The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent, Lehigh Portland Cement Company/Furniture Division ("Lehigh"), discriminated against the Petitioner on account of her race (white) by discharging her from employment following a verbal altercation with a black co- employee in which the Petitioner allegedly uttered racial slurs directed at or concerning that black co-employee and whether the Petitioner was discriminated against on account of her sex (female) and because of a perceived interracial, personal relationship with another co-employee, who is black.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a former employee of Lehigh. She was discharged by that concern on August 4, 1989 as a disciplinary measure in response to her utterance of racial slurs concerning a black co-worker in the vicinity of the factory floor on Lehigh's premises immediately before the workday began on the date in question. She ultimately filed a charge of discrimination raising the issues and commencing the proceedings referenced in the above Statement of Issues and Preliminary Statement. Lehigh is a furniture manufacturer located in Marianna, Florida. Its plant consists of several large buildings where employees assemble and finish furniture. Lehigh employs somewhat over 400 persons at that factory. On the morning of August 2, 1989, Dorothy Hall and Major Hallmon, both black co-workers of the Petitioner, were having a discussion concerning union business just before the workday commenced on or in the vicinity of the shop floor of Lehigh's factory. Ms. Hall was a shop steward for the union in the paint shop, where the Petitioner was employed. Mr. Hallmon was the chief union steward for Lehigh as a whole. Ms. Hall was expressing concern to Mr. Hallmon about employees in her department or "shop", including the Petitioner, avoiding her, in her capacity as shop steward, and presenting problems directly to Mr. Hallmon when issues or incidents arose which they felt involved the responsibility of their union representatives. Ms. Hall mentioned the Petitioner as one of the employees who had complained about her to Mr. Hallmon. While Ms. Hall was making these comments to Mr. Hallmon, the Petitioner approached them and interrupted their conversation, getting into a verbal altercation with Ms. Hall. Mr. Hallmon attempted to get the Petitioner to cease arguing and yelling. Lehigh's personnel management procedures require that if employees engage in a physical or verbal altercation in their work area, they must cease arguing or fighting and move the disagreement to their supervisor's office for their supervisor to handle with them in an adult manner. Ms. Hall retreated from the confrontation with the Petitioner and walked into the office of George Williams, the supervisor of both of them. The Petitioner then made loud comments which were overheard by a number of co-workers. During their argument, or about the time Ms. Hall walked away in the direction of the supervisor's office, she referred to the Petitioner as a "stupid, white fool" or a "white fool". When the Petitioner walked away from the site of their verbal altercation, a white co-worker, Annette White, told the Petitioner that "Dorothy said she is going to whip your tail" or words to that effect. At this point, the Petitioner responded "I am not afraid of no black ass nigger." The Petitioner's comments were made in a very loud voice and were overheard by a number of co-workers nearby although Ms. Hall, herself, did not hear them nor did Mr. Hallmon. Anne Hamlin, a white woman, who worked in the Petitioner's department, heard the Petitioner say the above-quoted comment. Ms. Hamlin admonished the Petitioner that she should not be calling people by that name. Wilford Pittman, a black man, observed Mr. Hallmon trying to calm the Petitioner during or shortly after her verbal altercation with Ms. Hall. He heard the Petitioner use the word "nigger" and state words to the effect that "I am not scared of that nigger". Odell Harrison, a white man, also heard the Petitioner state "I am not scared of that nigger". Ron Baker, a black man, heard the Petitioner reference Ms. Hall as "a black son of a bitch". The Petitioner, herself, admitted that she stated "I am not afraid of no black ass nigger". The Petitioner immediately joined Ms. Hall in the office of the supervisor after the above incident. Mr. Jack Toole, a crew leader, was also present in the office on that occasion. The argument was renewed once the Petitioner and Ms. Hall were together in the supervisor's office. During the course of their renewed argument, in one of the Petitioner's comments, she used the words "I am white" to which Ms. Hall retorted "No you ain't, your shorts is white". Mr. Toole, who was present during the argument in the supervisor's office, recalls Ms. Hall telling the Petitioner that she was "a white fool for fooling around with Major Hallmon and ruining his life". He also recalls Ms. Hall first coming into the office when he was already present and stating words to the effect that "if we didn't do something about that white woman out there, she would do something with her". Mr. Williams remembers Ms. Hall stating "you make an old fool out of Major". The Petitioner then made a comment to the effect that Ms. Hall should stay home and tend to her "thieving husband" and stay out of other people's business, whereupon Ms. Hall picked up an ashtray as though to strike the Petitioner. Mr. Toole grabbed her arm and took the ashtray from her hand, replacing the ashtray on the desk. The signal to begin work then sounded and Mr. Williams instructed both antagonists to leave his office and begin work. Lehigh has a very specific policy prohibiting racial slurs. That policy provides: Further, it is a stated policy of Lehigh to prevent and prohibit discriminatory conduct in the work environment including statements or actions which could be interpreted as, racially, sexually, religiously or ethnically based, sexual harassment or any other discriminatory harassment or conduct with respect to co-employees, subordinate employees, or supervisors. Any employee who is found to have violated this policy will be subject to discipline, up to and including discharge. This equal employment opportunity policy was posted on all of the company's bulletin boards in the work place in early 1987 and was so maintained and posted forward of that time. Lehigh's management had experienced two disciplinary incidents in the past where two employees, Mr. Cecil Sims and Mr. Coy Jackson, both white, had used the word "nigger", in a conversational context with two black co-employees or in a circumstance where those employees overheard the comment, although it was not uttered in the course of an argument or verbal altercation. Those employees were disciplined by Lehigh for uttering that word, which is found to constitute a "racial slur". Shortly thereafter, during contract negotiations with the union in November of 1988, union representatives informed Lehigh's management that they felt that Lehigh was not enforcing its anti-discrimination policy as vigorously as it should, with the Sims and Jackson incidents used as examples of the union's perception that management's disciplinary practices with regard to the use of this racial slur by employees was too lax. Although Lehigh's management took the view, and still does, that it had taken appropriate disciplinary action in those two prior incidents, Lehigh also agreed with union representatives that such racial slurs constituted a serious offense and agreed that the company would thenceforth enforce its discrimination policy more vigorously. Lehigh's policy, with regard to racial slurs, includes its view that the word "nigger" is one of the most severe or offensive words used to disparage or embarrass a person on account of that person's race. This interpretation of its anti-discrimination policy is a reasonable one because it was established in the record that that word, dating from the time of slavery in America forward to the present time, has been used essentially as a term of disparagement. It is one of the few words in the American vocabulary most likely to demean the person to whom it is directed, to arouse ill will between the person employing the word and the person or persons to whom it is directed, or about whom it is referenced, and even to incite violence between them. It is rational for Lehigh to consider that the use of that racial slur is one of the most severe offenses to which its anti-discrimination policy is directed and designed to prohibit and prevent. In carrying out its disciplinary policy and procedures, Lehigh investigates alleged violations of company rules or policies to find out what occurred and to determine if a rule or policy was, indeed, violated. That customary procedure was performed in the instant case situation. If the management of Lehigh determines that an employee has violated a rule or policy of the company, it evaluates the nature of the offense and views it against the past employment and disciplinary record of the employee to determine what discipline, if any, is appropriate. The management of the company considers the severity of the offense; whether the violation was a willful one; whether it was done with malice; whether the employee under investigation was the aggressor in the incident; the degree of provocation for that employee's behavior; whether the employee expresses or demonstrates any remorse for the occurrence; and the employee's past general work history and disciplinary record. All of these factors are weighed by the company's management in determining what discipline is appropriate. The company customarily has viewed the disciplinary history of an employee as a very significant factor in determining the appropriate discipline to be imposed for a violation of company rules or policies under review as to that employee. In imposing discipline for infractions of company rules or policies, Lehigh employs progressive discipline whenever possible in order to attempt to persuade the employee to change his or her behavior which has resulted in the violation. If an employee exhibits a pattern of rule infractions, especially infractions of the same rule or type of rules, the company imposes a progressively harsher discipline. When considering an employee's past disciplinary record, the company considers only disciplinary violations which have occurred within the past nine months, however. This is because the company's union contract, by which it is bound in terms of its personnel policies and procedures with regard to its union-member employees, contains a provision which requires this restriction. This provision has been applied to all hourly employees of Lehigh for the life of that contract or approximately the past 18 years. It is thus a regular and customary past practice of the company for purposes of the terms of its union contract. The disciplinary measures, which the company imposes for infractions of its rules and policies, range from an oral reprimand (the imposition of which is recorded in the employee's personnel record even if delivered verbally); a written reprimand; suspension from employment for a discreet time period; and permanent discharge from employment. Mr. Albert Berger is the Vice President of Operations for Lehigh. He is responsible for personnel management, among other duties. His personnel management duties include the investigation of alleged infractions of the company's personnel policies and rules, interpreting the company's disciplinary policies and procedures and arriving at decisions about how to discipline employees. Mr. Berger investigated the subject incident involving the Petitioner and Ms. Hall, ultimately determined how to discipline each employee and imposed that discipline. He followed the company's disciplinary policies and procedures in deciding how to discipline the Petitioner and Ms. Hall concerning the incident of August 2, 1989. Upon learning of the incident between those two employees on August 2, 1989, Mr. Berger commenced an investigation of the matter that same day. After making a preliminary inquiry into the matter, he elected to suspend the Petitioner from work sometime on the morning of August 2, 1989, such that she left the company premises under suspension shortly before Noon. He continued his investigation that afternoon, conducting taped interviews with employees and supervisors who had witnessed the altercation. Those witnesses later signed summaries of their statements to Mr. Berger. The Petitioner returned to the factory between 1:00 and 2:00 on the afternoon of August 2, 1989, while Mr. Berger was still concluding his interviews of other employees and supervisors. He gave the Petitioner an opportunity to relate her version of the incident to him. During her taped interview, the Petitioner was very loud and hostile in her demeanor and statements and responses to his questions. She repeatedly employed the term "nigger" with reference to Ms. Hall and her version of the occurrence in question. During the course of the hearing, the Petitioner attempted to explain her behavior during the taped interview with Mr. Berger by insinuating that she was under the influence of alcohol when she exhibited loud and hostile demeanor and comments during the interview, including the use of the term "nigger". She attempted to substantiate this claim by stating that she had consumed several six-packs of beer between the time she left the company premises under suspension shortly before Noon on August 2, 1989 and the time of her interview with Mr. Berger at approximately 2:00 that afternoon. She did not, however, appear drunk or under the influence of alcohol to Mr. Berger when he interviewed her nor did her verbal statements and responses depicted on the tape of that interview justify a finding that she was drunk or under the influence of alcohol at the time of the interview. Moreover, this explanation of her conduct during the interview is self-serving and is thus deemed not credible. Upon concluding his investigation and in the process of determining what, if any, discipline to impose on the two protagonists, Mr. Berger reviewed and considered the employment histories of both the Petitioner and Ms. Hall. Ms. Hall's disciplinary record was a good one. Her most recent disciplinary offense had occurred 13 years before the August 2, 1989 incident. She had been disciplined only one other time, approximately 16 years before the August 2, 1989 incident. Under its union contract, Lehigh was prohibited from considering those two disciplinary incidents in deciding whether and how to impose discipline for the current August 2, 1989 occurrence because those disciplinary infractions occurred more than nine months prior to the August 2, 1989 incident. In addition to the fact that her disciplinary record was a good one with no disciplinary infractions for more than a decade, Ms. Hall readily expressed remorse for her involvement in the incident, apologizing to Mr. Berger and promising to let no such occurrence happen in the future. Because of this and because Lehigh's management, through Mr. Berger, viewed the racial slur "nigger", loudly uttered by the Petitioner, as more egregious than the remark "white fool", "old fool", or "you're not white, your shorts are white", made by Ms. Hall, a lesser discipline was imposed upon Ms. Hall. Mr. Berger imposed a written warning upon Ms. Hall for picking up the ashtray as a threatening gesture directed to the Petitioner and a verbal warning upon her for the above- quoted name calling. This is not a minimal sanction. Written memoranda of both types of discipline are made a part of such an cmployee's personnel record. Concerning the discipline imposed upon the Petitioner, the record establishes that on June 23, 1989, less than two months prior to the incident concerning Ms. Hall, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension for interference with company operations through the use of abusive language directed at another employee. This incident involved the Petitioner painting the words "High Ass" on the door front of a piece of furniture and sending it down the assembly line so that it could be viewed by the co-worker to whom the words were directed. The Petitioner admitted that the words were directed at a black co-worker who was farther down the assembly line. In conjunction with her suspension, Mr. Berger warned her that if she continued to engage in name calling or racial slurs, the consequences for the next such incident would be more severe, including the potential loss of her employment. Mr. Berger concluded and the record establishes that the Petitioner's conduct on August 2, 1989 clearly violated the company's explicit policy against racially-discriminatory conduct in the work place, as that policy is quoted in the above Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's conduct on August 2, 1989, along with the incident leading to her earlier suspension for similar conduct, establishes a pattern of abusive, racially-discriminatory behavior towards her co-workers. Further, the Petitioner was shown to be the aggressor in the incident, interrupting the private conversation between Ms. Hall and Mr. Hallmon, and making statements or comments which incited the ensuing argument and name-calling episode. The Petitioner showed no remorse for her behavior. She was still hostile and inflammatory in her description and reaction to the occurrence concerning Ms. Hall in her interview with Mr. Berger hours later, when she had every reason to believe that her job was at stake with a strong resulting incentive to be conciliatory and remorseful in her reaction and relation of her version of the occurrence to Mr. Berger. Because of these differences in her conduct, her past record, and the severity of her infraction of company policy, as opposed to that of Ms. Hall, and because of Ms. Hall's relative demeanor and reaction to the occurrence and the subsequent summons by Mr. Berger to account for it, Mr. Berger decided, after considering all of the above factors, to convert the Petitioner's suspension to a termination. Discharging the Petitioner for the August 2, 1989 violation in consideration of the above factors related to her conduct, demeanor and past record, as opposed to that of Ms. Hall, was shown to be reasonable, pursuant to Lehigh's customarily-followed "progressive discipline" policy. The differences in severity between the actions of the Petitioner and Ms. Hall, the differences in their personnel histories, the differences in the circumstances of their actions and their demeanor and conduct after the occurrence with regard to it support the differences in the discipline imposed upon them. In attempting to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and discrimination related to her termination, the Petitioner employed in her case the examples of Coy Jackson, a white employee and crew leader, being disciplined, but not terminated for using the term "nigger" directed at a black co-employee, Rudolph Townsend, and the similar example of Cecil Sims, a department supervisor, who is also a white man, using the term "nigger" in the presence of a black co-employee. Mr. Sims was also not terminated, but was given a lesser level of discipline. Concerning the Jackson and Sims incidents, the record establishes that in 1988, Coy Jackson spoke of Mr. Townsend, the black employee, who had complained of being cold, as follows: "Get that nigger a coat before he freezes to death." Mr. Sims, a supervisor in that same department, investigated that incident. During Mr. Sims' investigation, he questioned the employees involved about the name calling and the use of the words "black" and "nigger". Mr. Sims stated to Mr. Townsend that there were two names "you all" (meaning black people) could be called-"black" or "nigger"-and he then asked Mr. Townsend which he preferred to be called. Mr. Townsend responded that he simply wished to be called by his own name. Mr. Townsend complained about Mr. Sims' comment to him; and Mr. Berger investigated that incident, as well. He ultimately decided to give Mr. Sims a verbal warning concerning it and admonished him that he was never to use the word "nigger" again in any context and that the next incident, when it occurred, would result in his discharge. The discipline imposed on Mr. Sims was based upon the fact that Mr. Sims readily expressed remorse for the incident, that he had a long, unblemished career with Lehigh, and was then near retirement. He had had no prior history of uttering abusive language, name calling, or the use of racial slurs in the work place. Moreover, the incident occurred in Mr. Sims' office in a normal conversational tone; it was not shouted or uttered loudly on the factory floor in the presence of a number of other employees. Mr. Jackson, the crew leader who made the remark concerning the coat, was also given a verbal warning for use of the word "nigger". The imposition of a verbal warning as discipline for Mr. Jackson was directly related to the fact that Mr. Jackson had personally apologized to Mr. Townsend for making the remark even before the occurrence had been related to Mr. Berger and any investigation of the matter instituted. Moreover, he had made the comment quietly to one other employee and did not shout it in the work place before a number of other employees. Further, these two incidents occurred in February of 1988 before Lehigh elected, at the urging of the employees' union, to more vigorously enforce its policy against racial slurs, which vigorous enforcement policy it has uniformly pursued since that time. These incidents were thus not proven to be similar to the incidents involving the Petitioner and her employment and disciplinary record. Neither involved the disciplining of a black employee differently than a white employee. The Petitioner, Mr. Sims and Mr. Jackson are white. The less severe discipline imposed on Mr. Sims and Mr. Jackson was rationally related to the mitigating circumstances described above, rather than to their status as men or white men. It is also noteworthy that several years before the Petitioner's discharge, a white man employed in Lehigh's loading department, in the course of a conversation with a black employee, held up a piece of rope, apparently tied as a hangman's noose, and told the black employee that he would show him what use was made of rope in the white employee's home town. The black employee, at this juncture, hit the white employee with his fist. Mr. Berger investigated that incident, as well. Although it was alleged to him that the white employee had used the term "nigger", Mr. Berger was not able to identify a disinterested witness who would actually establish that the term had been used. In any event, however, Lehigh's management, through Mr. Berger, determined that this was a serious, malicious violation of the company's anti-discrimination policy. He promptly discharged the white employee for this conduct. The black employee, in turn, was also discharged for engaging in violence, which the company has uniformly considered to be one of the most severe violations of its disciplinary rules. Each of those employees was individually disciplined for their respective violations of company policy, based upon the circumstances peculiar to each. Neither of those incidents is similar to the incident for which Lehigh discharged the Petitioner. The discipline imposed on each of them was shown to be consistent with the company's customary anti-discrimination policy. None of the exemplary incidents described above serve to establish that white employees, male or female,(or, for that matter, black employees) have been subjected to a pattern of discriminatory disciplinary measures, including termination. They, likewise, do not show that any of those employee groups were accorded favored treatment. Rather, the facts regarding these incidents show that the company has pursued a pattern of non-discriminatory employee discipline. The employees who were disciplined in these three incidents were not shown to be similarly situated to the Petitioner, in terms of the infraction she committed, her past record, the circumstances surrounding her infraction and the investigation afterward, versus the underlying reasons for the various disciplinary measures imposed on these other employees, related above. During the hearing, the Petitioner first raised the issue of alleged discriminatory treatment because of a perceived close interracial relationship between her and Mr. Hallmon. Accordingly, she amended the Petition, ore tenus, without objection. Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner had apparently become close friends at the point when he asked her to be his assistant in his position as chief union steward. She accepted the position. Mr. Hallmon indicated that this was because of his concerns about tensions between black and white employees. He wished a white employee to be his assistant to, as he termed it, "balance things out". That association began approximately three years ago. Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner customarily would spend their lunch period together on frequent occasions to discuss union business. They sometimes met after work, in the parking lot next to the factory, to discuss union business because, as Mr. Hallmon put it, he maintained his union business office in the trunk of his car. The two also met many mornings prior to work for donuts and coffee. Their apparent friendship is corroborated by the fact that Mr. Hallmon elected to urge one of the witnesses to the Petitioner's behavior on August 2, 1989 to conceal her knowledge of it. He stopped Anne Hamlin in the parking lot on the day of the incident and told her that she should say nothing about it. The Petitioner has been engaged in contesting her discharge through the union grievance procedure or the administrative process before the Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings for more than a year and one-half as of the time of hearing. However, she never had complained prior to the day of hearing that her friendship with Mr. Hallmon or any perceived close, personal interracial relationship between her and Mr. Hallmon had been involved in the reasons for her discharge or any discriminatory treatment she believed had been imposed upon her. Mr. Hallmon contended at the hearing that 80% of the approximately 400 workers at Lehigh had made comments about their relationship but, upon questioning about this testimony, was only able to relate two specific comments which had been made to him concerning his and the Petitioner's relationship. Neither of these comments were made by management-level personnel of Lehigh. Moreover, both the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon, as union representatives, were acquainted with procedures for bringing a grievance to the attention of management, concerning discriminatory treatment, or any other basis for a grievance and yet neither had complained concerning any perceived discriminatory treatment to management. The only instance in which management might have gained any knowledge of their alleged relationship, other than personal observation, was from a conversation between Mr. Hallmon and Mr. Berger on one occasion when Mr. Hallmon asked Mr. Berger whether there was any violation of company policy if two people, black and white, or male or female, have lunch together. Mr. Berger responded by stating, in effect, that it was not any of management's business or anyone else's business concerning which employees had lunch together. Mr. Berger, however, upon learning that Mr. Hallmon had an apparent concern about the perception which management or co-employees might have concerning his and the Petitioner's relationship, did advise him to remember that "...this is the deep south...and I wouldn't want any of these rednecks catching up with you". When asked if he could recall any discussions between management personnel concerning the amount of time Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner spent together, Mr. Berger answered "no, it's none of our business". Although Mr. Berger had observed the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon together on several occasions, he felt that was none of his business as a manager of the company. Neither body of testimony, appearing at pages 49, 50 and 90 of the transcript nor any other testimony or evidence in this record, establishes that management had any knowledge of any pervasive discriminatory pattern of behavior in the work place by co-workers toward the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon, if such indeed existed, which was not proven. It was also not established that management had any concern with any real or perceived relationship between the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon and it was not demonstrated that it had any effect on the decision to discipline the Petitioner nor on the severity of the discipline imposed. After her termination, the Petitioner attempted to secure employment through the services of Job Services of Florida by application of August 28, 1989. Job Services referred her to Russell Corporation on September 8, 1989 and to Wal-Mart on September 21, 1989. She applied for employment unsuccessfully at both places. These were the only attempts the Petitioner made to obtain employment from the time of her August 2, 1989 termination until the hearing. Her listing, as available for employment, with Job Services of Florida became inactive on November 30, 1989. It was not established that she sought to reactivate that listing until just prior to the hearing. During the period of her unemployment, there were opportunities to seek employment which she did not avail herself of. On the date of the hearing, there were 22 jobs with private employers and 15 jobs with public employers listed with Job Services of Florida for which the Petitioner could have qualified to apply. She contended that she had looked in the help-wanted advertisements in a weekly newspaper for jobs, but there were none for which she was qualified. Local papers published in Jackson, Calhoun and Liberty counties, in the immediate vicinity of the Petitioner's residence in Altha, reveal that there were a number of advertisements for jobs during her unemployment period which she could have qualified to apply for and possibly to secure. The Petitioner's payroll records for 1988 reveal seven pay periods out of 52 when her total hours equaled or exceeded 50 hours. There were seven pay periods when she worked fewer than 40 hours per week. The average hours worked weekly during 1988 were 42.2. The highest gross pay received in 1988 was $375.76 per week, and the lowest weekly gross pay was $98.56. Her weekly gross pay on an average basis for 1988 was, thus, $273.24. The Petitioner worked 36 pay periods in 1989. She worked more than 40 hours in only eight of those weekly pay periods. The time in excess of 40 hours in these eight pay periods varied, with 5.5 hours being the largest number of hours in excess of 40 hours worked for a weekly pay period; and .3 hours was the lowest number of hours in excess of 40 hours worked for a weekly pay period. In 15 of these 36 pay periods, the Petitioner worked fewer than 40 hours. The average hours per pay period for 1989 were, thus, 33.98. She received overtime pay in eight pay periods. Her highest gross salary for any pay period in 1989 was $309.28. Her lowest gross salary for a pay period in 1989 was $51.28. Her average gross pay for 1989 was, thus, $220.72 per week. The average weekly gross pay for the entire period of her employment was $246.12. She earned $6.41 per hour at the time of her discharge. Had she remained employed, this would have increased to $6.63 per hour on December 16, 1989 and to $6.83 on December 16, 1990. She was eligible for two weeks of paid vacation per year since she had been employed for three years, and eight paid holidays per year. Federal income tax, social security, and union dues were withheld from her gross weekly pay. In 1988, income tax withholding totaled $1,022.80; social security totaled $1,066.98; and union dues totaled $110.00. In 1989, federal income tax totaled $513.97; social security totaled $596.76; and union dues totaled $96.00 for the 36 pay periods she worked in 1989. Lehigh was self- insured for health insurance and any amounts exceeding the employee contributions were to be paid by Lehigh. The employees, including the Petitioner, contributed $7.50 per week towards health insurance. Her payroll records reveal, however, that she ceased participating in the employer-provided group health insurance after the seventh pay period of 1989. In arriving at the above Findings of Fact, it has been necessary, to some extent, to reject the testimony of the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon. This is because the Hearing Officer finds the testimony of other witnesses to the argument between the Petitioner and Ms. Hall and the surrounding circumstances and events to be more credible. The testimony of the other witnesses to these events was accepted because of their basic agreement on the significant circumstances concerning the occurrences in question and the fact that these other witnesses were demonstrated to have no reason to shade the truth concerning the occurrences and the underlying circumstances, including the fact that these witnesses, whose testimony has been accepted as more credible, are of both races involved. The Petitioner, however, is interested in the litigation and admits using the words "black ass nigger" and her tape-recorded statements made the same day of the argument in question are corroborative of the statements, behavior and demeanor on the part of the Petitioner reported by the other witnesses who have been found to be more credible and who are named in the above Findings of Fact. It is found that Mr. Hallmon's close relationship with the Petitioner might have influenced his recollection of the events in question. More significantly, his effort to actually prevent Ms. Hamlin from relating her knowledge about the incident is evidence of a bias in favor of the Petitioner. Moreover, the Petitioner's testimony about alleged recent job-search efforts was impeached because in her deposition taken approximately a week prior to hearing, she repeatedly asserted that the potential jobs at Russell and Wal-Mart were the only ones she had sought, although she maintained at hearing that she had also applied for work at Oglesby Nursery and McDonald's two or three weeks prior to hearing. She offered no explanation of why she did not mention job applications allegedly made less than a month prior to her deposition testimony. It is simply not credible that she would have forgotten those applications if, indeed, they had been made, especially since she was repeatedly asked about that subject matter at her deposition. Thus, her testimony about applying for employment with the two additional employers is deemed not credible.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding that the Petitioner, Donna J. Brown, was not discharged in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1989), and was not the victim of a discriminatory employment practice and, therefore, that her Petition be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6596 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter after determination of the relative credibility of the witnesses. Accepted. 6-9. Accepted. 10-11. Accepted. Accepted, but not material based upon the issues actually pled even by ore tenus amendment at hearing in this proceeding. It has not been established that the employer had knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of any pattern of usage of racial slurs by multiple employees on such a frequent basis, or with any frequency. Thus, it could not have condoned such a pattern of utterance of racial slurs if it was not shown to have known about them, nor was it established that the use of the word "nigger" by fellow employees approximately once or twice a month, as apparently heard by Mr. Hallmon, was made only by white employees. Accepted. Accepted, but not to the extent that this finding establishes a pattern of discrimination against white employees by Mr. Berger or the management of Lehigh. 15-17. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. As delineated in the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, a number of factors were considered in the decision to terminate as opposed to imposing another type or degree of discipline; not consideration of the word "nigger" alone. 20-21. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. This finding of fact is not, in itself, materially dispositive of the issues to be adjudicated. Accepted, but not material to resolution of the relevant issues presented for adjudication. Accepted, but not material in this de novo proceeding. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's more detailed findings of fact concerning this subject matter and issue. 26-30. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, including finding that the Petitioner did not participate in the group health insurance program any longer than the period of time delineated in the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. It has not been established that employment available for purposes of mitigation of damages for lost wages and benefits has to be precisely comparable in circumstances, condition, quality, wages or benefits or any other element in order to be a relevantly considered available job. Rejected, as contrary to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. It has not been established that the Petitioner would work 50 hours, with 10 hours of overtime, for each week which she would have worked since August 2, 1989 had she not been discharged. Such a figure is therefore speculative, rendering the figures contained in this proposed finding, other than the actual wage figures for a 40-hour work week, speculative. The Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter are adhered to and those in this paragraph are rejected as not supported by the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record in light of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact concerning the liability issue. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Accepted. 3. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the record. 4-6. Accepted. 7. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence of record. 8-10. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, except as modified by the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 15-17. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. 20-25. Accepted. 26. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 27-98. Accepted, except as modified by the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and by the Hearing Officer's acceptance of the proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner concerning the hourly wage rates Petitioner would have received with her next scheduled pay raises had she remained employed. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Ben R. Patterson, Esq. PATTERSON & TRAYNHAM 1215 Thomasville Road P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315-4289 George J. Little, Esq. 134A Constitution Lane P.O. Box 1612 Marianna, FL 32446 John D.C. Newton, III, Esq. AURELL, RADEY, ET AL. Suite 1000, Monroe-Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street P.O. Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, race, and/or national origin.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's race is black and her nation of origin is Jamaica. She was born on January 12, 1933. Petitioner completed a State of Florida employment application on August 7, 2002, for the position of Human Services Worker II at the Department's Gulf Coast Center in Fort Myers. The state employment application does not require an applicant to list her age or date of birth. All applicants for the Human Services Worker II position were required to sign a "willingness survey" indicating the applicant's willingness to work beyond the hours of a normal shift and/or willingness to work on an assigned day off, if such was required, in order for the facility to meet its minimum staffing requirements. Petitioner read and signed the willingness survey. The Department hired Petitioner for the Human Services Worker II position on September 13, 2002. Her letter of appointment informed Petitioner that she was required to complete a 12-month probationary period before attaining permanent status. Petitioner is a certified nursing assistant ("CNA"), and the job for which she was hired involved the provision of direct care, supervision, and assistance to residents of the Gulf Coast Center. Gulf Coast Center is a 24-hour licensed intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled, primarily the mentally retarded. Gulf Coast Center's license requires that a minimum number of direct care staff be present and on duty 24 hours per-day, every day of the year, for each residential unit. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.430(d)(3). Petitioner was assigned to the second shift (2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), with Mondays and Tuesdays as her days off. She worked in the Madison Cottage, which houses 16 profoundly retarded adult females exhibiting a variety of extreme behaviors, including self-injury and aggression towards facility staff. The third shift in Madison Cottage began at 10:45 p.m. and ended at 6:45 a.m. The minimum staff required for the second shift was six persons. The minimum staff required for the third shift was three persons. To ensure that the minimum staff requirements were met, Gulf Coast Center promulgated a "holdover policy," which was in effect at the time Petitioner was hired and throughout her employment. The policy provided that staff persons on one shift could not leave the facility until the next shift met the minimum staffing requirement. In practice, the holdover policy was most commonly invoked when an employee from an incoming shift called in sick. The supervisor of the outgoing shift would first invoke the "pull policy," contacting other cottages in Gulf Coast Center to ascertain whether they could pull an employee from their incoming shifts to fill the slot of the absent employee. If no one was available from another unit, the supervisor would then seek a volunteer from her own cottage to work the incoming shift. If no one volunteered, the supervisor was then required to "hold over" an employee from the current shift. Having signed the "willingness survey," this employee was required to work the extra shift, later receiving compensatory leave to ensure that she did not work more than 40 hours in a given week. Employees were given the opportunity to choose which day of the week they would be available for holdover. If the employee failed to choose a day, then her supervisor would assign a day. Petitioner failed to choose a day and was assigned Wednesday as her holdover day. Prior to May 21, 2003, Petitioner had worked at least one holdover shift without incident. On Wednesday, May 21, 2003, Laurie Whidden was the acting supervisor of Madison Cottage for the second shift. She was informed that a third-shift employee had called in sick. Ms. Whidden attempted to pull an employee from another cottage to cover the shortage, but no one was available. She asked for volunteers to work the third shift, but received no response. Ms. Whidden then informed Petitioner that she would be required to hold over and work the third shift. Petitioner responded that she could not work the third shift, because she could not leave her sick husband at home alone for 16 hours. Petitioner's husband suffered from heart disease, and at that time, his condition was precarious. Petitioner testified that she frequently had to take her husband to the emergency room. However, Petitioner gave Gulf Coast Center no prior notice that she could no longer work a holdover shift, nor did she make any arrangements for the care of her husband on Wednesday, which she knew was her potential holdover day. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner made no effort to ask a fellow second-shift employee to cover for her that night. Petitioner simply went home at the end of the second shift. There was some dispute as to whether Petitioner answered, "Hell, no," when Ms. Whidden asked her to hold over for the third shift. The weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's assertion that her statement was directed at another employee's remark that Petitioner could sue the state if she came home after working the third shift and found her husband dead on the floor. Petitioner was indicating to the other employee that she wanted her husband alive, not money from the state. Petitioner and Beverly Morgan, another second-shift employee, testified that another employee was sent over from another cottage to work the third shift on May 21, 2003, meaning that Petitioner's refusal to stay had no real impact on the staffing of Madison Cottage. Ms. Whidden testified that no one came from another cottage to cover the shortage and that Ms. Whidden herself stayed to work the third shift. Ms. Whidden's testimony is credited on this point. Ms. Whidden informed Colette Fritts, the residential services supervisor of Madison Cottage, that Petitioner refused to hold over for the third shift on May 21, 2003. Ms. Fritts forwarded the report to Gulf Coast Center's human resources division with a recommendation for disciplinary action against Petitioner. The superintendent of Gulf Coast Center terminated Petitioner's employment. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her age was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. Ms. Morgan claimed that one night she overheard Ms. Whidden and Leoncia Trevino, another Human Services Worker II in Madison Cottage, discussing Petitioner's age, saying that if she was too old to hold over, she should quit. Given that Petitioner only once refused to hold over, on the night of May 21, 2003, this testimony is not credible. Further, the evidence established that in March and June 2003, probationary employees in their twenties were terminated for refusing to hold over at the end of their shifts. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her national origin played a role in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner, Ms. Morgan, and Carmel Henry, another Madison Cottage employee, all testified that Ms. Whidden, the acting supervisor, wanted to "get rid" of the Jamaican employees in Madison Cottage before the regular supervisor, Monica Franks, herself a Jamaican, returned from sick leave. However, none of them could point to any action by Ms. Whidden to put such a plan into effect or even any statement by Ms. Whidden that would indicate an animus toward Jamaicans. Ms. Whidden testified that at the time of the events at issue, she knew Petitioner was from an island, but didn't know which one. The source of the rumors regarding Ms. Whidden's intention to get rid of the Jamaicans appears to have been Leoncia Trevino. The other workers in Madison Cottage believed that Ms. Trevino had the ear of management. Ms. Whidden credibly testified that she had no special friendship with Ms. Trevino, who was moved out of Madison Cottage on June 24, 2003, after a confrontation with Ms. Henry, and then resigned her employment at Gulf Coast Center the next day. Petitioner produced no evidence that her race played any part in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of her dismissal, meaning that she could be dismissed "at will." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3). At the time of her hiring, Petitioner received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook, which informed her that she could be dismissed at will as a probationary employee. Petitioner was aware of the holdover policy and consented to abide by that policy at the time of her employment. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner refused the lawful order of her duly-delegated supervisor to hold over. This refusal constituted insubordination, which would provide cause for dismissal even for a permanent career service employee. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3)(d). The evidence produced at hearing demonstrated that the sole reason for Petitioner's termination was her direct refusal to follow the lawful order of her supervisor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Department of Children and Family Services did not commit any unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, PPC Products Corporation (PPC), manufactures power transistors, recitifers, diodes, and semiconductors. Approximately 80 percent of its business deals with government contracts. Petitioner is Sandra Boatwright, a black female, who worked for PPC for sixteen years. During her career with PPC she received good evaluations. In September 1989, Ms. Boatwright was working in the marking section of the production department. Her duties included putting product units in an oven and removing the units at the end of the baking period. She was a line leader with two to three employees reporting to her. Ms. Boatwright's immediate supervisor was Blynn Gause, the manager of the production department. Stringent government requirements called for the brands on the products to be permanent. During the summer of 1989, a problem had developed concerning the permanency of the marking or branding of the units. Some of the brandings were coming off prematurely. Mr. Gause asked Dolf Storz an employee in the engineering section to find a solution. In order to eliminate possible causes of the problem, Mr. Storz instituted the use of a logbook in the marking section to record the time the units went in and came out of the oven. Logbooks were a common requirement by the engineering section as a means of gathering data. In September 1989, Mr. Storz took the logbook to the marking section and requested the employees, including Ms. Boatwright, to use it. Ms. Boatwright admitted that, contrary to her initial charge, Mr. Storz was never her supervisor. In the latter part of September 1989, after Mr. Gause had returned from a vacation, Ms. Boatwright complained to him that Mr. Storz had been "acting like a king" while Mr. Gause had been away and requested a meeting to discuss the matter. On October 3 Ms. Boatwright, Mr. Gause, and Mr. Storz met in Mr. Gause's office. The discussion centered around the logbook, which the marking section had not been using. Ms. Boatwright did not feel that it was necessary to use the logbook because the marking section was already using an informal logbook to track the units in production. Mr. Storz's position was that the logbook was required by the production specifications and the informal logbook did not record the times the units went in and came out of the oven. Mr. Gause resolved the issue by requiring Ms. Boatwright and the other employees in the marking section to use the engineering log book. Ms. Boatwright thereafter used the engineering log book. On October 3, 1989, the process specification for the marking process, Device Branding Process Specification No. 200-140 was changed to require that the oven data be recorded in a logbook. This change was called Revision J. Ms. Boatwright signed off on this change. Race had nothing to do with the requirement that a marking logbook be maintained. Mr. Gause never advised Ms. Boatwright that he treated whites better than blacks. There was no disparate treatment of Ms. Boatwright in the terms and conditions of Ms. Boatwright's employment with PPC. In mid September 1989, a vacant position in the Lorlin automatic test area of the quality control department was posted. Ms. Boatwright had previously worked in the quality control department. Some time during late September or early October 1989, Ms. Boatwright approached Marleen Williams Coker (Ms. Williams), the quality manager, and asked to be transferred to that position. Ms. Boatwright knew the position was not a supervisory position. Ms. Williams told her she would agree to the transfer but Ms. Boatwright would have to talk to Mr. Gause about the transfer. Ms. Boatwright told Mr. Gause that she wanted to transfer to the quality control department. Mr. Gause, Ms. Williams, and Mindy Hill, the general manager of PPC, discussed the transfer. Although such a transfer was not common in the company due to the necessity for retraining the transferring employee, they agreed to approve the transfer due to Ms. Boatwright's long-term employment with the company. Although the position in quality control was a lower position than her position in production, Ms. Boatwright's pay was not cut. The transfer was approved in early October with an effective date of October 24, 1989. After the approval was given, applications were discontinued for the posted position, a decision was made to combine two other sections with the marking section, a new position with different tasks and responsibilities was created to oversee the merged sections, and the engineering section was contacted to move an engineering employee to the new position. Sometime between the approval and the effective date of the transfer, Ms. Boatwright changed her mind about wanting to transfer. Mr. Gause, Ms. Williams and Mindy Hill met to discuss Ms. Boatwright's change-of-mind. Ms. Hill decided not to reverse the transfer because of the changes that were being made to accommodate the transfer. Race played no part in the decision to allow the transfer or in the decision not to reverse the transfer. Ms. Boatwright's transfer from production to quality was not involuntary. Ms. Boatwright began working in the testing area of the quality control section on October 24, 1989. There were two other employees in that section, Steve Matthey and Mary Lou Rouse, who was the line leader for that section. Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey reported to Ms. Rouse, and Ms. Rouse reported to Ms. Williams. In January 1990, Ms. Boatwright received a good performance evaluation from Ms. Williams. On February 10, 1990, Ms. Boatwright received a pay increase. On March 14, 1990, Ms. Boatwright filed an employment discrimination charge against PPC, alleging that she had been discriminated against based on race in the terms and conditions of her employment. Specifically, she alleged that in the middle of 1989, that all the white line leaders were promoted to supervisory positions and that she, a black, was not promoted. At the hearing Ms. Boatwright stated this allegation was incorrect and should be for the years 1984 through 1990. She alleged that she received increased scrutiny on her work, and her non-black coworkers did not. She charged that Mr. Gause had told her that he treated whites better than blacks. Her complaint stated that she had inquired about a transfer and later informed Mr. Gause she was not interested in the transfer, but was transferred anyway, resulting in a loss of job responsibilities and supervisory promotional opportunities. Each PPC employee is issued an employee handbook, which contains information on various employment related topics, including promotional opportunities. If an employee was interested in an opening, the employee was to contact his supervisor to make sure he was considered and if an employee was interested in advancing to another position, the employee was to discuss it with his supervisor to determine what additional skills or education might be needed to qualify for the position. Ms. Boatwright never discussed supervisory promotional opportunities with Mr. Gause or Ms. Williams, and never inquired of them what education or skills she might need to qualify for a supervisor position. No evidence was presented to show that Ms. Boatwright ever applied for a promotional opening. The employee handbook states that the final decision to promote would be based on the employee's demonstrated skills and capabilities, the employee's experience, education and service with PPC. One of the biggest factors to be considered is the employee's past work performance. In order to qualify for a supervisor position an employee would have to have knowledge of the area that the employee would be supervising, including the equipment and process specifications, to be able to supervise personnel, including disciplining personnel, and to be able to generate reports. Based on Mr. Gause's observations of Ms. Boatwright's past performance in dealing with personnel, she would not be qualified to handle disciplinary matters. As a line leader, Ms. Boatwright brought all personnel problems to Mr. Gause for him to resolve. In 1989 and 1990 there were no promotions from line leader to supervisor at PPC. No evidence was presented to show whether there were promotions from line leader to supervisor during the years 1984 through 1988. Race played no part in Petitioner's lack of promotion in marking and production. PPC maintains an affirmative action plan and annually files an Equal Employment Opportunity Employer Information Report EEO-1. The affirmative action plan, which is updated annually, sets forth PPC's policy with respect to equal opportunity for all employees in hiring, employment practices, recruiting, training, terms and conditions of employment, and compensation. Ms. Boatwright was in Production I job classification for purposes of PPC's Equal Employment Opportunity reports. From 1987 through 1992, the statistics collected by PPC indicate that PPC utilized more minorities and females in Ms. Boatwright's job classification than were available in the general work force in Palm Beach County. The employee handbook states that leaving early is the same as being absent. Before leaving early, an employee must have prior approval from his supervisor, preferably a day in advance. On April 2, 1990, Ms. Williams fired Audrey Shanahan, a white female, for leaving work without informing her supervisor or department manager. The employee handbook states that if work is not available in the employee's area the employee may be assigned another task. The handbook provides for immediate discharge for insubordination. Each employee is expected to follow the work instructions of his immediate supervisor or any other person having the authority of supervisor. If the employee does not think that the instructions are legitimate, the handbook tells the employee to do the work instructed and then take up his complaint with the appropriate person in authority. Bobby Mills was a quality manager at PPC in 1990. He and Ms. Williams were of equal rank, but supervised different sections. Both reported to Mindy Hill, the general manager. When Ms. Williams was absent from work, Mr. Mills would supervise her section as well as his own. When Ms. Williams was present on the job, Ms. Rouse, as line leader, would relay employee requests for permission to go home early to Ms. Williams for a final decision. Ms. Rouse would then relay Ms. Williams' decision to the employees requesting to leave early. On May 2, 1990, Ms. Williams was absent from work, and Mr. Mills filled in for her. Work in the Lorlin testing area was slow on that day, although work was expected to come later in the day. Ms. Boatwright had asked her line leader, Ms. Rouse, for permission to go home at lunch because of the lack of work. Ms. Rouse, believing that she had the authority to grant the permission in Ms. Williams absence, told Ms. Boatwright that she could go home early. Mr. Mills, observing that Ms. Boatwright, Mr. Matthey, and Ms. Rouse were not working, inquired of them why they were not working. Ms. Boatwright told Mr. Mills that she was going to go home at lunch. Mr. Mills informed the group that they could work in another area or go home then. Ms. Rouse told him she could not afford to go home early and she went to another area to work. Mr. Mills left and came back a few minutes later and told both Mr. Matthey and Ms. Boatwright to go to the back to work. Both indicated that they were going to go home early, which they did. To Mr. Mills, their leaving constituted a refusal to follow orders and was therefore insubordination. Although Mr. Mills had the authority to fire employees under his supervision without consulting the general manager, he did discuss the incident with Mindy Hill because Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey were in Ms. Williams' section. He recommended dismissal; however, he was unaware at that time that Ms. Boatwright had filed a discrimination complaint. His recommendation for dismissal of Ms. Boatwright was not racially motivated. Mindy Hill made the final decision to dismiss Mr. Matthey and Ms. Boatwright for insubordination for leaving the workplace when requested to work. No evidence was presented to show that either race or retaliation played a part in her decision to terminate Ms. Boatwright and Mr. Matthey. Mr. Matthey learned of his termination when he spoke to Mr. Mills by telephone on the same day. Ms. Boatwright was verbally advised of her termination when she returned to work the next day. On February 26, 1991, Ms. Boatwright amended her discrimination charge to include her termination from employment with PPC. She alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for having filed a charge of unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The statistics collected by PPC for its affirmative action plans show that for the year October 1, 1989 through September 1990, thirty-four Caucasians and eighteen blacks were terminated. For the previous year, thirty-two Caucasians and twenty-four blacks were terminated. On October 8, 1992, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a Determination of No Cause relating to Ms. Boatwright's charges. The Florida Commission on Human Relations conducted a substantial weight review and issued a Redetermination: No Cause on April 8, 1993, adopting the October 8, 1992 determination of the EEOC. Ms. Boatwright filed a Petition for Relief on May 6, 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2647 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 2 and 3 - Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 4 - First, third, and fifth sentences accepted in substance. Second and fourth sentences rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 5 and 6 - Accepted. Paragraph 7 - First and second sentences accepted in substance. Third sentence rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that there was no evidence to show that Ms. Rouse on prior occasions had given employees permission to leave early without getting approval from her superiors. Paragraph 8 - First, third and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner did leave early but rejected to the extent that she left immediately after the conversation with Mr. Mills at which Ms. Rouse was present. Paragraph 9 - Accepted. Paragraph 10 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraphs 11 and 12 - Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Accepted. Paragraph 2 - Accepted except as to the date of hire. The evidence shows Ms. Boatwright began her employment on 2-8-74. Paragraphs 3 and 4 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 6 - Accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 9 - Accepted. Paragraph 10 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17 -Accepted. Paragraphs 18-22 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23 - The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 24 - Accepted. Paragraph 25 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26 - The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 27, and 28 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29 - To the extent that the first sentence infers that Revision J was in operation prior to 10-3-89, it is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Storz testified Revision J instituted the logbook requirement and was not signed off until 10-3-89. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 30 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and 40 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41 - The first sentence is rejected to the extent that it infers that Revision J was in effect prior to 10-3-89. The remainder of the sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 42 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 43 - Accepted. Paragraphs 44, 45, 46 and 47 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48 - The third sentence is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 49, 50, 51. and 52 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 53 - Accepted Paragraph 54 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 55, 56, and 57 - Rejected as subordinate. Paragraph 58 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 59 - The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that the term "personnel" included. Ms. Rouse, Ms. Boatwright, and Mr. Matthey. The greater weight of the evidence shows that those three persons did not understand that Mr. Mills was their supervisor. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 60 - Accepted. Paragraphs 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 66 - The last sentence is rejected to the extent that Mr. Mills instructed Ms. Rouse to go to the back upon his return. Ms. Rouse left before Mr. Mills returned. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 67 - Accepted in substance to the extent that Ms. Rouse complied with his instructions prior to Mr. Mills leaving the testing area to inquire if there was work in another area. Paragraphs 68 and 69 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 70 - The first and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 71 and 72 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 73 - The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that Mr. Mills clearly revoked Ms. Rouse's permission. It is obvious that it was not clear to Ms. Boatwright, Ms. Rouse, and Mr. Matthey. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 74 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 75 - Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. Paragraph 76 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 77 and 78 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 79 - The first sentence is accepted in substance and the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 80 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 81 - Accepted. Paragraph 82 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 83 - Accepted. Paragraphs 84 and 85 - Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 86 and 87 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 88 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89 - Accepted. Paragraph 90 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 91 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 92 - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 93 and 94 - Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found in this recommended order. Paragraph 95 - Accepted. Paragraph 96 - Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97 - Accepted. Paragraph 98 - Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Sandra Boatwright 390 West 33rd Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404-33036 Terry E. Lewis, Esquire Robert P. Diffenderfer, Esquire Suite 900 2000 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by retaliating against Petitioner for filing a charge of discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jacques Pierre (Petitioner or Mr. Pierre) is black and his national origin is Haitian. He has worked in the United States for 24 years. On or about January 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge of discrimination against his employer, Respondent, SSA Security, Inc., a/k/a Security Services of America, a California Corporation (Respondent or SSA). SSA, under a subcontract with a federal government contractor, Alutiiq-Mele, provided security services for a federal building in Miami. SSA continued to employ Petitioner as a security guard when it took over the contract from his previous employer, Superior Protection. Contractors and managers changed, in the past, but the security guards stayed the same. On August 10, 2006, and August 15, 2006, first Mr. Pierre, then a representative for SSA signed an agreement to settle the EEOC complaint. With a letter dated August 23, 2006, Mr. Pierre received a settlement check in the amount of $1,257.04, and he was advised to report any future unlawful harassment or discrimination charges by use of a "Harassment Hotline and [to] speak with your local area manager, Barry Hirsch [sic]." Captain Barry Hersch was Mr. Pierre's immediate supervisor. The agreement was approved, in principle, by Kent Jurney, Sr., an SSA corporate officer. The language of the agreement is, in relevant part, as follows: Removal of all Disciplinary Notices in File. Company agrees to remove all writings related to disciplinary actions taken against Employee from Employee's personnel file maintained by the Company. Employee understands that the removal of said documents does not prevent the Company from issuing disciplinary notices and/or taking disciplinary action against Employee as necessary in the future should Employee violate the Company's rules of [sic] policies. * * * 4. Confidentiality Clause. The Employee and the Company agree to the following confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement: (a) The parties represent and agree that they will keep the terms and amount of this agreement completely confidential. The parties will not hereafter disclose any information concerning this agreement to anyone, including but not limited to, any past, present or prospective employee of the Company or any prospective employer of the Employee. On August 25, 2006, the federal government changed the requirements in the contract. No longer would security guards be allowed to take breaks at the start or end of their shifts, but only during the middle. Mr. Pierre was made aware of the change. In violation of the requirement, on September 1, 2006, Mr. Pierre took his break at the end of his shift. The federal government contract also prohibited security guards from being on the work premises more than 30 minutes before or after their shifts. On August 28, 2006, Mr. Pierre returned to his work site and entered the building more than 30 minutes after his shift to retrieve keys and a telephone charger. Mr. Pierre also got into a loud and profane argument with another worker during his unauthorized return to the building. Mr. Pierre admitted he had an incident where he got into an argument with and "fired back" at a supervisor in 1995 or 1996. Beginning on or about July 10, 2006, Petitioner began to request, but initially was denied, leave. Mr. Pierre was feeling threatened and harassed by his supervisors and was suffering physically as a result. On a form dated August 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre said he was requesting leave from September 11 to September 25, with a return date of September 27, 2006. Spaces on the form to indicate whether it was approved or disapproved, and by whom are blank. As the reason for the request, Mr. Pierre indicated "stress related: as a result of retaliation.” This time, Captain Hersch, approved the request and Mr. Pierre went on vacation in September 2006. On September 5, 2006, as instructed by Mr. Jurney, another Miami supervisor, Bill Graham, issued a memorandum to Mr. Pierre requiring him to attend a mandatory meeting "about several important issues and notifying him of his "temporary removal from the schedule until this meeting has taken place." Copies of the memorandum were sent to Mr. Jurney and Captain Hersch. The evidence is insufficient to determine if other security guards who violated the same rules were subjected to the same consequences, or if discipline was uniformly applied. Mr. Pierre requested, either through his supervisor, Captain Hersch, or directly to Mr. Graham, that the attorney who handled his EEOC complaint and settlement agreement be allowed to attend the meeting with him. Mr. Jurney denied the request. Because he never attended a meeting, Mr. Pierre remained "off the schedule." For the remainder of 2006 and in early 2007, he was working part-time only at his second job with the State Department of Corrections. Mr. Pierre's income was reduced from $15 an hour ($17 minus $2 for insurance) for 40-hour weeks with SSA, plus $1,000 every two weeks from Corrections to only his Corrections pay. The evidence is insufficient to determine how long Mr. Pierre was, or if he still has, a lower income and what, if any, efforts he has taken to secure alternate employment to mitigate damages. SSA supposedly notified Mr. Pierre, in a memorandum dated September 22, 2006, that he was suspended without pay for two weeks for his rule violations and his failure to attend the mandatory meeting. The authenticity of the memorandum was questioned, and no witnesses testified to sponsor it or to explain why it was necessary, given the fact that Mr. Pierre was already "off the schedule." On October 3, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed a charge of retaliation with the Florida Commission on Human Relations which, on July 2, 2008, found that reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. In the fall of 2006, Mr. Pierre applied for a job with the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (Miami- Dade). It was his understanding that his background investigation had been successfully completed, but that SSA had not responded to a reference form. Mr. Pierre took the form to SSA. The form, dated October 4, 2006, was completed by Captain Hersch, who responded, in relevant part, as follows: Reason for termination (voluntary/fired)? NON APPLICABLE Describe the applicant's work performance. GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE Describe the applicant's attendance record. GOOD OVERALL Was the applicant ever disciplined for any reason? If YES, please explain. YES CONFIDENTIAL." Is applicant able to work well with others? YES Is applicant trustworthy? YES Describe applicant's work habits? KNOWS HIS JOB, AND DOES IT Is applicant eligible for re-employment? If NO, please explain why. STILL EMPLOYED There is no explanation why Captain Hersch mentioned the confidential agreement, but not the subsequent disciplinary actions that were the focus of concern to Mr. Jurney and Mr. Graham, which could have been disclosed without violating the agreement. Based on the earlier assurances from Miami-Dade, Mr. Pierre, having put "no" when asked about discipline of his job application, believes the contradictory response from SSA caused him not to get the job. He received a letter informing him, but without giving specific reasons, that he was not hired by Miami-Dade. He failed to prove the correctness of his belief. Mr. Pierre testified, but presented no supporting evidence, that he could have earned up to $120,000 a year with Miami-Dade. SSA received notice on the second anniversary of its contract, in October 2006, that the federal government contract would not be renewed. Some time in 2007, most likely in February, at Mr. Pierre's request, he met with Mr. Jurney. It was not until that meeting, Mr. Pierre remembered, that Mr. Jurney had someone remove pre-settlement discipline records from his personnel file. By that time, SSA no longer had a contract with the federal government and was transferring its personnel over to work for the next contractor, Alutiiq. Mr. Pierre asked to be transferred and Mr. Jurney testified that he contacted someone at Alutiiq and asked for Mr. Pierre to be interviewed, but the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that SSA attempted to transfer Mr. Pierre to Alutiiq, or what the routine procedures were for transferring security guards. When Mr. Pierre found out that the necessary paperwork was never sent from SSA to Alutiiq, he tried unsuccessfully for two or three weeks to contact SSA. It is reasonable to believe that SSA, while not allowing Mr. Pierre to work, would not help him transfer over to the next contractor. Mr. Pierre was not transferred and was not employed by Alutiiq. Mr. Jurney testified unconvincingly that he made non-federal contract job offers to Mr. Pierre and Mr. Pierre found the offers acceptable, “but he didn’t accept them.” It is inconceivable that Mr. Pierre, who has three children to support and a wife who works part-time, would have rejected any legitimate job offer at that time. Mr. Pierre and Mr. Jurney, a former highway patrol trooper and member of an advisory board for the Florida Highway Patrol, discussed Mr. Pierre’s desire to be a trooper. Mr. Jurney offered to assist him but that employment never materialized. As a corporate officer, Mr. Jurney was responsible for overseeing hundreds of contracts involving 1,500 employees. He was senior to Mr. Graham and Captain Hersch. Yet, once he authorized the EEOC settlement, he became directly involved in the decision-making concerning discipline and consequences for Mr. Pierre. There is no evidence that Mr. Pierre had ever come to his attention before he approved the settlement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order directing that Respondent cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $15.00 an hour for each normal 40-hour work week between September 5, 2006, and the date of the final order, offset by earnings from substitute employment, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald G. Polly, Esquire Hawkins & Parnell, LLP 4000 SunTrust Plaza 303 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30308-3243 Jacques Pierre 19601 Northwest 12th Court Miami, Florida 33169 Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue : The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by being allegedly retaliated against by termination from employment for purportedly making complaints concerning alleged discriminatory practices toward Hispanic employees.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was hired by the Escambia County Health Department (Department) the Respondent herein, as a Community Health Nursing Supervisor. It was the Petitioner's duty to supervise nursing staff under her direction and to perform their employee evaluations. She, in turn, was responsible to her supervisor, Jennifer Carter. The Petitioner maintains that she was retaliated against by the Respondent, in the employment action taken, because she complained to her supervisors concerning what she claimed was discriminatory conduct toward Hispanic employees by other employees of the Respondent. The Petitioner, for instance, made reference to an employee, Annette Thrasher, who purportedly made reference to "those people" in a meeting when referring to Hispanic people or employees. The Petitioner, however, did not make a formal complaint about that matter when offered the opportunity to do so. Maribel Reyes is a Hispanic employee. She testified that another employee, possibly employee Thrasher, criticized her as well as Esperanza Rietz, also a Hispanic employee, for speaking the Spanish language at work. Ms. Reyes and/or Ms. Rietz took a complaint about this matter to the Petitioner. The Petitioner did not act to resolve it, however, and therefore Ms. Reitz took her concerns about criticism of her speaking in Spanish to the Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Carter. The issue was then resolved quickly by Ms. Carter, who assured Ms. Rietz that she could speak any language she wished; that there was no prohibition against that. The Respondent had contended that this was one of the instances of purported discrimination against Hispanic employees which she purportedly defended against and made complaint about to the Respondent's management. In fact, the complaint had been made to her by the Hispanic employee referenced above and she had done nothing about it. In any event, the fact that the Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Carter, acted quickly to assure Ms. Reyes and indeed Ms. Rietz, that the Respondent's management did not tolerate employment conduct indicative of such discrimination, tends to belie the Petitioner's contention that the Respondent retaliated against her for making a complaint about discrimination against Hispanic employees. Rather, it was her supervisor, and the Respondent's management who acted to ensure that such potentially discriminatory conduct was not condoned. This belies any likelihood that the Respondent would have retaliated against the Petitioner for following the same policy, had she done so. When she was hired the Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Carter, instructed her to include Ms. Carter in any meetings and/or discussions with employees concerning those employees' performance evaluations, especially if the evaluations were contemplated to be negative ones. The Petitioner was still a probationary employee herself, and Ms. Carter, as her supervisor wanted to ascertain that she had followed instructions and was doing the employee performance evaluations in accordance with the Respondent's relevant personnel rules and policies. In fact, however, the Petitioner failed to follow Ms. Carter's instructions and completed a number of performance evaluations and meetings with the affected employees without informing Ms. Carter or securing her presence at those discussions. The testimony of witnesses Jessie Wilson and Jennifer Carter, established that the Petitioner gave Jessie Wilson an unfair and inaccurate employee performance evaluation. She excessively criticized and was rude toward Jessie Wilson. The Petitioner apparently made a comment somewhat to the effect that Ms. Wilson, who is white, had a "Jim Crow" attitude or an "overseer" mentality. The Petitioner was overly critical, demeaning, and rude toward employees at various times. She embarrassed and criticized Esperanza Rietz, an employee she supervised, in front of the employee's co-workers and disclosed her personal medical information improperly to Ms. Rietz's co-workers. Velda Gardner is a Health Technician in the health unit. Ms. Gardner took a long lunch period one day, taking an extra hour. She took the extra hour from administrative leave she was entitled to as "compensation time." The Petitioner wrongfully docked her the hour of administrative leave time. Ms. Gardner demonstrated to the Petitioner, with a witness, that she was entitled to the hour of administrative leave time or compensation time but the Petitioner refused to accept her truthful explanation. She effectively and wrongfully accused Ms. Gardner of lying. In addition to prompting employee Jessie Wilson to file a grievance against the Petitioner because of the untrue, inaccurate, and overly disparaging evaluation concerning Ms. Wilson's performance, the Petitioner yelled at and criticized Ms. Wilson in front of her peers. She also treated other employees in front of peers in a similar fashion at various times. Ms. Rietz worked as a Spanish language interpreter for the Respondent. The Petitioner disparaged her in front of other employees. Ms. Rietz felt demeaned by this. On another occasion the Petitioner approached a physician, Dr. Tamalo, in the hallway outside her office and commenced yelling at him and berating him in a loud, rude manner. This was overheard by witnesses Virginia Howard and Gracie Stovall, employed, respectively, in the nearby Family Planning Clinic and Family Health Clinic. According to these two witnesses, "everyone in adjoining rooms could hear it." The Petitioner behaved in a very loud, rude disparaging way to Dr. Tamalo and another physician. Jennifer Carter, as referenced above, is employed by the Family Health Clinic and is the Petitioner's supervisor. She corroborated the testimony of witness Jessie Wilson concerning the Petitioner's "Jim Crow" reference and described the above-named witnesses' and employees' complaints concerning the Petitioner's conduct towards them, corroborating the nature of their complaints. Witness Carter described Respondent's Exhibit A, which is Jessie Wilson's performance evaluation, as being in some respect harsh and demeaning, with the same sort of criticisms directed at the Respondent's Exhibit B, the performance evaluation of Tammy Buckney. These evaluations were not done in accordance with Ms. Carter's instruction. Ms. Carter, in fact, had to re-formulate and re-draft three of the six employee evaluations she received from the Petitioner because they were inaccurate, overly disparaging, and not done according to her instructions. Ms. Carter is the Assistant Community Health Nurse of the Escambia County Health Department. Ms. Carter thus corroborated the testimony of other employees that the Petitioner's treatment of staff members under her supervision was frequently rude and demeaning. Ms. Carter also corroborated the testimony of Ms. Reyes in establishing that no discrimination against Hispanic people was tolerated by the Respondent, nor to the knowledge of Ms. Carter had occurred. Dr. John Lanza is director of the Escambia County Health Department. He is the ultimate supervisor of the Petitioner as well as all other employees of the Department, including Jennifer Carter. Dr. Lanza has been with the Department of Health for 15 years. He has never heard any reports of discrimination against Hispanics or as to Ms. Rubin herself. Ms. Rubin is Black. Dr. Lanza became aware through reports of his management team, such as Dr. Susan Turner, Barbara McCullough, and Jennifer Carter of the Petitioner's disparaging, and rude treatment of employees under her supervision. He also learned that she failed to participate in her clinic duties. Dr. Lanza, as director of the health department, is authorized to dismiss Department personnel. He dismissed the Petitioner because she failed to follow her supervisor's instructions, was unacceptably rude and overly critical of employees under her supervision. She was demeaning at times toward employees and even was rude to two physicians at the Department whom she had no authority to supervise. These criticisms, which have been established as true by the preponderant evidence in this record, and the fact that all this deficient conduct occurred while the Petitioner was still in her probationary period after her hiring, motivated Dr. Lanza to dismiss the Petitioner from employment. When Dr. Lanza made this decision he was unaware of any allegation of any discrimination directed toward Hispanic employees anywhere in the Escambia County Health Department. Because he was unaware of such allegations of discrimination, akin to that complained of in the Petition for Relief, he could not have retaliated against the Petitioner for taking a stand or making complaints about alleged discriminatory conduct directed toward Hispanic employees.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Edna M. Rubin 1140 East Baars Street Pensacola, Florida 32503 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, an African-American female, submitted an application for employment directly with the store manager, Jerry Wienhoff. Mr. Wienhoff personally interviewed Petitioner and hired her within 48 hours of her application for the afternoon clerk position. She began working for Respondent on July 21, 2009. Petitioner received a notice of a disciplinary issue on March 9, 2010. Respondent cited Petitioner for failure to complete her work in a timely manner. Petitioner was warned that if her work did not improve, her employment would be terminated. Not long after issuance of this disciplinary notice, Mr. Wienhoff, the store manager and Pensacola Regional Manager for 17 years, began receiving complaints about Petitioner's behavior. One complaint came from a long-time customer, while another came from a co-employee. The complaints were that Petitioner treated them rudely. During her employment, Petitioner complained that her work duties were heavier than those of the morning clerk. Mr. Wienhoff relieved Petitioner of certain duties related to tagging each garment dropped off during the afternoon shift. None of the other stores out of the four area stores had similar requests to remove this duty. Petitioner testified that the morning clerk, a white female, Amanda Sidner, was given a lighter workload. Petitioner further testified that Ms. Sidner was given additional hours during Petitioner's vacation, yet Petitioner was not given additional hours during Ms. Sidner's vacation. Mr. Wienhoff testified and Petitioner admitted that she took vacation days during the same week that Ms. Sidner took vacation days. Further, Petitioner was given additional hours during the days Ms. Sidner was on vacation, and the balance of those hours that Petitioner was not interested in working went to Petitioner's daughter, Anastarsia Martinez, also an African- American female. On December 14, 2010, Petitioner was issued her second and final corrective action report by Mr. Wienhoff. At that time, Mr. Wienhoff terminated Petitioner due to the ongoing complaints about her behavior in the workplace. Respondent also established the racial composition of every employee under Mr. Wienhoff's supervision. The company profile in Pensacola shows a racially diverse mix of employees. Petitioner candidly testified that she never heard Mr. Wienhoff make racially insensitive comments to her or any other employee. Her claim of discrimination is based upon favoritism. She believes that other employees were treated better than she, but did not tie this perceived favorable treatment to their race.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that no act of discrimination was committed by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Douberley & Cicero 1000 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 590 Sunrise, Florida 33323 Mary Cottrell 776 Backwoods Road Century, Florida 32535 Christopher J. Rush, Esquire Christopher J. Rush & Associates, P.A. 1880 North Congress Avenue, Suite 206 Boynton Beach, Florida 33426 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation, discriminated against Petitioner, Charles Bean, on the basis of his age and retaliated against him, as stated in the Petition for Relief, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a public agency of the State of Florida. It has offices throughout Florida commensurate with its responsibilities. Petitioner is a Caucasian male. He is a long-time employee of Respondent. By letter of July 1, 2003, Petitioner was dismissed from his position as a technician for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public employee. Petitioner did not offer any evidence of his actual age or that, other than his stated opinion, his age was the reason he was discharged. He did indicate that his age and experience were mentioned referable to his capacity to teach inexperienced employees and to perform his job. Petitioner did not offer any evidence regarding a replacement for the position from which he was discharged or of any employee who was treated differently than he. Petitioner did not offer any evidence of retaliation. He made a vague statement that he was the victim of retaliation, but did not offer any basis for his opinion. Petitioner refused to complete work assignments in a timely manner. These assignments were appropriate for his job responsibilities. When questioned by his supervisor regarding his failure to complete a particular job responsibility, Petitioner became defiant refusing to provide a written explanation; his angry response to the request included expletives. He then threatened a fellow employee who overheard the exchange between Petitioner and his supervisor. Petitioner's immediate supervisor does not believe age had any bearing on Petitioner's discharge. In addition, he supervises two other employees, aged 53 and 63. Petitioner's conduct violated the published Disciplinary Standards for State of Florida Employees.
Recommendation Based of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief and finding that Petitioner failed to present a prima facie case and, additionally, that Respondent demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's termination was not based on unlawful discriminatory reasons. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Ann Cowles, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Charles Bean 431 Buffalo Street West Melbourne, Florida 32904 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Marlowe D. Robinson ("Petitioner"), was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent, Broward County School District ("BCSD"), his employer, based on his disability and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination, in violation of chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Civil Rights Act; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for BCSD for approximately 20 years prior to the termination of his employment on May 8, 2018. Petitioner is a disabled veteran. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was employed as the Head Facility Serviceperson at BCSD's office in the Katherine C. Wright Building ("KCW"). On February 5, 2016, Richard Volpi began working at KCW as the Manager of Administrative Support and as Petitioner's immediate supervisor. During Mr. Volpi's third day on the job, Petitioner told him that he was not happy that Mr. Volpi was at KCW and that KCW was "his house." He also told Mr. Volpi that he did not work because he "delegated to his crew." On February 18, 2016, Petitioner filed two internal labor grievances. In the first, he asked to have his job title changed to "Building Operations Supervisor." In the second grievance, Petitioner alleged that Mr. Volpi and Jeff Moquin, Chief of Staff, created a hostile and unclean work environment. Mr. Volpi processed the grievances by having a meeting with Petitioner on February 25, 2016. Finding no basis for the grievances in the collective bargaining agreement, Mr. Volpi denied them. On October 10, 2016, Mr. Volpi met with Petitioner to discuss a significant pattern of Petitioner coming in late, failing to notify BCSD when arriving late, staying after his scheduled shift to make up time without authorization, failing to call in as required for sick days, and failing to have pre- authorization for using accumulated leave. After the meeting, Mr. Volpi issued a written "Meeting Summary," which included counseling, based on Petitioner having come in late 24 days since August 1, 2016, and only notifying Mr. Volpi's assistant of the tardiness on three of those 24 days. The "Meeting Summary" was not considered discipline and stated, "If for any reason you need to change your shift hours to assist you in getting to work on time, please let me know." On October 19, 2016, Petitioner filed his third internal labor grievance after Mr. Volpi became his supervisor. The third labor grievance made numerous allegations against Mr. Volpi, including, but not limited to, sexual harassment, unspecified Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") violations, and retaliation for filing prior grievances. On October 26, 2016, Petitioner submitted a request for intermittent leave pursuant to FMLA. The next day, Petitioner was notified that his FMLA leave request was incomplete, and was therefore denied. Petitioner was later granted intermittent FMLA leave with the agreement that he was to provide advance notification of his anticipated absences. On November 9, 2016, Petitioner was notified in writing to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on November 16, 2016, for a pre- disciplinary conference to discuss Petitioner's failure to adhere to the directive of October 10, 2016, to notify Mr. Volpi if he was going to be late, out for the day, or working outside his scheduled hours. The letter specified that Petitioner was late October 11, 13, and 17, 2016, without notifying Mr. Volpi, and that Petitioner was late and worked past his regular scheduled hours on October 21, 25, and November 7, 2016. The letter also specified that Petitioner "called out" (took time off) without notifying Mr. Volpi on October 31 and November 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, 2016. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth grievance against Mr. Volpi alleging retaliation, bullying, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and various policies of BCSD. On November 16, 2016, Mr. Volpi memorialized in writing that Petitioner failed to show up for the November 16, 2016, pre-disciplinary meeting. On November 21, 2016, Petitioner was notified in writing that he was to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on November 30, 2016, for a pre-disciplinary meeting to replace the original meeting scheduled for November 16, 2016. Petitioner was not disciplined for not showing up to the November 16, 2016, meeting. The meeting on November 30, 2016, went forward as scheduled and Petitioner was issued a verbal reprimand on December 5, 2016, his first discipline from Mr. Volpi, for Petitioner's ignoring the prior directive to contact his supervisor if he was going to be late, absent, or wanted to work beyond his scheduled shift. He was again reminded that he had to make such notifications and have permission in advance of working hours other than his regular shift. On January 12, 2017, Petitioner was granted a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The accommodation granted permitted Petitioner to report to work within one hour of his scheduled work time and leave within one hour of his scheduled end time ("flex time"). Additionally, Petitioner was required to notify his supervisor in advance of using flex time. Mr. Volpi assisted Petitioner in the accommodation process. Mr. Volpi provided Petitioner the accommodation paperwork and advocated for Petitioner to be granted an accommodation. On January 26, 2017, Petitioner again came in late without providing Mr. Volpi advance notice of intent to use his flex time. On January 27, 2017, Mr. Volpi sent an email to Petitioner reminding Petitioner that he was required to notify him if he is going to be late. This was not considered discipline. On March 21, 2017, Petitioner was notified in writing that he was to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on March 27, 2017, for a pre-disciplinary meeting regarding ongoing excessive tardiness and failure to adhere to his work schedule. On March 23, 2017, Petitioner filed his fifth internal labor grievance, again alleging harassment (among other claims) against Mr. Volpi. On March 28, 2017, Petitioner filed his sixth internal labor grievance, again making harassment allegations against Mr. Volpi. On April 6, 2017, Petitioner was issued a Written Reprimand by Mr. Volpi for his nine days of tardiness in February and March and his failure to notify Mr. Volpi in advance. On April 7, 2017, Petitioner appealed the Written Reprimand. Petitioner also filed his seventh and eighth internal labor grievances alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation. Petitioner filed his Charge with the FCHR on April 13, 2017. Mr. Volpi conducted a first-step grievance hearing on April 27, 2017, and as a result of the discussion with Petitioner, who agreed to notify Mr. Volpi in advance of his inability to arrive at work as scheduled, the April 6, 2017, Written Reprimand was reduced to a verbal warning. The FCHR dismissed Petitioner's Charge with a No Reasonable Cause Determination on October 10, 2017. Between January 1 and February 15, 2018, Petitioner came to work late 14 days without providing prior notice, was absent without leave two days, and worked overtime one day without prior authorization. As a result, BCSD issued a three- day suspension on February 21, 2018. On February 22, 2018, Mr. Volpi met again with Petitioner to go over the expectations and provided a reminder memo not to work unauthorized hours without prior approval. On March 13, 2018, Mr. Volpi asked BCSD to issue a ten-day suspension to Petitioner for his ongoing failure to report to work at assigned times, unauthorized overtime, and absences without leave. In response, Petitioner filed yet another labor grievance. BCSD approved the ten-day suspension on April 10, 2018. Despite the ADA accommodation, increasing discipline, multiple counseling meetings and reminders, Petitioner continued his pattern of tardiness, unauthorized overtime, and absences. Accordingly, BCSD terminated Petitioner's employment on May 8, 2018. Petitioner's discipline and ultimate termination were not performance based, but rather, related solely to ongoing attendance issues.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing FCHR Petition 201700954. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner when her employment assignment with Respondent was terminated in November 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 48-year-old African-American female. On or about September 10, 2004, Petitioner was placed with AT&T Wireless as a customer service specialist by a staffing agency, AppleOne. Petitioner's job duties as a customer service specialist included answering phone calls from AT&T Wireless' customers about their bills and assisting them with problems that they were having with their accounts. For the most part, Petitioner received positive feedback regarding her job performance as a customer service specialist. That feedback, which is reflected on the Advisor Evaluation Detail forms received into evidence as Exhibit P7, came from her supervisors as well as from quality assurance specialists. Petitioner testified that she generally got along well with her co-workers,2 but that she preferred getting assistance and taking instruction from men rather than women. After AT&T Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Petitioner and the other customer service specialists working for AT&T Wireless were required to attend a two-week training class regarding Cingular’s policies and procedures. The training class attended by Petitioner was also attended by her supervisor, Wendy Miller. Ms. Miller is a white female. On the first day of the class, Petitioner was having trouble logging into the computer system that was being used in the training class. Ms. Miller, who was sitting directly behind Petitioner, attempted to ask Petitioner a question about the problems that she was having and/or provide her assistance, but Petitioner simply ignored Ms. Miller. According to Petitioner, she ignored Ms. Miller because she was trying to pay attention to the teacher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Miller sent an e-mail to AppleOne dated November 30, 2004, which stated in pertinent part: It has been decided by Sandy Camp and myself to end [Petitioner’s] temporary assignment due to insubordination. She has been coached on her attitude for which she is not receptive to and several other people have mentioned that they do not want to help her due to her not wanting to listen. The last incident was today during our CSE class where she demonstrated insubordination and disrespect to me. In a later e-mail, dated March 7, 2005, Ms. Miller described the incident in the training class as follows: [Petitioner] was one of the reps not able to get into [the computer] system so I was attempting to assist her because she was sitting directly in front of me. I attempted to ask her a question and she turned her back to me & put up her hand as to say “don’t speak to me” and she completely ignored me even as I kept speaking to her. . . . . The descriptions of the incident in Ms. Miller’s e- mails are materially the same as Petitioner’s description of the incident in her testimony at the hearing. On the evening of November 30, 2004, Petitioner was called by someone at AppleOne and told that her assignment with Cingular had been terminated. Petitioner was paid by AppleOne during her entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular. Petitioner’s salary while she was working at AT&T Wireless and Cingular remained constant at $10 per hour. Petitioner’s entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular was approximately two months. Petitioner testified that she did not receive any other assignments through AppleOne after her assignment with Cingular was terminated. She attributed her inability to get other assignments through AppleOne to the fact that AppleOne "sided with" Cingular, who was its client, but there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. In January 2005, Petitioner filed separate charges of discrimination with the Commission against AppleOne and Cingular. According to Petitioner, she was paid $400 by AppleOne to settle her claim against that company. Petitioner testified that she sold vacation plans and did other “odd jobs” between November 2004 and mid-February 2005 when she was hired by Sears as a home delivery specialist. Her job duties in that position include contacting customers to coordinate the delivery of appliances purchased from Sears. Petitioner testified that her initial salary with Sears was $9 per hour and that as of the date of the hearing her salary was $10 per hour. Petitioner testified that other customer service specialists had “problems” or “personality conflicts” with Ms. Miller, but she was unable to identify any other employee (of any race or age) who was similarly insubordinate or disrespectful towards Ms. Miller (or any other supervisor) and who received discipline less severe than termination. Petitioner’s actions toward Ms. Miller during the training class were disrespectful, at a minimum. Petitioner testified that Ms. Miller acted like a white supremacist, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner also testified that AT&T Wireless and Cingular did not have any permanent customer service specialists that were as old as she, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding the race, age, or other characteristics of the person who filled her position at Cingular after her assignment was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s discrimination claim against Cingular. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2005.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner had been subjected to a discriminatory practice or decision based upon his race.
Findings Of Fact The facts are hereby found to be as delineated above in the preliminary statement of this Recommended Order and they are incorporated by reference as findings of fact. The Petitioner has twice defaulted, failed to attend the hearing to present his case, and concomitantly failed to contact the Division of Administrative Hearings, the administrative law judge, or any party or party's representative to advise that he would not be able to attend and conduct the hearing on either of the noticed occasions. Such conduct abuses the legal process offered to the Petitioner by Chapters 760 and 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner has defaulted on two occasions in this proceeding. The Respondent has expended significant time and funds to prepare for and attend these hearings. The Respondent, by motion, has asserted that it has incurred costs and reasonable attorney's fees in the following total amounts: costs; $1,499.25, and attorney's fees are requested in the amount of $4,478.50. There has been no response to the motion. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, it is concluded that this matter should be dismissed for lack of prosecution. The motion has preserved the request for fees and costs, which can be addressed once the Commission, by entry of the final order, has determined that the Respondent is the prevailing party. See § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat. Ruling on that motion is reserved until after the entry of the final order.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, argument of the parties, and the pleadings, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety while reserving determination of the issues of costs and attorney's fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 G. Thomas Harper, Esquire Harper Gerlach, LLC 4110 Southpoint Boulevard, Suite 228 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 John F. McBride 201 North Cherokee Street Madison, Florida 32340