The Issue Whether Respondent, when he voted April 18, 2002, as a member of the Palm Beach Gardens City Commission, on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, relating to Parcel 6 and Parcel 24, respectively, of the Mirasol development project, knew that these measures would inure to the special private gain or loss of a principal by whom he was retained and thereby violated Section 112. 3143(3), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the public hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the factual stipulations set forth in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Each of the "Sabatello construction companies" referred to in the parties' Stipulations of Fact 3 and 4 was wholly owned by Carl Sabatello and his brothers Paul, Theodore, and Michael Sabatello (Sabatello Brothers), with each brother owning an equal (25%) share of the company. Of these companies, only one, Sabatello Development Corporation IV (SD IV) was involved in the Mirasol Project. SD IV has been in continuous existence since its formation in or around the 1980's. Carl Sabatello serves as its president, "oversee[ing] all [of its] functions." SD IV is a Subchapter S corporation. As such, its profits are passed through to the Sabatello Brothers, its four shareholders, in equal amounts. Respondent is a certified public accountant. Since 1989, through his accounting firm, he has provided tax preparation services to SD IV and the Sabatello Brothers. His firm has derived "anywhere from 15 to 25%" of its total income from the monies received for providing these services. Before establishing his accounting firm in 1989, Respondent was SD IV's chief financial officer and one of its shareholders. Taylor Woodrow Communities (Taylor Woodrow) was the master developer of the Mirasol Project. Taylor Woodrow's Craig Perna had "overall responsibility for every aspect of the [Mirasol] development" project, including the "selection of builders." The builder selection process started with Mr. Perna getting the names of "prominent builders in the Palm Beach Gardens market" having "excellent reputation[s]" and then contacting them to inquire as to their interest in participating in the Mirasol Project. Carl Sabatello was among those Mr. Perna contacted. He was contacted (by telephone) in mid-May of 2000, and advised Mr. Perna he was "very interested" in having his company, SD IV, considered for selection as a builder in Mirasol. SD IV, was one of at least ten or 12 builders vying to be selected to participate in the Mirasol Project. Over a period of approximately eight months (from mid-May 2000, to mid-January 2001), Taylor Woodrow requested and obtained from SD IV and from the other would-be participants in the project (Other Builders) information and documents in order to evaluate these builders' qualifications for selection. In the latter part of 2000, prior to any selection having been made, Carl Sabatello requested the Palm Beach Gardens City Attorney, Leonard Rubin, Esquire, "to provide a [written] legal opinion as to [Mr. Sabatello's] obligation to abstain from voting in [his] official capacity on matters relating to Mirasol that come before the [Palm Beach Gardens] City Council." In response to Mr. Sabatello's request, Mr. Rubin prepared a written memorandum, dated December 5, 2000, which was provided, not only to Mr. Sabatello, but to all members of the Palm Beach Gardens City Council, including Respondent, as well as to the Interim City Manager. The memorandum read as follows: You have indicated that the Sabatello Companies, of which you are a principal, is currently in negotiations with the developers of the Mirasol Planned Community District ("PCD") to become a builder of homes within that community. Your activities as a builder would be limited to specific parcels or pods within the PCD. You asked this office to provide a legal opinion as to your obligation to abstain from voting in your official capacity on matters relating to Mirasol that come before the City Council. Voting conflicts for members of the City Council are governed by section 112.3143, Florida Statutes. Subsection (3)(a) provides that a municipal officer shall not vote in an official capacity on any measure that "would inure to the special gain" of the officer, a principal by whom the officer is retained, or a relative or business associate of the officer. According to the state Ethics Commission, the determination of whether the officer receives a special private gain is based upon the size of the class of persons affected by the vote at issue. The Mirasol PCD encompasses a variety of residential, commercial, recreational and community uses. The residential uses range from low density single family homes to high density multi-family apartments. It is anticipated that your company's activities will be limited to the construction of single family dwellings within a specific, identifiable parcel for which a site plan has already been approved. Because of this limited involvement, there does not appear to be any requirement that you abstain from every vote relating to the approval of plats, parcels and site plans within the entire Mirasol PCD. See CEO 85-62 (city council member not prohibited from voting on rezoning of property within a large redevelopment area where member's corporation owns a parcel of land within the same area). By way of example, the City Council's approval of the site plan for the fire station or the plat for Jog Road in no way inures to your or your company's special private gain. You would, however, be required to abstain from any additional votes relating to the specific parcels or pods within the community in which your company possesses or acquires an interest by virtue of a contractual relationship with the master developer. Where a conflict of interest exists, you are required to state the nature of your interest prior to the vote and file a voting conflict memorandum with the City Clerk, within 15 days. The existence of a voting conflict does not necessarily require you to abstain from all discussion relating to the matter (although you are free to do so). If you plan to participate in discussion of a matter in which you know you have a conflict, you must file a written conflict memorandum before the public meeting. You have also expressed concern that upon learning that your company will be building homes within Mirasol, members of the public may perceive a conflict of interest in all matters relating to Mirasol. To avoid the appearance of impropriety, it would be appropriate to make the following disclos[ure] prior to any vote: "While it is anticipated that the Sabatello Companies will be building homes within Mirasol, the matter before the City Council does not concern the areas in which such construction will take place and is wholly unrelated to any interest held by me or my corporations." Should you have any questions or be in need of additional information, please do not hesitate to contact this office. In January of 2001, Taylor Woodrow selected SD IV to build on Mirasol Parcel 4.3 It sent Carl Sabatello a letter dated January 22, 2001, advising him of the selection, along with a Parcel Builder Agreement and Exclusive Agency Brokerage Agreement for Mirasol Parcel 4. These agreements were fully executed in February of 2001. Sometime thereafter SD IV began building on Mirasol Parcel 4. SD IV was one of first builders to start construction in Mirasol. SD IV eventually purchased all 46 lots in Mirasol Parcel 4, constructing homes on each. All of the homes it built were sold. On or about October 18, 2001, at Respondent's request, Mr. Rubin prepared and distributed to Respondent and the other members of Palm Beach Gardens City Council a written memorandum designed to provide "clarification and confirmation from [the City Attorney's] office regarding a Council Member's obligation to vote on an item before the City Council." In this memorandum, Mr. Rubin made the following points: A council member must vote in the absence of a voting conflict or conflict of interest. Section 28[6].012, Florida Statutes, requires a member of the City Council, who is present at a meeting, to vote on an item before the Council unless there is, or appears to be, a conflict of interest or voting conflict pursuant to the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. * * * A voting conflict arises when the vote inures the Council member's own special private gain or loss of the special private gain or loss of the Council member's principal, family member or business associate. * * * The special private gain to the Council member depends on the size of the class of persons affected and is fact-specific. * * * The special private gain to the Council member must be direct and proximate. * * * In the event of a voting conflict, a Council member must disclose the nature of the conflict and abstain from voting. Mr. Rubin's memorandum "reinforced what [Respondent] already knew about the law." On April 18, 2002, the Palm Beach Gardens City Council voted on and passed two measures concerning the Mirasol Project, one, Resolution 54, 2002, dealing with Mirasol Parcel 6 (a 10.11 acre site within the development), and the other, Resolution 57, 2002, dealing with Mirasol Parcel 10 (a 14.6-acre site within the development). As the summary statement on its first page reflects, Resolution 54, 2002 was: A resolution of the City Council of the City of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, providing for the approval of a site plan to allow for the development of 41 semi-custom homes, known as Mirasol Parcel 6, located within the Mirasol Planned Community District (PCD), as more particularly described herein; providing for conditions of approval; providing for waivers; providing for severability; providing for conflicts; and providing for an effective date. Section 5 of the resolution granted the following waivers: From Section 78-498 of the LDRs, to permit a 45-foot wide right-of-way. The code requires a minimum right-of-way width of 50 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a minimum lot width of 60 feet. The code requires a minimum width of 65 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit lot coverage of 50%. The code requires a maximum lot coverage of 35%. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a building side setback of 3 feet 1 inch on a "zero" side and 6 feet 11 inches on a "non-zero" side. The code requires a minimum side setback of 7.5 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a screen/accessory side setback of 3 feet 1 inch on a "zero" side and 5 feet on a "non-zero" side. The code requires a minimum side setback of 7.5 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a screen/accessory rear setback of 3 feet. The code requires a minimum setback of 10 feet. As the summary statement on its first page reflects, Resolution 57, 2002 was: A resolution of the City Council of the City of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, providing for the approval of a site plan to allow for the development of 26 custom homes, known as Mirasol Parcel 10, located within the Mirasol Planned Community District (PCD), as more particularly described herein; providing for conditions of approval; providing for waivers; providing for severability; providing for conflicts; and providing for an effective date. Section 5 of the resolution granted the following waivers: From Section 78-498 of the LDRs, to permit a 45-foot wide right-of-way. The code requires a minimum right-of-way width of 50 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit lot coverage of 45%. The code requires a maximum lot coverage of 35%. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a building/screen side setback of 10 feet. The code requires a minimum side setback of 12 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit an accessory structure setback of 5 feet. The code requires a minimum side setback of 12 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a screen/accessory rear setback of 3 feet. The code requires a minimum setback of 10 feet. The "waivers" that were granted by Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002 were from the requirements of the Palm Beach Gardens Code that Taylor Woodrow, or whichever builder(s) it subsequently selected to build on the affected parcels, would otherwise have to meet. At the April 18, 2002, Palm Beach Gardens City Council meeting, Carl Sabatello orally announced to those in attendance, including Respondent, that he was going to abstain from voting on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, explaining that he was involved in discussions regarding the possible purchase of the two parcels that were the subject of these measures. At the time of the vote on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, although he may have been aware of the investment Mr. Sabatello's company had made in Mirasol Parcel 4, Respondent had no knowledge of any connection that Mr. Sabatello or his company may have had with Mirasol Parcel 6 and Mirasol Parcel 10 other than what Mr. Sabatello had told the audience at the meeting about the matter. As far as Respondent knew, neither Mr. Sabatello nor his company owned or had a contract to purchase Mirasol Parcel 6 or Mirasol Parcel 10. Respondent did not attempt to engage Mr. Sabatello in conversation or otherwise seek to find out more about the discussions Mr. Sabatello had referred to in his abstention announcement. Respondent did, however, consult with the Palm Beach Gardens City Attorney to determine whether or not he should vote on the resolutions. Respondent "knew [that the law required him] not to vote [on] things that a client had an interest in," but, based on what Mr. Sabatello had said at the meeting, he believed that Mr. Sabatello was merely "in a discussion phase" regarding the acquisition of an interest in Mirasol Parcel 6 and Mirasol Parcel 10 and that there had not been any agreement reached on the matter. He therefore voted on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, consistent with the advice that the Palm Beach Gardens City Attorney had given. Approval of the site plans for Mirasol Parcel 6 and Mirasol Parcel 10 (which the passage of Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, respectively, accomplished) was needed before any permits for building on those two parcels could be obtained. Mr. Sabatello, on April 18, 2002, filled out a voting conflict form (Form 88, Memorandum of Voting Conflict) explaining why he did not vote on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002. On the form, he indicated that these votes "inured to the special gain of Sabatello Development Corp, IV, Inc, by whom I am retained," and then added that this "company," of which he was "an officer and owner[,] [was] in the process of negotiating [the] purchasing of Pod 6 & Pod 10." At the time he cast his votes for Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, Respondent was "not privy" to the contents of Mr. Sabatello's completed voting conflict form. On April 30, 2002, 12 days after the votes on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, SD IV entered into an agreement with Taylor Woodrow to purchase all of the lots in Mirasol Parcel 6. It closed on lots 10, 11, 32, and 33 on September 25, 2002, and on the remaining lots in the parcel on January 3, 2003. SD IV built a home on every lot it purchased in Mirasol Parcel 6, and it sold every home it built. SD IV received a contract to purchase Mirasol Parcel 10, but it never executed the contract and therefore never acquired an interest in the parcel.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a public report finding the evidence presented at the public hearing in this case insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent violated Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting at the April 18, 2002, Palm Beach Gardens City Council meeting on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, and dismissing the complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent Garrison's license as a real estate broker and Respondent Arbree's license as a broker-salesman should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 475, F.S., as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated December 22, 1980. This proceeding commenced with the filing of an Administrative Complaint by the Department of Professional Regulation on December 22, 1980 alleging that Respondents Gary D. Garrison and Joseph M. Arbree had violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes in connection with a 1977 real estate transaction wherein Respondents allegedly failed to disclose to the seller that purchaser Respondent Arbree was a licensed broker-salesman and that Respondent Garrison had, or would have a financial interest in the property upon its purchase. The Respondents requested an administrative hearing on the charge and filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that Petitioner lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the cause in that there had been no lawful compliance with the provisions of Section establishment of any fiduciary relationship between the Respondents and the seller of the property in question, and that Petitioner had not complied with the motion was reserved until argument was presented at the final hearing. At that time, the motion was denied for reasons which will be set forth in the Petitioner forwarded the Request for Hearings to this Division on July 1, 1981 and hearing was set for September 17, 1981. On August 27, 1981, Petitioner Oklahoma on September 9, 1981. Respondent filed objections to the said notice, together with a Motion For Protective Order, claiming that the notice period was depositions outside the State for use at trial. Respondent sought either to have the notice "stricken" or that a protective order be entered to require deposition or, alternatively, that the deposition testimony not be allowed in evidence at final hearing. The motion was denied by the Hearing Officer on At final hearing on September 17, 1981, Petitioner announced that the deposition of McNickle, an indispensable witness, had not yet been received. deposition as a late-filed exhibit, a continuance was granted until November 23, 1981, to permit receipt of the deposition and to afford Respondents an its taking in Oklahoma. Although the parties were afforded the opportunity to file Proposed herein, no post-hearing submissions have been filed.
Findings Of Fact times material to the complaint was registered as a real estate salesman with Investment Equity Corporation, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Respondent Joseph he was associated with Investment Equity Corporation during the times material to the allegations in the Complaint. (Testimony of Respondents) acre unimproved lots in a development called Palm Beach Country Estates located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The purchase price of each lot was telephoned Respondent Garrison and they thereafter had several telephone conversations which led to the sale of the three lots to Respondent Arbree. The found that Respondent Garrison's version is more credible. In the initial conversation, McNickle advised Garrison of his ownership of the three lots and to inspect the lots and advise him as to the distance to electrical power, the type of roads adjacent to the lots, and whether the lots were corner lots. and that he was interested in trying to get his money back from the company. There was no mention of the value of the lots or of listing the property for sale. Garrison inspected the lots and, in a subsequent telephone conversation with McNickle, informed him that the nearest electrical power was approximately 1-3/4 miles from the lot locations, that they were on a dirt road, and that none were corner lots. He also informed him that the lots were approximately fifty percent under water during the rainy season. During this conversation, Garrison told McNickle that he had an "associate" with Investment Equity who sometimes purchased such lots. McNickle asked him to see if he could obtain an offer on the lots. Garrison then asked Respondent Arbree if he desired to purchase the lots, and the latter agreed if he could obtain financing for the purchase. Arbree asked Garrison if there was a listing on the property and Garrison told him that there was not. The reason for this inquiry was that Arbree had in the past frequently made personal purchases of real estate and had disclosed his status as a real estate salesman on such contracts when the property was listed with a broker. A question had arisen in his office as to when licensed real estate personnel should disclose their status to sellers when buying on their own account. Arbree had resolved this question in his mind some time previously by telephoning the legal office of the Florida Real Estate Commission and receiving information from someone there that it was not necessary to make such disclosure if the property was not listed with a real estate office. (Testimony of Respondents, McNickle (Deposition-Petitioner's Exhibit 3), Petitioner's Exhibit 4-1, Respondents' Exhibits 1-4) On February 28, 1977, Respondent Arbree executed a deposit receipt contract whereby he agreed to pay McNickle $15,000.00 for the three lots. The contract originally provided for a $500.00 deposit evidenced by Arbree's promissory note to be held in trust by the Investment Equity Corporation, but this was later deleted by the parties at the request of McNickle, and a $500.00 check as deposit was placed in the Investment Equity Corporation Trust Account on March 10, 1977. The check was drawn on the account of J. V. Company and signed by both Respondents. J. V. Company was simply a bank account established by Arbree and Garrison sometime prior to the McNickle transaction to serve as a depository for funds which were generated through sales for their private account. Both signatures were required for issuance of checks. Originally, the funds in the account were exclusively those of Arbree and these were the funds used for the deposit and subsequent mortgage payments to McNickle. (Testimony of Respondents, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4-5, 4-9, 5) The deposit receipt contract was executed by Melvin F. McNickle and his wife on March 10, 1977. The contract provided that "The buyer hereby recognizes Investment Equity Corporation by separate agreement as the broker in this transaction". This provision made reference to the fact that in cases where associates of Investment Equity Corporation purchased property in their own name which was not listed with the firm, the firm broker did not require payment of any commission. On the other hand, if an associate sold his own property, whether or not listed with Investment Equity Corporation, office policy required that he pay the firm a three percent commission for overhead, escrow maintenance, and the like. The commission was payable directly to the company and not shared with any of the associates. McNickle did not enter into a listing contract with the firm nor did he pay a real estate commission on the sale. The real estate transaction closed on August 1, 1977. Warranty deeds, dated July 26, 1977, for each of the three lots were issued by McNickle to Arbree. (Testimony of Respondents, Brown, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4-3, 4-4, 4- 5) Garden lots and is familiar with the selling price places the top value on choice lots of $8,000.00 in 1977, and $4,000.00 to $5,000.00 if fill was Shortly after Arbree had contracted with McNickle for the sale of the lots, Arbree told Garrison that if the lots could be resold at a profit, he McNickle contract had been entered into, another associate at Investment Equity Corporation told Garrison that he had a prospect looking for vacant land, and prospect, Carl Doty, was contacted by Garrison and, on March 17, 1977, a contract for sale and purchase was entered into between Arbree and Doty for the Investment Equity Corporation as the broker and agreed to pay a commission of three percent of the gross sales price to the firm. This was in accordance with minimum commission for processing a sale of property owned by the associate. Garrison did not receive a commission on the sale, but did receive one half of Arbree. Warranty deeds were issued to Doty by Arbree on August 24, 1977. The proceeds of the sale were placed in the J. V. Company bank account. (Testimony This case was originally docketed in the Florida Real Estate Commission in September, 1978, but was not investigated until December, 1979. A prior to comply with the notice provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (Testimony of Stephens) Petitioner's proposed disciplinary action against both Respondents is predicated upon their alleged failure to disclose to the seller of the lots in Petitioner, and that Respondent Garrison had or would have a financial interest in the said property upon its purchase. The said nondisclosure is alleged to trick or device, breach of trust", and that thereby each Respondent "has aided, assisted or conspired with another in furtherance thereof, all in violation of subsequently reenacted and renumbered (Subsection 475.25(1)(b), F.S. (1981)), the provisions of the cited ground for disciplinary action have remained the penalties. The evidence in this case falls short of the standard required under (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), i.e., that in a proceeding which "may result in the loss of a valuable business or professional license, the critical matters at issue must Here, the fact that the real property in question was not the subject of a listing contract with Respondents' firm, Investment Equity Corporation, raises commission was paid to Respondent Garrison or to the firm by the seller, nor was any expected. Respondents and their broker treated the transaction as a private Respondents misled McNickle in any respect. Garrison made it clear at the outset that Arbree was his associate in the firm and was acting in his own behalf. The circumstances demonstrate that Garrison was acting as a gratuitous "middle man" for the benefit of both parties. The offer of Arbree, which was accepted by McNickle, was not unreasonable in the light of the location of the lots and other relevant considerations bearing on market value. The evidence shows that the McNickle lots were purchased solely with Arbree's funds, even though the checks issued for the deposit and several mortgage payments were drawn on the "J. V. Company" account which had been used in a limited fashion in the past by both Respondents in real estate ventures. No competent evidence was presented to show that Respondent Garrison had acquired a financial interest in the Arbree-McNickle transaction. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that subsequent purchaser Doty was made known to Garrison as a prospective purchaser of the lots only after the purchase contract between Arbree and McNickle had been executed, and that Respondents had not agreed to split any profits in a resale until that time. It is undoubtedly true that if Investment Equity Corporation had had a broker-principal fiduciary relationship with McNickle, the duties resulting therefrom would have also been imposed upon Garrison as a salesman, and he would have been obliged to disclose to McNickle the circumstances concerning his subsequent interest in the resale to Doty. This was not the case, however, and no such duty can be found in the light of the existing circumstances. Although it is recognized that a registrant can violate Subsection 475.25(1)(a), F.S. (1977) for dishonest conduct in a business transaction for his own account, as well as for such conduct in which his only interest is as a broker (or salesman) Sellars v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 380 So.2d, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the evidence here is insufficient to so characterize Respondents' conduct. It is therefore concluded that Petitioner has failed to establish that Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(a), F.S. as alleged. Although the foregoing conclusion renders it unnecessary to deal with Respondents' various claims concerning Petitioner's failure to accord them procedural rights in the prehearing process, it is considered that the amendment to Section 120.60(6), F.S. by Chapter 81-180, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1981, renders any defense based on the prior Section 120.60(6)(1979) no longer available. Additionally, Respondents' contentions that this proceeding is barred by the statute of limitations applicable to criminal prosecutions or by statutory laches are not well founded. Finally, Respondents did not establish any failure of Petitioner to comply with the applicable provisions of Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, in processing this case.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Board of Real Estate dismiss the allegations against Respondents Gary D. Garrison and Joseph M. Arbree. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1982. Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 45 Southwest 36th Court Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 611 North Pine Hills Road Orlando, Florida 32808 Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Executive Director Florida Board of Real Estate Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action and, if so, whether Respondent Stuart Yacht Corporation is entitled to the General Permit which the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) intends to issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 4 in St. Lucie Settlement, a subdivision in Stuart, Florida. The subdivision has one border along the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. The subdivision has a finger fill that extends to the South Fork with canals on both sides. There are four lots on the finger fill, Lots 1 through 4 of the subdivision. Lot 4 is farthest from the river. On the north side of Petitioner’s property he has a dock where he keeps a boat. The dispute in this case involves the canal on the south side of Petitioner’s property. All references to “the canal” hereafter, unless otherwise noted, will be to the canal on the south side of Lot 4. Between Lots 2, 3, and 4 and the canal is a road which provides access to the lots on the finger fill. Between the road and the canal is a narrow strip of land. Petitioner owns this narrow strip of land where it corresponds with his lot lines. In other words, the southern boundary of his Lot 4 abuts the canal. However, because the canal is artificial, having been created by dredging, Petitioner has no riparian rights associated with the canal. That was the holding of the circuit court for Martin County in the litigation between Stuart Yacht Corporation and Petitioner. It was also established in the circuit court litigation that St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., which is the homeowner's association for the subdivision, owns the northern half of the canal and Stuart Yacht Corporation owns the southern half of the canal. No subdivision documents were presented to show the extent of rights granted to homeowners within St. Lucie Settlement related to the construction of docks or other uses of water bottoms that are included within the subdivision. Petitioner testified that he terminated his membership in the homeowners association three-and-a-half years ago. Stuart Yacht Corporation owns and operates a marina on the south side of the canal which includes docks over the water. At some point in the past, but before Petitioner purchased Lot 4 in 1995, Stuart Yacht Corporation constructed a dock along the north side of the canal, over the water bottom owned by St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. The dock along the north side of the canal has been used for mooring large yachts. The portion of the dock that ran along the boundary of Lot 4 was recently removed by Stuart Yacht Corporation following the rulings in the circuit court. The balance of the dock along the north side of the canal would be removed as a part of the proposed permit that Petitioner has challenged. In addition to removing the dock along the north side of the canal, the proposed permit authorizes Stuart Yacht Corporation to construct a new dock that is four feet wide and runs 150 feet along the property boundary in the center of the canal. No part of the proposed new dock would be on the property of St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., did not challenge the proposed permit. In his petition for hearing, Petitioner alleged that the proposed new dock would cause the following injuries to his interests: interference with ingress and egress to Petitioner’s shoreline; interference with Petitioner’s desire to obtain a permit in the future to construct a dock or to “harden” the southern shoreline; and interference with Petitioner’s riparian rights. Petitioner’s testimony about his past use of the canal was inconsistent. He said he moored his boat in the canal once in 1995. He said he boated into the canal to fish on several occasions. He said that (at least twice) when he attempted to enter the canal by boat, he was denied access by representatives of Stuart Yacht Corporation. However, in a deposition taken before the hearing, Petitioner said he had never attempted to use the canal. The only testimony presented by Petitioner to support his claim that the proposed permit would interfere with his navigation, fishing, and desire to obtain a dock permit in the canal was the following: I couldn’t get a boat in there with that proposed dock in the center line of the canal right on their side of the canal. It would be 150 feet long. It would be a huge Wall of China. My neighbor and I couldn’t get to our shoreline. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to navigate into the canal in a small boat or to fish in the canal if the proposed dock is constructed. The evidence was also insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to construct any kind of dock for any kind of watercraft if the proposed dock is constructed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department dismiss the petition for hearing based on Petitioner's failure to prove standing, and issue the proposed permit to Stuart Yacht Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul B. Erickson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Amanda Gayle Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Office of the General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Stop 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Guy Bennett Rubin, Esquire Rubin & Rubin Post Office Box 395 Stuart, Florida 34995
Findings Of Fact Talbott and Drake, Inc. is and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker corporation. William F. Talbott is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Paul P. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Helen C. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. On or about January 18, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated a contract for sale and purchase between the High Ridge Water Company -- John H. McGeary, Jr., sellers, and William Montaltos and Genevieve L. Montaltos, his wife, buyers, for the purchase of lot in a new housing area known as River Forest in the Boca Raton area, Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is received into the record pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, was subject to the declarations of restrictions filed by High Ridge Water Company as seller on June 28, 1976, wherein, in Paragraph 7, the developer retained the right to approve or disapprove the plans and specifications for the construction of any structure, building, fence, wall or sign in the River Forest area. A copy of said declarations of restrictions is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. As a part of the restrictions and provisions of the contract, the purchasers, Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, were required to use a builder selected from a list of designated builders, approved and designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and the High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos decided to build on the subject property and contacted numerous builders designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. to submit the bids for the construction of a home on the property. On or about June 9, 1976, the McGeary partnership, as developer of the River Forest area, entered into a joint venture agreement with Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., whereby Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. purchased lots in the River Forest area and agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on all homes constructed on said lots by Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. in the River Forest area. A copy of said joint venture agreement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 recites on the first page of said agreement as follows: WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, by that certain Purchase Agreement intended to be executed this date, BUILDER (Group Six Collaborative, Inc.) is agreeing to purchase certain real property as set forth herein, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1; . . . (emphasis added) WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of forming a joint venture for the purpose of finan- cing, constructing and selling single family residences upon the property described in Exhibit 1; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the pro- mises and of the mutual covenants of the parties hereto, and for other good and valuable considera- tion, the parties agree as follows: 9. BROKER. The parties agree that TALBOTT AND DRAKE, INC., a Florida real estate brokerage corporation, shall have an exclusive listing agree- ment with BUILDER, as owner and joint venturer, for the sale of residences to be constructed pursuant to this Agreement, a copy of which Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. As a commission for their services, which shall include but not be limited to, advertising, manning model houses, showing receiving of deposits, qualifying prospects, assisting in obtaining financing for purchasers, they shall receive five percent (5 percent) of the pur- chase price, according to the provisions contained in Exhibit 2. The joint venture agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is clearly limited to houses to be constructed on the lots purchased from the McGeary partnership. The agreement does not constitute an agreement to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the construction cost of any custom home built by one of the designated builders on a lot purchased by an individual. When Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos received the bid statement from Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. there was noted thereon: "Add Real Estate Commission as per Talbott and Drake contract." A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 4 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Although Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos were informed that Talbott and Drake, Inc. was to be paid a ten-percent commission by the seller on the sale of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, they were at no time informed directly by the Respondents that the builders on the "approved list" were required to pay a five-percent commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc., nor that the said five- percent commission would be passed on to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos when they contracted with an "approved" builder to construct a home on the subject property. On or about February 4, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated the contract for sale and purchase between High Ridge Water Company, as seller, and Donald James Kostuch and Mary Louise Kostuch, his wife, buyers, for purchase of a lot in the River Forest area of Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 5 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch were required by the contract to select a builder from an approved list of designated builders approved and supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and seller, High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch selected Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. from the list supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. had an agreement with the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. similar to that outlined in the joint venture agreement between the McGeary partnership in Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., Petitioner's Exhibit 3, whereby Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on any residence that Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. built in the River Forest area. The bid supplied by Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. on March 7, 1977, to Talbott and Drake, Inc. contained a listing of real estate commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc. in the amount of $3,652. A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 6 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. The Kostuchs were advised of a five-percent fee to be paid by the builder by a salesman working for another broker who first introduced the Kostuchs to the real property in River Forest. The salesman advised the Kostuchs prior to their entry into the contract for the purchase of the lot in River Forest in which they agreed to limit their choice of builder to one approved by the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. This disclosure would be sufficient to comply with the provisions of Rule 21V-10.13, Florida Administrative Code, because the fee was revealed by a salesperson involved in the transaction prior to the execution of the contract under which the favor, if any, was granted. Talbott and Drake, Inc., in addition to performing services as listing agent for the sale of homes in River Forest, also functioned as the prime developer in this project pursuant to an agreement with High Ridge Water Company and the McGeary partnership. Regarding the Montaltos' transaction, the limitation of the owners to the use of one of the approved builders constitutes the granting or placement of favor, because it narrows the competition to one of five builders out of all the builders available in the Fort Lauderdale area. The affidavits introduced indicate that, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement, the designated builders had agreed to pay to Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the cost of construction of any custom home as compensation for the efforts of Talbott and Drake, Inc. in developing the property. While compensation for these services is reasonable, it still constitutes a fee to be paid Talbott and Drake, Inc. from one of the five designated builders who would benefit from the contract. The potential adverse effect of this arrangement was to transfer a cost generally allocated to the cost of the lot to the cost of the house. Therefore, people shopping for a lot could be misled in the comparison of similar lots in different subdivisions in the absence of being advised of the fee to be paid by the builders to Talbott and Drake, Inc. However, the evidence shows no attempt to keep this fee a secret and thereby mislead buyers. The existence of such a fee is referred to in sales literature prepared by Talbott and Drake, Inc. The Kostuchs were advised of the fee by a participating salesman for another real estate company. The builders set out the fee as a separate cost item as opposed to absorbing it in general costs within their bids. While the Respondents could not produce evidence that the Montaltos' had been advised of the existence of the fee, and the Montaltos' testified that they had not been advised, this appears to be an isolated incident as opposed to a course of conduct. Notwithstanding proof of the above, no evidence is presented that the Montaltos' contracted with a designated builder to build their house, and that a designated builder paid a fee to Talbott and Drake, Inc. To the contrary, the testimony of William Talbott was that the Montaltos' had breached the terms of their contract regarding the use of a designated builder.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a letter of reprimand to Talbott and Drake, Inc. which, in fairness to the Respondents, should set out the specifics of the violation and to further apprise other registrants of the potential dangers of such fee arrangement. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles M. Holcomb, Esquire 653 Brevard Avenue Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Whether either Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 475, Florida Statutes,1/ regulating real estate sales associates, as alleged in the administrative complaints, and if so, what sanctions are appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Commission, created within the Department, is the entity charged with regulating real estate brokers, schools, and sales associates in the State of Florida. The Division of Real Estate is charged with providing all services to the commission under chapters 475 and 455, Florida Statutes, including recordkeeping services, examination services, investigative services, and legal services. In 2006, Ms. Linda Fiorello and Ms. Catherine Lichtman, associates at another brokerage, decided to open up their own real estate business, with each owning a fifty-percent share. They created Luxury Realty Partners, Inc. (“the corporation”), a licensed real estate corporation in the State of Florida. While Ms. Lichtman was initially the qualifying broker, she soon stepped down from that position and a series of other individuals served as brokers for the corporation. Neither Ms. Fiorello nor Ms. Lichtman was licensed as a real estate broker at any time relevant to the Administrative Complaints. The corporation sold, exchanged, or leased real property other than property which it owned and it was not an owner-developer. On April 23, 2010, Mr. Brian Davis was added as the sole officer and director of the corporation, and he became the qualifying broker. At all times material to the complaints, Ms. Fiorello and Ms. Lichtman were licensed as real estate sales associates in the State of Florida, Ms. Fiorello having been issued license number 659087 and Ms. Lichtman having been issued license number 3170761. They worked together at the corporation, nominally under the direction, control, and management of Mr. Davis. The corporation did not maintain an escrow account. Mr. Davis did not manage any of the corporation’s bank accounts. He was not a signatory on the operating account. He did not collect brokerage commissions or distribute them to sales associates. He testified he went into the office “maybe once, once or twice a month.” When he agreed to become the qualifying broker for the corporation, he did not even know all of the names of the agents he was supposed to be responsible for. Mr. Davis stated: Well, basically, I was just doing a favor and I was – I put my license there until one of the other two could get their Broker’s license. I was just really stepping in for a short term to – to fill the time frame until one of them could get their Brokerage license, and I didn’t go on any management or any other books or anything of that nature. As Ms. Patty Ashford, one of the sales associates testified, Mr. Davis was seldom in the office. Ms. Ashford would turn in her contracts to Ms. Fiorello or Ms. Lichtman, who would review them. Ms. Ashford testified that her commission checks were then paid by checks signed by Ms. Lichtman. In short, Mr. Davis effectively provided no direction, control, or management of the activities of the corporation or its sales associates. In December of 2009, Ms. Jennie Pollio was living at 10861 Royal Palm Boulevard in Coral Springs, Florida (the property), a Section 8 property that she had been renting from Mr. Jimmy Laventure for about nine years. The property was in foreclosure. Ms. Pollio thought that she might be able to buy the property. She consulted Ms. Victoria Guante, a real estate sales associate with Luxury Realty Partners, Inc. Ms. Pollio knew Ms. Guante because they both had sons who played baseball on the same team. Ms. Guante told Ms. Pollio to get $40,000.00 in cashier’s checks and put it in escrow with Luxury Realty Partners, Inc., so that she could make a strong offer and show that she really had the money. Although they were not produced as exhibits at hearing, Ms. Pollio testified that she signed a couple of different contracts for the property in early 2010. On or about April 29, 2010, Ms. Guante accompanied Ms. Pollio to the bank to get cashier’s checks. Ms. Pollio received five Bank of America cashier’s checks made out to “Luxury Partner Realty,” four in the amount of $9000.00, and one in the amount of $4000.00. Ms. Pollio understood that the property could be purchased for a total of $40,000.00, which included $37,000.00 for the property, and the balance in closing costs. The cashier’s checks were not given to a broker. Ms. Pollio gave the $40,000.00 to Ms. Fiorello as a deposit on the property when she met with her in the corporation office on State Road 7. Ms. Pollio made a copy of the cashier’s checks and Ms. Fiorello wrote a note on the bottom of the copy, “Received by Linda A. Fiorello for Luxury Escrow deposit on contract 10861 Royal Palm Blvd Coral Springs FL 33065” and gave it back to Ms. Pollio.2/ Although the payee name on the cashier’s checks was transposed, Ms. Pollio gave the checks to Ms. Fiorello as agent of the corporation as a deposit on the property, and Ms. Fiorello accepted the checks on behalf of the corporation for the same purpose. Ms. Fiorello did not advise Mr. Davis that the checks had been received. Instead, she deposited the checks in an account formerly belonging to Luxury Property Management, an entity unaffiliated with Luxury Realty Partners, Inc.3/ Luxury Property Management had never been a licensed real estate brokerage corporation, and was no longer in existence, as it had been dissolved. The account had never been properly closed. The account usually had a low balance. Just prior to the deposit of Ms. Pollio’s money, the balance was $10,415.15. Ms. Lichtman had no ownership or interest in Luxury Property Management, but she was aware of the account. The corporation did not have an escrow account, and the Luxury Property Management account was sometimes used to hold money “in escrow,” as Ms. Lichtman was aware. As he testified, Mr. Davis knew nothing about this account and did not authorize Ms. Fiorello to place Ms. Pollio’s deposit there. Ms. Fiorello’s contrary testimony that she told Mr. Davis of the transaction and had his authorization was not credible and is rejected. Ms. Guante was negotiating for the property on Ms. Pollio’s behalf. She testified: At that point the guy was asking (unintelligible) I think was sixty-five, and then we made the offer for $40,000.00. The guy came back and say “no,” and then we went back and make another offer for $50,000.00, and then by that time the guy still say “no.” And then her and I get into an argue because baseball game that don’t have nothing to do with the real estate and then she decided she don’t want me no more as her agent. Ms. Guante called Ms. Fiorello and told her that Ms. Pollio didn’t want to work with Ms. Guante anymore. Ms. Fiorello told Ms. Guante not to worry about it, that the corporation would handle the transaction for Ms. Pollio. On September 23, 2010, a check in the amount of $40,000.00 was written from the Luxury Property Management, LLC, account to Luxury Realty Partners. It is undisputed that the hand writing on the “amount” and “pay to the order of” lines on the check was that of Ms. Lichtman, while the signature on the check was that of Ms. Fiorello. This check, posted into the corporation’s operating account the same day, along with a check for $6000.00, left a balance of only $684.15 in the Luxury Property Management, LLC, account. The two sales associates gave completely different explanations for the check. Ms. Fiorello testified that she always left one or two signed checks locked in the office when she was out of town. She testified that only she and Ms. Lichtman had keys to the lock. Ms. Fiorello testified that without her knowledge, Ms. Lichtman had removed a signed check and filled in the top portion. She testified that although it was her account, she did not realize that the money had been removed until around May 2011, some eight months later.4/ On the other hand, Ms. Lichtman testified that on numerous occasions, the two associates would write out checks together, and that in this instance they discussed the transfer in connection with the opening of a Rapid Realty real estate office in New York which involved Ms. Fiorello’s son. Ms. Lichtman testified that she filled out the top portions of the check, and Ms. Fiorello then signed it. Ms. Lichtman testified that the $40,000.00 “represented monies coming back into Luxury Realty Partners from Rapid Realty.” Ms. Lichtman did not explain why funds from Rapid Realty to repay a loan from Luxury Realty Partners would have been deposited into the Luxury Property Management account, and records for the Luxury Property Management account do not reflect such deposits. On November 4, 2010, a little over a month later, Ms. Lichtman transferred $40,000.00 from the corporation operating account into an account for Chatty Cathy Enterprises, an account controlled by her, and inaccessible to Ms. Fiorello. Ms. Lichtman’s explanation for these transfers, that the $40,000.00 came from the New York real estate venture in repayment of a loan made from the corporation, was unpersuasive, and is rejected. First, the only documentary evidence of a loan made to the “start-up” was an unsigned half-page note dated April 30, 2010. That document indicated that an interest-free business loan in the amount of 25,000 would be made from the corporation to “Rapid Realty RVC and its owners” and that re- payment of the loan would be made in monthly payments to the corporation. No amount was specified for these payments. Similarly, there was no evidence of any repayment checks from Rapid Realty to Ms. Fiorello, Ms. Lichtman, or the corporation. A document dated November 5, 2010, purports to be a “formal release” of that loan. It states in part: The above stated note lists a dollar amount of $25,000 dollars which is inaccurate. The total balance of the loan was approximately $48,000 dollars that was loaned by Luxury Partners Realty (sic), Catherine A. Lichtman and Linda A. Fiorello. This is the formal dollar amount of the loan that is considered paid and satisfied in full. This release appears to be signed by Ms. Lichtman and Ms. Fiorello. Even assuming that the loan had been repaid in full by the New York venture (although no corporation account deposits indicate this), it is not credible that Ms. Lichtman believed she was personally entitled to a payment of $40,000.00 for repayment of a $48,000.00 loan made by the corporation. The spreadsheet of itemized expenses of the New York office and offered by Ms. Lichtman as proof of amounts loaned has no apparent correlation to a spreadsheet prepared by Ms. Lichtman purporting to show checks and cash amounts transferred to New York.5/ In January 2011, Ms. Teresa Ebech, the listing agent for the property with First United Realty, took another contract for the Royal Palm property to Ms. Pollio. This contract referenced a $40,000.00 deposit and listed “Luxury Property Mgt. Escrow” as the escrow. This contract indicated a total purchase price of $55,000.00, and called for a February 21, 2011, closing date. Ms. Pollio signed the contact. The closing did not occur. Ms. Pollio decided to stop trying to buy the property and get her money back. No other party ever acquired an interest or equity in the deposit. Ms. Pollio had difficulty getting in touch with Ms. Fiorello about getting her money back. When Ms. Pollio finally was able to ask Ms. Fiorello for a return of her deposit, Ms. Fiorello did not return it, but told Ms. Pollio that she should get it from Ms. Lichtman. On or about April 28, 2011, Ms. Pollio, with help from her friend, Ms. Joyce Watson, prepared a letter to cancel the contract. The letter noted that the $40,000.00 had been in escrow for over a year and stated that due to the inability of Luxury Realty Partners to close on the property, Ms. Pollio requested immediate return of the deposit. The letter was sent to Catherine Lichtman at the Luxury Realty Partners, Inc., address. Ms. Lichtman’s testimony that she never received the letter is discredited. Ms. Ashford, another real estate sales associate at the corporation, had never met Ms. Pollio, but was in the Luxury Realty Partners, Inc., office one day in May of 2011 when Ms. Pollio came in with her husband. Ms. Ashford testified: She came in with her husband pretty much screaming and yelling from the minute she stepped foot in the door. She was very angry, very upset. I looked at her and said, you know, Ma’am please calm down. She said I’m not calming down. She pointed at Cathy, she said she knows exactly why I’m f’in here. This has nothing to do with you. Ms. Lichtman asked Ms. Ashford to call her husband, which Ms. Ashford did, thinking this was unusual because he never had anything to do with what went on at the office. Ms. Pollio yelled at Ms. Lichtman, and Ms. Lichtman yelled back, each becoming more and more agitated. Ms. Lichtman then left the room and locked the door. The police were called, though Ms. Ashford was not sure if it was Ms. Pollio or her husband, or perhaps Ms. Lichtman’s husband, who called them. Ms. Ashford testified that when the police officer arrived, Ms. Lichtman lied and told him that her name was Victoria. The officer tried to calm both parties, and told them it was a civil matter. The police officer finally persuaded Ms. Pollio and her husband to leave. Ms. Ashford testified as follows about the conversation that took place between Ms. Lichtman and Ms. Ashford after Ms. Pollio left: Q What did you say? A I asked her point blank what the hell was going on and she responded. Q What did she respond? A That yes, she had her money. The money was-– Q When you said her money. What-–what are talking about? A She had Jennie’s money. Q She-- A It was a deal, a transaction. “She came into our office with cash coming out of her boobs and I don’t have to give it back.” Were her words. Q Did you tell Cathy that she had to return the money? A Yes, I did. I said “Cathy, its escrow money, it doesn’t matter where she got it from,” and Cathy went on about “it’s illegal she’s a dancer, she’s on Section 8. I’m going to report it to the IRS. She thinks she buying a f’in house.” Ms. Lichtman’s admission to Ms. Ashford after Ms. Pollio left showed that Ms. Lichtman knew that she had money in her possession that had been given by Ms. Pollio to buy a house. Ms. Ashford testified that she was upset, as an agent with the corporation, about what appeared to be going on. She and Ms. Fiorello met with Mr. Davis in April of 2011. Ms. Fiorello told Mr. Davis that Ms. Lichtman had stolen funds. Mr. Davis reviewed the January contract that Ms. Fiorello gave him, and concluded that it didn’t make much sense. He had not given any authorization to place escrow funds into the Luxury Property Management, LLC, account. He did not have access to that account or to any of the corporation’s operating accounts to determine if money was missing. After the meeting, Mr. Davis asked Ms. Lichtman what she knew about the accusation. Ms. Lichtman denied that she took any money from an escrow account. Mr. Davis called the Florida Real Estate Commission and reported the incident. At some point, Ms. Lichtman advised Ms. Pollio that the cancellation letter was not sufficient, and provided Ms. Pollio with a “Release and Cancellation of Contract for Sale and Purchase” form. Mr. Laventura signed the form in June 2011, and Ms. Pollio signed the form when she returned it to Ms. Lichtman at the Luxury Realty Partners, Inc., office. The form released Luxury Partner Realty from liability and indicated that the escrow agent should disburse all of the $40,000.00 deposit to Ms. Pollio. At the time of the final hearing, Ms. Pollio had yet to receive her $40,000.00 deposit back. The testimony and documentary evidence in this case clearly demonstrates a recurring and systematic disregard of the legal entities and procedures intended to provide structure and accountability to business and real estate transactions by both Ms. Fiorello and Ms. Lichtman. Ms. Fiorello and Ms. Lichtman employed a qualifying “broker” for the corporation, but intentionally assumed the responsibilities of that position themselves during the time relevant to the Administrative Complaints. In doing so, they each operated as a broker without being the holder of a valid and current active brokers’ license. No evidence was introduced at hearing to indicate that the professional license of either Ms. Fiorello or Ms. Lichtman has ever been previously subjected to discipline.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that final orders be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission: Finding Linda Fiorello in violation of sections 475.25(1)(k), 475.25(1)(d), 475.42(1)(d), 475.42(1)(a), 475.25(1)(b), and 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and imposing an administrative fine of $10,000.00, reasonable costs, and revocation of her license to practice real estate; and Finding Catherine A. Lichtman in violation of section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing an administrative fine of $1000.00, reasonable costs, and revocation of her license to practice real estate. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, John's Island Club, Inc. (petitioner or the club), is a not-for-profit corporation which owns and operates a private country club facility in the John's Island residential development in Indian River County, Florida. It provides a variety of recreational facilities to its members. Among the amenities are three golf courses, nineteen tennis courts, a tennis building, a beach club, a club house, a swimming pool, and dining facilities. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is a statutorily created agency charged with the administration of the state revenue laws, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated thereunder. As a result of an amendment made in 1991 to Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, DOR is authorized by law to impose an admissions tax on "dues and fees" paid to private membership clubs providing recreational facilities. As a private membership club, petitioner is subject to this tax. Beginning on July 1, 1994, petitioner made an assessment on each member to raise capital for the purpose of repairing and replacing many of its physical facilities. During the six month period ending December 31, 1994, $10,441,897 was collected from the members and made available to the club. Rule 12A- 1.005(d)1.b., Florida Administrative Code, which was adopted by DOR in December 1991 to implement the admissions tax on dues and fees, imposes a tax on "(a)ny periodic assessment (additional paid-in capital) required to be paid by members of an equity or non-equity club for capital improvements." Under the authority of that rule, DOR required that petitioner pay the applicable sales tax on the assessment collected through December 31, 1994, or $730,932.79, and that it continue to pay the tax as other similar assessments are made in the future. Claiming that the rule exceeds DOR's grant of rulemaking authority, and it modifies, enlarges, and contravenes the law implemented, petitioner filed a petition for administrative determination of invalidity of existing rule. DOR denies all allegations and asks that the validity of its rule be upheld. The Club and the Assessment The composition of the club The club began operation in 1969 but was purchased by its members in 1986. It is an equity private membership club but issues no stock. The club has two types of memberships: golf and sports social. Currently, the cost of a golf equity membership is $85,000 while the cost of a sports social membership is $30,000. After payment of these fees, the member receives a membership certificate, which represents his or her equity ownership interest in the club. At the present time, there are 1125 golf memberships and 257 sports social memberships. Of the 1125 golf memberships, the original developer still owns 67. In addition to having to purchase a membership, members must also pay annual dues. A golf member pays $4,875 in annual dues while a sports social member pays $2,760 in annual dues. A sales tax is also collected on these dues. The dues are used to cover operating expenses such as insurance, administrative costs, staff salaries, and maintenance costs. In addition, members pay fees for additional services such as golf cart use, golf bag storage, locker room use, and golf and tennis lessons. When a member decides to resign or retire from the club, he or she may resell the membership to the club (but not a third party) and receive the greater of (a) the initial amount paid by the retiring member, or (b) 80 percent of the current membership cost (with the remaining 20 percent retained by the club in a separate capital improvement account). The assessment In 1992, the club began studying the feasibility of repairing and replacing many of its physical facilities. The total cost of the proposed work was set at $16,372,000. By majority vote taken in the spring of 1994, the members decided to raise capital for the work by imposing a capital assessment on each current member. It was agreed that the capital contribution would be $12,000 from each golf member and $11,150 from each sports social member. However, the payment of the capital contribution was not intended to, and did not result in any, decrease in the dues which members were required to pay for the use of the club's facilities. A failure to pay the assessment would result in suspension from the club. Three different options were made available to the members for the manner of payment of the capital contribution. The options included (a) a single payment, (b) payment over a three-year period, or (c) payment of interest only until such time as the member either sold the membership or left the club. After making payment in full, the member would be issued a certificate of capital contribution. It is noted that the developer was required to pay the capital contribution for his 67 golf memberships. Further, any person joining the club after the imposition of the assessment would likewise be required to pay the assessment. Beginning in July 1994, the club began collecting the capital contribution from its members. From July through December 1994, some $10,441,897 was collected. A total sales tax of $730,932.79 has been paid on those collections. Shortly thereafter, petitioner opted to file this rule challenge. The Rule and its Origin Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b. provides as follows: (d)1. Effective July 1, 1991, the following fees paid to private clubs or membership clubs as a condition precedent to, in conjunction with, or for the use of the club's recreational or physical fitness facilities are subject to tax. * * * b. Any periodic assessments (additional paid in capital) required to be paid by members of an equity or non equity club for capital improvements or other operating costs, unless the periodic assessment meets the criteria of a refundable deposit as provided in sub-subparagraph 2.e. below. * * * Under the terms of the rule, the capital contri- bution assessed by the club does not qualify as a refundable deposit. This is because any difference between the amount collected by the club upon the sale of a membership to a new member, and the amount which was paid to the retiring member, is retained by the club. Because Rule 12A-1.005, Florida Administrative Code, covers a wide array of items subject to taxation, the DOR cites Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the rule, and Sections 212.02(1), 212.031, 212.04, 212.08(6) and (7), 240.533(4)(c), and 616.260, Florida Statutes, as the law implemented. There is no dispute between the parties, however, that in adopting sub-subparagraph 1.b., which contains the challenged language, the agency was relying principally on Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, as the law being implemented. That subsection defines the term "admissions" for sales tax purposes. Although the parties did not specifically say so, DOR relies on Section 212.17(6), Florida Statutes, as its source of authority for adopting the rule. That subsection authorizes DOR to "make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter . . . for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder." For the purpose of assisting DOR in administering the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, which imposes a sales and use tax on various transactions, Section 212.02, Florida Statutes, provides definitions of various terms used in the chapter, including the term "admissions." Prior to the 1991 legislative session, subsection 212.02(1) read in pertinent part as follows: The term "admissions" means and includes . . . all dues . . . paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities, including, but not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting, boating, athletic, exercise, and fitness facilities. During the 1991 legislative session, the definition of the term "admissions" was expanded by the addition of the following underscored language: The term "admissions" means and includes . . . all dues and fees . . . paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities, including, but not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting, boating, athletic, excercise, and fitness facilities. Thus, the legislature added the term "fees" to the term "dues" for those amounts "paid to any private clubs and membership clubs" which would be subject to the admissions tax. Prior to the above change in substantive law, rule 12A-1.005(5), as it then existed, provided that dues paid to athletic clubs which provided recreational facilities were taxable. However, subparagraph (5)(c) of the rule also provided that (c) Capital contributions or assessments to an organization by its members are not taxable as charges for admissions when they are in the nature of payments made by the member of his or her share of capital costs, not charges for admission to use the organization's recreational or physical fitness facilities or equipment, and when they are clearly shown as capital contributions on the organization's records. Contributions and assessments will be considered taxable when their payment results in a decrease in periodic dues or user fees required of the payor to use the organization's recreational or physical fitness facilities or equipment. Therefore, capital contributions were not taxable unless they resulted in decreased dues. That is to say, if a club levied an assessment on members and concurrently lowered its monthly dues, the assessment would be deemed to be taxable and in contravention of the rule. Thus, the effect of the rule was to prevent a club from renaming "dues" as "capital contributions" or "assessments" in order to avoid paying a tax on the dues. After the change in substantive law, the DOR staff began preparing numerous drafts of an amendment to its rule to comply with the new statutory language. At one stage of the drafting process, a DOR staffer recommended that, because the legislature had not provided a definition of the term "fee," the DOR should adopt a rule which provided that capital contributions be "not taxable if assessed under an equitable membership." Relying on what it says is the legislative intent, the DOR eventually proposed, and later adopted, the rule in its present form. In doing so, the DOR relied upon the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees" which are found in certain legislative history documents pertaining to the new legislation. Legislative History of the Law Implemented Although a number of bills related to the subject of a sales tax on admissions, the bill enacted into law was identified as Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523 (CS/HB 2523). The legislative history of the various bills relating to this subject has been received in evidence and considered by the undersigned. In early 1991, the House and Senate considered bills which addressed amendments to the sales tax on admissions. The first time the issue was addressed was at a meeting on February 21, 1991, of the Subcommittee on Sales Tax of the House Committee on Finance and Taxation. The discussion at the meeting indicated that the intent of the bill was to close a loophole that allowed physical fitness facilities to change their pricing structure to charge a higher initiation fee, which was not taxable, and thereby reduce their monthly dues, which were taxable, so as to reduce the revenue below that originally anticipated by this tax on admissions. This is corroborated by the bill analysis of the proposed committee bill that was offered, PCB FT 91-3A, which summarized the problem and solution as follows: Section 212.02(1), F. S. was amended during the 1990 Legislative Session to include in the definition of admissions those "dues" of "membership clubs" providing "physical fitness" facilities. Some clubs have attempted to avoid the tax (on dues) by shifting a substantial portion of the members' payments from "dues" to "initiation fees." Section 212.02(1), F. S., is amended to include "fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of admissions. All fees, including initiation fees and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities would be subject to the sales tax on admissions. It is unclear, but likely, that PCB FT 91-3A became House Bill 2417 (HB 2417). The bill analysis and economic impact statement on HB 2417, which was prepared by the House Committee on Appropriations, contained identical language to that in the bill analysis on PCB FT 91-3A. At the same time, the Senate was considering Senate Bill 1128, which later became Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1128 (CS/SB 1128). On March 14, 1991, a staff analysis and economic impact statement on CS/SB 1128 was prepared by the Senate Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. It provided that: Section 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, defines "admissions" for sales and use tax purposes. Monthly fees of clubs with major facilities such as tennis courts, a swimming pool or a golf course have always been subject to the sales tax. During the 1990 Legislative Session this statute was amended to include dues on membership clubs providing physical fitness facilities, and not having these other major facilities. According to the DOR, such clubs have attempted to avoid payment of this tax by shifting a substantial portion of the members payments from dues to initiation fees which are not taxed. Accordingly, the purpose of the proposed statutory amendment was "to include initiation fees as well as dues in the definition of admissions." HB 2417 was passed by the House on April 17, 1991, and was sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. HB 2417 died in that Committee. CS/SB 1128 was passed by the Senate on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the House, where it died in messages. A separate bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523, which addressed similar issues to those addressed in HB 2417 and CS/SB 1128, was passed by the House on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the Senate where it was passed with amendments. The Bill was then returned to the House where further amendments were adopted. The Bill was again sent to the Senate with a request for the Senate to concur with the House amendments. The Senate refused to concur and the Bill was sent to a conference committee. The conference committee on finance and taxation met on April 19, 1991. The entirety of the discussion of the committee on this issue is as follows: Senator Jenne: The - - going down to number 21, admissions, initiation fees. The House includes capitalization fees. Representative Abrams: Which is this? Mr. Weiss: The Senate bill just states initiation fees are additionally included. The House bill, I believe, says that it's just all fees, which would include whether they called them initiation fees or capital facility fees or whatever. Representative Abrams: Because we are using something other than initiation - - Mr. Weiss: It's a fee that is going to be included. Representative Abrams: Yes, they were using - - they were breaking down categories of fees to avoid the tax, I think is what the deal was there. That gets us how much? Senator Jenne: Okay, well, it doesn't matter, because you can do it. Representative Abrams: Okay, good. Although the terms "capital facility fees" and "capitalization fees" were used during the discussion, contrary to DOR's assertion, it is far from clear that the intent of the amendment was to make taxable all capital contributions and assessments paid by members of private clubs providing recreational facilities. When placed in context with the prior debate before the committees and their staff analyses, it is much more likely that the intent was to close a loophole then used by physical fitness clubs who were renaming dues as fees in order to avoid taxes. The report of the conference committee was received by both houses on April 30, and CS/HB 2523 was passed by both houses the same day. The conference committee report for the bill contains only the following language describing the sales tax on admissions/initiation fees: Includes all recreational or physical fitness facility fees in the definition as admissions. The official conference committee report contains no reference to the terms "capitalization fees" or "capital facility fees." Neither does it make reference to the terms "assessment" or "paid in capital," which are the terms used by DOR in its rule. In the final bill analysis and economic impact statement prepared by the House Committee on Finance and Taxation for CS/HB 2523 on June 12, 1991, or 43 days after the bill was passed, the analysis states that subsection 212.02(1) was amended to include: "fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of admissions. All fees, including initiation fees and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities would be subject to the sales tax on admissions . . . This amendment should also limit further attempts to avoid taxation by renaming the fees collected from members. The staff analysis was obviously not available to members of the House or Senate when they voted on the bill on April 30, 1991. Although the final bill analysis used the term "capitalization fees," no where in any of the legislative history is there evidence of any legislative consideration of what was actually meant by that term. This is also true of the term "capital facility fees" which surfaced on one occasion prior to the passage of the bill. Capitalization Fees and Their Significance The sole basis for the DOR including the tax on assessments for capital improvements was the appearance in the legislative history of the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees." Neither term has any meaning to tax accountants. However, the accounting witnesses for both parties agreed that, from an accounting perspective, the phrase "capital facilities" would be understood to be assets having a life longer than one year. A capital contribution is typically a one time payment for the purchase of assets. It does not entitle the member to use the club. It is an equity transaction, not an income transaction, and it represents an intent to make an investment to improve the value of the membership assets separate and apart from the payment of annual expenses for the receipt of some service. "Dues" are a member's contribution to the operating costs of a club. They are assessed over an annual period and they are recurring. They also represent the payment that a member pays for admission to the organization. A capital contribution paid by a member of an equity membership club is not "dues." "Fees" as applied to a club are user charges. They are voluntary so that a member can decide whether or not to incur the charge based on whether the member uses the particular service to which it relates. A capital contribution is not a "fee."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to these proceedings, respondents Barry P. Rifkin and Flag Realty, Inc. were registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as brokers, and respondent Sandra Mae Rifkin was registered as a broker-salesman. Respondents caused to be placed in the yellow pages of a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company telephone directory for Hollywood a full page advertisement containing the words "Free Appraisals by Licensed Real Estate Appraiser". As noted above, all the respondents were registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission, but none were specifically licensed as appraisers by any governmental or regulatory agency regulating only appraisers. Bobby Glenn Johnson, who was a broker for Flag Realty, Inc. at the time the ad was placed, had received on December 1, 1971, a certificate from an instructor of the Broward County Public Schools, Division of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education, certifying that ,he had met the requirements of a 36-hour course of training in real estate appraising. Prior to November or December of 1974, respondent Barry Rifkin and one Arnold Savader each held a fifty percent interest in Broward Investment Company. The purpose of this company was to purchase from the owner derelict houses needing repair or houses going into foreclosure, fix them up and then resell them. It appears from the testimony that at the time houses were originally purchased by Broward Investment, respondent Rifkin was nothing more than a silent partner an investor who at times gave advice to Savader regarding the value of the property to be purchased. After the houses were repaired or restored by Savader, they were listed with Flag Realty, Inc. for resale. The homes purchased were put in Savader's name, and only Savader's name appeared on the Company's business card. It appears that prior to purchasing the homes and listing them with Flag Realty, all contact with prospective clients was done by Savader. A form of advertising used by Broward Investment Company was a door- hanger advertisement stating in part "No Brokers Involved (No Commissions)". There was no evidence that brokers' commissions were ever charged to the sellers.
Recommendation In consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the charges contained in the information based upon the offenses of misleading advertising be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of December, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
