The Issue The issue is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondents’ licenses based on the allegations set forth in Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Background on Annuities In general, annuities are contracts in which the purchaser, usually an individual, makes one or more premium payments to the seller, usually an insurance company, in return for a series of payments that continue for a fixed period of time or for the life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary. In re May, 478 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012); Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 2001). “For traditional or ‘fixed annuities,’ the stream of payments begins immediately or soon after the contract is purchased. The contract will specify the amount of interest that will be credited to the [buyer]’s account as well as the amount of payments to be received under the contract.” Lander, 251 F.3d at 104. Fixed annuities are similar to certificates of deposit in that the seller of a fixed annuity guarantees that the purchaser will earn a minimum rate of interest over time. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In other words, fixed annuities do not lose money. Fixed annuities are typically thought of as insurance products because the purchaser receives a guaranteed stream of income for life, and the seller assumes “mortality risk.” The seller’s risk arises from the possibility that the purchaser will live longer than expected, thereby receiving benefits that exceed the amount paid to the seller. Id. In re May, 478 B.R. at 434 (noting that “a person typically purchases an annuity to avoid the risk associated with living an unexpectedly long life and running short of financial resources.”). A fixed annuity is appropriate for someone who desires a guaranteed interest rate without incurring the risk associated with the stock market. Because there is little to no risk, the returns on fixed annuities tend to be lower than the types of annuities discussed below. In contrast to a fixed annuity, the stream of payments associated with a variable annuity does not start upon purchase of the contract. Instead, the purchaser makes a single payment or a series of payments that are invested in securities of the purchaser’s choosing. Those securities are typically mutual funds or other types of investments that reflect the purchaser’s investment objectives. Lander, 251 F.3d at 104-05. From the time that a variable annuity is purchased to the time it begins to pay out, the annuity’s value will fluctuate depending on the performance of the underlying securities in which the purchaser’s principal is invested. Id. at 105. After a defined number of years, the variable annuity will mature and begin paying benefits to the purchaser. The purchaser is not guaranteed a particular payout. Instead, the payout will vary depending on the value of the portfolio at the annuity’s maturity and the purchaser’s life expectancy. Id. A variable annuity has characteristics that make it like an insurance product. By providing periodic payments that continue for the purchaser’s life, a variable annuity provides a hedge against the possibility that the purchaser will outlive his or her assets after retirement. Id. However, a variable annuity is also like a stock mutual fund in that the amount of benefits paid to the purchaser depends on the performance of the investment portfolio. As a result, many purchasers use variable annuities to accumulate greater retirement funds through market speculation. See In re May, 478 B.R. at 434 (explaining that “[m]any annuities are now ‘variable’ rather than fixed, and contemplate that the premiums collected will be invested in stocks or other equities, and that benefit payments to the annuitant will vary with the success of the annuity’s investment policy. In other words, the annuitant is not guaranteed a fixed level of benefits, rather the payment amount will vary depending upon the value of the stock portfolio upon maturity. Such variable annuities are considered akin to an investment contract, because they place all the investment risk on the [purchaser] and guarantee nothing to the annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks or other equities . . . .”)(internal citations omitted). A fixed index annuity is a hybrid financial product that combines some of the benefits of fixed annuities with the earning potential associated with a security. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 168. Like fixed annuities, fixed index annuities provide downside protection through a minimum guaranteed rate of return. However, the seller of the annuity “credits the purchaser with a return that is based on the performance of a securities index, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq 100 Index, or [the] Standard & Poor’s 500 Index.” Id. Therefore, depending on the index’s performance, the return on a fixed index annuity might be much higher than the guaranteed return. Id. The fixed index annuity may have a participation rate that limits the buyer’s upside. For example, if a particular fixed index annuity has an 80 percent participation rate and is tied to the Standard and Poor’s 500, then that annuity would return 8 percent if the Standard and Poor’s 500 rose 10 percent that year. In short, a fixed index annuity provides principal protection in a down stock market. While the potential return is less than what one would expect from a variable annuity, it is greater than what one would expect from a certificate of deposit or a fixed annuity. Therefore, a fixed index annuity appeals to someone who desires an opportunity to experience gains in a good market while also receiving protection from market downturns. For an additional fee, a purchaser can customize an annuity through the addition of “riders.” For example, an annuity with a guaranteed income rider provides a guaranteed amount of income for the annuity owner’s life. That income stream continues even if declines in the stock market cause the principal to dissipate. That guaranteed income stream does not start until it is activated by the annuity owner. Until activation, the money associated with the rider grows at a guaranteed rate of return, known as the “roll-up rate,” so long as the annuity owner does not activate the income stream. That guaranteed income stream can be destroyed if the annuity owner takes a withdrawal from the annuity’s principal. Surrender charges are another annuity feature and provide that the buyer will be penalized if he or she withdraws money from the annuity. Surrender charges usually apply during the first five to ten years after the annuity’s purchase and gradually decline over time. For example, an annuity could have a 10 percent surrender charge if the owner withdraws money during the first three years after purchase. During the next three-year period, that surrender charge may decrease to 7 percent. By the tenth year after purchase, the surrender charge could have decreased to 3 percent. Before a sale is completed, Florida law requires that insurance agents ensure that an annuity is “suitable” for the client. For example, section 627.4554(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), imposed the following duty on insurers and insurance agents: In recommending to a senior consumer the purchase of an annuity or the exchange of an annuity that results in another insurance transaction or series of insurance transactions, an insurance agent, or an insurer if no insurance agent is involved, shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the senior consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the senior consumer as to his or her investments and other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation and needs. The current version of section 627.4554 does not limit the suitability analysis to senior consumers and sets forth additional detail about the content of a suitability analysis: When recommending the purchase or exchange of an annuity to a consumer which results in an insurance transaction or series of insurance transactions, the agent, or the insurer where no agent is involved, must have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer, based on the consumer’s suitability information, and that there is a reasonable basis to believe all of the following: The consumer has been reasonably informed of various features of the annuity, such as the potential surrender period and surrender charge; potential tax penalty if the consumer sells, exchanges, surrenders, or annuitizes the annuity; mortality and expense fees; investment advisory fees; potential charges for and features of riders; limitations on interest returns; insurance and investment components; and market risk. The consumer would benefit from certain features of the annuity, such as tax-deferred growth, annuitization, or the death or living benefit. The particular annuity as a whole, the underlying subaccounts to which funds are allocated at the time of purchase or exchange of the annuity, and riders and similar product enhancements, if any, are suitable; and, in the case of an exchange or replacement, the transaction as a whole is suitable for the particular consumer based on his or her suitability information. In the case of an exchange or replacement of an annuity, the exchange or replacement is suitable after considering whether the consumer: Will incur a surrender charge; be subject to the commencement of a new surrender period; lose existing benefits, such as death, living, or other contractual benefits; or be subject to increased fees, investment advisory fees, or charges for riders and similar product enhancements; Would benefit from product enhancements and improvements; and Has had another annuity exchange or replacement, including an exchange or replacement within the preceding 36 months. § 627.4554(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). Despite section 627.4554, the suitability analysis tends to be subjective in nature. Extreme circumstances notwithstanding, it is fair to say that reasonable people could reach different conclusions about what annuity would be best for a certain person. The Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating and licensing insurance agents and agencies. That responsibility includes disciplining licensed agents and agencies for violations of the statutes and rules governing their profession. At all times relevant to the instant case, Ms. Dorrell was a Florida-licensed insurance agent selling fixed annuities and fixed index annuities. She owns SFS, a licensed insurance agency located in The Villages, Florida. Ms. Dorrell is not licensed to conduct securities business. Count I – Frederic Gilpin Frederic Gilpin was born in 1940 and worked in the automobile industry, primarily as a service manager in dealerships, for 44 years before retiring in 2006. Mr. Gilpin purchased a Prudential variable annuity in 2006 through Bryan Harris, an investment advisor in Maryland, for $260,851.14. By September 30, 2007, the value of Mr. Gilpin’s Prudential variable annuity had increased to $326,557.31. On December 31, 2007, its value had fallen to $319,877.84. On December 31, 2008, Mr. Gilpin’s Prudential variable annuity was worth only $200,989.32. By March 31, 2009, its value had fallen to $183,217.37. The decrease in the annuity’s underlying value coincided with the precipitous declines experienced by the stock market in 2008 and 2009. On May 1, 2009, Mr. Gilpin exercised a rider in the Prudential annuity contract that guaranteed a yearly income of $15,625. That annual income would continue for the rest of his life regardless of the stock market’s performance. The guaranteed income stream would only be destroyed if Mr. Gilpin withdrew from the annuity’s principal. Mr. Gilpin and his wife met with Ms. Dorrell in 2012 to discuss their financial situation. Mr. Gilpin reported that he was very concerned with income, preservation of assets, and maximizing growth. According to Ms. Dorrell, Mr. Gilpin “did express to me that he was concerned about a downturn [in the stock market] because he had already gone through one in [2007 and 2008] and lost quite a bit of money in the annuity.” Mr. Gilpin also told her that he and his wife had committed “financial suicide” because “he had taken excess withdrawals from his variable annuity when they went to buy [their home in Florida] and that they were constantly invading their investments to help their children and they needed to stop that.” As recommended by Ms. Dorrell, Mr. Gilpin surrendered the Prudential annuity and used the proceeds to purchase a fixed index Security Benefit annuity. The purchase price of approximately $205,000 for the Security Benefit annuity was allocated between two accounts whose performance was tied to the Standard and Poor’s 500. Mr. Gilpin filled out a Department form titled “Annuity Suitability Questionnaire” on September 26, 2012, and reported that he was purchasing the Security Benefit annuity for “safety of principal + guarantee.” He also reported that he planned to keep the Security Benefit annuity for 10 years. At the time of this transaction, the Prudential annuity had four more years of surrender charges, and Mr. Gilpin started a new 10-year period of surrender charges associated with the Security Benefit annuity.4/ Mr. Gilpin incurred a surrender charge of $13,077.56 for surrendering the Prudential annuity. The surrender charge was more than offset by the 8 percent bonus (i.e., $16,000) he earned by purchasing the Security Benefit annuity. However, the 8 percent bonus was subject to recapture for the first six years. With the Security Benefit annuity, Mr. Gilpin could withdraw 10 percent of the money without penalty after the first year. If Mr. Gilpin waited until 2016 to take income from the Security Benefit annuity, then he would be getting over $17,000 a year in guaranteed income for his lifetime. If he died, then the guaranteed income stream would continue for his wife’s lifetime. Mr. Gilpin had no pressing need for income in 2012 because he had used the sale from his home in Maryland to acquire a home in Florida, and he had $50,000 left over. The Prudential annuity did not have a home healthcare doubler, and the Security Benefit annuity did. That feature increases the annuity purchaser’s income stream if he or she becomes disabled. The Security Benefit annuity had a 100-percent participation rate, and a 7-percent roll up rate. In contrast the Prudential annuity only offered a 5-percent roll up rate. In retrospect, Mr. Gilpin considers the move from the Prudential annuity to the Security Benefit annuity to be unwise. In recent years, Mr. Gilpin and his wife have experienced significant health issues. By purchasing the Security Benefit annuity and extending the amount of time that their funds were committed to relatively illiquid annuities, the Gilpins would likely have incurred substantial penalties if they had needed to use those funds to finance their medical treatment. Fortunately, the Gilpins are well-insured and were not compelled to take such drastic measures. Mr. Gilpin is also critical of Ms. Dorrell for recommending that he move his money from a variable annuity to a fixed index annuity. As a result, his holdings did not appreciate as much when the stock market rebounded from the lows of the most recent recession. Given that the Prudential annuity guaranteed him annual income of $15,625 regardless of valuations in the stock market, Mr. Gilpin stated “[t]here’s no way in the world [the Security Benefit annuity] could have been better for me, especially since the stock market has gone up.” This criticism is unfounded. It is exceedingly difficult to predict whether the stock market will go up or down, and Mr. Gilpen’s testimony enjoys the benefit of “20/20 hindsight.” A strongly contested point between the Department and Ms. Dorrell concerns whether Mr. Gilpin destroyed his guaranteed income stream by taking an excess withdrawal from the Prudential annuity. If he had, then it would be more difficult for the Department to argue that the Security Benefit annuity was not a suitable replacement for the Prudential annuity. In that regard, there is evidence suggesting that Mr. Gilpin took an excess withdrawal in 2010 and/or 2011. For example, Mr. Gilpin appeared to acknowledge during his testimony that he had taken an excess withdrawal from the Prudential policy in order to assist his daughter with purchasing a condominium.5/ Mr. and Mrs. Gilpin’s income tax return for 2010 indicates that they received $44,423.00 from “pensions and annuities.” That amount is listed separately from $15,626 attributed to “IRA distributions.” The Gilpin’s 2011 income tax return indicates they received $32,005.00 from “IRA distributions” and $43,778.00 from “pensions and annuities.” The evidence indicating that Mr. Gilpin may have taken an excess withdrawal corresponds with when the Gilpins moved to Florida and bought a house in 2011. According to Ms. Dorrell, Mr. Gilpin stated during a meeting with her on September 21, 2012, that “he had made an excess withdrawal to buy the house in Florida, because when they were down here, they found something and they didn’t want to lose out, so they took extra money out.” Also, Ms. Dorrell testified that she called Prudential and confirmed that he took an excess withdrawal in 2011. However, even if Mr. Gilpin had not destroyed the guaranteed income from the Prudential annuity, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that the Security Benefit annuity was not a suitable replacement for the Prudential annuity. In sum, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Dorrell or SFS violated any statutes or rules in conducting business with Mr. Gilpin. Count IV – Deborah Gartner’s Annuities Deborah Gartner is a 71-year old widow who met Ms. Dorrell at an SFS seminar in 2007. Ms. Gartner filled out an SFS form indicating that her net worth was between $500,000 and $1 million. In January of 2008, Ms. Gartner met with Ms. Dorrell in order to seek financial advice. Ms. Gartner had $201,344.14 in a Guardian Trust account and $195,182.44 in a Guardian Trust IRA. In addition, Ms. Gartner owned an $80,000 certificate of deposit. On a monthly basis, Ms. Gartner was receiving $1,381 from social security, $786.15 from a pension, and $4,500 from investment withdrawals. The latter came from depleting principal rather than interest. Ms. Gartner also earned income from teaching one to three Zumba classes a week. One hundred people would attend those classes and pay $10 a person. At the time of the January 2008 meeting, the stock market was declining, and Ms. Gartner was adamant about getting out of equities. Ms. Dorrell told Ms. Gartner that annuities would be appropriate if she was interested in principal protection and guaranteed income. Because she lacked a securities license, Ms. Dorrell could not legally recommend or instruct Ms. Gartner to liquidate her equity investments, and Ms. Dorrell credibly denies doing so. Ms. Gartner was able to liquidate her Guardian Trust accounts without incurring any fees. The funds from the Guardian Trust accounts were used to purchase two Allianz and two American Equity annuities on February 1, 2008. The Department criticizes Ms. Dorrell for directing Ms. Gartner’s funds into four annuities rather than just two. Ms. Dorrell explained that this was intended to increase Ms. Gartner’s income: Q: Now, Mr. Davis this morning was explaining the reason for having multiple annuities. And if I understood him, it was that if you have multiple annuities and you want to either take a withdrawal or whatever other thing, you have to do it at a specific amount based upon the amount of the annuity; is that correct? A: Yes, that’s correct. It’s - - - Q: Well, for example, if you’re going to take a 10 percent penalty-free withdrawal, if you have a $75,000 annuity, you take $7,500. A: Right. Q: If you had a $150,000 annuity, you’re stuck at 15,000. A. Right. Q: But if you’ve got two $75,000 annuities, you could take it from one and leave the other one without being reduced? A: Yeah, some of the companies – some of the companies only allow a penalty-free withdrawal after the first year, but then once somebody makes a penalty-free withdrawal, some of the companies make them wait around another 12 months before they could make another one. So if she only needed $7,500 and she had 15,000 available, but then she needed the rest of it before the 12 months went by, she might have a problem. So that’s the reason I staggered the accounts for her and for many clients that are taking income. Q: In your opinion, was this suitable for Ms. Gartner at that time? A: Yes, it was. Q: Did you believe it was in her best interest? A: Yes. In March of 2008, Ms. Gartner used the $80,000 from her certificate of deposit to purchase a Reliance Standard fixed index annuity. At that time, the certificate of deposit was coming due and had been paying 3.9 percent. The Reliance Standard annuity offered 4.5 percent along with an additional 1 percent for the first year. The minimum guaranteed rate was 3 percent. As for why she recommended that Ms. Gartner purchase the Reliance Standard annuity, Ms. Dorrell testified as follows: Deborah was very sensitive to creditor protection. Due to what her husband had done for a living, he often told her about making sure your assets are creditor-protected. She had a son that had a problem with being – having assets seized. I believe it was in a divorce or some sort of lawsuit. And so one of her things that she liked about the annuities is that they gave her creditor protection. So she still had the CD at the bank that was at risk if for some reason something happened and she needed her assets protected. It wasn’t paying as much. She wanted to get more income, and she wanted principal protection and safety. By January of 2011, Ms. Gartner wanted more income, and Ms. Dorrell recommended that the Reliance Standard annuity be split into two annuities. Surrendering the Reliance Standard annuity caused Ms. Gartner to incur a $5,132.56 surrender charge and left her with $72,496.03 from the initial $80,000 purchase. She used $43,815 of the $72,496.03 to purchase an American Equity annuity that offered a guaranteed minimum interest rate of 3 percent. However, the American Equity annuity also had 16 years of surrender charges, and the surrender charge for the first year was 20 percent. Ms. Gartner used $26,185 of the $72,496.03 to purchase a North American annuity. As for the reasoning behind recommending the surrender of the Reliance Standard annuity, Ms. Dorrell testified as follows: A: I recommended, because she wanted more income, and my concern was she was getting to the point where she might be having to live on her IRA monies, which would be a taxable event. So I made a recommendation that we do a split annuity with the money that was in the Reliance to give her more income and less taxes. Q: Can you explain how that’s done? A: Yes. So, a split annuity is like a bucket concept. In her case we use two buckets. One was going to be the immediate annuitization in the North American that would then give her $150 more a month in income with much less taxation. Only a small portion of that payment would be taxable. And then on the other side was the American Equity which was purchased for accumulation over that same 5-year time frame that the North American would be paid out, so when the North American balance went to zero, she’d have the same amount of money in her American Equity policy as she started with when she bought both of them. Q: So how long a period of time would this provide the same income for her? * * * A: For the rest of her life. That was the reason for buying the American Equity, because it would remain – when we used the rider on that side, it would give her guaranteed income for as long as she lived and she was concerned about that because her parents were both in their nineties. Q: In your opinion, were these purchases suitable for her? A: Yes, they were. Q: And the surrender of the Reliance Standard, was that suitable? A: Yes. Q: Because that was a source of the funds to obtain the other two annuities; is that right? A: Yes. Ms. Dorrell also addressed the Department’s allegation that it was ill-advised to incur a $5,132.56 charge for surrendering the Reliance Standard annuity: Q: It’s been alleged that the liquidation of the Reliance Standard annuity cost Ms. Gartner $5,132.56 and, apparently, that it shouldn’t have cost her or that it was a bad idea to surrender the policy. Does that take into account what’s known as the market value adjustment? A: No. So many just straight fixed annuities and some fixed index annuities, in particular we’re speaking of the Reliance Standard fixed annuity, they come with what’s called a market value adjustment. It’s really something that an insurance company determines if they’re going to give them a positive market value adjustment or a negative value adjustment. So a negative market value adjustment could make a higher surrender charge and a positive market value adjustment could make a lower surrender charge, and they’re sort of driven by interest rates. So at that time, if you remember, you know, 2011 interest rates were, you know, still very low. But it was a good time, if you had an annuity with a market value adjustment, it was a good time to consider changing it because they would still have positive market value adjustments, which by the next year, the next six months later, exactly what I knew would happen is all those market value adjustments went negative. So not only would it have cost her the percentage rate on the surrender penalty to get out, she would have paid an additional negative market value adjustment. And this way it was timed to better her annuity anyway and she ended up in the positive. Q: Was there a positive market value adjustment? A: Yes. Q: $1,700? A: Correct. Q: And was there also a bonus on the American Equity? A: Yes. Q: And do you know what the bonus was? A: 10 percent. Q: And what was that, about $3,000? A: I think she put 43,000 in there, so it was about $4,300. Q: So after the surrender, taking into account the market value adjustment, taking into account the bonus on the American Equity, in fact, wasn’t she $1,000 ahead? A: Yes. The Department argues that Ms. Dorrell gave investing advice to Ms. Gartner and that Ms. Dorrell’s actions led to a depletion of Ms. Gartner’s assets. Ms. Dorrell addressed those allegations as follows: Q: It’s alleged in the administrative complaint that Ms. Gartner’s assets were depleted by the exchange of policies and also that you gave securities advice. First of all, were her assets in any way depleted? A: No. Q: She takes at the beginning $300,000 cash. She buys $300,000 worth of annuities. And the annuity companies add 10 percent, so initially she takes $300,000, truly liquid asset[s], but earning very little, and now she’s got $330,000 in the annuities; is that right? A: Yes. Q: Is there any depletion of her assets there? A: No. Q: Two months later, March of 2008, she takes an $80,000 CD and buys an $80,000 Reliance Standard annuity. Is there any depletion of assets there? A: No. Q: Later on she takes the $80,000 Reliance Standard annuity and converts it to a total of almost $80,000 in American Equity and National American? A: North American, yes. Q: North American? Is there any depletion of assets there? A: No. Q: Do all of these annuities actually earn income? A: Yes. Q: Did the principal balance of any of these assets decline? A: No. Q: In comparison to the stock market where there’s volatility up and down and your account may vary, did Ms. Gartner’s accounts ever vary or get lower? A: No. Q: Do you know the difference between giving advice on insurance and on securities? A: Yes. Q: Now, honestly, I’m not quite sure what is advice on securities, but I assume it is sell this one and buy another one? A: Right. Q: Did you make any recommendation that she sell a particular security? A: No, I did not. Q: Did you make a recommendation that she buy a particular stock? A: No, I did not. Q: Other than advising her that she needs to get the source of some funds to buy the annuities, and they would have to come from her accounts, is that the only advice you gave her? A: Yes. In sum, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Dorrell or SFS violated any statutes or rules in conducting business with Ms. Gartner. Count V – Gartner’s Real Estate Ms. Gartner and Ms. Dorrell became friends, and Ms. Gartner sought Ms. Dorrell’s advice in 2012 about selling her home in Summerfield, Florida. At that time, Ms. Gartner wanted to acquire a smaller home in The Villages, Florida. However, Ms. Gartner was having difficulty selling the Summerfield home. Along with referring Ms. Gartner to a real estate agent, Ms. Dorrell allegedly advised her to stop paying the mortgage on her Summerfield home and to do a short sale.6/ Ms. Dorrell denies making either recommendation. Ms. Dorrell spent $3,100 on “staging” the Summerfield home in order to make it appear more attractive to potential buyers. Ms. Gartner and Ms. Dorrell informally agreed that Ms. Gartner would select a house in The Villages, Ms. Dorrell would purchase it, and Ms. Gartner would then buy the house from her. Ms. Dorrell made the initial purchase because Ms. Gartner lacked funds and/or a good credit rating following the short sale. Ms. Gartner and Ms. Dorrell discussed Ms. Gartner purchasing the villa from Ms. Dorrell, but they never reached a formal agreement on terms. Because a short sale would have a negative impact on her credit rating, Ms. Dorrell allegedly advised Ms. Gartner to buy a new car prior to executing the short sale. Ms. Gartner sold her 2003 Mazda Tribute to Ms. Dorrell for $10,000, and Ms. Gartner purchased a new car. Ms. Dorrell then gave the Mazda Tribute to Diana Johnson, an SFS employee. Ms. Dorrell deemed the car to be income, and Ms. Johnson declared it on her tax return. Ms. Gartner selected a villa in The Villages, and Ms. Dorrell purchased it for $229.310.78 on November 1, 2012. Of the aforementioned amount, Ms. Gartner paid $10,000, and Ms. Dorrell paid the remaining $219,310.78. At this point in time, Ms. Dorrell was the legal owner of the villa. Ms. Gartner could not move into the villa immediately after the sale because it was being rented, and the tenants’ lease extended through April of 2013. Ms. Dorrell received the rental payments of $1,800 per month and paid the expenses associated with the villa between November of 2012 and April of 2013. Those expenses included items such as home insurance, cable television, lawn maintenance, and utilities. By May of 2013, Ms. Gartner had completed a short sale of her Summerfield home. She received a short sale benefit of $36,775.00 and a seller assistance payment of $3,000.00. Ms. Gartner moved into the villa in May of 2013. At that point in time, there was no formal agreement between Ms. Gartner and Ms. Dorrell about when Ms. Dorrell would sell the villa to Ms. Gartner or how Ms. Gartner would pay Dorrell for it. Ms. Gartner paid no rent to Ms. Dorrell from May of 2013 through April of 2014. In November of 2014, Ms. Dorrell sold the villa to Ms. Gartner for approximately $219,000, the same price that Ms. Dorrell paid for it. In order to finance the sale, Ms. Gartner executed a promissory note that would pay Ms. Dorrell $100,000 with 4-percent interest. Ms. Dorrell did not record that promissory note.7/ In order to finance the remainder of the purchase price, Ms. Gartner obtained a reverse mortgage. Ms. Dorrell allegedly pressured Ms. Garter to obtain the reverse mortgage, but Ms. Dorrell denied having any discussions with Ms. Gartner about a reverse mortgage. There is a substantial amount of disagreement between Ms. Gartner and Ms. Dorrell as to who was entitled to receive the rental payments. They also disagree about the expenses associated with maintaining the villa prior to Ms. Gartner moving in. This is not surprising given the lack of a written agreement between them. The Department’s Exhibit 185J purports to be an accounting of the rental income and expenses associated with the villa prior to Ms. Gartner moving in, and it suggests that Ms. Gartner should have received or been credited for an additional $17,950.51. Ms. Dorrell had Diana Johnson prepare Exhibit 185J, but there is substantial reason to question Ms. Johnson’s credibility about the interpretation of Exhibit 185J.8/ Ms. Gartner ultimately sold the villa for $285,000. Ms. Dorrell filed a mortgage foreclosure action against Ms. Gartner in order to recover the balance of the money Ms. Gartner owed her. Part of that litigation involved a reconciliation of expenses associated with the villa prior to Ms. Gartner moving in. Following a mediation conference on June 6, 2017, Ms. Gartner agreed to pay $97,500 to Ms. Dorrell in settlement of the foreclosure action. In the Administrative Complaint, the Department alleges that Ms. Dorrell acted “wrongfully” through the following actions: (a) advising Ms. Gartner to stop making mortgage payments on the Summerfield home; (b) advising Ms. Gartner to buy a new car and purchasing Ms. Gartner’s used car; (c) arranging for the purchase of the villa and accepting a $10,000 deposit from Ms. Gartner without giving her credit for it; (d) not crediting Ms. Gartner for paying expenses associated with taking possession of the villa; (e) directing Ms. Gartner to sign a $100,000 promissory note; (f) making Ms. Gartner responsible for all of the property taxes owed for the villa in 2014; pressuring Ms. Gartner to procure a reverse mortgage; and arranging for Ms. Gartner to use funds from an IRA account to pay off the promissory note. Ms. Dorrell’s failure to have a written agreement governing her acquisition and subsequent sale of the villa to Ms. Gartner was foolhardy. Without such an agreement, conflicts regarding the villa were inevitable. However, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Ms. Dorrell violated any statutes or rules in her dealings with Ms. Gartner. Count VI – Earl Doughman Earl Doughman was born on December 6, 1934. After completing a two-year stint of military service in 1958, Mr. Doughman spent the next 40 years managing a company’s inventory. At some point after his retirement, Mr. Doughman and his wife moved from Cincinnati, Ohio to The Villages. On August 4, 2008, Mr. Doughman purchased a Midland National Deferred Annuity (“the Midland annuity”) from Ms. Dorrell. That annuity provided a 5.25-percent guaranteed interest rate for five years. The annuity did not have an income rider or a home healthcare doubler. In 2013, Mr. Doughman visited SFS to inquire about purchasing another annuity. According to Mr. Doughman, he dealt exclusively with Diana Johnson and never met with Ms. Dorrell about his finances.9/ Ms. Johnson allegedly advised Mr. Doughman to utilize 10-percent penalty free withdrawals from the Midland annuity and a Fidelity and Guaranty annuity to fund the acquisition of a Security Benefit annuity for $29,492. The Department asserts that the Security Benefit annuity was not a suitable replacement for the Midland annuity. The Midland annuity was a fixed annuity and the Security Benefit was a fixed index annuity. The Midland annuity had five more years of surrender charges, and the surrender charge for each year was 10 percent. The purchase of the Security Benefit annuity resulted in Mr. Doughman beginning a new 10-year term of surrender charges. Those surrender charges were 10 percent for the first five years, but gradually declined to 0 percent by year 10. As noted above, Mr. Doughman could withdraw 10 percent a year from the Midland annuity without incurring a penalty. With the Security Benefit annuity, he would incur a 10 percent surrender charge after the first year. The Midland annuity provided a minimum guaranteed interest rate of 1 percent, and the Security Benefit Annuity had no minimum guarantee. However, the Security Benefit annuity came with a 9-percent bonus based on the premium amount. As a result, Mr. Doughman received approximately $2,654.28 upon purchasing the Security Benefit annuity. The Midland annuity had a 5.25-percent interest rate cap for the first year. By 2013, the Midland annuity was paying 3 percent. The participation rate in both annuities was 100 percent. The Security Benefit annuity had a home healthcare doubler, and the Midland annuity did not.10/ However, the Midland annuity had a death benefit and a terminal illness rider that would result in the waiver of surrender penalties if they were activated. Ms. Dorrell testified as follows as to why the Security Benefit annuity was more suitable for Mr. Doughman than the Midland annuity: Q: Why is the Security Benefit [annuity] a better product for Doughman? A: Because it has the home healthcare doubler that he desperately needed. It has the income rider. It has the upside potential in the stock market with not any downside potential whatsoever. It has a fixed account inside of it that would have paid close to the same amount that the Midland had renewed out at 3 percent. So why wouldn’t he buy something that he can get a bonus on, not lose anything from the Midland, and have the ability to make more money than what he was going to make if he stayed at Midland? It makes perfect sense to move that. Mr. Doughman was concerned about whether he was actually earning 4 percent on the annuity contract amount as had allegedly been represented to him. Therefore, Mr. Doughman asked Don Geist, an insurance agent with Financial Solutions Group of Florida, to review the terms of this Security Benefit annuity. Mr. Geist is a competitor of Ms. Dorrell’s and determined that the 4-percent interest rate applied only to the annuity’s income rider.11/ With Mr. Geist’s assistance, Mr. Doughman wrote a letter to Security Benefit on April 14, 2014, seeking the termination of the Security Benefit annuity and a refund of the $29,492.30 he paid to acquire that annuity.12/ Security Benefit refunded the money that Mr. Doughman had paid to acquire the Security Benefit annuity. Ms. Dorrell learned of Mr. Doughman’s complaint in April of 2014. In response, she had Ms. Johnson use SFS’s records to prepare a chronology and description of Mr. Doughman’s meetings with SFS. Ms. Johnson then transmitted the following e-mail to Ms. Dorrell’s attorney on April 29, 2014, indicating that Ms. Johnson did not sell an annuity to Mr. Doughman: Hi Jed, Here is a timeline of when the Doughmans came to our office and who they met with: July 17, 2012 attended Seminar, which Jean was the speaker. July 31, 2012, met with Goldie, who was a licensed agent and discussed annuities. August 28, 2013, met with Jean for a review and purchased annuity. August 29, 2013, brought in beneficiary information and gave to Diana. October 3, 2013, met with Jean for policy delivery. February 21, 2014, met with Diana and the Doughmans expressed concern re: a salesman that came to their door inquiring about their finances and dropped off card from Don & Tim Geist from Financial Solutions. The Department alleges that Ms. Dorrell committed wrongdoing by having unlicensed agency personnel (i.e., Diana Johnson): (a) perform prohibited sales activities with respect to Mr. Doughman’s transactions of insurance; (b) unreasonably recommend the partial surrender of senior consumer Doughman’s existing annuities to fund the purchase of the Security Benefit annuity; (c) misrepresent the percentage return on the Security Benefit policy by including a costly rider to the policy; and (d) advising Mr. Doughman that the cap on the indexed Security Benefit policy was two points lower than the cap on his indexed Midland annuity. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Ms. Dorrell or SFS violated any statutes or rules in dealing with Mr. Doughman. Count VII – Margaret Dial Margaret Dial was born in 1950 and earned a high school diploma. She was married for 42 years. During her marriage, she worked as a bookkeeper until she took an early retirement to care for her mother. Ms. Dial receives income from a pension and social security. Ms. Dial met Ms. Dorrell in July of 2007 and purchased multiple annuities from her. One of those annuities was an Old Mutual annuity that she purchased on November 11, 2007. In 2013, Ms. Dorrell advised Ms. Dial to surrender the Old Mutual annuity and use the proceeds to purchase a Security Benefit annuity. After incurring $16,560.39 in surrender charges, Ms. Dial received $129,901.21 in the form of a check mailed to her home. Ms. Dial then wrote a check for $130,000 to purchase a Security Benefit annuity. The difference between the purchase price of the Security Benefit annuity and the proceeds from the surrender of the Old Mutual annuity was $98.79. On March 12, 2013, Ms. Dial signed an application to purchase the Security Benefit annuity recommended by Ms. Dorrell for $130,000. The application associated with the Security Benefit annuity was incorrect because it did not show that it was a replacement for the Old Mutual annuity. The Department asserts in its proposed recommended order that: [t]he manner in which [the Old Mutual annuity] was replaced shows that it was a smokescreen to avoid Old Mutual conservation efforts and to make the new purchase look like it was accomplished by fresh money. By replacing her own business, Dorrell sold the same money twice, making commissions each time, while Ms. Dial incurred a $16,000 surrender penalty. Instead of encouraging the sale, Dorrell should have conserved the Old Mutual business. “Conservation” is the term used to describe an insurance company’s effort to retain existing business. As for why it was problematic that the Security Benefit annuity was not identified as a replacement, Mr. Spinelli testified as follows: A: Because this case – the first contract, [Old Mutual], was written by Dorrell, and she’s replacing her own business to move it to – having the check sent to the client’s house to avoid a conservation effort because it’s saying that she’s surrendering the policy for cash. A proper replacement, if it was a legitimate replacement, would have been a 1035 exchange from one company to another, therefore, avoiding any taxable events. If it was gains in this policy, which there might have been, by surrendering it, it could have created a tax event. And it also avoided the conservation effort that [Old Mutual] was trying to perform. And then adding $99 created a different amount that was surrendered. So that’s a big smokescreen to the company that it was a different amount than was surrendered. Q: So it looks like fresh money, so to speak? A: Correct. And there was [a] $16,604 surrender charge when that transaction was done. The – that’s the case of that money being sold twice. Dorrell sold that money twice there. She sold it with [Old Mutual} and then she turned around and sold it again with Security Benefit. She made commission twice on that. Q: If that were – if, in fact, that had been indicated as a replacement, how do companies look upon – do they look upon these kinds of replacements with a jaundiced eye, so to speak? I’m talking about where the real facts are set forth. A: The company I work for, they do. They take conservation very seriously, especially in a situation like this where the money’s being sent to somebody’s home. Q: And so isn’t the reason for the comparison sheet between the two annuities, to try to point out to the underwriting people that, if the facts are true, then they may or may not allow for issuance of the annuity, the replacement annuity; correct? A: Well, they have to eventually comply with the client’s wishes. If the client insists on surrendering that and making a terrible mistake and paying $16,000 surrender charges, there’s nothing the company can do to stop it. But they can have the agent try to conserve the business. Q: And that’s what the agent should be doing? A: Correct. ALJ: I’ve heard the term conserve. I have a pretty good idea – think I know what it means, but no one’s actually defined it for me. Could you formally define what conserve is? A: Yeah. Conserve, conservation, you’re conserving the business on the books for that company for your clients. You should be conserving the business for your clients. Why are they leaving? You know, quality companies have a high retention rate in their business. It’s because of conservation efforts. ALJ: Okay. Thank you. A: If you have more business leaving the company, your ratings are going to go down. It’s going to be detrimental to the company. Not just the company, but to the clients they serve. Ms. Dorrell acknowledged during her direct testimony that she failed to make the proper notation on the application form. However, she disputed Mr. Spinelli’s assertion that her failure prevented Old Mutual from initiating conservation efforts: Q: Now, on that third page with respect to the question, “Does this proposed contract replace or change any existing annuity or life insurance policy,” the answer is no. Is that incorrect? A: It’s incorrect, yes. Q: Did you notice that when the application was completed and was shown to Margaret Dial? A: I did not. Q: Were you with Margaret Dial when the application was shown to her? A: Yes. * * * Q: At some point did you discover that there was an error on the application before the administrative complaint was filed? A: No. Q: Okay. Now, what impact would that incorrect answer have in regard to the transaction? * * * A: Well, it’s a replacement. I should have checked yes. I mean, that was an error on my part. Q: Did you do that intentionally? A: No. Q: Okay. So, again, did this have an impact on Margaret Dial, financial impact? A: No. Simply because we had discussed that she would pay a surrender charge, and she knew that she was paying it, and she knew what the bonus was as presented in my illustration to her on the Security Benefit annuity. It showed her the bonus. It showed her how her money grew at 7 percent each year, what the value would be, so she knew it took about a year to get back to where she was, and she was willing to pay that surrender penalty because of all the other benefits she was getting. Q: I understand. Mr. Spinelli testified though that if an application is not marked that it is a replacement, that there might not be the conservation letter sent to the policy holder. A: No, there’s a conservation letter sent regardless of that. No insurance company wants to lose business so they – as far as I know, all the companies I work with, they send conservation letters out to the client because they don’t want to lose the business, so they want to make sure that they’re informing the client what they may be giving up. Q: So in other words, the Old Mutual that was being surrendered, whether it was being replaced or just being surrendered and Ms. Dial was taking the money, Old Mutual would still send her a conservation letter. A: Yes. Q: Because she was cancelling the policy. A: Yes, and they didn’t want to lose the business. Q: And it’s irrelevant, really, whether it’s being replaced or whether it’s just being cashed out. A: Right. They send it regardless. * * * Q: And this conservation letter that went to Ms. Dial advises her of the surrender charge, doesn’t it? A: Yes. Q: $16,560.39? A: Yes. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Ms. Dorrell or SFS violated any statutes or rules in the dealings with Ms. Dial. Count VIII - Unlicensed Activities The Department alleges under Count VIII of the Administrative Complaint that Ms. Dorrell and/or SFS employees performed work without having the proper licensure. Specifically, the Department alleges that SFS employees wrote Lady Bird deeds and wills without being licensed attorneys. A Lady Bird deed enables a person to designate a child or some other beneficiary as the person who will take possession of the designator’s property after death. The Department also alleges that Ms. Dorrell and/or SFS employees encouraged clients to liquidate security holdings without being licensed investment professionals. The Department’s case largely depends on two former SFS employees with questionable credibility. Laura Wipperman began working for SFS in July of 2010, providing support to Ms. Dorrell as an administrative assistant. Ms. Wipperman did not have an insurance license. Ms. Wipperman left SFS in March of 2013, supposedly because of Ms. Dorrell’s harsh treatment of her employees. Nevertheless, Ms. Wipperman later returned to SFS as a receptionist. Ms. Wipperman separated from SFS a second time in June of 2014. Ms. Dorrell was upset that Ms. Wipperman failed to timely prepare a file. After Ms. Dorrell had a tense confrontation with Ms. Wipperman, she told Diana Johnson to fire her. Because Ms. Wipperman and Ms. Johnson were friends, Ms. Dorrell’s direction probably led to tension between Ms. Dorrell and Ms. Johnson. In approximately June of 2014, Ms. Dorrell fired Ms. Johnson for stealing money from SFS’s petty cash fund. Ms. Wipperman and Ms. Johnson filed a complaint a few weeks later with the Department alleging that Ms. Dorrell had engaged in improper conduct. Ms. Johnson also joined Ms. Gartner in reporting improper conduct by Ms. Dorrell to an organization called Seniors Versus Crime. Ms. Johnson unsuccessfully pursued a claim alleging that Ms. Dorrell did not pay her what she was owed after the firing. Ms. Johnson acquired an insurance license and began working for an SFS competitor in December of 2014. Ms. Johnson and Ms. Wipperman had obvious reasons to hold a grudge against Ms. Dorrell, and that cast a great deal of doubt on the credibility of their testimony. In addition, the undersigned found their testimony to be unpersuasive and unsupportive of the allegations made in Count VIII. Ms. Dorrell credibly testified that SFS refers clients needing wills and/or deeds to attorneys. Also, there was no sufficiently credible testimony to clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Ms. Dorrell instructed clients to liquidate their securities holdings. In sum, the Department failed to prove its allegations under Count VIII by clear and convincing evidence. Count IX - SFS Employees Performing Unlicensed Insurance Activites The Department’s allegations under Count IX also substantially rely on the testimony of Ms. Wipperman and Ms. Johnson. They testified that they performed activities that should have been handled by someone with an insurance license. Those alleged activities included tasks such as selling insurance, reviewing products with clients, and encouraging clients to use penalty-free withdrawal money to acquire new annuities. As found above, the undersigned does not find the testimony provided by Ms. Wipperman or Ms. Johnson to be credible or persuasive. In sum, the Department failed to prove any of its allegations under Count IX by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2018.
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount to be reimbursed to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Respondent or AHCA), for medical expenses paid on behalf of Petitioners, Devyn Jeffries (Devyn) and Makayla Jeffries (Makayla), minors, by and through their parents and natural guardians, Theresa Jeffries and Christopher Jeffries, (collectively Petitioners), from settlement proceeds received by Petitioners from third parties.
Findings Of Fact On January 24, 2010, Devyn and Makayla were born via emergency C-Section at 27 weeks gestation. During the birthing process, both children suffered severe and permanent brain damage. As a result, Devyn suffers from Cerebral Palsy with spastic paralysis and cognitive developmental disabilities, and Makayla suffers from Cerebral Palsy, failure to thrive, feeding difficulties, and cognitive deficits. Devyn and Makayla’s medical care related to their birth injuries was paid by Medicaid in the following amounts: 1 Respondent’s Proposed Final Order was served by email and received by DOAH at 9:50 p.m. on October 21, 2020. It was, therefore, “filed” at 8:00 a.m. on October 22, 2020, in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.104(3). However, it is accepted and considered as though timely filed. In regard to Devyn, Medicaid, through AHCA, provided $108,068.58 in benefits and Medicaid, through a Medicaid Managed Care Plan known as Simply Healthcare, provided $25,087.08 in benefits. The sum of these Medicaid benefits, $133,155.66, constituted Devyn’s entire claim for past medical expenses. In regard to Makayla, Medicaid, through AHCA, provided $107,912.33 in benefits and Medicaid, through a Medicaid Managed Care Plan known as Simply Healthcare, provided $13,915.84 in benefits. The sum of these Medicaid benefits, $121,828.17, constituted Makayla’s entire claim for past medical expenses. Devyn and Makayla’s parents and natural guardians, Theresa and Christopher Jeffries, pursued a medical malpractice lawsuit against the medical providers responsible for Devyn and Makayla’s care (“Defendants”) to recover all of Devyn and Makayla’s damages, as well as their own individual damages associated with their children’s injuries. The medical malpractice action settled through a series of confidential settlements, which were approved by the court on February 21, 2020. During the pendency of the medical malpractice action, AHCA was notified of the action and AHCA asserted a $108,068.58 Medicaid lien associated with Devyn’s cause of action and settlement of that action and a $107,912.33 Medicaid lien associated with Makayla’s cause of action and settlement of that action. AHCA did not commence a civil action to enforce its rights under section 409.910, nor did it intervene or join in the medical malpractice action against the Defendants. By letter, AHCA was notified of the settlement. AHCA has not filed a motion to set aside, void, or otherwise dispute the settlement. The Medicaid program through AHCA spent $108,068.58 on behalf of Devyn and $107,912.33 on behalf of Makayla, all of which represents expenditures paid for past medical expenses. No portion of the $215,980.91 paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program on behalf of Petitioners represented expenditures for future medical expenses. The $215,980.91 combined total in Medicaid funds paid towards the care of Devyn and Makayla by AHCA is the maximum amount that may be recovered by AHCA. In addition to the foregoing, Simply Health spent $39,002.92 on Petitioners’ medical expenses. Thus, the total amount of past medical expenses incurred by Petitioners is $254,983.83. The taxable costs incurred in securing the settlement totaled $109,701.62. Application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to the settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $108,068.58 Medicaid lien associated with Devyn and the full $107,912.33 Medicaid lien associated with Makayla. Petitioners have deposited the full Medicaid lien amounts in interest- bearing accounts for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA’s rights, and this constitutes “final agency action” for purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pursuant to section 409.910(17). This case is somewhat unique in that it involves two petitioners, with separate injuries and separate Medicaid expenditures. However, the incident causing the injuries was singular, and resulted in a total settlement of all claims asserted by Devyn, Makayla, and their parents of $2,650,000. Therefore, for purpose of determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement for the Medicaid lien, it is reasonable and appropriate to aggregate the amounts paid in past medical expenses on behalf of Devyn and Makayla, and the economic and non-economic damages suffered by them. There was no suggestion that the monetary figure agreed upon by the parties represented anything other than a reasonable settlement. The evidence firmly established that the total of Devyn’s and Makayla’s economic damages, consisting of lost future earnings, past medical expenses, and future medical expenses were, at the conservative low end, roughly $4,400,000 for Devyn and $2,400,000 for Makayla, for a sum of $6,800,000 in economic damages.2 Based on the experience of the testifying experts, and taking into account jury verdicts in comparable cases, Petitioners established that non- economic damages would reasonably be in the range of $10,000,000 to $15,000,000 for each of the children. Based on the forgoing, it is found that $15,000,000, as a full measure of Petitioners’ combined damages, is very conservative, and is a fair and appropriate figure against which to calculate any lesser portion of the total recovery that should be allocated as reimbursement for the Medicaid lien for past medical expenses. The $2,650,000 settlement is 17.67 percent of the $15,000,000 conservative value of the claim.3
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was overpaid in the amount of $1,022.45 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department of Health.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a career-service employee of Respondent and was initially employed with the Department from October 14, 2005, until January 20, 2007. In February 2007 Petitioner received a cash payout for her annual leave balance of 3.25 hours in the amount of $67.18. In January 2007 when Petitioner terminated her employment with the Department, the state’s timekeeping system, People’s First, was not set up to automatically zero out leave balances for employees. The Department’s human resource office was responsible to manually adjust the leave balance to zero each time an employee left employment with the Department. The Department’s human resource office failed to zero out Petitioner’s leave when she left. On March 6, 2009, Petitioner became re-employed with the Department at a remote high school as a nurse. The People’s First system credited Petitioner leave balances she was not entitled to upon re-employment with the Department because her previous leave balances had not been adjusted to zero. Upon Petitioner’s re-employment, the People’s First system reflected incorrect leave balances in the amount of 3.25 hours accrued annual leave, and 107.75 hours of accrued sick leave. Petitioner noticed a leave balance when she returned to work for the Department and asked her supervisor about the hours. Petitioner’s supervisor provided her with incorrect information, which was, because she returned to the State within five years Petitioner was able to keep the time she had accumulated. Petitioner followed up with the Department’s personnel officer, Karen Cayson (“Cayson”), to see if the policy was true and Cayson confirmed that it was correct. During Petitioner’s last two pay periods prior to her second separation from employment with the Department, Petitioner took leave and used the unearned leave amount People’s First indicated she had. Petitioner was paid salary for 34.50 hours of leave for the May 30, 2014, warrant date and 37.50 hours of leave for the June 13, 2014, warrant date. When Petitioner took the 34.50 and 37.50 hours of leave, it should have been leave without pay had the Department’s Human Resource section properly accounted for her leave to ensure it was at a zero balance when she left the Department in 2007. Petitioner worked for the Department until May 30, 2014. After Petitioner left, the Department conducted a payroll and leave audit. Katie Williams (“Williams”) did an official attendance audit by pulling all of Petitioner’s leave and historical data. Williams completed the audit and discovered Petitioner had been overpaid $509.61 for the warrant date May 30, 2014, and overpaid $566.65 for the warrant date June 13, 2014. The Petitioner did not become aware of the overpayment until the Department requested repayment by letter. On July 3, 2014, the Department sent Petitioner a certified letter requesting the overpaid amount of $1,022.45, in which the Petitioner timely contested the letter. Petitioner did her best to determine and verify that she was entitled to the leave money and was assured the amount was correct by Department employees. Petitioner took leave relying upon the assurance that her leave balance credit was correct. Petitioner’s sole income is from her monthly $1,195.00 social security check. She does not have the money to pay the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner repay $10.00 to the Department of Health monthly and continue each month thereafter until the $1,022.45 overpayment amount is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark John Henderson, Esquire Florida Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Mary Jane Williams 1922 Northwest 113th Drive Gainesville, Florida 32606 (eServed) Jaime Briggs, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 (eServed) Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S. State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is not currently an employee of any FRS employer. Petitioner was an employee of several different FRS employers during the 1970's and 1980's. Petitioner proved that he had creditable earnings from three FRS employers. The creditable earnings were from Hillsborough County from October 1977 through April 1978, Pasco County from August 1987 through December 1987, and Hernando County from March 1988 through August 1989. Petitioner has 3.09 years of creditable service in the FRS. The creditable service is not sufficient to vest Petitioner and does not entitle Petitioner to retirement benefits. Petitioner was employed with the City of Largo, Florida, for some time. However, that municipality was not an FRS participating employer during the period of employment. Petitioner worked for the U.S. Postal Service for some time. That agency is not an FRS participating employer. Petitioner was a student on work study at both the University of Florida and Florida State University. Paid student positions at state universities were not positions which were included in the FRS during that time. Petitioner also seeks to purchase his military time of approximately 22 months. Members of the FRS are allowed to purchase certain military service after they vest in the FRS. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has sufficient years of service to vest in the FRS and then purchase military service. Petitioner was employed in some state positions prior to 1975. Until 1975, the FRS was a "contributory" system. Employers withheld contributions to the retirement system from the wages of participating members and forwarded the withheld amounts to the Division. It is undisputed from Petitioner's testimony that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from his wages during the period that FRS was a contributory system.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2010.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Sevalp Corporation, committed an unlawful act of discrimination as alleged by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner contacted the Respondent regarding the possible rental of an apartment on or about February 5, 2004. At that time, according to the Petitioner, she was approximately 8.5 months pregnant. Whether or not the Petitioner’s pregnancy was obvious is unknown. Petitioner claims her state was self-evident. Mr. Intriago claims he did not notice that she was pregnant. Mr. Intriago is the apartment manager for the buildings owned by the Respondent at 915 Palermo Avenue, Miami, Florida. It is undisputed that Mr. Intriago showed the Petitioner an apartment at the cited address and that Petitioner expressed an interest in leasing the unit. The Petitioner did not, however, fill out an application for the apartment, did not pay a deposit to hold the apartment, and did not have approval from the Respondent to rent the apartment. The Petitioner believes that the Respondent violated Florida law by refusing to rent to a pregnant female. The Respondent did not have an application from the Petitioner to consider. Had the Petitioner filled out an application, however, the Respondent would have rejected the Petitioner as a tenant based upon a history of misadventures with the Petitioner. The Respondent accepts applications from all ethnic and familial groups. The complex Petitioner desired does have family residents. It is not a “singles only” or a “no children” complex. The primary reason the Respondent would not rent to Petitioner (had she filed an application and paid the deposit) is that the Petitioner had broken a lease with the Respondent in the past. Additionally, the Petitioner on yet a second unit had failed to take occupancy when she was supposed to causing the Respondent to lose rental income. In addition to the foregoing, on at least one occasion in their prior business dealings the Petitioner gave the Respondent an insufficient funds check.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner’s claim. S DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Celeste Montalvo 2851 Southwest 38th Avenue Miami, Florida 33134 Arthur Ross Sevalp Corporation 923 Catalonia Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33143
Findings Of Fact The employee herein, the Petitioner, is employed by DEP as a park ranger. DEP is an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioner failed to report for work after June 10, 1995. He apparently had some health problem or complaint and was on sick leave for a time. October of 1995 was the first month that he was on leave without pay. He was on leave without pay when he was terminated, which occurred on November 27, 1995. The Petitioner was not receiving workers compensation benefits between his last day of work on June 10, 1995 and the termination date of November 27, 1995. His monthly rate of pay was $1,627.23. He was paid $1,627.62 in gross wages for 176 hours on November 30, 1995. He received $1,319.18 in net wages for November of 1995. The Petitioner was entitled to $71.74 in wages for 10.75 hours for November of 1995. DEP calculated the amount of overpayment by offsetting the wages issued to him in November of 1995 by the amount he was actually entitled to receive for that month for the 10.75 hours. Thereafter, on December 12, 1995, DEP notified the Petitioner, by certified mail, return receipt requested, that he had been overpaid $1,247.44 in net wages for November of 1995. That return receipt reflected that the Petitioner received that letter on December 15, 1995. The Petitioner failed to refund the money to DEP during the 1995 tax year and as yet, has still not refunded the money. Because the money was not refunded during the 1995 tax year, the Petitioner also owes DEP an additional $163.87, which was withheld for taxes on the payment or overpayment in question. Thus, DEP overpaid the Petitioner a total of $1,411.31 in wages for November of 1995.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a Final Order finding that the employee, the Petitioner, Eugene Breeze, owes $1,411.31 for a salary overpayment received by him in November of 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Eugene Breeze 1110 Florida Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444 Melease Jackson, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact On November 19, 1981, the Florida Real Estate Commission, then Board of Real Estate, received the application of Kay M. Harvey, Petitioner, asking that she be licensed to practice real estate as a salesperson. A copy of that application form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following the review, and by correspondence dated February 19, 1982, the application for licensure was denied. A copy of that denial statement may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The basis for denial was as set forth in the Issues Statement to this Recommended Order, with the exception of the assertion that the answer to Question No. 6 was incomplete. That assertion was first offered at the final hearing in this cause. In keeping with the opportunity expressed in the letter of denial, Petitioner requested a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. The Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings was then requested to assign a Hearing Officer and the case was considered through the process of a formal hearing conducted on July 30, 1982. Petitioner is a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, residing at 2612 Sandra Lane. She has lived in Jacksonville for the period of her life. She is now twenty-nine (29) years old and is employed by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. She has held employment with that organization for ten and one half (10 1/2) years. During that time, she has held various clerical positions and at present is a rate clerk. In that capacity she calculates insurance premium rates and informs customers of their premium rates. Her position includes making decisions on the question of premium adjustment refunds for the benefit of customers. This responsibility includes a determination on the part of Petitioner on the subject of proper refund; however, Petitioner does not prepare the refund draft nor mail the refund check. Petitioner does not handle cash money in other facets of her employment. On the topic of the answer to Question No. 6, which is the focus of the dispute between the parties, when asked to describe her understanding of the instructions given to an applicant who was answering Question No. 6, she stated, "I feel that it is asking me whether I've ever been arrested, and if I have, what it was for, and whether I was on parole or not." On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was arrested for obtaining property by the issuance of a worthless check. The arrest occurred in Duval County, Florida, for an offense committed in that county. The amount of the check was two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), constituting a felony offense. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was placed on probation. The probation was successfully concluded on July 8, 1982, following restitution by Petitioner. This pertained to the circuit court case, Docket No. 81-5065CFR, Duval County, Florida. In connection with the offense involved with the issuance of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check, Petitioner purchased carpet from a merchant in Duval County, The Carpet Barn. When the check was processed, Petitioner was informed that she did not have sufficient funds to honor the check. This information was provided by an employee of the merchant. The check was then processed a second time and again Petitioner was informed that there was insufficient money in the account to allow the check to be negotiated. Petitioner was again told by the employee of The Carpet Barn that there were insufficient funds. Petitioner also received notice from her bank that there was insufficient money to honor the claim for a two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) payment. The check was not suitable on the first occasion due to the Petitioner's failure to deduct certain service charges from her bank account, which service charges had the effect of reducing the amount of available funds to be spent for other purposes. The check was not honored on a second occasion due the submittal of another check issued by the Petitioner, which had been outstanding, causing the reduction of available monies in the Petitioner's checking account, such that there were insufficient funds to honor the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($208.00) check when it was processed on the second occasion. In the face of the shortages, Petitioner was requested to provide money to balance the checking account and allow payment of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. This was not done. Petitioner then requested that she be given a month to place sufficient funds in the account to honor the claims by The Carpet Barn, and was granted that opportunity. Following the second submission for payment, an employee of The Carpet Barn contacted the personnel office where Petitioner worked and spoke with the Personnel Manager about the subject of the outstanding check. Petitioner was disturbed by this contact and called the employee of The Carpet Barn and entered into an argument on the subjects of the check and that employee's contact with Petitioner's employer. The employee of The Carpet Barn indicated that the matter would be turned over to the local State Attorney for prosecution. Petitioner then contacted The Carpet Barn to try to arrange for the payment of the check and was told that they expected total payment and no settlement was arrived at, in view of the fact that Petitioner was suggesting payment of a lesser amount. The Petitioner and the merchant being unable to resolve their differences, Petitioner was prosecuted. She retained the carpet she had purchased and an amount of two hundred sixty or seventy dollars ($260.00 or $270.00) in her checking account, which represented the difference between the initial cost of the carpet and the charges in her account which had been deducted, causing the disallowance of the payment of the full amount of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. At the time of the incident involving the check, Petitioner was making an annual salary of twelve to thirteen thousand dollars ($12,000.00-$13,000.00) and the merchant was repaid the amount of two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), in keeping with the terms of Respondent's probation. The repayment was made through installments over a period of eleven (11) months. The other conditions of probation related to maintenance of her position in employment with the State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and submission of periodic reports were compiled with. In 1975 or 1976, Petitioner, while married, wrote a check at a time when the bank upon which the funds were drawn did not believe that she had check writing privileges, in that the bank was not aware that a signature card had been executed by Petitioner, thereby entitling her to write checks on a joint account with her husband. Prior to being notified by Respondent that it wished to inquire about the event of 1975 or 1976, Petitioner did not feel that any crime had been committed or that any criminal law investigative record of the events involving this particular check existed. At hearing, Petitioner did acknowledge that she had been charged with the offense in 1975 or 1976, related to checks or worthless checks, in the sense that she received a court summons about the check. Petitioner, by her explanation, was taken "downtown" and signed papers and was fingerprinted. The signature card had in fact been signed and filed with the bank, but the bank, not being cognizant of that signature at the time the check was written, refused to accept it. On the date of court appearance, under summons, an official of the bank accompanied Petitioner to that proceeding and the matter was dismissed. If Petitioner were licensed, one Terry Baker, licensed broker in Florida, has indicated that he might employ Petitioner. Petitioner indicated that to guard against problems of the type which occurred with the check incidents, that she would be more careful in her calculations in protecting the interests of her clients as a real estate salesperson.
Conclusions This cause has come on for final agency action after the filing of a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice (Notice) by Suntree Pharmacy, inc. (Suntree) at the Division Of Administrative Hearings in Case No. 13-4637 on December 27, 2013 and that Division's entry of an Order Closing File And Relinquishing Jurisdiction (Order) on January 9, 2014. Having considered the Notice and the Order and the Order of Conditional Release From Stop Work Order (Release) and the Payment Agreement Schedule For Periodic Payment of Penalty (Payment Agreement) and associated documents (Attachment A hereto), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Notice Of Assignment And Order issued herein on January 30, 2014 is hereby withdrawn as improvidently issued. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Order of Conditional Release From Stop Work Order and the Payment Agreement Schedule For Periodic Payment of Penalty are affirmed and remain in full force and effect until all terms and conditions thereof are satisfied. Should any term or condition therein be defaulted on by Suntree, the Release shall be immediately lifted and a bar against further work immediately re- ss igsyerneeminyeevnerttaneimm mee imposed and the Payment Agreement shall be accelerated and the full amount due thereunder shall become immediately due and payable. March THE DONE AND ORDERED this _@rel_day of February, 2014. Robert C. Kneip, Chief of Sta
The Issue Should Petitioner Alma Slocum receive either the Option 3 or Option 4 retirement benefits retroactive to the death of Clyde Slocum in March 1975?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Clyde Slocum (Slocum), deceased, was a member of the State and County Officers Retirement System (SCOERS) under Chapter 122, Florida Statutes. Slocum was employed by the Suwannee County School Board as a school bus driver until he became physically unable to work in June 1970. Slocum married Alma Sanchez in October 1934, and was continuously married to her until his death on March 30. 1975. By letter dated May 6, 1968, Slocum made an inquiry to the Division regarding the benefits he would be eligible for if he retired from his employment as a school bus driver with the Suwannee County School Board. Slocum noted in the letter that he was not ready to quit work but wanted to know what benefits would be available, if and when he retired. The Division, by letter dated June 20, 1968, notified Slocum of the amount of his contributions on file and the benefits he would be eligible for under Options 1 through 4. It was pointed out that Options 3 and 4 would provide a smaller monthly benefit. However, these options would provide survivor benefits for his wife. It was also stated that proof of age for Slocum and his wife, Alma Slocum, would be required, if he selected Option 3 or 4. The following information was provided to Slocum: (a) Option 1 would provide $43.60 a month, but upon his death, no further benefits would be paid; (b) Option 2 would be 13 cents lower at $43.47, but in the event he died, his beneficiary would receive any balance of the amount of his contribution ($1,006.81) not paid; (c) Option 3 would provide a reduced monthly payment of $35.58 and one-half of that amount ($17.79) to his wife upon his death; and (d) Option 4 would provide for a payment of $30.08 and the same benefit to the wife upon his death. By letter dated August 5, 1970, Lavada Reuthinger, daughter of Slocum, sought information on the three different ways that Slocum could receive his retirement benefits. By letter dated August 7, 1970, Elizabeth Smith, Supervisor, Benefits Section, notified Slocum of the availability of an option election that would provide benefits for his wife after his death. The letter also notified Slocum that proof of his age was required, and if he chose benefits for his wife, then proof of her age was required as well. An estimate, dated September 22, 1970, of benefit amounts, similar to the estimate sent to Slocum in 1968, was prepared by the Division, and sent to Slocum. This estimate of benefits was for Options 1 an 2 only, and did not set forth a benefit amount for Options 3 and 4. The letter stated: "Only the first two options apply in your case." Apparently, the Division assumed that Slocum was retiring under disability. By letter dated October 2, 1970, the Division was notified by Dr. G. L. Emmel that Slocum was disabled and was not able to work. Elizabeth Smith notified Dr. Emmel of the statutory language requirement for an application for disability. Using a form provided by the Division, Slocum, on October 10. 1970, also under the assumption that he was retiring on disability, elected to receive benefits under Option 2. At this point, Slocum had been advised by the Division that neither Option 3 or Option 4 were available to him. Dr. Emmel provided the Department with the requested documentation that Slocum was permanently disabled. On October 26, 1970, Elizabeth Smith requested that Slocum submit proof of his age. By letter dated November 13, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he had failed to furnish proof of his age, but instead he had furnished his wife's birth certificate. Slocum's wife's birth certificate was returned by letter dated November 13, 1970. By letter dated November 21, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he could not retire under disability because he had reached normal retirement age, but that he could retire under Option 3 or Option 4 which would provide monthly payments to his wife upon his death, if he accepted a reduction in the amount of benefits. Smith further advised Slocum that he would need to furnish proof of his wife's age if he selected Option 3 or Option 4. Smith further stated that: "It was thought you were retiring under disability when proof [of your wife's age] was returned to you." Smith also advised Slocum that if he waited until June 30, 1970, he would receive the five-year average. The letter does not indicate what the payment amounts would be for the four different options, and the letter does not indicate that a option election form was included with the letter. Furthermore, the letter does not refer to the Option 2 selection form that Slocum had previously submitted to the Division. Slocum responded to Smith's letter on November 30, 1970, and enclosed a copy of his wife's birth certificate. Slocum also requested "the necessary forms concerning his retirement." Additionally, he notified the Division that since he had not worked since June 1970 he wanted retirement benefits to be paid as soon as possible. The Division did not comply with Slocum's request for the "necessary forms concerning his retirement." A warrant was mailed to Slocum on December 31, 1970, for retirement benefits from July 1, 1970, through December 31, 1970, at $59.17 a month. This benefit amount was the Option 2 retirement benefit amount furnished to Slocum on September 22, 1970, by the Division when it was assumed that he was retiring under disability. No explanation was given to Slocum if, or that, the Division was using Option 2 benefit selection that Slocum had signed and submitted to the Division on October 1970, prior to the time the Division had notified Slocum that he could choose Option 3 or Option 4. Slocum and his wife were both under the impression that since Slocum had furnished the Division a copy of his wife's birth certificate that she would receive retirement benefits after his death. Slocum died on March 30, 1975, five years after he retired. The Division advised Alma Slocum by letter dated May 19, 1975, that her husband had retired under Option 2 and, therefore, no benefits would be paid to her. A copy of his option election and the computation of his monthly benefits were enclosed in the May 19, 1975, letter from the Division. Thereafter, Petitioner repeatedly inquired of the Division why she was not entitled to retirement benefits as Slocum's widow. These inquires were made from the time of Slocum's death in 1975 through the present. In response to each inquiry the Division replied that Slocum had selected Option 2, and no benefits were payable to Petitioner under that option. In February 1999, Petitioner and her granddaughter, Theresa L. Crosby, visited the Division's office in Tallahassee, Florida and reviewed Slocum's file. After they reviewed the file, it was their position that Petitioner was entitled to receive survivor benefits and made a demand on the Division for Petitioner to receive those benefits. At no time prior to February 1999, had the Division advised Petitioner that she was entitled to a formal hearing on the matter. A final agency action letter dated March 26, 1999, was mailed to Petitioner which pointed out that her husband elected and received Option 2 benefits from 1970 until his death in March 1975 and there was no provision under SCOERS, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, to change the option choice at this time. This letter is the first written notice to Petitioner that she was entitled to request a formal hearing if she disagreed with the Division's decision. A Petition for Formal hearing contesting the Division's denial of a survivor's benefit for Petitioner was received by the Division on April 19, 1999. When Slocum made the selection for Option 2 retirement benefits he did so because he was advised by the Division that only Option 1 or Option 2 were available to him since he was retiring under disability. Once Slocum became aware that his wife could receive retirement benefits after his death, it is clear that he intended to select an option which would provide his wife with benefits after his death. Furthermore, after it was determined that he could not retire under disability, which had limited his options, the Division failed to give Clyde Slocum an opportunity to make a selection of the options offered for retirement benefits, either initially in writing or verbally by telephone with a follow-up written option, notwithstanding any testimony to the contrary which, lacks credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order finding Alma Slocum eligible to receive retirement benefits under Option 3 retroactive to Clyde Slocum's death on March 30, 1975, making adjustments for the higher rate paid Clyde Slocum during the years 1970 through his death in 1975, and any adjustments for interest that may be applicable to the benefits paid Clyde Slocum or those benefits that should have been paid to Alma Slocum. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra E. Allen, Esquire 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of, or credit equal to, the amount of the contributions he made to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) for service between November 8, 1971 and June 30, 1972.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a paraprofessional by the Alachua County School Board from November 8, 1971 through June 30, 1972. During this period, he was a participant in FRS. Petitioner was employed as a County Commissioner by the Bradford County Board of County Commissioners from November 19, 1996, through November 16, 2004. During this period, he was a participant in FRS. On October 20, 2004, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement with Respondent Division of Retirement. Respondent's audit of Petitioner's FRS account indicated that Petitioner had been paid in 1976 for his service with the Alachua County School Board. By an October 21, 2004, letter, Respondent acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's Service Retirement Application and gave Petitioner the opportunity to "buy back" his 1971/1972 time with the Alachua County School Board. By a November 18, 2004, letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that he must provide either a check to buy back his 1971/1972 time or a written statement indicating he did not want to purchase the service. Petitioner sent Respondent's letter back to Respondent with the following handwritten letter at the bottom, "I do not wish to purchase this service. Send check of refund." Petitioner signed and dated his signature, "11-23- 04."3/ Respondent notified Petitioner, in a proposed final agency action letter dated November 30, 2004, that an audit of his FRS account showed that, in the 1975/1976 fiscal year, Petitioner had requested a refund of his contributions to FRS for the period from November 8, 1971 through June 30, 1972. The letter noted that a refund check, in the amount of $104.00, representing the Petitioner's full contribution to FRS had been issued on February 11, 1976. Respondent enclosed with the letter a copy of the signed refund request card bearing a signature it presumed to be Petitioner's. Respondent's letter also informed Petitioner that he could reinstate this service credit by repaying the $104.00, plus accrued interest, for a total of $645.89. It further stated that Respondent had received Petitioner's written statement that he did not wish to repurchase this service credit and therefore his name would be added to the retired payroll without the refunded service. By a December 16, 2004, letter, Petitioner asked Respondent to get a handwriting expert to prove his signature on the refund request card was a forgery and a fraud. Respondent did not get a handwriting expert, but referred the underlying issue to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Respondent is the State Agency charged with the responsibility of administering FRS. Its information management system maintains a file on each member of FRS, including Petitioner. This file permits the construction set forth in Respondent's November 30, 2004, letter. Respondent's file also reflects that on or about November 2, 1998, Respondent, after conducting an audit of Petitioner's retirement account, determined that Petitioner then would have had to submit a check in the amount of $442.65, if Petitioner wanted to purchase previously refunded service from November 8, 1971 through June 30, 1972. Also, the file reflects that a letter, dated November 16, 1998, was mailed to Petitioner, in care of (c/o) the Bradford County Board of County Commissioners (of whom Petitioner was one at the time), at the Board's official address. This letter provided Petitioner with a Statement of Account, which reflected the findings of the above audit and explained that Petitioner had the option to purchase his refunded service. At the time of leaving his FRS-covered employment in June 1972, Petitioner had accrued .80 years (eighty per cent of one year) of creditable service in FRS, which computed to $104.00, but he was not a vested member of FRS. In early 1976, Respondent received a "Request for Refund" card, dated "12-22-75," bearing Petitioner's name, social security number, mailing address, and what purported to be Petitioner's signature. The mailing address listed on the refund card was, and still is, Petitioner's mailing address. It is a post office box. At all times material, Petitioner had the sole key to this post office box. It was not unusual in 1975 for a non-vested member of FRS to request a refund of accumulated contributions in FRS after terminating employment. Reasons for this might include an intention not to return to work for the State or an immediate need for the money contributed. Respondent Division of Retirement and the Comptroller followed their established procedures when they processed the request for refund card. Respondent Division of Retirement provided the pertinent information from the card to the Comptroller and requested a corresponding warrant. The Comptroller prepared a warrant in the requested amount and returned it to the Division, along with a computer-printed label that contained Petitioner's name and social security number, the refunded amount ($104.00), voucher number (270029), warrant number (0304887), and the date of the warrant (February 11, 1976). Upon receipt of the warrant and label, Respondent affixed the label to the refund request card, somewhat left of the middle, and over some of the other printing and markings. The label was affixed rather than filling out by hand the printed space indicated for the same information in the lower right hand corner of the card. The Respondent Division then mailed the warrant to Petitioner's address of record. It is possible, but unlikely because he was employed elsewhere at the time (see Finding of Fact 18) that in 1975, Petitioner made out the refund request card at the office of his former employer, the School Board of Alachua County, and transmitted it through the former employer's office to Respondent. Petitioner could also have transmitted it personally under those conditions, but there is no affirmative proof either of the foregoing scenarios occurrence. It is possible that when the card was transmitted to the Respondent, it did not already have the necessary approval information filled out by a representative of the School Board of Alachua County, providing the date of Petitioner's last retirement deduction, employer agency code, and approval signature, but there is no affirmative proof of this, either. It is possible that the card acquired this information before it was submitted to Respondent or that Respondent requested that the former employer place this information on the card before Respondent requested that the Comptroller cut a State warrant to Petitioner. Therefore, it also is possible that the card was handled sometime during the process by persons in the office of the School Board of Alachua County, who may also have corrected dates in the request portion of the card, presumably filled out by Petitioner, but there is no affirmative proof that any of that chain of conjectured events actually happened. Respondent now cannot determine how the Agency initially was contacted (in writing or by telephone) concerning the refund or whether it was initially contacted by Petitioner or by his first FRS employer, the Alachua County School Board. However, nothing in this chain of possible, yet unproven, events alters Mr. Snuggs' clear and convincing testimony that at the time at issue, retirement refund checks were mailed by Respondent directly to the address of the former State employee, not to the former employing agency.4/ At hearing, Petitioner admitted that, when he left State employment in 1972, he had no idea what the future would bring and that he continued to run for office (presumably an FRS-covered employment) whenever the opportunity arose. Petitioner also testified that he was working for IBM in late 1975 and early 1976 and that his financial situation was "pretty good." However, Petitioner denied executing the request for refund card and further denied ever receiving the State warrant for $104.00. The actual warrant at issue was destroyed by the Comptroller's Office in accordance with its statutory document control schedule, so it is impossible to determine who endorsed and cashed it. Petitioner contended that the signature on the refund request card was not his, but a forgery. He based this claim on his belief that he "never had a signature that looked that good." Respondent produced no handwriting expert to refute this testimony. However, Petitioner admitted that the appearance of his signature had "changed from time to time," and Respondent offered in evidence three examples of Petitioner's signature to show the different forms Petitioner's signature has taken over the years. Upon reviewing these exhibits, Petitioner conceded that all of the examples were of his signature and that they "don't look the same." The undersigned has compared the three acknowledged signatures with the signature on the refund request card. There are differences among all of them, and the undersigned cannot make any reasonable finding of fact one way or the other as to the authenticity of the signature on the retirement refund card in this case.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies Petitioner's request for a refund or credit for the amount of the accumulated contributions he made to FRS between November 8, 1971, and June 30, 1972. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006.
