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CLARENCE E. BURTOFT vs. SOUTHERN LINEN SERVICE, 83-003758 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003758 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Clarence E. Burtoft, was hired by respondent, Southern Linen Service, in November, 1982 as assistant general manager at its Daytona Beach plant. Prior to this employment, he had back surgery performed in Augusta, Georgia but the effects of such surgery did not interfere with his job duties. After being on the job for approximately three days, he was told by the regional manager that labor costs needed to be reduced, and that one employee must be laid off. He was also told to shift two female employees from one department to another. There is a dispute between the parties as to what the actual instructions were, and whether they were in fact carried out by Burtoft. Nonetheless, the employer construed Burtoft's actions as not complying with its instructions, and Burtoft was accordingly terminated the following day and told he was not the right man for the job. The back surgery was not related in any respect to the termination and Burtoft himself acknowledged as much. Burtoft's complaint is that his job records at Southern Linen Service contain a notation that he was fired for refusing to follow instructions. He only wants that adverse information removed. 1/ He is not contending that his employer unlawfully discriminated against him, or requesting that his job be reinstated with full back pay. Indeed, it was only after he visited the State employment office that he filed this complaint upon that office's encouragement. At no time was he ever told by any Florida Commission on Human Relations representative that its jurisdiction extended only over certain employment practices, and that any complaint must necessarily be founded on some form of discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed by Clarence E. Burtoft be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1984.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68760.10
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CATHERINE M. LECAS vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 15-007003 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Dec. 10, 2015 Number: 15-007003 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged by Petitioner in her Employment Charge of Discrimination.

Findings Of Fact During all times material to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a park ranger at Alafia River State Park in Lithia, Florida. On January 1, 2010, Petitioner became a full- time park ranger, and from this date through June 5, 2014, Petitioner was supervised by Coy Helms, the manager for Alafia River State Park. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment for “poor performance and conduct unbecoming a public employee.” The events that led to Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent occurred on March 28, 2014. Petitioner is a 40-plus-year-old Christian female, who identifies as being of Greek and Native American origin. Petitioner describes her skin color as “olive.” Background Information On November 18, 2013, Petitioner received a written reprimand from Coy Helms, who at the time served as park manager at Alafia State Park and Petitioner’s immediate supervisor. Petitioner was reprimanded for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public employee. According to the reprimand, Petitioner had interactions with certain park volunteers that resulted in complaints being filed with Mr. Helms. The written reprimand advised that “THIS IS AN OFFICIAL WRITTEN REPRIMAND [and that] FUTURE VIOLATIONS MAY RESULT IN FURTHER OR MORE SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, UP TO AND INCLUDING DISMISSAL.” Petitioner refused to sign the reprimand when the same was presented to her by Mr. Helms. In early December 2013, a few weeks after receiving the written reprimand, Petitioner verbally reported to Valinda Subic that during the summer of 2011, Petitioner was inappropriately touched on the ear by her co-worker, Ronald Stevens. Ms. Subic advised Rae Kelly, from Respondent’s bureau of human resource management, of Petitioner’s complaint, and on December 6, 2013, Ms. Subic and Ms. Kelly contacted Petitioner to get a statement from her about the incident. Petitioner advised that she did not wish to make a statement about the incident but would provide follow-up documentation in support of her harassment allegations at a later time. After several unsuccessful attempts to secure from Petitioner information supporting her harassment allegations, Ms. Kelly informed Petitioner that if the information that Petitioner promised was not received by March 12, 2014, the harassment allegation investigation would be closed. There is no evidence of record indicating that Petitioner ever provided additional information to Respondent in support of her allegation of harassment by Mr. Stevens. Termination of Employment On March 28, 2014, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Petitioner met with Mr. Helms to discuss work plans for the day. It was understood that Petitioner would be doing yard maintenance work at the park’s north gate. In addition to the yard maintenance work, Mr. Helms assigned Petitioner an additional work-related task of placing an out-of-order sign on the restroom facility near the north gate. In order to perform her work-related tasks, Respondent assigned Petitioner a DEP-owned Ford Ranger pick-up truck. Mr. Helms, within a few hours of assigning tasks to Petitioner, went to the north gate area to verify that Petitioner had completed her assignments. When Mr. Helms arrived at the north gate, he did not see Petitioner. Mr. Helms noted that the out-of-order sign had been placed on the restroom as directed, but that Petitioner had failed to perform the yard maintenance work. Seeing that Petitioner had not completed her work assignment, Mr. Helms then searched for Petitioner throughout the park but was unable to locate her. Mr. Helms then exited the park and went to a nearby Circle K convenience store in a further attempt to locate Petitioner. After waiting for some period of time at the Circle K, Mr. Helms observed Petitioner, while driving her assigned Ford Ranger pick-up truck, enter the convenience store parking lot. Petitioner parked the truck, exited the vehicle, walked towards the store, and then returned to the vehicle without entering the store. Upon reentering the vehicle, Petitioner drove back to the state park. Respondent’s email records show that on April 3, 2014, Mr. Helms submitted a written narrative to Ms. Subic wherein he outlined what he observed on March 28, 2014, with respect to Petitioner, her whereabouts, and her use of DEP’s vehicle. On April 7, 2014, Ms. Subic directed Mr. Helms to speak with Petitioner about what he observed on March 28, 2014. On April 10, 2014, Mr. Helms met with Petitioner to discuss her actions of March 28, 2014. Petitioner testified that during this meeting with Mr. Helms, she explained that on the morning of March 28, 2014, after placing the out-of-order sign on the restroom near the north gate, she left the park in her assigned DEP vehicle to go to the Mobil station to get gas for the vehicle. Petitioner also testified that although she did drive to the Mobil station, she did not purchase gas for the vehicle, but instead went to the Sweetbay market located next to the Mobil station where she filled a personal prescription and purchased a sympathy card for the family of a deceased friend. Petitioner further testified that after leaving Sweetbay, she went to Ace Hardware. Petitioner has no specific recollection of why she stopped at Ace Hardware and did not present any evidence indicating that the visit to the store was for work-related reasons. Finally, after leaving Ace Hardware, Petitioner then drove to the home of the bereaved to deliver the sympathy card that she purchased from Sweetbay. In explaining her actions on March 28, 2014, Petitioner claims that Mr. Helms allowed employees to conduct personal business if the personal business did not cause the employees to deviate from their authorized travel route related to DEP official business. Petitioner’s statement regarding Mr. Helms may generally be true; however, under the facts of the present case there is no credible evidence that Petitioner left the park on March 28, 2014, for anything other than reasons related to the handling of her personal affairs. Succinctly stated, Petitioner put 50 miles on DEP’s vehicle on March 28, 2014, and none of these miles were related to the operation of Alafia River State Park. By correspondence dated April 28, 2014, Scott Robinson, on behalf of Respondent, informed Petitioner that it was the intent of Respondent to terminate her employment with the agency for reasons related to her actions of March 28, 2014. Following Petitioner’s predetermination conference, Mr. Robinson, by correspondence dated June 5, 2014, informed Petitioner that her employment was being terminated due to her actions of March 28, 2014. Mr. Robinson also informed Petitioner that the written reprimand she received on November 18, 2013, was a factor in Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner did not offer any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that in any way establishes that she was subjected to discriminatory animus, or that Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment was motivated by reasons related to her allegation of sexual harassment by Mr. Stevens.1/ Respondent had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner’s employment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, did not commit unlawful employment practices as alleged by Petitioner, Catherine M. Lecas, and denying Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2016.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.68760.10760.11
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DEBORAH Y. TURNER vs LP ORMOND BEACH, LLC/SIGNATURE HEALTH CARE, 13-003874 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Oct. 07, 2013 Number: 13-003874 Latest Update: Sep. 10, 2014

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, LP Ormond Beach, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare ("Signature") committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race by subjecting her to disciplinary procedures that were not applied to non-minority employees.

Findings Of Fact Signature is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7). Signature is a provider of long-term nursing care in many markets in the United States. Signature operates the skilled-nursing facility in Ormond Beach that is the locus of this proceeding. Petitioner is a black female. On February 29, 2012, Petitioner was hired by Signature as a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”). Petitioner’s job consisted of providing personal care to the residents of Signature’s Ormond Beach facility, including assisting the residents with their activities of daily living (“ADLs”). Signature terminated Petitioner’s employment in August 2013, when she failed to show up for work or call to notify her superiors that she would not be there. Petitioner did not contest the grounds of her dismissal in this proceeding. Petitioner’s complaint is limited to her allegations of disparate treatment on the job at Signature. At the time of her hiring, Petitioner was provided a copy of Signature’s “Stakeholder Handbook,” a document setting forth the company’s employment policies, including its anti- discrimination and anti-retaliation policies. The handbook sets forth Signature’s policies and procedures that prohibit, among other things, discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national origin, or any other categories of persons protected by state or federal anti-discrimination laws. Prior to filing her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR, Petitioner never made a complaint of employment discrimination while working at Signature. Signature also has a written “Abuse, Neglect and Misappropriation Policy” (abbreviated herein as the “Abuse and Neglect Policy”). Petitioner received a copy of this policy during her orientation and raised no objection to any of its contents. The policy states that the facility will “immediately report and thoroughly investigate allegations of mistreatment, neglect, abuse, misappropriation of resident’s property or any injury of unknown origin.” The policy further states, “Employees accused of participating in alleged abuse will be immediately suspended until the findings of the investigation have been reviewed by the Administrator, Director of Nursing Services, and Human Resources Director.” Signature’s uniform practice is to suspend the accused employee without pay during the investigation. If the investigation discloses that the employee did not commit the alleged abuse, then the employee receives back pay for the period of the suspension. On September 27, 2012, Petitioner’s supervisor, Director of Nursing Judy Wade, issued a “Stakeholder Performance Improvement Plan” to Petitioner because of resident complaints. Ms. Wade wrote: You’ve had three residents complain of your care in the past five months. Complaints summarized as “less than gentle” care, that you told resident you couldn’t provide care because we didn’t have enough staff, sitting in resident room without resident’s permission, rudeness, and lack of assistance to residents in need.[2/] These complaints resulted in you being removed from providing care for these residents. Staff complaints summarized as: Not open to direction, makes excuses, confrontational, not a team player, and off the floor without informing nurse. Ms. Wade went on to outline Petitioner’s future expectations, which included providing care “in a timely, gentle and caring manner,” assisting co-workers and taking direction from superiors “in a positive, friendly manner,” and not leaving the floor without permission of the supervising nurse. The Performance Improvement Plan concluded with the statement, “If any expectation is not fully met your employment will be terminated.” Petitioner was not suspended pursuant to the Performance Improvement Plan because it addressed work performance issues, not “abuse” or “neglect” as defined by the Abuse and Neglect Policy. In late October 2012, Signature suspended Petitioner without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an incident in which a resident whom Petitioner had placed upright in a wheelchair, fell out of the wheelchair and was injured. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she placed the resident in the wheelchair and saw the resident fall. Petitioner’s only contention is that a white co-worker, Claudia Dominique, was also present and witnessed the fall but was not suspended. Luz Petrone, then the human relations director for Signature’s Ormond Beach facility, and Tiffani Petersen, the facility’s abuse prevention coordinator, testified that at the time of the incident they were not aware of any involvement by or allegation of abuse and neglect against Ms. Dominique. Therefore, they were in no position to suspend Ms. Dominique for the resident’s fall. Both women testified that Ms. Dominique would have been suspended if there had been an allegation of her involvement in the incident. The investigation concluded that Petitioner needed additional training on wheelchair usage but that she had not engaged in any abuse or neglect. Signature reinstated Petitioner to her position and paid her for the time she had missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On November 19, 2012, Petitioner was suspended without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an allegation of abuse and neglect. Petitioner did not allege that any white employees were involved in this incident. The record does not disclose the specifics of this incident, but does indicate that the investigation concluded with a finding that Petitioner had not engaged in any abuse or neglect. Petitioner was reinstated to her position on November 26, 2012, and reimbursed for the work she missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On January 15, 2013, Petitioner was suspended without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an allegation that she was being “rough” with a resident while providing care. One of Petitioner’s co- workers, Tina Williams, was involved in the incident and was also suspended pending the investigation. The investigation concluded that Petitioner needed additional training but had not engaged in any abuse or neglect.3/ Petitioner was reinstated to her position and paid for the time she missed while on suspension, as was Ms. Williams. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On March 5, 2013, Signature suspended Petitioner without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation regarding rough handling of a resident and failure to toilet a resident when the resident asked to use the bathroom on March 2. A white co-worker, Patricia Capoferri, was also involved in the incident and was also suspended without pay pending investigation. Ms. Capoferri asserted that the resident in question was assigned to Petitioner but that Ms. Capoferri had to answer the resident’s call light because Petitioner would not do so.4/ Ms. Capoferri claimed that she had to answer Petitioner’s “lights all the time, because she don’t answer them.” Upon completion of the investigation, Signature determined that the allegations of abuse or neglect against Petitioner were not substantiated. Petitioner was reinstated to her position and paid for the time she had missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. Petitioner credibly testified as to the hardship caused by the suspensions imposed on her during the investigations. It is reasonable to assume that a person attempting to survive on a CNA’s wages can scarcely afford to go a week without being paid, even when she ultimately receives full compensation for the suspension. Petitioner suffers from high blood pressure, and the tension generated by the frequent suspensions required several visits to her physician. On March 11, 2013, Signature terminated Ms. Capoferri’s employment as a result of the investigation. Petitioner claimed that Ms. Capoferri never went into the resident’s room on March 2, and that Signature suspended and fired Ms. Capoferri in order to cover its tracks regarding its pattern of discriminatory actions against Petitioner. Petitioner claimed that Signature acted against Ms. Capoferri only after Petitioner filed her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR. However, Ms. Capoferri was suspended on March 5, three days before Petitioner filed her complaint. Ms. Capoferri was fired on March 11, three days after Petitioner filed her complaint, but Ms. Petrone and Ms. Petersen credibly testified that they were unaware of the complaint at the time Ms. Capoferri’s employment was terminated. Petitioner offered no credible evidence to support her somewhat fanciful claim that Signature would fire a white employee solely to shield itself from a charge of discrimination by a black employee. Signature offered persuasive evidence that it applies its Abuse and Neglect Policy consistently and without regard to race or any other protected category. In April 2013, an allegation of abuse and neglect was made against Nancy Harnonge, a white CNA working at the Ormond Beach facility. Consistent with its policy, Signature suspended Ms. Harnonge without pay pending investigation and then reinstated her to her position with back pay after the investigation concluded that the allegations could not be substantiated. In May 2010, an allegation of abuse and neglect was made against Ms. Capoferri, who was suspended without pay pending investigation and then reinstated with back pay after the investigation did not substantiate the allegations. Petitioner never complained of discriminatory treatment or harassment to any supervisor at Signature prior to filing her Employment Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Signature for her several suspensions pending investigation of abuse and neglect allegations. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Signature's stated reasons for her suspensions were a pretext for race discrimination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Signature discriminated against her because of her race in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner made no claim that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of Signature.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that LP Ormond Beach, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.02760.10
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CAROL MANZARO vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 05-000685 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Feb. 23, 2005 Number: 05-000685 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2005

The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner's claim is time-barred for failure to timely file an initial charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. If Petitioner's claim were timely, then the question would be whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact From April 4, 1998 until May 22, 2003, Petitioner Carol Manzaro ("Manzaro") worked for Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF") as an Inspector Specialist I (essentially, an investigator) in the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"). Manzaro's duty station was at a satellite office located in Riviera Beach, Florida. Her supervisor was Richard Scholtz, who was based in the OIG's Fort Lauderdale field office. In October 2002, Sheryl Steckler became DCF's Inspector General. Shortly after assuming this position, Ms. Steckler hired Tom Busch as Chief of Investigations. Mr. Busch was responsible for, among other things, overseeing the OIG's field office in Fort Lauderdale and the satellite office in Riviera Beach. Ms. Steckler and Mr. Busch worked at offices in Tallahassee. In late December 2002, Mr. Busch called Manzaro and reprimanded her for sending an e-mail that Ms. Steckler felt was inappropriate. Manzaro believes that the reprimand was unwarranted and demonstrates that she was being singled out (or set up), but the evidence regarding this particular incident is much too sketchy for the undersigned to make such a finding. In January 2003, Manzaro and Louis Consagra, another inspector who worked in the Riviera Beach satellite office, were directed to attend a meeting in Fort Lauderdale, which they did. After they arrived, their immediate supervisor Mr. Scholz, recently back from a trip to Tallahassee, told the two that Mr. Busch had said to him, "Sometimes when you get older, you miss a step." Mr. Scholz further related that Mr. Busch had announced that "changes w[ould] be made." Mr. Scholz warned them that "they are looking to fire people," and that he (Scholz) would fire people to protect himself if need be. The three (Manzaro, Consagra, and Scholz) then met with Mr. Busch, who had traveled to Fort Lauderdale to see them. Mr. Busch informed them that he had just fired an inspector who worked in Fort Lauderdale, and that Ms. Steckler planned to close the Riviera Beach satellite office by June or July of 2003, at which time Manzaro and Mr. Consagra would be reassigned to the Fort Lauderdale field office. Manzaro, who was then 55 years old, decided at that moment it was time to start looking for a new job. Immediately upon returning to Riviera Beach, she began making phone calls to that end. Manzaro claims that for some weeks thereafter she received "haranguing" phone calls from Mr. Busch, who deprecated her abilities and was rude and patronizing. The undersigned credits Manzaro's testimony in this regard (which was not rebutted), but deems it insufficient to support an inference that Mr. Busch was critical of Manzaro because she was over the age of 40.1 Mr. Busch's telephone calls caused Manzaro to see (in her words) the "handwriting on the wall"; by this time, she "knew" her employment would be terminated. In March 2003, Manzaro's co-worker, Mr. Consagra, was fired. Around this time——it is not clear when——Manzaro was given a below-average performance evaluation.2 Not long after that, by letter dated April 18, 2003, Manzaro was notified of her appointment to the job of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I with DCF's District Nine, a position which Manzaro had sought.3 By accepting this appointment, she could continue working for DCF in Palm Beach County, albeit at a lower salary than she was earning as an inspector for the OIG. She decided to take the job. Manzaro resigned her position with the OIG via a Memorandum to Ms. Steckler dated April 18, 2003. In pertinent part, Manzaro wrote: I would first like to thank you for the opportunity to serve the Department and Office of Inspector General and for the opportunity to find other employment within the Department. At this time, familial and financial responsibilities preclude my traveling to the proposed new duty location in Ft. Lauderdale. As you will see from the attached letter, I have accepted a position with Economic Self Sufficiency effective May 23, 2003. With your permission, I would like to complete writing the three cases I presently have open and commence annual leave on May 5 through May 22, 2003. On or about May 27, 2003, Manzaro started working at her new job for DCF. On July 12, 2003, Manzaro received some paperwork that had been sent to her accidentally, which revealed that her replacement in the OIG was younger than she, and also was being paid more than she had earned as an investigator. Manzaro claims that it was then she discovered that she had been the victim of age discrimination, absent which she would not have been "involuntarily demoted" to the position of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I. Ultimate Factual Determinations Manzaro's theory is that she was forced to resign her position in the OIG by the threat of termination, which caused her to seek and ultimately accept other, less remunerative employment with DCF. Manzaro describes the net effect of her job-switch as an "involuntary demotion" and charges that DCF "demoted" her because she was over the age of 40. Manzaro testified unequivocally, and the undersigned has found, that during a meeting in Fort Lauderdale in January 2003 (the one where Mr. Busch had informed Manzaro and her colleagues that the Riviera Beach satellite office would be closed), Manzaro had made up her mind to look for another job. This means that the untoward pressure allegedly used by DCF to force Manzaro's resignation had achieved its purpose by January 31, 2003, at the latest.4 Therefore, if the alleged discrimination against Manzaro were a discrete act——which is, at least implicitly, how Manzaro views the matter——then the discrete act apparently occurred on or before January 31, 2003.5 Assuming, for argument's sake, that DCF did in fact force Manzaro to decide, in January 2003, to resign her position as an inspector, then the pressure that DCF exerted on Manzaro consisted of: (a) a verbal reprimand regarding an e-mail; (b) Mr. Busch's comment (reported via Mr. Scholz) that age sometimes causes one to "miss a step"; (c) Mr. Scholz's warning that people would be fired; (d) the firing of a Fort Lauderdale-based inspector; and (e) the announcement that the Riviera Beach satellite office would be closed. Assuming for argument's sake that the foregoing circumstances amounted to discriminatory coercion, the undersigned determines that Manzaro should have known, when she succumbed to the threat of termination and involuntarily decided to resign, that she might possibly be a victim of age discrimination.6 The undersigned comes to this conclusion primarily because Mr. Busch's comment about older people sometimes missing a step is the strongest (if not the only) hint of age discrimination in this record.7 The significance of the previous finding is that, if the discrimination consisted of the discrete act of demotion (as Manzaro urges), then the 365-day period within which a charge of discrimination must be filed with the FCHR began to run on Manzaro's claim no later than January 31, 2003, by which time she was on notice of the allegedly discriminatory act.8 Because Manzaro's charge of discrimination was not filed with the FCHR until June 10, 2004, it is clear that, as a claim involving a discrete act of discrimination, Manzaro's charge was untimely. Putting aside the question whether Manzaro's case is time-barred, it is further determined that, in any event, Manzaro did not suffer an "adverse employment action." The undersigned is not persuaded that Manzaro was forced to take another job, as she now contends. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that Manzaro elected voluntarily to seek other employment after learning that her duty station was being moved to Fort Lauderdale and developing concerns about her job security in light of new management's efforts to weed out employees it viewed as under-performers. Ultimately, it is determined that DCF did not discriminate unlawfully against Manzaro on the basis of her age.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Manzaro's Petition for Relief as time-barred, or alternatively finding DCF not liable for age discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2005.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.11
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MARK CLEVELAND vs SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, 91-005274 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Aug. 22, 1991 Number: 91-005274 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1992

The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.

Florida Laws (3) 120.5757.111760.10
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THERESA FOSTER vs. HANDLING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INC., 87-003048 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003048 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1987

The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.

Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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DAVID COLEMAN vs CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 92-005926 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 18, 1994 Number: 92-005926 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1995

The Issue Whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: This discrimination case involves an allegation by petitioner, David Coleman, that he was denied employment by respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), because of his handicap. The City denies this allegation. A preliminary investigation by the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no probable cause that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. By way of background, petitioner has been employed by the City on four separate occasions, the last time as an employee in the mosquito control department in 1984. He was "released" the same year for "unacceptable leave." Since 1990, he has applied for at least twenty separate positions with the City. In conjunction with those and earlier efforts to obtain a job with the City, he has filed several job applications, including one in December 1987 and another in June 1992. Such applications are valid for a period of two years after they are signed and filed with the City. Therefore, if petitioner applied for a position with the City in March 1991, he did not have a valid job application on file. The petition for relief filed by Coleman describes the unlawful employment practice allegedly committed by the City as follows: unlawful hired or employment practice: with veteran preference that I have, and a handicap, which is alleged. The petition for relief does not describe the handicap. At hearing, however, petitioner contended he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Petitioner says that he applied for a job as a "traffic checker" with the City's engineering department in March 1991. City records reveal, however, that it has no such position called "traffic checker," and thus it hired no one for that job in 1991. It does have a position called "parking enforcement specialist," but since no description of the functions of that job is of record, it is unknown if the two positions are the same. Even so, City records do not show that petitioner made application for that position in March 1991. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, petitioner says that he interviewed for the position with an unidentified "supervisor," and he was told to prepare a resume, which he later gave to the interviewer's secretary. Thereafter, he made inquiry with the City's affirmative action office and learned that a veteran, not disabled, had been hired to fill the slot. Petitioner then brought this action charging the City with an unlawful employment practice. It is noted he has subsequently filed a second discrimination claim pertaining to another job application with the City. At hearing, petitioner contended that he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Other than his own assertion, however, no evidence was produced to confirm this disability, and as to this issue it is found that insufficient credible evidence exists to support a finding in petitioner's favor. The City admits that in one of petitioner's job applications filed with the City, petitioner attached a copy of a DD214 form reflecting that he was honorably discharged from the military. Also, the City acknowledges that in one of the applications is found a statement that petitioner had a 30 percent service related disability but the type of disability is not described. Whether the service related disability was still valid in March 1991 is not of record. Finally, petitioner's exhibit 1 is a copy of what purports to be a "statement of patient's treatment" from a VA outpatient clinic prepared in February 1985, but this document is hearsay, and in any event, is so dated as to have no probative value in this case. The more credible evidence shows that petitioner did not apply for the position of "traffic checker" or parking enforcement specialist in 1991. Moreover, petitioner had no valid application on file at that time, and there is no credible evidence as to who, if anyone, was hired to fill the position or what were the qualifications of the person hired. Even if one assumes an application was filed, the record is silent as to why petitioner's application may have been denied or, assuming he had a handicap, whether he could adequately perform the essential functions of the job. Given these considerations, and the lack of evidence to establish that petitioner is disabled with a handicap, it is found that the City did not commit an unlawful employment practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5926 Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commissioin Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Mr. David Coleman 1071 Ontario Street Jacksonville, FL 32205 Brian M. Flaherty, Esquire 600 City Hall 220 East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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CAROLYN HADLEY vs MCDONALD`S CORPORATION, 04-001601 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 29, 2004 Number: 04-001601 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent, McDonald's Corporation, discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Hadley, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who worked at the Cocoa Beach, Florida, McDonald's restaurant from October 1, 2000, until March 17, 2001. She voluntarily terminated her employment. Respondent owns and operates restaurants and is subject to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2000). Respondent has an extensive, well-conceived, "Zero Tolerance" policy which prohibits unlawful discrimination. This policy is posted in the workplace, is distributed to every employee at the time he or she is employed, and is vigorously enforced by management. There are published procedures which can be easily followed by an employee who believes that he or she has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner did not avail herself of Respondent's "Zero Tolerance" policy. Petitioner complains of two isolated instances of what the evidence clearly shows to be workplace "horseplay" as the basis of her unlawful employment discrimination claim. On one occasion, a shift manager placed a promotional sticker on Petitioner's forehead. The second involved ice cream being placed on Petitioner's face. The evidence reveals that the "horseplay" complained of was typical of this workplace and not race or sex based. Practical jokes, food fights, ice down shirt backs, and similar activities, while not encouraged by corporate management, were a part of the routine at this restaurant. Petitioner was not the singular focus of the "horseplay"; it involved all employees. There is no evidentiary basis for alleging that it was racial or sexual in nature, as it involved employees of differing races and sexes. Approximately a month after the latest of the incidents complained of, on March 17, 2001, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment. Six months later, in September, 2001, Petitioner complained to Dexter Lewis, an African-American corporate employee who is responsible for investigating claims of unlawful workplace discrimination, about the two incidents. She claimed that she had been embarrassed by the incidents but did not suggest to him that they had been racially or sexually motivated. Mr. Lewis investigated the alleged incidents; he confirmed that the incidents had occurred and that similar incidents were widespread, but not racially or sexually motivated; he reprimanded the store manager and shift manager for their unprofessional management.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Hadley 135 Minna Lane Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia Brennan Ryan, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802-1526 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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STEPHEN G. LESLIE vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 13-001620 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida May 01, 2013 Number: 13-001620 Latest Update: Oct. 16, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent) committed an act of unlawful employment discrimination against Stephen G. Leslie (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) of 1992.

Findings Of Fact In 1986, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent as a "Safety Specialist." Beginning in 2001, and at all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as an "Outdoor Advertising Regional Inspector." As an outdoor advertising regional inspector, the Petitioner's responsibilities included patrolling state roads in his assigned counties to ascertain the status of permitted outdoor advertising signs and to remove signs that were illegally placed on state right-of-way. The Respondent's duties required extensive driving, which he did in a state-supplied vehicle. The Petitioner was based at the Respondent's Tampa headquarters, but was supervised by employees located in Tallahassee. In 2007, the Petitioner began to experience neurological health issues, but he continued to work and was able to perform the responsibilities of his employment. From September 2008 to June 2011, the Petitioner was supervised by Robert Jessee. In 2009, the Petitioner's health issues got worse. He began to take more sick leave, which the Respondent approved upon request of the Petitioner. The Respondent also provided equipment to accommodate the Petitioner's health issues, including a laptop computer and larger mirrors on the Petitioner's state vehicle. The Respondent also assigned another employee to ride with the Petitioner and to remove signs illegally placed on state right-of-way so that the Petitioner did not have to exit the vehicle. In 2010, the Petitioner was involved in two automobile accidents while driving the state vehicle. In January, he ran into a vehicle that was stopped for a school bus. In February, while transporting a group of other employees on I-75, the Respondent struck rode debris and the vehicle was damaged. In April 2010, the Petitioner's presence in the Tampa headquarters building was restricted for reasons that were unclear. Although the restrictions caused embarrassment to the Petitioner, there was no evidence presented at the hearing to suggest that such measures were related in any way to the Petitioner's disability. Following an investigation of the traffic incidents by the Respondent's inspector general, the Petitioner received a written reprimand dated August 18, 2010, and was directed to take the Respondent's online driving course. Beginning in June 2011 and through the remainder of the Petitioner's employment by the Respondent, the Petitioner was supervised by Michael Green. The Respondent collects statistical data to measure the productivity of persons employed as outdoor advertising regional inspectors. The Petitioner's productivity statistics were significantly lower than those of other inspectors, and he was behind in his assignments. Accordingly, Mr. Green rode along with the Petitioner for three consecutive days in September 2011 to observe the Petitioner's work. At the hearing, Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner arrived late to pick him up at his hotel on all three days. On one of those days, the Petitioner accomplished an employment- related task prior to picking up the supervisor. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner's driving made him feel unsafe during the observation. Mr. Green observed that the Petitioner accelerated and slowed the vehicle in an abrupt manner, and that he failed to use turn signals at appropriate times. Mr. Green also testified that the Petitioner was preoccupied as he drove by electronic devices, including a cell phone. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner appeared to have difficulty entering and exiting the vehicle, and with hearing certain noises in the vehicle, including the click of the turn signal. Mr. Green testified that he felt so unsafe that he asked the Petitioner to alter his driving practices while Mr. Green was in the vehicle. Mr. Green testified that during the observation ride, the Petitioner discussed his physical condition and admitted that medical appointments during the week made it difficult to maintain the routine work schedule. The Petitioner also advised Mr. Green that he was considering filing for disability retirement. After returning to the Tallahassee headquarters, Mr. Green prepared a memorandum dated September 19, 2011, to memorialize his observations about the Petitioner's job performance. Mr. Green's memorandum was directed to Juanice Hughes (deputy director of the Respondent's right-of-way office) and to the Respondent's outdoor advertising manager. In the memo, Mr. Green recommended that the Petitioner be required to provide medical verification of his continued ability to perform the responsibilities of his position. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 23, 2011, Ms. Hughes restated Mr. Green's observations and directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that the Petitioner was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. The letter specifically directed the Petitioner to provide medical information related to his ability to work his normal schedule, the existence of any work restrictions or required accommodations, and the impact of any medications prescribed for the Petitioner. The letter established a deadline of September 30, 2011, for the Petitioner's compliance with its requirements, and advised that he would not be permitted to resume his employment duties until the medical verification information was provided and any required accommodations were in place. The Petitioner apparently did not become aware of the letter until September 29, 2011. On that date, both Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes attempted to contact the Petitioner via his work cell phone and by email to advise him of the letter and to direct that he retrieve the letter from the district headquarters. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., contact was made with the Petitioner by calling his personal cell phone. At that time, the Petitioner was advised that he needed to return to the district headquarters to pick up the letter. He was further advised that he was being placed on leave until the requirements of the letter were met and that he needed to turn in his state vehicle when he arrived at the headquarters. The Petitioner advised Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes that he was attempting to obtain documentation required to file for disability retirement, and he asked for an extension of time during which to do so. His request for an extension was denied. The Petitioner, clearly unhappy with the circumstance, made a statement during the conversation that was considered by Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes to suggest that the Petitioner could cause damage to himself or to the state vehicle. The actual words spoken were disputed at the hearing, and the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have actually damaged the vehicle or himself. Nonetheless, it was clear after the conversation that the Petitioner was resistant to the Department's instructions. The Respondent immediately directed James Moulton, the director of Transportation Operations for the Tampa district, to check on the Petitioner's condition and to retrieve the vehicle assigned to the Petitioner. Mr. Moulton did so, accompanied by local law enforcement personnel, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 29, 2011. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 30, 2011, Ms. Hughes recounted the events of the day before and again directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that he was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. No deadline was set for the Petitioner's compliance, and he was advised that he could use leave for any absence related to obtaining the medical documentation. A few days later, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that he would be unable to obtain the requested medical verification and that he would be filing an application for medical disability retirement. In November 2011, the Petitioner filed the application accompanied by medical documentation establishing that the Petitioner had a "total and permanent disability," as defined by section 121.091(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/ His application was approved.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2013.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68121.091760.01760.10760.11
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AMYER JONES vs. BILL IRLES RESTAURANT, 88-002596 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002596 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 1988

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent in January, 1986, as a dishwasher at $4.00 per hour. Because of his good work and dependability, Petitioner received periodic increases in his rate of pay, and in May, 1987, he became head dishwasher at $6.00 per hour. Respondent's owners also own certain apartments located next to their restaurant, and since Petitioner had been a dependable employee, he was given the additional responsibility of showing these apartments when anyone wanted to rent one that was vacant. He also performed repair and maintenance work on the apartments Petitioner was allowed to take time off from his job as head dishwasher to show vacant apartments, and was periodically assigned work to do on the apartments when he was not working at the restaurant. Petitioner agreed to, and was readily willing to perform these additional duties for which he was allowed to live in one of these apartments for $15.00 per week, rather than the normal rate of $65.00 per week. Beginning in October, 1987, Petitioner began to call in sick to his job at Respondent on a regular basis. Between the week of October 18, 1987, and his termination on January 12, 1988, he did not work a full forty hour week. This was during Respondent's busy time when business was especially heavy, and was a great inconvenience to other staff and the owners of Respondent. Frequently, Petitioner gave virtually no notice of his absence. Due to his repeated absences, and his lack of dependability, Respondent terminated Petitioner on January 12, 1988. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed a complaint of discrimination with the City of Clearwater, Office of Community Relations. Petitioner introduced no evidence in support of his allegation of discrimination based upon race. He alleges that a white woman was hired to replace him, but he did not identify her, or in any way corroborate his charge. Respondent disputed this allegation, and denied that Petitioner's discharge was due to anything but his repeated absences and increasing lack of responsibility. There is absolutely no evidence that Petitioner was terminated based upon racial considerations.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the City of Clearwater, Office of Community Relations, enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of September, 1988. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Amyer Jones 1343 San Remo Street Clearwater, Florida 34616 Richard R. Logsdon, Esquire 1423 South Ft. Harrison Street Clearwater, Florida 34616 Miles Lance, Esquire Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Ronald McElrath, Director Office Of Community Relations Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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