The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, City of Edgewater (the City), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, gender, and/or disability by the manner in which the City terminated Petitioner’s employment. Also at issue is whether Petitioner’s termination was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaints regarding discriminatory conduct by her immediate superior.
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white female who was over the age of 40 during the events relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner was hired by the City as a part-time animal control officer on June 9, 1993. At the time Petitioner was hired, animal control was part of the City’s police department. On October 15, 1993, Petitioner was transferred to a full-time position as records clerk/telecommunicator in the police department. Petitioner maintained the department’s records and answered all police calls, including 911 calls. She dispatched officers and emergency personnel. Petitioner testified that this was a desk job with no real physical requirements beyond walking to a window to deal with members of the public. She received excellent evaluations and stayed in this position until early 1999. While working this job, Petitioner obtained police training at Daytona State College. Upon graduation, Petitioner applied for a job as a police officer with the City. On February 19, 1999, the City hired Petitioner as a police officer. Petitioner was promoted to sergeant on May 7, 2006, and served in that position until her demotion following an altercation with a female detainee in the City’s holding facility on June 16, 2011. Petitioner was continuously employed by the City for 18 years and eight months. During her employment, she received regular pay increases and numerous commendations. Over the years, she received three written warnings and one demotion, from sergeant to officer after the incident on June 16, 2011. Chief of Police David Arcieri characterized her disciplinary record as good in light of Petitioner’s length of service. During the course of her employment, Petitioner had multiple health problems. In 2001, during work-related mountain bike training, Petitioner suffered a fall that badly injured her shoulder.3/ Petitioner had surgery and recalled that she missed at least four months of work. When she came back to work, Petitioner was unable to perform the normal duties of a police officer. She was allowed to return in a light-duty desk position, working with the City’s chief of grants. She worked in this position for approximately six months before returning to regular duty as a police officer. In 2004, Petitioner was diagnosed with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”). Petitioner testified that she freely discussed her condition with her co-workers because of the problems she had establishing a medication regime that did not cause allergic reactions. Until late 2011, she was forced to give herself painful injections in the stomach. She now has a port implanted that allows her to take the medications via infusion. Chief Arcieri confirmed that it was common knowledge in the City’s police force that Petitioner had lupus. Petitioner testified that she missed very little work because of the lupus and RA. She requested no accommodations in the workplace for these conditions. Sometime in 2009, Petitioner underwent neck surgery to repair a disc “that was almost gone.” Petitioner recalled discussing her condition with then-Sergeant Arcieri4/ prior to the surgery. They talked about the fact that her doctors were unsure whether the neck condition had been brought on by her RA. Petitioner testified that she was out of work for two or three months due to this surgery, but did not require a light-duty assignment when she reported back to her position. On September 22, 2009, Petitioner was at work conducting a witness interview when her nose began bleeding uncontrollably. A fellow officer drove her to the emergency room. Another city employee came to the emergency room to make sure Petitioner got home safely. At the hospital, Petitioner was diagnosed with hypertension. She missed several days of work and was placed on medications to control her blood pressure. City Manager Tracey Barlow testified that he was contemporaneously aware of Petitioner’s hypertension. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodations for her hypertension. In early 2010, Petitioner was out of work for a time with uncontrolled vomiting and diarrhea. Petitioner’s physician, Dr. Beatrice Bratu, diagnosed her condition as stress-induced colitis. Petitioner testified that her treatments for the colitis lasted about three months but that she was back at work within a few weeks. On March 15, 2010, Personnel Director Donna Looney addressed the following email to Petitioner: We are very pleased to see you back and doing well! I am in receipt of a note from Dr. Bratu which indicated you may return to work. I want to stress that we understand the necessity for you to follow your doctor’s instructions. No restrictions are noted; therefore you are allowed to continue your regular duties. Please be advised that you have a continuing obligation not to work when you are feeling impaired (fatigue, weakness, pain, etc.). It is City policy that if you expect to have any adverse side effect while taking medication, you must inform your supervisor, and you are never to drive a City vehicle when you are feeling impaired. If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodation related to her colitis. On June 16, 2011, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with a 28-year-old female detainee at the City police station. Several officers submitted witness statements about the incident and police station video cameras captured the essentials of the acts that occurred. The video recording did not include sound. The detainee, J.G., had been arrested for battery and was by all accounts heavily intoxicated and belligerent. J.G. asked to go to the bathroom. Petitioner let her out of the cell and escorted her to the bathroom. The video shows Petitioner standing in the open doorway of the bathroom, waiting for J.G. to finish. Petitioner told the police department’s internal affairs investigator that J.G. asked for tampons. Petitioner responded that the police department did not keep such items and that she would have to clean up as best she could with the materials available in the bathroom. J.G. replied that she could not put back on the shorts she had been wearing. She stated they were not her shorts and they were bloody. Petitioner told her that she had to put the shorts back on. At this point, the video shows the shorts flying out of the bathroom and landing behind Petitioner, who kicked them back into the bathroom and stepped into the doorway. J.G., stepping into camera range, picked up the shorts and threw them at Petitioner. The shorts hit Petitioner along her beltline. Petitioner took a step forward and struck J.G. in the face with her open right hand. J.G. pushed forward momentarily, but retreated into the bathroom as Petitioner continued to advance. At this point, Officer Eric Selvaggio entered the picture to assist. For a period of roughly forty seconds, all three people were inside the bathroom, invisible to the camera. The doors then opened, and the three emerged. The two police officers guided the handcuffed J.G. toward a point outside the range of the camera. J.G. wore only a shirt and underwear. The video next cut to an empty holding cell. Petitioner and Officer Selvaggio entered the picture, guiding the handcuffed J.G. toward the cell. J.G. continued to struggle with the officers. She dropped to the ground. The officers pulled her to her feet and pushed her into the cell. J.G. kicked at Petitioner. The camera angle made it impossible to see whether there was contact, but Petitioner stated at the time, and has consistently maintained since the incident, that J.G. kicked her in the stomach. Immediately after the kick, Petitioner attempted to push her way past Officer Selvaggio toward J.G. Petitioner drew back her right fist but Officer Selvaggio’s left arm blocked her from throwing a punch. He pushed Petitioner away and then secured J.G. in the holding cell. Though there is no sound on the video, it is clear that Petitioner and J.G. continued an animated conversation after J.G. was locked in the cell. Multiple police witnesses recalled Petitioner calling J.G. a “fucking bitch.” Petitioner and the other officers on duty went out the back door to discuss the situation. The video appears to show Petitioner performing a joking reenactment of her attempted punch at J.G. Officer Selvaggio stated to the investigator that Petitioner told him she might not charge J.G. for the incident, but he replied that under the circumstances it would be best if she did follow through with charges. Petitioner filled out a charging affidavit against J.G., charging her with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In her charging affidavit, Petitioner wrote as follows, in relevant part, verbatim: On June 16, 2011 at approximately 12:45 a.m., the defendant, [J.G.] was in police custody at the Edgewater Police Department on a battery charge from a previous police call. The defendant requested to use the bathroom and was escorted to the bathroom by me. The defendant was upset over being arrested, while sitting on the toilet, she kicked off her shorts and threw them out of the restroom stating that she was not putting them back on as they were not hers and were soiled from her menstrual cycle. I pushed the shorts back into the restroom with my foot and advised her she needed to put them back on, she screamed she was not going to. When the defendant rose from the toilet, she picked up the shorts and threw them directly into my face, striking me with the shorts. The defendant then pushed herself up against the sink and began calling me a bitch and telling me again she was not putting the shorts back on and she was leaving. I entered and attempted to get her out of the bathroom, she began to punch at me. Myself and Officer Selvaggio, who was standing nearby, grabbed hold of the defendant in an effort to get her out of the bathroom. The defendant struggled against us, before we got her to the floor and secured her. As we were getting her back into the cell, the defendant threw herself onto the bench and kicked out striking me in the stomach with her right foot. The defendant was left in the cell with no shorts on and in handcuffs . . . . It should be noted that Petitioner’s charging affidavit states that J.G. hit her in the face with the bloody shorts, when in fact the shorts hit Petitioner in the waist area. Petitioner failed to mention that she slapped J.G. in the bathroom or that Petitioner attempted to punch J.G. in the holding cell. Chief Arcieri testified that when he came in later that morning, he reviewed all of the reports filed since the previous day. Petitioner’s report caught his eye because it involved battery on a law enforcement officer inside the station house. He instructed his assistant to pull the video of the incident and make one copy for him and one for Petitioner. When he saw the video, Chief Arcieri notified the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) and requested an investigation. Chief Arcieri testified that he went to FDLE because he thought criminal charges could ensue in the case and that he does not like to investigate criminal matters internally. He also ordered an internal affairs investigation, but placed it on hold pending the outcome of the FDLE investigation. On June 21, 2011, Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave for the duration of the investigations. J.G. refused to cooperate with the FDLE investigators. Without a victim willing to go forward, no criminal charges could be brought against Petitioner. The FDLE investigation was dropped. The internal affairs investigation was completed on August 15, 2011. The investigator’s written report concluded as follows: Sgt. Winston did commit the act of perjury on an official felony charging affidavit. Sgt. Winston did in fact using her hand strike a prisoner in the face which caused her to fall back onto the sink. Sgt. Winston did reach her right arm over the shoulder of Officer Selvaggio in an attempt to strike a handcuffed prisoner which Officer Selvaggio was attempting to secure inside the holding cell. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by removing a prisoner, removing the prisoner’s handcuffs without another officer present and allowed the prisoner to use the restroom. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Policy & Procedure by entering the cell/booking area wearing both her issued side arm as well as her issued taser. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by openly criticizing the policy of securing any and all weapons prior to entering the booking/cell area when prisoners are present. This was done openly in the presence of fellow officers. Sgt. Winston violated City Policy and Procedure 12.02 Inappropriate/Unacceptable Behavior. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police Department Policy & Procedure Excessive force not resulting in injury. Petitioner was represented by counsel for the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) in defending herself against the allegations that resulted from the internal affairs investigation. Negotiations ensued between the City and Petitioner to resolve the matter short of litigation. A settlement agreement was reached and executed on August 24, 2011. Petitioner agreed to findings that some of the allegations were sustained.5/ Petitioner agreed to a demotion from sergeant to officer, effective August 19, 2011, with a resulting salary cut, and she agreed to attend anger management courses. On August 24, 2011, Chief Arcieri ordered Petitioner to report for duty at 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Petitioner called in sick and did not report for work on August 25, 2011. Ms. Looney, the personnel director, contacted Petitioner to find out why she was not reporting for work. Petitioner told Ms. Looney that she had sustained a back injury during the altercation with J.G. on June 16, 2011. Ms. Looney testified that this was the first she knew of Petitioner’s back injury. In a letter dated August 24, 2011, and received by Chief Arcieri on August 25, 2011, Petitioner’s personal workers’ compensation attorney wrote as follows, in relevant part: As you know, Ms. Winston is an 18 year employee with our [sic] agency who was recently in an altercation with a belligerent, drunken female on June 16, 2011. Ms. Winston was injured during the arrest but was placed on Administrative leave pending an internal investigation and the matter has not been reported as an injury as of yet. Ms. Winston was not aware that she had injured her low back immediately due to circumstances surrounding the altercation and the typical adrenaline response resulting from such an altercation. She thought she was just sore from being beat up a bit but as the weeks went by her condition worsened. A recent MRI has revealed two herniated discs in the lower back and Ms. Winston does require medical treatment for this work related injury. I am requesting at this time that the Agency immediately file a First Report of injury on behalf of Ms. Winston. This should be considered notice under Chapter 440 of the work related injury. In addition to the back injury, Ms. Winston now suffers from uncontrolled high blood pressure which is also disabling. Ms. Winston will be receiving a letter from her doctor indicating that she is unable to work due to her uncontrolled blood pressure at this juncture. That is also a work related claim under F.S. 112.18, more popularly known as the “Heart/Lung Bill.” This claim should also be processed and medical care should be provided as soon as possible. Please see that a First Report of Injury is completed with regard to this claim . . . . In a related claim, Ms. Winston also has a September 22, 2009 uncontrolled hypertension incident which resulted in hospitalization. As you know, the 2009 accident occurred while Ms. Winston was interviewing a sex crime victim. She was experiencing a severe headache and then had an uncontrollable nose bleed during the interview. The blood pressure reading at the time revealed her blood pressure was severely elevated and she was taken to the hospital. This incident should have triggered the immediate filing of a First Report of Injury under F.S. 112.18 as referenced above. For whatever reason, no First Report of Injury was filed but I am requesting that you file such a First Report of Injury immediately on Ms. Winston’s behalf and that you provide appropriate medical care for this condition . . . . Finally, Ms. Winston advises me that she has been under an internal investigation since the June, 2011 incident. This internal investigation appears to be entirely inappropriate given the circumstances surrounding this event and would appear to be part of an intimidation practice on the part of your Agency, which is in clear violation of F.S. 440.205. As I am sure you know, 440.205 prohibits the harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or termination of an employee by virtue of a workers’ compensation claim. Needless to say, Ms. Winston has numerous ongoing workers’ compensation claims and it appears that all of the harassment which she has been subjected to since the time the internal investigation was opened in this matter appears to be directly attributable to her ongoing workers’ compensation issues. It should also be noted that Ms. Winston is suffering from post traumatic stress disorder as a result of this recent altercation and all of the fallout related to same. As I am sure you are well aware, post traumatic stress disorder of this nature is also covered for First Responders under the auspices of F.S. 112.1815. I am requesting again that a First Report of Injury be filed relative to this issue and that appropriate medical care be provided. Ms. Winston is entitled to full pay as she was injured during an altercation with a violent individual. Full pay is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of F.S. 440.15(11). This means that she should be receiving a regular paycheck without deduction of sick or vacation bank time. Please see that the appropriate adjustment is made relative to payment of benefits and feel free to contact me with any question . . . . On August 30, 2011, Petitioner submitted three “Incident/Accident Information Forms” to the City in regard to her workers’ compensation claims. The first states that Petitioner suffered an injury to her lower back on June 16, 2011, when “an intoxicated combative prisoner . . . kicked me in my stomach just above my gun belt.” The second describes “stress” as the injury, dated June 28, 2011, caused by “constant harassment & belittled by Dave Arcieri.” The third form states that the date of injury was September 22, 2009, the injury was “blood pressure caused bleeding of the nose,” and describes the incident in terms similar to those used in the attorney’s letter of June 24, 2011. Petitioner testified that she still sees a psychiatrist once a month and goes to counseling every two weeks, but that she first sought mental health counseling in June 2011 because of problems with Chief Arcieri that dated from long before he became chief. She testified that “he would cuss me out, call me names, have people that were subordinates watching me and reporting back to him to make sure I didn’t breathe the wrong way.” Petitioner testified that Chief Arcieri’s animus toward her dated from her handling of a situation as a sergeant that led to the firing of an officer. A member of Petitioner’s squad reported to her that an officer in another squad stole property from a civilian during a traffic stop and then gave him the stolen item. Petitioner told the officer to file a report and drop the item into evidence and that she would meet with the other officer’s sergeant. The other officer’s sergeant required him to write a report. The officer lied in the report. Petitioner and the other sergeant brought the matter to the attention of their superiors. After an investigation, the department had no choice but to fire the officer. At a sergeants’ meeting a little while later, then- Administrative Sergeant Arcieri said that Petitioner was incompetent. If she had handled the situation differently, Sergeant Arcieri would not have had to fire a good officer. Petitioner asked how the department could tolerate a lying thief in its midst. Sergeant Arcieri told her that the officer could have been reprimanded in some other way. Petitioner testified that she was afraid of Chief Arcieri because of threats he made to her. He made it clear to her and to any other officer who thought about reporting something to Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow that these officials would let him know and the snitch would pay a price. On September 27, 2011, Petitioner sent an email to Michelle Grenham, Chief Arcieri’s secretary, stating that she would be unable to attend the anger management class required by the settlement agreement because she was undergoing major surgery on September 28 at Halifax Hospital in Daytona Beach. Ms. Grenham forwarded the email to Chief Arcieri and Ms. Looney. Petitioner underwent surgery on September 28, 2011, to repair the herniated discs in her back. Petitioner testified that prior to the surgery, she had difficulty walking, standing, bending at the waist, reaching, and climbing stairs due to the pain in her back. She was able to drive a car but only for short distances. She did not have full control of her bladder and bowels. She could only sleep by putting herself in a fetal position then bracing herself with pillows to keep her in that position. Petitioner described the surgery as less than a complete success. She had numbness in her right leg, was unable to bend, squat, kneel or stretch, and could not sit for very long. She eventually required spinal injections and the surgical insertion of a morphine pump in her stomach for pain in her spine. The morphine pump was still in place at the time of the hearing. Physicians also implanted a spinal cord stimulator in her back. She regained control of her excretory functions but was unable to walk without the use of a walker for several months and a cane thereafter. She wore a back brace most of the time. On November 29, 2011, Petitioner and her husband met with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney to discuss Petitioner’s medical situation and when she might return to work. The meeting was held at Petitioner’s request. Petitioner testified that she came into the meeting wearing a back brace and using a walker. Her husband had to drive her to the meeting. Petitioner testified that she asked for the meeting to find out if she could get an extended leave until her physician cleared her to go back to work. She also wanted to discuss Chief Arcieri’s harassment and belittling of her. At the meeting, Petitioner told Mr. Barlow that she didn’t know how long the healing process would take or whether she would need additional surgeries. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow told her it might be in her best interest to retire, in light of her age and her many health problems, including RA, lupus, hypertension, and now the back injury. Mr. Barlow stated that it seemed to him that Petitioner didn’t have anything that was going to go away, and that anyone with a back injury would have issues with it for life. Mr. Barlow asked whether Petitioner really thought she could ever come back as a police officer. Petitioner could only say that she didn’t know. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she hoped to reach retirement as a police officer but that she was willing to take another position with the City if her physical limitations kept her from returning to her former position. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she had a doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, and that Mr. Barlow promised to give her a leave of absence until that appointment. Petitioner’s husband, Ricky Winston, testified that at the meeting, his wife explained her injuries to Mr. Barlow and complained about Chief Arcieri’s constant ridicule and badgering. Mr. Winston stated that Mr. Barlow had a calendar and some paper and a calculator that he was using to diligently figure out something. It turned out that Mr. Barlow was calculating the date of Petitioner’s full retirement, with the idea of carrying her on the City’s employment roster until then. Mr. Winston testified that he left the meeting with the understanding that Mr. Barlow had agreed to grant Petitioner unpaid leave until she reached retirement. Mr. Winston recalled that Mr. Barlow listed all of Petitioner’s physical problems and asked why she didn’t just quit. Mr. Winston testified that this question was devastating to his wife because she never had any intention of leaving the job she loved. Ms. Looney testified that she did not recall Mr. Barlow mentioning any of Petitioner’s physical infirmities aside from her back injury. She did not recall Mr. Barlow using a calculator or calendar during the meeting or stating a date for Petitioner’s retirement. Ms. Looney stated that the goal was for Petitioner to return from her next doctor’s appointment with a physician’s statement as to when she could return to work, whether at full or light duty. Ms. Looney’s assumption, based on Petitioner’s condition, was that Petitioner would return to light duty at first. Mr. Barlow explicitly stated that the City wanted Petitioner to return to work, either full or light duty. Ms. Looney testified that she believed everyone at the meeting understood that Petitioner wanted to return to light duty and that the police department would try to find light duty restricted work for Petitioner when her doctor cleared her to return. Petitioner would remain on unpaid leave until her next doctor’s appointment in January 2012, at which time the City would need to know whether she could return to work. Petitioner had given Ms. Looney light duty notes from physicians in the past, which led Ms. Looney to assume that Petitioner understood what she needed to provide to the City. Ms. Looney stated that Mr. Barlow did not promise to keep Petitioner’s job open until May 2012. Mr. Barlow recalled almost nothing about the November 29, 2011, meeting with Petitioner. The only relevant specific testimony he provided on the subject was a denial that he told Petitioner that she could have a leave of absence until May 2012. However, given his lack of recall as to anything else that transpired in the meeting, Mr. Barlow’s testimony on this single point is not credited. The testimony of Petitioner and her husband regarding the statements made at the November 29, 2011, meeting is credited as to Mr. Barlow’s discussing Petitioner’s retirement and as to the fact that a discussion of Chief Arcieri’s behavior toward Petitioner occurred. On these points, Petitioner and Mr. Winston were credible, consistent witnesses. Ms. Looney’s testimony on these points was confused and equivocal. Mr. Barlow’s testimony was of little use at all as he claimed to remember virtually nothing about the meeting. However, the testimony of Petitioner and her husband cannot be credited as to the matter of Mr. Barlow’s promise to give Petitioner a leave of absence until May 3, 2012. Even disregarding Mr. Barlow’s convenient memory on this point, Petitioner’s testimony and that of her husband diverged on the ground for the leave of absence. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 3, 2012, because that was the date of her next doctor’s appointment. Mr. Winston vaguely recalled that a date was mentioned, either March or May, and that this date was based on Mr. Barlow’s calculation of Petitioner’s retirement date. Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 2012 is further undercut by documentary evidence. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner sent Ms. Looney an email that stated as follows, in relevant part: Call me when you get the chance, I have prescriptions to pick up and get fitted for another brace, but I am going to need to take a leave of absence for a bit. Dr. Vinas [Petitioner’s surgeon] is not releasing me for duty at this time . . ., I will be going into a new brace and will be going to pain management for epidural injections in my spine. I have attached the letter from Dr. Vinas, as well as a copy of the medications I will be taking. My next appointment with him will be May 03/2012 unless the Dr. at the pain management center feels I need further surgery. I have no idea what to do about taking a leave, is there paperwork I need to file or just send you a letter? I would rather speak to you so if you are not busy please call me . . . . If the November 29, 2011, meeting had settled the question regarding Petitioner’s leave of absence until her doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, there would have been no need for Petitioner to write to Ms. Looney on January 26, 2012, to request a leave of absence and to inform Ms. Looney that her next doctor’s appointment would be on May 3. This email is consistent with the assertion made in the City’s February 21, 2012, letter terminating Petitioner’s employment that Mr. Barlow agreed to maintain the status quo until January 23, 2012, the date of Petitioner’s next scheduled doctor’s appointment.6/ In an email to Ms. Looney dated February 9, 2012, Petitioner stated, “[A]t this stage nothing surprises me anymore, I mean after all, I was supposed to be back on my feet and rarin to go by January, well that, as you know did not happen.” Petitioner closed a separate February 9, 2012, email to Ms. Looney with the following: “I forwarded this to [Mr. Barlow] also, but if he does not get it please let him know and tell him I said to keep his chin up as he always does and thank him for allowing me to take a leave of absence. Hopefully it won’t be much longer.” These emails cast further doubt on Petitioner’s claim that she had obtained a leave of absence until May 3, 2012, from Mr. Barlow at the November 29, 2011, meeting. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was granted an unpaid leave of absence at the November 29 meeting, but only until her physician cleared her to return to work in some capacity, which Petitioner at the time anticipated would occur in January 2012. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Petitioner had used her twelve weeks of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as of November 16, 2011. She had exhausted all of her accrued leave as of December 9, 2011, when she formally began the unpaid leave of absence. On January 1, 2012, Petitioner began receiving the City’s long-term disability benefits. Ms. Looney signed a letter to Dr. Federico Vinas, dated January 25, 2012, that stated as follows: Ms. Winston has informed us she is a patient of yours. She has a follow-up appointment January 26, 2012 in association with surgery perform [sic] by you. First, and foremost, enclosed you will find the Authorization to Disclose Medical Information form executed by Ms. Winston along with her job description (Police Officer) setting out the physical requirement. JoAnne is a valued City employee and it would be greatly appreciated if you verify her ability to perform any or all of these duties. Please provide us with specific restrictions or requirements necessary not to aggravate her condition and advise as to exactly when she can be cleared for full police officer’s duties. Your expertise is [sic] this matter is greatly appreciated. Please contact me for any further information you may need. The City’s job description for “Police Officer” reads as follows, in relevant part: PRIMARY DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: (all duties may not be performed by all incumbents) Patrols designated area of the City to preserve the peace, to prevent and discover criminal acts, and to enforce traffic regulations. Answers calls and complaints involving drunkenness, domestic disputes, assaults and batteries, missing persons, fires, thefts, accidents and other felonies and misdemeanors. Is responsible for being knowledgeable of the crime problem in assigned work area and developing strategies to combat the problem. Develop contacts and provide intelligence reports to detectives and administration. Makes preliminary investigations at crime scenes or incidents, protects and collects physical evidence, locates witnesses, interviews witnesses, makes arrests, assists paramedics with basic and advance [sic] life support. Interviews complaints [sic] and witnesses to obtain information about crimes; assists in investigative work. Prepares evidence for issuance of complaints and testifies as a witness in both civil and criminal court, transports prisoners. Patrols school zones and high activity areas when assigned. Assists motorists, directs traffic, investigates accidents, recovers stolen automobiles, prepares detailed reports, advise of and interpret laws and ordinances and provides general information to the public. Cooperates and coordinates with other law enforcement agencies and other components of the Criminal Justice System. * * * Environmental Conditions: Outdoor environment with exposure to discomforting and dangerous working conditions Office environment with exposure to computer operations Physical exertion in lifting/moving items weighing up to 50 pounds Routine travel is required along daily assigned routes Occasional overnight travel is required Other physical/mental requirements may apply * * * DISCLAIMER STATEMENT This job description is not intended as complete listing of job duties. The incumbent is responsible for the performance of other related duties as assigned/required. The physical demands described herein are representative of those that must be met to successfully perform the essential functions of this job. Reasonable accommodations may be made to enable qualified individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions. On January 26, 2012, Dr. Vinas forwarded to Ms. Looney a “Work Status” form regarding Petitioner that provided as follows: The above captioned patient is being treated in this office. The patient’s current work status is as follows: ( ) This patient was seen for treatment in our office today, please excuse any absence from work or school. (X) Based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time. Restrictions The patient may return to or continue to work with the following restrictions: ( ) No lifting over pounds. ( ) No excessive/repetitive bending or twisting. ( ) No prolonged sitting/standing or stooping. ( ) No excessive/repetitive pulling or pushing. ( ) No excessive activity with arms above shoulder level/overhead activity. ( ) ALL OF THE ABOVE ( ) Specific instructions ( ) This patient does not work at this time, but has been instructed to limit household/daily activities so as to remain within the above noted restrictions. ( ) This patient’s most recent evaluation supports a return to normal, routine work activities. The effective date of this Work Status is from the date noted above until further notice. If the patient’s current position of employment can be modified or other position found that conforms to the above restrictions, then the patient may return to work. If these restrictions cannot be maintained, I would recommend that the patient be excused from work until further notice. The patient’s work status will be evaluated on a visit-to-visit basis. Ms. Looney testified that based on Dr. Vinas’ Work Status form and her own conversations with Petitioner, she concluded that Petitioner was unable to return to work in any capacity, full or light duty, as of January 26, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner conceded that she could not have returned to work as a police officer on January 26, 2012. As set forth in Finding of Fact 54, supra, Petitioner notified Ms. Looney via email on January 26 that her next appointment with Dr. Vinas would be on May 3, 2012. In the same email, Petitioner asked for guidance on how to request a further leave of absence. The record of this proceeding includes a “Request for Leave of Absence” form in which Petitioner asked for a leave of absence commencing on January 26, 2012, with an “anticipated return date” of May 3, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner could not recall filling out this form. In her testimony, Ms. Looney indicated that she filled out the form for Petitioner. In the space in which the applicant is to set forth reasons for the leave of absence, Ms. Looney wrote, “See attached e-mail,” which was Petitioner’s January 26 email to Ms. Looney. Mr. Barlow denied the request for a further leave of absence by signature on the request form. The form does not indicate when Ms. Looney filled it out or when Mr. Barlow denied the request. The record is also unclear as to when Petitioner was notified that the City was denying her a further leave of absence. As late as February 9, 2012, Petitioner was still sending chatty emails to Ms. Looney regarding her medical condition and treatment, even asking Ms. Looney and Mr. Barlow to stop by her house for a visit if they are ever in the neighborhood. The first clear notice of the denial was in the termination letter set forth in the next paragraph. On February 21, 2012, Ms. Looney wrote the following letter to Petitioner: On November 29, 2011 Tracey Barlow, City Manager, and myself met with you to discuss your medical situation. You informed us your next doctor’s appointment was January 23, 2012, at which time you were hoping to be taken out of your brace. We agreed your continued employment with the City would depend on your returning to full duty and I would send Dr. Vinas a letter requesting exactly when you would be cleared to return to full duty as a police officer. Following your exam on January 26, 2012, you emailed me Dr. Vinas’ work status form which states “based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time.” You also stated your next appointment is May 3, 2012 and asked about taking a leave of absence. JoAnne, as you are aware your FMLA was met as of November 16, 2011; all your workers compensation claims have been denied;7/ you exhausted all of your accruals as of December 9, 2011 and have been granted unpaid leave of absence for the previous 74 days, and as of January 1, 2012 you began receiving the city’s long term disability benefit. Therefore, due to all the facts stated too [sic] include uncertain ability to return to work date, the City Manager has denied your request for leave of absence exceeding 30 days. As a result, consider this formal notification that your employment with the City of Edgewater ends effective February 24, 2012. It is very important that you contact the Personnel Department to make the necessary arrangements for your continued insurance coverage and any outstanding benefits/obligations you have with the City. Petitioner testified that at the time the City terminated her employment, she was still using a cane at home and a walker when she went out. There is no question that Petitioner was unable to return to full duty as a police officer on February 24, 2012. It was Petitioner’s contention that she could have come back to work for the police department in some form of light duty, as she had been allowed to do in the past, or in one of several jobs that the City advertised as open during her convalescence. Petitioner further contended that Ms. Looney should have sent Dr. Vinas the job descriptions of all open City jobs rather than just the job description of a police officer. As to the last point, Ms. Looney testified that it was standard practice for the City to send the physician an employee’s current job description for an assessment of the employee’s ability to return to work. Petitioner was treated no differently than any other City employee in this regard. Petitioner testified that she asked the City to bring her back in another position, but could offer no documentary evidence to support that testimony. She claimed that part of the discussion at the November 29 meeting with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney was her hope to retire as a police officer, but her desire to remain a city employee in whatever capacity she could. Ms. Looney testified that Petitioner never asked to work in any position other than that of police officer. Petitioner sent an email to Ms. Looney on December 26, 2011, asking whether Ms. Looney had “heard from my Dr. as to when I might be able to come back light duty or anything else?” Petitioner claims that the “anything else” portion of the email indicated her desire to be placed in any available job. Ms. Looney read the email as merely asking whether she had heard from Petitioner’s doctor, not as a job request. Ms. Looney’s reading is not unreasonable given that this was the only document Petitioner produced that even arguably contained a statement asking to be placed in a position other than police officer. In any event, whether Petitioner asked to be placed in another position is not decisive because of the blanket statement in Dr. Vinas’ work status form. Ms. Looney testified that she was unable to place Petitioner in any position because Petitioner’s physician had clearly stated that it was in her best interest to be excused from all work duties. It was always the City’s understanding that Petitioner would return to work in a light duty function at first, but in fact Petitioner was not cleared to work at all. Ms. Looney might have followed up with Dr. Vinas and inquired whether Petitioner was capable of doing clerical work or some other form of indoor, deskbound job, but Petitioner has pointed to nothing that required Ms. Looney to do so in light of Petitioner’s failure to request that accommodation. Ms. Looney testified that it was the City’s practice to hold off on discussing positions outside of an employee’s department until the employee has actually been cleared for light duty. No evidence was presented that the City treated Petitioner any differently than it treated other employees in a similar position. Similarly, Mr. Barlow might have agreed to extend Petitioner’s unpaid leave of absence to May 3, 2012, but he was not required to do so. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had used twelve weeks of FMLA leave and had been granted an additional 74 days of unpaid leave at Mr. Barlow’s discretion. Petitioner had been out on some form of medical leave for approximately six months. The City did not seize on some early opportunity to dismiss Petitioner; rather, the City had anticipated that Petitioner would return to work as a police officer and waited until Petitioner had exhausted all avenues of leave except a second discretionary unpaid leave of absence before deciding to terminate her employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that her termination was based on her age, gender, disability or perceived disability or that she was treated differently than other employees due to her age, gender, or disability. The lone indication of possible bias was Mr. Barlow’s statement at the November 29, 2011, meeting that Petitioner should consider retirement in light of her age and poor health. This statement may be easily read as a kindly (if poorly phrased) expression of concern for Petitioner. By her own testimony, Petitioner was on good terms with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney right up to the time of her termination. Petitioner sent solicitous emails to them as late as February 9, 2012. Petitioner’s feelings were hurt by the statement, but no other ill effect followed. She was granted the requested unpaid leave of absence and remained employed by the City for three more months. Petitioner testified that she never considered herself disabled and prided herself on not calling in sick or requesting accommodations for her conditions. Ms. Looney, Mr. Barlow, and Chief Arcieri all testified that they did not perceive Petitioner as having a disability that required accommodation in the workplace, though they were all aware of at least some of her chronic conditions such as lupus, RA, and hypertension. Petitioner claimed that Chief Arcieri carried on something of a vendetta against her. Chief Arcieri testified that prior to the demotion his relationship with Petitioner was friendly. When Petitioner’s house was flooded, Chief Arcieri took off work to help Mr. Winston solder a broken shower valve. After Petitioner was demoted, the relationship was less friendly but always professional. Chief Arcieri testified that he has never yelled at Petitioner or any other employee. He never called her names. The harassment and belittling that Petitioner alleged never happened. Chief Arcieri denied any sort of gender bias, pointing to the successful efforts his department has made to recruit and hire female officers. He denied ever making a comment about Petitioner’s age. He testified that he never considered Petitioner disabled while she was on active duty, despite her lupus. Petitioner never requested an accommodation and Chief Arcieri never saw the need for an accommodation. Chief Arcieri testified that at the close of the internal affairs investigation of the June 16, 2011, incident, he declined to sustain some of the allegations in order to protect Petitioner from a referral to the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) for further discipline. Chief Arcieri assented to a request by the FOP that he submit a letter to the Commission stating that he believed the demotion was sufficient and asking the Commission not to take further action against Petitioner. Petitioner’s testimony against Chief Arcieri consisted of general statements that he harassed and belittled her. The only specific incident Petitioner recounted as to the source of any possible animus the chief bore toward her involved the firing of the officer who stole something during a traffic stop. Even if Petitioner’s version of events is accepted, Chief Arcieri’s anger toward Petitioner had nothing to do with her age, gender, or disability. He called her “incompetent.” He was upset about the manner in which Petitioner performed her job, which he believed led to the needless dismissal of a good officer. Whether Chief Arcieri was right or wrong to be angry at Petitioner, he did not engage in an act of discrimination. Even if the factfinder were to accept Petitioner’s description of Chief Arcieri as a bully on the job, there is no evidence aside from Petitioner’s general comments to indicate that she was singled out due to her age, gender or disability. It is telling that in testifying about her fear of reporting the bullying, Petitioner stated, “I was afraid. I was very afraid. David Arcieri made it not only clear to me, but to any other officer who even thought about going to report to Donna Looney or to Tracey Barlow, ‘Don’t worry, they’ll let me know and you will pay the price.’” This statement might be evidence that Chief Arcieri is a bully, a poor leader of his department, or a bad administrator. However, the statement does not establish that Chief Arcieri discriminated against Petitioner in a manner prohibited by section 760.10, Florida Statutes. If anything, the statement indicates that Petitioner found herself in the same boat as the other officers in her department.8/ Petitioner was aware of and understood the City’s nondiscrimination and no-harassment policy, the operative language of which states: The nature of some discrimination and harassment makes it virtually impossible to detect unless someone reports the discrimination or harassment. THUS, IF ANY EMPLOYEE BELIEVES THAT HE OR SHE OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE IS BEING SUBJECTED TO ANY OF THESE FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION OR HARRASSMENT, HE OR SHE MUST REPORT THIS TO THE PERSONNEL DIRECTOR (386-424-2408) AND/OR CITY MANAGER (386-424-2404). If you are encountering a problem, please do not assume that the City is aware of it. The City is committed to ensuring that you have a pleasant working environment, and your assistance in bringing your complaints and concerns to our attention is a necessary first step. (Emphasis in original). The policy was included in the City’s personnel manual. Petitioner was provided with copies of the policy and amendments thereto several times during her tenure with the City. Petitioner conceded that, notwithstanding the policy, she did not report any incidents of harassment or discrimination to either Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow while she was actively working for the City. The allegations of intimidation and harassment made by Petitioner’s attorney in his August 24, 2011, letter and Petitioner’s allegation of “constant harassment and belittlement by Dave Arcieri” in her workers’ compensation incident report were made only after Petitioner had been off the job for eight weeks. Further, the specific allegations made by Petitioner’s attorney claimed that the City was in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes, not that Chief Arcieri or any other City employee was discriminating against or harassing Petitioner because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. The evidence produced at the hearing established that Petitioner sustained an injury to her back, most likely due to an altercation with a detainee on June 16, 2011, that necessitated surgery and a rehabilitation process that was not complete even at the time of the hearing in May 2014. The City carried Petitioner as an employee until all of her available leave had been used and then for another 74 days on an unpaid leave of absence. The City had no legal obligation to grant Petitioner an unpaid leave of absence but did so in the hope that Petitioner would be able to return to work in January 2012. As of the termination date of February 24, 2012, Petitioner had been away from her job for more than six months, had not been cleared by a physician to do work of any kind, and would not receive a physician’s clearance to work any sooner than May 3, 2012. The City could have consented to carry Petitioner even longer on an unpaid leave of absence, but it was not discriminatory for the City to make the business decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence to refute the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by the City for the termination of her employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City's stated reason for the termination of her employment was a pretext for discrimination based on her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City discriminated against her because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of the City.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the City of Edgewater did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner based upon her race or sex and whether she was subjected to retaliation after complaining to the Respondent concerning the alleged harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner became employed on October 10, 2005, at HOM. She worked as a general laborer and finisher at times pertinent to this case. HOM is a manufacturer of mobile and modular homes at its Lake City, Florida, plant. It has in excess of 15 employees and is therefore a statutory employer with the meaning of Section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes (2006). The Petitioner has a number of blemishes on her employment record with the Respondent. She had performance problems prior to the events leading up to the termination of her employment. She was disciplined for an incident occurring on December 21, 2005, for failure to report to required overtime work, as well as for insubordination. Steve Weeks, the Respondent's Production Manager, deemed the failure to report for required overtime work to be insubordination and a violation of the company's attendance policy. She received an employee warning notice on May 3, 2006, regarding a perceived need for her to "pickup the pace and for her attendance." Mr. Weeks told Ms. Pate that she needed to increase her production pace and needed to work on her attendance and work quality. The Petitioner was given to understand that her employment could be terminated for further violations. The Petitioner maintains she has been subjected to "harassment." Specifically, she complains that her co-workers in the finishing department harassed her by "bumping into me and playing threatening songs, threatening, talking about they were going to beat my behind, you know, just constantly threatening." Her complaints concern Priscilla Berry, Katherine Belford, and Melody Adkins. Melody Adkins is a white female, Priscilla Berry and Katherine Belford are African-American females. Most of the Petitioner's complaints concern Katherine Belford and Priscilla Berry. The Petitioner admits that these individuals never indicated they were committing any alleged harassing acts because of the Petitioner's race or gender. She further acknowledges that the harassment "may not have been for my race" and that the harassment "might have been because I was a female and I was doing my job and I didn't hang with that certain group" of females. No male employees are alleged to have threatened or harassed the Petitioner and she never complained to her direct supervisor, Tommy Smith, concerning any problems related to her race or gender. Ms. Pate spoke to Supervisors Weeks and Smith in an effort to stop the harassment and threats. In response to her complaints Mr. Weeks talked to the supervisors and employees involved in the incidents Ms. Pate complained about and told them they were not to bring personal problems to the work place. Mr. Smith separated the Petitioner from Ms. Belford and Ms. Berry because of the antagonism that had developed between them. He directed her to perform her duties in a different location in order to alleviate the hostilities. The Petitioner called the HOM corporate office on June 27, 2006, and spoke to Mr. Jeff Nugent. Mr. Nugent directed the Regional Human Resources Director, William Allen, to investigate the Petitioner's complaints. Mr. Allen spoke to the Petitioner by phone on June 29, 2006, and arranged a meeting with her for July 11, 2006. The Petitioner told Mr. Allen during that phone conversation that she was being harassed and threatened and that the supervisor was not doing anything to alleviate the matter. She told him that "they" were discriminating against her because she was a black woman and the supervisors were still doing nothing to alleviate her harassment, in her view. The Petitioner met with Mr. Allen on July 11, 2006. Mr. Allen also met with other employees. The plant had been shut down during the first week of July and immediately thereafter on July 11, 2006, the Petitioner had the meeting with Mr. Allen. She found him responsive to her complaints. He took notes during the meeting with the Petitioner and with the other employees he interviewed. The Petitioner complained that she was being harassed and threatened by the above-referenced women on the job, that she "went up the chain of command" to get the harassment to stop but that it had not stopped. She did not complain to Mr. Allen that she was being harassed based on her gender or her race, however. Mr. Allen determined that the problem between Ms. Pate and the other employees was based upon difficulties in "getting along well" or, in effect, personality differences. He also determined that the Respondent had responded to the prior complaints by separating Ms. Pate from working with the employees about whom she had complained. On July 13, 2006, Mr. Smith observed Ms. Pate out of her assigned work area while using a cell phone. The use of a cell phone during working hours, and in working areas, violates company policy. Mr. Smith asked Ms. Pate to report to the plant office to speak to Mr. Weeks. Upon arriving at the office, the Petitioner told Mr. Smith and Mr. Weeks that she was leaving because she did not feel well. Mr. Weeks told Ms. Pate that she could leave the premises, but she would have to bring in a physicians note to prevent the absence from being unexcused. She returned to work the next scheduled work day and did not bring in a physician's note as directed. The previous work day's absence was thus an unexcused absence. Mr. Weeks decided to terminate the Petitioner's employment for her attendance problems and for her failure to submit a doctor's note justifying her absence of July 13, 2006. Her unexcused lack of attendance caused her to have excessive absences in violation of the Respondent's adopted attendance policy. The Petitioner's employment was terminated on July 17, 2006. The Petitioner never told Mr. Weeks that she felt her employment was being terminated in retaliation for her having called the corporate office to complain, or that she was being harassed because of her race and gender.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Pate 862 Northeast Coldwater Street Lake City, Florida 32055 Kevin E. Hyde, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP One Independent Drive, Suite 1300 Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 32201-0240 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices; to wit: disparate treatment due to Petitioner's race (Hispanic) and/or retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a Registered Nurse, Nursing Supervisor, by Respondent. Respondent is a rehabilitative nursing facility in Gainesville, Florida, which qualifies as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Since the situations complained-of by Petitioner occurred, Petitioner has continued to be employed by Respondent with no breaks in service, no decreases in pay, no change in benefits, and no demotions in rank. At all times material, Respondent has employed Caucasians, Hispanics, African-Americans, and persons of Indian sub-continent descent. Petitioner signed on March 23, 2007, and on April 5, 2007, filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR. The Charge alleged that the Employer Respondent had perpetrated an unlawful employment practice upon Petitioner due to her race (Hispanic) and in retaliation. On July 25, 2007, FCHR entered and served a Determination: No Cause. On August 27, 2007, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief. However, her Petition for Relief only alleged discrimination on the basis of retaliation. The retaliation named was that "my evaluation would be done in a group because of a meeting with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Hawkins." There are no references whatsoever to race or national origin within the Petition for Relief. The Petition does not specifically allege pattern, or on-going discrimination. It does not specifically allege harassment or hostile work place. It suggests only that Petitioner feels that she does not get respect and is "attacked without evidence." Via her Petition, Petitioner seeks the remedy of ". . . that they [the employer] pay for all my therapies and medication and pay for the meetings I attended.” Early on September 5, 2006, Petitioner was standing in line to punch-in on her timecard at Respondent’s facility. Barbara Washington, an African-American CNA, was standing directly behind her. Petitioner shielded her social security number from Ms. Washington’s gaze. Later the same day, Petitioner was rolling a medicine cart down the hallway in Unit Two of Respondent's facility. Ms. Washington was taking a dinner break, seated in a position near the nursing station, which permitted her to view the patients assigned to her. Unfortunately, Ms. Washington's position did not permit Petitioner and the medicine cart to pass. Petitioner requested that Ms. Washington move, so as to let Petitioner and the medicine cart pass. Ms. Washington spoke sharply to Petitioner, either because Petitioner asked her to get out of the way of the medicine cart or for reasons of Ms. Washington's own related to the morning punch-in. During a later investigation by Director of Nursing (DON) Lisa Woods Streer, several versions of what Ms. Washington actually said were elicited. However, the best and most credible evidence on this particular point is Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Washington loudly used profanity (“the F word”) directly to Petitioner. There is, however, no evidence that, whatever the exchange entailed, any patient was disturbed, upset, or even aware of the exchange, and there is no evidence that the statements from Ms. Washington had anything to do with Petitioner’s Hispanic origin or any type of employer “retaliation.” At least three hours later on September 5, 2006, after Ms. Washington had gone off-shift and was standing outside the facility waiting for a ride home, Petitioner handed Ms. Washington a disciplinary form, known as “a counseling slip.” At that point, Ms. Washington refused to sign the counseling slip and, screaming loudly, denunciated Petitioner with additional profanity similar to her earlier verbal abuse. This language was overheard by Yadira Chavala, who was inside the building making out reports. Ms. Chavala stood up and looked out the window so as to determine who was yelling the profanity. Ms. Chavala considered the volume and content of Ms. Washington's comments to be unprofessional and unacceptable, but she did not take it upon herself to report the incident to the DON, who was not present in the facility at that time of the evening. Again, there is no evidence that Ms. Washington was attacking Petitioner’s ethnicity or acting on behalf of the employer in her screams at Petitioner. Petitioner, however, reported to the DON both incidents of loud profanity and insubordination from Ms. Washington towards Petitioner, via a copy of the counseling slip she had given to Ms. Washington and a note slipped under the DON’s door. DON Lisa Woods Streer, found these items when she came on duty the next morning, September 6, 2006. Pursuant to Respondent’s protocol, Ms. Streer asked Unit Director Karen Derrico to take written statements from staff, concerning the med-cart incident which had occasioned the counseling slip from Petitioner. The general tone of the feedback that Ms. Derrico got was that everyone in the facility had heard about the medicine cart incident, but there were no clear and reliable eye witnesses. Ms. Washington did not immediately own-up to her conduct and told DON Streer that Petitioner had made Ms. Washington feel like a thief by covering Petitioner’s social security number when they punched-in together the morning of September 5, 2006. The DON viewed this comment by Ms. Washington as a counter-accusation of some kind (possibly a complaint of discrimination) against Petitioner, and so the investigation continued. At some point, Ms. Chavala came forward to describe what she had heard from inside the building when Ms. Washington was cursing in the patio/parking area. Petitioner did not like the taking of statements and considered the process to be an attack on herself. She also did not like the fact that she was called in for a meeting on September 13, 2006, but was informed after she had arrived that the meeting had been put off to the next day. By September 13, 2006, the decision to discipline Ms. Washington had been made, because by that time Ms. Chavala had come forward concerning the second incident, but because the DON felt that Petitioner “had backed Ms. Washington into a corner” Petitioner required some counseling. Upset that a meeting was to take place the next day, Petitioner telephoned Mr. McKalvane of Respondent’s Human Resources Department in Pensacola, to complain about how the September 5, 2006, situation was being handled. Petitioner testified, without corroboration, that Mr. McKalvane told her that he could not talk to her before the next day’s meeting, but would attend the meeting by speaker phone. On Thursday, September 14, 2006, a two-hour meeting was held at the facility. DON Streer; Administrator George C. Hamilton; Unit Director Derrico; Ruthie Moore, the facility’s Staff Development Coordinator; and Petitioner were present. Streer, Hamilton, and Derrico are Caucasians. Moore is African- American. Mr. McKalvane's race/national origin is not of record, but he did not appear at the meeting, even by telephone. Petitioner felt betrayed because Mr. McKalvane did not attend the September 14, 2006, meeting by telephone. At the September 14, 2006, meeting, Ms. Moore suggested that if Petitioner had known that Ms. Washington was upset, it might have been wise for Petitioner to wait until the next day to hand Ms. Washington her counseling slip. Petitioner was offended by this comment because she believed her delay of three hours after the medicine cart incident before issuing the counseling slip had been sufficient. At the September 14, 2006, meeting, DON Streer suggested that Petitioner might want to get with Ms. Moore for some in-service instruction on how to be a better supervisor. Petitioner was offended by this suggestion, because Petitioner perceived no fault in her handling of Ms. Washington. At no time has Petitioner ever been required by the employer to take supervisory in-service training as a result of the September 5-14, 2006, events. In fact, Petitioner has not taken such training or any similar one-on-one training or in- servicing with the employer, and she has not been penalized for not doing so. As a result of Petitioner’s counseling slip concerning the September 5, 2006, incidents with Ms. Washington, Ms. Washington was suspended from work for one day without pay, but Petitioner was not disciplined in any way concerning Ms. Washington’s accusations. Petitioner suffered no discipline or loss in pay, position, or benefits as a result of the September 5, 2006, or September 14, 2006, events. Petitioner submitted that the employer’s punishment of Ms. Washington was somehow discriminatory against Petitioner because it took management nine days to come to the one-day suspension of the person that Petitioner wanted to be disciplined. However, the only comparator that Petitioner was able to offer was a situation which occurred a year later, in 2007. On that occasion, an oral confrontation occurred between an African-American female worker and a Caucasian female supervisor. There is no specific evidence concerning how similar the 2007 incident was to any of the September 5, 2007, incidents involving Ms. Washington and Petitioner. However, in the 2007 incident, the African-American female immediately admitted wrong-doing, and the very next day, the employer suspended her for one day without pay, just as the employer had suspended Ms. Washington for one day without pay in 2006, in response to Petitioner's counseling slip. Ms. Streer testified credibly that in 2007, the investigation and counseling period was shortened by the subordinate’s immediate admission of wrong-doing and lack of accusations against her reporting supervisor. Approximately September 20, 2006, Petitioner sent a 19- page, typewritten letter of complaint to Respondent’s corporate headquarters. The scope of this letter is not clear because it is not in evidence. Petitioner was supposed to be evaluated annually each September, but she did not receive her evaluation in September 2006. She reminded the DON in November 2006, that she had not yet been evaluated. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner received her annual evaluation which bears a date of October 5, 2006, signed on October 22, 2006, by Weekend Nursing Supervisor Sneha Rema, R.N. Supervisor, and signed-off on by DON Sterer on October 31, 2006.1/ Ms. Rema received no input for her 2006 evaluation from the DON or Administrator. By observation, Ms. Rema appears to be a member of one of the ethnic groups originating on the Indian sub-continent. She rated Petitioner as "exceptional" in categories "work quality," "work quantity/productivity," and "compliance & adherence to policies," and as "meets expectations" in categories "core values" and "leadership skills." Under the 2006, evaluation's heading, "Areas of Improvement, Developmental and/or Upcoming Objectives," Ms. Rema put this comment about Petitioner: May improve her leadership skills by attending seminars on interpersonal relationship and how to influence others to accomplish goals in constructive way and team building from a constructive point-of- view. Ms. Rema approaches evaluations with the belief that each employee has different levels of education and skills, should be encouraged to constantly improve, and can best improve if supervisors point out to the employee performance areas susceptible of improvement by the employee. This viewpoint was Ms. Rema’s sole motivation in making the foregoing comment. Ms. Rema views these types of comments as a way of pointing out goals, not failures. Contrariwise, Petitioner holds the personal belief that unless every single nurse received identical language on the foregoing part of his or her respective annual evaluation, regardless of that employee’s individual circumstances and regardless of who wrote the evaluation, then Petitioner has suffered a personal attack and discriminatory treatment by the employer. There is no evidence that the 2006, evaluation caused Petitioner any loss of pay, position, benefits, or hours. In fact, she received a raise. If the raise was delayed by one month, that information does not appear in the record. At some point between September 20, 2006, which was the date of Petitioner’s letter, and the end of November 2006, (the exact date is not of record), Mr. Ken Hawkins, a consultant of Respondent’s corporate personnel office in Tampa, journeyed to the facility and met with Petitioner to try to resolve her concerns. Mr. Hawkins race/national origin is not of record. The meeting was more acrimonious than harmonious and ended with Mr. Hawkins advising Petitioner that her concerns “were history” and he was not going to go over everything that had already been addressed. Petitioner was offended by Mr. Hawkins’ description of the events that concerned her as “history”; because she felt he yelled at her; and because she felt he had made her come to the facility for a live meeting when he could have just told her “no” over the phone. The two-hour September 14, 2006, counseling meeting and the brief meeting sometime after September 20, 2006, during which Mr. Hawkins told Petitioner he was not going to go over her concerns again are the meetings for which Petitioner feels Respondent employer should pay her. Sometime after her meeting with Mr. Hawkins, Petitioner filed a discrimination complaint with the City of Gainesville Office of Equal Opportunity. The date of this complaint is uncertain. However, it had to precede March 9, 2007, because on that date, in response to the city action, and in accord with Respondent’s Human Resources Office’s instructions, Administrator Hamilton wrote Petitioner and provided her with the Respondent’s 1-800 telephone number to report discrimination. Respondent has an anti-discrimination policy and also posts the 1-800 number in its facilities. Petitioner also filed an EEOC discrimination complaint, and the underlying discrimination complaint herein was filed with FCHR on April 5, 2007. Because her FCHR complaint was signed on March 23, 2007, the undersigned takes it that the EEOC complaint was filed at approximately that time. Petitioner has complained that, as a result of her September 20, 2006, letter to corporate headquarters, she was told, either by Ms. Streer or by Mr. Hawkins that she must be evaluated “in a group.” Her testimony on this issue as to who told her this vacillated, and the group rating was not confirmed by any other witness nor by the signatures on the 2006 and 2007 evaluations in evidence. Although Ms. Streer signs-off as the next level of management on evaluations, that action hardly constitutes "group rating." The evidence as a whole provides the overall sense that Petitioner has been, in the vernacular, “prickly” about what she perceives as situations of disparate treatment, none of which were supported by credible evidence in the instant case, and that as a result of Petitioner’s heightened sensitivity, none of Petitioner's on-site superiors want to expose themselves to old or new accusations by her, but the greater weight of the credible evidence is that in 2007, Theresa Volk, Unit Manager of Station One, supervised Petitioner for only two days per week, so Ms. Volk believed that Petitioner's supervisor for the remainder of the week should have input to Petitioner's 2007 evaluation. Ms. Volk’s name and that of Ms. Rema appear on the first page of Petitioner’s 2007 evaluation, but only Ms. Volk signed as her “evaluator” on October 9, 2007. In that 2007, evaluation, Ms. Volk rated Petitioner “exceptional” in “work quality” and “work quantity/productivity,” and “meets expectations" in “customer service,” “compliance & adherence to policies,” “core values,” and “leadership skills.” Under “areas for improvement,” she made a comment about wound care documentation intended for Petitioner’s improvement. After receiving her September 2007, evaluation, which had been signed by Ms. Volk on October 9, 2007, Petitioner suffered no loss in pay, position, or benefits, and, once again, received her annual raise. Petitioner testified that she got her 2007 raise “late” but did not quantify how late. Petitioner wrote Ms. Volk a letter treating Ms. Volk’s evaluation comment for improvement as a criticism related to a particular past incident, and was offended when Ms. Volk refused to stop the work she was doing to read Petitioner’s letter. Respondent has a policy which requires employees to request personal paid time-off 30 days in advance. Petitioner testified that under this system, she properly requested time off for October 20, 2007, and November 3, 2007, but that shortly before those dates, Ms. Streer told her she could have only one date or the other, but if Petitioner wanted to take off both days, Petitioner had to get a replacement for one day. While this much of Petitioner’s testimony is unrefuted, Petitioner was not persuasive that she ever got written approval of the dates, and she did not establish any connection between the denial of two days' leave and either her Hispanic heritage or as retaliation for her prior letter to corporate headquarters or as retaliation for any of her discrimination complaints in March or April 2007. Petitioner presented no evidence that she lost pay, position, promotion or benefits at any time, on the basis of retaliation or her Hispanic heritage. Petitioner testified that she had to go into therapy and pay for medications as a result of the stress that the foregoing incidents have caused her. She presented no corroborative medical testimony or evidence of any professional diagnosis and further presented no medical or pharmaceutical bills to establish any damages therefor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on an alleged disability.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Carnegie I residential and coeducational university of approximately 40,000 students and over 13,000 full and part-time faculty and staff located in Tallahassee, Florida. The Office of Financial Aid (OFA) is responsible for the overall administration of student financial aid, including federal, state, and institutional financial aid. Of the approximate 40,000 students, 25,000 on average receive some form of financial aid in the amount of approximately $300 million dollars per year. OFA hired Petitioner on August 7, 1990, as a secretary. Thereafter, Petitioner worked for OFA for almost 18 years. During her 18 years of employment, Petitioner resigned from OFA on three occasions. She resigned in 1996 and again in 2006, only to be rehired by the same OFA Director each time. Petitioner submitted her third resignation and notice of retirement on September 19, 2008, effective September 30, 2008. With one exception, Petitioner did not make Respondent aware of any complaints or allegations of unfair treatment prior to her ultimate retirement from OFA. She never complained to anyone that she was being stalked, monitored, or overworked more than her co-workers. She did complain on one occasion that Joann Clark, OFA's Assistant Director, was walking by her office/work station and knocking on the wall/desk/counter. All new employees receive Respondent's policies and procedures relative to retirement and employee benefits eligibility. The policies and procedures include sections on the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Workers' Compensation (WC). On July 13, 2005, Petitioner had surgery for carpel tunnel of the wrist. Petitioner did not inform her immediate supervisor of the scheduled surgery until July 12, 2005, even though Petitioner's doctor scheduled the surgery on June 13, 2005. On July 12, 2005, Petitioner's supervisor was Lassandra Alexander. Ms. Alexander provided Petitioner with copies of, ADA, FMLA, and WC forms and reviewed them with her as soon as Ms. Alexander became aware of the surgery scheduled for the next day. Petitioner told Ms. Alexander that she was not going to worry about applying for an accommodation under the ADA, for leave under FMLA, or WC benefits. Petitioner failed to timely file for WC in July 2005. She was not eligible to receive Workers' Compensation benefits because she did not comply with the proper protocol and procedures. Petitioner returned to work on August 29, 2005, with a doctor's statement recommending her for "light duty." On September 23, 2005, Petitioner presented a doctor's statement recommending her to work half time, four days a week. Respondent complied with the doctor's recommendations. Respondent divided Petitioner's work among other co-workers and also allowed Petitioner to take breaks as needed. On October 26, 2005, Petitioner presented a doctor's statement, allowing her to return to work full time. After October 26, 2005, Petitioner never submitted any further medical documentation to indicate that she had continuing work restrictions. After October 26, 2005, Petitioner did not formally request an accommodation or furnish medical documentation indicating a need for an accommodation. Even so, Respondent continued to provide Petitioner with support and assistance as requested. On July 25, 2008, Petitioner signed a letter confirming her appointment to a full-time position. That same day, Petitioner signed a Memorandum of Understanding that advised her about the FMLA, Respondent's Sexual Harassment and Non-discrimination Policies, and Respondent's Workers' Compensation Program Guidelines. Petitioner's testimony that she never received copies of these documents and that she was unaware of benefits and eligibility forms at any time during her several hires by OFA is not persuasive. There is no competent evidence that Petitioner was substantially limited in performing the essential functions of her job or that she suffered from a disability as defined by the ADA after October 2005. Additionally, Petitioner never informed her supervisors of an alleged on-going disability and never provided medical certification to substantiate her current allegations. Therefore, it is clear that Petitioner's co- workers and supervisors did not regard her as having an impairment. Petitioner's work evaluations for her entire 18-year employment with OFS were above standards. Petitioner's supervisors valued her work ethic and production in the office. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's staff did not intentionally discriminate against Petitioner. They did not harass Petitioner by any means, including stalking her, excessively monitoring her work habits, isolating her to her office, giving her more work than her co- workers, tampering with her office computer, refusing to investigate her allegations of vandalism to her car in the parking lot, and refusing to give her a new office chair and computer mouse that she requested on an office "wish list." Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is not credible. At some point in time, Petitioner complained to Willie Wideman, OFA's Associate Director, that Assistant Director Joanne Clark was knocking on the wall to her office/workspace/counter. Mr. Wideman spoke to Ms. Clark, determining there was no validity to Petitioner's allegations. Petitioner also complained to her friend and co- worker, Joann Smith, that she was irritated because people were knocking on her counter. Ms. Smith admitted she had knocked on Petitioner's counter as a means of friendly communication, a way to say hello in passing. Later, Ms. Smith became aware of the "no knocking" sign on Petitioner's desk. Petitioner's two letters of resignation and her notice of retirement clearly demonstrate that she did not perceive any discrimination, harassment or hostile work environment from her fellow employees or supervisors. All of Petitioner's colleagues were shocked when they learned about Petitioner's complaint and read the allegations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheryl Mask-Brockman 536 West 5th Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Florida State University 424 Wescott Building 222 South Copeland Street Tallahassee, Florida 32306 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Scott Rhodes, should be terminated from employment with Petitioner, City of Clearwater (City), for violating City policies as alleged in the City's Termination and Dismissal Notice dated February 16, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction The City is a government employer governed by a City Council. A City Manager oversees the City’s operations. Pursuant to the Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater (City Code), the Clearwater Civil Service Board has adopted policies and rules regulating all aspects of the civil service employee positions within the City.1/ Mr. Rhodes began his employment with the City as a Solid Waste worker on September 6, 2004. He worked in the same position until his termination effective February 20, 2018. Approximately 85 percent of the current Solid Waste staff is African-American. Mr. Rhodes describes himself as “white” and “not black.” At all times relevant, Mr. Rhodes’ supervisor was Joseph Farrar, who is Caucasian. Mr. Farrar’s ultimate supervisor is Earl Gloster, an African-American. Mr. Gloster is the department head of Solid Waste and reports directly to the City Manager. Mr. Rhodes’ Disciplinary History Prior to his termination, Mr. Rhodes had been involved in a number of incidents with co-workers requiring counseling or discipline. In late November 2011 and early 2012, Mr. Rhodes reported he was being harassed by a co-worker in Solid Waste, Feth Benbelgacem. His complaint was investigated by the City’s HR Department and a report was issued. Although the City found Mr. Benbelgacem had violated the City’s Workplace Violence Policy, the report concluded: No one was able to corroborate the specific claim that Mr. Rhodes made that Mr. Benbelgacem [threatened him]. A number of those interviewed feel that Mr. Rhodes has animosity because Mr. Benbelgacem is permitted to operate the equipment which causes Mr. Rhodes to “nitpick” Mr. Benbelgacem’s work performance, thereby instigating their interaction. This behavior on the part of Mr. Rhodes has been reported to the supervisors and although Mr. Rhodes has been directed to cease the behavior and worry about himself, the behavior allegedly continues. * * * Although Mr. Rhodes has been instructed by his supervisors to stop delegating and criticizing tasks relating to Mr. Benbelgacem, the behavior seems to continue and should it not stop, the supervisor should address it through the Performance and Behavior Process. In November 2016, Mr. Farrar issued Respondent a coaching and counseling form for “violence in the workplace” based on a verbal altercation Mr. Rhodes had with an African-American co-worker. The form signed by Mr. Rhodes states: Outcome of Meeting: Mr. Rhodes understands that verbal misconduct is as serious as physical conduct. Verbal attacks can lead to physical confrontations just as this situation did. In the future, verbal attacks on a co-worker’s family or loved ones will not be tolerated. At some point after the November 2016 counseling, when someone did something he did not like, Mr. Rhodes would either tell that person that he was going to give that person a specific number of lashes or he would direct a co-worker to distribute a specific number of lashes to that person. Mr. Rhodes also told his co-workers to “kiss the ring,” implying they were subservient to him. Mr. Rhodes would talk about certain co-workers being on his “hit list.” When asked who was on his “hit list,” Mr. Rhodes named the same African-American co-worker involved in the November 2016 incident. In early 2017, Mr. Farrar overheard Mr. Rhodes saying he would give certain co-workers lashes. Mr. Farrar believed these comments were inappropriate and could have been interpreted as racially offensive. He also overheard Mr. Rhodes talking about his “list.” As a result, Mr. Farrar met with Mr. Rhodes and instructed him to stop making such remarks. Although Mr. Farrar did not specifically tell Mr. Rhodes these comments violated any specific policy, he did tell Mr. Rhodes “that he needed to watch what he was saying around newer people because they might not know how to take it the way people that had been around him do.” At the final hearing, Mr. Rhodes admitted he told other employees he would give them lashes, they were on his hit list, and they should kiss the ring, but claimed he was joking. In April 2017, Mr. Farrar placed Mr. Rhodes on a “Development Plan” after repeatedly being warned by Mr. Farrar about failing to properly clock in and out, and accruing unauthorized overtime. The Development Plan was to remain in effect from April 28 to October 28, 2017, and required Mr. Rhodes to meet personally with Mr. Farrar on “Payday” Fridays and comply with the City’s timeclock regulations. Mr. Rhodes defied orders to meet with Mr. Farrar and otherwise failed to adhere to the Development Plan. As a result, Mr. Rhodes received a one-day suspension (referred to as a “decision-making leave day”) and was referred to the Employee Assistance Program. The Development Plan was also revised and extended to remain in effect until March 2018. Meanwhile, Mr. Rhodes continued to make the same type of inappropriate remarks referring to “lashes” and the “hit list.” In October or November 2017, Mr. Farrar had a second meeting with Mr. Rhodes and again instructed him to stop making these types of remarks. The Terminating Incident On January 17, 2018, Mr. Farrar received a complaint from Allan Craig, an African-American Solid Waste worker, that Mr. Rhodes claimed he was the “emperor of all black people.” According to Mr. Farrar, Mr. Craig reported the incident just after it was made and was visibly shocked. Mr. Farrar referred the incident to the City’s Office of Diversity and Equity Services (“ODES”), a division within the HR department tasked with handling and investigating complaints of the City’s anti-discrimination policies, as well as potential employee violations of state and federal employment laws. Mr. Craig testified that on the day in question, Mr. Rhodes did not like something an African-American co-worker said. In turn, Mr. Rhodes told Mr. Craig to give this co-worker “50 lashes,” which Mr. Craig understood to be a whipping. Mr. Craig, said, “no, we [have] to stick together.” It is unclear to whom Mr. Craig is referring when he said “we”--“Solid Waste workers” or “African-Americans.” Regardless, in response, Mr. Rhodes made the statement, “I’m the emperor of black people.” Mr. Craig did not respond, but instead immediately left the worksite to report the comment to Mr. Farrar. Although Mr. Rhodes corroborates Mr. Craig’s version of events, he disputes saying “I’m the emperor of black people.” Instead he claims he told Mr. Craig “I am the emperor of Solid Waste”; and after Mr. Craig said, “no, we [have] to stick together,” Mr. Rhodes replied, “Allan, even black people have to answer to somebody.” Mr. Rhodes saying, “I’m the emperor of black people” is more believable than him saying “Allan, even black people have to answer to somebody.” The undersigned rejects Mr. Rhodes’ version of events for a number of reasons.2/ First, Mr. Rhodes statements do not seem to flow naturally. Second, Mr. Craig’s demeanor was more credible, and his version of the facts leading up to the “emperor” statement was consistent with the testimony of the other witnesses. Moreover, Mr. Deris, the ODES investigator, testified that Mr. Rhodes admitted to making the statement, “I am the emperor of black people” when questioned during the investigation. Mr. Gloster testified that during the pre-termination meeting he had with Mr. Rhodes, “I asked him specifically as to the comment that was made . . . that he was the emperor over all black people, and he said, yes, that he said it.” Even assuming Mr. Rhodes’ version is correct, it is equally offensive; it still implies African-Americans at Solid Waste need to answer to him. Based on the competent and credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Rhodes made the statement, “I am the emperor of black people,” and this statement was reasonably offensive to Mr. Craig. Grounds for Dismissal Based on the ODES investigation and after meeting with Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Gloster made the decision to terminate Petitioner. Thereafter, the City issued the Dismissal Notice citing numerous violations of City policy and regulations: City Policy 3201.2, Equal Employment Opportunity Policies (EEO); City Policy 3704.1, Workplace Violence Prevention Policy; and Relevant portions of the City’s Performance and Behavior Management Program Manual (PBMP), which set standards for City workers in the areas of personal responsibility, excellence, and integrity. Chapter 13, section 3, of the Civil Service Board Rules and Regulations outlines the grounds for discipline, including terminations. That section provides in pertinent part: Reasons for Suspension, Demotion, and Dismissal--Whenever practical, employees will be given reasonable opportunity to bring their performance and/or behavior up to acceptable standards pursuant to the procedures and rules of the City’s performance and behavior management programs. However, employees may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate dismissal for the following acts, including but not limited to specifically cited examples: * * * (e) Commitment of a flagrant offense, including harassment or discrimination or abusive conduct or language toward coworkers, City officers, or the public. * * * (l) Failure to conform to the dictates of corrective action, including but not limited to failure or inability to comply with an agreed-upon “development plan,” or when the City believes that an employee is willful in refusing to adhere to establish rules, regulations, or guidelines. (emphasis added). Violation of EEO Policy The City’s EEO policy states in relevant part: It is the policy of the City of Clearwater that no person shall be unlawfully discriminated against with regard to recruitment, selection, appointment, training, promotion, retention, discipline or other aspects of employment because of any consideration of race, color, religion, national origin, age, disability, marital status, or gender (including conditions of pregnancy and sexual harassment), or genetic or family medical history information as defined by the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. Mr. Rhodes’ “lashes” comments could reasonably be interpreted as a reference to slavery, and be racially offensive to African-American (and other) employees. As such, Mr. Rhodes continued references to “lashes,” even after being warned, violated the City’s EEO policy. Mr. Rhodes statement that he, a white person, was the “emperor of black people” clearly violates the City’s EEO policy. Violation of the City’s Workplace Violence Prevention Policy The City’s Workplace Violence Prevention Policy states in relevant part: Policy: The City of Clearwater will not tolerate violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, and other disruptive behavior in our workplace [.] All reports of incidents will be taken seriously and will be dealt with appropriately. Individuals who commit such acts may be removed from the premises and may be subject to disciplinary action, criminal penalties, or both. Definitions: Workplace violence is any physical assault, threatening behavior, or verbal abuse occurring in the workplace. Such behavior can include oral or written statements, gestures, or expressions that communicate a direct or indirect threat of physical harm. Although there was no evidence anyone believed Mr. Rhodes’ “lashes” or “hit-list” statements were real threats of violence, these statements could be considered a form of intimidation, disruptive behavior, and verbal abuse under the policy. These comments, however, when taken in the context of Respondent’s history of verbal altercations with co-workers, and coupled with the fact he was told that these statements may be misinterpreted, constitute violations of the City’s Workplace Violence Prevention Policy. Violation of the City’s Employee Standards The PBMP contains the following relevant standards and instructions: INTEGRITY STANDARDS The following standards represent Integrity issues of such a serious nature that immediate formal discipline, up to and including termination, may be recommended. Violation of the City Workplace Violence Policy. Violation of the City Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Policy. * * * EXCELLENCE STANDARDS We will present a professional image through actions, dress, speech and behavior. We will strive for excellence and continuously learn and make improvements. We will learn from mistakes, modify behavior and recommend procedural changes to improve operations and processes. Again, Mr. Rhodes’ statements described above when considered cumulatively and in context clearly violate the standards for employee integrity. Mr. Rhodes’ continued use of these comments, even after being repeatedly counseled, violates the standards for professional image through actions and speech; continuously learning and improving; and modifying behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board make a determination that the charges in the Dismissal Notice are sustained, and that Respondent be terminated as a City employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (the Department or DEO) engaged in discriminatory practices, concerning Petitioner’s disability, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), as alleged in the Petition for Relief; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Wright was an Employment Program Specialist with the Department’s Reemployment Assistance Division. Although she primarily worked in the Special Programs Child Support unit, she was also assigned to the Benefit Records unit during her employment with the Department. Ms. Wright testified that her issues with the Department started in 2014, and continued until her resignation on August 15, 2018. In 2014, Ms. Wright began experiencing serious medical issues, including bowel and bladder trouble, fatigue, and fibromyalgia. In September 2014, she took a month of leave from her employment because of these medical issues. Upon her return, Ms. Lampkin, who worked in DEO’s human resources department (HR), primarily focused on payroll, and Ms. Wright’s then-supervisor, Ayman Youseff, instructed her to use “leave without pay” for additional absences. Ms. Wright testified that after her return in 2014, Mr. Youseff began harassing her after she took another leave from employment, in the form of requiring her to provide additional supporting medical documentation for the leave. When Ms. Wright informed Mr. Youseff that his request was incorrect, he apologized and advised his supervisors of the mistake. Ms. Wright and her former co-worker, Ms. Milton, both testified that Mr. Youseff was rude and unprofessional. Ms. Milton testified that Mr. Youseff also had issues with Ms. Wright concerning her absences due to illnesses, and with other employees donating leave to Ms. Wright. Ms. Wright also testified that Mr. Youseff made her turn in her timesheets to him directly, as opposed to HR. Ms. Wright testified that she viewed this request, as well as requests from HR to use donated sick leave after she had exhausted all other remaining leave, and ultimately to use leave without pay—which she acknowledged were prompted by her absences from work during this time period—as harassment. In February 2015, Ms. Wright requested a transfer back to a previous unit within DEO, under a supervisor she liked, because she felt she was being harassed. DEO granted her transfer request in less than two weeks. Ms. Wright’s new supervisor was Mr. Leonard. However, after her transfer, Ms. Wright’s medical conditions did not go away. In September 2016, she submitted a request for a modified schedule accommodation to Mr. Huddleston, in DEO’s Office for Civil Rights, which noted that she had issues in the mornings because of her medical condition. DEO granted this request, and changed Ms. Wright’s work schedule to 10:30 a.m. through 6:30 p.m. Beginning in early 2017, DEO overpaid Ms. Wright several times because she failed to complete her timesheet and failed to timely document her use of leave without pay. In August 2017, Ms. Wright took a one-month absence from employment because of her medical issues, and was frequently absent from work during the following few months. During this time period, an HR employee accepted Ms. Wright’s incorrect timesheets for those time periods, and recouped each month’s overpayment from the following month’s pay. This became an issue for DEO because Ms. Wright utilized leave without pay for most of the month of August; however, the resulting lack of funds owed to her precluded DEO from immediate recoupment. Ms. Lampkin, who had left her employment with DEO but returned to her position in August 2017, recognized the payment issue with Ms. Wright. Ms. Lampkin testified that, because of Ms. Wright’s submittal of timesheets that utilize leave without pay after the payroll deadline for correcting timesheets, DEO’s HR department began paying Ms. Wright “on-demand,” i.e., payment for hours that she actually worked, to avoid overpaying Ms. Wright month after month. DEO introduced into evidence the Bureau of State Payroll Manual (Manual), which governs DEO’s handling of payroll issues. With respect to salary overpayment, the Manual states that “Agencies are responsible for identifying and preventing salary overpayments ” Although Ms. Wright contends that this switch from recoupment (which resulted in salary overpayment) to payment on-demand was evidence of harassment based on her disability, she also testified, on cross-examination, that “it’s verified in [the Manual] that it could be done that way.” Ms. Lampkin also credibly explained an issue that arose with Ms. Wright’s allegation that DEO canceled her insurance benefits, which Ms. Wright considered additional harassment. Ms. Lampkin testified: The term canceled is kind of an overstatement. There is a glitch in their insurance if I have to cancel their check and pay them on demand, because that means that the payment doesn’t go over when the regular payroll runs, and it gets paid on supplemental, and it’s usually on the same date that their payday is, but then it’s—the payment to the insurance companies would be sent at a later date than the other ones. It would be a lag time there. * * * If I canceled their monthly paycheck, that stops payment going to any pretax deductions; it would stop them. And then by paying them on demand, that would create the payment and send it over, but the difference in an on-demand and the regular payroll is processed approximately one week before payday. And on-demand is processed three days before payday. Technically two days, because the third day is when they get paid so—so it’s that lag time from a week to down to three days. Ms. Wright also testified that DEO engaged in harassment in discouraging other employees from donating sick leave to her. For example, in 2018, Ms. Wright testified that DEO hindered Charlie Davis, a DEO management level employee, from donating hours to her. DEO presented evidence that Ms. Wright was the recipient of many sick leave donations during her employment; all told, she received and used over 1,000 hours between 2014 and her resignation. Although Mr. Davis had donated sick leave hours to Ms. Wright previously, Ms. Pottle, who was Ms. Lampkin’s supervisor in DEO’s HR Department, explained that DEO employees in a supervisory or management position “are highly discouraged from donating to employees because it – it could be construed as favoritism.” Ms. Wright testified that she discussed Mr. Davis’s intention to donate additional sick leave hours with another DEO employee, and Mr. Davis was ultimately permitted to donate sick leave to Ms. Wright. On February 6, 2018, in response to Ms. Wright’s expressed concerns, individuals in Ms. Wright’s supervisory chain and Ms. Lampkin, met with Ms. Wright to discuss two options she could use in an attempt to resolve her leave and payroll issues: (a) be paid on-demand early, with the balance paid after she finalized her timesheet at the end of the month; or (b) remain on automatic pay, but provide donated leave hours and any necessary medical certification supporting their use by the 15th of each month. Following the February 6, 2018, meeting, Ms. Wright began providing medical certifications, which stated that she needed time off from work intermittently to attend medical appointments. Ms. Wright testified that she believed that these medical certifications allowed her to arrive for work as late as she felt necessary due to her medical condition. Ms. Wright, during a June 5, 2018 meeting with Mr. Leonard, expressed this belief; Mr. Leonard, in an email to Ms. Wright that same day, asked her “to provide supporting documentation regarding the need to arrive at work after 10:30 a.m. since the most recent documentation reflects a schedule of 10:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.” Mr. Leonard also testified about his team’s experience covering for Ms. Wright when she was absent. He stated that Ms. Wright cross-trained other members of this team to complete her work in her absence. However, when covering for Ms. Wright, these team members would then have work duties above and beyond their regular work duties. On June 8, 2018, Ms. Wright submitted a request to Mr. Huddleston in DEO’s Office for Civil Rights requesting a flexible, part-time schedule that would allow her to arrive for work between 10:30 a.m. and noon, and end her workday at 6:30 p.m. (Second Accommodation Request). With this Second Accommodation Request, Ms. Wright also submitted a letter from her physician stating that she was unable to arrive to work and do her job before 10:30 a.m., and would benefit from the flexible schedule she requested. At the time of Ms. Wright’s Second Accommodation Request, DEO’s Reemployment Assistance program was undergoing a significant reorganization. Ms. Wright worked in the Special Programs unit of DEO’s Reemployment Assistance program at that time. Mr. Huddleston testified that, after receiving Ms. Wright’s Second Accommodation Request, DEO decided to deny it. In an email dated July 11, 2018, Mr. Huddleston wrote: After reviewing your request, at this time, your request, to modify your accommodation of a flexible part-time work schedule is denied. Currently your accommodation allows you to work at 10:30 AM instead of your regularly scheduled start time of 8:00 AM. Your new accommodation request asks that you be allowed to arrive at work after 10:30 AM but before 12:00 PM. In making this decision our office has spoken with your management team and has determined that this modification would cause an undue hardship. This modification to your existing accommodation would also require a lowering of performance or production standards. Based on these two factors, we have determined that you would not be able to perform the essential functions of your position if this modification were to be put into place. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states that essential functions are basic job duties that an employee must be able to perform, with or without a reasonable accommodation. These duties must be performed to achieve the objectives of the job. As part of this, and all accommodation request reviews, our office analyzed your position to determine its purpose and essential functions, consulted with your management team, and researched and explored accommodation options to assess the effectiveness of the accommodation. During this interactive process we explored the possibility of reassigning you to another position that was as close as possible to your current position in status and pay; however, we were unable to find a suitable position. There are no part-time positions currently available and the essential functions of your position can not be completed working the hours you requested. Our office would be more than happy to meet with you to discuss this further and to explore other accommodation options that you and/or your medical professional come up with. However, on July 10, 2018—the day before Mr. Huddleston sent the email denying the Second Accommodation Request—Ms. Wright went on another month-long leave of absence from her employment because of her worsening medical condition. Ms. Wright testified that she believed that DEO would approve of her Second Accommodation Request and that, after returning to work, she would start the new schedule. Ms. Wright testified that she did not know the status of her Second Accommodation Request until she returned to work (after her month-long leave of absence) on August 13, 2018, and read Mr. Huddleston’s email. She sent him the following email response later that afternoon: Thanks for reviewing my request to modify my work schedule. I understand that there is no part- time positions available; but I was referring to me working at least 30 hours per week. When I met with my supervisor Marche and Joel in June concerning me arriving later than my scheduled time 10:30 AM, I advised them that I needed to request a modification to my previous work schedule because I moved back home with my mom which is outside of Quincy due to my health. I also advised them that it was impossible for me to arrive to work at 10:30 AM due to the distance I had to travel and the medications I take. I informed them that 11:15 or 11:30 would work better for me because I understand that my job consists of duties that must be performed in order to achieve the objectives outlined for the job. Please let me know when there’s a good time for us to meet. Thanks again for your help concerning this matter. Rather than wait for Mr. Huddleston’s response, Ms. Wright resigned on August 15, 2018, by a letter that she left in a co-worker’s chair. This resignation letter does not identify any reason for her resignation. On August 20, 2018, Mr. Huddleston—unaware of Ms. Wright’s resignation—actually responded to Ms. Wright’s August 13, 2018, email, inviting her to meet with him about her concerns. Ms. Wright testified that she has not sought out employment after her resignation from DEO because of her medical condition. Ms. Wright presented no persuasive evidence that DEO’s actions subjected her to harassment based on her disability, or that such actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to create a hostile work environment. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful disability harassment or hostile work environment. Ms. Wright presented no persuasive evidence that, at the time of her resignation, her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Angela Wright’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Angela Michelle Wright 4102 Greensboro Highway Quincy, Florida 32351 (eServed) Dominique Gabrielle Young, Assistant General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Brandon W. White, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment and/or retaliation while employed with Respondent in violation of Subsections 760.10(1)(a) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired as an employee of Respondent in July 1993, as an X-ray technologist ("tech") in the Radiology Department. She is an adult female and, as such, is a member of a protected class. During her employee orientation, Petitioner received and read a copy of Respondent's Employee Handbook. Among other things, Respondent's Employee Handbook addresses the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. Respondent's policy strictly prohibits sexual harassment and states that Respondent "will not tolerate such action by employees." Respondent's policy also encourages any employee who feels that he/she is being subject to sexual harassment to discuss and/or make a complaint with the Human Resources Department. Any such complaint is handled according to Respondent's Policy No. 9510-17, in order to ensure appropriate investigation and action. Respondent's employees also receive computer-based training regarding sexual harassment and Respondent's policy prohibiting the same, every year. Petitioner received this computer-based training regarding sexual harassment. In October 2006, Petitioner started training to be a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") tech. Petitioner was chosen to be cross-trained from an X-ray tech to a MRI tech by Greg Phillips, who was then the manager of Diagnostic Imaging. Phillips became her unofficial "mentor" at Respondent's facility. Petitioner received on-the-job training for an MRI tech from Chris Depelteau, Amy Brantly, and Lucinda Swales, all of whom were MRI techs at the time. In December 2006, Petitioner received a secondary job code which allowed her to work independently as an MRI tech part-time. Essentially this meant that she could "take call." That same month, Paul Licker was hired by Respondent as lead MRI tech. Depelteau had also applied for this job, but had not been chosen. Upon being hired by Respondent, Licker was also made aware of its policy regarding sexual harassment. As lead MRI tech, Licker was responsible for scheduling the MRI techs, ordering supplies, working on protocols, ensuring that patients were being properly scanned and treated, and following up with the MRI techs as they cared for patients. Therefore, Licker became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Like all the other MRI techs, Licker also trained Petitioner in MRI. In training Petitioner, Licker often taught her different techniques or ways of doing things than the way she had been taught by the other MRI techs. Licker, on several occasions, sought to teach Petitioner his way of doing things on the computer, which was different from the others. In doing so, Licker invaded Petitioner's workspace and engaged in inappropriate touching, particularly by covering her hand with his while manipulating the mouse, to the point that she became uncomfortable. Licker also started implementing changes and different ways of doing things throughout the MRI department. As lead MRI tech, Licker had the authority to implement such changes. Also, during this same period, if Licker added patients or made other changes to her schedule, Petitioner would argue with or complain to him. In fact, Petitioner did not like Licker and also told Depelteau and other employees that Licker was a "bad supervisor." Licker himself recognized that Petitioner did not like the way he was supervising the department. A few weeks after Licker started working for Respondent, Petitioner approached Phillips complaining that Licker was calling her, other female employees, and patients, "Babe." For instance, Licker would say, "Babe, I need you to do this for me," when asking Petitioner to complete a task. Petitioner indicated that she thought that the use of this term was inappropriate and demeaning and that it made her uncomfortable. In fact, other employees who were friendly with Petitioner understood that Licker was using the term "Babe" the way another person might use the terms "Sweetie," or "Honey," i.e., in a non-sexual or non-derogatory way. However, understanding that Licker was a new supervisor who may not have understood that the term suggested something sexual in using the term "Babe," Phillips suggested to Petitioner that she speak directly with Licker to resolve this issue. Phillips also spoke to Licker directly regarding his use of the term "Babe." Specifically, Phillips advised Licker that he "needed to carefully choose his words around patients and employees." Phillips also advised Licker that some people did not like being addressed by "Sweetie or Hun or Babe," and that he should refrain from using these terms in the workplace. Licker understood Phillips' suggestion and tried to refrain from calling Petitioner, or anybody else, "Babe" or any word similar to the term. Petitioner did not complain about any other alleged inappropriate conduct by Licker to Phillips, or any other manager, until February 1, 2007. However, shortly after he started working for Respondent, Licker made an inappropriate comment in the cafeteria to Petitioner. Licker stated to other employees that he could not sit next to Petitioner because they were sleeping together. Licker made a similar inappropriate comment to Dana Keach when he first started employment at Parrish. He suggested that there was a lesbian relationship between Keach and another woman. This conduct was not reported until much later. Prior to February 1, 2007, it became readily apparent that the MRI department was suffering serious setbacks because the department employees were not working cooperatively together. The biggest problem in the MRI department appeared to be a lack of teamwork resulting from the staff's inability to communicate effectively with one another. Licker advised Gallacher that he was struggling in his "daily interactions" with Depelteau and Petitioner and that he simply "could not make the group happy, whether it was scheduling or time off or just getting through the day." MRI's problems grew to the point that Phillips and Gallacher both stepped in to try to improve communications and teamwork among Licker, Petitioner, Depelteau, and Shelly Hugoboom, the MRI CT assistant. The entire MRI department engaged in team-building meetings and even worked with the medical center's chaplain in an attempt to learn to work together. These department meetings were intense and discussion often became heated among the MRI staff members. In addition to these team-building meetings, Gallacher met with staff members individually to discuss their concerns. Gallacher also addressed the interpersonal skills issues between Petitioner and Hugoboom. Specifically, Gallacher met with the two employees together "to see if they could put [their issues] to rest and move on." In the midst of these efforts to improve the department, Petitioner came to Phillips on February 1, 2007, complaining that Licker was continuing to call her "Babe," and that he had also offered her some concert tickets. Phillips observed that Petitioner was extremely upset and immediately contacted Human Resources Manager Roberta Chaildin to start an investigation in regard to Licker's alleged behavior. Phillips and Chaildin spoke with Petitioner and Licker, individually, regarding Petitioner's claims. When questioned regarding the concert ticket, Licker explained that he had been looking to sell an extra ticket that he had. Licker advised Phillips and Chaildin that Petitioner had taken his offer to sell her the extra ticket "out of context," when she assumed that he was asking her to the concert on a date. Licker specified that he had asked Petitioner if she wanted to buy his extra ticket and "tag along" with him and his friends to the concert. Licker also offered his extra ticket to other people besides Petitioner. After speaking with Petitioner and Licker, Phillips and Chaildin determined that they were dealing with a "he-said- she-said situation and a misunderstanding." "He said, I was trying to sell the ticket or give it away. She said, he had asked me out on a date to a concert." Phillips and Chaildin determined that this was not a case of "sexual harassment" by Licker. They did, however, warn Licker that as a supervisor, he had to be "extremely careful" in how he spoke to his subordinate employees. Phillips and Chaildin advised Petitioner that they had investigated her claim and concluded that there was no evidence of sexual harassment. They encouraged her, however, to file a report if she continued to have issues with Licker. Over five months passed without a complaint or incident. Then on July 11, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner regarding her having accumulated nine tardy appearances ("tardies") at work since January 1, 2007. In speaking with Petitioner, Licker wanted to ensure that Petitioner understood that she needed to be on time in the future, as she had exceeded the number of tardies deemed acceptable by Respondent. To ensure that nothing said during the verbal counseling session was misconstrued by Petitioner, Licker had another supervisor, Boyd Wallace, serve as a witness. The tardies cited in Licker's verbal counseling to Petitioner were unrelated to instances when he would excuse her from work due to slower volume in the MRI department. On August 21, 2007, Licker observed Petitioner on the telephone being advised by security that she had parked in a "no parking" zone. During the conversation, Petitioner became agitated. Licker documented and filed the incident. Phillips personally addressed this incident with Petitioner. On October 10, 2007, the MRI department was working an already full schedule when Licker had to add a patient to the schedule due to an emergency situation. Petitioner objected to Licker adding another patient to the day and became withdrawn and resentful. Licker instructed Petitioner that she needed to change her attitude and become more cooperative. The evidence is not persuasive that Licker assigned Petitioner "menial tasks" after she complained about his having offered her the concert tickets in February 2007. In October 2007, Gallacher, Phillips and Chaildin met Petitioner and issued her a Decision Day disciplinary letter. A "Decision Day" meeting and letter is a management tool in which the employee is given a paid day off to contemplate whether they wish to remain an employee of Respondent. This resulted from Respondent's concerns regarding her "interpersonal skills." This was an issue that had been continuously addressed by Licker and other supervisors or managers at Respondent. The incident which prompted the progressive disciplinary action involved Debbie York, a relatively new employee who resigned from the MRI department, claiming that Petitioner and her interactions with other employees and with Licker was the reason for her leaving. During the Decision Day meeting, Petitioner stated that she was the "victim" and brought up the previous incidents of allegedly being sexually harassed. Petitioner was reminded that she had not complained of any other instances of alleged sexual harassment since she complained of Licker's offering her concert tickets in February 2007 and that the matter was investigated and resolved. From the point of view of management, the Decision Day meeting was intended to address Petitioner's on-going issues with her co-workers and her supervisor. However, Petitioner did not bring up any new incidents of alleged sexual harassment by Licker during the Decision Day meeting. Following the meeting, Petitioner took her Decision Day letter and returned to work. The Decision Day letter called for the creation of an Action Plan, which Respondent uses to help a struggling employee "become invested with the organization and with [his or her] team." Thereafter, Petitioner met with Gallacher to discuss what should be included in her Action Plan. On November 7, 2007, an Action Plan was drafted and signed. It included a number of initiatives designed to assist Petitioner in being "re[-]engaged" with the MRI department. Despite being placed on an Action Plan, Petitioner continued to have issues with Licker being her supervisor. On November 20, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner for her failure to discuss changes in her weekly schedule with him. Licker specifically identified Petitioner's "communication skills" as a continuing issue. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner was suspended without pay for two days for stating that Licker was being an "asshole," or something to that effect, in front of a co-worker. Petitioner accepted responsibility for her comment. Along with her suspension, Petitioner was also issued a written warning stated in pertinent part, "Upon your return [from suspension], you will be expected to demonstrate a high level of interpersonal skills towards your co-workers, management and this organization and work on completion of your Action Plan items. Any reports of less than acceptable behavior or performance or deviation from a Diagnostic Imaging or PMC policy or procedure will result in immediate termination." As a result of the written warning, Petitioner also lost 50 percent of her annual merit increase. In January 2008, management considered that the MRI department was still very "dysfunctional." Scott Hazelbaker, the new executive director of Diagnostics/Cardiovascular, met with all of the MRI employees as a group to discuss his "expectations of working together as a team." Hazelbaker also discerned that Licker lacked leadership skills to be an effective supervisor. In fact, none of the MRI employees had much respect for Licker's management style. On April 10, 2008, Hazelbaker, Gallacher, and Chaildin met with Petitioner to discuss her progress under the Action Plan. During the meeting, Hazelbaker reviewed Petitioner's history toward Respondent, explaining that her negative attitude could not be tolerated. Specifically, her negativity, failure to be a team player, and refusal to embrace or become engaged in Respondent's culture were detrimentally affecting the work of MRI as a whole. Hazelbaker continued by advising Respondent that as a result of her "track record," she could either resign from her employment or be terminated. Petitioner was advised that if she resigned, Respondent would pay her for two weeks in lieu of having her work through her notice period, pay her the balance of her personal leave bank, extend her health benefits for two weeks so that she could fill her prescriptions, and even designate her eligible for rehire in its system. At the end of the meeting, Petitioner tendered her resignation notice to Respondent. At no time during the meeting did Petitioner ask to leave the room or make a call in order to seek advice or legal counsel. Further, at no time during the meeting did Petitioner raise her past issues regarding Licker and the alleged sexual harassment she suffered. The evidence is persuasive that Licker did not influence the decision to terminate Petitioner. He had not asked for her to be terminated. In August 2009, more than one year after Petitioner resigned, Respondent received a complaint regarding Licker from then-X-Ray Tech Dana Keach, who claimed that Licker made sexually suggestive comments to her. Following an investigation, Licker was terminated, effective September 24, 2009, for "communication unsuitability between care partners." It does not appear that Licker was terminated for engaging in sexual harassment. The evidence is not persuasive that during the time he was employed by Respondent that Licker had inappropriate discussions in the workplace on numerous occasions in front of both male and female employees; nor that Licker would also discuss pornography in the workplace.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lesa Burkavage's, claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation against Respondent, Parrish Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Fort Walton Beach Medical Center (FWBMC), engaged in employment discrimination and, thus, violated the Florida Civil Rights Act(FCRA), section 760.10, et seq., Florida Statutes, by: (a) failing to accommodate Petitioner, Jennifer L. Landress, because of her alleged disability; (b) subjecting Ms. Landress to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex; (c) constructively discharging Ms. Landress from employment; and (d) retaliating against Ms. Landress, and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact FWBMC hired Ms. Landress on October 31, 2005, and employed her for approximately 14 years as a Cardiovascular Services Specialist. Ms. Landress resigned her employment with FWBMC on October 4, 2019. During her employment with FWBMC, Ms. Landress reported to either Ms. Ristom, Vice President of Quality and Risk Management, or Rob Grant, the former Director of Cardiovascular Services. Between August 30, 2018, and October 4, 2019, FWBMC also employed Ms. Sanders, Human Resources Business Partner, and Ms. Clark, Cardiovascular Tech. FWBMC never employed Dr. Al-Dehneh (or the other physicians who testified at the final hearing—Dr. Sandwith and Dr. Chen). Dr. Al-Dehneh has privileges to use FWBMC to provide services to the patients who come to FWBMC to receive care. Neither Dr. Al-Dehneh nor any of the physicians who testified at the final hearing were supervisors of Ms. Landress. Further, Dr. Al-Dehneh: never had a role in Ms. Landress’s discipline or schedule; never evaluated her performance; and did not exercise any control over Ms. Landress or affect the terms or conditions of her employment with FWBMC. FWBMC’s Policies Concerning Discrimination and Sexual Harassment FWBMC has a policy entitled “Equal Employment Opportunity/Harassment,” which is included in the employee handbook, as well as on its “HR Answers” online portal and intranet. The “Equal Employment Opportunity/Harassment” policy states, in part: Equal employment opportunities are provided to all employees and applicants for employment without regard to race, color, religion, gender, gender identity, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, genetic information, or protected veteran status with applicable federal, state and local laws. This policy applies to all terms and conditions of employment, including, but not limited to, hiring, placement, promotion, termination, layoff, transfer, leaves of absence, compensation and training. * * * Any form of unlawful employee harassment based on race, color, religion, gender, gender identity, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, protected veteran status or any other status in any group protected by federal, state or local law is strictly prohibited. Improper interference with the ability of employees to perform their expected job duties is not tolerated. Each member of management is responsible for creating an atmosphere free of discrimination and harassment, sexual or otherwise. Further, employees are responsible for respecting the rights of their co- workers. The following is prohibited: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and all other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual or otherwise offensive nature …. Behaviors that engender a hostile or offensive work environment will not be tolerated. These behaviors may include, but are not limited to, offensive comments, jokes, innuendos and other sexually oriented or culturally insensitive/inappropriate statements, printed material, material distributed through electronic media or items posted on walls or bulletin boards. FWBMC also has a policy entitled “Complaint Procedures,” which is contained in the employee handbook, as well as on its “HR Answers” online portal and intranet. The “Complaint Procedures” policy states, in part: If you experience any job-related harassment based on race, national origin, religion, gender, gender identity, color, disability, age or other factor prohibited by federal, state or local statute, or you believe you have been treated in an unlawful, discriminatory manner, promptly report the incident to your manager or Human Resources, who will investigate the matter and take appropriate action. If you believe it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter with your manager or Human Resources, you may bypass your manager or Human Resources and report it directly for investigation at The Ethics Line at [phone number]. Ms. Landress testified that she received a copy of the employee handbook, read the policies contained in it—including the policy concerning “Equal Employment Opportunity/Harassment” and “Complaint Procedures”—and knew of and utilized them. Ms. Sanders testified that if FWBMC, after investigation by its human resources department, substantiates a claim of harassment or discrimination by a physician, it would provide its investigative findings to the medical staff office, who would then refer the physician to a peer review process that could culminate in an appropriate action with respect to that physician’s hospital privileges. The undisputed evidence at the final hearing revealed that Ms. Landress reported to FWBMC’s human resources department that she was subjected to discrimination and harassment in August 2018, and again in March 2019. Allegations of Harassment and Hostile Work Environment Ms. Landress testified that Dr. Al-Dehneh began sexually harassing her starting in 2013. On August 30, 2018, she met with Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom and discussed this allegation. Ms. Sanders testified of the allegations made by Ms. Landress at the August 30, 2018, meeting: That Dr. Al-Dehneh had asked Rob to find women for him and to get Ms. Landress to sleep with him. She also indicated that Dr. Al-Dehneh was listening to her conversations via some sort of recording or monitoring device in her computer. She felt that Dr. Al-Dehneh had bugged her home through Siri and had accessed her medical records here at the facility. She was afraid for her life and had a gun. She also felt that Dr. Al-Dehneh was watching her home and that she told us a story about a lady on a bike who said that she was dead to her. She was afraid to go to the police about Dr. Al-Dehneh because she had been told that he was a mobster. And then she did admit to us at one point that she had started developing feelings for Dr. Al-Dehneh. Ms. Ristom also testified concerning the allegations made by Ms. Landress at the August 30, 2018, meeting: She said that Dr. Al-Dehneh had said to her to let him know when she was ready to get married. She said that Rob was tasked with getting women and obtaining sex for Dr. Al-Dehneh. And, you know, during that time Jennifer told me that – told Julie Sanders and I that she had started developing feelings for him, for Dr. Al-Dehneh. And in addition, she felt like her neighbor was watching her and providing information back to Dr. Al-Dehneh about her activities at home. Also, she said that she was afraid to report him because she felt like she – she understood him to be a mobster. She said he was listening to her through a listening device when she was at home through, like, a Siri, a radio kind of device because he would say things that he would only know if he was able to hear her at home. She told us about a heavyset lady on a bicycle who told her that she was a dead lady, that Jennifer was a dead lady, but that that woman was not going to be the one to kill her because Jennifer had been nice to her. She said that she was afraid to go to the police because she believed Dr. Al-Dehneh to be a mobster and that he owned the police and the hospital as well. She said that she was defending herself – felt like she needed to defend herself and had been carrying a gun and keeping it on her nightstand as well. She told us that she hadn’t slept in months, that she was taking medication to help her but that she was having difficulty concentrating. The testimony of Ms. Landress more or less confirmed that she made those allegations that Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom testified were made at the August 30, 2018, meeting, and that those allegations formed the basis for her Petition for Relief. She added that Dr. Al-Dehneh “constantly” harassed her, that she believed he started a rumor at the hospital that she had herpes, and that he had her “followed” to a local mall. Ms. Landress denied that she had romantic feelings for Dr. Al-Dehneh, but stated that she “had a great working relationship with him for a long time.” Dr. Al-Dehneh testified and denied all of Ms. Landress’s allegations, including: asking Ms. Landress to let him know when she was ready to get married; offering to “buy” Ms. Landress from her husband; threatening to have Ms. Landress fired; having Ms. Landress followed; putting a “hit” out on Ms. Landress; making comments about Ms. Landress to other physicians; spreading a rumor that Ms. Landress had herpes; calling Ms. Landress’s treating physician, Dr. Chen, for information about her; and accessing Ms. Landress’s medical records. According to Ms. Landress, Dr. Sandwith and Ms. Park were witnesses who could corroborate many of her allegations concerning Dr. Al-Dehneh. Both denied each and every allegation. Dr. Sandwith testified that he never saw Ms. Landress and Dr. Al-Dehneh together; denied talking to Dr. Al-Dehneh about Ms. Landress; denied ever seeing or hearing Dr. Al-Dehneh harass or act inappropriately with Ms. Landress or any other hospital staff; and denied hearing rumors concerning Ms. Landress, Dr. Al-Dehneh, their alleged relationship, or that Ms. Landress had herpes. Ms. Park, who worked with Ms. Landress: testified that she never heard any rumors that Dr. Al-Dehneh was having sexual relationships with other women; denied witnessing Dr. Al-Dehneh tell Ms. Landress that he was going to call Ms. Landress’s husband and offer $5,000 for her; denied talking with Ms. Landress about being sexually harassed; denied hearing rumors about Ms. Landress and Dr. Al-Dehneh; denied hearing rumors that Ms. Landress had herpes; and denied telling Ms. Landress to stay away from Dr. Al-Dehneh. According to Ms. Landress, she also discussed her allegations of sexual harassment with her orthopedic physician, Dr. Chen, on numerous occasions. Dr. Chen testified that during one of Ms. Landress’s appointments, I recall you telling me just occurrences at home, of what happened in the workplace between yourself and a certain physician on staff at the – at the Walton Beach Medical Center. Yeah, and there was situations or there were occurrences that were – upsetting to you and they were providing some sorts of distress. He further testified that Ms. Landress “spoke … about the herpes.” Dr. Chen testified that he may have heard FWBMC staff discussing the alleged herpes rumor, but could not recall from whom he heard those rumors, and admitted that the rumors could have come from Ms. Landress herself. Dr. Chen testified that he never witnessed Dr. Al-Dehneh acting inappropriately towards Ms. Landress, and that he never heard any other physician at FWBMC discuss any rumors concerning Ms. Landress or Dr. Al-Dehneh. FWBMC Investigation of Complaint of Harassment and Hostile Work Environment At the conclusion of the August 30, 2018, meeting, Ms. Sanders immediately investigated Ms. Landress’s claims by interviewing Dr. Al-Dehneh that same day, and by interviewing other employees who could potentially substantiate Ms. Landress’s claims. However, Ms. Sanders was unable to find any witness who corroborated any of Ms. Landress’s allegations. Ms. Sanders testified, as part of her investigation, that she determined that Dr. Al-Dehneh did not have any remote access or log-in capabilities to access Ms. Landress’s computer. Ms. Sanders further testified, as part of the investigation, that she confirmed that Dr. Al-Dehneh never had access, nor tried to access, Ms. Landress’s medical records. During the investigation, Ms. Ristom testified that she offered to move Ms. Landress’s office to distance her from the individuals allegedly involved, including Dr. Al-Dehneh. Ms. Landress declined this offer. Ms. Sanders completed her investigation of Ms. Landress’s claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment on September 18, 2018, and informed Ms. Landress that FWBMC could not substantiate her claims. Subsequent Events On September 20, 2018, Ms. Landress suffered an anxiety attack and went home from work early. When Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom learned of the anxiety attack, they attempted to speak with Ms. Landress in her office and told her to take the weekend off to deal with her anxiety. Both Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom testified that Landress did not attribute her anxiety attack to the alleged past sexual harassment incidents with Dr. Al-Dehneh, nor any new incidents of harassment. Ms. Landress’s testimony concerning the anxiety attack and subsequent leave was as follows: Predominately because I really wanted to come home and take medication because I couldn’t stand – I – I just couldn’t get past people in the hospital constantly talking about me having herpes. I mean, it’s kind of like if you were walking in the building and that’s all you heard, you want to get out of there. As previously noted, the FWBMC investigation did not substantiate Ms. Landress’s allegation concerning hospital rumors that she had herpes. Further, there was no testimony or evidence presented at the final hearing, outside of Ms. Landress’s testimony, that confirmed this allegation. Ms. Landress soon returned to work and did not report another incident of harassment until March 2019. On March 1, 2019, Ms. Landress reported that a nurse practitioner, who she claimed worked for Dr. Al-Dehneh, took a photo of Ms. Landress on her cellphone when she walked by Ms. Landress’s office. Ms. Landress testified that she “assumed” the nurse practitioner took the photo for Dr. Al-Dehneh. Ms. Landress further testified that she never saw the photo. Ms. Ristom and Ms. Sanders met with Ms. Landress concerning this allegation, and Ms. Sanders investigated it. Ultimately, FWBMC was unable to substantiate this claim or that she was being harassed by Dr. Al-Dehneh or his nurse practitioner. Ms. Landress did not report any other incidents of harassment after March 1, 2019. Leave(s) of Absence FWBMC approved Ms. Landress for a paid leave of absence from June 10, 2019, until she resigned on October 4, 2019. FWBMC granted this leave for two separate reasons: for an orthopedic condition, and for a mental health condition. Initially, Ms. Landress was placed on leave for her claims of stress, anxiety, and post traumatic stress disorder related to the alleged harassment. Then, on September 9, 2019, Ms. Landress submitted a separate claim because of pain in her right elbow. Dr. Chen, Ms. Landress’s treating orthopedic physician, informed FWBMC that her anticipated return work date was October 7, 2019, with restrictions, such as “no repetitive use of right arm to include typing, mouse use, [and] writing.” After Dr. Chen cleared Ms. Landress to return to work, with restrictions, Ms. Sanders reminded Ms. Landress that she could not return until her mental health counselor also cleared her. Ms. Landress’s mental health counselor never cleared her to return to work. In July 2019—during her leave of absence for a mental health condition—Ms. Landress requested, to Ms. Ristom, the opportunity to work from home. FWBMC denied Ms. Landress’s accommodation request; Ms. Sanders testified: At that time we weren’t able to accommodate the work from home request. There was concerns around protecting patient medical records and her ability to work with the staff and the physicians when she needed to ask questions. On September 20, 2019, while Ms. Landress remained on leave, Ms. Ristom received an email from Q-Centrix, a third-party data management provider that collaborates with healthcare providers, such as FWBMC. The September 30, 2019, email requested that FWBMC terminate Ms. Landress as an employee so that Q-Centrix could employ Ms. Landress in a full-time position. Ms. Ristom forwarded this email to Ms. Sanders to investigate and did not reply to the September 20, 2019, email from Q-Centrix until FWBMC could confirm from Ms. Landress that it was her intention to resign her position with FWBMC. On September 27, 2019, Q-Centrix emailed another request to FWBMC to terminate Ms. Landress. Ms. Sanders testified that she spoke with Ms. Landress about this request. On October 4, 2019, Ms. Landress—who still had not received clearance to return to work at FWBMC from her mental health counselor— submitted a letter of resignation to Ms. Sanders. Her letter of resignation stated that she and her mental health counselor agreed that her “PTSD is too great to return.” Her letter further stated that because FWBMC denied her request to work from home, she had accepted a position with “another company.” The October 4, 2019, letter of resignation attached four additional pages of what Ms. Landress contends were the events that led her to resign. The first page listed the allegations of sexual harassment by Dr. Al-Dehneh that Ms. Landress discussed with Ms. Sanders and Ms. Ristom during the August 30, 2018, meeting. The remaining three pages listed various allegations that Ms. Landress did not report to FWBMC and did not include in her charge of discrimination with FCHR. Findings of Ultimate Fact Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC’s decisions concerning, or actions affecting, her, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by sex-based or disability-based discriminatory animus. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful sex-based or disability-based discrimination. Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC’s actions subjected her to harassment based on sex. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful sexual harassment. Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC discriminated against her because she opposed an unlawful employment practice, or because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the FCRA. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful retaliation. Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that FWBMC’s actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to create a hostile work environment. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of hostile work environment. Finally, Ms. Landress presented no persuasive evidence that her working conditions at FWBMC were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her condition would have been compelled to resign. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of constructive discharge.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Jennifer L. Landress 7758 Ramona Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 For Respondents: Cymoril M. White, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Jennifer L. Landress’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Tracey K. Jaensch, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jennifer Lynn Landress 7758 Ramona Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cymoril M. White, Esquire Ford & Harrison, LLP 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Suite 900 Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of age and retaliating against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Meikle is an African-American male. At hearing, Mr. Meikle withdrew his claim of age discrimination. Mr. Meikle is only pursuing the claim of retaliation. Mr. Meikle was employed with the Radisson Hotel (Radisson), which was owned by Hotels Unlimited. Mr. Meikle’s supervisor at the Radisson was Harland McPhun, who was the Assistant General Manager. Mr. McPhun’s supervisor at the Radisson was Diane Gray, who was the General Manager. During his employment at the Radisson, Mr. Meikle was promoted from a cook to the Kitchen Director. He was very proud of being in the position of Kitchen Director. Mr. McPhun had not encountered any problems with Mr. Meikle being on time for work or being a “no-show” for work as scheduled. However, Mr. McPhun had encountered problems with Mr. Meikle in other areas, such as Mr. Meikle's providing his sister, who was employed at the front desk of the Radisson, with larger portions of food than the other employees; and being in places other than the kitchen area talking, i.e., at or near the front desk. Mr. McPhun gave Mr. Meikle verbal warnings, regarding the incidents, but never documented any of the verbal warnings. At some point in time, Hotels Unlimited decided to convert the Radisson to a Double Tree Hotel (Double Tree). The Double Tree’s structure required the position of a Food and Beverage Manager, who would supervise the food and beverage personnel, kitchen staff, and restaurant servers. Gerald Brown was hired as the Food and Beverage Manager in January 2008. Mr. Brown began his employment before the completion of the conversion from the Radisson to the Double Tree. On February 14, 2008, Mr. Brown held his first staff meeting with the entire staff over whom he had supervision. Mr. Meikle was late for the staff meeting. On February 16, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a “Disciplinary Document” indicating that he was giving Mr. Meikle his first written warning for being late at the meeting. Mr. Meikle admits that he was late for the meeting. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle (the date of the signature was not completed), by Mr. Brown, as the Manager (the date of the signature was not completed), and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 18, 2008. Additionally, on February 16, 2008, Mr. Brown issued another Disciplinary Document indicating that he was giving Mr. Meikle his first written warning for failing to follow rules and direction involving four different matters about which Mr. Brown had repeatedly counseled Mr. Meikle on several occasions, but were not being adhered to by Mr. Meikle. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle (the date of the signature was not completed), by Mr. Brown, as the Manager, on February 16, 2008, and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 18, 2008. On February 25, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a Disciplinary Document for an incident that occurred on February 23, 2008, a Saturday night. Mr. Meikle was scheduled to work, but he departed the kitchen and the hotel property without informing and obtaining permission from the manager. Hotels Unlimited’s policy required the informing of the manager in order for the manager to take appropriate steps to make adjustments to accommodate the absence. Mr. Meikle was entitled to a break, but he failed to notify the manager of his absence in accordance with the policy. The Disciplinary Document included a statement that “Disciplinary Action to be decided by the General Manager.” The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle on February 26, 2008, by Mr. Brown, as the Manager, on February 25, 2008, and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 26, 2008. Regarding Mr. Meikle’s absence from work on Saturday evening, February 23, 2008, he was working an 18-hour shift, without anyone to relieve him, which meant that he was unable to take a break. He was exhausted and needed to take a break. Before Mr. Brown was hired, Mr. Meikle was working the 18-hour shift, and after Mr. Brown was hired, Mr. Meikle agreed to continue working the 18-hour shift. Mr. Brown did not wish to disrupt what was already in place, so he agreed to allow Mr. Meikle to keep the 18-hour shift. It was not unreasonable for Mr. Brown to maintain Mr. Meikle on the 18-hour shift, as Mr. Meikle requested. On that same day, February 25, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a Disciplinary Document for an incident that occurred on February 25, 2008. Mr. Meikle raised his voice and became very loud, resulting in guests being disturbed. As Mr. Meikle had been absent from work on Saturday evening, February 23, 2008, Mr. Brown was inquiring of Mr. Meikle the reason for his (Mr. Meikle’s) absence. Further, during the conversation, Mr. Brown raised several other concerns. Mr. Meikle raised his voice and became very loud, which Mr. Brown determined was disturbing the guests. Mr. Brown requested Mr. Meikle to remove himself from the dining area. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Brown on February 26, 2008. Mr. Meikle refused to sign the Disciplinary Document where the employee’s signature is indicated; but, he (Mr. Meikle) noted on it, “Refuse to sign because I did what I was told,” and signed his name under the statement. Each Disciplinary Document indicated that Mr. Meikle’s termination was effective “2/29/08.” Mr. Brown did not indicate a date for termination on any Disciplinary Document and could offer no explanation as to why or how each Disciplinary Document contained such information. Furthermore, no testimony was presented as to why or how each Disciplinary Document contained such notation. Mr. Brown contacted Ms. Gray, recommending the termination of Mr. Meikle. Ms. Gray did not approve the recommendation; she wanted to continue to work with Mr. Meikle. On February 25, 2008, a letter, bearing the same date, from Mr. Meikle was faxed to Hotels Unlimited’s Human Resources. Among other things, Mr. Meikle notified Human Resources that he was working in a hostile work environment created by Mr. McPhun, providing examples of what he considered inappropriate action and conduct by Mr. McPhun; that Mr. McPhun “strongly dislike[s]” him “for whatever the reason”; that Mr. McPhun was taking food from the hotel and that he (Mr. Meikle) had reported it to the general manager; that all of his (Mr. Meikle’s) current problems at work stemmed from Mr. McPhun, providing examples of the problems that he (Mr. Meikle) had encountered2; that Mr. McPhun was the cause of all of his problems at work; that he (Mr. Meikle) had no one to ask for help; that Mr. McPhun was out to get him (Mr. Meikle) fired; that everyone was biased against him (Mr. Meikle) because of Mr. McPhun; and that a copy of the letter would be forwarded to the EEOC and the FCHR. Ms. Gray was notified by her superior that Human Resources had received a letter from Mr. Meikle, but she was not notified of the content of the letter nor did she receive or view a copy of the letter. Her superior told her to talk with Mr. Meikle and resolve the problem. Hotels Unlimited’s Employee Handbook, Employment Policies & Practices section, provides in pertinent part: Equal Employment * * * If you suspect discriminatory or harassing actions on the part of the Company or any other employee, you should immediately notify your General Manager or Corporate Department Head, as applicable, or, if you prefer, a Company Officer. Such notification will be held in confidence to the extent possible. Discriminatory behavior or action by any employee is cause for discharge. * * * Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment Policy Statement: Hotels Unlimited, Inc. is committed to a work environment in which all employees are treated with respect and dignity. It is the policy of Hotels Unlimited, Inc. to provide a work environment that is free from discrimination and harassment. Action, words or comments based on an individual’s sex, race, color, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, citizenship or any other characteristic protected by law – either overt or subtle – are demeaning to another person and undermine the integrity of the employment relationship. . . . * * * Harassment on the basis of any other protected characteristic is also strictly prohibited. Such harassment is defined as verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility toward an individual because of his/her race, color religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, citizenship or any other characteristic protected by law, and that has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance; or otherwise adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunity. * * * Administration of Policy: * * * It is unlawful to retaliate in any way against anyone who has complained about harassment. Any incident of retaliation should be reported in the same manner as an incident of harassment. Any employee who engages in such retaliation will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including discharge. All allegations of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation will be subject to prompt, thorough and confidential investigation. All investigations will be designed to protect the privacy of, and minimize suspicion toward, all parties involved. . . . The Employee Handbook provided protection against employment practices for statuses beyond those set forth by law.3 In the early morning hours of February 29, 2008, Mr. Meikle was awoken by a telephone call from a co-worker inquiring as to why he (Mr. Meikle) was not at work. Mr. Meikle informed his co-worker that he was off that day, but his co- worker advised that he (Mr. Meikle) was scheduled to work. Mr. Meikle telephoned Mr. Brown, who informed Mr. Meikle to be at work. Mr. Meikle reported to work, but failed to report for his shift as scheduled. Regarding Mr. Meikle’s failure to report to work on time for his scheduled shift, all work schedules for Food and Beverage, during Mr. Brown’s tenure, were typed and posted, one week in advance. The work week for Food and Beverage was Monday through Sunday. The posted work schedule for the week of February 25, 2008, was prepared, typed, and posted by Mr. Brown and indicated that Mr. Meikle was required to work on Monday, February 25, 2008, and Tuesday, February 26, 2008; was not required to work on Wednesday, February 27, 2008, and Thursday, February 28, 2008; but, was required to work on Friday, February 29, 2008, specifically, from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Mr. Meikle reviewed a work schedule for the week of February 25, 2008, that was typed and hand-written. The work schedule indicated that it was prepared by Mr. McPhun and that he (Mr. Meikle) was not required to work on Friday, February 29, 2008. Based on that work schedule, Mr. Meikle did not believe that he had to report to work on February 29, 2008. However, Mr. Meikle was required to report to work on February 29, 2008, and work from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. He failed to report to work for his shift as scheduled.4 No dispute exists that, at no time previously, had Mr. Meikle failed to report to work for his shift as scheduled. On February 29, 2008, Mr. Meikle was terminated for failing “to be at work on time for [his] schedule [sic] shift.” A Termination Report dated February 29, 2008, was signed by Mr. Brown, by Mr. Meikle, and Ms. Gray. Mr. Brown made the determination to terminate the employment of Mr. Meikle, and Ms. Gray agreed. Mr. McPhun did not participate with Mr. Brown and Ms. Gray in the determination to terminate the employment of Mr. Meikle. At the time of Mr. Meikle’s termination, Mr. Brown was not aware of Mr. Meikle’s letter to Hotels Unlimited’s Human Resources.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Hotels Unlimited/Double Tree did not retaliate against Marshall Meikle in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended and dismissing his petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2009.
