The Issue The issue is whether Florida Petroleum Markers and Convenience Store Association (Florida Petroleum) is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, and if so, in what amount.1
Findings Of Fact Introduction Florida Petroleum is the prevailing party in the underlying rule challenge and requests an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes.2 Florida Petroleum prevailed in DOAH Case No. 05-0529RP on one of two challenged proposed rule revisions to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770, which governs cleanup of petroleum contamination. Proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) was held to be an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." Proposed rule 62-770.220(4), was "not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, except insofar as notice must be given every five years to persons other than 'local governments and owners of any property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend,' as provided in Section 376.3071(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes."3 The Department argues that its actions were "substantially justified" because there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time its actions were taken. The proposed rules were approved by the Environmental Regulation Commission (ERC) on February 2, 2005, which is the time when the Department's "actions were taken." The Department does not argue that special circumstances exist that would make the award of fees unjust. Department Contamination Programs The Department's Division of Waste Management is comprised of the Bureau of Petroleum Storage Systems, the Bureau of Waste Cleanup, and the Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste. The Bureau of Petroleum Storage Systems administers the state's petroleum contamination cleanup program. This cleanup program encompasses the technical oversight, management, and administrative activities necessary to prioritize, assess, and cleanup sites contaminated by discharges of petroleum and petroleum products from petroleum storage systems. There are approximately 23,000 petroleum-contaminated sites statewide. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770 establishes petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria. These criteria are established for the purposes of protecting the public health and the environment and for determining, on a site-specific basis, the rehabilitation program tasks that comprise a site rehabilitation program and the levels at which a rehabilitation program task and site rehabilitation program may be deemed complete. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-770.160(8). The petroleum contamination cleanup program incorporates risk-based corrective action (RBCA) principles to achieve protection of human health, public safety, and the environment in a cost-effective manner. The phased RBCA process is iterative and tailors site rehabilitation tasks to site-specific conditions and risks. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-770.160(8). The Bureau of Waste Cleanup administers the state's drycleaning solvent cleanup program. This program is for the cleanup of property that is contaminated with drycleaning solvents as a result of the operations of a drycleaning facility or wholesale supply facility. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-782 establishes drycleaning solvent cleanup criteria, established for the purposes of protecting the human health, public safety and the environment under actual circumstances of exposure and for determining, on a site-specific basis, the rehabilitation program tasks that comprise a site rehabilitation program and the levels at which a rehabilitation program task and site rehabilitation program may be deemed complete. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-782.150(1). The drycleaning solvent cleanup program, like the petroleum contamination cleanup program, the brownfield site rehabilitation program, and the global RBCA contamination cleanup program mentioned below, incorporates RBCA principles to achieve protection of human health and the environment in a cost-effective manner. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-782.150(1) and 62-785.150(1). In 2003, the Legislature adopted Section 376.30701, Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Department to adopt rule criteria for the implementation of what is referred to as "global RBCA," which extends the RBCA process to contaminated sites where legal responsibility for site rehabilitation exists pursuant to Chapter 376 or Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. Global RBCA is a cleanup program for contaminated sites that do not fall within one of the Department's other contamination cleanup programs. Department Rulemaking Efforts After the passage of Section 376.30701(2), Florida Statutes, the Department initiated rulemaking to develop Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-780 (global RBCA). Section 376.30701(2) established July 1, 2004, as the date the Department was to adopt rule criteria to implement the global RBCA contamination cleanup program. At the same time, the Department initiated rulemaking with respect to revisions to Florida Administrative Code Chapters 62-770 (petroleum), Chapter 62-782 (drycleaning solvents), and Chapter 62-785 (brownfields). This decision was predicated on the similarities among the four waste cleanup programs and the Department's desire to ensure a consistent approach across the four programs and pursuant to one large rulemaking effort. As such, the Department sought to include the same notification provisions in each rule for consistency purposes. (T 33-34, 55). However, the Department also recognized at the time that the notice provision for RBCA for petroleum contamination cleanups, i.e., Section 376.3071(5)(b)2., was different from the notice provisions for RBCA cleanups for the drycleaning solvent (Section 376.3078(4)(b)), brownfields (Section 376.81(1)(b)), and global RBCA (Section 376.30701(2)(b)) programs. (T 69, 115, 126-129). In each of these three statutes, the Legislature expressly expanded the class of persons to whom notice is required to be given and expressly referred to a specific type of notice to be given (actual or constructive) depending on the class of persons designated to receive notice. Each of the latter statutes was enacted after, and presumably with knowledge of Section 376.3071(5)(b)2., which was materially amended in material part in 1996 to add, in part, the notice provision. See Ch. 96-277, § 5, at 1131, 1135-1136, Laws of Fla. In May 2004, the Department became aware of concerns with regard to on-going efforts to assess the groundwater contamination at the former American Beryllium plant in Tallevast, Manatee County, Florida. (The party's refer to the city as Tallavast, whereas the Transcript (T 36) and DEP Exhibit 1 refer to the city as Tallevast.) For approximately two years, the owner of the plant, Lockheed Martin, had been conducting an on-going assessment of the extent of the solvent (trichloroethylene) contamination. The Department was concerned that there were residential areas located adjacent to and in the immediate vicinity of the former industrial plant. In May 2004, it became apparent that there were problems with certain assumptions concerning the assessment of the groundwater contamination. First, there had been an erroneous assumption that the contamination plume was small and located predominantly on-site. Second, based on well surveys, there was an assumption that there were no human health exposure points in the form of contaminated off-site potable water wells. Significant concerns arose when it became apparent the contamination plume was more extensive than anticipated and had migrated off-site. These concerns were exacerbated when it became apparent that groundwater contamination was impacting off-site potable water wells. Tallevast residents raised concerns that they were being exposed to contamination and that they were never properly notified by the Department, upon the initial discovery of the groundwater contamination. Tallevast residents were also concerned about whether the Department had failed to properly notify then once it was discovered the groundwater contamination had migrated off-site. The problems experienced at Tallevast emphasized to the Department the need to explore available avenues to enhance public notification procedures as a whole.4, 5 The Department asserted as to a reasonable basis in fact for the proposed rules, that contamination affecting Tallevast residents provided an impetus for the Department in May 2004 to address notification of contamination to affected off-site property owners. The situation in Tallevast arose because well surveys failed to indicate the extent of the contamination plume and that residents were using private wells for potable water. The Department's objective was to make sure that if there was exposure potential, the potentially affected parties should be notified. The Department seems to agree that the failure to discover the contamination of the potable wells in Tallevast occurred during the assessment phase of the cleanup and that it had not yet gotten to the stage of determining the remediation strategy. (T 45-46). The Department's stated concerns regarding Tallevast are not specifically addressed by proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4). (T 74-75, 95-96). The Department’s procedure for granting a temporary extension of the point of compliance is that the responsible party will propose such an extension in its remedial action plan. (The four cleanup programs provide for the establishment of a TPOC.) The Department will then issue its notice of intended agency action, notice of the agency action will be provided to the enumerated persons, and the persons receiving notice will have a 30-day comment period. (T 149-155). (Pursuant to proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(a), the person responsible for site rehabilitation (PRSR) "shall provide" actual notice "to the appropriate County Health Department and all record owners of any real property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend . . . ." In this regard, as Mr. Chisolm testified, the process is "similar to a permit.") Mr. Sole testified that, in the course of rulemaking, Florida Petroleum argued to the Department that the "petroleum statute under 376.3071 is different as it addresses the temporary point of compliance. It's not as prescriptive as the other statutory provisions for Risk-Based Corrective Action and the dry-cleaning, the Brownfields, and now the Global RBCA [statutes]. And their concern was that because it's not as prescriptive, [the Department] should not be establishing these additional notice provisions, such as constructive notice . . . But their fear was or concerns . . . were that you're going to engender a lot of litigation that's unnecessary because, as soon as you say the word 'contamination,' somebody is going to want to sue me . . . . And I understood that position. But at the same time, the lessons that we learned were that failure to provide that notice, unfortunately, can cause exposure and can cause a public health concern; and [the Department] needed to balance the two." (T 63-64, 122). Mr. Chisolm testified, in part, about the development of the constructive notice provision in proposed rule 62- 770.220(3)(b) and explained that the global RBCA, brownfields, and drycleaning solvent statutes required constructive notice to residents and business tenants of impacted properties.6 Mr. Chisolm further explained: So, if you're going to give notice to the legal owners of a piece of property, many cases there are tenants there. And they may not get the word, and they may be the ones that are drinking the water. The same with business tenants. So the idea was let's give notice to the people who are going to be or potentially going to be affected by this contamination, which is, after all, under the property which they may be inhabiting and using. So that was the purpose for the rule change in this case. Let's give notice to everybody who could potentially be affected by the rule, by the contamination beyond the property boundaries . . . . The whole idea behind RBCA, Risk- Based Corrective Actions, is that, if there's no exposure, there's no risk. There's no danger to the individual, to any individual. (T 116-117).
The Issue Whether Petitioner's service station site known as Siesta Key Exxon Village, at 5201 Ocean Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida, is eligible for state administered cleanup pursuant to Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Weeks Oil Company, Inc., owns and operates a service station, Siesta Key Exxon, located at 5201 Ocean Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida. On December 21, 1988, Petitioner applied, pursuant to the Early Detection Incentive Program (EDI), for state assistance due to a suspected discharge of gasoline at the facility. The application indicated that a manual test of a monitoring well, conducted on December 16, 1988, detected contamination. After free product was discovered in the monitoring wells in December, 1988, subsequent monitoring well reports for the months of January - May, 1989, indicated the presence of free petroleum product. The January, 1989, monitoring report indicates six inches of free product; the February, 1989, monitoring report indicates twelve inches of free product; the March, 1989, report failed to indicate the presence of free product; and both the April and May, 1989, monitoring reports indicate the presence of sixteen inches of free product. Purity Well Company, the monitoring well contractor retained by Weeks Oil, bailed free product out of the monitoring wells once a month during the period January through May, 1989. On May 23, 1989, Richard Steele of the Sarasota County Pollution Control Division conducted an Early Detection Incentive Program Inspection at Siesta Key Exxon, 5201 Ocean Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida, DER Facility #588521170. During the inspection, Mr. Steele examined the monitoring well reports for Siesta Key Exxon for the months of January through May, 1989. Evidence of contamination was indicated by each month's monitoring well report, and the amount of free product indicated by the monitoring well reports increased over time. During the May 22, 1989, inspection, Mr. Steele observed a minimum of two feet of free product in monitoring well number three. As part of the Early Detection Incentive Program inspection, Mr. Steele requested inventory records for Siesta Key Exxon, which records were provided on June 7, 1989. Inventory records for January, February, March and April, 1989, indicated a total shortage of 441 gallons of gasoline. Mr. Steele's inspection report of May 22, 1989, indicates that no initial remedial action other than the bailing of monitoring wells occurred subsequent to the December, 1988, EDI application. During the May 22, 1989, inspection, Mr. Steele was neither provided with any evidence of repairs to the petroleum storage system made for the purpose of acting upon monitoring well reports, nor did he visually observe any evidence of repair. By letter dated May 24, 1989, from Richard Steele to Weeks Oil Company, Mr. Weeks was informed of the presence of two feet of free product in monitoring well number three and specifically requested a tank tightness test. The May 24, 1987, letter requested Mr. Weeks to send the results of the tank tightness test to the Sarasota County Pollution Control Office or the Department of Environmental Regulation district office. Mr. Weeks discussed with Steele the fact that the contaminants appeared to come from tanks no longer in service, which tanks were scheduled for relining. Mr. Weeks did not consider it practicable to test tanks scheduled for relining and thought Steele agreed that he could delay the testing until the tanks were refitted. Mr. Steele never made such a commitment, and the tank test was never conducted. On October 20, 1989, the tanks at Siesta Key Exxon were excavated and fiberglass coated. The August 22, 1989 ineligibility determination cites as the reason for denial, the failure of Weeks Oil to conduct a tank tightness test as requested by Sarasota County or otherwise immediately investigate and repair the contamination source as required by Chapter 17-61, Florida Administrative Code, The ineligibility letter concludes that failure to immediately investigate and repair the contamination source as required by Chapter 17-61, Florida Administrative Code, shall be construed as gross negligence in the maintenance of a petroleum storage system, which precludes participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program. A tank tightness test should be performed by the owner or operator of a petroleum storage system where there are any discrepancies in inventory records or monthly monitoring system checks. Rule 17-61.050(4)(c) 3., Florida Administrative Code, requires upon discovery of an inventory discrepancy that investigation of the system "shall not stop until the source of the discrepancy has been found, the tank has been tested, repaired, or replaced, or the entire procedure has been completed." Pursuant to Rule 17-61.050(6), Florida Administrative Code, the owner or operator of a storage system shall test the entire storage system whenever the Department has ordered that such a test is necessary to protect the lands, ground waters, or surface waters of the state. Specifically, the Department may order a tank test where a discharge detection device or monitoring well indicates that pollutant has been or is being discharged. Given the inventory record discrepancy and the amount of free product continually observed in the monitoring wells at Siesta Key Exxon, it was appropriate for Mr. Steele to request a tank tightness test. The bailing of a contaminated monitoring well is not an appropriate method of determining the source of petroleum contamination. The failure of Weeks Oil Company, Inc., to timely conduct a tank test as requested by Sarasota County, acting on behalf of the Department, creates a risk of or the potential for greater damage to the environment because a continual unchecked discharge leads to the release of more petroleum product into the environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order denying the application of Petitioner to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program. ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet D. Bowman, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2400 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 James B. Weeks, Jr. Weeks Oil Company Post Office Box 100 Sarasota, FL 34230 Dale H. Twachtmann Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the reimbursement program to provide for rehabilitation of as many petroleum contamination sites as possible, as soon as possible. Section 376.3071(12)(a), Florida Statutes. The Legislature intended that those responsible persons who possessed adequate financial ability should conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting the cleanup. Section 376.3071(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). When owners and operators of the site or their designees perform site remediation program tasks under any of the programs created by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, those entities become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes, requires DEP to: Reimburse actual and reasonable costs for site rehabilitation; and Reimburse interest on the amount of reimbursable costs for applications filed after August 14, 1992, at a rate of 1 percent per month or the prime rate, which- ever is less. Interest shall be paid from the 61st day after an application is filed with the department until the application is paid, provided the department determines the application is sufficient; otherwise, interest shall be paid commencing on the date the application is made sufficient until the application is paid. . . . A site owner or operator may engage the services of firms to perform remediation activities on a site and may designate an entity to receive reimbursement for such work. Section 376.301(14), Florida Statutes. Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code (as revised in April of 1993), contains DEP's rules which were in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications. This chapter is currently located in Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code establishes procedures and documentation required to receive reimbursement from the IPTF. Rule 17-773.100(4), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: "review and approval of reimbursement applications shall be based upon the statutes, rules and written guidelines governing petroleum contamination site cleanup and reimbursement which were in effect at the time the work was performed or the records of activities and expenses were generated, as applicable. . . . In order to be reimbursable, an applicant must break charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether an allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations established by DEP rule: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. When the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) has no financial interest in the site, DEP considers the following costs as incurred when the program task is complete: Reasonable rates, including profits associated with the work performed, claimed for the use of their own personnel or equip- ment with documentation pursuant to Rule 17-773.700(7), F.A.C.; and Allowable markups or handling fees applied to their paid contractor, subcontractor, or vendor invoices pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(9), (10), and (11), F.A.C. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. Other rules reference limitations on the ability of an entity to take a markup. Rule 17-773.600(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: . . . If the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation manufactured the [capital expense item], or a markup is otherwise prohibited under Rule 17-773.350(9), (10) or (11), Florida Administrative Code, no markup of the equipment shall be allowed. Rule 17- 773.700(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: Costs claimed in a reimbursement application for the employees, equipment or materials of the site owner, site operator or any entity which has a financial interest in the site or a familial or other beneficial relation- ship with the site owner or operator shall be considered to be in house and reimburse- ment shall be limited to actual costs only. No fee, markup, commission, percentage or other consideration shall be allowed. . . . Rule 17-773.700(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part as follows: Pursuant to Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code, reasonable rates, including profits, may be claimed for the personnel and equipment or other allowable expenses of the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation as well as allowable markups on paid contractor subcon- tractor and vendor invoices and shall be considered incurred for the purpose of reimbursement provided: The person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation does not have a financial interest in the site pursuant to Rule 17-773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code, or a familial or other beneficial relationship with the site owner or operator; The activities performed were integral to the program task claimed pursuant to Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code; and Detailed invoices are provided by the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation that include all subcon- tractor and vendor invoices . . . [which] must identify the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation and clearly distinguish their costs from those for paid subcontractors or vendors. There are no other provisions in the applicable rules which pertain to markups. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices normally may take one of the allowable levels of markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or PRFCSR involved in the reimbursement chain must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second allowable markup and submit the reimbursement application for review by DEP and payment from the IPTF. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. Rule 17-773.200(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: "Beneficial relationship (interest)" means a connection or association, excluding an arm's length contractual relationship, which benefits a person or company by yielding a profit, advantage or benefit, or entitlement thereto, exceeding five percent of the person's or company's annual gross income. Rule 17-773.200(6), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: "Familial relationship (interest)" means a connection or association by family or relatives, in which a family member or a relative has a material interest. . . . Rule 17-773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: "Financial relationship (interest)" means a connection or association through a material interest or sources of income which exceed five percent of annual gross income from a business entity. Banks, lending institutions, and other lenders that provide loans for site rehabilitation activities are not considered to have a financial interest in the site on that basis alone. However, as of the effective date of this rule, guarantors of loans to or co-makers of loans with persons signing as responsible party are considered to have a financial interest if the amount of the loan exceeds five percent of the net worth of either company. As used in this definition, sources of income shall not include any income derived through arm's- length contractual transactions. Rule 17-773.200(13), Florida Administrative Code, states as follows: "Material interest" means a direct or indirect interest or ownership of more than five percent of the total assets or capital stock of any business entity. The rules and written guidelines of DEP do not address activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement, so long as an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. Pursuant to Section 376.3071(l2)(m), Florida Statutes, DEP must perform financial audits "as necessary to ensure compliance with this rule and to certify site rehabilitation costs." Rule 17-773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17- 773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. However, DEP never intended for its predominate rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement of claims which are not otherwise actual and reasonable costs of site rehabilitation. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as a conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding cleanup projects flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. WIFL's directors are also its shareholders. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as a conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. SEI was specifically created to meet the needs of American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) Florida investors. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into financing contracts with entities in the reimbursement process: (a) Petitioners ET and SEI, funders; (b) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (c) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of ET, SEI, Gator, and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process, including Petitioners. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust agreement. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created Petitioners, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The primary purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET as an affiliate of AEE. At least five of the letters written on SEI's behalf refer to ET as the funder and AEE as ET's affiliate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a Certified Public Accountant in each application; (c) Funder's Authorization; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term operating capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced Gator and Tower a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of an invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoice and the discounted amount of the invoice represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loan or advance provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from Gator. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to repay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from Gator. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. A bill of sale evidenced the sale of Tower's right to receive payment on each application. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Contract. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum required Gator to sell EF Gator's right to receive payments from ET or SEI. In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to repay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. A bill of sale evidenced the sale of Gator's right to receive payment on each application. The financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions though not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcon- tractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The on-site work on each project was complete or substantially complete prior to Gator's involvement. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. The amount of time between AEE's payment of the advances and Gator's and Tower's subsequent remittance of 100 percent of the face amount of their invoices to AEE varied from a few days to a few weeks. The Agency Statement--Factoring Petitioners submitted the subject applications to DEP between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to the receipt of these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of factoring scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when it promulgated its rules and written policies. In the instant applications, the "chain of reimbursement" included: ET and SEI as funders or PRFCSRs, Gator as the named general contractor, Tower as prime subcontractor, and numerous subcontractors and vendors. As stated above, DEP was also aware that AFG and AEE (including EF) were "affiliated" with ET and SEI and would ultimately receive all reimbursement payments from the IPTF. 56 When Petitioners submitted the subject applications, no rule or written policy disallowed reimbursement for the face amount of contractors' and subcontractors' invoices when they sold their right to payments, i.e. the receivables, at a discount. When Petitioners submitted the subject applications, DEP had rules that restricted the ability of an entity to apply markups on invoices when a familial, financial or beneficial affiliation existed between a contractor, subcontractor, PRFCSR and the site or site owner, or when such relationships existed amongst those entities in the chain of reimbursement. However, there were no rules or written guidelines restricting reimbursement, based upon financial transactions occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement, if the applicant did not pass the costs of such transactions to DEP in an reimbursement application. In that regard, DEP usually dealt only with what was apparent in an application. If an application had a line-item claim for interest, DEP would not pay that claim under the rule limiting the payment of interest. Otherwise, DEP generally did not deal with costs, including interest, for which the applicant did not seek reimbursement. The applications in the subject cases did not contain line-item claims for interest. However, the difference between the face value of the invoices and the amount for which Gator and Tower sold their right to receive reimbursement for those invoices clearly represents interest. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site remediation which was broken down into appropriate Eunits and rates. There is no evidence that the prime subcontractor, subcontractors and vendors intentionally inflated their invoices to cover the cost of financing. However, they did agree to accept a lesser amount then the face amount of their invoices for their services prior to the filing of the applications. In September and October of 1993, Paul DeCoster wrote letters to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. Mr. DeCoster wrote a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. In this letter, Mr. DeCoster proposed that AFG would charge the contractor a finder's fee which would be in addition to the 15 percent financing "markup" taken by the investor providing the financing. This proposal referenced a funder, FEC, whose parent was AFG. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve a finder's fee or a funder identified as FEC. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. AFG would receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. At that time DEP was concerned that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which DEP should deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs or risky projects. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve a finder's fee. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the clean-up or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP personnel exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those memoranda dated September 2, 1994, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In November 1994, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, DEP's Director of the Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formally Chapter 17-773). A draft rule accompanied the request. Mr. Ruddell developed the draft rule in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services. . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. The draft rule did not single out any other financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate that draft rule. DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, Petitioners responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filling the applications, ET (and in some cases SEI) paid Gator for the face amount of the invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE, an affiliate of ET, purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET or SEI and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET, in turn, was obligated to pay AEE following its receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On or about April 21, 1995, Bruce French, Environmental Manager in DEP's Bureau of Waste Cleanup, developed a memorandum discussing the proper handling of factored and/or discounted reimbursement applications. Mr. French initially sent the memorandum to Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator in DEP's Bureau of Waste Cleanup. The memorandum states that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. DEP subsequently disseminated the memorandum to all application reviewers to acquaint them with DEP's policy on invoices or applications involving factoring as the financing mechanism. DEP did not direct the policy on factoring towards any individual company. DEP intended it to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third party capital provider paid those program participants or suppliers a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices. The policy memorandum directed DEP reviewers to deduct costs from an application in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice. The language of the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum was broad and did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and February 2, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications at issue here. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications because of the factoring of the supporting invoices and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62- 773.350(4), F.A.C." DEP deducted from the cost of each application an amount equal to the amount of the discount on each relevant invoice. When DEP issued the denial letters, it had not adopted the policy against factoring by the rulemaking procedure required in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The notices reflected a basis of denial of costs that was consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 Draft Rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. This non-rule policy, which generally applied to all factoring schemes was not apparent from the rules in effect at that time. The Agency Statement--Markup/Value Added Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors usually are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors' invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders normally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the entity at the next lowest level in full. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the entity at the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, DEP was not aware of situations where general contractors claimed markups for work that was complete before they ever became involved in the projects. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors and vendors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct any of the on-site remediation activities. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower had undertaken and completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, the record contains no evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. Gator performed some type of minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. The deficiency letters were limited to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice often were prepared on the same day. Gator "technically" paid the invoices at the next lowest level with money that AEE advanced. When Gator received payments from ET or SEI, it immediately repaid AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or soon thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator allegedly indemnified the funder and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, Inc., an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. The memorandum indicated that DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that if the "GC" [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the "GC" came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the "GC" markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed." Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services which were not reflected in an application in order to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The report acknowledges that a prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The Comptroller's Report did not address whether a contractor would be entitled to a markup if it became involved after all site work was complete. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force's (PETF) final report concerning financing for reimbursement contractors issued on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups on paid invoices. The report recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued this final report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. The "value added" policy is not reflected in any rule or written guideline, and would not be made available to a participant in the reimbursement program who requested program information. The "value added" agency statement is a non-rule policy which has the effect of a rule. DEP intends to apply the policy in all cases where a contractor's service adds no value to a project. DEP did not anticipate the need for such a rule when it promulgated the current rules. The Agency Statement Standard During the 1994 Legislative Session, the Florida Legislature directed that "no later than January 1, 1995, DEP shall review and revise rules related to the pollutant storage tanks programs . . . ." Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida. DEP understood that legislative instruction to include rule revisions related to the reimbursement program. On April 7, 1994, the Office of Statewide Prosecution issued a Statewide Grand Jury Report. The final report concerning financing of reimbursement contractors was prepared for the Florida Petroleum Efficiency Task Force on August 17, 1994. The Office of Controller issued its report on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. All of these reports offered suggestions for changes to the reimbursement rule. DEP first learned about factoring from presentations by Paul DeCoster and Will Robins in 1993. After these meetings, Petitioner proposed several factoring plans as proposed schemes to finance petroleum contamination site cleanup projects. Petitioners did not finalize the exact financing scheme they intended to use until July of 1994. Petitioners filed the first applications on July 18, 1994. By that time, DEP was aware that the factoring company was affiliated with the funders. DEP was also aware that the factoring company would receive the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discount amount of that invoice. However, DEP was not aware of the exact nature of the relationships between AFG, AEE, EF, ET, WIFL, SEI, Gator and Tower. DEP was unable to evaluate all aspects of Petitioners' factoring plan without supplemental information about the details of the purchase and sale of receivables as they related to each application. DEP requested additional information from the applicants to determine if the costs were actually incurred. As a result of the information that DEP received, it reviewed all transactions to determine whether the costs claimed in the applications were actual and reasonable. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code). A draft rule accompanied the request. DEP intended the draft rule to comply with the legislative mandate contained in Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida. By that time, Petitioners had filed 41 of the subject applications. The 1994 draft rule provided that if a program participant sold a receivable at a discount, reimbursement would be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services rendered. The draft rule eliminated markups of contractor and subcontractor invoices. The December 20, 1994 memorandum to DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee did not indicate any deficiency in the existing delegated legislative authority that would prevent DEP from implementing the changes to the draft rule. DEP policy coordinating committee declined to approve the initiation of rulemaking procedures. Instead, it directed DEP staff to draft a bill for the 1995 legislative session. DEP based this decision on a determination that it would take too long to correct the numerous problems through the rulemaking process. The 1995 Legislative Session made several changes to the reimbursement program, particularly as it related to the direction of future site remediation activities. Chapter 95-2, Laws of Florida, passed the 1995 Legislative Session and changed the program from reimbursement of completed work to requiring pre-approval of work before it commenced. The 1995 Legislative Session did not make any relevant amendment to the reimbursement payment procedures in Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes. During the period between adjournment of the 1995 Legislative Session and February 2, 1996, DEP took action on each of the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. Meanwhile, DEP focused its attention on making the necessary changes to switch from a reimbursement program to the new pre- approval program. It is not unreasonable to believe that such a significant change in a large program would take an agency some time to educate itself and the program's participants, prepare documentation and forms, and take steps to begin implementation. On March 22, 1996, approximately six and one-half months (198 days) after the petition for administrative hearing in Case No. 95-4606, and almost 21 months after the effective date of Chapter 94-311, Laws of Florida, DEP published its notice of rule development in the Florida Administrative Weekly. DEP filed the notice of rule development specifically "in response to litigation pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings" in the 45 cases that are the subject of this proceeding. In these consolidated cases, DEP did not have sufficient time prior to March 22, 1996 to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address, through the rulemaking process, the policy statements relative to factoring and markups based on value added services. Certainly, related matters were not sufficiently resolved to enable DEP to initiate rulemaking to address the policies set forth in the March 21, 1995 and October 20, 1995 memoranda until the spring of 1996. DEP is currently using the rulemaking procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address these non-rule policies. Additionally, the record indicates that it was not possible for the agency to initiate rulemaking in time to give Petitioners advance notice of the new policies. Petitioners filed the last applications in February of 1995 before DEP had time to fully evaluate the factoring plan. The time it took DEP to develop the detail or precision in the establishment of the policies set forth in the March 21, 1995 and October 20, 1995 memoranda was reasonable under the circumstances.
Findings Of Fact Puckett Oil Company, at times pertinent hereto, operated a full-service gasoline and auto service station at 7251 Pensacola Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida. The station at that site performed a complete range of automotive repairs, including lubrication and oil changes. These services are typical of such full-service service stations. On or about June 27, 1986, the operator of that station which was owned by Puckett, Mr. Winters, discovered a discharge of used oil at the site. The discharge occurred because the operator believed that used oil had been drained into an underground storage tank on a routine basis at the facility, as the oil was changed in customer vehicles. In fact, it developed that, unbeknownst to Mr. Winters, the tank had been removed by the prior land owner. This resulted in repetitive contamination of soil and groundwater at the facility, since the oil poured into the floor drain at the station, after being removed from the crank cases of customer vehicles, was in reality draining into the ground, instead of into a storage tank. After becoming aware of this problem, Puckett filed an Early Detection Incentive (EDI) Program Notification Application, reporting the discharge of used oil to the Department, pursuant to Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). That EDI notification application form lists used oil as a "product." Puckett notified the Department of its intent to proceed with voluntary cleanup at the Puckett site pursuant to Section 376.3071(11) and (12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), and to seek reimbursement for the cost of that contamination cleanup pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). The Department, in view of the request, conducted a site inspection on December 19, 1986. The Department's inspection personnel prepared an EDI Program Compliance Notification Checklist on the Puckett site. This report noted the circumstances of the discharge, to the effect that the used oil tank had been removed while used oil was still being disposed of through the drain at the service station. Thereafter, by its Order of April 16, 1987, the Department advised Puckett that its site was not eligible for "Super Act" reimbursement. The denial of eligibility was based on the DER's position that used oil was not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" for purposes of Section 376.301(9) or (10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). On May 8, 1987, Puckett filed a Petition for Formal Proceedings, alleging, among other things, that used oil is "petroleum" or "petroleum product" within the meaning of the "Super Act" and that the Department is estopped from denying "Super Act" reimbursement eligibility for voluntarily reported discharges of used oil. Inasmuch as the DER conducted inspections of the site in question, recording its findings, the Department was aware of the circumstances of the discharge; that the used oil tank had been removed and that oil had continued thereafter to be placed in the drain facility, thus contaminating the soil where the used oil disposal tank had formerly been placed. The Department did not raise the eligibility exception involving gross negligence in the Order of April 16, 1987, however, nor by any other vehicle until the filing of its Motion for Continuance with the Hearing Officer on August 31, 1987. Additionally, in response to a Request for Admissions served by Puckett, the Department admitted that the sole basis for denial of the reimbursement eligibility for the Puckett site was the fact that the substance discharged was "used oil," which the Department contends is not petroleum or petroleum product and thus is not a proper subject for reimbursement of related clean up and decontamination expenses. Uncontroverted evidence establishes that in August 1984, eleven oil changes at the Puckett site generated 3.5 quarts or about 9 1/2 gallons of used oil. Using this figure as an average, until the time the discharge was discovered 22 months later, the Puckett site generated approximately 210 gallons of used oil. Mr. Winters testified that he believed he had a 500 or 1,000 gallon used oil tank. Puckett's used oil was disposed of by inserting the drain bucket on the floor drain. The floor drain is a receptacle with an adapter on it for the oil drain bucket. Although the floor drain system appeared to be a working system, the underground used oil storage tank at the Puckett site had been removed, unbeknownst to Mr. Winters. It was apparently removed by Exxon Corporation, the previous site operator. It was Exxon's practice to remove fuel tanks from non-operational stations, such as the Puckett site was at the time it was sold to Puckett. It was not their normal practice, however, to remove used oil storage tanks. Mr. Winters, in his sixteen years of operating service stations, has never experienced a floor drain with such an adapter that was not connected to an underground storage tank. Further, he had previously leased a service station that had been purchased from Exxon after being closed for seven years and the used oil tank was still in place at the time he took possession of the station. He asked the person responsible for closing the Exxon station (the Puckett site) where the used oil tank was located. That person responded by pointing to an area of landscape shrubbery where a galvanized pipe could be seen protruding from the ground. A used oil collection company attempted to pump the contents of the tank using that pipe. Three large holly bushes were growing undisturbed over the area where Mr. Winters had been told the tank was located. It thus appeared to Mr. Winters that the tank could not have been removed. There was no evidence that Mr. Winters attempted to conceal the discharge of the oil or that he continued to dispose of the used oil in the floor drain after discovering that the tank had been removed. If the floor drain had not become stopped up, Mr. Winters likely never would have begun looking for the presence of the tank. A used oil collection company never was able to pump any used oil from the pipe supposedly connected to the tank. It was Mr. Winters' belief that used oil collection companies normally came to service stations after closing hours to pump the used oil storage tanks, so they can avoid paying for the used oil. It was for this reason, he believed, that he rarely had seen a used oil collection company trying to pump oil from such a storage tank. He was thus not concerned when the company reported that it could pump no used oil from the tank because he believed that another used oil collector had previously drained it. The used oil discharged at the Puckett site consists of used engine crank case oil with an estimated two percent of used transmission oil. Used oil at the Puckett site is not mixed with solvents or other hazardous wastes. Puckett does not accept neighborhood collections of used oil. An assessment of the contamination at the Puckett site was conducted by Delta Environmental Consultants. Delta had an analysis of soil samples prepared by Pioneer Laboratories and an analysis of ground water samples by Savannah Laboratories. Dr. Litt, the Petitioner Puckett's expert witness, opined, based on the contamination assessment, that the contamination was due to used oil or "used oil fuel" instead of "hazardous waste fuel" or hazardous waste. Dr. Litt relied on the testimony of Mr. Winters to the effect that solvents or other hazardous wastes were not mixed with the used oil at the Puckett site in the service station's operations. Based on the soil and ground water analyses supplied him, Dr. Litt found an absence of halogenated solvents which would commonly be mixed with used oil, thus corroborating Mr. Winters' testimony that the used oil at the Puckett facility was not known to have been mixed with any hazardous wastes. The soil analysis indicates a level of organic halogens of 1,090 parts per million. This level might raise a presumption, under relevant EPA regulations, that the oil had been mixed somewhat with hazardous wastes, but Dr. Litt established that indeed no mixing had occurred based upon Mr. Winters' testimony, as well as the fact that the testing method used is accurate to only a plus or minus 700 parts per million in a total range of 1,000 to 2,000 parts per million. Indeed, some halogen levels may be attributed to natural soil conditions. Thus, the finding of 1,090 parts per million organic halogens could be as much as 700 parts per million in error, and some of this quantity can be due to natural backgrounds. Additionally, the level of individual chlorinated solvents sampled indicated no mixing of used oil with typical hazardous wastes. International Petroleum Corporation International Petroleum Corporation (International) has operated an oil storage plant and used oil reclamation facility at 105 South Alexander Street, Plant City, Florida, since May 1980. That site contains approximately 10 acres. There are two on-site tank farms containing 17 above-ground stationary tanks and two underground tanks. One underground tank holds 10,000 gallons and is used to store diesel fuel. The other tank holds 5,000 gallons and stores virgin gasoline. The above-ground tanks range in size from 8,000 to 212,000 gallons and are used to store oil, both used oil and new oil. All the tanks have been registered with the DER in accordance with its rules and are a part of the DER's "stationary tank system." The plant site also contains an office building and a testing laboratory which provides an array of testing services. The lab contains an atomic absorption unit, kinematic viscosity baths, API gravity hydrometers, distillation equipment and a gas chromatography. International uses this equipment, operated by a trained chemist, to test incoming loads of oil for such things as viscosity, flash point, API gravity, heavy metals, halides, etc. Since 1980, International has received, processed and sold more than 5,000,000 gallons of oil from this facility. The oil processed through the facility includes virgin kerosene, diesel, jet fuel and oils of various grades ranging from ASTM grade numbers 1-4 (the distillates) and ASTM grade numbers 5, 6 and "bunker C" (the residuals). The residual oils are those oils left after the lighter distillates are removed through the vacuum distillation process. The amount of residual oils processed since 1980 is relatively low, less than fifteen percent of the total amount of oils processed at International's facility. Out of 7,000,000 gallons processed in an average year, the plant may receive two or three carloads of grade numbers 5, 6 or bunker C. From 1980 to 1985, approximately 7,000,000 to 12,000,000 gallons of virgin oils were processed at the facility. In each of those years, from 4,000,000 to 7,000,000 gallons of used oil were also processed. Over that five- year period approximately 20,000,000 gallons of used oil were processed and sold through the International facility. International blends virgin oils received at the plant with used oils to meet particular specifications of a customer. It uses its own trucks to collect oil from service stations, automobile dealerships and other industrial accounts. Oil is then delivered to the plant and tested for basic constituents before being placed in an appropriate storage tank. International tests all incoming used oil to see if it meets the criteria for so-called "on spec" used oil or "off spec" used oil. These specifications were established by the EPA in 1985 and adopted by the DER. Used oil meeting these criteria may be burned as fuel in industrial and non-industrial boilers without limitations. The criteria are as follows: Constituent/Property Allowable Level Arsenic 5 ppm maximum Cadmium 2 ppm maximum Chromium 10 ppm maximum Lead 100 ppm maximum Total Halogens 4,000 ppm maximum Flashpoint 100 degrees Fahrenheit minimum International has followed a practice of rejecting incoming used oil which fails to meet the criteria of 1,000 parts per million or less of total halogens, which is the rebuttable threshold presumption of "hazardous waste" oil. International makes an effort to ensure that used oil it receives and processes is thus "on spec." It regularly sends samples to independent laboratories to cross-check its own laboratory testing results. It is selective in its sources of used oil and typically obtains used oil from large companies such as the Mack truck shops, car dealerships and other large volume producers of used oil. These are sources unlikely to be contaminated with any hazardous materials. The "on-spec" used oil accepted by International is placed in separate storage tanks, segregated according to water content and API gravity, viscosity and lead content. It is then blended with virgin oils to meet the specification of various customers. Heat is sometimes supplied in order to drive off water. The used oil undergoes no further treatment or alteration, being merely tested and blended to meet the customer's requirements. Often blending is unnecessary. When a truckload is received, tested and found to meet specifications, it is sometimes directly delivered to a customer. International sometimes obtains used oil without payment from its suppliers and has often purchased it from the generators of used oil. It always sells it to its customers, however. It has a definitely defined industrial market as a fuel commodity and is recognized as having value when sold for such purposes. It may sell for as little as 30 cents per gallon and has sold for much more than that, depending on the market conditions prevailing at the time of sale. It is used both as a burner fuel for industrial and non-industrial boilers, as well as a key constituent in the phosphate beneficiation process. International sells approximately 40 percent of its used oil production to asphalt plants where it is used to fire burners and to rock drying mills, also as a burner fuel. It sells approximately 60 percent of its production of used oil to the phosphate companies for the beneficiation process. In that process, oil is used with other reagents and fatty acids to "float" phosphate out of the rock or ore in which it is contained, allowing it to be skimmed and separated. Although the oil is not burned as a fuel in this process, its use by the phosphate plants substitutes for virgin oils of ATM grade numbers 4 and 5 (heating oil) or in some cases kerosene or number 2 diesel. In 1985, International produced 4,295,101 gallons of used oil which were burned as a fuel by its customers and in 1986 produced 2,221,652 gallons of used oil which were burned as a fuel. The used oil which it sells for the beneficiation process meets DER and EPA standards for "on spec" used oil fuel, except for the lead content, which fact is immaterial to its use for the beneficiation of phosphate. The used oil sold for phosphate purposes does meet pertinent regulatory standards for "off spec" used oil, in any event, so that it could be burned as industrial furnace fuel under EPA and DER rules. The sale of used oil for final use as a burner fuel is very common. Many oil recyclers pick up used oil and take it directly to asphalt plants for burning as fuel without any blending or other treatment. International's sale of 60 percent of its used oil for phosphate processing is unique in the used oil industry, but is attributable to its close proximity to the central Florida phosphate plants. Most oil recycling facilities sell a larger percentage of their product for burner fuel than does International. The used oil which International sells as burner fuel is comparable to heating oil, ASTM grade numbers 2 or 4 and has a similar viscosity, specific gravity and flash point. It can be poured and handled without preheating. Residual oil, however, such as grade numbers 5 and 6 (bunker C) are very viscous and require preheating in industrial boilers or burner furnaces before it can be burned as fuel. The used oil sold by International Petroleum is more similar to ASTM grades 2 and 4 (the distillates) than it is to grades 5 and 6 (the residuals). Petroleum hydrocarbon contamination of the soil and groundwater at the International site was discovered in December 1983 by DER personnel. International retained a consultant to assess the site and determine the nature and extent of any contamination. It has already expended more than $50,000 in an effort to investigate and clean up petroleum contamination at its site. DER conducted a soil and groundwater site investigation in 1985, which showed that hydrocarbons were in the soil and that volatile organics were also present in the groundwater at the site. International has provided all background information requested by DER on site conditions existing prior to cleanup. This was for purposes of showing its entitlement to reimbursement eligibility. The contamination at the site consisted mostly of small leaks, drips and spills associated with loading and unloading railway tank cars, as well as stationary tanks, over at least a five year period. The storage tanks include integral piping systems, and some leakage occurred at hose or pipe connections. The petroleum products placed in the various tanks in the tank farm vary, so that the contamination existing at the site cannot be differentiated or attributed separately to used oils or virgin oils, to distillates (ASTM grades 1-4) or the heavier residuals. All are made up of hydrocarbons and their breakdown products in the ground are essentially indistinguishable. The record does not establish that any major or significant oil spills have occurred at the plant site and does not show that the operators have been particularly negligent or have failed to conform to industry standards. International has already taken remedial action by building high retaining walls and by removing contaminated dirt where repeated drippages occurred near the railroad tracks. Employees have received training to avoid leaks from hoses and pipes and have been instructed to clean up even small spills immediately. Valve equipment has also been upgraded. As a result of these efforts, subsequent testing of the monitoring wells at the site has shown that the groundwater condition has markedly improved and it may be possible that the cleanup action already taken will be sufficient to accord with regulatory standards for groundwater. Used Oil as "Petroleum" or "Petroleum Product" Used oil is derived from crude oil and consists primarily of engine lubricating oil which is a form of hydrocarbon and a special fraction of the original crude oil. The lubricating oil consists of vacuum distilled base oil and atmospheric distillate portions of crude oil produced at a refinery and further refined by processes involving wax removal and solvent extraction. The remaining portion of lubricating oil consists of additives added to the base oil to improve certain physical properties such as rust inhibition and to improve viscosity. Many of these additives, in turn, are substantially comprised of base oil themselves. Used oil also typically contains gasoline which condenses in the crank case, water, gasoline additives, lead sulfates, carbonates or oxides and other partial combustion products of gasoline motor fuel. Lead contained in used engine oil is produced by engines running on tetraethyl lead gasoline. This lead accumulates in the form of lead sulfate, lead carbonate or lead oxide, rather than tetraethyl lead in its original form. The sulfates, carbonates and oxides are insoluble and are not likely to be leached out by groundwater, in contrast to tetraethyl lead. Use of the oil does not change its basic chemical structure. The oil may be contaminated by various impurities resulting from partial combustion of gasoline, from rust, from condensed water and so forth, but these are essentially mechanical mixtures, rather than alterations of the chemical structure of the oil itself. Aside from water, when oil is pumped from the ground at the well, two substances are produced at the well head: crude petroleum oil and natural gas, including casing head gas. Used oil is similar in nature to the petroleum products specifically listed in Section 376.301(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). The predominant use of used oil is as a fuel, similar to diesel, kerosene and gasoline. A fuel is a material burned as a source of heat, rather than for disposal purposes. It can be either for propulsion purposes or for stationary equipment such as industrial boilers, asphalt plants and the like. Kerosene and diesel fuel are similar in terms of viscosity and BTU value to ASTM grade number 2 fuel oil. Used oil is thicker and more viscous than ASTM grades 2, 3 or 4, but not so viscous as grades 5 or 6. Neither does it have as high a BTU content as grade number 5 fuel oil. ASTM grade number 5 residual oil must be preheated before burning as a fuel. Viscosity is too high for the material to atomize properly at normal temperature. In fact, used oil can be used as a blending agent to blend down or reduce viscosity of grade number 5 oil and reduce the temperature to which number 5 oil must be preheated before burning. With some variance from one sample to another, used oil typically is similar in viscosity and BTU value to ASTM grade number 3 or 4 fuel oil. Gasoline, kerosene, diesel and used oil are all hydrocarbons which burn readily. These materials are mixtures of hydrocarbons, with additives which do not materially affect the properties of the hydrocarbon fuel, or its use as a fuel. Gasoline, in fact, is not classified by ASTM grade. Parenthetically, it thus appears that the Legislature did not intend to limit the scope of "petroleum product" by such considerations as only viscosity and BTU value. "Petroleum products" are commonly used as fuels and are typically stored at service stations or storage tank facilities which can pose a danger of causing inland soil or water contamination, if improperly discharged. Gasoline, kerosene, diesel and used oil are commonly stored in tanks at facilities throughout the state. Used oil does not have any meaningful similarity to the substances specifically excluded from the definition of petroleum or petroleum product by Section 376.301(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). Used oil, for instance, bears little similarity to liquefied petroleum gas or to petrochemical feed stocks, which latter products are used to supply the raw materials for chemical plants manufacturing petrochemicals of many types. Used oil only is similar to these substances to the extent that it is within the broad family of hydrocarbons derived from crude oil or gases, derived in turn from petroleum wells. Likewise, the ASTM Grades 5 and 6 residual oils are based on the residuum or the heave viscous material left after the distillation process is applied to crude oil. This residuum is the material left that is too heavy to further distill. On the other hand, crank case lubricating oils and transmission oils, which are typically involved in the category "used oil" or "used oil fuel," are derived by the process of vacuum distillation such that they are distillation products, as opposed to residual products. "Bunker C" oils, and marine bunkering oils generally, are residual fuel products and, together with asphalt oil, are not used as fuel, at least not at inland locations. These materials likewise are typically not stored at inland service stations or bulk storage or reclamation facilities and locations. Both the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Florida DER, in their regulatory scheme concerning used oil, encourage its collection and recycling. Used oil is typically recycled as a fuel and as a lubricant, by being separated from its contaminants by a re-refining process. Indeed, the oil constituent of used oil is not altered by use as lubricating or transmission oil, but rather is rendered in a "used oil" state by being subjected to various contaminants. It is not presently economically viable, given low virgin oil prices, to recycle used oil for lubricating oil. Thus, the two alternatives for disposition of used oil are to deposit it in landfills, a practice now generally prohibited by the DER and other regulatory authorities, or to use it as a fuel. Indeed, the use of used oil as a fuel is about the only practical way to dispose of it safely and legally in view of former uses, such as road oiling for dust control and weed abatement, now being prohibited in potable water aquifer areas. Section 403.75(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Thus, it is not only common and general practice to burn used oil as a boiler fuel and as a fuel in various industrial and utility plants, at the present time-that is almost the only manner in which it can be legally and safely disposed of. The Department itself has a policy encouraging the collection and recycling of used oil, as lubricating oil, fuel or as a feed stock in the manufacturing of other petroleum products. (See IP Exhibits 17, 18 and Joint Exhibit 5 in evidence.) Under EPA regulations which have been adopted by DER, used oil is not regulated as a hazardous waste. Under these regulations, the EPA has adopted a "rebuttable presumption of mixing" in order to distinguish between used oils which have been contaminated through mere use and used oils which have been mixed with hazardous wastes and therefore must be regulated as hazardous wastes or "hazardous waste fuel." Certain hazardous, halogenated constituents, such as chlorinated solvents, are the hazardous wastes typically found mixed with used oil. The "presumption of mixing" provides that any used oil containing greater than 1,000 parts per million of total halogens (such as chlorine, fluorine, bromine, iodine and similar substances) is presumed to have been mixed with a hazardous waste and will be regulated as "hazardous waste fuel" under 40 CFR Part 266, Subpart D, rather than as "used oil fuel" under 40 CFR Part 266, Subpart E. Hazardous waste fuel is essentially a hazardous waste with a BTU value of at least 5,000 BTUs per gallon. Hazardous waste fuel burning is tightly regulated by the EPA and DER. The presumption of mixing can be rebutted through a demonstration that the used oil in question has not been mixed with any hazardous waste. If mixing of used oil with hazardous wastes is known to have occurred, however, the oil is regulated as a hazardous waste when it is burned for energy recovery. Once it has been determined that a particular used oil is a used oil fuel and not a hazardous waste, the used oil falls into one of two categories: "Specification used oil fuel" or "off-specification used oil fuel." Specification used oil contains essentially the same toxic constituents as virgin oil fuels. Off-specification used oil fuel contains elevated levels of toxic components. Most used oil is off-specification, particularly if it is made up of mixtures of several types of used oil. If oil comes from a service station which was used in an engine burning leaded gasoline it would likely result in the used oil from that engine being off-specification due to the toxic lead compounds which would be present in the oil. If the oil was used in an engine which burned unleaded fuel, it is likely that it would be within specification limits for "on-specification used oil." Neither type of used oil is regulated as hazardous waste when burned as fuel, however. For purposes of determining whether an oil fuel is off-specification on on-specification, the EPA has developed a list [at 40 CFR Section 266.40(e): of contaminants, with the allowable levels for each contaminant, below which oil will be determined to be "on specification." Those contaminants are arsenic (5 ppm), cadmium (2 ppm), chromium (10 ppm), lead (100 ppm), with total halogens not exceeding 4,000 ppm in order for used oil to be within specification for nonindustrial burning. Specification used oils may be burned as fuel in nonindustrial boilers, including schools, hospitals, and apartment buildings. Off-specification used oil fuel may be burned in industrial furnaces, industrial boilers, utility boilers and some space heaters meeting certain federal safety requirements. Moreover, EPA regulations allow the blending of off-specification and specification used oil so that the resultant used oil, when burned, meets the specifications for nonindustrial burning. The Department's policy makers who were responsible for the initial decision that used oil is not petroleum or a petroleum product did not consult with certain key personnel in the Department's own used oil section concerning whether oil should be considered as a petroleum or petroleum product. In fact, Mr. Gentry, who is involved in policy making regarding the subject matter of the "Super Act," was not aware that the Department has a program to encourage the burning of used oil as a fuel nor the fact that used oil is extensively burned as a fuel in Florida.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the applications of Puckett Oil 4 Company and International Petroleum Corporation for eligibility for reimbursement pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 7th of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NOS. 87-2161 & 87-2465 Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-23. Accepted. 24. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 25-38. Accepted. 39-40. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and as not directly material. 41-45. Accepted. 46-48. Rejected as not material and relevant. 49-54. Accepted. 55. Rejected as subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 56-58. Accepted. 59. Rejected as subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 60-63. Accepted. 64. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject and as unnecessary to the resolution of material issues. 65-70. Accepted. 71. Rejected as irrelevant. 72-77. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject. Accepted, but not directly relevant and material. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-5. Accepted. 6. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 7-8. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as immaterial, in part, because the Hearing Officer, in determining whether the material at the subject sites meets the statutory definitions at issue is not, by the "pleading" confronted with the issue of whether any and all types of "used oil" meet these definitions, rather merely those types comprising the contamination at Petitioner's facility. The Hearing Officer cannot, in this proceeding, issue declaratory statements or advisory opinions. Accepted. Accepted, except for the next to last sentence. 11-12. Accepted. Accepted as to its historic accuracy, but not as a resolution of the essential issue presented. Rejected as immaterial in the absence of a Motion to Compel further, more detailed answers. Accepted as to its historical accuracy, but, for reasons similar to the ruling next above, not as probative of the appropriate, timely raising of the issue of gross negligence. 16-24. Accepted. 25-26. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Accepted. Accepted as to its historical import. 29-38. Accepted. 39. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant evidence of record. 40-43. Accepted. 44-45. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact, but, rather, a conclusion of law and statement of policy. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant evidence, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and as largely immaterial. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter; as being partially immaterial and as a discussion of policy and not a pertinent finding of fact. 51-53. Rejected as constituting legal argument and not a finding of fact. 54-55. Rejected as constituting legal argument. 56. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 57-58. Rejected as - subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 61-63. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and as constituting, in part, legal argument instead of fact finding. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and, standing alone, of scant materiality in proving whether used oil is a "petroleum product" or a "fuel commodity." Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 78-80. Accepted in part, but not as to its material import and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 81-84. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant credible evidence. 85. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant credible evidence and as largely immaterial. 86-87. Rejected as immaterial to the ultimate factual and legal issues. 88-89. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as contrary to the preponderant credible evidence. Accepted. 92-93. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 94-95. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and not in itself material. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as not comporting with the preponderant weight of the evidence and as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and as not directly material and relevant. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's 4 findings on this subject matter. 102-103. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as to its purported material import. 104. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as to its purported material import and further as not being in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. 105-106. Rejected as constituting legal argument and discussion. 107-109. Rejected as constituting legal argument and discussion and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 110-111. Rejected as constituting legal argument and discussion. 112-113. Rejected as constituting legal argument and discussion and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected as constituting legal argument and discussion. Accepted but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and not, in itself, material to the legal issue sub judice. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of credible evidence. Rejected as not in itself material and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Rejected as not in itself material and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the credible evidence and as constituting legal argument and discussion. 119-120. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as to its purported material import and further as not being in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Fingar, Esquire HUEY, GUILDAY, KUERSTEINER & TUCKER Regulation Suite 510 First Florida Bank Building Post Office Box 1794 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Blair 2600 Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399. L. Caleen, Jr., Esquire OERTEL & HOFFMAN 2400 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 E. Gary Early, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of the site known as Union 76 #702 or as Taylor's 76, Inc., located at 9700 East Indigo Street, Perrine, Dade County, Florida. The prior owner of that site was Lawrence Oil Company. There appears to be a commonality of principals between Petitioner TYU, Inc., and its predecessor in title, Lawrence Oil Company. In 1986 the Legislature created the Early Detection Incentive Program (hereinafter "EDI") to encourage early detection, reporting, and cleanup of contamination from leaking petroleum storage systems. Essentially, the Legislature created a 30-month grace period ending on December 31, 1988, for owners of sites with contamination from petroleum storage systems to apply for reimbursement for cleanup expenses due to the contamination, without retribution from the State. The statute also provided several bases for which an applicant would be deemed ineligible. Prior to the December 31, 1988, deadline Petitioner checked the various sites owned by it, including the site which is the subject of this proceeding, to determine whether contamination was present. The subject site had been a service station, selling gasoline for 30 to 35 years. From 1986 forward, however, gasoline was no longer being dispensed at the site although the underground gasoline tanks were still present. It is unknown whether the tanks were emptied at the time that they were taken out of service. Automobile repairs were still performed at the site. By 1989, the site was also occupied by a lawn maintenance company and a pool company. In 1988 and 1989 a 55-gallon drum of used oil was located on the site. The lawn company employees used that oil to lubricate their chain saws. The remainder of the used oil and the solvents from the small parts washer were picked up from that site for recycling. In November or December of 1988, Harry Barkett, president of Lawrence Oil Company, personally visited the site. He sampled the monitoring wells. Because he smelled gasoline in the monitoring wells, he retained Seyfried & Associates, Inc., an environmental consultant, to prepare a report to be submitted to the Department. That report is dated December 15, 1988. Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program, together with the report of Seyfried & Associates, Inc., was submitted to the Department prior to the December 31, 1988, deadline. At the time, Metropolitan Dade County's Department of Environmental Resources Management (hereinafter "DERM") was performing EDI inspections for the Department pursuant to a contract. On March 22, 1989, a DERM employee who performed only industrial waste inspections went to the subject site. He specifically was not there to inspect the petroleum storage systems, and he did not do so. That employee went into the service bays where the routine auto repair and maintenance services were performed. He noticed the floor drains going from the service bays to the oil/water separator. He then inspected the oil/water separator. He noted that a hole had been cut at the top of the effluent pipe, which breached the system and which might allow oil to flow into either a drain field or a septic tank system. He did not check further to ascertain which. He took three samples from inside the oil/water separator, one for oil and grease, one for phenols, and one for metals, specifically cadmium, chromium, and lead. Not surprisingly, the laboratory analysis of those samples indicated the presence of phenols, oil, and grease. The only sampling done by that employee was of the contents of the oil/water separator. No investigation was made of, and no samples were taken from, the soil or groundwater anywhere on the site. Such sampling was not part of that employee's authority or responsibility. On October 11, 1989, Dade County DERM sent a different employee to perform the EDI inspection at the subject site. To determine the presence of contamination from petroleum or petroleum products, that employee dipped an acrylic bailer into each of the monitoring wells and then "sniffed the bailer" to ascertain if the odor of gasoline could be detected. He did not dip the bailer lower than the top foot of water since he did not wish to bring the bailer up through a column of water before sniffing. Dade County DERM employees no longer "sniff the bailer" due to the health risk involved in such a procedure. In 1989, however, it was the common practice for DERM employees to "sniff the bailer," albeit cautiously. That employee failed to detect the odor of gasoline and did not see any petroleum contamination in the monitoring wells. He issued a report to that effect. He took no samples from the soil or groundwater to determine if there were contamination from petroleum or petroleum products at the site. Based upon the second report indicating the absence of gasoline odor and based upon the first report indicating the presence of oil, grease, and phenols inside the oil/water separator, Dade County DERM recommended to the Department that Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program be denied. Based upon that recommendation, the Department sent Petitioner a letter dated May 23, 1990, denying Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program. That letter stated as the two reasons for denial the following: Contamination is not the result of a discharge from a petroleum storage facility as defined in Section 376.301(11), Florida Statutes. Waste oil contamination found on the ground and groundwater was the result of poor maintenance practices by site owner/ operator. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is restricted to contamination from such storage facilities pursuant to 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. Contamination is a mixture of waste oil, grease and phenolic compounds. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is limited to petroleum or petroleum products as defined in Section 37.301 [sic] (9) and (10), Florida Statutes. That letter further advised Petitioner of its right to request a hearing regarding that determination and advised Petitioner that its failure to timely request an administrative hearing would render that correspondence to be a final Order of Determination of Ineligibility. When Petitioner received that correspondence, one of its employees interpreted the letter to mean that the Department had determined that the site did not have contamination from petroleum or a petroleum product. Viewing that as good news, that employee merely put the letter in a file. No request for an administrative hearing was made by Petitioner, and the correspondence became a final Order of Determination of Ineligibility by its own terms. In 1990 the Legislature determined that all sites which had been declared ineligible by the Department would be re-determined for eligibility. The Legislature established March 31, 1991, as the new deadline by which owners or operators could request the Department to reevaluate eligibility for sites for which a timely EDI application had been filed but which had been deemed ineligible by the Department. The new legislation set forth several circumstances under which the Department would not redetermine the eligibility of a previously denied site. One of those exceptions related to the reason for which a site had initially been denied. Petitioner had remained convinced that the subject site was contaminated by petroleum or petroleum products prior to the original deadline for filing EDI applications. Petitioner was aware of the new legislation and new deadline by which sites determined ineligible could have their eligibility redetermined. Petitioner therefore retained Kiefer-Block Environmental Services, Inc., to do a site analysis to verify Petitioner's belief that the site had a petroleum contamination. That company issued a report indicating that was the case. Petitioner timely filed its application for redetermination before the March 31, 1991, deadline and submitted to the Department the information obtained from Kiefer-Block, the second environmental consultant to verify the presence of petroleum contamination. In reviewing applications for redetermination, the Department established a procedure whereby it simply looked at its original letter denying eligibility to ascertain the reason for denial. If that reason matched one of the exclusions under the new legislation, the Department advised the applicant that it was not eligible to have its site redetermined. The Department did not review the Department's files relating to a site and did no additional inspection. In 1991 the Legislature again amended the statute, this time carving out an exception to those sites excluded from redetermination of eligibility by directing that sites excluded due to an absence of contamination be redetermined for eligibility if contamination had in fact existed. That amendment went into effect July 1, 1991. Accordingly, that amendment was part of the law in effect when the Department made its decision as to whether it would redetermine Petitioner's eligibility. By letter dated September 3, 1991, the Department advised Petitioner that it was not eligible to participate in the redetermination process. That letter specifically provided as follows: This Order is to inform you that this site is not eligible to participate in the eligibility redetermination process pursuant to Section 376.3071(9)(b), F.S., because the original reasons for ineligibility were: Contamination is not the result of a discharge from a petroleum storage facility as defined in Section 376.301(11), Florida Statutes [definition in Section 376.301(15), F.S., current revision]. Waste oil contamination found on the ground and groundwater was the result of poor maintenance practices by site owner/ operator. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is restricted to contamination from such storage facilities pursuant to 376.3071(9), F.S. Contamination is a mixture of waste oil, grease and phenolic compounds. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is limited to petroleum or petroleum products as defined in Section 376.301(9) and (10), Florida Statutes [definitions in Section 376.301(13) and (14), F.S., current revision]. Section 376.3071(9)(b)3.c., F.S., states that redetermination of eligibility is not available to facilities that were denied eligibility due to contamination from substances that were not petroleum or a petroleum product, or contamination that was not from a petroleum storage system. Petitioner timely filed its request for an administrative hearing regarding that letter, contesting the Department's refusal to redetermine Petitioner's eligibility to participate in the EDI program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: (1) granting Petitioner's application for redetermination of eligibility and (2) finding Petitioner ineligible to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-0678 Petitioner's three unnumbered paragraphs contained in its post-hearing submittal have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5-18, and 20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Vittorino Special Projects Manager TYU, Inc. 1601 McCloskey Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33605-6710 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue Whether Petitioner's site, Hughes Supply, Inc. located at 2920 Ford Street, Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida is eligible for restoration under Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Hughes is a Florida Corporation in good standing and authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The Department's facility no. 36-8519331 (the Facility), owned and operated by Hughes and the subject matter of this proceeding, is located at 2920 Ford Street, Ft. Myers, Lee County, Florida, and is a "Facility" as defined in Section 376.301(5), Florida Statutes. The Facility consisted of (a) two underground storage tanks (USTs), one 4000 gallons UST (gasoline tank) and one 8000 gallons UST (diesel tank), and (b) four monitoring well, and is a "petroleum storage system" as defined in Section 376.301(15), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Hughes held, and was the name insured of, an effective third party pollution liability insurance policy (No. FPL 7622685 - Renewal No. FPL 7621566) applicable to the Facility that was issued in accordance with, and qualified under, Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes. Hughes paid annual premiums exceeding $20,000.00 for the above insurance. In accordance with Sections 376.3072, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 17- 769, Florida Administrative Code; the Department issued to Hughes a Notice of Eligibility pertaining to the Facility and the third party pollution liability insurance referred to in Finding of Fact 4 above. Lee County, Florida has a local program approved by the Department pursuant to Section 376.3073, Florida Statutes, to provide for the administration of the Department's responsibilities under certain sections of Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Diesel fuel was placed into the diesel tank at the Facility on August 12, 1991, and no diesel fuel has been placed in the diesel tank at the Facility since that date. On Thursday, August 29, 1991, a contractor bidding on the removal of the tanks detected free product in one of the monitoring wells at the Facility and told Larry Carman, the Warehouse Manager for Hughes. Mr. Carman told Phillip Ross, the Branch Manager for Hughes, who in turn informed Gene Kendall, the Operations Coordinator for Hughes. All of this occurred on August 29, 1991. On Friday, August 30, 1991, an employee of IT Corporation, acting upon the request of Gene Kendall, sampled the four monitoring wells at the Facility and found six inches of free product in the northwest monitoring well. On Tuesday, September 3, 1991, Fred Kendall discussed the discharge with Bill W. Johnson, Supervisor, Lee County Storage Tank Local Program. During this discussion, Johnson learned that the diesel tank had not been emptied. Johnson advised Kendall that the diesel tank had to be emptied of its product and placed out of service. On Tuesday, September 3, 1991 Mr. Kendall completed the Discharge Reporting Form (DRF) pertaining to the discharge and mailed the DRF to Johnson on September 4, 1991. The DRF indicated August 30, 1992, the day that IT Corporation confirmed the discharge, as the day of discovery of the discharge. The discharge was diesel fuel as indicated by the DRF and a "petroleum product" as defined in Section 376.3-1(14), Florida Statutes. The discharge reported in the DRF constitutes a "discharge" as defined in Section 376.301(4), Florida Statutes, which constitutes an "incident" as defined in Section 376.3072(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and as described in Rule 17-769.600, Florida Administrative Code. On Wednesday, September 4, 1991, Mr. Kendall also mailed a letter to Johnson stating Hughes' intent to seek restoration coverage for the Facility, pursuant to Policy No. FPL 762285, Renewal No. FPL 7621566. On September 13, 1991 when Hooper, Inspector for the Lee County Storage Tank Local Program, inspected the Facility the diesel tank contained a total of 39 5/8 inches of diesel and water, of which 4 3/4 inches was water. On September 16, 1991 when Hooper again inspected the Facility, the diesel tank contained a total of 36 1/2 inches of diesel and water, of which 4 1/2 inches was water. On this date, Hooper advised Hughes that the diesel tank had to be emptied of its product. The inspection report issued on September 16, 1991 by Hooper advised Hughes that the Facility was not in compliance with Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code. On September 17, 1991, Hughes had the diesel tank emptied of all its product. Although Hughes was in the process of emptying the diesel tank by giving diesel away, at no time between August 30, 1991 and September 16, 1991 was the diesel tank completely empty of its product. Between August 30, 1991 and September 16, 1991 Hughes did not test the diesel tank to determine if the diesel tank was leaking and, if so, to pinpoint the source of the leak. There was no evidence that either the Department or Lee County Storage Tank Local Program personnel ever informed Hughes before September 16, 1991 that there was a time frame within which the diesel tank had to be emptied of all of its product, and placed out of service in order for Hughes to be in compliance and eligible for reimbursement for restoration under the FPLIRP. Likewise, Hughes did not request any information from the Department or the Lee County Local Program personnel concerning any time frames within which the diesel tank had to be tested for leaks or emptied of its contents to prevent any further discharge in order to be eligible for reimbursement for restoration under the FPLIRP. Between August 29, 1991 and September 17, 1991 Hughes bailed the monitoring wells at the Facility on a daily basis, removed the free product from the monitoring wells, and placed the free product in a sealed 55-gallon drum. When the discharge was discovered, Hughes made the decision to close the Facility by tank removal, and at this point did not intend to repair or replace the Facility. As a result of an inspection of the Facility by the Lee County Local Program personnel in May, 1991, Hughes was made aware that the Facility was not in compliance with Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code, since the gasoline tank had not been used in over three years, and there had been no closure of the gasoline tank. This noncompliance with Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code, concerning the gasoline tank was also a portion of the noncompliance report filed by Hooper on September 16, 1991. The gasoline tank comes within the definition of "unmaintained" as defined by Rule 17-761.200(2), Florida Administrative Code. Both the diesel tank and the gasoline tank were removed on October 28, 1991 by a Florida licensed storage tank system removal contractor, and the Facility permanently closed by IT Corporation on October 29, 1991. In December, 1991, Hughes filed a tank closure assessment report pertaining to the removal of the diesel and gasoline tanks from, and closure of, the Facility. The tank closure assessment report was prepared by IT Corporation upon a request made by Hughes to IT Corporation on September 3, 1991 for a tank closure assessment proposal which was submitted by IT Corporation to Hughes on September 4, 1991. In April or May, 1992, Hughes filed with Lee County a contamination assessment report prepared by IT Corporation pertaining to the removal of the USTs from and closure of the Facility. Subsequent to discovery of the discharge. Hughes has expended approximately $60,000.00 as of June 10, 1992, on the Facility in connection with the USTs. Site rehabilitation costs for the Facility have been estimated in a range of $220,000.00 to $245,000.00 as of June 10, 1992. In the early part of 1991 water was present in the diesel tank, and approximately six months before discovering the discharge in August, 1991, Hughes had the water pumped out of the diesel tank. Hughes gave no explanation for the presence of water in the diesel tank. Neither the Department nor the Lee County Local Program personnel were notified of this unexplained presence of water in the diesel tank.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order denying Hughes application for restoration coverage under the Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-8334 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the Proposed Finding(s) of Fact:(1); 2-3(2); 4-5(3); 6- 8(4); 9(5); 10(6); 11(8,9); 12(10,11); 14(15,22); 15(10); 16(19); 18(10); 19(13); 20-21(7); 22-23(24); 24(21); 25(17); 26-29(20); 30(15); 31(16); 32(22); 33(23); 35(23); 36(7); 37(23); 38(24); 39(25); 40(26); 41(27); 42-43(27); and 44(15,22). Proposed Findings of Fact 13, 17 and 34 are neither material nor relevant to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. The following Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the Proposed Finding(s) of Fact:1-2(2); 3(3); 4-6(5); 7(6); 8(22); 9(7); 10(8); 11(9); 12(10); 13-16(11); 17(12); 18(13): 19(18); 20(17); 21-22(14); 23-24(15); 25-26(28); 27(16); and 28(23). COPIES FURNISHED: Scott E. Wilt, Esquire Maguire, Voorhis and Wells 2 South Orange Plaza Orlando, Florida 32801 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Notice of Violation (NOV) and Orders for Corrective Action (OCA) filed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) against Respondents, Thomas Kerper (Kerper) and All Salvaged Auto Parts, Inc. (ASAP) , in DEP OGC File No. 02-0447 should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact 1. The real property located at 3141 Sharpe Road, Apopka, Florida, is owned by the heirs of Donald Joynt, who owned it for the 30 years prior to his death in 2002. The property consists of approximately 40 acres in the shape of a right triangle with the west side bordered by Sharpe Road, the south side by a potting soil business, and the northeast side (the hypotenuse of the right triangle) bordered by a railroad track. Prior to his death, Joynt used the property primarily for the purpose of operating a junkyard and recycling business ultimately entitled Don's Auto Recycling. 2. At some time before 2000, Joynt became desirous of selling his property. He offered it to a neighbor named José Luis Benitez for $600,000. Benitez counter-offered for between $350,000 and $400,000 because he thought it would cost $200,000 to $250,000 to clean the property up. Joynt rejected the counter-offer, and asked Benitez to help him find a buyer who would pay more than Benitez. At some point, Joynt listed the property with a real estate broker for $600,000. 3. In 1999, Kerper was operating an automobile parts salvage business at a location near Joynt's property. Kerper needed a new location to move his business and inventory. A real estate broker showed him Joynt's property. The broker told Kerper that the seller's broker said the property was clean and had no environmental problems. The broker also told Kerper that Orange County had recently purchased an easement for $300,000 to run a drainage ditch through the property to a local lake, which was true. While this gave Kerper some level of assurance, the broker advised Kerper to have an environmental assessment done before going forward with the sale. 4. After being shown the property by the broker, Kerper spoke with Joynt directly. It was agreed that they could save the real estate commission and split the savings by waiting until the listing expired. Joynt personally assured Kerper that there were no environmental issues, as evidenced by Orange County's purchase of the easement for a drainage ditch. In late March of 2000, after expiration of the real estate commission, Kerper and Joynt entered into an informal agreement allegedly written on a scrap of paper, which was not placed in evidence. Kerper testified that the agreement was for him to buy the property for $500,000, with $100,000 down, and the balance payable over time at seven percent interest. He also testified that the required $100,000 down payment would be payable in installments, with $25,000 payable whenever Joynt cleaned 25 percent of the site to make it usable by Kerper for his business operations. 5. When it came time for Kerper to move onto Joynt's property, Kerper discovered that Joynt had not done any clean-up or removed any of his property from the site. Used cars, car parts, and tires that belonged to Joynt remained throughout the site. According to Kerper, it was agreed that Kerper would help Joynt clean off the western half of the property, which was split approximately in half by a stream, while Joynt worked on cleaning off the eastern half of the property.” 6. Starting from the gate at Sharpe Road, Kerper began removing junk from the western side to the eastern side of the site for Joynt to remove from the property. Pieces of equipment and used car parts that had been left there by Joynt were removed from this section of the property. When enough space was cleared off, Kerper began setting up his auto salvage operations on the western side. He used a bulldozer to level the driveways and spread powdered concrete where the ground was soft. He also used the bulldozer to level an area near the scale house, which was on the western side of the property, but continued to be used by Joynt for Don's Auto Recycling business. In doing this work, his workers encountered steel reinforcement bars, which Kerper had them cut with a torch. Some tires and battery casings also were visible in the ground. Kerper had several truckloads of fill dumped in the area and installed a concrete pad for storing and dismantling automobiles. 7. In September or October of 2000, Kerper was evicted from his prior business location, and he had to move to Joynt's property regardless of its condition. As he increased business operations on the cleared spaces, Kerper continued to clear more space on the western side of the property. Another concrete pad was installed farther to the north. Eventually, Kerper was operating ASAP on approximately ten acres on the western side of the 40-acre site. 8. As Kerper continued to move north, his heavy equipment began encountering assorted kinds of buried material. When a buried propane tank exploded, Kerper stopped working his heavy equipment in the area and confronted Joynt. Joynt denied any knowledge of buried tanks and stated they must have been placed there by someone else. Joynt told Kerper he would let Kerper move his operations to the east side of the property when Joynt finished cleaning it up, and then Joynt would finish clearing the western side for Kerper. Kerper agreed, and continued making payments on the required down payment. According to Kerper, he eventually paid $90,000 of the down payment. 9. By August of 2001, Kerper began to have serious misgivings about Joynt's promises and the condition of the site, and he decided to seek advice. Kerper hired David Beerbower, vice-president of Universal Engineering, to perform an assessment of the northern portion of his side of the site (in the vicinity where the exploding tanks were encountered). During his assessment on August 20, 2001, Beerbower observed various automotive parts including numerous crushed fuel tanks, antifreeze containers, and motor oil containers being excavated from the upper three feet of soil. It was determined by Beerbower, and stated in his written report to Kerper, dated September 21, 2001, that these parts appeared to have been buried there several years ago. This determination, which DEP does not dispute, was based on the high level of compaction of the soil found around these items that could be attributed to either the passing of a significant amount of time or a bulldozer passing over the items. Since the excavations Beerbower observed were in a separate location from where Kerper had already bulldozed, the soil compaction around these items could not be attributed to Kerper's bulldozing. It was stated in Beerbower's letter that the “amount of buried automotive debris qualifies this area essentially as an illicit landfill." ad 10. Mark Naughton from the Risk Management Division of the Orange County Environmental Protection Division (OCEPD), which runs the petroleum storage tank and cleanup program for Orange County under contract with DEP, was also present during the time Beerbower conducted his assessment. Naughton agreed with Beerbower's assessment that Kerper is not liable for the assessment or remediation of this area. Naughton also advised Kerper to move ASAP off Naughton's property and to seek legal advice from attorney Anna Long, who used to be the Manager of OCEPD. 11. Meanwhile, according to Kerper, Joynt changed his position and began to maintain that it was Kerper's responsibility to clean up the western side of the property. Given the newly-discovered environmental condition of the property, Kerper did not feel it was in his best interest to purchase the property "as is," and contacted Long to help him negotiate to extricate himself from his arrangement with Joynt. While negotiations proceeded, Kerper began to scale down ASAP's operations in anticipation of relocating. Kerper began fixing up more whole automobiles for resale, and had a car crusher used in connection with ASAP's business begin crushing more cars for removal from the site for recycling. 12. Eventually, Long had Beerbower conduct another assessment of portions of Joynt's property to try to establish responsibility for contamination as between Kerper and Joynt. On 10 February 13, 2001, Beerbower took a surface water sample froma "drain pipe under the north driveway," a soil sample "where the car crusher was," and another soil sample from "the sandblasting area." The evidence was not clear as to the exact location of these samples, particularly the soil samples, as described in Beerbower's written report to Long dated March 11, 2002. But it appears that the "car crusher" refers to the location of Respondents' car crusher operation in the northern part of the site, just across the northern driveway; it appears that the sandblasting area refers to a location used by Joynt on the eastern side of the property, but located just east of the trailers used by Kerper for his offices. These samples were analyzed and found not to contain volatile organic compounds (VOC) or total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons (TRPH) in excess of Florida's cleanup target levels. 13. Kerper continued to operate his junkyard until the beginning of March of 2002. On March 5, 2002, Long filed a citizen's complaint with OCEPD on Kerper's behalf. While acknowledging that Kerper was operating on the site at the same time as Joynt in recent years, the complaint alleged Kerper's discovery that Joynt had been burying waste batteries, tires, and gasoline tanks on the property and covering the burial sites with broken concrete pieces. The complaint alleged that Kerper had been moving his personal property off of the site since August of 2001, when he backed out of his "lease to purchase" agreement 11 with Joynt, and would be "completely off the property by 3/10/02." 414. It is not clear exactly when Kerper and ASAP were completely off the property. The testimony and evidence on the point is inconsistent. Kerper, after some confusion, placed the date at March 9, 2002. His wife said it was March 2, 2002. An attorney representing Kerper and ASAP in an eviction proceeding filed by Joynt and his wife, filed a notice "that as of the evening of March 15, 2002, [ASAP had] vacated the property." In any event, the evidence seemed clear that Kerper and ASAP did not go on Joynt's property on or after March 15, 2002. 15. On March 15, 2002, DEP representatives inspected Joynt's property in response to Long's complaint. Kerper remained outside the front gate of the property and did not participate in the inspection. This inspection covered the entire property including the section that had been occupied by Kerper and ASAP. 16. doynt told the DEP inspectors that Respondents were responsible for a 55-gallon drum found tipped over on its side on the western half of the site and leaking a substance that appeared to be used oil from a hole in the side of the drum. DEP's inspectors righted the drum, which still was partly full of its contents. There also were several other unlabeled 55-gallon drums and 5-gallon containers "of unknown fluids"; a burn pile containing burned oil filters, battery casings, and electrical 12 wiring; other broken battery casings; and an area of dark-stained soil which appeared to be soaked with used oil. Joynt accepted responsibility for other contamination on the site, but told DEP that Kerper and ASAP were responsible for these items. Kerper denied the allegations. 17. As to the leaking oil drum, Kerper first contended that DEP did not prove that the overturned drum contained used oil. But the evidence was clear that DEP's inspectors were ina position to determine that the liquid was oily. Respondents also contended that the drum would have been empty, not still partly full, if Kerper or ASAP had left it on its side at the site when they vacated the property several days earlier. Kerper alleged that Joynt could have put the hole in the drum and turned it over shortly before the arrival of DEP's inspectors. But, as stated, it was not clear when Kerper and ASAP vacated the site, and it was not clear from the evidence that Respondents were not responsible. 18. Similarly, the other unlabeled drums and containers were in a part of the site occupied and used by Respondents. Despite Kerper's denials, it is not clear from the evidence that they belonged to Joynt or that they were placed where DEP found them after Respondents vacated the site. Testimony that Respondents had containers properly labeled "used oil," "antifreeze," and "gasoline" inside one of the trailers on the site did not negate the existence of unlabeled drums and 13 containers on the site. However, there was no proof whatsoever as to what the closed drums and containers held. But some were open, and DEP's inspectors could see that these held an oily substance (possibly hydraulic fluid), mixed with other substances. 19. As to the dark-stained soil, none of it was tested, and Respondents contended that it was just naturally darker in color or possibly wet from water or some other liquid, DEP's witness conceded could explain the color variation. (Natural reasons such as different soil or rainwater probably do not explain the color variations in the site.) Joynt told DEP's inspectors that the discoloration seen by them on March 15, 2002, was froma hydraulic hose on a piece of heavy equipment that burst earlier. The evidence was not clear who Joynt was saying owned and operated the equipment. But Respondents also blamed Joynt's employees for repeatedly blowing hoses on aged heavy equipment all over the site. It is found that the dark-stained soil probably was the result of one or more releases of hydraulic fluid or motor oil. However, the testimony and evidence was not clear that all of the releases were Joynt's doing and that Respondents bear no responsibility at all for the releases observed on March 15, 2002, in the areas where Respondents were operating. 20. Respondents were able only to produce documentation of proper disposal of 232 gallons of oily water through IPC/Magnum, 14 dated February 13, 2002, and 29 batteries through Battery World, dated March 8 and 14, 2002. 21. The testimony of Kerper and others was that Respondents generally removed gasoline from automobiles and placed it ina marked container for reuse within a day or two by Respondents and their employees. The testimony was that used oil and antifreeze generally also were removed from automobiles and placed in marked containers until proper disposition. The testimony was that batteries were removed from automobiles and that most were given to one of the employees to sell for a dollar apiece. There was no documentation to support this testimony. 22. There was testimony that, when Respondents had cars crushed, E & H Car Crushing Co., Inc., managed the collection and proper disposition of gasoline, used oil, and batteries. But the documentation placed in evidence contained no description of the wastes removed, but only provided a weight calculation of the materials removed from Respondents’ facility. 23. There was testimony that Gabriel Lynch, who was properly licensed, removed freon from automobiles at Respondents’ facility every two to three days, or upon request. Respondents would trade the freon Lynch recovered and used in his business, Gabe's Auto Tech, for repair work on Respondents' vehicles. However, no documentation of these transactions was produced. (Lynch testified that he did not know it was required that he provide documentation to Respondents.) 15 24. Runoff from where Respondents were operating on Joynt's property entered the stream running north-south through the center of the property. Neither Joynt nor Respondents had a stormwater permit or an exemption from stormwater permitting. 25. Kerper argued that his duties were limited to managerial responsibilities for ASAP, and that he was not at any time responsible for ASAP's day-to-day operations and did not conduct any activities that may or could have resulted in hazardous waste or petroleum discharge violations so as to be liable as an "operator." But the evidence was clear that Kerper was involved in ASAP's day-to-day operations. 26. While the evidence did not totally absolve Respondents from the allegations in the NOV, several people testified on Respondents' behalf as to their practice of properly disposing of hazardous materials generated by his business. For example, Rafael Rivera, a former employee, testified that Kerper would get mad at him if any gas or oil was spilled and left on the ground or was not disposed of properly. Meanwhile, it appeared that environmental problems at Joynt's site existed for years before the arrival of Respondents. Mrs. Sandra Lovejoy, a neighboring property owner for the past 30 years, testified that she had experienced problems with her water quality, such as a foul smell or funny taste, for many years before Respondents moved onto Joynt's property. An inspection was conducted by OCEPD in September of 2000, in response to Lovejoy's complaint regarding 16 fuel odor and a drinking well which was no longer in service. In part, OCEPD's written report on the complaint found "[m]any spots of surficial petroleum contamination . . . from gasoline, motor oil and other petroleum products leaking or spilled from the junk vehicles" at Don's Auto Recycling and included a recommendation "referring this site to the FDEP task force that has been put together to inspect and deal with junk yard facilities," although "[n]o Petroleum Cleanup issues were found at [that] time." For reasons not explained by the evidence, it does not appear that Don's Recycling was referred to any task force, or that OCEPD followed up on the reported contamination. 27. Respondents contend that this entire proceeding against them was part of a vendetta against Kerper for going to the local television station to expose the condition of the site, the failure of OCEPD and DEP to follow up on the September 2000, report and recommendation, and Orange County's purchase of a north-south drainage easement through the western portion of the property in 2000. The evidence did not prove this contention. However, it is clear that Joynt was responsible for the condition of most of the 40-acre site, not Respondents, and that Joynt shared responsibility with Respondents for the conditions alleged in the NOV. 28. While this case has been pending, Joynt's heirs have cooperated with DEP in cleaning up the site, and DEP acknowledged in its PRO that several items in the OCA--specifically, those 17 relating to Counts II, III, and VII of the NOV--are moot and unnecessary in light of Respondents' eviction from the property and subsequent cleanup operations by Joynt's heirs. It also is suggested that the corrective actions requested in DEP's PRO to address Counts IV, V, and VI of the NOV--relating to failure to document proper disposal of wastes--are unnecessary. It seems clear that, to the extent such disposals occurred, any available documentation would have been placed in evidence during the final hearing. Ordering that they be produced within 30 days of the Final Order, as suggested in DEP's PRO, would be a futile act. 29. Count VIII of the NOV alleged costs "of not less than $500. In its PRO, DEP requested recovery of $1,367.31 of costs. Some of these costs--$867.31--were itemized in the PRO. The balance appears to relate to the $500 alleged in the NOV. There was no evidence introduced at the final hearing as to any of these alleged costs, and the costs itemized in the PRO seem to represent travel costs of counsel for DEP.
Conclusions David J. Tarbert, Esquire Jason Sherman, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Albert E. Ford II, Esquire Webb, Wells & Williams, P.A. 994 Lake Destiny Road Suite 102 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order providing: 1. Under Count I of the NOV, Respondents shall be jointly and severally liable, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for cleaning up the releases of used oil evidenced by the discolored soils photographed by DEP's inspectors on 24 March 15, 2002 (DEP Exhibit 20, photographs 5 and 7 on page 2 of the exhibit). As such, they shall be responsible, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for implementation of DEP's Initial Site Screening Plan to assess and remove all contaminated soils resulting from those releases. If the results of the Initial Site Screening indicate that further assessment and/or remediation of the contamination is required, Respondents shall also participate, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, in completing the required work, consistent with the "Corrective Actions for Contaminated Site Cases" (DEP Exhibit 16). 2. Counts II through VIII of the NOV are dismissed. 3. Respondents' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Vane ya J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2003. 25
The Issue Did the site in question fail to meet monitoring and retrofitting requirements within the schedules established under Chapter 17-61, Florida Administrative Code, and thereby not be eligible for the Early Detection Incentive Program?
Findings Of Fact The State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 was enacted as Chapter 86-159, Laws of Florida, and codified primarily in Section 376. 071, Florida Statutes. It provides for the expeditious cleanup of property contaminated as the result of storage of petroleum or petroleum product. As part of the SUPER Act, the legislature created the program which is of direct relevance in this litigation. The EDI Program, Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes,, provides for state cleanups of sites contaminated as a result of a discharge from a petroleum storage system. Petitioner now owns and operates a facility at Route 1, Box 167 Jay, Florida. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The facility contains two underground petroleum storage tanks which were installed on or before 1970. (T8, 9). Monitoring wells were installed for the tanks in December, 1988. (T7). Monitoring wells are pipes which are installed in the ground around a tank excavation to allow for detection of leaks from the tanks. (T8).
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the site owned by Petitioner be determined to be ineligible for the Early Detection Incentive Program, pursuant to Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-15SO (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Mr. Thomas L. MCNAUGHTON MCNAUGHTON's Store Route 1 Jay, FL 32565 Mr. Dale H. Twachtmann Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Notice of Intent to Issue Order Requiring Access to Property (“Access Order”) issued by the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”) and directed to Glenda Mahaney, as the property owner, is a valid exercise of the Department’s authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Glenda Mahaney is a natural person and the owner of the property identified in the Access Order. The Department is the state agency which has been granted powers and assigned duties under chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, for the protection and restoration of air and water quality and to adopt rules and issue orders in furtherance of these powers and duties. Background The groundwater beneath a parcel of land adjacent to Petitioner’s property was contaminated with petroleum when the land was used in the past for auto salvage operations. Initial groundwater sampling near the border of Petitioner’s property showed groundwater contamination by gasoline constituents which exceeded Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). In other words, the contamination was at levels that required cleanup. However, later sampling showed the concentration of contaminants had decreased below GCTLs, probably as a result of natural attenuation. The existing data suggests that any groundwater contamination beneath Petitioner’s property is probably now at a level that would not require cleanup. However, the Department issued the Access Order because the Department is not certain about the contamination beneath Petitioner’s property and because Petitioner has continually requested further investigation. Petitioner believes contamination from the auto salvage site has caused illness in a tenant and even contributed to other persons’ deaths. However, no expert testimony was received on this subject and no finding is made about whether contamination exists on Petitioner’s property which has caused illness or death. The Department’s Site Investigation Section wants access to Petitioner’s property in order to determine whether contamination has migrated beneath Petitioner’s property and, if it has, the extent and concentration of the contaminants. The Department wants to: (a) install up to five temporary groundwater monitoring wells, (b) collect groundwater samples from the wells, (c) collect a groundwater sample from Petitioner’s potable water well, and (d) remove the monitoring wells after the sampling. The Access Order includes terms related to advance notice, scheduling, and related matters. Liability Although Petitioner believes petroleum contamination is present and wants it cleaned up, she objects to the provision of the Access Order related to liability. Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order provides: Ms. Mahaney shall not be liable for any injury, damage or loss on the property suffered by the Department, its agents, or employees which is not caused by the [sic] negligence or intentional acts. Petitioner insists that she should not be liable under any circumstances for injuries or damages suffered by Department’s agents or employees who come on her property for these purposes. She demands that the Department come onto her property “at their own risk.” At the final hearing, the Department stated that it did not intend to impose on Petitioner a level of liability different than the liability that would already be applicable under Florida law. The Department offered to amend Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order to indicate that Petitioner’s “liability, if any, shall be determined in accordance with Florida law.” Scope of the Investigation Petitioner objects to the proposed groundwater sampling because she does not believe it is extensive enough. Petitioner also believes the Department should test for soil contamination. The Department’s expert, David Phillips, testified that the proposed monitoring well locations were selected based on the direction of groundwater flow in the area and the wells are along the likely path of migration of any contaminated groundwater from the former auto salvage site. Another Department witness, Tracy Jewsbury, testified that no soil contamination was found on the auto salvage site, so the Department has no reason to expect there would be soil contamination on Petitioner’s property that came from the auto salvage operation. The Department will use the data collected from the wells to determine if contamination is present and whether future contamination assessment and/or remediation activities are necessary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection withdraw the Access Order or, alternatively, that Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order be amended to provide that Ms. Mahaney’s potential liability, if any, shall be determined in accordance with Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2017. William W. Gwaltney, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Glenda Q. Mahaney Post Office Box 123 Mount Dora, Florida 32756 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Robert A. Williams, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Legal Department, Suite 1051-J Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed
Findings Of Fact The Department (DER) is the regulatory agency of Florida charged with the duty and authority to administer and enforce Chapter 403 and Sections 376.30-376.319, Florida Statutes, and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Hendry is a Florida corporation that has been conducting business in excess of 60 years. The two main aspects of its business are the dredging operation and the shipyard. Hendry's site can be loosely described as an industrial site. The shipyard division performs approximately one-half its work for governmental entities, particularly the U.S. Coast Guard, which operations are largely ship refurbishing. Hendry has a Coast Guard certificate enabling it to receive mixtures containing oil and oily water waste. A significant portion of Hendry's ship refurbishing work involves repairing/replacing steel on ships which has deteriorated due to salt water exposure. That work frequently requires cutting, welding and burning. Prior to commencing the refurbrushing work, the ships must be certified as safe. In certifying a ship as being safe, the bilge area is pumped of used oil or waste oil which collects in standing waste water and oil. Also, before that works commences, the ship is defueled. Currently, Hendry's practice is to subcontract the pumping of waste oil from the ships bilge, which waste oil is pumped directly into the tanker truck of the subcontractor. Hendry no longer pumps or stores waste oil on site. In the past, the waste oil and water from the ship's bilge was pumped from the ship through a pipeline from the dry dock across the property to a 10,000 gallon above-ground storage tank. During December 1987, the U.S. Coast Guard observed a fuel spill on the water at Petitioner's facility. Based on that observation, Respondent conducted site inspections of Petitioner's facility during March and April 1988. The fuel spill was occasioned by Petitioner's refurbishment of a tuna boat at its site. Petitioner subsequently received a warning notice regarding alleged violations in its petroleum storage tanks and contamination. The transfer pipeline is of steel construction. Between 1980 and 1984, the pipeline leaked. In 1984, the pipeline was rerun with PVC line and in 1986, it was refitted with 4 inch steel pipe. The 10,000 gallon above-ground tank is located in Area 1. The removal of waste oil occasionally resulted in accidental spills. After 1985, a smaller, above-ground tank was installed adjacent to the 10,000 gallon tank to provide a storage tank for draining off water from the 10,000 gallon tank. The small tank was used to receive only water drained from the 10,000 gallon tank. Prior to installation of the small tank, a retention pond was used to drain water from the 10,000 gallon tank. The retention pond had a 2 foot berm with a visqueen liner. In October 1988, Hendry submitted an EDI Program Notification Application, a prerequisite for EDI reimbursement eligibility, under the program for costs associated with cleanup of certain petroleum contamination. In May 1989, Hendry submitted a document entitled Preliminary Contamination Assessment III Specific Areas--Task IV Rattlesnake Terminal Facility--Westshore Boulevard, Hillsborough County prepared by Mortensen Engineering, Inc. That document included reports of analysis of oil and groundwater samples taken from the site in January, March and April 1989, demonstrating extensive contamination of soil and groundwater including "free product" in monitoring wells MW-2, MW-4 and MW-4A. By letter dated November 9, 1989, the Department informed Hendry of its determination that the facility had been denied EDI reimbursement based on specific enumerated findings. Hendry entered into a stipulation with the Department on October 16, 1990, "regarding the conduct of this case and the basis for denial. " Attached to the stipulation is a sketch of the facility grounds showing a rough division of the area into four separate areas. Area 1 has two waste tanks. One was a large 10,000 gallon closed tank approximately 20 feet high and 12 feet in diameter; the other contained a volume of approximately 1,500-2,000 gallons and was an open tank. Petitioner's practice was to pump bilge in the dry dock area, located west of "Area 2" and direct the waste through underground pipes to the 10,000 gallon tank. The smaller tank was used to "bleed" water from the larger tank. Bilge waste is approximately two-thirds water. Area 2 was the location of Hendry's diesel tank farm. In the stipulation, the Department agreed to withdraw two of the seven specific grounds for the denial, namely denial of site access and failure to report discharges. Likewise, Hendry agreed to withdraw "Area 4" from its application for EDI eligibility. In the stipulation, Hendry was informed of a then recent amendment to Section 376.3071(9), which offered certain applicants who had been earlier determined ineligible for participation in the EDI program, standards and procedures for obtaining reconsideration of eligibility. The amendment required the facility to come into compliance, certify that compliance and request reconsideration prior to March 31, 1991. Additionally, compliance was to be verified by a Department inspection. Pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of the stipulation, these standards and procedures were specifically to be applied to Areas 2 and 3 at the facility. Hendry did not make a written request for reconsideration of the denial of eligibility with respect to Areas 2 and 3 on or before March 31, 1991 or at anytime subsequently. Hendry also did not come into compliance with the underground or above-ground storage tanks system regulations on or before March 31, 1991 in that Hendry failed to register a 560-gallon above-ground diesel storage tank which was onsite on that date as required by Rule 17-762.400, Florida Administrative Code. Hendry also failed to notify the Department of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission (HCEPC), as the administrator of a designated local program at least thirty days prior to closure of the storage tank system, pursuant to Subsection 376.3073, Florida Statutes. These determinations were made on April 1, 1991 by Hector Diaz, inspector in the HCEPC tanks program. Hendry submitted a registration form for the 560-gallon tank on November 18, 1991, which was of course subsequent to the March 31, 1991 deadline. Hendry stored petroleum products and waste material including petroleum constituents in the above-ground tanks until approximately March 25, 1991 when it initiated tank removal. Hendry's above-ground storage tanks, which were in use at its facility for approximately three years after extensive soil contamination was documented, were without secondary containment. In November 1991, Hendry submitted a document entitled Supplemental Preliminary Contamination Assessment Report, prepared by Keifer-Block Environmental Services, Inc. (Supplemental PCAR). The stated purpose of the study was solely to determine whether hazardous constituents were present in groundwater in Areas 2 and 3. The report included laboratory analysis of groundwater samples taken from the site in August 1991 including monitoring wells located in Area 3. The results of these analysis reflect that Area 3 is contaminated solely with heavy metals, lead and chromium. No petroleum hydrocarbon contamination was detected in Area 3. In the area adjacent to Area 2, seven of eight monitoring wells show chromium or lead contamination. Hendry had, and continues to have, a practice of removing paint from vessels by blasting them with a gritty material known as "black beauty." This practice takes place in the dry dock area near Areas 2 and 3. The waste blast grit/paint chip mixture is vacuumed or shoveled into wheelbarrels or a frontend loader and dumped into an open pile. Occasionally, the waste blast grit/paint mixture is blown about or spilled. Waste "black beauty" has been observed scattered on the ground throughout the facility. Paints sometime contain heavy metals, specifically, lead and chromium. The concentrations and distribution of lead and chromium contamination at the site are consistent with Hendry's long-standing practice of grit-- blasting paint from ships and other vessels and allowing the metal-contaminated paint and waste mixture to fall to the ground. Areas 2 and 3 are contaminated with substances other than petroleum or petroleum products, namely heavy metals. Costs associated with cleanup of lead and chromium are not reimburseable under the EDI program. Paragraph 5(c) of the stipulation allowed Hendry an opportunity to establish eligibility for Area 1 by providing information regarding operating practices at two above-ground storage tanks and a retention pond in that area demonstrating that contamination in that area is predominantly from leaks or unintentional spills of petroleum products from the tanks in that area. Hendry did not provide the required information. On January 27, 1992, Hendry submitted to the Department an affidavit executed by its principal, Aaron Hendry, which Hendry contends fulfills the requirements of paragraph 5(c) of the stipulation. Hendry, the principal who executed the affidavit, is an affiant with a legal and financial interest in the outcome of the EDI eligibility determination. The executed affidavit did not contain specific information with respect to "operating practices at the tanks and retention ponds as required by the stipulation." Specifically, the affidavit is silent as to: What the tanks were made of; When, how and by whom they were installed; What piping, leak detection or overfill protection was associated with them; What repairs or alterations had been made to them; What inventory reconciliation methods were used; Where the materials came from which was put into the tanks; In what manner, how often, and by whom material was put into the tanks; In what manner, how often, and by whom material was removed from the tanks; Disposition of material removed from the tanks; When, how, by whom and why the retention pond was dug; How and for what period of time the retention pond was used; How, often and by whom inspections of the tanks were conducted; When and how leaks occurred and were discovered at the tanks; When and how spills occurred and were discovered at the tanks; What records, including reports to state or local agencies, insurance claims, newspaper accounts, and so forth were kept with respect to leaks or spills at the tanks; What cleanup efforts were made at the time of any leaks or spills; Documentation related to registration of the tanks with state or local agencies; and Documentation with respect to any removal of the tanks, including any description of the condition of the tanks when, or if, removed. For years, the facility's retention pit was used as a "waste pit" namely, a rectangular hole in the ground, approximately 30 feet by 120 feet by 3 feet, for direct discharge of bilge waste piped from vessels at the dry dock area to the waste pit, prior to installation of the storage tank systems. After installation of the large tank in Area 1, the retention pit was used to bleed water from the bilge tank. In the past, the Department has denied eligibility to facilities where a retention pond was used for disposal of petroleum related waste and cleanup of contamination resulting from use of a retention pond. Hendry's affidavit nor other documentation submitted to the Department prior to the EDI redetermination or at hearing establishes that the bilge waste taken from the storage tanks was "a liquid fuel commodity" or recycled into such a commodity. By letter dated June 9, 1992, the Department notified Hendry that reconsideration of its EDI eligibility request for Areas 2 and 3 was denied and that the affidavit of Aaron Hendry submitted with respect to Area 1 did not satisfy the requirements of the stipulation. Thereafter, Hendry challenged the Department's denial of reconsideration and EDI eligibility which joins the issue for this proceeding. The hazardous waste allegation discovered during an inspection of Hendry's facility on April 14, 1988, resulted in a consent order which was entered as a final order of the Department on November 21, 1990. The consent order allowed Hendry an opportunity to demonstrate that not all areas at the facility were hazardous waste disposal areas and, thus, not all areas would be subject to closure and cleanup under the permitting requirements of Subsection 403.722, Florida Statutes and the remediation standards set forth in Chapter 17-730, Florida Administrative Code. To establish appropriate remediation standards and procedures which would be applicable to various areas, Hendry was required to prepare a property diagram designating areas at the property exhibiting any of the following types of contamination: Areas contaminated solely by petroleum or petroleum products or used oil which is not hazardous waste; Areas contaminated by materials which are not hazardous waste; Areas contaminated by the past or present disposal of hazardous waste. The consent order allows contamination assessment and remediation pursuant to the standards and procedures set forth in Chapter 17-770, Florida Administrative Code, for areas contaminated solely by petroleum or petroleum products. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5, paragraph 11.) The consent order requires contamination assessment and remediation pursuant to the Department's corrective action and groundwater contamination cases for all areas at the facility contaminated by used oil which is not hazardous waste or by hazardous material. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5, paragraph 12.) The consent order requires contamination assessment and remediation pursuant to a closure permit with a contingent post-closure plan to close the areas at the facility contaminated by the disposal of hazardous waste. In response to the consent order to delineate areas on the property exhibiting various types of contamination, Hendry submitted the supplemental PCAR. By letter dated March 19, 1992, the Department responded to the supplemental PCAR with a determination that: Area 1 can be assessed and remediated through the standards set forth in Chapter 17-770, Florida Administrative Code. Contamination in Areas 2 and 3 includes heavy metals, which are hazardous materials. Thus, Areas 2 and 3 should be assessed and remediated through the corrective action process for groundwater contamination cases. A hazardous waste facility closure permit application should be submitted for assessment and remediation of Area 4, which, because of the presence of Dichloroethylene, a hazardous substance and chlorinated solvent, should be expanded to include the location of monitoring well MW KBMW-2. Hendry had a practice of cleaning electrical motors by placing such motors on the ground outside the electrical repair shop near Area 4. The motors were sprayed with Trichloroethylene, a waste solvent, which was allowed to runoff into the soil. At the time of this practice, the intention was to leave the solvent contamination unchecked. The Department, pursuant to directives from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), characterizes the disposition of hazardous waste to the environment as a result of intentional, ongoing industrial practices as "disposal of hazardous waste" within the meaning of Subsection 475.703(21), Florida Statutes and 40 CFR 260.10. The consent order allowed Hendry an opportunity to challenge the Department's determination with respect to delineation of the various areas by filing a petition per paragraph 21 of the order for formal administrative hearings. Hendry filed its petition with respect to the March 19, 1992 letter, which petition is the subject of DOAH Case No. 92-2312.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, issue a Final Order in these consolidated cases concluding that 1) the contamination areas at issue herein are not eligible for EDI reimbursement under Subsections 376.3071(9) and (12), Florida Statutes; 2) that Petitioner cleanup the contamination in Areas 1, 2 and 3 under the guidance document entitled "Corrective Actions for Groundwater Contamination Cases"; and 3) that Area 4 be expanded to include the location of monitoring well MW KBMW-2 and closed through a hazardous waste closure/post closure permit application process. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 14, partially adopted in Paragraph 13, Recommended Order. Paragraph 19, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence and speculative. Paragraph 20, rejected, unnecessary. Paragraph 21, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraphs 24-28, Recommended Order. Paragraph 22, partially adopted, Paragraphs 13 and 14, Recommended Order. Paragraph 23, partially adopted, Paragraph 15, Recommended Order. Paragraph 29, partially adopted, Paragraph 18, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 31, 32, 35, 48, 49, 51, 52, 60, 62 and 73 rejected, unnecessary. Paragraph 33, adopted in part, Paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 38, adopted in part, Paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 41, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence and the two cases cited at hearing where Respondent exercises his discretion are distinguishable from Petitioner's failure to timely apply. Paragraph 43, rejected, unnecessary and/or argument. Paragraph 45, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 50, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraphs 37-39, Recommended Order. Paragraph 54, rejected, not probative. Paragraph 55, rejected, not probative. Paragraphs 56 and 57, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraphs 30 and 31, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 58 and 59, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraphs 23 and 24, Recommended Order. Paragraph 61, rejected, speculative and unnecessary. Paragraph 63, rejected, speculative. Paragraph 67, rejected, not probative. Paragraph 68, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraphs 30 and 31, Recommended Order. Paragraph 69, rejected, not probative. Paragraph 70, adopted in part, Paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 72, rejected, irrelevant and not necessary to the issues posed. Paragraph 74, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence and unnecessary. Paragraph 75, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraph 53, Recommended Order. Paragraph 76, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraph 53, Recommended Order. Paragraph 77, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, Paragraph 53, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 78 and 79, rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraph 80, rejected, not probative. Rulings in Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 2 and 3, adopted in part, Paragraph 9, Recommended Order. Paragraph 12, adopted in part, Paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 23, adopted in part, Paragraph 32, Recommended Order. Paragraph 27, adopted in part, Paragraphs 38 and 39, Recommended Order. Paragraph 30, rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Patka, Esquire Rory C. Ryan, Esquire HOLLAND & KNIGHT 200 South Orange Ave - Suite 2600 Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802 Agusta P. Posner, Esquire Lisa Duchene, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 2400 Virginia B. Wetherell Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 2400
