $63,919 1999 $45,562 $18,224 $10,255 <$12,554> $61,487 Jan. 00- Sept. 00 $35,880 $14,352 $7,691 <$9,415> $48,508 401K Withdrawal $102,556 Total Back Pay Damages $539,119 However, Petitioner's damages would have terminated upon his stroke in March 1995. At that time, Petitioner was no longer qualified for employment with Respondent due to his uncontrolled high blood pressure. However, Petitioner would have received $5500.00 in disability benefits because of his stroke.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of committing an unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Davisson F. Dunlap, Jr., Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 John P. McAdams, Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601 Harriett W. Williams Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Steven Carter, Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.
Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based on his sex and race in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2003); and (b) whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by retaliating against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male. He began working as a truck driver for Respondent on May 29, 2002. Mike Helms, Petitioner's supervisor, was responsible for hiring Respondent's truck drivers. During the year and a half that Mr. Helms worked for Respondent, 80 to 90 percent of the truck drivers hired were black. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he repeatedly requested Respondent's mechanics to repair the leak in his truck cab beginning in August 2002. Petitioner stated that Respondent's mechanics did not repair the truck cab until sometime after August 2003 when he was not working and a white female truck driver was driving his truck. Petitioner's allegations of disparate treatment involving the repair of the truck have not been considered here because the record does not reflect that they were raised in Petitioner's original or amended complaint or during FCHR's subsequent investigation. Because the allegations were not raised in either of Petitioner's complaints, FCHR never considered them, which would have allowed consideration in the contested hearing. Petitioner also testified that Respondent did not enforce the no-smoking policy in the driver's lounge until Mr. Helms became ill with a heart condition. The allegations that Mr. Helms dismissed Petitioner's complaints without explanation prior to that time were not included in Petitioner's original or amended complaint. There is no record evidence that Petitioner ever raised an issue involving the no-smoking policy during FCHR's investigation or that FCHR ever considered Respondent's alleged failure to enforce the no-smoking policy, which would have allowed consideration in the contested hearing. Respondent provided its truck drivers with radio/ telephones so that they could communicate with each other and with the office. Each driver had an assigned radio/telephone that he or she used every day. Each night the drivers would leave their telephones in an unsecured area of the truck office that was accessible to all employees. Typically, each telephone was programmed to identify incoming calls by the number of the unit making the call. In other words, the unit number of the person initiating the call would appear on the recipient's screen. However, the recipient's telephone could be programmed to show the name of the incoming caller instead of his or her unit number. On February 17, 2003, Petitioner was using the telephone usually assigned to him. During the day, he noticed that the word "nigger" was programmed into his internal telephone directory. Petitioner made this discovery when he scrolled through his internal telephone directory to place a call to another unit. Petitioner realized that someone had programmed his telephone to show the racial slur when unit 12 called him. Unit 12 was an extra phone, used by the drivers when their phones were not working properly. Therefore, the person who programmed the racial slur into Petitioner's assigned telephone did not know necessarily which driver would be using unit 12 on February 17, 2003. It follows that the driver who used unit 12 on February 17, 2003, might not have known that the derogatory name would appear on Petitioner's screen when unit 12 contacted Petitioner. Petitioner first checked with a couple of drivers who verified that their internal telephone directories were not programmed to identify unit 12 as "nigger." Petitioner concluded that he was the only target of the epithet. Petitioner then called unit 12/"nigger" and discovered that Ed Wight was using the spare telephone that day. Petitioner believed that only a few drivers knew how to program names into an internal telephone directory. He assumed that Mr. Wight was responsible for tampering with his telephone. Petitioner waited to confront Mr. Wight at Respondent's pit. Petitioner put the radio in Mr. Wight's face and asked him if he had programmed the name in the telephone. Petitioner told Mr. Wight that he did not "play that way" and did not appreciate it.1/ Next, Petitioner drove his truck into Respondent's parking lot at a high rate of speed. Mr. Helms, who was standing outside, feared the truck would not stop before it struck him. After Petitioner's truck slid to a stop, he emerged yelling and screaming. Petitioner then threw his telephone at Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms did not understand why Petitioner was so upset until Petitioner showed Mr. Helms the racial slur in Petitioner's internal telephone directory. Petitioner then got into his truck and sped away. Mr. Helms later learned that Petitioner had confronted Mr. Wight at the pit, accusing him of programming the racial slur into Petitioner's telephone. In the meantime, Mr. Helms instructed Petitioner to go home and not to return to work until Mr. Helms called him. When Petitioner returned to work, he met with Mr. Helms and Mr. Wight. During the meeting, Petitioner apologized to Mr. Wight for confronting him. Mr. Helms advised Petitioner that he was suspended for two days for his conduct toward Mr. Wight and for driving into the parking lot in an unsafe manner. There was no evidence that Mr. Wight was responsible for the racial slur. Therefore, Mr. Wight was not disciplined. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he does not know who programmed the racial slur into his telephone. He acknowledged that no one at work ever called him by that name again. Petitioner testified that he has never heard Mr. Helms or anyone else in a position of authority at Respondent's place of business make a racially derogatory comment in his presence. Respondent took appropriate steps to ensure that future racial slurs could not be programmed anonymously into the telephones. Specifically, Mr. Helms padlocked the doors that led to the room where the telephones were stored when they were not in use. This was inconvenient for Mr. Helms because he had to be at the office every time a driver picked up or returned a telephone. Nevertheless, Mr. Helms knew it was important to secure the telephones to prevent any recurrence of the problem experienced by Petitioner. Mr. Helms did not believe that a driver would admit to being responsible for the racial slur. Therefore, he did not interview all of the drivers. Instead, Mr. Helms spoke to a couple of drivers, asking them to come forward with any information that might reveal the identity of the guilty person. Mr. Helms hoped the drivers he talked to would cooperate by sharing information circulating among the employees. For these reasons, Mr. Helms considered his investigation to be ongoing. However, neither Mr. Helms nor any other member of Respondent's management team ever found out who was responsible for the racial slur. Respondent did not conduct any special meeting to educate the drivers about Respondent's intolerance of racial discrimination. Respondent's employee handbook clearly prohibits any type of racial discrimination, including but not limited to, "racial and ethnic slurs, jokes or other derogatory remarks about or directed toward minority groups." Respondent required all employees to acknowledge that they have received and read the employee handbook. Petitioner signed the employee acknowledgement on January 10, 2003. The handbook states that failure to comply with safety rules is an offense that may subject an employee to discipline. The handbook also states that an employee may be discharged for threatening another employee or showing disrespect for a supervisor. On May 1, 2003, approximately two and a half months after the telephone incident, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position of crew chief. Mr. Helms made the decision to promote Petitioner. As crew chief, Petitioner was responsible for leading a group of drivers and was eligible for a monthly bonus in the amount of $250.00 if no accidents or traffic violations occurred during the month. Petitioner resigned his position as crew chief in August 2003. He made the decision to step down as crew chief because he did not believe the compensation was sufficient. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he believed Mr. Helms treated four specifically-named male drivers more favorably than Petitioner. Petitioner testified that three of these drivers were black males and one was a white male. Petitioner did not include allegations of Mr. Helm's alleged favorable treatment of the four male drivers in his original or amended complaint. There is no record evidence that FCHR investigated or considered these allegations, which would have allowed consideration in the contested hearing. On October 1, 2003, Petitioner hauled a load of dirt to Respondent's dump. The person responsible for telling drivers where to dump and for pulling them out when they got stuck in the mud was David Cochran, a white male. On this occasion, Petitioner followed Mr. Cochran's instructions and got stuck. Because Mr. Cochran ignored Petitioner's request for assistance in getting his truck out of the mud, Petitioner called Mr. Helms to report that Mr. Cochran was not providing assistance. After waiting for 40 to 45 minutes, Petitioner's crew chief, Tommy Bennett (a black male), and another driver, Leonard Glover (a white male) came by to speak to Petitioner. Petitioner explained that he was waiting for Mr. Cochran to pull his truck out of the mud. Mr. Glover then hooked his truck to Petitioner's truck and freed Petitioner's truck from the mud. Approximately one half hour later, Petitioner returned to the dump. He saw a white female truck driver stuck in the same location. Mr. Cochran immediately pulled her truck from the mud. At this point, Petitioner decided that Respondent was discriminating against him. First, he called a television station. Next, he called FCHR regarding the process of filing a complaint. He then called Vicki Goodman, Respondent's director of human resources, requesting documentation regarding the February 17, 2003, telephone incident. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Goodman about the incident with Mr. Cochran. When Ms. Goodman inquired why Petitioner wanted the documents, he responded that he was dissatisfied with Ms. Goodman's and Mr. Helms' response to the telephone incident. Ms. Goodman advised Respondent that there was no information about the telephone incident other than as discussed with Petitioner eight months before. She also told him he was not entitled to a copy of the report of that incident. Ms. Goodman then inquired whether Petitioner was concerned about something else that was occurring in the workplace. Petitioner responded by saying, "I really don't want to talk about it right now. You'll find out soon enough." During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he told Ms. Goodman, "[s]omeone from FCHR would be contacting her soon." In papers submitted to FCHR, Petitioner claimed he responded to Ms. Goodman's inquiry by stating that "[s]omeone would be contacting her in the near future in reference to the information that [he] was requesting.” Petitioner's testimony that he informed Respondent on October 1, 2003, that he was filing a complaint with FCHR is not persuasive. On October 5, 2003, Petitioner signed a written Charge of Discrimination. He filed the charge with FCHR on October 7, 2003. In the meantime, Mr. Helms received a complaint from a female truck driver, Tina Pincumbe, on October 6, 2003. The complaint involved allegations of sexual harassment by Petitioner toward Ms. Pincumbe and other female truck drivers.2/ Upon hearing Ms. Pincumbe's complaint, Mr. Helms referred her to Ms. Goodman. He made the referral because he felt Ms. Pincumbe would be more comfortable talking with another female. Ms. Pincumbe went to Ms. Goodman's office and made a statement that was reduced to writing. During the interview, Ms. Goodman told Ms. Pincumbe that it was important for other women who were uncomfortable with the way Petitioner was treating them to come forward. Later on October 6, 2003, Janice Simpson voluntarily visited Ms. Goodman's office. Ms. Simpson also signed a written statement, accusing Petitioner of sexual harassment. On October 7, 2003, Sheila Nichols, a female truck driver, was working light duty in the office. Ms. Goodman approached Ms. Nichols as part of her investigation. Ms. Nichols subsequently signed a written statement containing allegations of unwanted advances by Petitioner. On October 7, 2003, Cathie Corrie, a female truck driver, approached Mr. Helms with allegations about Petitioner's unwanted advances. Mr. Helms referred Ms. Corrie to Ms. Goodman. On October 8, 2003, Ms. Corrie signed a statement alleging sexual harassment by Petitioner. On October 8, 2003, Ms. Goodman interviewed Mr. Helms and several male truck drivers. On October 9, 2003, Ms. Goodman interviewed Petitioner, who denied all allegations of sexual harassment in a written statement. Respondent placed Petitioner on administrative leave pending completion of the sexual harassment investigation. Based on her investigation, Ms. Goodman concluded that the allegations of sexual harassment by the four females had merit. She completed a written report and recommended that Behzad (Steve) Ghazvini, Respondent's owner, discipline Petitioner. Mr. Ghazvini and Mr. Helms met with Petitioner either October 10, 2003, or October 13, 2003.3/ During the meeting, Mr. Ghazvini informed Petitioner that he was discharged from employment for violating Respondent's policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Mr. Ghazvini terminated Petitioner's employment based on the similarity of the sexual harassment complaints by the female truck drivers, Ms. Goodman's judgment that the women were telling the truth, and out of concern that Respondent would be morally and legally responsible if Petitioner harmed the female employees. When Mr. Ghazvini made the decision to fire Petitioner, neither he nor anyone on Respondent's management team were aware that Petitioner had contacted FCHR to file a discrimination complaint. Respondent received notice about the discrimination complaint for the first time on October 15, 2003. The next two truck drivers that Respondent hired after terminating Petitioner were Troy Rowells, who was hired on October 21, 2003, and Darrell Butler, who was hired on October 22, 2003. Both men are black.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of law, it is ORDERED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2004. END NOTES 1/ Mr. Wight did not testify at the hearing. Testimony that Mr. Wight denied programming the racial slur into Petitioner's telephone is inadmissible hearsay. 2/ Neither Ms. Pincumbe nor any of the other female truck drivers testified at the hearing. Any reference here to their allegations of sexual harassment is inadmissible hearsay except to show Respondent's reaction to the complaints. 3/ The record is not clear whether Respondent met with Petitioner to terminate his employment on Friday, October 10, 2003, or Monday, October 13, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vicki Goodman Sandco, Inc. 2811 Industrial Plaza Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Craig J. Brown, Esquire Brown & Associates, L.L.C. 223 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian S. Duffy, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0229 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 6816 Southpoint Parkway No. 500 (32216) Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on February 24, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates one of the largest continuing care retirement communities in the country with about 2,400 residents and just over 1,000 employees on a single site in Fort Myers, Florida. Petitioner describes herself as "Indo-Guyanese" and testified that she is a member of the Catholic denomination. Petitioner is an articulate woman who projects an air of dignity and refinement. These qualities, when combined, can easily be interpreted by some individuals as producing an arrogant personality type. On June 6, 2013, Petitioner began employment with Respondent and was assigned to work at The Arbor, which is one of Respondent's assisted living facilities. Petitioner was employed as a hospitality care assistant (HCA) and worked on a PRN, or "as needed/on-call," basis. Petitioner's final date of employment with Respondent was May 8, 2014. Petitioner's employment relationship with Respondent ended after Petitioner refused to return to work after being cleared to do so by her authorized workers' compensation treating physician. During her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was supervised by Stacey Daniels, the registered nurse manager assigned to The Arbor. Ms. Daniels has held this position for 15 years. In her capacity as registered nurse manager, Ms. Daniels supervised seven licensed practical nurses, approximately 35 HCAs and resident care assistants, and two front-desk staff. In addition to Petitioner, Ms. Daniels also supervised Marjorie Cartwright, who works at The Arbors as a full-time HCA. Alleged Harassment by Marjorie Cartwright Petitioner, in her Complaint, alleges that she "endured on-going harassment by Marjorie Cartwright." According to Petitioner, Ms. Cartwright would tell Petitioner things like "we don't allow terrorists to have keys and [a] radio," would ask Petitioner if she is "Muslim," and referred to Petitioner as "that bitch nigger" when speaking with other staff. The Complaint also alleges that Ms. Cartwright told co-workers that she "hate[s Petitioner] to the bone." Olna Exantus and Nadine Bernard were previously employed by Respondent, and each woman worked with both Petitioner and Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Exantus testified that she witnessed an incident between Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner, during which Ms. Cartwright called Petitioner "stupid" and an "idiot" because Petitioner did not deliver to Ms. Cartwright the number of lemons that were requested. Ms. Exantus also recalled an incident where she was working with Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner when, out of the presence of Petitioner, Ms. Cartwright said that she hates Petitioner to the bone or words of similar import. Ms. Bernard testified that Ms. Cartwright referred to Petitioner as "stupid" on one occasion, and on another occasion, she called Petitioner a "bitch." Ms. Bernard also testified that she heard Ms. Cartwright state that she hates Petitioner to the bone or words of similar import. Both Mses. Exantus and Bernard testified that they heard Ms. Cartwright say that the reason why she hates Petitioner to the bone is because Petitioner thinks that "she is a rich lady" and is, therefore, better than everyone else. Neither Ms. Exantus nor Ms. Bernard testified to having heard Ms. Cartwright refer to Petitioner as either a "nigger" or a "bitch." Ms. Cartwright, who is not Indo-Guyanese, has been employed by Respondent for approximately six years as a full-time HCA. Although Ms. Cartwright testified for only a few minutes during the final hearing, she projects a personality type that can best be described as "feisty." Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner worked together approximately ten times during Petitioner's period of employment with Respondent. Ms. Cartwright testified that she never referred to Petitioner using either the word "nigger" or "Muslim." Ms. Cartwright did not deny that she referred to Petitioner as "stupid" or called her an "idiot." Ms. Cartwright also did not deny that she stated that she hates Petitioner to the bone. Petitioner was informed by Mses. Exantus and Bernard that she was disliked by Ms. Cartwright, and they suggested to Petitioner that she should take appropriate steps to protect her food items from possible contamination by Ms. Cartwright. Although Petitioner was warned to take such steps, there is no evidence that Ms. Cartwright engaged in any behaviors designed to cause harm to Petitioner. The evidence is clear, however, that Ms. Cartwright disliked Petitioner during Petitioner's period of employment by Respondent. Petitioner contemporaneously prepared personal notes as certain events happened during her employment by Respondent, including issues she claimed to have had with Ms. Cartwright. None of Petitioner's contemporaneous notes indicate that Ms. Cartwright, or anyone else employed by Respondent, referred to her as either a "nigger" or a "Muslim." The evidence does not support Petitioner's claim that Ms. Cartwright referred to Petitioner as a "bitch nigger" or as a "Muslim" as alleged in the Complaint. Stacey Daniel's Alleged Failure to Act on Complaints Petitioner alleges in her Complaint that she attempted to report Ms. Cartwright's behavior to their joint supervisor Ms. Daniels, but was told by Ms. Daniels that she "didn't have time to listen" to Petitioner's complaints. On December 13, 2013, Ms. Daniels met with Petitioner to discuss Petitioner's possible workers' compensation claim. During the meeting, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Daniels that she was upset with her because approximately three months earlier, on or about September 4, 2013, Ms. Daniels refused to immediately meet with Petitioner to discuss the problems that Petitioner was having with Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Daniels had no recollection of Petitioner approaching her with concerns about Ms. Cartwright. Petitioner acknowledged that she only approached Ms. Daniels once to discuss her concerns about Ms. Cartwright. During the meeting on December 13, 2013, Ms. Daniels reminded Petitioner that she (Ms. Daniels) is very busy during the workday, that it may be necessary to bring matters to her attention more than once, and that she is not always able to stop what she is doing and immediately meet with employees to address work-related disputes. She apologized to Petitioner for the oversight and immediately offered to mediate any dispute between Petitioner and Ms. Cartwright. Petitioner refused Ms. Daniels' offer because Ms. Cartwright, according to Petitioner, would simply lie about her interaction with Petitioner. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Daniels about Ms. Cartwright referring to Petitioner as either a "nigger" or a "Muslim." Petitioner Complains to Karen Anderson Karen Anderson is the vice-president of Human Resources, Business Support, and Corporate Compliance and has been employed by Respondent for approximately 18 years. On November 21, 2013, Petitioner met with Ms. Anderson to discuss matters related to a workers' compensation claim. During this meeting with Ms. Anderson, Petitioner complained, for the first time, about Ms. Cartwright and the fact that Ms. Cartwright had called Petitioner "stupid" and had also referred to Petitioner as a "bitch." At no time during this meeting did Petitioner allege that she had been referred to by Ms. Cartwright as a "nigger" or a "Muslim." Additionally, at no time during her meeting with Ms. Anderson did Petitioner complain about Ms. Daniels, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, refusing to meet with her in order to discuss her concerns about Ms. Cartwright. Denied Promotion on Three Occasions In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that she "was denied promotions to Registered Medical Assistant 3 different times" by Ms. Daniels. This allegation is not supported by the evidence. Ms. Daniels testified that Petitioner was never denied, nor did she ever seek, a transfer to the position of registered medical assistant. Ms. Daniels also testified that the only conversation that she and Petitioner had about the position of registered medical assistant occurred before Petitioner was hired by Respondent. Petitioner offered no credible evidence to refute Ms. Daniels' testimony. Retaliatory Reduction in Hours Worked In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that "[o]ut of retaliation for complaining to Ms. Stacey about Ms. Marjorie, they cut my hours back to 2 days a week without my request." As previously noted, Petitioner worked for Respondent on an "as needed/on-call" basis. Typically, Respondent's on-call staff members are presented with a work schedule that has already been filled in with work times for the full-time staff members. Any work times not filled by full-time staff are then offered to on-call staff. In addition, on-call staff may be called at the last minute, if there is a last minute schedule change by a full-time staff member. On-call HCAs do not have set work schedules and are offered work hours on a first-come, first-served basis. After Petitioner was cleared to return to work following her alleged work-related injuries, Ms. Daniels, along with Amy Ostrander, who is a licensed practical nurse supervisor, tried to give Petitioner notice of the availability of work shifts that were open on upcoming schedules at The Arbor. Ms. Daniels encouraged Petitioner to provide her with an e-mail address in order to provide Petitioner with a more timely notice of available work shifts, but Petitioner refused to do so. E-mail communication is the most typical form of communication used by the rest of the on-call staff and serves as the most efficient and quickest way for Ms. Daniels to communicate with HCA staff. Because Petitioner would not provide an e-mail address, she was at a disadvantage, because other on-call staff members were able to learn of the availability of work shifts and respond faster to the announced openings. Because Petitioner would not provide an e-mail address and indicated that she preferred to receive the notice of work shift availability by mail, Ms. Daniels complied and sent the schedule of availability to Petitioner by U.S. mail. The evidence establishes that any reduction in the number of hours worked by Petitioner resulted exclusively from her own actions and not as a result of any retaliatory animus by Ms. Daniels or Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding: that Respondent, Shell Point Retirement Community, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Ghanshaminie Lee; and denying Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of employment discrimination against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in Spain and is of Hispanic origin. At all material times, he has been employed by Respondent. Since 1992, he has been employed as a truck driver. At the time of the incident described below, Respondent was a Waste Truck Driver. His job was to drive a 66,000-pound truck in Miami to collect garbage from the utility customers. On February 28, 2006, Petitioner was operating his truck along Northwest 54th Street. This is a major east-west arterial through central Dade County. At the location of the incident, this busy road contains five lanes of traffic. Leaving a strip mall, from which he had just collected garbage, Petitioner drove the truck across this arterial, crossing double-yellow lines in the middle, in order to save time in driving to the next pick-up location. Petitioner was not at an intersection and knew that the double-yellow lines meant that his maneuver was illegal. Petitioner "explains" that he chose to do this maneuver at the urging of the Waste Collectors riding on the back of the truck and with the knowledge that other truck drivers had done it too. Unable to clear all of the lanes at one time, Petitioner was forced to stop the truck around the middle of the highway at an angle closer to perpendicular than parallel to the direction of the traffic flowing around him. A collision resulted when a passenger car tried to pass the garbage truck on the left at the same time that Petitioner moved his truck forward to try to complete his maneuver. After an investigation, Petitioner's supervisor, who is black, decided to demote him to Waste Collector, which resulted in a small decrease in pay, but presumably less-preferred tasks involving more direct contact with solid waste. The supervisor weighed Petitioner's substantial experience with Respondent as a driver against the facts that he could have prevented this accident, even though he did not receive a citation, and that he has had five other preventable accidents while driving Respondent's vehicles. Respondent had previously required Petitioner to take good-driving courses on three occasions due to avoidable accidents. He had also been given progressive discipline for his driving mishaps, culminating in an eight-day suspension for his last accident, which was in December 2004. Petitioner claimed to his supervisor that he had done nothing wrong, that he had not violated any rules, and that everyone drives like he did. The supervisor was unfavorably impressed by his failure to accept responsibility for the accident and his nonchalant attitude. The supervisor legitimately concluded that this attitude combined with Petitioner's driving history unreasonably raised the risk of additional accidents caused by Petitioner. Petitioner's attempt to show disparate treatment was unpersuasive. Either similar discipline was imposed for a similar number of similar offenses, supervising personnel were different, or the similarity of past offenses could not be determined. Petitioner's supervisor testified that she did not demote him because he is Hispanic, and this testimony is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141 Eric A. Rodriguez, Esquire Office of Dade County Attorney 111 Northwest First Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128-1930 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment action by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 760.027, Florida Statutes (2005). Petitioner is an African-American female. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked full-time as a floor technician (floor tech) at Respondent's nursing home facility. As a floor tech, Petitioner was responsible for dusting, mopping and buffing the floors. At all relevant times, Cheryl Johnson was Respondent's facility administrator. Ms. Johnson has held that position since December 2002. In May 2003, Petitioner asked Ms. Johnson if she could receive her paycheck early. Petitioner was aware that Ms. Johnson had given an early paycheck to a nurse. The record does not reveal the nurse's race. Ms. Johnson refused to give Petitioner the early paycheck. Ms. Johnson admitted that she had made a mistake in giving the nurse an early paycheck. Ms. Johnson stated that she would not violate Respondent's policy against early paychecks again. Petitioner filed a grievance, claiming that Ms. Johnson was not being fair. Sometime thereafter, Ms. Johnson gave an early paycheck to a dietary employee. The dietary employee was an African- American. With regard to early paychecks, there is no evidence that Ms. Johnson ever gave preferential treatment to employees who were not members of a protected group. In October 2003, Sue Goldfarb was Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Goldfarb criticized Petitioner because Petitioner was spending too much time in the Activities Room. Petitioner complained to Ms. Johnson and filed two grievances, claiming that she was being treated unfairly. According to Petitioner, Ms. Goldfarb and a medical records clerk, Pam Brock, did not get into trouble for spending time in the Activities Room. Ms. Johnson explained that Petitioner could assist in the Activities Room, but only after she completed her floor tech duties. There is no evidence that Respondent ever allowed employees to assist in the Activities Room before they completed their regularly assigned duties. Petitioner did not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of Ms. Goldfarb's criticism. At some point in time, Respondent informed all housekeepers, including Petitioner, that their hours were being cut from seven-and-a-half hours per day to six-and-a-half hours per day. Respondent also informed the housekeepers that they would not be eligible for overtime hours. Respondent took these actions because the facility's "census" (number of residents) was low. In February 2004, Ms. Johnson decided to redecorate the Activity Room as a special weekend project. Ms. Johnson requested Gary Brock, Pam Brock's husband and a maintenance man for the facility, to work over the weekend to complete project. Ms. Johnson also requested Ms. Brock to assist with the project because Ms. Brock recently had been short on hours. Thereafter, Petitioner impermissibly reviewed a document on a supervisor's desk. The document indicated that Ms. Brock, the medical records clerk, received three hours of overtime on the weekend of the special project. Petitioner copied the document and returned the original to the supervisor's desk. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she was not supposed to be looking at documents on the supervisor's desk. In February 2004, Petitioner filed a grievance, complaining that Ms. Brock had received overtime. Petitioner thought it was unfair for Ms. Brock, a medical records clerk, to receive overtime hours, while the housekeepers had their hours reduced. There is no evidence that Petitioner was treated any differently than any other housekeeper. At some point in time, Petitioner complained to Ms. Johnson and filed a grievance that Ms. Goldfarb was not doing her job. After receiving Petitioner's complaint, Ms. Johnson decided to obtain a statement from each housekeeper as to whether they had any concerns regarding Ms. Goldfarb. In March 2004, Ms. Johnson temporarily held all of the housekeepers' paychecks. She requested the housekeepers to visit her office, render their opinions about the housekeeping supervisor, and collect their checks. Petitioner, like all of the housekeepers had to visit Ms. Johnson's office to pick up her paycheck. While she was there, Petitioner signed a statement, indicating that Ms. Goldfarb did not treat her fairly. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a grievance, complaining, in part, because Ms. Johnson held the paychecks for the entire housekeeping department. There is no evidence that Petitioner was treated any differently than any other housekeeper. At the end of March 2004, Petitioner had a confrontation with a co-worker, Robert Goldfarb. Mr. Goldfarb was Sue Goldfarb's husband. The altercation occurred after Mr. Goldfarb walked across a wet floor that Petitioner had just mopped. Mr. Goldfarb had to walk across the wet floor to get to the restroom. Petitioner and Mr. Goldfarb cursed at each other and engaged in a shouting match. Petitioner filed a grievance about the incident. Respondent did not discipline Petitioner or Mr. Goldfarb for getting into the argument. Petitioner and Mr. Goldfarb have not had a similar exchange since the March 2004 incident. In September 2004, Petitioner and her supervisor, Ms. Goldfarb, engaged in an argument outside Ms. Johnson's office. Ms. Johnson suspended both employees for three days. After an investigation, Ms. Johnson reinstated Petitioner and Ms. Goldfarb and gave them back pay to make them whole. Since September 2004, Petitioner has received pay raises. She has not received any write-ups, reprimands, or any other type of discipline. She has not filed any grievances since September 2004. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Goldfarb was still Petitioner's supervisor. Petitioner was serving as Respondent's Chairperson of the Safety Committee, a position of special trust and responsibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorina Smith 1160 East Mays Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Alvin J. Taylor Delta Health Group 2 North Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Mark E. Levitt, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner has been the victim of discrimination based upon his race and upon retaliation regarding his termination (lay-off) from employment with the Respondent and with regard to his allegation that he was denied overtime by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a laborer and carpenter's helper for the Respondent, a construction company, at times pertinent to this case. The two construction projects involved in this proceeding are known as the Oceans Grande Project, a 20-story high rise condominium in Daytona Beach Shores and the Salida Del Sol project in Daytona Beach Shores. The first was commenced in construction in January 2004, and the Salida project in December 2004. They are still ongoing. Sometime in 2004 the Petitioner applied at the Respondent's Oceans Grande worksite asking for a wage rate of $14.00 per hour. He filled out an application and left and had no more contact with the Respondent employer for two or three months. He returned after that period of time and spoke with Grady Johnson, the project superintendent for the Respondent. He ultimately took a job at $12.00 per hour with the Respondent as a carpenter's helper/laborer. He was thus employed initially at the Oceans Grande project. The Petitioner was employed at that location from June 21, 2004 until early March 2005, when he was transferred to the Salida Del Sol project. Prior to that transfer, in November 2004, at the Oceans Grande site the Petitioner suffered an on- the-job injury. He was provided medical care by the Respondent, and had been placed on light duty by his physician. In early March 2005, the Oceans Grande project no longer had any light duty work available. It was the understanding of the superintendent, Grady Johnson, that at all times after November 15, 2004, the Petitioner had been on light duty status. He was aware of three specific letters that the company received from the physician. The latest one, advising that the Petitioner must remain on light duty, was received in March according to Mr. Johnson; however, rather than lay-off the Petitioner, the Respondent transferred the Petitioner to the Salida Del Sol project. That project was just getting underway at that time and light duty work was available. Two other employees were also transferred to that project. Thus, the Petitioner's employment at Salida Del Sol consisted of light duty work. Superintendent Getz of that project re-affirmed that the transfer to his project was because of a lack of a need for one such as the Petitioner on light duty at the Oceans Grande project, as well as the fact that his project at this time had light duty work. The transfer to the Salida Del Sol project occurred on March 7, 2005. At the time of the Petitioner's transfer to the Salida job site there were only two Yates employees, including the Petitioner, who were employed there, aside from supervisory personnel. On or about April 12, 2005, an employee of a subcontractor referred to the Petitioner with a racial slur, and made other unkind, argumentative comments toward him. The Petitioner made no mention of it initially, but on the very next day was working in that area and realized that one of the female employees was quite angry because of her awareness of the racially derogatory comment that the subcontractor's employee had made toward the Petitioner. This co-employee made a complaint about the matter to Rick Getz, the project superintendent at the Salida job. Mr. Getz immediately investigated the matter and confronted the employee of the subcontractor ("Dominick") and told him in no uncertain terms that such conduct was not to be tolerated on that job, regardless of whom he worked for. Subsequently Mr. Getz, along with the assistant project superintendent Rick Bilodeau, met with the subcontractor's employee, Dominick, as well as his employer and reiterated to both of them that this type of conduct would not be condoned and there would be no further incidents like this. There were no more complaints thereafter by the Petitioner or any other employee of the Respondent. In a conversation shortly after this meeting, Mr. Bilodeau informed the Petitioner that the matter had been resolved, at which point the Petitioner made a statement to the effect that he wanted to know the name and address of Dominick's employer because "my people like people with big mouths and lots of money." In any event, the Respondent's action remedied the situation and stopped any further racially derogatory incidents. The Petitioner has also complained of being denied overtime. This stems from Friday, April 29, 2005, when the Petitioner learned that the other two employees on his job site were going to work overtime the next day, Saturday. He claims he knew nothing about it and was not told by his employer and concluded therefore that he was denied overtime. The Respondent, however, offered preponderant evidence that there was overtime available on Saturday April 30, 2005, and that no effort had been made to exclude the Petitioner. Rather, overtime is voluntary and because of the small number of employees superintendent Getz had announced to all employees near the end of the workday on Friday that work was available for anyone who wanted to work on Saturday. It was Mr. Getz's impression that this had been made known to the Petitioner, but if the Petitioner had not heard the announcement at a gathering at the end of the day, it was not through any intentional effort by the Respondent to exclude him from an overtime opportunity. This was confirmed by Assistant Superintendent Billodeau in his testimony to the effect that it was customary on the job site on Friday to announce to everyone congregated in the afternoon whether they were going to work on Saturday or not. It was Billodeau's impression also that the Petitioner was present on that occasion. So all employees were told as a group that there was work to be done on Saturday. It is also true that numerous occasions had arisen on this and the Oceans Grande project in which the Petitioner was asked to work overtime but declined for various reasons, as the Petitioner himself has conceded. Finally, the Petitioner complains concerning his lay- off from the Oceans Grande project on May 6, 2005. In fact, efforts were made to avoid laying the Petitioner off, and to find him available work at the Salida project. Additional efforts were also made to contact the Petitioner for re-call purposes even after he was laid-off from the Oceans Grande project. This belies any intention on the part of the Respondent to retaliate against the Petitioner for complaining about the racial comment incident by denying him overtime or laying him off. On May 2, 2005, the Salida Del Sol project had reached a stage in which there was very little work to do. The project was waiting for a work permit and for the installation of a tower crane. Therefore there was no work for a laborer, the Petitioner, or for the two carpenters, Felix Hernandez and Otillo Toledo. Rather than lay them off, however, Superintendent Getz called the project Superintendent, Mr. Johnson, at the Oceans Grande project to see if there was any work for the three employees. Mr. Johnson told him that he might have work for perhaps a week and therefore the Petitioner and the other two employees were transferred to the Oceans Grande project. Both Hernandez and Toledo were skilled carpenters, as opposed to the Petitioner, who was a laborer/carpenter's helper. When this transfer occurred it left only two traffic control employees, who were females, at the Salida job site, along with the tower crane operator. On May 6, 2005, the Petitioner was laid-off from the Oceans Grande project. There was simply no further work for a laborer at that job site so Mr. Mecker, the foreman, explained to the Petitioner why he was laid-off. He also told him that the company might soon have another project starting known as the Halifax Landing project and that he might have work available there. He told the Petitioner that he should remain in contact with the Oceans Grande project supervisory personnel in case a re-call came up because of additional work becoming available. The Respondent also noted in the Petitioner's personnel file at the time of this "reduction in force" that the Petitioner was "recommended for re-hire." Mr. Johnson also testified that as far as he was concerned the Petitioner was still eligible for re-hire and that he actually liked Julian Lawrence as a person and as an employee. It is undisputed, however, that the Petitioner never contacted the Respondent and never made any inquiry as to additional work. On occasion, Project Superintendent Johnson made efforts to call the Petitioner at the only phone number he had for him, regarding re-calling him for more work. This was probably three to four weeks after the lay-off. The fact that the Respondent noted on the personnel record at the time of his lay-off that the Petitioner was recommended for re-hire belies any indication that the Petitioner was being retaliated against by the Respondent. It also significant that the decision-maker with regard to the lay-off was Grady Johnson. The Petitioner maintains that he was laid-off in retaliation for complaining about the racial epithet incident involving "Dominick" at the Salida project. Mr. Johnson however, was totally unaware of that incident at the time he made the decision to lay the Petitioner off. Thus it was not possible that he did so as an act of retaliation. Indeed the Petitioner himself did not complain regarding the racial comment incident, but rather learned of it from the female employee who had made the complaint to the Respondent's management. Equally significant, no derogatory employment action was ever taken against the female employee who complained to the Respondent regarding the incident either. Project Superintendent Johnson established, based upon his 45 years experience in the construction industry, that it is important to understand how a construction project and company operates. There are different steps and different stages. During these different steps and stages of a project different employees are required and then become un-needed at a later stage of the project. Many times much of the work at various stages is performed by subcontractors. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that not only was Mr. Johnson unaware of the "Dominick" incident, but when asked if the lay-off of the Petitioner was in any degree an effort, to retaliate, Mr. Johnson was very adamant in denying that. He stated, "I've never done that in my life." Indeed, the testimony shows that on at least two occasions the Respondent sought to find available work for the Petitioner rather than lay him off. Mr. Johnson established that the Petitioner's employment record was marked as "eligible for re-hire" and the Respondent's attempts to reach the Petitioner after the lay-off was because the Respondent was actively trying to effect an arrangement so that the Petitioner would have work at different times with the Respondent. In Mr. Johnson's words, "We like Julian. Julian is good guy. There was no selection . . . we were trying to work it out where he could go to the other job, but that didn't work out."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julian J. Lawrence Post Office Box 263225 Daytona Beach, Florida 32126 Taylor B. Smith, Esquire The Kullman Firm Court Square Tower 200 6th Street North, Suite 505 Columbus, Mississippi 39703-0827 Jennifer Robbins Guckert, Esquire The Kullman Firm 1640 Lelia Drive, Suite 120 Jackson, Mississippi 39216
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Ronnie L. Ricks, has been a victim of an unlawful employment practice allegedly perpetrated by the employer, the Respondent, City of Gainesville (City), because of its termination of him, allegedly because of his race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ronnie L. Ricks, was employed by the City of Gainesville as a Motor Equipment Operator I from June 9, 2003 to August 6, 2003. The Respondent, City of Gainesville, is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida, and is an employer for purposes of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Upon accepting employment with the City, the Petitioner was made aware of the written job description including the job functions and selection factors specified in the job description. He was also provided and made aware of the written City of Gainesville Policies and Procedures, including policy number 6 relating to and describing the six-month probationary period applicable to all new employees. Upon being hired by the Respondent and commencing work as a Motor Equipment Operator I, on June 9, 2003, the Petitioner's continued employment was subject to the satisfactory completion of a six-month probationary period. The Respondent's written policy relating to the probationary period stated that, "The probationary period shall be regarded as an integral part of the selection process and shall be utilized for closely observing the employee's work for securing the most effective adjustment of a new or promoted employee to the position and for rejecting any employee whose performance or conduct is not satisfactory." Further, the policy stated, "During the probationary period, the supervisor and Department Head may discharge an employee who is unable or unwilling to perform the duties of the position satisfactorily or whose habits and dependability do not merit continuance in the employ of the City." At all times relevant to this action, the essential job functions of the position of Motor Equipment Operator I included a requirement that the employee, "Attends work on a continuous and regular basis." Additionally, among the "non-essential job functions" was a requirement that the employee, "Makes minor repairs and adjustments to equipment. Checks oil and tires." One of the selection factors listed in the written job description for the position of Motor Equipment Operator I was, "Ability to work effectively with co-workers and the general public." The Petitioner claims to have suffered discrimination when his crew leader allegedly told other employees that the Petitioner was a "policeman." He maintains this caused black co-workers to shun him or refuse to speak to him. He also contends that his supervisor allegedly made comments about his clothes and his car. Apparently, he means that his choice of clothing for work was criticized because he allegedly wore "designer clothes" for a job which required more casual work clothes. He also feels he was discriminated against because of his supervisor's alleged comments concerning the type or model car he drove. The Petitioner maintains he was harassed by his supervisor when he refused to mow a retention pond in an area he was assigned to maintain. He claims the retention pond had a hole in it and he felt it was dangerous to mow it on the tractor. When he refused to do the job, his supervisor Ed Sams completed the job. The Petitioner also contends he was discriminated against because he had to complete a City of Gainesville Accident Analysis form after damaging a tractor by bending the metal roof of the tractor when he hit an overhanging tree limb. He maintains that white employees were not disciplined for such conduct. Aside from his contention that white employees were not disciplined for damaging equipment and he was, the Petitioner did not testify that any of the alleged discriminatory or harassment acts he cited were in any way related to his race or other protected status. There was no substantial evidence offered at hearing to support the Petitioner's claim that his crew leader Ed Kersey, ever referred to the Petitioner as a "policeman" or other similar term. The Petitioner made that accusation in his testimony based on uncorroborated hearsay, the relator of which was not present as a witness. His crew leader, Ed Sams, testified that he did not make such a statement and further testified that his father was a career law enforcement officer and he had a great deal of respect for such a position and would not have used "policeman" or a similar term in a derogatory way. The Petitioner claimed that his supervisor, Ed Sams, made derogatory comments about his clothes and car. The Petitioner claims that those comments were inappropriate but did not indicate that they were discriminatory on the basis of race or in any other way. Supervisor Sams testified that he has no recollection of making comments about the Petitioner's clothes and did not recall him dressing inappropriately during his brief employment with the City. He was never reprimanded or otherwise disciplined concerning the clothes he wore. Supervisor Sams did acknowledge making comments about the Petitioner's vehicle in that he testified he had merely asked the Petitioner's opinion concerning the various qualities of that vehicle because he was considering purchasing a similar one for himself. Concerning the Petitioner's testimony about being "harassed" by being ordered to mow a retention pond he considered to be an unsafe site, Supervisor Sams testified regarding that incident. He showed it to be an example of the Petitioner's unwillingness to work effectively with co-workers and his poor attitude toward supervision. On that occasion, Mr. Sams witnessed the Petitioner sitting near an unmowed retention pond and inquired why he was not working. The Petitioner responded that he was going to "let Ed do it." "Ed" was crew leader Ed Kersey, one of the Petitioner's supervisors. Supervisor Sams testified that he was somewhat taken aback by the Petitioner's attitude toward both the assigned work and to his direct supervisor. Ultimately, Mr. Sams performed the required mowing operation and clearly demonstrated that it could easily be safely done. The Petitioner indicated he felt harassed by this incident or this direction to mow the retention pond, but he gave no testimony whatever to indicate that it was racially discriminatory toward him. The Petitioner maintains that he felt harassed when drove his tractor into a tree limb causing damage to the tractor's aluminum canopy. He was required to complete a "City of Gainesville Accident Analysis form," but in spite of his testimony that he was disciplined, there is no evidence to show he was disciplined for the incident. Despite the clear language on the accident analysis report completed as a result of the accident, the Petitioner apparently failed to understand that he was not being disciplined or "written up" for the accident. He was not treated differently from the white employees he maintained were not disciplined for damage to equipment. The Petitioner was merely required to complete the accident analysis report in order to maintain a record of incidents involving City equipment. Under the section entitled "corrective action," the report merely indicated, "reinstruct employee." There was no discipline imposed. Mr. Sams testified that he did not issue a warning, reprimand, re-assignment, or job change as a result of the tractor damage incident. Mr. Sams testified that the Petitioner's obstinance regarding the completion of the accident report form was a further example of difficulties encountered in supervising the Petitioner. Ed Kersey is a Labor Crew Leader II who reports to Mr. Sams and who directly supervised Ricks. In addition to the incident where Ricks refused a directive to mow the retention pond, Mr. Kersey also encountered the Petitioner's obstinance and failure to follow supervision, on occasions when the Petitioner was angry or upset and would mow over litter or trash on the ground rather than pick it up, or have it picked up, before running the mowing machine over it. He also had a tendency to show up late for equipment maintenance work. He was verbally counseled for this, although never "written up," but kept doing it even after being counseled about it. During less than nine weeks in which the Petitioner was employed in the relevant position, he was absent from work for four days. He left early on one occasion without permission and was late at least twice without excuse. When he left early, he left two and one quarter hours early from work without permission. The four days missed from work were without leave or permission. He arrived late for job assignments on the two occasions. His poor attendance in a nine-week period is more egregious because the Petitioner was only working a four-day work week. The Petitioner frequently missed the designated maintenance times set aside for the motor vehicle equipment operators to work together to maintain their equipment. This is a part of their job description. Crew leader Ed Kersey established that this time was specifically designated in recognition that workers could maintain their equipment if they cooperated with each other. When the Petitioner frequently failed to attend the group maintenance sessions, he would complain about the difficulty of performing maintenance tasks alone. In summary, the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner was discriminated against due to his race or any other protected status. The preponderant evidence showed that the Petitioner's employment was terminated during his probationary period, because his habits and dependability did not merit continued employment. Specifically, the preponderant evidence establishes that the Petitioner's poor attendance record, sub-standard equipment maintenance, and unresponsive and confrontational attitude towards his supervision were all legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons justifying the termination of the Petitioner's employment, especially considering that he was in his probationary period. The Petitioner offered no persuasive evidence that, as a member of a protected class, he was treated differently or worse in any employment decision or category as compared to similarly situated employees outside his protected class. Additionally, based upon the above-found instances of deficient performance and deficient attitude toward supervision, the Petitioner did not offer persuasive evidence that he was qualified for the position in question from which he was terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronnie L. Ricks 3531 Southwest 30th Terrance, Unit 50-B Gainesville, Florida 32608 Daniel M. Nee, Esquire 200 East University Avenue, No. 425 Gainesville, Florida 32601
