The Issue The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background This case involves a claim by petitioner, John E. Phillips, Jr., that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs because of an administrative action improvidently brought against him by respondent, Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). When the complaint was filed, Phillips was registered with DBF as an associated person with Aragon Financial Services, Inc. DBF contends the claim is without merit because Phillips is not a small business party within the meaning of the law, there is substantial justification to support the agency's decision to file a complaint, and special circumstances are present which would make an award of fees and costs unjust. The action which underlies this claim involved an administrative complaint filed against Phillips on February 4, 1994, charging him with violating various provisions within Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. That complaint was assigned Case No. 94-1266. The complaint also denied an application by Phillips to register as an associated person with a new firm. In addition, the complaint named Bruce M. Walker as a co-respondent, and as to that registrant, the complaint was assigned Case No. 94-1358. Both cases were consolidated for hearing and, after an evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 27, 1994, a Recommended Order was issued on September 13, 1994, recommending that all charges against Phillips be dismissed and that his application for registration be approved. The Recommended Order was adopted by DBF without change, and Phillips is accordingly deemed to be a prevailing party in that action. Phillips has requested fees and costs in the amount of $15,000.00, the maximum allowed by law. Respondent does not contest the reasonableness of that amount. Prima Facie Requirements for an Award of Fees and Costs In order to show entitlement to an award of fees and costs, petitioner must demonstrate that he is a "prevailing small business party" within the meaning of the law. Since he has filed the petition on his own behalf, he must show he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time the action is initiated by the state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, Phillips was domiciled in Pensacola, Florida, and had a net worth of less than $2 million. According to an uncontroverted allegation in his petition, Phillips had no "employees relating to business that formed the basis for the Agency's charges." Petitioner was also a 50 percent shareholder in a subchapter S corporation known as Phillips, Walker & Associates, Inc. (PWA), a Pensacola firm engaged in the sale of insurance products. Although Phillips was registered with DBF as an associated person with Aragon Financial Services, Inc., that firm was not the subject of the complaint nor is it otherwise relevant to this dispute. Petitioner's principal source of income was through the sale of insurance products sold through PWA although he occasionally sold a few securities during that same period of time. The administrative complaint was not filed against PWA, which held no licenses from the state, but rather was filed against the registration of Phillips as an individual. Although he was an officer, employee and shareholder of PWA, Phillips was not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice. Therefore, he does not qualify as a small business party. Was There Substantial Justification? The consumer complaint which eventually led to the filing of the charges in Case No. 94-1266 was made by Jane Hubbard, a Gulf Breeze realtor who had loaned a substantial amount of money ($50,000.00) to PWA in May 1988 and was never repaid. The loan was secured by a promissory note personally signed by Phillips and Walker, as the owners of the corporation. After PWA ceased doing business in May 1990, and both Phillips and Walker had filed for bankruptcy, Hubbard, or her attorney, contacted DBF in an effort to seek DBF's aid in collecting her money from Phillips and Walker. Since petitioner was registered with DBF as an associated person, and thus was subject to DBF's regulatory jurisdiction, Hubbard apparently assumed that Phillips may have violated the law in some respect, and the agency might be able to assist her in recovering all or a part of her money. A similar complaint filed with the Department of Insurance was not pursued by that agency. Hubbard's complaint was eventually referred to a DBF financial examiner, Robert R. Kynoch, who, among other things, interviewed Phillips, Walker, Hubbard, and three other persons who had made loans to Walker (but not Phillips). Although Kynoch did not place the persons interviewed under oath during the investigative stage, there was no requirement that he do so. Based on a representation by Hubbard that Phillips and Walker had failed to disclose to her all relevant information regarding PWA's financial status at the time the loan was made, Kynoch concluded that a reasonable basis existed to bring charges against the two if the loan was actually an investment, and thus subject to DBF's jurisdiction under Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Kynoch prepared a written investigative report, received in evidence as respondent's exhibit 3, which recommended that the report "be further reviewed for appropriate disposition." The report was first reviewed by Michael D. Blaker, a DBF area financial manager, who approved the recommendation and forwarded it to his supervisor, Richard White. It was then reviewed and approved by a bureau chief, William Reilly, and finally by the division director, Don Saxon. After Saxon signed off on the report, it was sent to the general counsel's office for a legal determination as to whether the loan was an investment. Margaret S. Karniewicz, an assistant general counsel, concluded that it was, and recommended the issuance of an administrative complaint. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted, a determination was made that the loan constituted an investment. This determination in the Recommended and Final Orders was not contested by any party, including Phillips. There was, however, insufficient evidence to establish that misrepresentations were made by Phillips during the sale of the investment. For this reason, the charges against Phillips were dismissed and his application for registration with a new firm was approved. Because DBF had statements, which it assessed to be credible, from a complaining witness (Hubbard) that misrepresentations or material omissions were made by Phillips and Walker during the transaction, and DBF properly construed the transaction as an investment, it had a reasonable basis in fact and law to file the complaint. Since there was no showing that the agency's credibility assessment was unreasonable, DBF was substantially justified in bringing the charges in Case No. 94-1266. Special Circumstances There was no evidence presented by respondent to show that special circumstances exist that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsection 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2002),1 and, if so, what penalty should be recommended.
Findings Of Fact Ellsworth served as a member of the Treasure Island City Commission from 1998 to 2004. Ellsworth is subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees for his acts and omissions during his tenure as a city commissioner for the City of Treasure Island (City or Treasure Island). Agnes Rice is presently one of the largest private land owners on Treasure Island. She owns property north of 127th Avenue. The portion of her properties north of 127th Avenue and east of Gulf Boulevard is known as "Kingfish Point." Her property north of 127th Avenue and west of Gulf Boulevard is known as the Rock House property. Mrs. Rice has ownership interests in at least two corporations doing business at Kingfish Point: John's Pass Marina, Inc., and Gator's on the Pass, Inc. John's Pass Marina, Inc., also owns land on Kingfish Point. Mrs. Rice hired an attorney, Tim Ferguson (Ferguson), who also had a master's degree in urban regional planning, to assist her in finding out the highest and best use for her properties on the north end of Treasure Island. Ferguson became a member of Mrs. Rice's advisory board, consisting of three attorneys, an accountant, and her son, Sid Rice. The advisory board had discussions with Mrs. Rice about assembling her properties on Kingfish Point. Mrs. Rice retained Ferguson to go before the City Commission and to meet with City officials to try to change the City's Land Development Regulations (LDRs) to gain more flexible land use for her properties. Thereafter, Ferguson actively lobbied his ideas for amendments to the LDRs on behalf of Mrs. Rice before City officials in public meetings, as well as individual meetings with City officials and City Commissioners. At the same time, Ferguson was lobbying for amendments to the LDRs on behalf of 13 other clients. When Ferguson appeared before the City Commission concerning the amendments to the LDRs, he stated that he represented Agnes Rice as well as other property owners. In January 24, 2000, Ferguson met with Lynn Rosetti (Rosetti) and City Manager Chuck Coward to discuss things that could be done with the Rice property at the north end of Treasure Island. On January 30, 2000, Ferguson and Sid Rice met with Rosetti and the City manager to discuss some kind of hotel or resort that included mixed uses such as a mix of commercial, residential, and hotel. Ferguson and Rice also inquired about the possibility of vacating a right of way and about a height variance. Thereafter, Ferguson had meetings with Rosetti and the City manager on July 17, 2000; August 3, 2000; August 4, 2000; April 4, 2001; October 30, 2001; April 25, 2002; and May 7, 2002. Ferguson wanted amendments to the LDRs that allowed mixed-use development, height incentives, development agreements and planned community development. He provided input to the City officials on those issues. Some of Ferguson's suggestions were later incorporated into amendments to the LDRs. In April 2002, City staff presented to the mayor, the City Commission, and the Treasure Island Planning and Zoning Board (Planning and Zoning Board) proposed amendments to the LDRs in a report and draft ordinance, which included amendments that could be passed through the local ordinance process and amendments that would require comprehensive plan amendments before they could be implemented. Major components of the proposed amendments that could be passed by local ordinance without comprehensive plan amendments included the concepts of mixed uses in the Commercial General (GC), Resort Facilities (FRM-30), and the Resort Facilities High (RFH-50) zoning classifications; accessory uses; density/intensity averaging; grand-fathering existing hotel/motel density for redevelopment in CG, RFM-30, and RFH-50; a height redefinition, giving an additional five feet in height to all zoning categories; bulk standards-height bonuses (height increase incentive plan) in CG and RFH-50; and development agreements. The proposed amendments requiring amendments to the comprehensive plan included the concepts of density bonuses in RFH-50; floor area ratios in RFM- 30 and RFH-50; increase in hotel/motel density in CG; and transfer of development rights. On May 3, 2002, the City manager and the City planner prepared and submitted to the mayor and members of the City Commission a memorandum identifying those proposed changes to the LDRs that could be addressed by the local ordinance process and those that would require amendments to the comprehensive plan. On May 21, 2002, a Commission Workshop Session was held during which a first draft ordinance was presented to the City Commission. The first draft ordinance deleted proposed changes to LDRs that would require changes to the City's Comprehensive Plan. Ellsworth voted in favor of passing proposed modifications to the City's LDRs. The first draft ordinance was incorporated into Resolution 02-48 for the draft ordinance's second reading and consideration on May 28, 2002. At the meeting on May 28, 2002, Ellsworth voted in favor of referring Resolution No. 02-48 to the Planning and Zoning Board for review and recommendation. The City Commission's vote to pass Resolution 02-48 and refer the ordinance to the Planning and Zoning Board was not merely a ministerial act. Rather, it was a required step in the process of adopting the amendments to the LDRs. The draft ordinance referred to the Planning and Zoning Board included the following proposed changes to the LDRs: Various definitions applicable to LDRs, including definitions for density, density averaging, floor area ratio, and transfer of development rights. Amendments to the Property Development Regulations applicable to GC, RFM-30 and RFH-50 permitting mixed uses under the following conditions: "Mixed uses shall not exceed, in combination, the respective number of units per acre and floor area ratio permitted, when allocated in their respective proportion to the total lot area." A new section relating to mixed uses, which authorized mixed-use developments within CG, RFM-30, and RFH-50; required site plan review for all proposed mixed-use projects; established rules for special exceptions for mixed-use projects; and provided for an unspecified percentage reduction in the parking requirements for a mixed-use project when it is determined that peak demand for parking of the various uses occurs at different times. A new section permitting density/intensity averaging between RFH-50, RFM-30, and GC for either hotel/motel uses or a mixed-use development that has a hotel/motel as the predominate use; providing that the shifting of any density/intensity could be used either between the same land districts or from a lower density district to a higher density district; and requiring that any project using density/intensity averaging would require written evidence of such averaging in a development agreement to be recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. A new section establishing a height incentive increase plan, permitting an increase in the maximum allowable height for hotels/motels in the RFH-50 and GC land use districts. A new section providing for development agreements subject to the following requirements: Any interested party may make a proposal for a development agreement at any time prior to the completion of discretionary approvals for the development of a project. Such a proposal shall be formulated with the applicant and the City manager. A proposed development agreement shall be adopted, amended, or resolved by following the procedures outlined in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, for development agreements. At a minimum, the City Commission shall hold a public hearing following the notification procedures set forth in Section 70- 12 of the City Code. Development agreement shall be adopted by ordinance and may be amended by mutual consent of the parties to the agreement or their successors in interest. After completing its review of the proposed changes to the LDRs, the Planning and Zoning Board referred the proposed changes to the City Commission with recommendations for modifications. The recommendations were summarized as follows: The most significant recommendation being made by the Planning and Zoning Board involves density averaging and the height incentive increase plan. The Board is recommending that both tools be placed under the umbrella of Development Agreements so that there can be more control over how and when such tools are used. In addition, they are recommending that the height incentive increase plan can only be used north of 104th Avenue to John's Pass and shall apply only to parcels that are one (1) acre or more in size. Finally these recommended changes include the requirement that any such development agreement would be reviewed and approved by the Planning and Zoning Board prior to the City Commission taking action on the development agreement. In that manner, a second set of checks and balances will occur prior to the density averaging and the height incentive increase plan being utilized. The City planner was directed by the City Commission to work up a draft ordinance including the modifications recommended by the Planning and Zoning Board. The draft ordinance was designated Ordinance No. 02-06. On October 8, 2002, the City Commission considered on first reading Ordinance No. 02-06, which reflected the proposed changes to the LDRs as proposed by City staff as modified by the recommendations of the Planning and Zoning Board. At the meeting, the City planner noted two problems with the proposed ordinance as it related to the provisions relating to the height incentive increase plan included as part of the development agreement provisions of the LDRs. First, there was an inconsistency between the first sentence of the proposed ordinance applicable to RFH-50 and CG with the provisions of subsection (4) applicable to RFH, RFM-30 and CG. The City planner recommended that the height incentive increase plan be applied only in RFH-50. Second, the City planner recommended deletion of the restriction that the height incentive increase plan apply only north of the 104th Avenue, because City staff had advised that the City could not split a land use district for disparate treatment. The City planner's suggested changes were accepted by the City Commission, and the proposed ordinance was passed forward to second reading. Ellsworth participated in the vote on October 8, 2002, voting in the affirmative on moving the proposed ordinance to second reading. On October 22, 2002, the City Commission considered on second reading Ordinance No. 02-06, as modified by the City Commission on first reading on October 8, 2002. Ellsworth participated in the vote on October 22, 2002, voting with the majority to approve the ordinance. The votes taken by the City Commission on October 8, and 22, 2002, were steps that were necessary in the process to amend the LDRs. Resolution No. 02-48 and Ordinance 02-06 (at its initial reading on October 8, 2002, and as finally passed on October 22, 2002) had modifications that were beneficial to landowners on Treasure Island. The total acreage of land in the City is 766.4885 acres. Of the total acreage, 40.4860 acres are zoned CG, 46.3162 acres are zoned RFM-30, and 46.3162 acres are zoned RFH-50. At the time of Ellsworth's votes for Resolution 02-48 and Ordinance 02-06, he was employed as the general manager of John's Pass Marina, Inc., and also worked for Gator's on the Pass, Inc. Agnes Rice is the sole owner of John's Pass Marina, Inc., and has an ownership interest in Gator's on the Pass, Inc. John's Pass Marina, Inc., owned 1.59 acres of property zoned CG at 12795 Gulf Boulevard/Kingfish Drive where John's Pass Marina is located. The property owned by John's Pass Marina, Inc., comprises slightly more than 3.9 percent of the property zoned CG in the City. Agnes Rice individually owned several parcels of land in the City, at various locations, at the time that Ellsworth voted on Resolution 02-48 and Ordinance 02-06. Most of the properties owned in the Kingfish Point area are owned by Mrs. Rice, including the "Rock House" property, which is .91 acres located on the western side of Gulf Boulevard at 12714 Gulf Boulevard and is classified as RFH-50. Mrs. Rice also owns three other parcels on the western side of Gulf Boulevard which are classified as RFH-50: .14 acre at 12717 Sunshine Lane; .12 acre at 12721 Sunshine Lane; and .02 acre with an address listed as Coney Island. Mrs. Rice's total acreage classified as RFH-50 is 1.19 acres. Agnes Rice also owns other properties in the Kingfish Point area, including properties upon which the following businesses are located: Gator's Café and Saloon, Gator's Gift Shop, Majesty Cruise Lines office, some rental properties, a parasailing business, and a high and dry boat storage. Of these properties owned by Agnes Rice, 3.92 acres are classified as CG: .6 acre at 12766 Gulf Boulevard; 1.89 acres at 12781 Kingfish Drive; .78 acre at 12783 Gulf Boulevard; and .65 acre at 12725 Gulf Boulevard. Less than one acre of the property owned by Agnes Rice in the Kingfish Point area was classified as residential: .19 acre lot, three .12 acre lots, one .11 acre lot and .08 acre lot at 12700 to 12714 Lagoon Drive and 110 127th Avenue. The properties owned by John's Pass Marina, Inc., and Agnes Rice that were zoned CG were affected by the votes Ellsworth cast for Resolution 02-48 and Ordinance 02-06. There are properties owned by Agnes Rice on Treasure Island, other than property zoned CG, which were affected by the votes Ellsworth cast for Resolution 02-48 and Ordinance 02-06. The 1.59 acres in the CG land use category owned by John's Pass Marina, Inc., at the time of the subject votes, constituted the following percentages of land on Treasure Island: approximately 3.92 percent of the total acreage of CG; 1.81 percent of the combined acreage in CG and RFH-50; and 1.18 percent of the combined acreage in CG, RFH-50, and RFM-30. Considering the 1.59 acres in CG owned by John's Pass Marina, Inc., plus the 3.92 acres of CG owned by Mrs. Rice on Kingfish Point, the total acres in CG owned by Mrs. Rice and her corporation at the time of the subject votes constituted the following percentages of land on Treasure Island: 13.6 percent of the total CG; 6.26 percent of the combined acreage in CG and RFH-50; and 4.1 percent of the combined acreage in CG, RFH-50, and RFM-30. Considering the 1.59 acres in CG owned by John's Pass Marina, Inc., plus the 3.92 acres of CG owned by Mrs. Rice on Kingfish Point plus the 1.19 acres of RFH-50 owned by Mrs. Rice north of 127th Avenue, the total 6.7 acres CG and RFH-50 owned by Mrs. Rice and her corporation at the time of the subject votes constituted the following percentages of land on Treasure Island: 7.6 percent of the combined acreage in CG and RFH-50 and 4.99 percent of the combined acreage in CG, RFH-50 and RFM-30. When interviewed by an investigator for the Commission on Ethics in this case prior to Ellsworth's voting on Ordinance 02-06 on October 8 and 22, 2002, Ellsworth advised the investigator that he was employed by A.E. Rice, Inc. Ellsworth was not employed by A.E. Rice, Inc., at the time he told the investigator that he was employed by A.E. Rice, Inc., and he has never been employed by A.E. Rice, Inc., which does not exist. A few months after his interview with the investigator, Ellsworth advised the investigator that he was employed by Kingfish Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., and John's Pass Marina, Inc. Ellsworth also advised the investigator that he did not know whether either of those corporations owned property on Treasure Island. It is clear that prior to his voting on October 8 and 22, 2002, Ellsworth viewed himself, without regard to the corporation that was issuing his paycheck, as working for the Rice family and, in particular, Agnes Rice. He described Mrs. Rice as the "matriarch." In the past, Ellsworth had abstained from voting on matters involving "[a]ny piece of property that the [Rice] family owned." He described his abstention as follows: I have recused myself from voting on anything that has gone down here. Any piece of property that the family owned. Even so minute as having a fund raiser for a fishing tournament, you know a fishing tournament fund raiser where all the money goes to charity. We've been involved with that for ten years. You know and I have to recuse myself from voting on that saying yes or no where they can have a tent up because there might be some type of monetary gain there. Because we do own a restaurant, there is a bar there, I say we do I'm doing that. The Rices own a bar and restaurant here and yes even if the money goes to charity somebody could go in and buy cocktails and that would ultimately benefit my employer. Ellsworth recused himself from voting on matters involving any piece of property owned by the Rice family based on an informal opinion obtained in 1998 by the City attorney from the Commission on Ethics concerning the propriety of Ellsworth voting on matters that were being presented to the City by the Rice family. Prior to his votes in October 2002, Ellsworth had been advised by the City attorney that the facts and circumstances could justify Ellsworth abstaining on voting on the LDR amendments. In making his assessment and giving advice to Ellsworth, the City attorney was of the opinion that Ellsworth was directly or indirectly employed by some of the entities that were involved in the ownership of the property on the north end of Treasure Island. The City attorney never advised Ellsworth that Ellsworth had a conflict, but he felt that it was a close call and abstention would be supportable. On or about September 25, 2002, Ellsworth spoke to Commission on Ethics staff counsel, Chris Anderson, by telephone. Ellsworth told Anderson that the City was considering some changes in the LDRs that would have an impact on some persons or companies that he worked for who were property owners or had an interest in the LDRs. Ellsworth told Anderson that there was an active complaint currently before the Ethics Commission on the subject of the vote. Ellsworth advised Anderson that the amount of land owned by persons or companies that he worked for was "nine acres, seven commercial." Anderson told Ellsworth that in view of the fact there was an active complaint on essentially the same activity, he should not vote on the changes to the LDRs when it came back to the City Commission for a vote. Anderson also had a "size-of- class" discussion with Ellsworth regarding the size of the land owned relative to the size of land affected. Ellsworth advised that his employer or the people he worked for was the biggest or one of the biggest landowners. A few days after Anderson spoke with Ellsworth, Tim Ferguson, the same attorney who had been retained by Agnes Rice to lobby the City Commission concerning the changes to the LDRs, spoke with Anderson. Ferguson told Anderson that he was representing Ellsworth and asked essentially the same questions that Ellsworth had asked. Ferguson also wanted to know if the Commission on Ethics would issue an advisory opinion on Ellsworth's voting in the upcoming votes on changes to the LDRs. Anderson advised Ferguson that the practice of the Commission on Ethics under the circumstances was to defer to the active complaint and investigative facts rather than issue an advisory opinion. Anderson emphasized to Ferguson that Ellsworth should not vote and that Ellsworth likely had a voting conflict. A few days before Ellsworth spoke with Anderson, Anderson had a conversation with the City attorney concerning Ellsworth voting on the changes to the LDRs. Anderson told the City attorney that Ellsworth was "going to step on a snake twice; it's a no-brainer; don't vote on it again when it comes back."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Irving Ellsworth violated Subsection 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and recommending the imposition of public censure and reprimand, and a civil penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, John's Island Club, Inc. (petitioner or the club), is a not-for-profit corporation which owns and operates a private country club facility in the John's Island residential development in Indian River County, Florida. It provides a variety of recreational facilities to its members. Among the amenities are three golf courses, nineteen tennis courts, a tennis building, a beach club, a club house, a swimming pool, and dining facilities. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is a statutorily created agency charged with the administration of the state revenue laws, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated thereunder. As a result of an amendment made in 1991 to Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, DOR is authorized by law to impose an admissions tax on "dues and fees" paid to private membership clubs providing recreational facilities. As a private membership club, petitioner is subject to this tax. Beginning on July 1, 1994, petitioner made an assessment on each member to raise capital for the purpose of repairing and replacing many of its physical facilities. During the six month period ending December 31, 1994, $10,441,897 was collected from the members and made available to the club. Rule 12A- 1.005(d)1.b., Florida Administrative Code, which was adopted by DOR in December 1991 to implement the admissions tax on dues and fees, imposes a tax on "(a)ny periodic assessment (additional paid-in capital) required to be paid by members of an equity or non-equity club for capital improvements." Under the authority of that rule, DOR required that petitioner pay the applicable sales tax on the assessment collected through December 31, 1994, or $730,932.79, and that it continue to pay the tax as other similar assessments are made in the future. Claiming that the rule exceeds DOR's grant of rulemaking authority, and it modifies, enlarges, and contravenes the law implemented, petitioner filed a petition for administrative determination of invalidity of existing rule. DOR denies all allegations and asks that the validity of its rule be upheld. The Club and the Assessment The composition of the club The club began operation in 1969 but was purchased by its members in 1986. It is an equity private membership club but issues no stock. The club has two types of memberships: golf and sports social. Currently, the cost of a golf equity membership is $85,000 while the cost of a sports social membership is $30,000. After payment of these fees, the member receives a membership certificate, which represents his or her equity ownership interest in the club. At the present time, there are 1125 golf memberships and 257 sports social memberships. Of the 1125 golf memberships, the original developer still owns 67. In addition to having to purchase a membership, members must also pay annual dues. A golf member pays $4,875 in annual dues while a sports social member pays $2,760 in annual dues. A sales tax is also collected on these dues. The dues are used to cover operating expenses such as insurance, administrative costs, staff salaries, and maintenance costs. In addition, members pay fees for additional services such as golf cart use, golf bag storage, locker room use, and golf and tennis lessons. When a member decides to resign or retire from the club, he or she may resell the membership to the club (but not a third party) and receive the greater of (a) the initial amount paid by the retiring member, or (b) 80 percent of the current membership cost (with the remaining 20 percent retained by the club in a separate capital improvement account). The assessment In 1992, the club began studying the feasibility of repairing and replacing many of its physical facilities. The total cost of the proposed work was set at $16,372,000. By majority vote taken in the spring of 1994, the members decided to raise capital for the work by imposing a capital assessment on each current member. It was agreed that the capital contribution would be $12,000 from each golf member and $11,150 from each sports social member. However, the payment of the capital contribution was not intended to, and did not result in any, decrease in the dues which members were required to pay for the use of the club's facilities. A failure to pay the assessment would result in suspension from the club. Three different options were made available to the members for the manner of payment of the capital contribution. The options included (a) a single payment, (b) payment over a three-year period, or (c) payment of interest only until such time as the member either sold the membership or left the club. After making payment in full, the member would be issued a certificate of capital contribution. It is noted that the developer was required to pay the capital contribution for his 67 golf memberships. Further, any person joining the club after the imposition of the assessment would likewise be required to pay the assessment. Beginning in July 1994, the club began collecting the capital contribution from its members. From July through December 1994, some $10,441,897 was collected. A total sales tax of $730,932.79 has been paid on those collections. Shortly thereafter, petitioner opted to file this rule challenge. The Rule and its Origin Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b. provides as follows: (d)1. Effective July 1, 1991, the following fees paid to private clubs or membership clubs as a condition precedent to, in conjunction with, or for the use of the club's recreational or physical fitness facilities are subject to tax. * * * b. Any periodic assessments (additional paid in capital) required to be paid by members of an equity or non equity club for capital improvements or other operating costs, unless the periodic assessment meets the criteria of a refundable deposit as provided in sub-subparagraph 2.e. below. * * * Under the terms of the rule, the capital contri- bution assessed by the club does not qualify as a refundable deposit. This is because any difference between the amount collected by the club upon the sale of a membership to a new member, and the amount which was paid to the retiring member, is retained by the club. Because Rule 12A-1.005, Florida Administrative Code, covers a wide array of items subject to taxation, the DOR cites Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the rule, and Sections 212.02(1), 212.031, 212.04, 212.08(6) and (7), 240.533(4)(c), and 616.260, Florida Statutes, as the law implemented. There is no dispute between the parties, however, that in adopting sub-subparagraph 1.b., which contains the challenged language, the agency was relying principally on Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, as the law being implemented. That subsection defines the term "admissions" for sales tax purposes. Although the parties did not specifically say so, DOR relies on Section 212.17(6), Florida Statutes, as its source of authority for adopting the rule. That subsection authorizes DOR to "make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter . . . for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder." For the purpose of assisting DOR in administering the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, which imposes a sales and use tax on various transactions, Section 212.02, Florida Statutes, provides definitions of various terms used in the chapter, including the term "admissions." Prior to the 1991 legislative session, subsection 212.02(1) read in pertinent part as follows: The term "admissions" means and includes . . . all dues . . . paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities, including, but not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting, boating, athletic, exercise, and fitness facilities. During the 1991 legislative session, the definition of the term "admissions" was expanded by the addition of the following underscored language: The term "admissions" means and includes . . . all dues and fees . . . paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities, including, but not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting, boating, athletic, excercise, and fitness facilities. Thus, the legislature added the term "fees" to the term "dues" for those amounts "paid to any private clubs and membership clubs" which would be subject to the admissions tax. Prior to the above change in substantive law, rule 12A-1.005(5), as it then existed, provided that dues paid to athletic clubs which provided recreational facilities were taxable. However, subparagraph (5)(c) of the rule also provided that (c) Capital contributions or assessments to an organization by its members are not taxable as charges for admissions when they are in the nature of payments made by the member of his or her share of capital costs, not charges for admission to use the organization's recreational or physical fitness facilities or equipment, and when they are clearly shown as capital contributions on the organization's records. Contributions and assessments will be considered taxable when their payment results in a decrease in periodic dues or user fees required of the payor to use the organization's recreational or physical fitness facilities or equipment. Therefore, capital contributions were not taxable unless they resulted in decreased dues. That is to say, if a club levied an assessment on members and concurrently lowered its monthly dues, the assessment would be deemed to be taxable and in contravention of the rule. Thus, the effect of the rule was to prevent a club from renaming "dues" as "capital contributions" or "assessments" in order to avoid paying a tax on the dues. After the change in substantive law, the DOR staff began preparing numerous drafts of an amendment to its rule to comply with the new statutory language. At one stage of the drafting process, a DOR staffer recommended that, because the legislature had not provided a definition of the term "fee," the DOR should adopt a rule which provided that capital contributions be "not taxable if assessed under an equitable membership." Relying on what it says is the legislative intent, the DOR eventually proposed, and later adopted, the rule in its present form. In doing so, the DOR relied upon the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees" which are found in certain legislative history documents pertaining to the new legislation. Legislative History of the Law Implemented Although a number of bills related to the subject of a sales tax on admissions, the bill enacted into law was identified as Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523 (CS/HB 2523). The legislative history of the various bills relating to this subject has been received in evidence and considered by the undersigned. In early 1991, the House and Senate considered bills which addressed amendments to the sales tax on admissions. The first time the issue was addressed was at a meeting on February 21, 1991, of the Subcommittee on Sales Tax of the House Committee on Finance and Taxation. The discussion at the meeting indicated that the intent of the bill was to close a loophole that allowed physical fitness facilities to change their pricing structure to charge a higher initiation fee, which was not taxable, and thereby reduce their monthly dues, which were taxable, so as to reduce the revenue below that originally anticipated by this tax on admissions. This is corroborated by the bill analysis of the proposed committee bill that was offered, PCB FT 91-3A, which summarized the problem and solution as follows: Section 212.02(1), F. S. was amended during the 1990 Legislative Session to include in the definition of admissions those "dues" of "membership clubs" providing "physical fitness" facilities. Some clubs have attempted to avoid the tax (on dues) by shifting a substantial portion of the members' payments from "dues" to "initiation fees." Section 212.02(1), F. S., is amended to include "fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of admissions. All fees, including initiation fees and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities would be subject to the sales tax on admissions. It is unclear, but likely, that PCB FT 91-3A became House Bill 2417 (HB 2417). The bill analysis and economic impact statement on HB 2417, which was prepared by the House Committee on Appropriations, contained identical language to that in the bill analysis on PCB FT 91-3A. At the same time, the Senate was considering Senate Bill 1128, which later became Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1128 (CS/SB 1128). On March 14, 1991, a staff analysis and economic impact statement on CS/SB 1128 was prepared by the Senate Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. It provided that: Section 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, defines "admissions" for sales and use tax purposes. Monthly fees of clubs with major facilities such as tennis courts, a swimming pool or a golf course have always been subject to the sales tax. During the 1990 Legislative Session this statute was amended to include dues on membership clubs providing physical fitness facilities, and not having these other major facilities. According to the DOR, such clubs have attempted to avoid payment of this tax by shifting a substantial portion of the members payments from dues to initiation fees which are not taxed. Accordingly, the purpose of the proposed statutory amendment was "to include initiation fees as well as dues in the definition of admissions." HB 2417 was passed by the House on April 17, 1991, and was sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. HB 2417 died in that Committee. CS/SB 1128 was passed by the Senate on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the House, where it died in messages. A separate bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523, which addressed similar issues to those addressed in HB 2417 and CS/SB 1128, was passed by the House on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the Senate where it was passed with amendments. The Bill was then returned to the House where further amendments were adopted. The Bill was again sent to the Senate with a request for the Senate to concur with the House amendments. The Senate refused to concur and the Bill was sent to a conference committee. The conference committee on finance and taxation met on April 19, 1991. The entirety of the discussion of the committee on this issue is as follows: Senator Jenne: The - - going down to number 21, admissions, initiation fees. The House includes capitalization fees. Representative Abrams: Which is this? Mr. Weiss: The Senate bill just states initiation fees are additionally included. The House bill, I believe, says that it's just all fees, which would include whether they called them initiation fees or capital facility fees or whatever. Representative Abrams: Because we are using something other than initiation - - Mr. Weiss: It's a fee that is going to be included. Representative Abrams: Yes, they were using - - they were breaking down categories of fees to avoid the tax, I think is what the deal was there. That gets us how much? Senator Jenne: Okay, well, it doesn't matter, because you can do it. Representative Abrams: Okay, good. Although the terms "capital facility fees" and "capitalization fees" were used during the discussion, contrary to DOR's assertion, it is far from clear that the intent of the amendment was to make taxable all capital contributions and assessments paid by members of private clubs providing recreational facilities. When placed in context with the prior debate before the committees and their staff analyses, it is much more likely that the intent was to close a loophole then used by physical fitness clubs who were renaming dues as fees in order to avoid taxes. The report of the conference committee was received by both houses on April 30, and CS/HB 2523 was passed by both houses the same day. The conference committee report for the bill contains only the following language describing the sales tax on admissions/initiation fees: Includes all recreational or physical fitness facility fees in the definition as admissions. The official conference committee report contains no reference to the terms "capitalization fees" or "capital facility fees." Neither does it make reference to the terms "assessment" or "paid in capital," which are the terms used by DOR in its rule. In the final bill analysis and economic impact statement prepared by the House Committee on Finance and Taxation for CS/HB 2523 on June 12, 1991, or 43 days after the bill was passed, the analysis states that subsection 212.02(1) was amended to include: "fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of admissions. All fees, including initiation fees and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities would be subject to the sales tax on admissions . . . This amendment should also limit further attempts to avoid taxation by renaming the fees collected from members. The staff analysis was obviously not available to members of the House or Senate when they voted on the bill on April 30, 1991. Although the final bill analysis used the term "capitalization fees," no where in any of the legislative history is there evidence of any legislative consideration of what was actually meant by that term. This is also true of the term "capital facility fees" which surfaced on one occasion prior to the passage of the bill. Capitalization Fees and Their Significance The sole basis for the DOR including the tax on assessments for capital improvements was the appearance in the legislative history of the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees." Neither term has any meaning to tax accountants. However, the accounting witnesses for both parties agreed that, from an accounting perspective, the phrase "capital facilities" would be understood to be assets having a life longer than one year. A capital contribution is typically a one time payment for the purchase of assets. It does not entitle the member to use the club. It is an equity transaction, not an income transaction, and it represents an intent to make an investment to improve the value of the membership assets separate and apart from the payment of annual expenses for the receipt of some service. "Dues" are a member's contribution to the operating costs of a club. They are assessed over an annual period and they are recurring. They also represent the payment that a member pays for admission to the organization. A capital contribution paid by a member of an equity membership club is not "dues." "Fees" as applied to a club are user charges. They are voluntary so that a member can decide whether or not to incur the charge based on whether the member uses the particular service to which it relates. A capital contribution is not a "fee."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to these proceedings, respondents Barry P. Rifkin and Flag Realty, Inc. were registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as brokers, and respondent Sandra Mae Rifkin was registered as a broker-salesman. Respondents caused to be placed in the yellow pages of a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company telephone directory for Hollywood a full page advertisement containing the words "Free Appraisals by Licensed Real Estate Appraiser". As noted above, all the respondents were registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission, but none were specifically licensed as appraisers by any governmental or regulatory agency regulating only appraisers. Bobby Glenn Johnson, who was a broker for Flag Realty, Inc. at the time the ad was placed, had received on December 1, 1971, a certificate from an instructor of the Broward County Public Schools, Division of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education, certifying that ,he had met the requirements of a 36-hour course of training in real estate appraising. Prior to November or December of 1974, respondent Barry Rifkin and one Arnold Savader each held a fifty percent interest in Broward Investment Company. The purpose of this company was to purchase from the owner derelict houses needing repair or houses going into foreclosure, fix them up and then resell them. It appears from the testimony that at the time houses were originally purchased by Broward Investment, respondent Rifkin was nothing more than a silent partner an investor who at times gave advice to Savader regarding the value of the property to be purchased. After the houses were repaired or restored by Savader, they were listed with Flag Realty, Inc. for resale. The homes purchased were put in Savader's name, and only Savader's name appeared on the Company's business card. It appears that prior to purchasing the homes and listing them with Flag Realty, all contact with prospective clients was done by Savader. A form of advertising used by Broward Investment Company was a door- hanger advertisement stating in part "No Brokers Involved (No Commissions)". There was no evidence that brokers' commissions were ever charged to the sellers.
Recommendation In consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the charges contained in the information based upon the offenses of misleading advertising be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of December, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact 1. Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1 provides: All docking facilities, whether for private residential single-family docks, private residential multi-slip docks, or commercial, industrial, or other revenue generating/income-related docks or public docks or piers, shall be subject to the following standards and criteria: no dock shall extend waterward of the mean or ordinary high water line more than 500 feet or 20 percent of the width of the waterbody at that particular location whichever is less; * * * Pursuant to stipulation, Petitioner has standing, a dock, and upland access to his property. The parties also stipulated that Petitioner's dock is limited by the 500-foot criterion, as the proposed dock extension would not exceed 20 percent of the width of the waterbody. Petitioner's upland property consists of a single family residence and is located adjacent to sovereign submerged lands located in the Gasparilla Island/Charlotte Harbor Aquatic Preserve. He has lawfully constructed a dock extending about 500 feet from the mean high water mark and into the waters of Charlotte Harbor. The consent of use granted Petitioner acknowledges the relative shallowness of the water adjacent to his property and correspondingly limits the draft of vessels to be moored to the dock. At mean low tide, the depth of the water at the end of Petitioner's dock is about two feet. Petitioner requested authorization to extend his dock waterward another 100 feet. On December 15, 1993, Respondents denied the request, in reliance upon the challenged rule and Section 258.42(3)(e)1, which allows the erection in an aquatic preserve of private residential docks for "reasonable ingress and egress of riparian owners." In a separate administrative proceeding, DOAH Case No. 94-2140, Petitioner is contesting the denial of his request to extend the dock. No single family docks in aquatic preserves extend over 500 feet into the water. In Charlotte Harbor, the average length of a single-family residential dock is 200 feet. Nearby Petitioner's dock is a 600-foot long public fishing pier, which was constructed before the subject 500-foot rule was promulgated. From mean high water waterward, the first habitat surrounding Petitioner's dock is an intertidal sand flat that extends about 100-150 waterward from shore. The next habitat is mostly unvegetated submerged bottom with patches of submerged aquatic vegetation that extends from the end of the intertidal sand flat to about 350-400 feet from shore. The vegetation of the latter habitat is mostly Cuban shoal grass, which occurs in no more than four patches of about 50 square feet, in an area measuring 25 feet in both directions from the dock. Last, extending from 350-400 feet waterward to the end of the dock, is a largely unvegetated area with sporadic pieces of attached algae. Unvegetated bottoms play no role in the propagation of fish or wildlife. The biological or scientific value of unvegetated bottoms is unaffected by a dock, although there is some evidence that toxic substances may leach from the construction materials and adversely impact nearby vegetation. However, the dredging caused by boat propellers scouring any form of submerged bottom suspends sediment that can be carried to areas of vegetated bottom, where the increase in turbidity may reduce the penetration of sunlight and thereby harm the aquatic vegetation. In the vicinity of Petitioner's dock, though, there is no evidence of significant prop dredging from recreational boating. The absence of submerged vegetation is more likely a feature of the high-energy shoreline where wave energy disrupts sediments and provides unsuitable habitat. In promulgating the predecessor to Rule 18- 20.004(5)(a)1, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund attempted to balance interests that sometimes are competing, such as environmental, aesthetic, recreational, and private commercial. There was some concern that previously authorized docks in sovereign submerged lands had infringed upon the riparian access of adjacent upland owners. The 500-foot limitation was not in the original rule, which was promulgated in 1981, but was added by an amendment in 1985. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund tried to set thresholds that would not result in the denial of more than a negligible number of dock applications, based on historic dock application data and predominant vessel lengths of under 27 feet. However, the record does not explain how the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund analyzed the above-described data so as to arrive at the 500-foot limitation now under challenge. Without providing more detail concerning the data and analysis, it is possible that a limitation of 100 feet or 900 feet would have satisfied the considerations stated in the preceding paragraph. Shallow water predominates in the aquatic preserves, and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund realized that a dock extending no more than 500 feet might not reach water depths that are readily navigable. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund could not rationally adopt a rule to ensure minimum water depths for all docks, and chose the 500-foot limitation evidently to provide an easy-to-administer standard.
The Issue The issue is whether ten applications filed by Petitioner, Normandy Shores, LLC, for an exemption from Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) requirements to construct and install ten docks to serve eighteen private boat slips and a letter of consent to use sovereign submerged lands in Indian Creek, within the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve (Preserve), Miami Beach, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: Background The Department is the agency responsible for administering the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes,2 regarding activities in surface waters of the State that may or may not require an ERP. Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3) authorizes the Department to approve exemptions from ERP requirements for the construction of certain docking facilities and boat ramps. In addition, the Department has authority from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund to review and take final agency action on Petitioner's requests for proprietary authorizations. Petitioner is a developer of residential and commercial properties. It owns waterfront land on the eastern side of Normandy Isle at 25-135 North Shore Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. Normandy Isle is surrounded by water, lies just west of Miami Beach, and is accessed by the John F. Kennedy Causeway (also known as 71st Street or State Road 934), which runs between the Cities of Miami and Miami Beach. Normandy Waterway runs in an east-west direction through the center of Normandy Isle, while Indian Creek appears to generally run in a northwest-southeast direction between Normandy Isle and Miami Beach. (Petitioner's property is on the northern half of the island.) Both of these waterbodies are in the northern portion of the Preserve, a Class III and Outstanding Florida Water. The Preserve is a body of water that stretches the length of Miami-Dade County, essentially from Broward County to Monroe County. The property adjoins Indian Creek to the east (the long side of the parcel) and Normandy Waterway to the south (the short side of the parcel) and is situated at the intersection of those two waterways. Petitioner is currently developing the property as Privata Townhomes (Privata), a luxury townhome community. Petitioner holds title to the property and a portion of submerged lands of Indian Creek and Normandy Waterway. The boundaries of the privately-owned submerged lands are accurately depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 12. The Privata development comprises a total of forty- three, single-family townhomes in seven buildings. Eighteen townhomes are being constructed as waterfront homes along Indian Creek (buildings 1, 2, and 3). Seven are being constructed as waterfront homes along Normandy Waterway (building 4), while the remaining eighteen townhomes (buildings 5, 6, and 7) are not situated on waterfront property. Each waterfront parcel is approximately eighteen linear feet wide and consists of both upland and private submerged lands. The private submerged lands facing Indian Creek run the entire length of the property and extend approximately ten feet from the shoreline. On October 1, 2007, Petitioner filed with the Department ten applications for an exemption and letter of consent to construct ten docks (docks 1 through 10) and eighteen boat slips. The proposed docks will be located on the shoreline extending into Indian Creek and the Preserve. Docks 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 will serve two slips each, or a total of sixteen slips, while docks 3 and 7 will project outward from one single- family parcel each and will be wholly-owned by that respective single-family parcel owner. All of the docks will be spaced less than sixty-five feet from one another. According to Petitioner, the Department has already given Petitioner authorization to construct three docks for the units in Building 4 facing Normandy Waterway to the south, and they are not in issue here. The basis for that authorization, and the distinction between those docks and the ones in dispute here, are not of record. Each of the docks will be built using four pilings with forty square feet of decking. Therefore, each dock will be less than five hundred square feet of surface area over the surface waters. Associated with the docks are eighteen boat slips that will include an additional pile installed approximately thirty feet from the shoreline. The slips and docks are exclusively for the private use of, and will be owned by, the waterfront townhome owners. The eighteen non-water townhome parcel owners will not have any rights to submerged lands owned in fee simple by the purchasers of the waterfront townhomes or the right to use any slip or dock. This is confirmed by Article II, Section 1 of the Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Privata Town Homes at Miami Beach (Declaration of Covenants). There have been docks and vessel moorings at the project site for at least forty years. However, the docks do not qualify for automatic grandfathering because a grandfather structure application was never submitted to the Department, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.0081. After reviewing the applications, the Department issued its Notice of Intent on December 13, 2007, as later amended on September 13, 2008, denying all ten applications. Citing Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), the Department asserted that "the proposed docks are part of a multi-family living complex and therefore must be a minimum of 65-ft. apart in order to qualify for the exemption." As to the letter of consent, the Department asserted that based upon the upland development at the site, the proposed docks constituted a private residential multi-family dock or pier, as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.003(44). In addition, the Notice of Intent stated that the proposed docks fell within the definition of a "commercial/industrial dock," as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.004(7), and therefore they required a lease (rather than a letter of consent) in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18- 18.006(3)(c). Thus, the Department takes the position that an ERP and a lease are required before the docks may be constructed. The parties have raised no issues regarding riparian rights. By an amendment to its Notice of Intent issued on September 13, 2008, the Department added as a reason for denying the letter of consent that the docks will cause unacceptable cumulative impacts on the Preserve within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.008. The Development Each townhome occupies three stories of vertical, independent space. No unit is situated over any other unit. Each townhome has a separate entrance through its own front door, and each has its own garage. The townhomes in each building share a single wall. Petitioner stated that this was done because if the units were constructed with a narrow space between them, it would create safety, fire, water moisture, and mold issues. However, there is no cross-access between the units, and there is no penetration (such as common plumbing, fire sprinklers, or electrical conduits) through the load-bearing walls. Even so, the units have various common structural elements such as bearings, bearing walls, columns or walls necessary to support the roof structure, and siding, finish, trim, exterior sheatings (coverings), and other exterior materials. There is a common area that runs the entire length of shoreline between the buildings and the water. Within the common area there is a seawall, sidewalk, pool, and grassy area that are accessible by any member of the Privata Homeowners' Association (Association). According to the Declaration of Covenants, the Association is responsible for painting the exteriors of the buildings, including the walls, doors, and windows; maintaining and repairing the docks and seawalls; and maintaining the common areas. Members who own docks will pay a higher fee to the Association than non-waterfront owners to offset the additional costs associated with maintaining and repairing the docks. Eighteen of the waterfront townhome parcels are currently under purchase and sale agreements. The boat slips were one of the main selling features of the waterfront townhomes. In fact, the sales are contingent on the docks being constructed, and Petitioner concedes that if the docks are not built, the buyers will not be required to close on their contracts. In its Privata marketing brochures, Petitioner refers to "private boat docks" and owners having "a private boat slip right in their own backyard" that is "[a]ble to accommodate vessels up to 40 feet." It is fair to infer from the evidence that the docks were used as a major inducement for customers to purchase the waterfront parcels. Exemption from an ERP Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)4. provides in relevant part that no permit shall be required for (b) The construction of private docks of . . . 500 square feet or less of surface area over wetlands or other surface waters for docks which are located in Outstanding Florida Waters. . . . To qualify for this exemption, any such structure: * * * 4. Shall be the sole dock constructed pursuant to this exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet, unless the parcel of land or individual lot as platted is less than 65 feet in length along the shoreline, in which case there may be one exempt dock per parcel or lot. For the purposes of this paragraph, multi-family living complexes and other types of complexes or facilities associated with the proposed private dock shall be treated as one parcel of property regardless of the legal division of ownership or control of the associated property. . . . (Emphasis added) Under the rule, an applicant will not qualify for an exemption from permitting requirements if the upland structure of a project site is a multi-family complex or facility. In those cases, the owner of the project site is allowed to construct one dock per sixty-five feet of shoreline (assuming the size of the dock comports with the rule). The rule specifically provides that the legal division of ownership or control of the property is not relevant in making this determination. The underscored language in the rule is at the heart of this dispute. The parties sharply disagree over whether the Privata development consists of single-family units or whether it is a multi-family living complex. Although the term "multi- family living complexes and other types of complexes or facilities" is not further defined by the rule, the Department has consistently (with one exception cited below) interpreted this provision to include buildings with so-called "attached townhomes." Because the Privata townhomes share a wall with a neighbor, as well as other common facilities, the Department considers each building on the uplands to "house multiple families." Put another way, multiple families will live in each structure (building). On the other hand, if the units were detached and free-standing, even by a few inches, the Department agrees they would probably fall within the category of "individual, detached, single-family homes." The greater weight of evidence supports a finding that the upland project is a multi-family living complex. This is because the project has the attributes of a multi-family complex, such as units sharing a common wall, multiple families living in each building, and common areas accessible for each member of the project. While Petitioner points out that each townhome owner has fee simple title to his or her upland parcel and the ten feet of adjoining submerged lands, the rule specifically provides that the division of ownership and control of the property is immaterial to the ultimate determination of whether the property qualifies for an exemption. Given these considerations, it is found that the project does not meet the requirements for an exemption from ERP requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)4.3 Letter of Consent A letter of consent is a form of authorization, but does not by itself determine whether a project is approvable or not.4 In order to qualify for a letter of consent, the docks would first have to be exempt from ERP requirements. As noted in finding of fact 20, they are not. The "18 series rules [in the Florida Administrative Code] are proprietary, essentially, real estate rules" that apply to the use of state owned, submerged lands. (Transcript, page 370). General guidance or "overarching" submerged lands rules are found in Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-21, while rules specific to the Preserve are found in Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-18. Both sets of rules apply here. The dispute over the letter of consent centers on whether the dock is a "private dock" or a "commercial/industrial dock," as those terms are defined by the rules. The former does not require a lease, while the latter does. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.006 (3)(c)("A commercial/industrial dock on sovereignty lands shall require a lease. Private docks to be constructed and operated on sovereignty lands shall not require a lease of those lands.") A private dock is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.004(18) as a dock located on or over submerged lands, which is used for private leisure purposes for a single family dwelling unit and does not produce income. On the other hand, a commercial/industrial dock is defined in subsection (7) of the same rule as a dock which is located on or over submerged lands and which is used to produce income, or which serves as an inducement to renting, purchasing, or using accompanying facilities including without limitation multi-family residential facilities. This term shall be construed to include any dock not a private dock. Therefore, a dock may constitute a commercial/ industrial dock if it is associated with a multi-family facility; if it is used as an inducement to rent, purchase, or use accompanying facilities; or if the dock does not constitute a private dock, which is used for a single-family upland facility. The more persuasive evidence here shows that the docks are associated with a multi-family facility; they are used as an inducement to purchase the units; and they are not used for a single-family upland facility. For any one of these reasons, then, the docks must be categorized as commercial/ industrial docks. Although the term "multi-family residential facilities" is not specifically defined in Chapter 18-18, another proprietary rule provides clarification of that term. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(44). That rule defines the term "private residential multi-family dock or pier" as a dock or pier on a common riparian parcel or area that is intended to be used for private recreational or leisure purposes by persons or groups of persons with real property interest in a multi-family residential dwelling such as a duplex, a condominium, or attached single-family residences or a residential development such as a residential or mobile home subdivision. (emphasis added) As noted earlier, both Chapters 18-18 and 18-21 should be read in conjunction with each other. When doing so, it is found that the proposed docks are associated with "attached single-family residences" (by virtue of sharing a common wall) and fall within the definition of a commercial/industrial dock. Therefore, they do not qualify for a letter of consent. Cumulative Impacts The waterbody in issue here is an Aquatic Preserve, that is, "an exceptional area of submerged lands and its associated waters set aside for being maintained essentially in its natural or existing condition." § 258.37(1), Fla. Stat. The Legislature intended for the submerged lands and associated waters to be maintained "in an essentially natural condition so that its biological and aesthetic values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations." § 258.397(1), Fla. Stat. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.001(1). "Essentially natural condition" is defined as "those conditions which support the continued existence or encourage the restoration of the diverse population of indigenous life forms and habitats to the extent they existed prior to the significant development adjacent to and within the preserve." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.004(10). In determining whether a letter of consent for new docks and piers in the Preserve should be approved, Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.008 requires that the Department consider the cumulative impacts of those projects. The burden rests on the applicant to provide reasonable assurances that the project will not cause adverse cumulative impacts upon the natural systems. In meeting this stringent test, the rule recognizes that "while a particular alteration of the preserve may constitute a minor change, the cumulative effect of numerous such changes often results in major impairments to the resources of the preserve." The rule goes on to identify five factors that the Department must consider as a part of its cumulative impact evaluation. In this case, the Department considered "the number and extent of similar human actions within the preserve which have previously affected or are likely to affect the preserve"; the "similar activities within the preserve which are currently under consideration by the Department"; and the "[d]irect and indirect effects upon the preserve which may reasonably be expected to result from the activity." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.008(1), (2), and (3). The fact that the Department discussed only the first three considerations, rather than all five, in its Amended Notice of Intent does not render its evaluation improper or incomplete, as suggested by Petitioner.5 If authorized, the project will allow eighteen boats to dock at Privata along Indian Creek. Although the marketing brochures indicate that boats up to forty feet in length will use the slips, the evidence at hearing indicates that they will be no more than twenty-five feet in length. The project adheres to best management practices. Also, the number of docks was limited by means of dock-sharing for eight of the ten docks. The docks are designed so that boats will be moored parallel to the shoreline rather than horizontal to the seawall; the docks will be over six feet above mean high water; and the docks will be constructed from materials designed to minimize environmental impacts. As noted above, the Preserve extends from Broward County to Monroe County. Within the Preserve, there are literally thousands of docks, including single docks, multifamily docks, and commercial and industrial marinas. Closer to the Privata project, there are docks, boat lifts, cranes, davits (small cranes used for boats, anchors, or cargo), and marinas located on both sides of Indian Creek. The development along Indian Creek and Normandy Waterway includes commercial, multifamily, and single-family docks. Due to heavy boat traffic and extensive development around Indian Creek, it is fair to say that the project is in a high turbidity area. Besides the applications here, there are "several" other applications now pending before the Department for docks, piers, and slips within the Preserve. Two in-water environmental resource surveys by the Department revealed that resources such as paddle grass, Johnson's grass (a threatened species), shoal grass, turtle grass, manatee grass, soft coral, sponge, oysters, and sea urchins are present in the immediate area. However, it is fair to infer that these marine resources have adapted to the existing conditions and are able to withstand the stress created by the heavy usage. The evidence is sharply in dispute over whether the project is reasonably expected to have direct or indirect adverse impacts on the natural systems of the Preserve. Petitioner contends that because a small number of docks and slips are being proposed, best management practices will be used in constructing the docks and slips, the area around Indian Creek is already heavily developed, and the natural resources in Indian Creek appear to have adapted to the stress created by the other activities, the effect on the Preserve's natural systems will be de minimus. There are literally thousands of similar activities and human actions that have already affected the Preserve and are reasonably expected to continue in the future. Other applications to engage in similar activities are now pending, and it is reasonable to assume that others will be filed. The natural resources in the immediate area are diverse, as described by the Department witnesses, including at least one threatened species. There will be direct and indirect impacts that are reasonably expected to occur from the docks and mooring areas such as increased shading and decreased water quality. When the impacts of the Privata project are viewed in isolation, they can be considered "a minor change." However, the cumulative effect of this and other changes can result in adverse impacts to the natural systems. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 18.008. The more credible evidence supports a finding that the proposed activities will cause direct and indirect adverse impacts on the Preserve's natural systems, so that the submerged lands and associated waters will not be maintained "essentially in [their] natural or existing condition." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.001(1). Therefore, in this respect, the requirement of the rule has not been met. Other Projects in the Preserve Petitioner points out that in June 2001, as later modified in April 2002, another project in the Preserve known as Aqua at Allison Island was given an exemption to construct fifteen single-family docks, nine of which were intended for private use and six to serve as shared structures for adjacent property owners. See Petitioner's Exhibits 28 and 29. The project site lies just south of Normandy Isle on Allison Island, which adjoins Indian Creek and involved a similar upland development of attached townhomes. While the Department concedes that this action occurred, no other project of this nature has ever been granted an exemption or letter of consent to construct docks and use state-owned submerged lands within the Preserve. The Department further explained that it "made an error" when it granted an exemption for the project at Aqua at Allison Island, and that with this single exception, it has consistently denied all similar applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Petitioner's ten applications for an exemption from ERP requirements and a letter of consent to use sovereign submerged lands to construct ten docks and associated slips on Indian Creek in Miami Beach, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2009.
The Issue Whether recording a claim of lien by a registered real estate broker for the purpose of collecting a commission pursuant to an exclusive listing contract violated the provision of Section 475.42(1)(j)?
Findings Of Fact Robert F. Tully is a registered real estate broker holding Certificate #0090289 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Robert F. Tully, on April 24, 1975, entered into a 30 day exclusive listing contract with James and Joyce Deede to find a purchaser for their residence located at 4150 Rector Road, Cocoa Beach, Florida. This contract was to continue in effect after the end of the 30 day period but could then be terminated on 10 day written notice. The Deedes were unable to produce any evidence of having given 10 day written notice and the Respondent and his agents denied having received written notice of cancellation of the contract. On August 21, 1975, Mr. DeVaughn Bird, a registered real estate broker, personally contacted the Deedes to inquire about selling their house for them. At that time the property had a Tully "FOR SALE" located on it, but Bird did not contact Tully or his associate sales personnel. The Deedes advised Bird that the exclusive sales contract with Tully was no longer valid and gave Bird an open listing. On August 23 and 24, 1975, Bird showed the subject property to Richard and Diane McClure at which time the Tully sign was still located on the property. A contract for sale and purchase was negotiated by Bird between the Deedes and McClures, and a closing date set. Because of difficulties, the closing was delayed and a new contract executed on October 15, 1975 for a November 7, 1975 closing. Following the execution of the initial contract, Bird put his own "SOLD" on the property. Tully became aware of the sale by Bird, and contacted Bird advising him of the existence of his exclusive listing contract, and his expectation to participate in the commission. Bird informed Tully that he would not share a commission and that Tully would have to look to the Deedes for any commission due him. The Deedes refused to acknowledge Tully's claim for any commission or share thereof. At this point, Tully sought the advice of his attorney. Tully's attorney advised him that Tully's contract was in full force and on the basis of the attorney's opinion law applicable to the situation, Tully was entitled to file an equitable lien against the property. Tully, based on his attorney's advice, authorized his attorney to negotiate a settlement if possible; and, if that failed, to file an equitable lien on the property. Negotiations were unsuccessful and on October 30, 1975, just prior to closing, Tully's attorney filed a claim of lien for real estate commission in the amount of $3,314.50 with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Brevard County, Florida, and this was recorded in OR Book 1570 at Page 349 of the official records of that county. Copies of, the claim of lien were also served on the closing agent for the sale of the property. The Deedes, as a result of the claim of lien, directed the closing agent to pay Tully one half the amount claimed, or $1,175.00, when Bird agreed to drop his commission from 7 percent to 5 percent of the selling price of $47,000. Having received payment of $1,175.00, Tully had the claim of lien immediately satisfied, which satisfaction may be found in OR Book 1572 at Page 115 of the Public Records of Brevard County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission direct Robert F. Tully to repay the $1,175.00 to the Deedes within 30 days, said period to be extended if the Deedes cannot be located, or face immediate suspension for 30 days; further, said repayment shall not act as a bar to any action by Robert F. Tully against the Deedes based on his contract with them. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward L. Stahley, Esquire Goshorn, Stahley & Miller Post Office Box 1446 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact The Defendants, Barry Shelomith and Isaac Shelomith, son and father, respectively, were, during times material to the allegations filed herein, registered with the Commission as real estate salesmen with Alan Leavitt, a registered real estate broker, who maintains offices at 1110 N.E. 163rd Street, Suite 345, Miami Beach, Florida 33162. Defendant Barry Shelomith sometimes identifies himself as a "Mr. Barry", also being publicly known by such pseudonym, and Defendant Isaac Shelomith sometimes identifies himself as "I.B. Shelly" and is also publicly known by that pseudonym. During the period between March 15, 1975 and November 15, 1975, the Defendants, Barry Shelomith and Isaac Shelomith, jointly and/or severally and for their own accounts or for the accounts of others, negotiated the sale of a number of platted, unimproved lots located in a subdivision near DeFuniak Springs in Walton County, Florida and identified as Country Club Heights, Northeast, in Plat book 3, Page 21, Walton County, Florida. In negotiating for the sale of the lots, the Defendants placed various ads in Florida newspapers as an inducement for sale. Typical of such ads is the following: OWNER SACRIFICE Seven Mobile and Camping lots on Spring Lake. Boating, fishing, swimming. Electricity, water available. Only $375 each lot. Cash only. Call Owner, 931-1809 after 6 PM for appointment. (See Commission's Exhibit #6). Donald Vesey and his wife Jeanette Vesey purchased two lots from the Defendants based on an inducement prompted by a newspaper ad cause to be published by the Defendants. Mr. Vesey testified that Isaac Shelomith advised him that the lots were easily accessible; that owners could drive to their lots and that the lots were platted and that electricity and water was available. The Veseys were given warranty deeds for the lots during early April, 1975, and thereafter they attempted to see the lots during a visit to Defuniak Springs. The Veseys stated that they were unable to see the lots because they are "completely surrounded by privately owned property and there is absolutely no access to this property". However, the adjoining land owner, a Mr. Strickland, showed them approximately where their property was situated and was further able to show them that their property was "land-locked". Mr. Vesey testified that there were no access roads to the property and that the surrounding area is heavily wooded. (See Commission's Exhibits 3 & 4). Cynthia and Charles Derditsch, husband and wife, also purchased a lot from Defendant, Barry Shelomith, who advised that the property was accessible to the lake and Mr. Derditsch, based upon this representation, considered the property to be a good investment. Carl and Francis Milam also purchased property from the Defendants which was located in Walton County. Mrs. Milam testified that Isaac Shelomith told her the lot sizes were approximately 25 by 150 feet, however, she testified that she later learned that the property was smaller. Mrs. Milam's testimony in this regard is unspecific inasmuch as she could not either confirm or deny the lot sizes because she did not view the property and her husband had no recollection of the transaction involving the purchase of the property. George A. Torrence, also purchased a lot from the Defendants which he was unable to see because there was no easy access. He went to Spring Lake, the adjoining property, and the land owner, Mr. Strickland denied his access. To the best of his recollection, he testified that a Mr. Astor, who accompanied Defendant Barry Shelomith, made all the representations regarding the amenities of the property. Defendant Barry Shelomith told him that he represented Miami Sunshine, Inc., an active Florida Corporation to which he (Torrence) tendered the purchase price for the property. His testimony is that Barry Shelomith advised that his uncle, Ben Mione, was President of Miami Sunshine, Inc. (See Commission's Exhibit #12). Mr. Torrence also recalled that the property was represented to be 50 by 100 feet whereas in actuality it only measured 25 by 100 feet. Barry Shelomith testified that there were two means of access to the property in question. One mean was through the adjoining landowner's property and the other is through the use of a heavily wooded area off State Road #183. He testified that the plat map which was provided to all prospective purchasers was given them (the Defendants) by Budget Systems, Inc., the former owner and that the plat map was certified by a licensed surveyor. He denied any intent to defraud prospective purchasers by using the pseudonym "Mr. Shelly" instead of his last name which means "peace" in the Jewish community. He testified that by utilization of the word "Shalom" would possibly hinder his sales efforts outside the Jewish community. He denied any attempt to conceal his last name and admitted that he was not registered with the Commission as being employed by anyone other than his then registered broker, Alan Leavitt. He further admitted that the pseudonym "Shelly" was not registered with the Commission. While he admitted to directly selling the property of an owner while having his license registered with the Commission through broker Alan Leavitt, he saw no violation in this instance inasmuch as the property was owned by his uncle. He opined that this was permissible inasmuch as an owner was free to sell less than 49 parcels and secondly that the property owner in question here was a blood relative i.e., his uncle.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED as follows: That the Defendant, Barry Shelomith, registration with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman be suspended for a period of two (2) years. That the Defendant, Isaac Shelomith, registration with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman be suspended for a period of two (2) years. That the complaint in all other respects be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of March, 1977. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Morgentaler, Esquire 1600 NE Miami Gardens Drive Greater Miami Beach, Florida 33179 Bruce I. Kamelhaire, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
