The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner in the provision of housing, or services in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pedro Tamayo, suffers from anxiety, depression, memory loss, and complex regional pain syndrome (“RPD”). Respondent, Avtec, is a residential construction contractor, doing business in Palm Bay, Florida. On November 10, 2018, Petitioner executed a Contract for Sale and Purchase (“Contract”) with Avtec to construct a residential structure on property owned by Petitioner on Raleigh Road Southeast in Palm Bay, Florida. The specific floor plan chosen by Petitioner was the Citation 4 Plus. Avtec executed the Contract on November 12, 2018. The Contract covers clearing of property for construction, materials and color selections by the buyer, and the buyer’s right to reverse the floor plan, among other terms. When Petitioner entered into the Contract, he simultaneously chose many of the options available to customize the Citation 4 Plus, such as impact windows, an exterior pedestrian door in the garage, and a front septic system. Among the options Petitioner chose was 36-inch (36”) doors for the master bedroom entrance, closet, and master bathroom entrance. Petitioner has no obvious physical disability and does not require use of a wheelchair or walker. Construction Setback The Contract does not address the construction setbacks from the property lines. Setbacks are governed by local government codes and Avtec is required to follow those codes. On November 30, 2018, Petitioner met with his sales agent, Sean McCarry, at the Avtec showroom, to discuss some of the options he had chosen for his new home. They specifically discussed plumbing issues for the master bathroom, 36” wide doors in the master bedroom, placement of the septic tank, the concrete culverts for the driveway, and a 45-foot (45’) setback of the home from the property line. While the standard setback for a home with a front septic tank is 38’ to 40’, Petitioner indicated he wanted to build an aluminum carport, which required additional setback footage. Respondent Amicucci stepped into the meeting with Petitioner and Mr. McCarry to address Petitioner’s request for mitered ends on the culvert pipe. Mr. Amicucci was not present when Petitioner requested a 45’ setback. Mr. McCarry verbally agreed to “take care of” the setback requested by Petitioner. Petitioner’s selection of 36” doorways for the master bedroom, and a front septic system were reduced to writing and included in the Contract, signed by both parties, as an Option to Sales Agreement. Petitioner executed five addenda to the Contract between November 30, 2018, and May 1, 2019, including optional upgrades and a modification to the design of the sidewalk. On July 23, 2019, Petitioner and Avtec executed a change order to include the mitered ends of the culvert pipe. No part of the Contract, any addenda thereto, or any change order, addresses Petitioner’s request for a 45’ setback. Section 28 of the Contract provides that “NO OTHER AGREEMENTS exist between the BUYER and SELLER except as set forth in this Agreement. This Agreement shall not be modified except by an instrument in writing executed by both BUYER and SELLER.” Section 29 of the Contract contains the following statement in red underlined text: No representative of Seller has authority to make any verbal statements that modify or change the terms or conditions of this contract. Buyer represents that buyer has read and understands this entire contract. Buyer also represents that buyer is not relying on any verbal statement, promise, or condition not specifically set forth in this contract. It is acknowledged that builder is relying on these representations and would not enter into this contract without this understanding. Section 20 of the Contract specifically provides, “Once the rough plumbing is installed, absolutely NO CHANGES will be allowed.” Petitioner’s new home was built 40’ from the property line, rather than 45’ as Petitioner requested. Sometime after the rough plumbing was installed and the foundation was poured, Petitioner complained to Avtec that his home was not built with a 45’ setback as promised by Mr. McCarry. On August 22, 2019, Avtec, through its Director of Corporate Development, responded in writing to Petitioner’s complaint. Avtec apologized that the home was not built to the setback he had communicated to Mr. McCarry, and referred to the Contract terms that exclude any verbal agreements. Avtec offered to release Petitioner from his contract, refund his deposit of $6,250, and give Petitioner $30,000 for the property after selling it to another buyer. On November 13, 2019, Petitioner signed a “Final Acceptance of Completion” of the construction of his home. Fill Dirt On March 8, 2019, Petitioner drove by the construction site and noted that the fill dirt being used was “contaminated” with tree branches and other material. He drove to the model home to discuss the issue with Mr. McCarry. Mr. McCarry contacted Mr. Amicucci, who agreed to meet Petitioner at the property to inspect the fill and address Petitioner’s concerns. Petitioner and Mr. Amicucci testified to two very different versions of the events at the construction site that day. Petitioner testified that, when Mr. Amicucci arrived, he got out of his vehicle, visibly upset, and raised his voice and cursed at Petitioner regarding his lack of knowledge of proper fill material. Petitioner testified, specifically that: I feared that [Mr. Amicucci] would physically attack me by his aggressive demeanor and I immediately froze. I could not comprehend how a paying customer could be treated this way by raising concerns for the foundation of my home. I am not a builder. [Mr. Amicucci] simply needed to explain the common practice of standard fill. Since March 8th, 2019, my quality of life has not been the same. I have severe anxiety due to the memories of that day and suffer constant nightmares. I feel as [sic] my life can be in danger and, therefore, live in a state of high alert. My daily life has been disrupted. Simply having to drive by Avtec showroom due to my normal routine routes triggers flashbacks of that day. Mr. Amicucci testified that when he arrived at the property, Petitioner was upset and aggressive toward him, demanding that the fill be removed from his property. Mr. Amicucci reassured Petitioner that the fill was all good soil and that it would be root-raked before it was spread for the foundation. Mr. Amicucci explained the root-raking process and the equipment used therefor. Nevertheless, Petitioner insisted that Mr. Amicucci go with him to another construction site to show him the type of fill he wanted used on his property. Mr. Amicucci accompanied Petitioner to the specific construction site, which was not an Avtec project, and Mr. Amicucci identified the fill being used there as a hard white shell material. Mr. Amicucci assured Petitioner that the brown sandy soil imported to his property would be better for the sod and plants Petitioner would be using to landscape the property. Mr. Amicucci testified that, at the end of the meeting, Petitioner extended his hand and said, “[l]ook, that all sounds good. I just want to start back over. Are we good?” Mr. Amicucci shook Petitioner’s hand and assured him that they “were good.” Mr. Amicucci’s testimony regarding the events that occurred on March 8, 2019, is accepted as more credible and reliable than Petitioner’s. Knowledge of Petitioner’s Disability Mr. Amicucci testified that he was not aware that Petitioner had any kind of disability until the Complaint was filed against him and Avtec. Petitioner testified that his disability was revealed to Mr. Amicucci on November 30, 2018, during a meeting at the Avtec showroom to discuss the various options selected by Petitioner when he signed the contract. Petitioner testified that Mr. Amicucci asked him what he did for a living and Petitioner told him that he was retired and disabled from the City of Hialeah. He testified that Mr. Amicucci was further on notice because Petitioner always wears a glove to improve circulation in his right hand and that he can hardly sign his name, which would have been apparent to Mr. Amicucci at the November 30, 2018 meeting. Finally, Petitioner alleges Mr. Amicucci should have been aware of his disability because he requested 36” ADA-compliant door widths for the master bedroom. Mr. Amicucci did not recall Petitioner telling him he was disabled or seeing Petitioner wearing a glove. He did recall seeing Petitioner wearing a sling of some sort and inquiring whether he had been injured. He recalled Petitioner telling him it was related to an old injury. Mr. Amicucci was not present for any discussion about the 36” doorways. Assuming, arguendo, that he was present for that discussion, a request for 36” doorways alone is not proof of a disability. Many buyers upgrade to larger doorways to accommodate larger furniture or in anticipation of needing a walker or wheelchair access in the future. Furthermore, requesting ADA-compliant doorways is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim that he has emotional disabilities and chronic pain. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Amicucci knew of Petitioner’s disabilities of anxiety, depression, memory loss, and RPD. No other witness was offered on behalf of Avtec. There is no evidence to support a finding that Avtec had knowledge of Petitioner’s disability through any other employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202022149. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Mike Amicucci Suite 3 590 Malabar Road Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Pedro Tamayo 987 Raleigh Road Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 (eServed) Rebecca E. Rhoden, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. 215 North Eola Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Lawrence F. Sietsma Avtec Homes, Inc. et al 2860 North Riverside Drive Indialantic, Florida 32903 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact In June 2016, Gaudina and Grand Lifestyle executed a document, entitled “GLC III/LLLP Lease – Basic Rental Agreement or Residential Lease” (lease), in which Gaudina leased from Grand Lifestyle a residence at 3346 East Dale Street, Leesburg, Florida, in the Lakeside Village mobile home park (premises). The lease provided that Gaudina pay to Grand Lifestyle $656.00 per month to lease the premises. The lease further provided that at the end of three consecutive years of living at the premises, Grand Lifestyle would provide Gaudina the option of purchasing the premises for $1,000.00. Gaudina testified that his primary residence is in Colorado, but that he wished to lease the premises so that he had a residence when he visited his wife, who lived nearby in Lake County, Florida. As he did not reside permanently at the premises in Leesburg, Gaudina subleased the premises to another individual, possibly in violation of the lease. That individual reported to Gaudina numerous issues with the premises, which Gaudina testified he brought to the attention of Grand Lifestyle.2/ Both parties testified that they sought various remedies in other courts concerning these issues. The undersigned finds that these issues are not relevant to Gaudina’s allegations concerning discrimination under the Florida FHA. Gaudina testified that he possesses a disability that requires use of an emotional support animal. The only evidence Gaudina submitted in support of this contention was a letter, dated February 24, 2015, from Emilia Ripoll, M.D. (Ripoll), located in Boulder, Colorado, and a “Health Care Provider Pet Accomodation Form,” also from Ripoll. This letter states: Mr. Jan Gaudina is currently my patient and has been under my care since 1998. I am intimately familiar with his history and with the functional limitations imposed by his medical condition. Due to his diagnosis of bladder cancer and bilateral ureter cancer, Jan has certain emotional limitations including stress which may cause his cancer to recur. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his ability to cope and live independently, I have prescribed Jan to obtain his pet for emotional support. The presence of this animal is necessary for the mental health of Jan. The Health Care Accomodation Form prescribed the use of Gaudina’s dog, a golden retriever, as an emotional support animal. Gaudina did not present the testimony of Ripoll or any other health care provider concerning his alleged disability. The letter and form, which are inadmissible hearsay that Gaudina failed to corroborate with admissible non-hearsay evidence, attempt to establish that Gaudina required an emotional support animal to prevent a recurrence of cancer. The undersigned cannot consider these documents to support a finding that Gaudina is disabled and in need of an emotional support animal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.213(3).3/ Therefore, the undersigned finds that Gaudina has failed to establish that he suffers from a disability that requires the accommodation of his golden retriever as an emotional support animal. Principe, the owner of Grand Lifestyle, testified that the prospectus for the premises restricted pet ownership to pets that weigh less than 20 pounds. The parties acknowledged that a golden retriever weighs in excess of 20 pounds. Principe testified that, during a telephone conversation, Gaudina asked whether he could bring his golden retriever to the premises, but never mentioned his alleged disability. Principe also testified that he asked Gaudina whether Gaudina’s golden retriever was a trained service dog. Gaudina testified that his golden retriever was not a “service dog,” as defined under section 413.08, Florida Statutes.4/ Principe further testified that Gaudina rarely visited the premises. Gaudina testified that, in total, he visited the premises in Leesburg three or four times over the period of approximately one year. Gaudina presented no credible evidence that he qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Further, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Jan Gaudina, did not prove that Respondent, Grand Lifestyle Communities III/IV, LLLP, committed discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, religion, or disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Parklife is the owner of a mobile home community known as St. Lucie Mobile Village (the “Village”), which comprises approximately 220 homes. For the last 21 years, McGrath has leased a lot in the Village, upon which her double-wide mobile home sits. She is a white woman, approximately 60 years old, who claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other unspecified anxiety disorders, and to be a practicing Jehovah’s Witness. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). McGrath alleges that Parklife has discriminated against her in several ways, which can be classified as selective enforcement, disparate treatment, and retaliation. Specifically, McGrath alleges that Parklife required her to upgrade the skirting around, and also to re-level, her home, while excusing other (predominately Hispanic) residents, whose homes were in comparable condition, from making similar improvements. McGrath alleges that Parklife issued warnings to her for violating the “two vehicle” rule, while allowing other (predominately Hispanic) residents to keep three or more cars on their lots. She alleges that Parklife permitted Hispanic residents to shoot off fireworks and make noise in violation of park rules, depriving her of the peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Finally, McGrath alleges that Parklife commenced a retaliatory eviction proceeding against her for being a whistle blower. McGrath does not dispute that her home needed new skirting and to be leveled, and she admits having violated the two vehicle rule. She claims, nevertheless, that Parklife took action against her on the basis of her race (white), religion (Jehovah’s Witness), disability (PTSD), or some combination of these, as shown by its more lenient treatment of residents outside the protected categories. McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim of housing discrimination. That is, if McGrath were able to prove the facts she has alleged, she would be entitled to relief. She failed, however, to present sufficient, persuasive evidence in support of the charges. It is not that there is no evidence behind McGrath’s claims. She and her witness, Kassandra Rosa, testified that other residents have violated park rules regarding skirting, leveling, and allowable vehicles––seemingly without consequence. To determine whether the circumstances of these other residents were truly comparable to McGrath’s, however, so as to conclude that she was singled out for different treatment, requires more information than the evidence affords. Taken together, McGraths’s testimony and that of Ms. Rosa was simply too vague and lacking in relevant detail to support findings of disparate treatment or selective enforcement on the basis of race, religion, or handicap. Indeed, the persuasive evidence fails to establish that Parklife declined to take appropriate action with regard to similarly-situated violators, or that it otherwise condoned, or acquiesced to, the rulebreaking of such residents. At most, the evidence shows that other residents violated the same rules as McGrath––not that they got off scot-free, which is a different matter. As for the eviction proceeding, which was pending in county court at the time of the final hearing, there is insufficient evidence (if any) to support McGrath’s contention that Parklife is retaliating against her or using the legal process as a pretext for unlawfully depriving her of a dwelling in violation of the Act. In terms of timing, Parklife initiated the eviction proceeding before it became aware that McGrath had filed a complaint of housing discrimination, which tends to undermine the assertion that the eviction was brought to retaliate against McGrath for exercising her rights under the Act. More important is that Parklife has articulated and proved nondiscriminatory grounds for seeking to terminate McGrath’s lease. Residents have complained to the Village’s management that McGrath has harassed her neighbors at various times, in various ways. While there is insufficient nonhearsay evidence in the instant record for the undersigned to make findings as to whether McGrath did, in fact, harass other residents in violation of park rules, Parklife proved by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence that it was on notice of such alleged misconduct on McGrath’s part. The fact that Parklife had such notice is sufficient to show that its bringing an action to evict McGrath was not merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination against her. Of course, the question of whether Parklife is entitled to terminate McGrath’s tenancy is one that need not, and cannot, be decided in this proceeding. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that McGrath has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Parklife or any of the Respondents, jointly or severally, committed an unlawful housing practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Parklife not liable for housing discrimination and awarding McGrath no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Laney H. McGrath 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317 Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Teresa Schenk St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Based on the undisputed facts included in pleadings filed in this proceeding and on the documentary evidence attached to the Association's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 16, 1999, Ms. Thornhill filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in which she accused the Association of housing discrimination on the basis of handicap and coercion. The complaint was apparently based on the Association's attempts to make Ms. Thornhill remove a set of steps leading from the terrace of her apartment. In June 1999, the Association filed a civil lawsuit against Ms. Thornhill in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, styled Admiral Farragut Condominium Association v. Maria Thornhill, Case No. 99-15567 CA 22. On or about September 21, 1999, Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, filed Defendant, Maria Thornhill's Answer to Complaint. Included in the answer was a Counterclaim filed by Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, against the Association, in which she sought injunctive relief and damages against the Association pursuant to Section 760.35(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. 1/ She asserted in the Counterclaim that she had filed a discrimination complaint against the Association with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which had been referred to the Commission and that this complaint was still pending before the Commission. Ms. Thornhill alleged in the Counterclaim that the Association had engaged in housing discrimination against her on the basis of her handicap because it had refused to accommodate her disability by giving her permission to retain the steps she had installed leading from the terrace of her apartment. Ms. Thornhill also alleged that the Association had "authorized or acquiesced in a series of actions intended as harassment and retribution" against Ms. Thornhill for having filed a housing discrimination complaint. The factual and legal bases on which Ms. Thornhill requests relief in the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission and in the Counterclaim filed in circuit court are virtually identical.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint filed by Maria T. Thornhill to enforce rights granted by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.30 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of housing discrimination against Respondent based on her race and disabilities, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is African-American, although the record fails to disclose any physical or mental disability. Due to her pending eviction at an apartment complex known as the Tennis Club in Fort Lauderdale, Petitioner visited the Venice Cove apartment complex, also in Fort Lauderdale, in the summer of 2002. Deciding that she liked Venice Cove, Petitioner applied for a one bedroom apartment on September 16, 2002. In accordance with its customary practice, Respondent obtained a credit report and learned that Petitioner owed a utility payment, possibly a cable television box. Respondent advised Petitioner that she would have to satisfy this debt to rent an apartment, and Petitioner did so. At some point, Petitioner decided that she wanted a two bedroom/two bathroom apartment, and Respondent tentatively assigned her a unit of this type, pending final approval of her application to lease. Petitioner changed her preferences for type of apartment several times. Respondent was able to accommodate immediately all but one of these preferences. In early December, Petitioner mentioned to Respondent's representative that she was being evicted from the Tennis Club. This is the first time that Petitioner disclosed any eviction to Respondent. Examining the file, Respondent's representative realized that she had failed to order the more thorough credit report that Respondent had been using since November 2002. This report would reveal evictions, among other things. Respondent's representative ordered the more thorough credit report, which revealed that Respondent had been evicted three times. Respondent's policy precluded renting to a person with this rental history, and Respondent's representative promptly informed Petitioner that she was denying Petitioner's application. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent denied Petitioner's application on the basis of Petitioner's race or any disability from which she may suffer.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elvira Williams 1515 Northwest 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Kristine A. Sawyers Law Offices of Lowenhaupt & Sawyers 7765 Southwest 87th Avenue Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33173
The Issue Whether Respondent, Cambridge Management Inc., engaged in housing discriminatory practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact In 2009-2010, Ms. Elizabeth Sherlock and her nine-year-old son, Luke Sherlock, rented a home from Ms. Sheryl Whitaker. The home was located in the Wedgewood II at Pelican Strand located in Collier County, Florida. The lease was from June 1, 2008, until June 1, 2010. Cambridge Management is the Master Association for the condominium association for the Strand properties. Cambridge Management did not rent or lease the home to Ms. Sherlock. Ms. Sherlock testified that the homeowner's association cited her for violations of the homeowner's association covenants, based on her son engaging in normal childhood activities such as climbing trees, archery, playing in the street and the community clubhouse. Ms. Sherlock testified that she was told in April 2010 that her lease would not be renewed, because her son had run across a sand trap on the golf course during a rain storm. According to Ms. Sherlock, Cambridge Management discriminated against her and her son by denying them access to their rented home.2/ Further, Ms. Sherlock testified that her son suffered severe traumatic stress, based on the security officers denying them access to their home. Finally, Ms. Sherlock testified that the decision not to continue renting to her caused her to move from the home and resulted in financial hardship. Ms. Sherlock's Petition for Relief summarily states that Respondents violated the Florida Fair Housing Act through "discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges or services, and facilities." The Petition for Relief does not contain any specific factual allegation against Respondents. The record does not support Ms. Sherlock's testimony that Cambridge Management engaged in any discriminatory practice or that it retaliated against her and her son in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Mr. LeClaire is a security guard for the Wedgewood at Pelican Strand. Mr. LeClaire testified that on June 24, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he had stopped Ms. Sherlock at the gate because his supervisor had told him that Ms. Sherlock may not be a current resident. After confirming that she was still a current resident, Mr. LeClaire allowed Ms. Sherlock to access her home through the gate. Although Mr. LeClaire's supervisor had told him that Ms. Sherlock may not be a current resident, no one from Cambridge Management had told Mr. LeClaire to deny Ms. Sherlock access to her rented home. Mr. Weaver is also a security guard for the Wedgewood at Pelican Strand. Mr. Weaver testified that on July 2, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he stopped Ms. Sherlock at the gatehouse to determine whether or not she was a current resident. Mr. Weaver credibly testified that he stopped Ms. Sherlock because he did not recognize her as a resident. After he verified that she was a current resident, Mr. Weaver allowed Ms. Sherlock into the community. Mr. Weaver credibly testified that he delayed her at most three minutes. Mr. Charles Sherlock is Ms. Sherlock's father. Mr. Sherlock resides in Naples, Florida, during the winter. He testified about the close relationship that he enjoys with his grandson Luke. According to Mr. Sherlock, Luke felt that it was his fault that he and Ms. Sherlock had been evicted from Ms. Whitaker's home, and had to move to Minnesota. Mr. Sherlock further testified that he had to pay for Ms. Sherlock's move to Minnesota, and that he would like to be reimbursed for the costs. Ms. Rubele is an officer with Wackenhut Security, and she testified about the Wackenhut Standard Operating Procedure for the Strand, and testified that Wackenhut's contact person for security was Ms. Brandy K. Callahan of Cambridge Property Management. Prior to the final hearing, Ms. Sherlock voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, her claims against Respondents, Wedgewood at Pelican Strand Neighborhood Association, et al., and Newell Property Management, et al., and voluntarily dismissed Respondent, Sheryl Whitaker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2011.
The Issue The issue for determination in this matter is whether Respondents engaged in acts of housing discrimination against Petitioners on the basis of race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Donald Travis and Lisa Harrell, are a bi-racial couple (Mr. Travis is African-American and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons subject to protection under Florida's Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, and Ms. Harrell is white). They have two sons who are bi-racial (one is African-American and white, the other is white and Asian). Petitioners lived in Apartment 163 at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506. Respondents, John and Anne Cutler, are the owners of two four-plex apartments at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506, including the unit occupied by Petitioners that gave rise to this matter. They are both retired educators who own and operate their apartment rental business in their retirement. In their teaching and professional careers, both have instructed students of various races and national origins. Petitioner, Donald Travis, is a veteran of Desert Storm and has been treated for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He regularly takes medications to treat anxiety and depression. On April 4, 2008, Petitioners moved into Apartment 163, which had been recently painted, carpeted, and had a new ceiling fan and light installed in the living room. Everything went smoothly between Petitioners and Respondents for several months. Mr. Cutler had to unplug the downstairs toilet with a plunger a few times, but everything else seemed to be in working order. Both Mr. and Ms. Cutler considered Petitioners to be good tenants. As summer approached, Mr. Travis asked Mr. Cutler about installing a screen door for the sliding glass doors. This could not be done without replacing the entire sliding glass doors. When Apartment 131 became vacant, its screen door was moved to Petitioners' apartment. The screen door had a slit in it, which Ms. Cutler repaired with tape. When Apartment 132 became vacant, the good screen door from that apartment was used to replace the taped one in Petitioners' apartment. Respondents tried to keep everything in working order in Petitioners' apartment. When Petitioners' refrigerator door would not close, Respondents replaced the refrigerator. Respondents thought Petitioners were happy with their apartment. Petitioners called Respondents about a plumbing leak and said feces was running down the wall. The leak and pipe were fixed by B & G Plumbing. Petitioners were shown the water shut-off valve in case of future leaks. Petitioners believe that Respondents treated them differently from other tenants in the apartment buildings. Petitioners believe that other tenants were allowed to keep pets in their apartments while they were not. Respondents allowed tenants who had pets when they purchased the apartments to keep them, but banned pets on all future rentals. The rent for Petitioners' apartment, including water, sewer, and garbage, was $650.00. Petitioners always paid their rent on time. Petitioners asked to be moved into a better unit since they believed their unit was inferior to others in the complex. Petitioners wanted to move into Apartment 162 which, in their opinion, was in much better shape than their unit. Respondents offered to put new carpet into Apartment 162 before Petitioners moved in, but they refused. Petitioners decided to leave the apartment because they believed the maintenance was not properly performed. On December 5, 2008, the day Petitioners made known their desire to leave the apartment, Mr. Travis confronted Mr. Cutler. Mr. Cutler offered Apartment 132 to Petitioners because it was ready for occupancy after its occupants had moved out. Apartment 133 would soon be ready, and was also offered to Petitioners. Mr. Travis angrily refused to move into any apartments in the two four-plexes. He yelled at Mr. Cutler and told him he hated him. This exchange was witnessed by a neighbor, Gary Denton. Mr. Cutler offered to let Petitioners move out without penalty, and agreed to return their $650.00 deposit. Petitioners accepted the offer and received the deposit in full as well as a waiver of the first five days' rent for December and an additional four days of rent to allow them time to pack and move. Petitioners accused Respondents of renting one four-plex to whites only and the other to minorities. At the time Petitioners moved out, both four-plexes had tenants of different races. As of the date of the hearing, five of the six total units rented were to non-white tenants. Only one was rented to a white couple.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: John Cutler Anne Cutler 5970 Limestone Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Donald Travis Lisa Harrell 1008 West Young Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Bosshardt Property Management, LLC (“Bosshardt”), violated the Fair Housing Act as alleged in the Housing Charge of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing. Ms. Rabalais is the owner of Lot 198 at Salt Springs Resort, a Florida recreational vehicle condominium established pursuant to chapter 718, Florida Statutes. As an owner of a lot in Salt Springs Resort, she is a member of SSRA, the homeowner’s association. Bosshardt is a Florida corporation providing community association management services and was the Community Association Manager (“CAM”) for SSRA from September 2013 until August 31, 2019. Bosshardt acted as the agent, and at the direction of SSRA, managed the business related to the property, including enforcement of SSRA rules and decisions of the Board of Directors. The CAM is the general point of contact for the association. The CAM would collect on bills and collect payments for assessment and manage the property. Petitioner contends Respondent subjected her to retaliation beginning after the filing of Petitioner’s HUD complaint. In support of her position, Petitioner points to alleged harassment by Ms. Noble, the failure to maintain her lawn and repaint her lot number, and removal of one of her posts from the townhall webpage. Throughout the hearing, Ms. Rabalais raised allegations about incidents that occurred before December 20, 2018, which is 365 days prior to the filing of her Complaint of Discrimination dated December 20, 2019. However, some of the facts will be discussed herein to help supplement and explain the alleged continued discrimination and to provide a more detailed record of Ms. Rabalais’s complaints. Golf Cart Incident Petitioner alleges that Bosshardt was responsible for housing discrimination and harassment arising out of an April 17, 2018, confrontation between Petitioner and Sharon Noble, a lot owner and former SSRA board member. Ms. Rabalais identified Ms. Noble as one of the worst of her neighbors who disliked her. At some point before Ms. Rabalais filed the complaint of discrimination, Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais were good friends. While there is a dispute regarding the nature of the relationship, at some point the friendship deteriorated. In 2016, a dispute arose between Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble over Ms. Rabalais’s intent to file a lawsuit against SSRA and Ms. Noble’s refusal to assist her. The dispute was referenced in emails between Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble and through Ms. Noble’s testimony at hearing. Ms. Noble acknowledged at the hearing that she and Ms. Rabalais were no longer friends. On April 17, 2018, Sharon Noble was driving her golf cart on the road in front of Ms. Rabalais’s lot. She stopped her cart to send a text message to someone. At around the same time, Ms. Rabalais attempted to enter her drive way. Ms. Rabalais was unable to enter the drive way as two carts could not drive on the road side by side. Ms. Rabalais began to blow her horn so Ms. Noble circled around behind Ms. Rabalais’s golf cart to allow her to drive pass her. Ms. Noble then finished her text message and left the area. Ms. Noble credibly testified that she did not attempt to intimidate Ms. Rabalais. Ms. Noble believed the incident was intentional and as a result, she wrote an incident report documenting the incident. Ms. Noble reported the incident to the SSRA. Jane Jorden was in Ms. Rabalais’s golf cart and witnessed the incident. She recalled that Ms. Noble was recording Ms. Rabalais’s lot and blocking the driveway with her golf cart. Ms. Rabalais became upset after Ms. Noble drove her cart behind her. Ms. Rabalais went to the guard gate to report the incident and call the police. Tom, one of the employees working at the guard gate, completed a report regarding the incident. Tom did not testify at the hearing and, thus, his statement about the incident is not relied upon for a finding of fact. It is simply used to supplement the testimony offered at the hearing. Tom did not observe the incident but rather reported that the police were called and took statements from Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais. SSRA sent Ms. Rabalais a letter advising her to contact the police if she is concerned about her safety. While Ms. Rabalais believes that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation by Respondent by way of the actions of Ms. Noble, the fact is that Ms. Noble, and more importantly Bosshardt, was in no position to deny Ms. Rabalais access to common services and facilities under SSRA’s control. To the extent Ms. Rabalais believed her fellow neighbors disliked her or were not nice to her, that activity is not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the incident with Ms. Noble was a personal dispute that was not due to housing discrimination facilitated at the direction of Bosshardt. Lost Assessment Payment Between July 1, 2018, and October 1, 2018, a quarterly assessment accrued. Ms. Rabalais’s check with a send date of September 28, 2018, was mailed to Bosshardt using an address that was previously known to be Bosshardt’s address. However, the assessment check payment was returned and the label affixed to the envelope indicated that the mail was returned to sender, was not deliverable as addressed, and was unable to be forwarded. In order to qualify as a candidate for a position on the SSRA Board of Directors, all assessments must be paid before a designated date. As a result of the assessment check not being delivered before the deadline to declare candidacy, Ms. Rabalais did not meet the criteria to run for the Board. Ms. Rabalais alleges in her complaint that Bosshardt engaged in a discriminatory act by not accepting her payment so she could not run for the Board of Directors. There is no sufficient evidence to support this allegation. Although there was testimony from Ms. Nelson that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding delivery of the check, the evidence offered at hearing does not demonstrate that Bosshardt engaged in nefarious or discriminatory actions regarding the assessment payment. The greater weight of the evidence, however, established that the check was returned undelivered. Failure to Maintain Property and Paint Lot Number Ms. Rabalais alleged in her Complaint that Respondent failed to maintain her lawn and failed to repaint her lot number as it did for other lot owners. There was no clear indication that the conduct occurred on or after December 20, 2018. Generally, all lot owners received basic services. An exception would be if the lot owner has a “no trespassing” sign on the property. Diane Suchy worked as the designated CAM for SSRA. She testified that maintenance staff were employees of SSRA and worked at the direction of Bosshardt. They maintained common areas and the lawns of individual lot owners. The maintenance team also repaints the lot numbers as needed. Gary Gensberg, the maintenance supervisor, testified that he maintained Ms. Rabalais's lawn and conducted weed maintenance as needed. He also recalled that Ms. Rabalais did not have a large area that required maintenance. Regarding the lot numbers, they would be repainted if it was not visible. Ms. Rabalais's lot number was visible at the time in question. Mr. Gensberg credibly testified that he was never given instructions to not maintain Ms. Rabalais's lot. Despite the maintenance team maintaining Ms. Rabalais property as needed, the evidence established that Ms. Rabalais posted no trespassing signs on her property for an unknown period of time. Furthermore, there was no evidence to support a finding that if Ms. Rabalais’s lawn was not maintained or her lot number was not repainted, it was result of discrimination based on disability or retaliation. Townhall Facebook Group Page Gary Griffith, the Bosshardt president at the time of the allegations alleged in the Complaint, testified about the lot owners’ Facebook group page. Mr. Griffith testified that Bosshardt did not manage the Facebook group page. Rather, Mr. Foster, Brenda Harvey, and other lot owners, were administrators on the account. Thus, Bosshardt made no determination regarding who could post or remove posts from the account. The page had rules for posting including, the exclusion of posts that were argumentative, contained unfounded allegations, or attacked the Board of Directors. On February 4, 2019, Ms. Rabalais posted a message about her experience with litigation with SSRA and Bosshardt. At the end of that message she wrote, “SSRA/Bosshardt has caused a homeowner to kill himself and ruined many owners’ lives ….” The administrators determined the post was unsubstantiated and threatening and failed to comply with the guidelines established for the page. As a result, the post was removed. Based on the evidence offered at hearing, Bosshardt was not involved with removal of Ms. Rabalais’s February 4, 2019, post. Therefore, there was no evidence to establish that Bosshardt discriminated against Ms. Rabalais when her post was removed from the Town Hall page. Expert Testimony Petitioner offered the testimony of Gary Solomon, Ph.D., as an expert regarding HOA syndrome. He works as a professor at the College of Southern Nevada. HOA syndrome is not a recognized clinical disorder, and there are no peer-reviewed articles offered to support Dr. Solomon’s opinion. Despite his purported knowledge about HOA syndrome, he was unable to provide a basis for his conclusions. Dr. Solomon had not read the SSRA rules or policies and procedures; and he had no understanding of Florida condominium law. He was also unable to provide an opinion regarding whether Ms. Rabalais had suffered from HOA syndrome. Based on the evidence offered at hearing, Dr. Solomon was not accepted as an expert in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 John McDonough, Esquire Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, O'Dell & Harvey Suite 2000 260 Wekiva Springs Road Longwood, Florida 32779 Scarlett Rabalais Post Office Box 5224 Salt Springs, Florida 32134 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether Respondent, Century Realty Funds, Inc., violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapters 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to install a poolside chairlift as requested by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is physically disabled and protected for the purposes of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the owner of Plantation Landings Mobile Home Park ("Plantation Landings") in Haines City, Florida. Plantation Landings is a 55-year-old and older community. It owns and leases the lots to the owner-tenants of Plantation Landings. Because Respondent owns the Plantation Landings real estate and the subject swimming pool, it has the sole discretion to approve the requested improvements. The swimming pool area is handicap accessible. It is a public swimming pool and regulated by the State of Florida, Department of Health. It was built approximately 30 years ago; there are no known existing construction plans for the pool. The swimming pool is surrounded by a wheelchair-accessible path, and the pool itself has two separate sets of handrails; one for the deep end and one for the shallow end. There are steps leading into the shallow end of the pool and a ladder leading into the deep end. The swimming pool does not have a poolside chairlift. The swimming pool area is not supervised by life guards. Plantation Landings does not provide any supportive services to its residents, such as counseling, medical, therapeutic, or social services. The owner-tenants of Plantation Landings are members of the Plantation Landings Mobile Home Park Homeowners' Association ("Homeowners' Association"), which is a voluntary homeowners' association. Petitioner and his wife are members of the Homeowners' Association. Petitioner and his wife purchased a home in Plantation Landings and leased a lot from Respondent on February 8, 2001, pursuant to a Lease Agreement of the same date. Petitioner is a paraplegic and is able to move about by wheelchair. He is able to access the swimming pool common area in his wheelchair. However, he is not able to get in and out of the pool by himself. He has attempted to get into the swimming pool with the assistance of other residents. He would like to be able to have access into the swimming pool without relying upon the assistance of other residents so that he can exercise. In April 2003, Petitioner discussed the feasibility of installing a poolside chairlift at the swimming pool with Respondent's agent. Petitioner offered to pay for the poolside chairlift and installation at his own expense. On April 1, 2003, Petitioner submitted a written request to Respondent requesting that Respondent install a poolside chairlift. Petitioner delivered his April 1, 2003, written request, literature, and video regarding the poolside chairlift to Respondent's agent. The request did not include any specifications or engineered drawings, nor did it state the proposed location for the poolside chairlift. The poolside chairlift initially proposed by Petitioner was the Model IGMT, which was an in-ground manually-operated lift with a 360-degree seat rotation. In its consideration of Petitioner's request, Respondent determined that the design and construction of the pool and the surrounding common areas were in compliance with all state and federal statutes and regulations and that the pool area and common areas to the pool were accessible by wheelchair. Respondent determined that it was not required to install a poolside chairlift for access into the pool. Respondent also learned that the IGMT model was not Americans With Disabilities Act compliant. It was Respondent's conclusion that the poolside chairlift was cost-prohibitive and a dangerous hazard. When Petitioner returned to Plantation Landings in November 2003, he was advised of Respondent's decision not to provide the requested poolside chairlift. In March 2004, Petitioner requested the assistance of James Childs, president of the Homeowners' Association, for the purpose of making a second request to Respondent for the installation of a poolside chairlift. On March 7, 2004, Mr. Childs, on Petitioner's behalf, wrote Respondent requesting a poolside chairlift. On May 3, 2004, Respondent wrote Mr. Childs denying the request. Over the several years Petitioner has resided in Plantation Landings, he has requested modifications to accommodate wheelchair accessibility. These requests included modifications to the ramp at the front of the clubhouse, modifications adding an additional wheelchair ramp to the back of the clubhouse for access into the clubhouse, and modifications to the handicap parking spaces in front of the clubhouse. All of Petitioner's requests for modifications were honored. In May 2006, Petitioner, again with the assistance of Mr. Childs, made a third request to install a poolside chairlift. This third request was identical to his two prior requests made in 2003 and 2004. This request was denied by letter on April 27, 2006. On December 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by refusing to allow him to install a poolside chairlift at his own expense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent, or, alternatively, that the claim is time-barred and that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2008.
