The Issue The issues are whether Respondent had good cause to reject the Escambia County School Superintendent's nomination of Petitioner to be principal of Woodham High School, and, if not, what relief should be granted to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Pensacola High School (PHS) is located in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. It is an inner city school of approximately 2000 students with a diverse population. Petitioner was appointed principal at PHS for the 1994- 1995 school year by Dr. Bill Malloy, the former Superintendent of Escambia County Schools. Petitioner served in that capacity until Superintendent Malloy transferred him in March of 1996 to the position of Director of Student Transfers. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent had a policy requiring principals to report incidents of suspected child abuse immediately to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)(currently the Department of Children and Families.) Another policy required principals to immediately report bomb threats to the district office and to proceed with the evacuation of the school property as instructed. Before school began in the fall of 1995, Petitioner assigned Kevin Sanders to be the teacher in charge of the In School Suspension (ISS) class. Petitioner made this assignment because Mr. Sanders previously had developed and successfully operated a similar class at PHS. The school district approved the plan at PHS for an ISS unit as designed by Mr. Sanders. Mr. Sanders also served as a weight training coach at PHS. He was not the only teacher/coach to run an ISS program for Respondent during the 1995-1996 school year. At least three other schools had coaches running their respective ISS programs in the fall of 1995. There is no persuasive evidence that the assignment of a coach to be in charge of an ISS class was in direct contravention of the Superintendent's instructions. No one ever told Petitioner that the Superintendent did not want a coach-like person in charge of the ISS class. Mr. Sanders wanted to work in the weight room at the stadium during the last period of the school day. Petitioner told Mr. Sanders that he could work in the weight room, provided he found someone to supervise his ISS class during that period. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Sanders had permission from Petitioner to take his ISS students to the stadium and leave them unattended in the bleachers. On October 16, 1995, a fifteen-year-old female student skipped school. The police returned the female student to PHS. As a consequence of her actions, the female student was temporarily assigned to the ISS class taught by Mr. Sanders. Normally, the female student attended a class for special students in the Exceptional Student Education (ESE) program. She functioned academically on a third or fourth grade level. On October 17, 1995, Ms. Sanders took his ISS class to the stadium and told them to sit in the bleachers. He then went to the weight room leaving the class unsupervised. The female student went into one of the restrooms in the stadium. She performed fellatio on a number of male students, primarily football players, in the presence of many other students. In the fall of 1995, PHS had several deans who served the general student population. Richard Sousa was the dean of students for ESE participants. He also served as the crisis teacher for the total student population at PHS. On October 18, 1995, Mr. Sousa saw a group of students outside the dean's office. When he investigated, Mr. Sousa found the female student sitting in a chair with her hands on her head. After Mr. Sousa closed the door to the deans' office, the female student stated that other students were falsely accusing her of performing oral sex with some boys. Mr. Sousa then took the female student to an ESE self-contained classroom so that she would not be harassed. Next, Mr. Sousa called the female student's mother and reported the facts as he understood them. The mother told Mr. Sousa that her daughter was not sexually active. Mr. Sousa asked the mother to pick up her daughter from school because the child was visibly upset. Later that day, Mr. Sousa reported to Petitioner that he had heard a rumor about sexual activity occurring in the stadium, on the fifty-yard line, or on the practice field. Mr. Sousa told Petitioner that other students were teasing the female student who denied being involved in any sexual behavior. After receiving this report, Petitioner directed Assistant Principal Leo Carvalis to contact Coach David Wilson, the head football coach. Petitioner instructed Coach Wilson and Mr. Sousa to investigate the rumor regarding the sexual activity. Coach Wilson talked to the football team that afternoon. The team assured him that they knew nothing of any sexual incident in the stadium, the football field, or the practice field. Coach Wilson and Petitioner discussed the situation again later that day. Petitioner told Coach Wilson to continue to listen to what was going on among the students, to ask questions, and to make his findings known. Petitioner gave other members of his staff and faculty the same instructions. Petitioner wanted to determine whether there was any truth to the rumor about the sexual incident. He wanted to discipline any students involved, including football players. However, Petitioner did not want to accuse any student, including the alleged victim, of inappropriate behavior until he had more facts. At the end of the day on October 18, 1995, Mr. Sousa did not believe that the sexual incident had occurred. He knew that special education students are often harassed, ostracized and picked on. Mr. Sousa thought the teasing would blow over and the female student could be returned to her regular classroom. Mr. Sousa expressed this opinion to Petitioner. For the rest of the week, Mr. Sousa took lunch to the female student in the ESE self-contained classroom because other students teased and pointed fingers at her. Mr. Sousa had to walk to the bus with the female student for the same reason. Nevertheless, Mr. Sousa continued to believe the rumor was false. His disbelief was based in part on the female student's persistent denials. Additionally, it was not uncommon for a rumor such as the one at issue here to prove to be unfounded. The next week, the female student requested that she be permitted to return to her regular ESE classes because she believed the teasing was over. Mr. Sousa granted the female student's request; however, after a couple of class periods, Mr. Sousa returned her to the self-contained classroom because even the special education students were saying things about her. Amanda Williams and Naomi Ferguson were guidance counselors at PHS during the fall of 1995. On October 26, 1995, Ms. Ferguson indicated to PHS Assistant Principal Sarah Armstrong that Petitioner knew about the sexual incident involving some of the football players. According to Ms. Ferguson, Petitioner was trying to cover up the situation because the football team was doing well. Later that day, Petitioner held a meeting in his office with Ms. Ferguson, Ms. Williams, Mr. Sousa, Ms. Armstrong, and Mr. Carvalis. During the meeting, Ms. Armstrong advised Petitioner that Ms. Williams had information from a male student (an informant) confirming the sexual incident but would not reveal her source because of confidentiality concerns. Petitioner asked Ms. Williams to speak with him in private. During their private conversation Ms. Williams revealed that an informant had given her information about a second male student who was involved in the sexual incident at the stadium. Ms. Williams gave Petitioner the names of both students. When he and Ms. Williams returned to the meeting, Petitioner stated, "I believe something must have happened. This is a credible witness." He also stated, "To hell with the football team. If these players can get away with this now, what will they think they can get away with in the future?" For the first time, Petitioner began to suspect that the sexual incident was factual and not an unfounded rumor. Ms. Ferguson revealed additional information about the female student at the meeting on October 26, 1995. Ms. Ferguson stated that the female student's mother intended to send her daughter to live with an uncle in Tampa, Florida. The female student did not want to make this move. The female student told Ms. Ferguson that the uncle had sexually molested her in the past. Ms. Armstrong stated that someone needed to call HRS to report the suspected sexual abuse by a family member. The group decided that HRS should also look into the allegations of sexual activity at the school. Petitioner instructed Ms. Ferguson to call HRS. He asked her to wait just long enough for someone to advise the female student's mother that an investigation was pending. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner ever intended to cover up the sexual incident. Likewise, he did not unreasonably delay his staff from reporting their suspicions to HRS. On October 26, 1995, Petitioner mistakenly understood that cases of suspected child abuse had to be reported to HRS within 24 hours instead of immediately. The last instructions he gave in the meeting on October 26, 1995, was to remind Ms. Ferguson to call HRS. She made that call on October 27, 1995. The female student was isolated from the general student population in the self-contained ESE classroom at PHS. Therefore, Mr. Sousa recommended at the meeting on October 26, 1995, that the school conduct an Individual Education Plan (IEP) meeting to review the female student's placement. He believed that the female student should be transferred to another school so that she could attend classes with the general population. After receiving Petitioner's authorization, Mr. Sousa contacted the Exceptional Student Education (ESE) district staff to arrange for an IEP meeting. Mr. Sousa also called the female student's mother on October 27, 1995, to advise her of his recommendation. On October 27, 1995, Petitioner talked to the male student who, according to Ms. Williams' informant, participated in the sexual incident at the stadium. The male student confirmed that the sexual incident occurred in the stadium. However, there is no evidence that the student admitted his personal involvement in the sexual activity to Petitioner at that time. The police investigation later revealed that the male student was one of the students who had participated in the sexual incident. At the IEP meeting on October 31, 1995, the entire IEP team, including ESE teachers from PHS and Woodham High School (WHS), ESE district staff, and the female student and her mother, discussed the reasons for changing the student's placement to WHS. Everyone on the IEP team, except the female student, believed that she should be transferred to a new school environment with peers who did not know her. The female student begged her mother not to permit the transfer. However, the parent agreed that the transfer was in her daughter's best interest and offered to provide transportation. On November 1, 1995 or November 2, 1995, the female student was supposed to enroll at WHS. Instead, she returned to PHS. Mr. Sousa called the mother to pick up her daughter and take her to WHS. On November 3, 1995, Mr. Sousa called the female student's mother. She stated that everything was all right with her daughter at WHS. On Monday, November 6, 1995, the female student's mother called Mr. Sousa because her daughter had run away from home. The mother wanted Mr. Sousa to be on the lookout for her daughter. During the conversation, the mother stated for the first time that the rumors about the sexual incident might be true because, despite her daughter's denials, it had been confirmed by one of her daughter's friends. Mr. Sousa informed Petitioner about the suspicions of the female student's mother. Petitioner then directed Coach Wilson to talk with the football team again. No one on the team would admit their involvement in the sexual incident. Petitioner also told the deans and the assistant principals to see if they could determine what had happened and who was involved. The efforts of the faculty and staff to verify the rumors were unsuccessful. On November 9, 1995, Petitioner received a letter from Ms. Ferguson suggesting that he was responsible for trying to cover up the sexual incident. He also received a call from Special Assistant to the School Superintendent Jerry Watson, stating that he had heard "bad things" were going on at PHS. Petitioner called a meeting with the appropriate PHS staff to discuss information about the alleged sexual incident. They reviewed information furnished by the male students and the female student's mother. During this meeting, Petitioner expressed his concern that someone in the group was acting unprofessionally by leaking confidential information about students to persons outside of PHS. Petitioner advised the group that he would try to transfer anyone who breached the students' confidentially. Petitioner did not make these comments to threaten or intimidate his staff and faculty or to cover up the sexual episode. After the meeting on November 9, 1995, Petitioner took Ms. Ferguson's letter to the district office where he met with Sherman Robinson, Deputy School Superintendent. Petitioner told Mr. Robinson about the facts leading up to the receipt of the letter. Mr. Robinson told Petitioner to contact Joe Hammons, the Superintendent's attorney, for advice as to the appropriate action. Petitioner then made an appointment with Mr. Hammons for Monday, November 13, 1995, because Friday, November 10, 1995, was a holiday. On November 13, 1995, Mr. Hammons met with Petitioner. At this meeting, Petitioner told Mr. Hammons what he knew concerning the sexual incident. Mr. Hammons then scheduled a meeting for November 14, 1995, with Petitioner, Mr. Robinson, and two members from the school district's risk management department. At the meeting on November 14, 1995, the group determined that information available from the male students and the female student's mother, justified contacting the Pensacola Police Department. Upon leaving that meeting, Petitioner contacted Sergeant Potts at the police department. The deans at PHS generally handled all disciplinary problems until they determined that a crime had been or might have been committed. At that point, the staff involved the school resource officer. In this case Petitioner relied on his staff to investigate the rumors of the sexual incident and did not involve the school resource officer. Until November 1995, Petitioner was not aware that, if the rumors of the sexual incident proved true, a crime had been committed. Shortly thereafter, Dusty Cutler of the Pensacola Police Department was assigned to investigate the sexual incident at PHS. On November 15, 1995, Officer Cutler talked to the female student who continued to deny all allegations. The female student did not admit to being involved in the sexual incident for several weeks after Officer Cutler began her investigation. Pursuant to Petitioner's suggestion, Officer Cutler also talked to the male student identified by Ms. Williams' informant as one of the participants in the sexual incident. The female student's mother told Officer Cutler that she did not want a police investigation. The mother became upset with the way Officer Cutler was talking to her. Petitioner complained to Lieutenant Knowles of the Pensacola Police Department about Officer Cutler's "abusive" behavior to the mother of the female student. From that time forward, Officer Cutler never spoke to Petitioner even though she spent six months investigating the sexual incident on a daily basis. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner interfered with Officer Cutler's investigation or failed to cooperate with her in any way. Officer Cutler reported the sexual incident to HRS. The agency gave her the same response they had given Ms. Ferguson, i.e., HRS would not investigate or follow the case because the sexual activity was not a rape and a family member was not involved. After Officer Cutler was assigned to the case, Petitioner was instructed by the school district to do nothing further until the police investigation was concluded. The Grand Jury released its Amended Report on Pensacola High School on April 15, 1996. The report indicted several male students involved in the sexual incident. Petitioner did not have an opportunity to discipline the students because he was not working at PHS at that time. In the spring of 1996, a number of middle school and high schools in the Pensacola area received bomb threats over the telephone. PHS received bomb threats on at least three occasions. The school evacuated to the adjoining football stadium on one occasion, to the fairgrounds on another occasion, and to Pensacola Junior College on a third occasion. On March 29, 1996, about 7:00 a.m., a school secretary, received a bomb threat call at PHS. Mr. Sousa received a second bomb threat call at PHS around 7:15 or 7:30. On both occasions the caller's voice was a raspy, young man's voice. The school secretary and Mr. Sousa recognized the voice of the caller as a young man in one of the self-contained classrooms. The student had created problems in the past. Each time he behaved improperly, the student would use his raspy voice. Mr. Sousa reported the first bomb threat to Mr. Carvalis. Mr. Carvalis called Petitioner at his home. Petitioner was not at school because he was not feeling well because he had been at the emergency room much of the night before. Petitioner instructed Mr. Carvalis to initiate a search. The search included a sweep of the stadium in case the school had to evacuate to that area. Petitioner advised Mr. Carvalis that he was on his way to the school. When Petitioner arrived at PHS, Mr. Carvalis informed him of the second threatening call. The staff again assured Petitioner that they knew the caller's identity, and that both calls had been made by the same student. The student was not at school. Therefore, Petitioner directed Mr. Sousa and the resource officer, Max Cramer, to go to the student's home and request the student's parent to bring the student to school. In the meantime, a third call was received from the same caller. Next, Petitioner phoned Deputy Superintendent Sherman Robinson. Petitioner explained to Mr. Robinson about the bomb threat and the school's discovery of the identity of the caller. Jones believed from his discussion with Mr. Robinson that his handling of the situation and his decision not to evacuate the school had the tacit approval, if not the explicit permission, of the district office. Petitioner believed Mr. Robinson concurred in his decision not to evacuate. The student with the raspy voice and his parent subsequently arrived at the school. After questioning the student, Petitioner believed the student was the caller. Petitioner decided to continue the search of the school without evacuating it. Petitioner directed Mr. Carvalis and the maintenance men to divide into teams and sweep the campus using the techniques taught by a handler of a bomb sniffing dog after previous threats. On one occasion a bomb sniffing dog and his handler came to PHS from Eglin Air Force Base in Ft. Walton. The PHS campus was so large that the dog got tired and refused to work about half way through the search. On that occasion, the search continued in the same manner employed by Petitioner on March 29, 1996. During the search on March 29, 1996, seven different groups looked for anything that was out of place. All of the deans had assigned areas where they searched trash bins, open lockers, and open classrooms. Later in the school day, Mr. Carvalis reported that the entire campus, including the portables, had been swept and nothing found. Petitioner does not dispute that he did not follow the Superintendent's policy regarding bomb threats on the day in question. Petitioner believed that he knew the identity of the caller. He also was concerned about the disruption that the bomb threats were causing to the academic programs at PHS. The students in the gifted program were preparing to take their advanced placement tests. The students in the International Baccalaureate program were studying for their exams. Additionally, March 29, 1996 was the last chance for some students to take the high school competency test before graduation. Superintendent Malloy was particularly concerned that Petitioner failed to evacuate the school. The previous day he had reiterated his policy of evacuation to all principals. However, Petitioner did not attend the meeting; one of Petitioner's assistant principals attended that meeting in his absence. On March 30, 1996, Superintendent Malloy placed Petitioner on administrative leave with pay, pending an investigation of his failure to evacuate PHS after a bomb threat. Superintendent Malloy subsequently assigned Petitioner to his current position as Director of Student Transfers. On June 3, 1996, Superintendent Malloy issued a letter reprimanding Petitioner for the following reasons: (1) failing to ensure that the ISS class had appropriate supervision; (2) failing to follow up on information regarding sexual activity in the stadium in a timely manner; and (3) failing to evacuate the school after receiving a bomb threat. In November of 1996, Jim May was elected Escambia County School Superintendent. On or about June 10, 1997, the Commissioner of Education, Frank T. Brogan, filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner in Education Practices Commission (EPC) Case Number 956-1609-B. This complaint alleged that Petitioner failed in his responsibilities to ensure that all students under his charge were properly supervised. The complaint also alleged that Petitioner failed to evacuate the school after receiving a bomb threat. On June 24, 1997, Superintendent May nominated Petitioner to be principal of WHS. At the time of the nomination, Superintendent May was aware of the relevant facts concerning the PHS sex incident and bomb threat incident. Additionally, he had been in contact with counsel for the Florida Department of Education regarding EPC Case Number 956-1609-B. Respondent rejected Petitioner's nomination to be principal of WHS. On a 3 to 2 vote, Respondent found good cause to reject the nomination based on the following: Among the reasons articulated by the three Board Members who voted against the nomination were, in addition to the reasons presented by the other speakers, Mr. Jones' unsatisfactory past performance of his duties when he served as Principal of Pensacola High School (which events were the subject of a grand jury report and are the subject of an administrative complaint by the Commissioner of Education now pending before the Education Practice Commission proceeding, . . . his lack of subsequent training to improve his skills in the areas in which his poor performance resulted in his 1996 removal as Principal of Pensacola High School, and his apparent violation of certain of the principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida, in addition to gross insubordination and willful neglect of duty in connection with the Pensacola High School incidents. In sum the three Board Members who voted against the nomination felt that Mr. Jones is presently unqualified to be a Principal. After Respondent rejected his nomination, Petitioner told Superintendent May that it was unfair to the students of WHS to make them wait for a principal. On July 22, 1997, Superintendent May nominated another person to be principal at WHS. On or about November 6, 1997, the Florida Department of Education decided that it would withdraw its probable cause determination against Petitioner and enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with him. The department requested the Education Practices Commission to close EPC Case Number 956-1609-B. On or about March 9, 1998, Superintendent May advised the Florida Department of Education that Petitioner had performed his assigned duties and responsibilities in a professional manner during the period of January 10, 1997 and March 1, 1997. Petitioner had fully complied with all district and state rules and regulations. On or about March 26, 1998, Education Commissioner Brogan determined that there was no probable cause to suspend or revoke Petitioner's teacher's certificate. Petitioner was released from his Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the department. Petitioner holds the proper state certification for a high school principal. Except for the two incidents in question, Petitioner's performance at PHS was exemplary. Under his leadership, the school population was stable and well under control. Petitioner created an atmosphere at PHS where high quality performance on the part of a number of students was recognized, encouraged, and supported by the faculty and staff. Petitioner had an excellent relationship with students, teachers, and the PHS Advisory Council. Petitioner genuinely cared for the health, safety and welfare of the students at PHS. He was concerned more about the feelings and self-esteem of the students than with winning academic and athletic competitions, and he did not make accusatory judgments about his students until he had the necessary facts and proof to support those accusations.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order finding that there is no good cause to reject Superintendent May's nomination of Petitioner to be principal at WHS, promoting him to that position, and awarding him any back pay to which he may be entitled. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, the Pinellas County School Board, should suspend the Respondent, Kay Kennedy, from her employment as a teacher for three days without pay on charges contained in July 5, and September 7, 1990, letters from the School Superintendent, Scott N. Rose. The July 5 letter lists as charges: (1) "on at least two occasions, you made vulgar and demeaning remarks to students"; (2) "you roughly handled a student in a disciplinary manner"; and (3) "you have been cautioned and reprimanded for this behavior in the past." The September 7 letter adds the charges that the Respondent: (1) "stared at approximately nine female students making them feel uncomfortable as they dressed or undressed"; (2) "touched two students inappropriately"; (3) "coerced students to write statements purporting to retract their allegations"; and (4) "misrepresented the truth to [her] administrator concerning the incidents." The letters charge that the allegations constitute misconduct in office and gross insubordination, grounds for discipline under Section 231.36(4), Fla. Stat. (1989).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Kay Kennedy, was one of two physical education (PE) teachers at the Clearwater Comprehensive Middle School in the Pinellas County School District during the 1989/1990 school year. She is on a continuing teaching contract with the Pinellas County School Board, and is teaching PE at another area middle school during the 1990-1991 school year. She holds a master's degree and has some credits towards a Ph.D. She has 22 years of teaching experience and is certified to teach in Florida, as well as in Illinois and California (secondary and junior college). While teaching in Pinellas County in years prior to the 1989/1990 school year, the Respondent has been accused of using vulgar and demeaning language towards students and vulgar language in the presence of students, of rough handling of students, and of misrepresenting facts to administration. As to the alleged use of vulgar and demeaning language towards students and the alleged rough handling in prior years, the charges were not proven. 2/ It was, however, proven that the Respondent was reprimanded and warned that the allegations, if proven, would constitute misconduct. As to the charge that the Respondent misrepresented facts to administration in years prior to the 1989/1990 school year, the evidence proved that in October, 1986, the assistant principal at Clearwater Comprehensive, Thomas M. Crook, confronted the Respondent with a student's allegation that the Respondent confiscated a camera from the student and used the camera to take pictures. The Respondent admitted confiscating the camera but, on two separate occasions, denied taking pictures with it. After being confronted with evidence that she did, the Respondent admitted that she had indeed taken pictures with the camera and was reprimanded. As to the charge that the Respondent used vulgar language in the presence of students in years prior to the 1989/1990 school year, the evidence proved that, at the very end of the 1987/1988 school year, the Respondent's new car was vandalized, apparently by students, during school on June 8, 1988, while parked off school grounds. Wood glue had been poured on the car, tomatoes had been smashed on the car, and the car tires had been slashed. When the Respondent saw the condition of her new car, she was very upset and angry. While some students and teachers were helping the Respondent try to clean her car, the Respondent was heard to say "G damn sons of bitches," not directed to anyone in particular. While the Respondent generally denies using the word "bitch," she admits that she was upset while the group was trying to clean her car on that occasion and admits that she does not recall what she might have said on that occasion. Even under those circumstances, the Respondent was reprimanded for using that language in the presence of students. The Respondent also stands accused of calling one or more students a "bitch," or some variation of that vulgarity, during the 1989/1990 school. This charge was precipitated when, on or about April 27, 1990, a student named Nina Schwartz, whom the Respondent recently had notified that she was failing PE during the fifth grading period (the first grading period of the third of four 12-week school quarters), accused the Respondent of inappropriately touching her and staring at her in the PE locker room during the fifth grading period while the student was dressing after showering. Nina gave the school principal, Edward Baldwin, the names of other students who she said could verify her accusations or give similar statements about the Respondent. One of the names Nina gave Baldwin was Christina Everett. Christina was a friend of Nina. When Nina told Christina about the accusation she had made, Christina started talking in general to the students that the Respondent was in trouble and was going to be fired. Christina also volunteered her own accusations--that the Respondent called her a "bitch" and that the Respondent roughly pulled her off the stage in the gymnasium during PE in order to discipline her. Several other students were called to Baldwin's office to give statements. Several were under the influence of Nina and Christina and gave statements generally corroborative of their statements. However, the details of the statements were rife with inconsistencies, and the evidence presented was weak. It seemed that every alleged witness had a different version of the variation of the vulgarity containing the word "bitch" that the Respondent allegedly used. Some had the expletive being said to Christina, some to another student. Some had it being said in the gymnasium; some said it happened at shuffleboard courts across the street from the school. As for Christina's allegation that the Respondent pulled her off the stage in the gymnasium, there were serious inconsistencies between Christina's version and the version of her main supposed witness, her friend Tara Sims. In addition, the alleged incident was unlikely to have occurred because, by Christina's own testimony, she would have struck back at the Respondent if the Respondent had tried to pull her off the stage. 3/ There is no evidence that such an altercation took place. Apparently as part of the School Board's case that the Respondent inappropriate stared at students, the School Board elicited testimony supposedly to prove the unlikely story that the Respondent deliberately and lewdly looked up the dress of a mentally retarded student in her class. The supposed victim of this alleged misconduct did not testify, and those who did said that the incident supposedly occurred when the alleged victim asked the Respondent to help with a stuck skirt zipper. Some of the testimony was given in terms that it "seemed," or "looked like," the Respondent was looking up the girl's dress. Some of the School Board's witnesses on other incidents also gave rather neutral statements supportive of neither side. For example, several girls gave weak statements to the effect that they "felt" uncomfortable when the Respondent checked on them in the locker room when they were dressing or undressing (part of the Respondent's job as PE teacher) and the Respondent "seemed" to be staring at them although they were not sure she was staring at them and "could have been" just looking in their general direction. After Baldwin referred the matter to School District personnel officials for handling, some of the witnesses gave additional statements, some by deposition. These statements added to the inconsistencies of the first set of statements. By the time of the hearing, Nina's story changed from accusing the Respondent of having touched her during the fifth grading period to having touched her during the first or second grading period. (Nina had health in place of PE during the third and fourth grading periods.) This change accommodated the fact with which Nina by then had been confronted that the students did not take showers during the fifth grading period (because the weather was cold, and there was no hot water.) But it did not accommodate the fact that the two primary supposed witnesses to the deed, Christina and another girl named Donna Newland, did not take PE during the first or second grading period. Seemingly unconcerned by the inconsistencies and weaknesses in its case, the School Board presented all of the witnesses' testimony, which repeated and even added to the inconsistencies in the original statements and subsequent statements. Suffice it to say, the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegations that the Respondent "made vulgar and demeaning remarks to students," "roughly handled a student in a disciplinary manner," "stared at female students making them feel uncomfortable as they dressed or undressed," or "touched students inappropriately." The Respondent also stands accused of "coerc[ing] students to write statements purporting to retract their allegations" and "misrepresent[ing] the truth to [her] administrator concerning the incidents." The former allegation was based on statements from some of the students to Baldwin. But the only evidence, other than those hearsay statements, was the Respondent's testimony denying the charge, the testimony of one of the students, Shannon Butler, also contradicting the charge, and the testimony of another student, Tina Farrell, that Tina "heard," from unspecified sources, that the Respondent had asked others to write notes, of unspecified content, and so Tina wrote one herself, unsolicited by the Respondent, and slipped it under the Respondent's office door so that the Respondent would not ask her for one. 4/ As to the latter allegation, since the School Board did not prove the truth of any of the current charges, it did not prove that the Respondent's denial of those charges constituted misrepresentations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the School Board of Pinellas County enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent, Kay Kennedy. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1991.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, in the performance of his duties as a city employee, used city property negligently or without authorization and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is employed by Petitioner as an Equipment Operator II in the Parks and Recreation Department. Respondent has worked for Petitioner for several years. Respondent’s supervisor, Rick Schill, has been a supervisor for 13 years. He has supervised Respondent for three years. In late March 1997, Mr. Schill directed Respondent to work in Eco Park. Eco Park is a natural area owned by Petitioner that was overgrown with vegetation, especially Brazilian Pepper trees. Petitioner had received a grant of over $400,000 that required, among other things, that it remove all exotic vegetation, such as Brazilian Pepper, from Eco Park by December 1997. Around the end of February 1997, Mr. Schill had asked Bob Taylor, a supervisor in the Streets Department, to remove the Brazilian Peppers, but the Streets Department did not commence the work when agreed. Mr. Schill was anxious that the work proceed without delay because it partly depended on chemical treatment, which could not be undertaken once the rainy season started. Removing mature Brazilian Pepper trees is difficult, particularly when the trees have grown in dense tangles, as they had done at Eco Park. Several years ago, Petitioner removed Brazilian Pepper trees from the Northgate area. A current city employee who worked on the Northgate project testified that the Brazilian Pepper is like barbed wire and can easily slash brake and hydraulic lines and tires. Attacking rooted masses of five or six gnarled trunks of 8-10 inches each in diameter at the base, this employee, using similar equipment to what Respondent used in this case, also smashed headlights, twice popped-off windshields, and frequently got the equipment stuck. He also explained that the root rakes that Petitioner has since purchased do not help tear out the trees easier; they only eliminate the dirt. A threshold problem in this case is the unsuitability of Petitioner's equipment to remove Brazilian Pepper in difficult terrain, especially when the vegetation has been allowed to mature to the extent that the vegetation had at Eco Park. A bulldozer is the most suitable equipment for tree removal under these circumstances, but Petitioner does not own a bulldozer. Petitioner has previously rented a bulldozer for such jobs, as at Mariner High School, but refused Respondent's request that it rent one for the Eco Park job. Respondent began the Eco Park job with a 580 backhoe that he borrowed from the Streets Department. After a couple of days, possibly devoted to preliminary trash removal, Respondent returned the 580 backhoe and asked Bob Taylor, a supervisor in the Streets Department, if he could borrow the department’s larger Case W-20 front-end loader. Respondent believes that Mr. Taylor mistakenly authorized Respondent to take the W-20 belonging to the Stormwater Department. Mr. Taylor testified that he told Respondent that the W-20 was unavailable because it was clearing Brazilian Pepper trees elsewhere. The Streets and Stormwater departments stored their heavy-duty equipment in the same yard. The Stormwater Department had Petitioner's only other W-20 front-end loader, which was in the yard when Respondent was finished with the 580 backhoe. Petitioner has not proved that Respondent took the Stormwater Department’s W-20 without anyone’s permission. Two facts militate against a finding of unauthorized removal of the W-20 by Respondent. First, nothing in the record suggests why Respondent would steal city equipment to do city work. Second, after failing to get a bulldozer, Respondent was sufficiently wary of being held responsible for damage to city equipment that he insisted on a witness at Eco Park, so it is unlikely that, given such caution at the possibility of equipment damage, he would take the W-20 without permission. In any event, Respondent took the Stormwater Department’s W-20 front-end loader to Eco Park. On March 27, 1997, while Respondent was operating the W-20 removing Brazilian Peppers, a branch, trunk, or stump pierced the tire, and Respondent got the machine stuck in a marshy area of the park. A few days later, after the flat had been repaired, Respondent severed a hydraulic line, broke the windshield, and possibly broke a headlight. Respondent next borrowed a Case 621 loader from the Stormwater Department. Respondent got the Case 621 stuck in the muck and borrowed a Trojan to try to free the Case 621. In doing so, Respondent damaged the engine cover on the Case 621 and damaged its hydraulic lines. Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent operated any city equipment negligently, without authorization, or in violation of uniformly enforced procedures concerning use or authorization. Whenever the equipment was damaged, Respondent promptly notified Mr. Schill or Fleet Department personnel, who were responsible for equipment repairs and maintenance. At all times, Respondent used the equipment in the scope and course of his employment--specifically, his assignment to remove Brazilian Peppers from Eco Park. The damage was most directly caused by the failure of Petitioner to rent the bulldozer requested by Respondent.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the School Board of Pinellas County should dismiss the Respondent on charges of alleged misconduct in office and sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Frederick Lemiesz, was employed by the Pinellas County School District as a chef instructor at Pinellas Technical Education Center in St. Petersburg (PTEC-St. Pete) from 1978 until his suspension without pay on June 12, 1996. In that time, he has been disciplined only once—on April 28, 1995, he received a letter of reprimand for threatening, pushing and using profane and abusive language toward another staff member. During the 1995-1996 school year, the Respondent taught a Gibbs High School student named Amanda Beasely, who was in the culinary arts program at PTEC-St. Pete. Amanda had been identified as having a special learning disability (SLD) was receiving SLD services both at Gibbs High, where she was taking her academic classes, and at PTEC-St. Pete, where she was taking vocational classes. Most of the 1995-1996 school year passed without incident of any kind. During a culinary arts class in May, 1996, the Respondent engaged Amanda in conversation regarding her intentions after her graduation from high school in June, 1996. When she told him that she had no plans, the Respondent asked her if she ever had thought of a career in modeling. She replied that she had not. He encouraged her to consider it. She agreed, and the Respondent explained to her that it would be necessary to have a portfolio of photographs to get started. He offered to make arrangements for a portfolio. Again, she agreed. The Respondent told Amanda to follow him, and he led her to the photography room of Terry Allison, a Commercial Photography Instructor at PTEC-St. Pete. The Respondent introduced Amanda to Allison and told Allison that Amanda needed a portfolio to get start her career as a model. Allison explained to them that initially she would need a “composite sheet,” not a “portfolio.” (A “composite sheet” consisted of a number of black and white photographs from the neck up.) He told them that the cost of a composite sheet would be $25. The Respondent agreed to the price, and Allison made an appointment for 7:15 the next morning. The Respondent told Amanda not to be concerned about her culinary arts class scheduled for the same time because the Respondent would mark her as being present. At some point, the Respondent offered to act as Amanda’s manager and explained to her that a manager usually received ten percent of the money a model made. Amanda told her that ten percent seemed reasonable to her. The Respondent believed that he had a verbal contract with Amanda to be her manager and that the contract would serve to compensate him for his expenses. That evening, Amanda reported to her parents what the Respondent had told her and what he had arranged for her the next morning. Her parents did not object to the idea but had some concerns. Apparently, Amanda’s parents inquired about it at Gibbs High, and somehow Dorothy Zeason, a Varying Exceptionalities Specialist at Gibbs High learned about it. Zeason and notified Sharon Lane, Amanda’s Varying Exceptionalities Specialist at PTEC-St. Pete. Zeason requested that Lane look into the situation. When Lane saw Amanda at PTEC-St. Pete the next morning all dressed up and carrying a change of clothes, it reminded her of her conversation with Zeason, and she asked Amanda about it. When Amanda told her that she was on the way to the photo shoot, Lane asked to accompany Amanda to her culinary arts class, where they met the Respondent. The question of payment was raised, and the Respondent assured them that he was going to pay for the composite sheet. Still not sure of the situation, Lane accompanied Amanda to meet Allison at the photography room. There, Allison told Lane what was planned. When Lane told Allison that Amanda’s mother had some concerns, Allison asked if Amanda was a high school student. When told that she was, Allison expressed surprise and said that, in that case, written parental permission was required. At that point, Amanda returned to her culinary arts class, and no photographs ever were taken. The Respondent telephoned Amanda at her home on two occasions in May, 1996. The first of these may have been the evening before the aborted photo shoot. During this first conversation, the Respondent spoke to Amanda about Amanda’s modeling career and about their agreement that the Respondent would act as her manager. The Respondent could give no good school-related reason for placing this call. (He said he called to verify personal information provided by Amanda for school purposes, but evidently saw no reason to do so earlier in the school year.) The Respondent also spoke to Amanda privately in his office at the culinary arts school at PTEC-St. Pete. On one occasion, the Respondent showed Amanda several pictures of a former girl friend who had died twenty years ago. The Respondent told Amanda that she reminded him of the deceased girl friend and that, if he was showing her any “extra liking,” it was because of this. In either the same or another conversation in his office in May, 1996, the Respondent asked Amanda if she believed in reincarnation and then told her that he believed the spirit of his former girl friend was inside Amanda. This kind of talk made Amanda uncomfortable. During either the same or another conversation in his office in May, 1996, the Respondent offered Amanda a spoon ring he had purchased in the PTEC-St. Pete jewelry workshop for about $5 and said he wanted Amanda to take it as a gift from him. Amanda tried several times to decline, saying that she did not feel right about accepting it, but the Respondent was insistent. He suggested that Amanda have it sized, if necessary, or exchange it for something she liked better. To placate the Respondent, Amanda accepted the spoon ring. She brought it to the jewelry workshop for sizing but never returned to pick it up. On another occasion during culinary arts class in May, 1996, the Respondent called Amanda into his office and told her that he wanted to give her money as a gift for her upcoming graduation and birthday. Once again, Amanda tried several times to decline, saying that she did not feel right about accepting it, and the Respondent again was insistent. However, this time the Respondent finally resigned himself to Amanda’s repeated refusals, telling her that he guessed he would just have to give the money to someone else. On another occasion during culinary arts class in May, 1996, Amanda and a friend thought they saw the Respondent winking at Amanda in a manner of flirting. During one of the Respondent’s conversations with Amanda in May, 1996, he asked for directions to her home and asked her to describe the house. The Respondent could give no good school-related reason for why he needed this information. The Respondent was intoxicated when he telephoned Amanda at her home the second time in May, 1996. (He claims not to remember anything about this telephone call due to his intoxication from a combination of alcohol and prescription drugs.) The Respondent first addressed Amanda by the wrong name. Then he introduced himself first as “Bo.” When she did not recognize the name (or voice), he told her he was her “teacher, Mr. Lemiesz.” During this conversation, the Respondent told Amanda that he thought she was beautiful, that he loved looking into her beautiful brown eyes, and that he loved her dimples and smile. He also told her that he believed the two of them were spiritually connected and were going to be friends for life. It was a Saturday, and the Respondent asked Amanda what she was doing the next day, Sunday. He told her that he was going out on his sailboat. She took it as an invitation to go with him, and she told him she was going to church in the morning and would be busy all the rest of the day. This second telephone conversation made Amanda uncomfortable. When her parents returned home, Amanda told them about it. Amanda’s parents became concerned for her safety and reported the series of incidents to her school. Amanda declined to return to school at PTEC-St. Pete for the few days remaining before the end of the school year. Action taken by the School Board culminated in the June 12, 1996, letter suspending the Respondent without pay and recommending his dismissal. The letter and its grounds were reported in the St. Petersburg Times. As a result of the Respondent’s conduct in May, 1996, his effectiveness in the school system has been impaired to some degree. Amanda’s parents would not want the Respondent teaching their daughter or any other female student, and school administrators are apprehensive about putting the Respondent back in the classroom. But their reactions are based in part on assumptions that the Respondent would have continued, or worsened, his behavior towards Amanda had he not been stopped and that the Respondent has not learned his lesson. It was not proven either that the Respondent would have continued, or worsened, his behavior towards Amanda had he not been stopped or that the Respondent has not learned his lesson. Meanwhile, although the Respondent’s effectiveness has been impaired to some degree, it was not proven that he could not still be an effective chef instructor for the school system at PTEC-St. Pete, especially in view of his long service without incident prior to May, 1996.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Pinellas County enter a final order upholding the Respondent’s suspension without pay but reinstating him at this time, without back pay. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of February, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue Did Respondent Siebelts commit the offenses set forth in the petition for dismissal (Case No. 88-4697) and the amended administrative complaint (Case No. 89-0189) filed against her? If so, what discipline should she receive?
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Karen Siebelts has held a State of Florida teaching certificate since 1976. Her current certificate was issued May 1, 1986, and covers the areas of elementary education, elementary and secondary reading, and secondary social studies and psychology. For the past thirteen years Siebelts has been employed by the School Board of Broward County as a classroom teacher. During the early stages of her employment, she taught at Melrose Park Middle School. She then moved to Perry Middle School, where she taught a class of emotionally disturbed sixth graders. Her performance at these two schools was rated as acceptable. In November, 1979, Siebelts was assigned to teach at Charles Drew Elementary School, a neighborhood school located in the predominantly black Collier city area of Pompano Beach. The charges lodged against Siebelts are based on specific acts she allegedly committed while she was a Chapter I Reading/Math and Computer teacher at Charles Drew providing remedial instruction to students whose test scores reflected a need for such special assistance. On January 22, 1985, while seated with her fifth grade students at a table during a reading lesson, Siebelts inadvertently kicked one of the students in the shin. The incident occurred as Siebelts was moving her legs to a more comfortable position. The force involved was minimal and produced no visible injuries. The student immediately demanded an apology from Siebelts. Siebelts responded to this demand with silence. She neither apologized nor said anything to suggest that she had intended to kick the student. Earlier in the lesson, Siebelts had directed the student to stop talking. The student had defied the directive and continued to talk. It was not until approximately three minutes after the student's initial defiance of the directive, however, that the kicking incident occurred. Nonetheless, the student suspected that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her because of her failure to obey Siebelts' order that she not talk. When the student came home from school that day she told her mother that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her during class. The mother immediately reported the incident to the principal of the school, Hubert Lee. The matter was referred to the School Board's Internal Affairs Unit for investigation. The requested investigation was conducted. Following the completion of the investigation, a written report of the investigator's findings was submitted to the administration. No further action was taken regarding this incident until approximately three and a half years later when the instant petition for dismissal was issued. Siebelts was annoyed when she learned that the student and her mother had accused her of wrongdoing in connection with the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. On February 19, 1985, she expressed her annoyance in front of her fifth grade class and in their presence threatened to take legal action against those students and parents who had made libelous or slanderous statements about her or had otherwise verbally abused her. She told the students that they and their parents would be subpoenaed to court and if they did not appear they would be incarcerated. The principal of the school was informed of these remarks shortly after they were made, but it was not until the instant petition for dismissal was issued on August 22, 1988, that Siebelts was first formally charged with having made the remarks. Before coming to work on January 28 1986, Siebelts took a codeine pain medication that her physician had prescribed. When classes started that morning she was still under the influence of the medication. She was listless and drowsy. Her speech was slurred and she appeared incoherent at times. She also had difficulty maintaining her balance when she walked. Because Siebelts had been taking this medication "on and off" since 1979, she had been aware of these potential side effects of the medication when ingesting it on this particular occasion. A teacher's aide in Siebelts' classroom concerned about Siebelts' condition summoned the principal, Hubert Lee, to the classroom. When he arrived, Lee observed Siebelts seated at her desk. She was just staring and seemed "to be almost falling asleep." The students were out of control. They were laughing and making fun of Siebelts. After questioning Siebelts and receiving an answer that was not at all responsive to the question he had asked, Lee instructed Siebelts to come to his office. Siebelts complied, displaying an unsteady gait as she walked to Lee's office. In Lee's office, Siebelts insisted that she was fine, but conceded that she was "on" prescribed pain medication. Throughout their conversation, Siebelts continued to slur her words and it was difficult for Lee to understand her. Pursuant to Lee's request, Dr. Lorette David, Lee's immediate supervisor, and Nat Stokes, a School Board investigator, came to Lee's office to observe and assess Siebelts' condition. A determination was thereafter made that Siebelts was not capable of performing her instructional duties that day, which was an accurate assessment. She therefore was sent home for the day. Because of her impaired condition, rather than driving herself home, she was driven to her residence by Dr. David. Although she believed that she was not suffering from any impairment, Siebelts did not protest the decision to relieve her of her duties because she felt that any such protest would have fallen on deaf ears. Following this incident, Siebelts was issued a letter of reprimand by Lee. She also was referred to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program because it was felt that she might have a substance abuse problem. Siebelts agreed to participate in the program and received counselling. At no time subsequent to January 28, 1986, did Siebelts report to work under the influence of her pain medication or any other drug. During the 1987-1988 school year, Siebelts and two other Chapter I teachers, Rosa Moses and Mary Cooper, occupied space in Charles Drew's Chapter I reading and math laboratory. Their classrooms were located in the same large room and were separated by makeshift partitions. Siebelts is white. Moses and Cooper, as well as the aides who were assigned to the laboratory during that school year, are black. In October, 1987, Moses complained to Principal Lee that Siebelts was not teaching her students, but rather was constantly engaging in loud verbal confrontations with them that disrupted Moses' lessons. Lee had received similar complaints about Siebelts from others. He therefore asked Moses to advise him in writing of any future classroom misconduct on Siebelts' part. Siebelts continued to engage in conduct in her classroom which Moses deemed inappropriate and disruptive. On November 4, 1987, for the last five minutes of one of her classes, she loudly exchanged verbal barbs with her students. Her yelling made it difficult for Moses and Cooper to teach their lessons. On November 5, 1987, throughout an entire 45-minute class period, Siebelts was embroiled in a verbal battle with a student during which she made derogatory remarks about the student's size. She called the student "fat" and told her that she "shake[d] like jelly." The student, in turn, called Siebelts "fruity" and likened her to a "scarecrow." On that same day during a later class period, Siebelts took a student by the arm and, following a tussle with the student, placed him in his seat. Thereafter, she made belittling remarks to the other students in the class. She said that they were "stupid" and "belonged in a freak show." She also referred to them as "imbeciles." Siebelts further told her students that their "mothers eat dog food." On November 25, 1987, Siebelts commented to the students in one of her classes that they would be able to move around the classroom with greater ease if they were not so fat. As she had been asked to do, Moses provided Lee with a written account of these November, 1987, encounters between Siebelts and her students, but Lee did not take any immediate action to initiate disciplinary action against Siebelts. Although she did not so indicate in her report, Moses believed that the unflattering remarks that Siebelts had made to the students on these occasions constituted racial slurs inasmuch as all of the students to whom the remarks had been addressed were black and in addressing these remarks to the students as a group she had referred to them as "you people." Moses thought that "you people" had meant black people in general, whereas Siebelts had intended the phrase to refer to just the students in the classroom. At no time during any of these reported incidents did Siebelts make specific reference to the students' race, nor did she specifically attack black people in general. The target of her demeaning and insulting remarks were those of her students whose unruly and disrespectful behavior she was unable to control. Her efforts to maintain discipline and promote learning in the classroom had failed. She had become frustrated with the situation and verbally lashed out at her students. Unfortunately, these outbursts only served to further reduce her effectiveness as a teacher. On March 1, 1988, Siebelts was involved in an incident similar to the one which had occurred more than three years earlier on January 22, 1985. As on the prior occasion, Siebelts was sitting at a classroom table with her students. Her legs were crossed. When she repositioned her legs, her foot inadvertently came in contact with the top of the head of a student who was crawling under the table to retrieve a pencil the student had dropped. The student had been told by Siebelts not to go under the table but had disobeyed the instruction. She had been under the table for approximately a minute and a half before being struck by Siebelts foot. The blow to the student's head was a light one and produced only a slight bump. Nonetheless, after getting up from under the table, the student, a brash fourth grader who had had confrontations with Siebelts in the past, threatened to physically retaliate against Siebelts. Siebelts did not say anything to the student and the class ended without the student following through on her threat. Following this incident, Siebelts telephoned the student's mother at home to discuss the student's classroom behavior. The call was placed sometime before 9:00 p.m. The conversation between Siebelts and the mother soon degenerated into an argument. They terminated the discussion without settling their differences. Lee subsequently met with the mother. He suggested that a meeting with Siebelts at the school be arranged. The mother indicated to Lee that she would not attend such a meeting unless school security was present. She explained that she was so angry at Siebelts that she was afraid that she would lose her composure and physically attack Siebelts if they were in the same room together.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission issue a final order suspending Karen Siebelts' teaching certificate for two years and that the School Board of Broward County issue a final order suspending Siebelts until the reinstatement of her teaching certificate. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of June, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 88-4687 AND 89-0189 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: Commisioner of Education's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance in the Findings of Fact portion of this Recommended Order. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Siebelts was not charged with having made threatening remarks the day after the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. These threats were allegedly made, according to the charging documents, on February 19, 1985. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts engaged in name-calling on dates other than those specfied in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint otherwise, it is accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Furthermore, the witness whose testimony is recited in this proposed finding later clarified her testimony and conceded that Siebelts did not use the precise words quoted in this proposed finding. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts made "racial comments" on the dates specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint. Insofar as it states that such comments were made on other occasions, it is rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. According to the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, Siebelts threatened her students with legal action on February 19, 1985. This proposed finding, however, relates to alleged threats of legal action made by Siebelts during the 1987-1988 school year. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Siebelts' Proposed Findings of Fact First unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Second unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and :incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Third unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as unnecessary; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fourth unnumbered paragraph: Rejected as more in the nature of a statement of opposing parties' position than a finding of fact; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fifth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as subordinate; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; tenth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; eleventh sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; twelfth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Sixth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Seventh unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony (The exculpatory testimony of Siebelts which is summarized in the first three sentences of this paragraph has not been credited because it is contrary to the more credible testimony of other witnesses) fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Eighth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as subordinate; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; ninth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Ninth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Tenth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Superintendent of School's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, except for the fourth sentence, which has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance except to the extent that it asserts that Siebelts "advised the students that they and their parents would be placed in jail because of the lies and the slander." The preponderance of the evidence reveals that she actually told them that they and their parents would be incarcerated if they did not appear in court when summoned. First sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second and third sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument concerning relatively insignificant matters than findings of fact addressing necessary and vital issues. Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts had alcohol on her breath. Any such suggestion has been rejected because it is contrary to the testimony of Investigator Stokes. Stokes, who has been employed by the School Board as an investigator for the past 20 years, testified that he was standing one or two feet away from Siebelts and did not detect the odor of alcohol on her breath. In view of his experience regarding the investigation of these matters, his testimony has been credited. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Siebelts made inappropriate remarks regarding the students' clothing or other matters on dates other than those specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, it has been rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts made derogatory remarks about black people in general on the dates specified in these charging documents, it has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding indicates that Siebelts otherwise insulted the students in her class on the dates specified in the charging documents, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "disparaging remarks" which are the subject of this proposed finding were purportedly made during the 1984-1985 school year. The "disparaging remarks" referenced in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint were allegedly made, according to these charging documents, during the 1987-1988 school year, more specifically, on November 4, 5, and 25, 1987. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "critical" remarks referred to in this proposed finding were allegedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. First sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the extent it references reactions to "disparaging" and "critical" remarks that were purportedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of the testimony of Siebelts' former students and colleagues rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it reflects that Moses actively monitored Siebelts classroom conduct "through December of 1987." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that such active monitoring actually ceased November 25, 1987; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent it indicates that Noses heard Siebelts tell her students that they "were dirty and needed baths." This comment was purportedly overheard, not by Moses, but by Margaret Cameron, a teacher's aide who had left Charles Drew prior to the commencement of the 1987- 1988 school year; fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. These proposed findings are based on Cameron's testimony regarding offensive comments she had allegedly overheard while an aide in Siebelts' classroom. These pre-1987-1988 school year comments, however, are not mentioned in either the petition for dismissal or the amended administrative complaint. First sentence: As this proposed finding correctly points out, Siebelts' insulting comments only served to heighten the students' hostility and anger toward her. There is no persuasive competent substantial evidence, though, to support the further finding that these comments "resulted in several physical altercations between the students;" second sentence: Rejected inasmuch as there no persuasive competent substantial evidence that there was any "heated verbal exchange" on November 5, 1987, between Siebelts and the student which preceded their "altercation." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the verbal battle with her students occurred immediately after this incident; third sentence: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although she may used physical force during her encounter with this student, it is unlikely that she actually "tossed" him into his seat. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected inasmuch as there is no persuasive competent substantial evidence to support a finding that Siebelts telephoned the student's mother as a result of the incident near the air-conditioner. The preponderance of the evidence does establish that Siebelts did telephone the mother on a subsequent occasion, but there is no indication that Siebelts threatened the mother or otherwise acted inappropriately during this telephone conversation. Although the mother asked to have security personnel present during a parent-teacher conference with Siebelts, the preponderance of the evidence reveals that this request was not the product of any threats that Siebelts had made against the mother. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Siebelts' testimony that the contact was unintentional is plausible and has been credited. The circumstantial evidence presented by Petitioners (including evidence of prior confrontations between Siebelts and the student) raises some questions regarding the veracity of Siebelts' testimony on this point, but such evidence is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the discrediting this testimony. Given her penchant for verbalizing to her students her thoughts about them, had Siebelts intended to kick the student as a disciplinary measure, she undoubtedly would have made this known to the student, rather than remain silent as she did; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that immediately after kicking the student, Siebelts had a "smirk on her face." To this limited extent, this proposed finding is not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; second, third, fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that Siebelts' behavior at school on January 28, 1986, and her verbal attack of her students on November 4, 5, and 25, 198', reduced her effectiveness as a teacher, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Insofar as it indicates that other conduct in which she engaged resulted in a reduction or loss of effectiveness, it has been rejected as either contrary to the greater weight of the evidence (other conduct specified in charging documents) or beyond the scope of the charges (other conduct not specified in charging documents). COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Whitelock, Esquire 1311 S.E. 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Suite 322, Bayview Building 4,1040 Bayview Drive Post Office Box 4369 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Virgil L. Morgan, Superintendent Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Thomas P. Johnson, Ed.D. Associate Superintendent Human Resources Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Craig R. Wilson, Esquire Suite 315 1201 U.S. Highway One North Palm Beach, Florida 33408-3581 Karen B. Wilde Robert F. McRee, Esquire Executive Director Post Office Box 75638 Education Practices Commission Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether Respondent’s Florida Educator’s Certificate should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for misconduct as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, FRANK T. BROGAN, as Florida Commissioner of Education, is statutorily responsible for maintaining teaching certification standards, and is authorized to enforce the provisions of Chapter 231, Florida Statutes. Respondent, JOEL M. BURKI, at all material times hereto, was a certified teacher in the State of Florida. STIPULATED FACTS Respondent holds Florida Educator’s Certificate 686763, covering the area of Art Education, which is valid through June 30, 1997. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was employed as an alternative education teacher at St. Pete Challenge School in the Pinellas County School District. During 1992, Respondent was reported to Professional Practices Services for allegedly using excessive force with students. On or about September 22, 1992, the Department of Education and Respondent entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement extending through the end of the first semester of the 1992-1993 school year. Respondent satisfactorily completed the agreement, and on or about April 9, 1993, the Commissioner issued a finding of no probable cause to take disciplinary action concerning his educator’s ceritficate. On or about January 30, 1996, the Pinellas County School District investigated Respondent for allegedly engaging in inappropriate conduct with students. The district subsequently reported Respondent to Professional Practices Services. On or about March 20, 1996, Respondent resigned his teaching position effective March 22, 1996. THE ALLEGED INCIDENT OF MISCONDUCT An incident occurred at the St. Pete Challenge School at some time shortly after January 26, 1996, in which five male students, aged nine-to-ten years old, fell down at the door outside Respondent’s art and music classroom. As a result of this incident one student suffered a cut lip, and one other complained of a headache. The students involved in this incident initially had been disrupting Respondent’s class prior to roll call. Respondent had instructed these students to wait outside the classroom door until Respondent attended to the remaining students in the classroom. Respondent then intended to address this disciplinary situation. The five misbehaving students were outside for a very short period of time when they observed another teacher approaching. Upon seeing the teacher approaching, the five students attempted to re-enter Respondent’s classroom; however, Respondent at this time was also opening the door from the other side. The force of Respondent opening the door caused a chain reaction resulting in the fall of the five students on the outside of the door. The injured students were taken to the front office for treatment. None of the injuries sustained was serious. Respondent did not intend to cause any physical contact with the five students, nor to cause any physical harm to the students. Respondent was not physically abusive to the five students involved in this incident. It is the policy of the Pinellas County School District that a teacher shall not use physical force upon a student absent extraordinary circumstances which require physical intervention for the protection of other students or school personnel. Respondent in this incident did not use physical force in a manner inconsistent with the policy of the Pinellas County School District. Respondent is considered mild-mannered, cordial, and friendly in both his professional and personal capacities. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT The Administrative Complaint filed in this matter alleged in paragraph 4 that "Respondent grabbed minor student J.M. and pushed him," and "Respondent also pushed minor student,” A.H. into other students causing A.H. and the other students to fall." No evidence was presented at final hearing to support these allegations; however, there was testimony from minor student, K.D., that Respondent pushed another of these students, B.W., which then caused the chain reaction fall. Petitioner, accordingly, made an ore tenus motion for leave to amend the administrative complaint to conform to the evidence. The student in question, B.W., testified at final hearing and did not state that Respondent pushed him. On cross- examination, B.W. testified that Respondent pushed some other unidentified student during the incident. There was no clear and consistent evidence that Respondent pushed any identified student including B.W. or A.H. during this incident. Another student involved in the incident, C.G., who also testified at final hearing, on cross-examination confirmed Respondent's account of this occurrence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire 501 First Avenue, Suite 600 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Mark Herdman, Esquire HERDMAN and SAKELLARIDES, P.A. 2595 Tampa Road, Suite J Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Karen B. Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's expulsion of Respondent from school is appropriate pursuant to provisions of Union County School Board Rule 5.37 and Section 230.23(6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is R.S.V. He was a senior year student at Union County High School in October, 1994. Donald Leech was the principal of Union County High School in October, 1994, when he was apprised that there was a possibility of sale and possession of marijuana at the school. Leech contacted the school resource officer, Union County Sheriff's Deputy Charles Townsend, Jr., and an investigation was launched. Efforts of Townsend and Leech failed to yield any evidence of contraband substances on the school campus that could be linked to any individual or tested for purposes of subsequent prosecution. They had, however, obtained information about an event involving the alleged use of marijuana which had occurred on the school campus and allegedly involved Respondent. As a result, their investigation focused on Respondent. Townsend was apprised by his superior at the sheriff's department that a criminal prosecution could not be maintained due to the lack of admissible evidence or a "corpus delicti." Still, Leech and Townsend determined to question Respondent. On October 11, 1994, Leech and Townsend interrogated Respondent regarding his participation in the possession of a marijuana "joint" on school property on October 6, 1994. Townsend first apprised Respondent of his right against self- incrimination through the reading to Respondent of "Miranda" warnings regarding incriminating statements. The questioning then began. In response to questions, Respondent denied any knowledge of the October 6, 1994, incident. Leech failed to gain an admission from Respondent even though Leech advised Respondent that suspension for 10 days for being in an improper area (the school parking lot) was the only likely penalty. Leech then left the room. Respondent asked to telephone his mother. Townsend agreed. Respondent called his mother and explained the situation to her. She asked to speak with Townsend. Townsend told her that sufficient evidence existed to criminally prosecute Respondent. Respondent's mother told Townsend to cease questioning her son until Respondent's father arrived. Townsend complied and left Respondent alone in the room. Respondent's father soon arrived. He did not speak with Respondent. He, likewise, was informed by Townsend that sufficient evidence for prosecution existed, but that co- operation by Respondent would go a long way with authorities and have an impact on the likelihood of prosecution. Then, with the assent of Leech and Townsend, Respondent's father spoke privately with two other youths who were alleged to be involved in the incident. As a result of his conversation with the two youths, Respondent's father learned that his son had been present at a incident on school property where an alleged marijuana cigarette had been smoked but that his son had refused to participate in smoking the "joint." Respondent's father then spoke with Leech and Townsend. In addition to the earlier advice by Townsend of leniency if his son co-operated with the investigation, Respondent's father was now informed by Leech that only a 10 day suspension from school was contemplated because of Respondent's presence during the incident which had occurred in the school parking lot, an "improper area." Without any discussion with his son or legal counsel and solely in reliance upon the representations made to him by Leech and Townsend, Respondent's father then confronted his son and told Respondent to provide a written statement to Leech and Townsend. Respondent's statement reads as follows: On October 6, 1994. Myself, people 1 and people 2 walked out to the parking lot. People 1 lit up a marijuana joint and smoked it then passed it to people 2. After that, people 2 passed it to me. The 2 peoples walked off and I put it out and left it in the parking lot. After school I picked it up and kept it. Respondent later admitted to his father that he subsequently destroyed the remains of the cigarette after leaving school property. While Respondent's written statement references a "marijuana joint", no evidence was presented at the final hearing which is dispositive of whether the substance was, in actuality, cannabis. On the basis of Respondent's written statement, Leech instituted an immediate 10 day suspension of Respondent. On October 13, 1994, two days later, Leech formally recommended to the Union County School Superintendent, Eugene Dukes, that Respondent be expelled for the remainder of the school year. At final hearing, Leech rationalized that his expulsion recommendation was based upon Respondent's actual possession of the alleged contraband, as opposed to merely being present at the incident. By notice dated October 12, 1994, one day before the formal notification to him from Leech, Respondent's mother was informed by Superintendent Dukes that he would recommend the expulsion of Respondent for the remainder of the school year. The notice set forth no specific factual basis for the expulsion recommendation, but recited that the action was taken on the basis of misconduct charges set forth in Section 230.33 and Section 232.26, Florida Statutes, as well as Union County School Board Rules Section 5.37. Dukes also recommended the expulsion of the other students who admitted to actually smoking the alleged marijuana cigarette in question. The proposed expulsion of Respondent prevented his return to Union County High School and resulted in his completion of his senior year of high school in the school district of Columbia County, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Union County School Board imposing a 10 day suspension upon Respondent for violation of school restrictions regarding his presence in an improper location. FURTHER RECOMMENDED that such final order direct the destruction or sealing of school records that document the expulsion of Respondent for possession of a controlled substance due to the absence of credible evidence to sustain such charge. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX The following constitutes my ruling pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1. Accepted. 2.-11. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 12.-13. Rejected, legal conclusions, relevancy. 14. Rejected as to first preparatory phrase of the paragraph as unsupported by weight of the evidence. Remainder rejected as unnecessary to result reached. 15.-16. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 17.-18. Incorporated by reference. 19.-20. Rejected, subordinate. 21. Rejected, legal conclusion. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-10. Accepted, but not verbatim. Incorporated by reference. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Meyer and Brooks Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen N. Bernstein, Esquire Post Office Box 1642 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Eugene Dukes, Superintendent Union County School Board 55 West Sixth Street Lake Butler, Florida 32054 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(f), (1)(g), and (1)(j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes (2016). § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 1128573, covering the areas of Elementary Education, English, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and Middle Grades Integrated Curriculum, which is valid through June 30, 2021. During the 2013-2014 school year, until her voluntary resignation effective June 3, 2015, Respondent was employed as a language arts teacher at Gulf Breeze High School. Since that time, Respondent has been employed as a third-grade teacher at a private Christian academy in Pensacola, Florida. Material Allegations The material allegations upon which the alleged violations are predicated are, in their entirety, as follows: On or about July 19, 2008, Respondent illegally operated a boat while under the influence of alcohol. As a result of conduct, she was arrested and charged with Boating Under the Influence. On or about February 18, 2009, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of Boating Under the Influence. In or around January 2015 through March 2015, Respondent provided a forum where underage students illegally consumed alcohol and/or consumed alcohol in the presence of students. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, instances: in or around February 2015, wherein Respondent provided alcohol to underage students; and on or about March 20, 2015, when Respondent drove to J.H.'s, a student's, home, while under the influence of alcohol, and thereafter, attempted to drive J.H. while so inebriated. On or about April 24, 2015, Respondent illegally operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. On or about May 26, 2015, as a result of the aforementioned conduct, Respondent was arrested and charged with DUI-Second Conviction More Than Five (5) Years After Prior Conviction. On or about April 7, 2016, Respondent pled nolo contendere to an amended charge of Reckless Driving; adjudication was withheld. Count 1 Count 1 alleged a violation based upon Respondent having “been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of guilty to, regardless of adjudication of guilt, a misdemeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation.” The Count was based on the two incidents described in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Amended Administrative Complaint as follows: Boating Under the Influence -- 2008 On or about July 19, 2008, Respondent was maneuvering a boat onto a trailer at the Navarre Beach boat ramp. Her husband was driving their vehicle, and had backed their trailer into the water. As a result of actions at that time, Respondent was placed under arrest for Boating Under the Influence (BUI), a misdemeanor (her husband was arrested for Driving Under the Influence). Respondent entered a plea of no contest to the BUI offense and, on February 18, 2008, was adjudicated guilty. Subsequent to the final hearing, counsel for Petitioner researched the issue and discovered that the incident occurred prior to Respondent’s initial certification as a teacher. As a result, Petitioner correctly concluded and stipulated “that no disciplinary action should be taken as a result of this conviction.” Driving Under the Influence -- 2015 On April 24, 2015, Respondent and a friend drove, in the friend’s car, to Pensacola Beach for drinks. Respondent left her car in a Publix parking lot. Upon their return, Respondent correctly perceived that she was not fit to drive home. Her phone was dead, so she got into her car and started it in order to charge the phone. She called her son and asked that he come pick her up. At some point after calling her son, Respondent called her soon-to-be ex-husband, from whom she was in the process of a bitter divorce, and engaged in a heated and animated discussion with him. A complaint was called in, and Officer Kidd was dispatched to the scene. Upon his arrival, Officer Kidd observed Respondent in her car, with the engine running, “yelling at someone on the phone.” He noticed a bottle of Crown Royal in the center console. Respondent refused to perform field sobriety tasks. Office Kidd’s observations of Respondent while she was in the car and upon her exiting the car led him to believe that she was impaired. Respondent had been in the car, with the engine running, and was clearly in control of the vehicle regardless of her intent to drive. Although Respondent’s son arrived on the scene to take her home, Respondent was arrested and transported to jail.2/ Respondent was charged with DUI. The charges were reduced, and she entered a nolo plea to reckless driving. The trial judge withheld adjudication. Count 2 Count 2 alleged a violation based upon Respondent having “been found guilty of personal conduct that seriously reduces that person’s effectiveness as an employee of the district school board.” The Count was based on the incidents described in paragraph 4 of the Amended Administrative Complaint. March 20, 2015 -- The Garage On or about March 20, 2015, over spring break, Joshua Hartley was at Pensacola Beach with friends, including Respondent’s son. He had his father’s car. Apparently, Joshua’s father, Jon Hartley had been trying for some time to reach Joshua and have him return the car. Joshua and his group of friends had plans to stay at the beach into the evening. Respondent’s son suggested that Respondent, who he knew to be at the beach, could follow Joshua home, and then return him to his friends at the beach. Respondent was called, and she followed Joshua from the beach to his house, a drive of perhaps 15 minutes. When Joshua and Respondent arrived at the house, Mr. Hartley, Ms. Barrett, and a third man were sitting and drinking in the open garage. Other than agreement that Respondent and Joshua showed up at the house at the same time, the description of the events by Joshua Hartley, Mr. Hartley, and Ms. Barrett were so divergent that the three might well have been in different places. Ms. Barnett described the incident as occurring between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., when it was dark. She testified that Joshua and Respondent pulled up in separate vehicles, and that Mr. Hartley initially approved of Joshua returning to the beach with Respondent as a good deed, since Joshua purportedly indicated that “she’s really drunk.” She indicated that Joshua got into the passenger seat of Respondent’s vehicle, whereupon Respondent put the vehicle in gear, and lurched forward, almost hitting Mr. Hartley’s vehicle. At that time, Ms. Barrett indicated that Mr. Hartley ran down, startled by the driving error, told Joshua that he could not go with her, and offered to let Respondent stay with them until she sobered up. Ms. Barrett further described Respondent as essentially falling out of her bathing suit, barefoot, staggering, with slurred and vulgar speech, and highly intoxicated. After about an hour, and as Respondent was preparing to leave, Ms. Barnett testified that Joshua, who had remained with the adults in the garage since his arrival, went to his room. Ms. Barnett testified that Respondent then excused herself to use the restroom. Ms. Barnett testified that after 15 minutes or so, she went inside, and found Respondent “exiting Joshua’s bedroom.” Her description of the event is not accepted, and her veiled insinuation that something improper occurred -- for which no evidence exists -- did not go unnoticed. Mr. Hartley described the incident as occurring between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. He testified that Joshua and Respondent arrived at the house in Respondent’s car with Joshua as the passenger. He was “positive” that Joshua was not driving because he was 15 years old and did not have a driver’s license. When they pulled into the driveway, Mr. Hartley testified that he walked down to the vehicle and that Joshua got out of the car. Mr. Hartley was unsure if Joshua stayed in the garage at all, but at most went to his room after a matter of minutes. Respondent joined the adults in the garage. Mr. Hartley indicated that Respondent “looked like she had been at the beach” and, though her speech was not slurred, he could tell she had been drinking because he could smell alcohol and by “the way she was speaking.” His description of Respondent was far from the florid state of intoxication as described by Ms. Barnett. Mr. Hartley offered no description of Respondent’s vehicle lurching forward, Respondent staggering, or of Joshua asserting that Respondent was really drunk. Finally, his concern that “the grown, intoxicated woman [as described by counsel in his question] was in your 15 year old son’s bedroom” was based solely on Ms. Barnett’s description of what she claimed to have seen. Joshua testified that he drove to his house in his father’s black Lincoln Aviator, and that Respondent followed in her white Ford Expedition. It was daylight, around 4:00 in the afternoon. Upon their arrival, Respondent pulled onto the grass next to the driveway. Mr. Hartley was mad, possibly about Joshua having the car, would not let him return to the beach, and sent him to his room within a minute of his arrival. Joshua testified that Respondent was in typical beach attire. He had no complaint as to Respondent’s actions either at the beach or at his house, and did not see her drinking. He did, however, indicate that “they” told him that “she might have been drunk or something.” He testified that after Respondent spent some time with the adults in the garage, she then went inside to use the restroom. Joshua’s door was open, and Respondent stood at the door and apologized if she had gotten him into trouble. She then left. Given the dramatic divergence in the stories of the witnesses, the evidence is not clear and convincing that anything untoward occurred when Respondent agreed to give Joshua a ride to his house to return his father’s car, and offered to return him to his friends at the beach. Though credible evidence suggests that Respondent had alcohol on her breath, there was no evidence that she was “under the influence of alcohol,” that she was not able to lawfully drive a vehicle, or that Joshua suspected that she had been drinking. Ms. Barrett’s more dramatic testimony that Respondent was drunk and staggering, falling out of her clothes, with her speech slurred and profane, and the intimation that she was in Joshua’s bedroom in that condition, is not accepted. The evidence adduced at the hearing was not clear and convincing that, on March 20, 2017, Respondent engaged in personal conduct that seriously reduced her effectiveness as an employee of the district school board. February 15, 2015 -- Mardi Gras There was a good bit of evidence and testimony taken that Petitioner was seen drunk and staggering down the street at the 2015 Pensacola Mardi Gras, and was seen and assisted by students in that condition. However, the basis for the Amended Administrative Complaint was not that Respondent was publically intoxicated, but that she “provided alcohol to underage students.” Pensacola has a Mardi Gras event with a parade and floats. In 2015, “Fat Tuesday” was on February 17. The big 2015 Mardi Gras parade was on Sunday, February 15. Respondent had a group of friends that were in a Mardi Gras Krewe and she had been helping them with the float. She apparently drank a good bit. By the time her friends were ready to join the parade, around noon to 1:00 p.m., Respondent determined that she was drunk enough that she should go to the hotel room the group had rented. Unlike the evidence for the “Garage” incident, the evidence was convincing that Respondent was very intoxicated. Ms. Smith testified that Respondent joined a group of alumni and students at a Subway parking lot where they had gathered to watch the parade. The evidence is persuasive that Respondent came upon the scene by happenstance, and that the parking lot was not her destination. While there, Respondent very likely consumed one or more “Jello-shots.” However, the suggestion that Respondent was in any condition to have brought the Jello-shots with her to the parking lot is rejected. Rather, the evidence supports that the shots were there, and that she partook. It would not have been out of character for Respondent to have taken them and handed them around. Furthermore, the testimony that Respondent was distributing beers to students is, for the same reason, simply not plausible. After a while, Ms. Smith, followed but not assisted by Mr. Brayton, assisted Respondent to her hotel. Respondent was, by this time, in a state colloquially known as “falling-down drunk.” She could not walk unassisted, and at one point laid down on a picnic table. It was at this time that Respondent and Ms. Smith were photographed, a picture that received some circulation. Ms. Smith finally delivered Respondent to her hotel, where Respondent’s son saw them and relieved Ms. Smith of any further duties. Mr. Brayton’s testimony that he thereafter entered Respondent’s hotel room was not supported by Ms. Smith or others. His testimony regarding Respondent’s son and his friends at the hotel was not clear and convincing. January 2015 -- The House Party Amelia Smith testified to an alleged incident in the fall of 2014 in which she was at Respondent’s house and students were having a party in the garage at which students were drinking. There was no allegation in the Amended Administrative Complaint as to any event in the fall of 2014. Ms. Klisart testified to an incident involving students drinking at Respondent’s house around the Martin Luther King holiday, which in 2015 was on January 19. That corresponds to Petitioner’s statement that she returned to her house after an evening celebrating her birthday,3/ to find her son and his friends having a party in the garage at which students were drinking. The allegation in the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent provided a forum where underage students illegally consumed alcohol in January 2015 was adequately pled. The evidence supports a finding that Respondent had been drinking when she arrived at her house. The evidence is not clear and convincing that she joined the students in the garage, but she clearly knew the party was ongoing, that it involved high school students, that the students were drinking, and that she made no effort to put a halt to the party. Notoriety of the Incidents The evidence is clear and convincing that the incidents described herein were widely known by students at Gulf Breeze High School, by other teachers, and by the school administration. Counts 3 and 4 Count 3 alleges that “Respondent has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession prescribed by State Board of Education rules.” Count 4 alleges “that Respondent has failed to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to student's mental health and/or physical health and/or safety.” Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) “does not require evidence that Respondent actually harmed [a student’s] health or safety. Rather, it requires a showing that Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to protect the student from such harm.” Gerard Robinson, as Comm’r of Educ. v. William Randall Aydelott, Case No. 12-0621PL, RO at 76 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 29, 2012; EPC Dec. 19, 2012). Under the circumstances described herein, Petitioner proved that Respondent, by allowing, if not condoning, student drinking at her home in January 2015, failed to make reasonable effort to protect students from harm.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(g) and (1)(j), and rule 6A- 10.081(3)(a). It is further recommended that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of five years, and be required to obtain treatment through the Recovery Network Program at a frequency and for a duration deemed appropriate by the Education Practices Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Chester K. Lewis (Lewis), applied to the Respondent, Department of Education (Department), for a Florida teacher's certificate. By letter of January 15, 1987, the Department advised Lewis that his application had been denied, and Lewis filed a timely request for formal hearing. Pertinent to this case, the application for teacher's certificate posed the following questions, and Lewis gave the following answers: - FULL TIME TEACHING EXPERIENCE Grades taught or No months Type School State District School if departmental- taught in Certi- Year (County) ized subjects school ficate taught term Held * * 1982 to Florida Dade Edison 1983 Park Elem. 9 1983 to Florida Dade Edison 1984 Park 9 1984 to Florida Dade Edison 1985 Park 9 1985 to Florida Dade Edison Varied 1986 Park Elem. 9 PLEASE CHECK ONE YES X NO Have you ever been convicted or had adjudication withheld in a criminal offense other than a minor traffic violation or are there any criminal charges now pending against you other than minor traffic violations? If yes, you must give complete details for each charge. Please attach a separate sheet if additional space is needed. Where Arrested Dates Nature of Charge(s) Disposition(s) Trespassing Resist- Nolo Contendere Dade County 5/6/82 ing Arrest 9 mos served 1/19/83 NOTARIZATION I hereby certify that I subscribe to and will uphold the principles incorporated in the Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of Florida. I understand that Florida Statutes provide for revocation of a teacher's certificate if evidence and proof is established that the certificate has been obtained by fraudulent means. I further certify that all information pertaining to this application is true, correct and complete. /s/ Chester K. Lewis Signature of Applicant Sworn to and subscribed before me this 3rd day of June , 1986. My Commission Expires Seal and Signature of Notary Public Contrary to the sworn representations in part IV of the application, that he had been employed full time by the Dade County School Board for the school years 1982-83 through 1985-86, the proof established that Lewis was employed by the Dade County School Board as follows: For the 1982-83 school year Lewis was employed as a per diem (daily) substitute teacher, and worked only 29 days between March 1983 and June 1983. For the 1983-84 school year Lewis was employed as a daily substitute teacher, and worked at 5 different schools between November 1983 and June 1984 for a total of only 5 1/2 days. For the 1984-85 school year Lewis was employed as a daily substitute teacher, and worked at 5 different Schools between October 1984 and June 1985 for a total of only 15 days. For the 1985-86 school year Lewis was employed as a daily substitute teacher, and worked only 1 day during that school year. With respect to Lewis' response to part V of the application, the proof established that by Information filed May 27, 1982, in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 82-11708, he was charged with aggravated assault (Section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes), battery upon a law enforcement officer (Sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes), and resisting an officer with violence to his person (Section 843.01, Florida Statutes). On January 19, 1983, Lewis entered a plea of nolo contendere, and the court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of nine months. Regarding the substance of the charges, the proof established that on May 6, 1982, at or about 11:00 p.m., in Dade County, Florida, Lewis did commit the crimes of aggravated assault (Section 784.O2l(1)(a), Florida Statutes), battery upon a law enforcement officer (Sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes), and resisting an officer with violence to his person (Section 843.01, Florida Statutes). At the aforesaid time and date, a uniformed Florida Highway Patrol Officer (trooper) responded to a request for assistance at the home of a female complainant (complainant) who professed a fear that Lewis would harm her. While at the complainant's residence, the trooper took a telephone call from Lewis, identified himself as a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol, and asked Lewis what the problem was. Lewis replied: I don't care who the fuck you are. If I get over there in 15 minutes and you're there I'm going to kill you. Approximately 15 minutes later, Lewis drove up to the residence. The trooper then told Lewis: Look, we don't need a problem Just leave. She doesn't want to be bothered with you. Just leave so we don't have a problem with you. Lewis responded, "Fuck you", sped down the street, and turned the car to face the trooper. Lewis then sped his car at the trooper, who barely avoided injury by jumping out of the way of Lewis' vehicle. Lewis then drove his car into an alley, and as the trooper approached from the rear Lewis attempted to back his car over the trooper. Again the trooper barely avoided injury. Subsequently, Lewis jumped from the car, and ran toward the complainant's residence. At that time the trooper removed the keys from the ignition of Lewis' car, and pursued Lewis. Fortunately, a backup unit from the Metro-Dade Police Department arrived and Lewis fled to his car and tried to lock himself inside. The trooper, noting that the front passenger door was open, entered the vehicle to arrest Lewis. During the course of the trooper's efforts to arrest him, Lewis repeatedly punched and kicked the trooper. Lewis' conduct demonstrated gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude. His conduct was inconsistent with the standards of public conscience, and was sufficiently notorious to bring himself and his profession into public disgrace or disrespect. Due to such notoriety, Lewis' service in the community, as well as his effectiveness in the school system, has been severely impaired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner, Chester K. Lewis, for a Florida teacher's certificate be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Chester K. Lewis 1028 N.W. Third Avenue, #1 Miami, Florida 33136 Marlene T. Greenfield, Administrator Professional Practices Services 319 West Madison Street, Room 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Karen Barr Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sydney McKenzie, General Counsel Department of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399
