Findings Of Fact Daniel Fowler, a general contractor licensed in Florida (T. 289), qualified Raben-Pastal, A Joint Venture, under license No. CG CA15439 on August 15, 1980, and renewed the license for the period 1981 to 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. At all pertinent times, he was employed as a construction superintendent for Raben-Pastal, at a residential development in the City of Coconut Creek known as The Hammocks at Coconut Creek, Phase II (The Hammocks), and answered to Paul Pariser, president both of Raben Builders and of Pastal Construction, Inc., and himself a general contractor licensed in Florida. Before construction began, Raben-Pastal secured a building permit for a two- story building (No. 280-81), Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, on February 19, 1981, and for a four-story building (No. 344-81), Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, on March 4, 1981. Respondent personally signed the applications, listing certificate of competency No. CG CA15439 on each. PLANS CHANGE After work had begun, Raben-Pastal decided on a change of floor plan for the two-story building. Their architect, Donald Bryan, approached James Cowley, Director of Planning and Zoning, and building official for the City of Coconut Creek. Mr. Bryan offered the building official an amended floor plan, but, after discussing it, the two men agreed that new elevations were involved as well as plumbing location changes, which should be reflected on additional drawings. Thereafter, Mr. Bryan "went back and submitted an entirely new set of working drawings and all of the architectural sheets to reflect" (T. 246) the changes. Eight or nine of the twelve pages in the amended application differed from the original application. The only structural change was in the balcony areas. (T. 238.) At the time the change of plans application was submitted on February 27, 1981, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, work on the two-story building had progressed through completion of the foundation. STOP WORK ORDER ENTERED On March 2, 1981, Mr. Cowley wrote and had delivered by hand a letter to "Daniel Fowler, Raben/Pastal" in which he stated: Please be advised that until such time that the Revised Plans have been reviewed and approved, permit #280-81 is suspended and that the previously approved plans are to be considered disapproved. All work on the building shall cease immediately. A notice to this effect will be attached to the permit board as of this date. While in all probability a new permit fee will not be necessary the standard plan examination fee shall be required prior to the resumption of work. For your reference, the following are the applicable South Florida Building Code 1/ Sections, 302.1(E), 302.4(H), 303.4 and 304.4 (A)(B). Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. The following day, Mr. Pariser wrote Mr. Cowley, as follows: In response to your letter of March 2nd, it is our opinion that stopping work on the building under code numbers 301.3, 302.3, 303.4 and 304.4 is invalid. We have contacted both our architect and structural engineer and confirmed that the 2 story revised plans have no revisions to the super structure. Since for the next 3 weeks we are doing nothing but super structure work, and certainly within that time frame, you will have had enough time to process the revised plans, we will continue to build the building as per permit #280-81 with our independent inspector making inspections per the South Florida Building Code requirements. . . Respondent's Exhibit No. 16. Mr. Pariser wrote Mr. Cowley a second letter on March 3, 1981, to the same general effect enclosing a letter signed by the building's architect and an engineer, which "represent[ed] that there are no structural changes outside of a minor slab configuration." Respondent's Exhibit No. 17. On March 4, 1981, Mr. Cowley wrote Mr. Pariser, with a copy to Mr. Fowler, as follows: I am in receipt of your letter of March 3, 1981, wherein you stated the stop work order issued pursuant to my letter of March 2, 1981 was invalid. My position, of course, is that my action was not only valid, but in fact mandated by code. After meeting with your architect, Mr. Bryan, I propose the following solution. The stop work order will remain in effect for Construction only, i.e. steel re-inforcement, concrete, etc. could not be placed. Site work could continue i.e. soil preparation, filling, compacting, placing of batter boards, excavation for footings and forming. If the above meets with your approval, please acknowledge. Respondent's Exhibit No. 15. To this, Mr. Pariser responded the following day with this letter: In response to your letter of March 4th, the construction that we are proceeding with is just the very 1st floor lift of columns. That lift of columns is the same as shown on the plans for permit #280-81. There is no reason why you could not look at the set of plans you now have in your office for permit #280-81 and make a determination on the number of bars, sizing and location of same. I believe there is a total of 23 columns. Independent of this, you have already received a letter from our architect and an independent engineer stating that these columns will remain the same and you will have an independent engineer's inspection signed off on the permit card. My sincere appreciation for your understanding and return of this letter with your signature below acknowledging acceptance. If however, there is any further harassment in this matter, we will have no alternative but to invoke Chapter 71-575 Section 4 a of the South Florida Building Code, which states in part. . ."if any elected or appointed officials prohibit by any means, directly or indirectly, the use of any materials, types of construction and methods of design authorized by the code or alternate materials, types of construction and methods of design approved by the provisions of the Code, then the elected or appointed official may be removed from office for nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in office". . .Respondent's Exhibit No. 19. On March 10, 1981, the amended plans were approved. After still further correspondence, Mr. Cowley wrote Mr. Pariser, with a copy to Mr. Fowler, advising that "receipt of the required $200.00 Plan Exam Fee. . .re[s]cinded the suspension of Permit #280-81," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8, effective April 7, 1981. STOP WORK ORDER VIOLATED By the time the stop work order was rescinded, the two-story building's superstructure was finished. No work accomplished before April 7, 1981, differed from that called for in the original plans. Through respondent and others, Raben-Pastal placed steel-reinforced concrete and performed other work in violation of the stop work order, without testing the validity of the order before the Board of Rules and Appeals or by initiating mandamus or other judicial proceedings. Respondent directed and participated in this work deliberately and with awareness that a stop work order was outstanding. At no time between March 2, 1981, and April 7, 1981, was anybody aware of the design defects that later came to light. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS In late April of 1981, Coconut Creek's Mr. Cowley learned of cracking in concrete slabs around columns in both the two-story and the four-story buildings. By this time, roof slabs on both buildings had been poured, but neither ground slab had been finished. On the city's behalf, Mr. Cowley engaged D. E. Britt & Associates, consulting engineers, to examine the buildings. After Duncan Britt telephoned to say the buildings should be shored, Mr. Cowley orally advised respondent Fowler that shoring was necessary, on May 6 or 7, 1981. SHORING ORDERED On May 7, 1981, Mr. Cowley wrote and caused to be delivered by hand to Paul Pariser a letter in which he stated: I have just received instructions from Mr. Britt of D. E. Britt and Associates to the effect that a minimum of four shores must be placed around ALL columns in the above referenced buildings. Said shores shall be placed immediately and remain in place until such time that the structural adequacy evaluation has been completed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10. A copy of this letter reached Mr. Fowler on May 8, 1981. On May 11, 1981, Mr. Pariser replied: I am in receipt of your letter of May 7, 1981, please be advised that even though Raben-Pastal is respecting your wishes as to the reshoring, we would like to know specifically by what basis in South Florida building code you are requesting same. Also, what is the time frame which we can expect to have this lifted? Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. In a separate letter dated May 11, 1981, Mr. Pariser wrote Mr. Cowley: I take exception to the fact that you have predetermined that there are structural deficiencies. According to Mr. Bromley, our structural engineer, both buildings, as they stand now, are structurally sound. We, at Raben-Pastal, will stop work on anything that is related to column and plate slabs until the Britt analysis has been submitted. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Also on May 11, 1982, in response to a mailgram from respondent Fowler, Mr. Cowley wrote respondent to the effect that his order requiring shores around columns should not be construed as a stop work order. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. A mailgram confirmation stamped received May 12, 1981, states, over respondent's name: Per your instructions requiring 4 post shores to be placed around our columns on building C-46 and C-47, Raben-Pastal will immediately commence this remedial work. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. During this period, the engineers advising Raben-Pastal continued to believe that both buildings were sound and this was communicated to Messrs. Fowler and Pariser. FIRST-STORY CEILING SLAB ESSENTIALLY UNSHORED Mr. Cowley, Duncan Britt, Ron Thomas, and Henry A. Luten, Britt's chief engineer, among others, visited the site of the four-story building on May 14, 1981. The building was 240-feet long and had more than 30 columns; the slab on grade had still not been poured. The upper floors had been shored, possibly in the process of flying the forms, but there were no more than two or three shores in place underneath the lowest slab then poured, i.e., the first-story ceiling. If done properly, shoring would have begun at ground level with shores placed on the concrete pads around the columns; work would have progressed upward floor by floor; and no more than two or three shores a day, on average, would have been dislodged by the contraction and expansion of concrete in response to temperature changes. Shoring upper floors without shoring the bottom floor may have enhanced rather than diminished the risk that the building would fall. On May 15, 1981, Mr. Cowley wrote respondent Fowler, as follows: Yesterday, May 14, Mr. Britt, Mr. Ludin [sic], Mr. Thomas and I made an inspection of the above referenced buildings. We were appal[l]ed to find that our reshoring instructions had not been carried out on the ground floor of the four story building, permit number 344-81. Considering that a potentially hazardous situation exists, you leave me no choice but to issue the following order. YOU SHALL IMMEDIATELY SHORE THE GROUND AND SECOND FLOOR COLUMNS IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: TWO (2) SHORES ON EACH SIDE AND ONE (1) ON EACH END. ALL SHORES ARE TO BE WEDGED TIGHTLY IN PLACE. GROUND FLOOR SHORES ARE TO BARE [sic] ON FOUNDATION. Failure to comply will result in a Stop Work Order which will remain in effect until such time the engineer of record, Mr. Arthur Bromley, determines what measures are required to correct the existing structural deficiencies. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. To this letter Mr. Fowler replied, also on May 15, 1981: Please be advised pursuant to your letter of today, that to the best of my knowledge we proceeded to a completed state, the shoring on both C-46 [the four-story building] and C-47 [the two-story building] per your request on May 7th. It may appear, without further investigation, that for whatever reason some of the shor[e]s may have come loose, however in your letter of May 7th, not received until May 8th, you asked for all columns in both the 2 story and 4 story buildings, with no mention of the bearing on the foundation. As you well know, your letter was untimely since we had poured our slab on C-47 on the 7th of May and have shored from the slab on grade, on certified compacted sub soil to the 1st raised slab. However in this new letter you are only asking for 2 floors of the 4 story building. Am I to understand that that is the total requirement? On May 7th your letter, specific in nature, required only 4 shor[e]s and this new letter requires 6 shor[e]s. Which is it? Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. The last hour of the working day on May 15, 1981, Mr. Fowler ordered all his men to spend shoring the four-story building. Just how much additional time was devoted to shoring was not clear from the evidence. On May 16, 1981, respondent Fowler wrote Mr. Cowley that "we have already expended. . .64 man hours in reshoring these buildings per your specifications." Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. At the final hearing, however, Mr. Fowler testified that, on May 7, 1981, "five men working on the two buildings [did] nothing but shoring. . .four of those men eight hours and one of those men for four hours," (T. 304-305) (May 7: 36 hours); on May 8, 1981, "seven men working on the shoring on the two buildings for a period of time varying between six and eight hours per man," (T. 305) (May 8: 42 to 56 hours); on May 9, 1981, "five men for half a day. . .[did] nothing but shoring on the two buildings," (T. 305) (May 9: 20 hours); on May 11, 1981, "five men working on shoring for a period varying between five hours and eight hours on the two buildings," (T. 306) (May 11: 25 to 40 hours); on May 12, 1981, "six men working on the shoring. . .one man at four hours and one man at five hours and four men at eight hours," (T. 306) (May 12: 41 hours); on May 13, 1981, "five men working on shoring. . .two for four hours and three for eight hours," (T. 306) (May 13: 32 hours); and, on May 15, 1981, seven men each working one hour (May 15: 7 hours). In short, respondent testified at hearing that 203 hours, at a minimum, were spent shoring both buildings from May 7, 1981, through May 15, 1981. This testimony has not been credited because of the witness's interest, because it exceeds by a factor of three the contemporaneous estimate or claim in Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, and because it does not square with the time sheets, Respondent's Exhibit No. 26, or with the progress reports, Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 27 and 28, on which Mr. Fowler purported to base his testimony. Mr. Goode was one of the workmen who eventually placed shores in the four-story building, working from the ground up. Read most favorably to respondent, Mr. Goode's testimony was that two men could shore one floor of the four-story building in seven hours. This, too, supports the view that Mr. Fowler's testimony about shoring was grossly exaggerated. The record is clear, however, that work of some kind, including work that was not shoring nor incident to the load test nor remedial took place on and under the four-story building between May 7, 1981, and May 15, 1981, thereafter. See Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 26-28; Testimony of Goode, Williams, Fowler. LOAD TEST As late as May 16, 1981, Mr. Pariser wrote Mr. Cowley that "Bromley's letter. . .coupled with the inspection reports list. . .should, beyond a doubt, put your mind, and anyone else's mind, at ease that the buildings. . .are structurally sound." Respondent's Exhibit No. 13. About a week later, a load test was begun by a testing laboratory using criteria agreed on by Henry A. Luten for the City and by Arthur H. Bromley for Raben-Pastal. In order to perform the load test, the shoring under two bays was removed and scaffolding was erected in its place. Afterward, the scaffolding was removed and shores were reinstalled. LAWYERS' MISUNDERSTANDING Construction at The Hammocks had received increasingly strident publicity, depressing sales of prospective condominium apartments. Raben-Pastal was concerned that premature disclosure of the results of the load test might aggravate the situation. John R. Young, Esquire, raised the matter with Paul Stuart, Coconut Creek's city attorney. Mr. Young proposed that the city be represented at the test by its consulting engineers but that no city employee observe the test, against the possibility that a Sunshine Law disclosure requirement would result in dissemination of a public employee's notes or report on the load test, before those conducting the test had been afforded time to evaluate the significance of things like cracks. Mr. Stuart agreed to communicate this proposal to Mr. Cowley and did in fact do so. Mr. Stuart left town, and Mr. Young eventually assumed that his proposal had been accepted. That it had been accepted, he told Mr. Pariser in Mr. Fowler's hearing as fact. Messrs. Pariser and Fowler were surprised to learn then, on the day of the load test, that Ron Thomas, chief building inspector of Coconut Creek, had accompanied Benjamin Eigner, an employee of D. E. Britt & Associates, to the site. Raben-Pastal employees confronted Mr. Thomas, at the edge of the property, and Lee Smith radioed Mr. Pariser's office. Mr. Fowler went to the scene of the controversy and Mr. Pariser telephoned the police. After the police arrived and while Mr. Fowler was talking to a policeman, Mr. Thomas started in the direction of the load test being performed on the second floor of the four-story building; Mr. Fowler ran toward the building and physically interposed himself, blocking Thomas's way. At this juncture, Mr. Fowler was arrested. He was eventually acquitted of criminal charges arising out of this episode. BUILDER'S ENGINEER STOPS TEST Mr. Bromley, who was also on site for the load test, recommended to Raben-Pastal that it be stopped before completion, because "the deflection was at a point that if there was anything further, it would cause permanent structural damage." (T. 234.) Most of the engineers involved later came to agree that there was insufficient post-tension cable in the slabs and that there was a "punching shear problem," a 122-percent "over-stress in the punching shear area." (T. 238.) Punching shear occurs when the "concrete that adheres around the column leaves the rest of the floor area or the floor area separates from the concrete that adheres to the column," (T. 235) with the collapse of the building a possible result. Raben-Pastal's own engineer testified at the hearing that, "It was a dangerous situation, yes." (T. 235.) (Widening the columns eventually remedied the problem.) SECOND STOP WORK ORDER ENTERED On May 28, 1981, Mr. Cowley wrote Mr. Pariser that he had visited the site on Sunday, May 25, 1981, found it deserted and "observed that the load test had very prudently been stopped slightly past the half way point." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12. The letter continued: With this knowledge, I have no choice but to place you on notice that the above referenced buildings are unsafe and constructed in a dangerous manner. Pursuant to section 201.9 of the South Florida Building Code and more specifically the fact that over-stressing and a danger of collapse was emminent [sic] if loading were continued. During a meeting held on May 27, 1981, with Mr. Britt, Mr. Luten, Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Bromley, Mr. Adams and myself in attendance, Mr. Bromley concluded that all work on the above referenced be stopped, with the exception of remedial repairs and additional testing if necessary until further notice. I am in complete accord and do so order. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12. By the time Mr. Pariser received this letter, he had already ordered all work stopped on or under both buildings, except for shoring, testing, or remedial work. Neither he nor respondent ever authorized any work in violation of the stop work order of May 28, 1981. On June 1, 1981, the day after respondent returned from vacation, Mr. Thomas visited the site and observed and photographed a workman standing on the ground underneath the four-story building, even though respondent had personally ordered everybody to stay out except for replacing shores as necessary. On or before May 29, 1981, the scaffolding installed for the load test had been removed and most, but not all, of the shores had been replaced. Some rested, however, not on the concrete pads around the columns but on scrap lumber and pieces of plywood. Also on June 1, 1981, at least one workman went underneath the four-story building to fetch a piece of PVC pipe.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1982.
The Issue Whether Summary Final Order should be granted and, if so, whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 9B-3.475 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of a construction company that constructs roof-overs in the Leon County area. A roof-over is a construction method where an existing roof is covered over with an additional layer of roofing material without removing the old roof. The construction method is specifically authorized by section 1510, Florida Building Code, Building Volume (2004 as amended 07/2007), and Section 511, Florida Building Code, Residential Volume (2004 as amended 07/2007). Roof-overs are not considered roof replacements; roof-overs are considered a form of reroofing. As indicated, amended Florida Administrative Code Rule 9B-3.0475 was effective on April 6, 2008. The rule adopted, by reference, the Manual of Hurricane Mitigation Retrofits for Existing Site-Built Single Family Residential Structures (the Manual). In general, Section 101 of the Manual provides the requirements for mitigation as prescribed by law. Section 201.2 provides permissible techniques for accomplishing the requirements defined by Section 101. The Manual is not part of the Florida Building Code. Section 101 of the Manual provides: Retrofits Required. Pursuant to Section 553.844, Florida Statutes, strengthening of existing site-built, single family residential structures to resist hurricanes shall be provided. Site built single-family residential structures shall mean site built family detached residential structures. 101.1 When a roof on an existing site-built, single family residential structure is replaced, the following procedures shall be permitted to be performed by the roofing contractor: (emphasis supplied) Roof-decking attachment and fasteners shall be strengthened and corrected as required by section 201.1. A secondary water barrier shall be provided as required by section 201.2. Section 201.2 of the Manual provides the methods for installation of a secondary water barrier when an existing residence is subject to work that includes a “reroof.” The term “reroof” is not defined within the Manual. The authority for Florida Administrative Code Rule 9B- 3.0475 is Section 553.844, Florida Statutes. Section 553.844(3)(a) states: A roof replacement must incorporate the techniques specified in subparagraphs (2)(b) 2 and 4. (emphasis supplied) Subparagraph (2)(b)2 states: Secondary water barriers for roofs and standards relating to secondary water barrier. The criteria may include, but not limited to. . . . Chapter 2 of the Florida Building Code, defines reroofing, for purposes of the Florida Building Code, to include roof replacement and roof-overs. However, the Florida Building Code definition of reroofing is not determinative of the meaning of the term reroof in the Manual since the Manual is not part of the Florida Building Code. Testimony demonstrated that Leon County’s Building Inspector recognized the fact that the mitigation manual was not meant to apply to roof-overs because application of the requirement for a secondary water barrier requires removal of an existing roof covering and is inconsistent with the practice of roof-overs. Additionally, the Respondents do not intend the requirement for secondary water barriers to apply to roof-overs and have stipulated to that interpretation in this hearing. While the Manual could have been more precise in the use of the terms roof replacement and reroofing, it is clear that, when read as a whole, the Manual only addresses roof replacement and does not apply to roof-overs. Such a requirement is within the Respondents’ statutory authority.
Findings Of Fact Eduardo Kirksey is licensed as a certified residential contractor, holding license CR C012717. He qualified a corporation known as Modern Construction Company, Inc. (Modern) to engage in contracting.Modern entered into a contract on about July 28, 1986 with Ira Goldstein of 4440 Southwest 32nd Drive, Hollywood, Florida for construction of two-story room addition which would include a family room, bedroom and bath. Modern was to provide the plan by which the addition would be built. A rough sketch of the addition is included on the contract. More specific plans, which are similar to architectural drawings, were thereafter prepared for submission with the building application, which Modern filed with the Broward County Building and Zoning Enforcement Division. The contract was later amended to add a balcony around the second floor of the addition. The plans which are in evidence as Department Exhibit 4 are the second set of plans. According to these plans, the second floor bedroom had a 6" x 6" sliding glass door. The door opened on to a balcony which was created by cantilevered joists consisting of 2" x 10" pieces of lumber bolted to 2" x 12" rafters between the first and second floor. These 2" x 10" members extended out four feet from the building. According to the plans, 2" x 6" decking was to be placed across these joists, and an appropriate railing would then be placed around the balcony. Mr. Kirksey submitted the amended application for the permit and the plan to the Broward County Plan Review Board for approval, and it was approved. After construction began, Mr. Goldstein determined that he did not wish the floor of the balcony to be pressure treated wooden decking. Instead, he wanted a tile floor on the deck. Mr. Kirksey had already filed two sets of plans with Broward County on the project, the first for the addition without the balcony, and the second for the addition with the balcony. He did not want to file a third building permit application which would also require the submission of new drawings. Mr. Kirksey did agree to change the construction to accommodate Mr. Goldstein's desire to tile the balcony but declined to do the tile work himself as part of his contract with Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Goldstein was to arrange for the tiling of the deck. The original design for the decking would have spaced the 2" x 6" lumber which made up the decking with small spaces between each piece of lumber to allow water to fall through during rain. In order to lay tile down, it was necessary to place plywood across the joists, rather than 2" x 6" pressure treated lumber. Before the plywood could be laid, however, Mr. Kirksey had to remove the 2" x 10" cantilevered joists from between the first and second floor, because the original design called for those joists to be level. They were reinstalled at about a 1/2 inch slant so that the water would then drain from the balcony after it had been tiled. In addition, Mr. Kirksey then had to place soffit under the balcony, and put facia around the bottom of the deck. Neither the soffit nor the facia were required in the plans. Although it was more expensive for Mr. Kirksey to add these items, Mr. Goldstein was not charged any additional money for this work. The plywood that was put down over the 2" x 10" rafters instead of the pressure treated 2" x 6" lumber was 3/4 inch exterior grade plywood. Pressure treated plywood was not used because the plywood was to be covered with tile, and if properly tiled, pressure treated plywood is unnecessary. Moreover, even if tile is put over pressure treated plywood, if tile is not laid properly, the pressure treated plywood will rot as well as exterior plywood will rot. It would not have been possible to place tile over the 2" x 6" pressure treated lumber which the amended plan filed with the Broward Building and Zoning Enforcement Division had called for. The 2" x 6" members would shrink and move, causing the tile to crack. Some type of plywood had to be used instead of decking to permit Mr. Goldstein to tile the deck. The 3/4 inch plywood which Mr. Kirksey used met or exceeded the standards established by the South Florida Building Code. No sealant, or paint, was applied to the plywood, nor was the deck covered with visquine. Preparation of the plywood before the tile was placed over it would be the job of the person doing the tile work. An inspector from the Broward County Building and Zoning Enforcement Division visited the site on a number of occasions. During the course of those inspections some of the work was originally rejected by the inspector. For example, the balcony railing pickets had a spacing greater than 5 inches and the top of the rail was only 36 inches high, not 42 inches high. As a result of this rejection, the picket spacing and railing were changed. Ultimately, the inspector gave final approval after having seen the plywood deck, even though no new plans had been submitted to change the deck to have a plywood floor for tile rather than the originally permitted 2" X 6" pressure treated lumber deck. When the job was completed by Modern it was in the condition a project would normally have been left where the contractor was not responsible for laying the tile over the balcony floor. Because the floor was to be tiled, there was no reason for Mr. Kirksey to have painted the balcony floor. In addition, the contract did not require that any painting be done. Mr. Goldstein did the tile work on the deck himself although he had no prior experience in laying tile. Mr. Goldstein spoke with one of Modern's workmen about how to lay tile. This was an informal conversation, and Mr. Kirksey, the contractor, never advised Mr. Goldstein on how to lay tile. I do not accept the testimony of Mr. Goldstein that the employee of Modern who explained to him how to lay tile was the job foreman. Nothing in the contract with Modern required Modern to lay tile, or to advise Mr. Goldstein how to lay tile, so whether the person who discussed laying tile with Mr. Goldstein was a foreman is not significant. Sometime after all the work had been completed by both Modern and Mr. Goldstein, Mr. Goldstein's daughter Evette stepped out onto the balcony, and her foot and leg went through the balcony. This occurred because the plywood had not been sealed or protected before the tile was laid by Mr. Goldstein. As a consequence, the plywood had rotted under the tile. The rot also extended to the supporting joists. Broward County has adopted and incorporated into the Broward County Charter, Chapter 71-575, Laws of Florida, a Special Act of the Legislature. Both adopt for Broward County the "South Florida Building Code, Dade County 1970 edition, as amended." The Department included with its proposed recommended order portions of the South Florida Building Code, 1986 Broward County edition, for the purpose of demonstrating that the conduct of Mr. Kirksey violated Section 301(a) and 302.1(e) of that 1986 code. As a matter of evidence, the 1986 Broward County edition of the Southern Florida Building Code does not appear to apply. The Department's exhibit 7, which is "a copy of the Broward ordinance which adopts the South Florida Building Code" (Tr. 6) shows that it is the South Florida Building Code, Dade County 1970 edition which applies in Broward County. No portion of that document has been offered in the record of this case. As a consequence, there is no record evidence that Mr. Kirksey has violated a portion of an applicable code. It is true that Mr. Joseph Montagnino testified that Section 301(a) of the South Florida Building Code would not permit a change in a plan once it had been approved (Tr. 22, 104). In a case such as this, however, it is necessary for the Department to produce the text of the applicable building code, which has been adopted either by State statute or local ordinance. It cannot prove a violation through the testimony of a witness who merely characterizes his recollection of the text of an authoritative code. Moreover, other witnesses who are experts in construction trades in Broward County testified that it is common for inspectors to approve changes such as that made by Mr. Kirksey here, at the request of Mr. Goldstein, to substitute plywood flooring for pressure treated decking, without the need for amended plans or permits. (Tr. 75-77, 88- 89). Without evidence of the text of the applicable code, it is not possible to determine whether these experts, or Mr. Montagnino are correct. Since Mr. Goldstein, the homeowner, intended to do the tile work, it would not have been Mr. Kirksey's responsibility to pull additional permits for the tile work. At most, Mr. Kirksey's duty might have been to have obtained approval of amended plans, showing the slight pitch of the joists supporting the balcony floor, and the substitution of plywood and tile for 2" X 6" pressure treated lumber as the flooring for the balcony. Mr. Kirksey is in no way responsible for the inadequate preparation of the plywood surface for the application of the tile. Mr. Kirksey is in no way responsible for informal advice given by an employee of Modern, whose identity cannot be determined from the evidence in this case, to Mr. Goldstein about the proper way to prepare the plywood deck for tiling. Tiling was not part of the construction contract which Mr. Goldstein entered into with Mr. Kirksey's company. Mr. Kirksey is therefore not liable for inadequate supervision of employees on the job. Mr. Kirksey's employees performed the work required under the agreement which Modern had with Mr. Goldstein, as the parties amended it after the construction began.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Board finding Eduardo Kirksey not guilty of the violations set out in Counts I, II or III of the Administrative Complaint. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1991.
The Issue The principal issue in this case is whether certain local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code adopted by the Broward County Board of Review and Appeals (BORA) comply with the requirements of Section 553.73(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2001). As to Broward County, there is the additional issue of whether Broward County is a proper party to this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, and upon the parties' stipulations, the following findings are made: Findings about status of Broward County Respondent Broward County is a county created pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Broward County became a charter county effective on January 1, 1975, by a referendum approved by the voters of Broward County in November of 1974. In 1976, the Broward County Charter was amended to add a new Section 8.18, which the legislative history for the charter describes as establishing BORA as “an arm of Charter government.” Broward County has not voted to adopt any local amendments to the Florida Building Code. Findings about status of BORA Respondent BORA, is a board created under the provisions of the Charter of Broward County (the “Charter”). BORA was originally created in 1971 by a special act of the Florida legislature, 71-575, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1971. That special act adopted the South Florida Building Code, as the applicable building code for Broward County and included within the South Florida Building Code as Section 203 the following language, which created BORA: 203. Board of Rules and Appeals. In order to determine the suitability of alternate materials and types of construction, to provide for reasonable interpretation of the provisions of this code and to assist in the control of the construction of buildings and structures, there is hereby created a BORA, appointed by the appointing authority, consisting of twenty-four (24) members who are qualified by training and experience to pass on matters pertaining to building construction. Findings about status of Petitioners Petitioner, TRG-Aquazul, Ltd. ("TRG"), is a Florida limited partnership and is the developer of a high-rise multi- family residential building project located in Broward County (“Project”) which is subject to the Florida Building Code, as amended, in Broward County. Petitioner, Alfonso Fernandez-Fraga, is a principal of Initial Engineers. Mr. Fernandez-Fraga and Initial Engineers are the mechanical engineers of record on the Project. Mr. Fernandez-Fraga's firm has designed other high-rise residential buildings in Broward County in the past and plans on doing more such projects in the future. Petitioners allege that they will be materially and adversely affected by the application of the Broward County local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code in that the application of said technical amendments to the Project will require a redesign of the mechanical systems of the Project to comply with those technical amendments and undertaking such redesign will cost significant time and money. Alfonso Fernandez-Fraga submitted plans to the Broward County Building Department for approval in connection with the Project. The plans submitted included plans for smoke control measures. The smoke control measures were not approved by the chief mechanical official because in his estimation they did not comply with the local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code enacted by BORA on March 1, 2002. Despite the Broward County Building Official’s suggestion that Mr. Fernandez-Fraga appeal the Building Official’s decision interpreting the applicable code, Mr. Fernandez-Fraga decided not to appeal that decision. Rather, Mr. Fernandez-Fraga chose to challenge the validity of the local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code adopted by BORA, a different appeal than the one discussed with the Building Official. TRG, through its engineer and its architect of record on the project, attempted to comply with option four of the local technical amendments at issue here, which allows one to achieve an understanding with the local building official on an alternative method for smoke control. TRG could not, and did not, reach that understanding with the Broward County Building Official. The building that TRG proposes to build is over 75 feet high, which makes it subject to the local technical amendments at issue here. At the time the local technical amendments at issue here were being adopted, Petitioners were not concerned with such developments because at that time they did not have any projects in Broward County. Findings about BORA's amendment process Once it was clear that Florida was going to have a new statewide Florida Building Code, BORA embarked upon a course of action to adopt several local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code. Such amendments were allowed, with certain qualifications and requirements, by the then-new statutes providing for the implementation of a new Florida Building Code. On March 1, 2002, BORA adopted the local technical amendments that are at issue here. Those two local technical amendmants, Sections 412 and M403.6.4, contained standards for the application and testing of smoke control systems for high-rise buildings. The two amendments were more stringent than the corresponding requirements in the Florida Building Code. Each of these local technical amendments had been part of Broward County’s local building code in effect prior to the adoption of the Florida Building Code, and as set forth in the South Florida Building Code, Broward Edition. BORA sought to maintain the status quo within Broward County with respect to the adoption of these two local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code, a status quo that had been in effect since the mid 1980's. The two local technical amendments at issue here did not introduce any new subjects that had not previously been contained in the South Florida Building Code, Broward Edition. The process leading up to the adoption of amendments on March 1, 2002, began several months earlier with the appointment of a committee and a sub-committee to discuss and draft proposed amendments. The chairman of BORA’s Mechanical Committee appointed a subcommittee which reviewed materials and made decisions with respect to the Local Amendments and made recommendations to the Mechanical Committee which, in turn, made recommendations to BORA The meetings of BORA’s Mechanical Committee and its Smoke Control Subcommittee were not publicly noticed in the Sun Sentinel or any other local newspaper of general circulation. No findings or determinations made by BORA’s Mechanical Committee or Smoke Control Subcommittee with respect to the local need to enact the Local Amendments are reflected in the minutes of their meetings. On December 13, 2001, BORA held a hearing to receive and consider information from the subcommittee and the committee regarding the pending proposed amendments. BORA’s December 13, 2001 hearing was not publicly noticed in the Sun Sentinel or any other local newspaper. Final BORA action to adopt the proposed amendments was eventually scheduled for March 1, 2002. The March 1, 2002, BORA meeting was the only BORA meeting pertaining to the local technical amendments at issue here that was publicly noticed in the Sun Sentinel or any other local newspaper. BORA did not make any findings or determinations at the March 1, 2002, meeting. There was no discussion or determinations made at the March 1, 2002, hearing regarding whether there was a local need justifying the subject local technical amendments. There was no discussion at the March 1, 2002 hearing regarding the subject local technical amendments. At the March 1, 2002, meeting, BORA determined that what its Mechanical Committee presented was acceptable and BORA therefore voted to adopt it without any meaningful discussion. BORA did not make any other determinations with respect to the local technical amendments at that hearing. The members of the Florida Building Commission’s Mechanical and Technical Advisory Committee, which drafted and/or made recommendations with respect to the Florida Building Code, are presently considering the possibility of putting more stringent smoke control measures into the Florida Building Code for statewide application. Findings about the challenge process Broward County does not have, and has never had, an interlocal agreement establishing a countywide compliance review board for the purpose of reviewing any challenges to local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code that may be challenged by a substantially affected party. Neither Broward County, per se, nor any of the municipalities in Broward County, is authorized to exercise any authority over the building code in Broward County. In light of this situation in Broward County it appears to have been the concensus of the members of BORA that it was simply not necessary to structure any interlocal agreement nor create any county-wide compliance review board as otherwise generally provided for in the applicable statutory provisions. Thus, when Petitioner Fernandez-Fraga advised BORA that he wished to challenge the validity of two of the local technical amendments adopted by BORA, it was initially unclear where the challenge should be filed and where it should be heard. Following discussion with Commission staff, BORA advised that the challenge should be filed with BORA and would be heard by BORA. On or about March 20, 2003, Petitioners filed an appeal with BORA challenging the validity of the subject amendments. BORA scheduled a hearing on the challenge for April 10, 2003. BORA was apparently of the initial view that it was hearing the Petitioners' appeal in the capacity of a statutory "countywide compliance review board" because BORA originally noticed the April 10, 2003, hearing as being held by “the Board of Rules and Appeals sitting as a Countywide Compliance Review Board pursuant to Florida Statutes 553.73(4)(b) to hear challenges to Broward County Local Amendments to Sections 412 and M403.6.4 by Mr. Alfonso Fernandez-Fraga, P.A.” Notwithstanding the notice and agenda of the April 10, 2003, BORA meeting/hearing, during the course of the hearing BORA took the position that Broward County does not have a countywide compliance review board as described in Section 553.73(4)(b)8, Florida Statutes. Counsel for BORA stated, on the record, that BORA “has exclusive authority over the building code in Broward County.” Counsel then advised the Board: That statutory section which refers to an interlocal agreement applies to counties where the county and municipalities have the authority to amend the code. In Broward County, the municipalities and the county do not have that authority. Therefore, we don’t have a Compliance Review Board in Broward County because it’s just not authorized because we operate on a different procedure here. The Board of Rules and Appeals has the sole authority to amend the code, so we’re hearing this appeal tonight really as an appeal to reconsider whether the action of this board in March of 2002, when you passed these amendments, were done properly, and that’s the sole issue. The appeal was heard by BORA on April 10, 2003. BORA voted unanimously to deny the appeal. Mr. Fernandez-Fraga promptly received a letter from James DiPietro advising him that the appeal had been rejected. Thereafter the Petitioners timely filed their petition seeking relief from the Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Building Commission issue a final order which concludes that, for the reasons set forth above, the local technical amendments adopted by BORA which are challenged in this case fail to comply with the requirements of Section 553.73(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes (2001), and are invalid local technical amendments, and further concluding that Broward County is not a necessary or appropriate party to this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2003.
The Issue Petitioner, Florida construction Industry Licensing Board (hereafter FCILB) seeks to revoke the building contractors license of Respondent, John N. Lambert (hereafter Lambert), on the ground that Lambert willfully or deliberately disregarded and violated applicable building codes of Metropolitan Dade County in violation of Section 468.112(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Initially, Lambert was also charged with abandonment of a construction project in violation of Section 468.112(2)(h), Florida Statutes. However, at the hearing, FCILB abandoned the charge.
Findings Of Fact Lambert is the holder of an inactive building contractors license number CBC009927 which legally qualified Lambert to act for Allstate Homecrafts, Inc., a corporation located in Miami, Florida, engaging in contracting work. Lambert was employed by the corporation but was not an officer or shareholder. On June 10, 1976, Lambert initiated a building permit application for work proposed to be done on the home of Mr. Nelson Tower. Mr. Tower had entered into a contract with Allstate Homecrafts, Inc., on June 4, 1976. The contract reflects that Mr. Neal Phillips acted as a corporate representative and not Lambert. The building permit was issued on August 11, 1976. On July 24, 1976, Allstate Homecrafts, Inc., contracted with a Mr. William Millman, and once again the contract reflects that Neal Phillips was the corporate representative and not Lambert. On September 13, 1976, and again on September 30, 1976, Lambert made application for a building permit with she City of Coral Gables, Florida, for the Millman job. Work was commenced on both projects. Work was still in progress on October 26, 1976, when Lambert wrote a letter to FCILB requesting that his qualification as contractor for Allstate Homecrafts, Inc., cease immediately. The reasoning given by Lambert, without further explanation, was that he could "in good conscience no longer comply" with Florida law regarding licensing of construction industry. Lambert further requested in the letter that he be requalified as an individual licensee. On the same date, Lambert terminated his employment with Allstate Homecrafts, Inc. The Tower project continued on until January, 1977, when it was abandoned by Allstate Homecrafts, Inc. The contract price was $30,000.00 and over $25,000.00 in draws were made. Five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) was drawn on November 2, 1977 $5,000.00 wad drawn on November 24, 1976, and $5,000.00 was drawn on December 16, 1976. These occurred after Lambert terminated his relationship with Allstate Homecrafts, Inc. After the contract was abandoned in January, 1977, Tower spent another $23,000.00 to finish the project. The Millman job continued until December, 1976, at which Lire it was abandoned at about 60 percent completion. A $10,000.00 draw was made on November 4, 1976, and a $5,000.00 draw was made on December 2, 1976. Millman spent an additional $10,000.00 to finish the project. Neither Tower nor Millman ever saw Lambert. All monies paid were given to other corporate representatives. While there was some evidence that violations of applicable building codes did occur, there was a complete absence of evidence to establish that Lambert willfully or deliberately disregarded the South Florida Building Code 4501.2(d)(4); failure to correct an electrical hazard. On February 2, 1978, the Dade County Construction Trade Qualifying Board reported that it had found that there was a prima facie showing of the charges brought against Lambert.
Findings Of Fact By Stipulation of the parties, it is found that Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a certified roofing contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CC-C015772. He is also known as Tony Gory, and was the qualifying agent for Roofing Technology, Inc., at all times material hereto. On or about August 16, 1982, Respondent submitted a proposal, on behalf of Roofing Technology, Incorporated, to Lillian Perper for roofing work to be done on her residence at 3616 Flamingo Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. Mrs. Perper accepted the proposal on August 17, 1982, and testified that the written proposal contained all terms and conditions of her agreement with Respondent. Respondent obtained the permit for this job on August 23, 1982. Mrs. Perper made timely payments to Respondent, under the terms of their agreement, totaling $11,057.00. Respondent completed the work in late September, 1982 and Mrs. Perper made her final payment on October 8, 1982. Respondent's agreement with Mrs. Perper included a warranty stated as follows: All workmanship and material to be guaranteed against defects for a period of ten (10) years; except for fire, termites, windstorm, or damages caused by acts of God. Within two months after completion of the reroofing, Mrs. Perper noted leaks in her livingroom and bedroom ceilings. She called Respondent, and-he came right out and 3 inspected her roof. He then sent a crew to Mrs. Perper's house and they attempted to locate and fix the leaks. However, they were not successful and the leaks continued. Mrs. Perper made several additional attempts to reach Respondent, but was not able to personally talk with him again about her roof. She did leave messages at his office that she was continuing to have leaks in her roof. In June, 1983, Respondent sent a crew of two men to Mrs. Perper's house to work on her roof. However, she denied them access to her roof because Respondent was not present, although they did identify themselves as roofers who Respondent had sent to repair her roof. Mrs. Perper was concerned that this crew would tear her roof off without Respondent being present to supervise the job. No additional attempts were made by Mrs. Perper to reach Respondent, or by Respondent to repair her roof, after she refused access to the roofing crew in June, 1983. The South Florida Building Code has been adopted as the building code of the City of Miami Beach. Regarding roof coverings, the South Florida Building Code provides that the building official shall be notified by the permit holder upon completion of the roof covering (Section 3401.1(b)(4)), nails should not be driven through the sheathing between supports (Section 3401.1(c)), mortar used to secure roof tile shall be sandwiched between all laps at all butts and along the sides of barrel tile (Section 3403.2(e)), roof tiles shall be secured to resist uplift forces (Section 3403.2(f)) and such tile shall extend beyond roof sheathing at the eaves (Section 3403.2(h)). An inspection of Mrs. Perper's roof conducted on February 25, 1985, by Robert B. Hilson, who was accepted as an expert in roofing and the installation of Spanish-S tile, indicates there were violations of several of the above provisions of the South Florida Building Code when he made his inspection, but there is no evidence that these violations were willful or deliberate, or that they were the result of work completed by Respondent in September, 1982. Between June, 1983, when Mrs. Perper denied access to Respondent's crew and February, 1985, when Hilson made his inspection, Mrs. Perper allowed a painter to go on her roof to see about her leak problem and to repair some flashing around her chimney. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether Respondent called for a final inspection after completing the roofing of Mrs. Perper's residence. Respondent testified that he did call for the inspection, but could offer nothing to substantiate his testimony. Petitioner called Oswald Ferro, building inspector, who testified that in the limited time he had available to him he could only find a record in the City of Miami Beach building department of one inspection on this job, but this was not a final inspection on this job. He had no personal knowledge about inspections on this job or whether Respondent had failed to call for a final inspection. Based upon the conflicting evidence presented and considering the demeanor of the witnesses, it is found that Petitioner has not established that Respondent failed to call for a final inspection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent Frank A. Gory. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1986 at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Errol H. Powell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Martin G. Brooks, Esquire 300 Hollywood Federal Building 4600 Sheridan Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1,2 Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant. 7,8 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in part and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 13,14 Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5,7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 12. 17,18 Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected in Finding of Fact 13. 21-28 Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Respondent did not timely file proposed findings of fact by August 26, 1986 as required by Order entered August 6, 1986, and therefore no rulings can be made relative to any proposed findings which may be submitted by Respondent.
The Issue Whether pursuant to Sections 57.111 or 120.595(1), Florida Statutes, Petitioner Rafael R. Palacios (Palacios) should be awarded reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in defense of an administrative proceeding against him that was initiated by the Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department). Whether pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes, Petitioner Steven L. Johns (Johns) should be awarded reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in defense of an administrative proceeding against him that was initiated by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Steven L. Johns, is a Florida Certified General Contractor and the principal qualifier for C. G. Chase Construction Company (Chase Construction). In 1994, Chase Construction entered into a construction contract with Carnival Cruise Lines for an expansion project at the Port of Miami. Chase Construction subcontracted the mechanical work to R. Palacios & Company. Petitioner, Rafael R. Palacios, is the president, primary qualifier, and 100 percent stockholder of R. Palacios & Company. Palacios' principal place of business is located in Miami, Florida. In July and December 1998, Palacios employed less than 25 employees and had a net worth of less than $2,000,000. The contract for the Port of Miami project consisted of two phases. Phase I was to construct an arrival lobby and an enclosed walkway to a terminal. Phase II included the addition of boarding halls, the renovation of an existing elevated area, and the addition of baggage areas. A foundation permit had been pulled for Phase I. The foundation work was quickly completed, and Chase Construction representatives advised both the Port of Miami and Carnival Cruise Lines that they could go no further without a permit. Work stopped for a short period of time. In June 1995, a Representative from the Port of Miami called Chase Construction and told them to go to the Dade County Building and Zoning Department (Building Department) the next day to meet with Port of Miami officials, the architect, and building and zoning officials. Johns sent Dave Whelpley, who was a project manager and officer of Chase Construction. Palacios did not attend the meeting. Dr. Carlos Bonzon (Bonzon) was the director and building official of Dade County's Building Department during the majority of the construction activities at the Port of Miami by Chase Construction. As the building official, Dr. Bonzon gave verbal authorization for the work on the project to proceed above the foundation without a written permit. Inspections were to be done by the chief inspectors for Dade County. After the meeting with the Building Department officials in June 1995, Johns understood that authorization had been given by the building official to proceed with construction without a written permit. Work did proceed and inspections were made on the work completed. The Dade County Building Code Compliance Office (BBCO) had the responsibility to oversee Dade County's Building Department. In early 1996, an officer of the BBCO accompanied a building inspector during an inspection of the Port of Miami project. It came to the attention of the BBCO officer that no written permit had been issued for the project. The BBCO officer notified the chief of code compliance for Dade County. A written permit was issued for Phase II of the Port of Miami Project on February 6, 1996, at which time approximately 80 percent of the work had been completed. On the same date, Chase Construction issued a memorandum to its subcontractors to secure the necessary permits. Shortly after the permits were issued, an article appeared in the Miami Herald concerning the project and the lack of written permits. Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department) became aware of the situation as a result of the newspaper article and began an investigation. Diane Perera (Perera), an attorney employed by the Department since 1993 to prosecute construction-related professional license law violations, played a major role in determining and carrying out the Department's subsequent actions regarding the Port of Miami project and persons licensed by the Department who had been involved in the project. The Department opened investigations against eight Department licensees. Those licensees included two building officials, Bonzon, and Lee Martin; four contractors, Johns, Palacios, Douglas L. Orr, and D. Jack Maxwell; one engineer, Ramon Donnell; and one architect, Willy A. Bermello. By Administrative Complaint prepared by Perera and filed on September 9, 1997, before the Building Code Administrators and Inspectors Board (BCAIB), the Department charged Bonzon with various violations of Part XIII of Chapter 486, Florida Statutes, for having allowed above-grade construction on the project to proceed in the absence of approved plans and building permits. In conjunction with the Bonzon case, Charles Danger (Danger), a licensed professional engineer and Director of BBCO testified in a deposition that above-grade construction of the project had proceeded without a building permit and without approved plans in violation of Chapter 3, Section 301 of the South Florida Building Code. He also testified that Bonzon had exceeded his authority under the South Florida Building Code by authorizing the above-grade construction and that the contractors who performed the work did so in violation of the South Florida Building Code. The Department's charges against Bonzon were resolved through a settlement agreement, whereby Bonzon agreed to relinquish his building code administrator's license. A final order of the BCAIB accepting the settlement agreement was filed on July 2, 1998. In the settlement agreement, Bonzon specifically agreed that his interpretation of the South Florida Building Code provisions, including portions of Section 301, was erroneous. On June 24, 1998, the Department presented the Department's Case Number 97-17322 involving Johns to the Division I Probable Cause Panel (PCP) of the Construction Industry Licensing Board (CILB). The panel members on this date were Gene Simmons and Wayne Beigle. Stuart Wilson-Patton and Leland McCharen, assistant attorneys general, were present to provide legal advise to the PCP. The prosecuting attorney presenting the case to the panel was Perera. The Department was requesting a finding of probable cause against Johns for a violation of Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, for knowingly violating the applicable building code by performing above-grade construction work on the Port of Miami project in the absence of approved plans and specifications. Prior to the meeting of the Division I PCP of the CILB, Perera had furnished the two panel members documentary evidence pertaining to the case, copies of which were received in evidence at the final hearing as Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 13, with the exception of a letter dated July 31, 1998, from Petitioners' attorney, Renee Alsobrook. Respondent's Exhibit 5 consisted of materials taken from the Bonzon and Lee Martin cases, including the transcript of the December 22, 1997, deposition of Charles Danger, who was the building officer for the BBCO from 1991 to 1998. Respondent's Exhibit 13 was the investigative file for the Johns' case. The Division I PCP discussed Johns' case and voted to request additional information regarding whether any fast track ordinance existed in Dade County, and if so, how it might have applied to the Port of Miami project. On June 24, 1998, the Division II PCP of the CILB met and discussed the Palacios case, which was designated as the Department's Case No. 97-17313. The members of the panel were James Barge and Richard Cowart. Mr. Wilson-Patton and Mr. McCharen were present to provide legal advise to the PCP. The prosecuting attorney presenting the case to the PCP was Perera. The Department was requesting a finding of probable cause against Palacios for violating Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by knowingly violating the applicable building code by performing above-grade construction work on the Port of Miami project in the absence of approved plans and a building permit. Prior to the Division II PCP meeting, the panel members were provided with materials which were received in evidence at the final hearing as Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 14, with the exception of letters dated July 31 and August 26, 1998, from Renee Alsobrook. Respondent's Exhibit 14 is the Department's investigative file on the Palacios case. Following a discussion of the Palacios case, one of the panel members made a motion not to find probable cause. The motion died for lack of a second, and the panel took no further action on the case that day. Pursuant to Section 455.225(4), Florida Statutes, the case was treated as one in which the PCP failed to make a determination regarding the existence of probable cause and was presented to Hank Osborne, Deputy Secretary of the Department, to make a determination whether probable cause existed. On July 2, 1998, Deputy Secretary Osborne found probable cause, and the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Palacios, charging a violation of Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes. The Department never served Palacios with the Administrative Complaint filed on July 2, 1998. The Department did not notify Palacios that the Administrative Complaint had been filed and did not prosecute the Administrative Complaint. At the time the Administrative Complaint was filed, the Department believed that the Legislature was in the process of enacting legislation to repeal Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Chapter 98-419, Laws of Florida, which became law on June 17, 1998, repealed Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 1998. Because of the repeal and the lack of a savings clause for pending cases, the Department determined that as of October 1, 1998, the Department did not have authority to take disciplinary action based on a violation of Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes. On December 18, 1998, the Department presented the Department's Case Nos. 97-17133 and 97-1732 to the PCPs for a second time with a recommendation to find probable cause that Johns and Palacios had violated Section 489.129(1)(p), Florida Statutes, for proceeding on any job without obtaining applicable local building permits and inspections. Mr. McCharen was present to provide legal advice to the PCPs. Ms. Perera was also present during the meetings of the PCPs. Documentary materials presented to the PCP considering Palacios' case included the materials on the Bonzon and Martin cases which had been previously presented to the PCP panel in June 1998 and the investigative files on Palacios. The investigative file included letters with attachments from Palacios' attorney Rene Alsobrook concerning the materials contained in the Bonzon and Martin cases as they related to Palacios and the investigative file on Palacios. Additionally, the investigative file contained a report from Frank Abbott, a general contractor who had been asked by the Department to review the file on Palacios. Mr. Abbott concluded that Palacios had violated several provisions of Chapters 489 and 455, Florida Statutes, including Section 489.129(p), Florida Statutes. The PCPs found probable cause in the Johns and Palacios cases. On December 23, 1998, the Department filed administrative complaints against Palacios and Johns alleging violations of Section 489.129(1)(p), Florida Statutes. The cases were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment to an administrative law judge. Palacios and Johns claimed that they were relying on the authorization from Bonzon when they proceeded on the above-grade construction work. No formal administrative hearing was held on the administrative complaints filed on December 23, 1998. On December 18, 1998, a Recommended Order was issued in the related case against Lee Martin, Department Case No. 97-11278, finding that Mr. Martin, the building official who replaced Bonzon and assumed responsibility for the Port of Miami project, had the discretion to allow the remaining construction to proceed while taking action to expedite the plans processsing. A Final Order was entered by the Department dismissing all charges against Mr. Martin. On February 26, 1999, Petitioners Palacios' and Johns' Motions to Dismiss and Respondent's responses were filed. The Motions to Dismiss did not request attorney's fees or costs and did not reference Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. The motions did contain the following language: The DBPR has acted in an improper and malicious manner by precluding the Respondent from asserting his response to the second draft Administrative Complaint and requesting the Panel to find probable cause for reasons other than whether there was probable cause to believe the Respondent violated specific disciplinary violations. On March 19, 1999, the cases were consolidated and noticed for hearing on May 12-13, 1999. Section 489.129, Florida Statutes, was amended during the 1999 legislative session to provide: A contractor does not commit a violation of this subsection when the contractor relies on a building code interpretation rendered by a building official or person authorized by s. 553.80 to enforce the building code, absent a finding of fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting, or gross negligence, repeated negligence, or negligence resulting in a significant danger to life or property on the part of the building official, in a proceeding under chapter 120. . . . On April 15, 1999, the Department filed a Motion for Leave to Revisit Probable Cause Panel and to Hold in Abeyance. On April 20, 1999, Petitioners filed a response, stating they did not object to the granting of the motion to hold in abeyance. The final hearing was cancelled, and the cases were placed in abeyance. On May 24, 1999, the Department submitted a Status Report, stating that the cases would be placed on the next regularly scheduled PCP meeting scheduled for June 16, 1999. By order dated May 25, 1999, the cases were continued in abeyance. On July 1, 1999, Palacios and Johns filed a Status Report, indicating that the cases would be presented to the PCPs sometime in July and requesting the cases be continued in abeyance for an additional 30 days in order for the parties to resolve the issues. On July 30, 1999, Palacios and Johns filed a Status Report, stating that the cases were orally dismissed on July 28, 1999, and that a hearing involving issues of disputed facts was no longer required. Based on Johns' and Palacios' status report, the files of the Division of Administrative Hearings were closed by order dated August 3, 1999. No motion for attorney's fees and costs was filed during the pendency of the cases at the Division of Administrative Hearings. On August 3, 1999, orders were entered by Cathleen E. O'Dowd, Lead Attorney, dismissing the cases against Palacios and Johns.
