The Issue Whether Respondent, McDonald's Corporation, discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Hadley, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who worked at the Cocoa Beach, Florida, McDonald's restaurant from October 1, 2000, until March 17, 2001. She voluntarily terminated her employment. Respondent owns and operates restaurants and is subject to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2000). Respondent has an extensive, well-conceived, "Zero Tolerance" policy which prohibits unlawful discrimination. This policy is posted in the workplace, is distributed to every employee at the time he or she is employed, and is vigorously enforced by management. There are published procedures which can be easily followed by an employee who believes that he or she has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner did not avail herself of Respondent's "Zero Tolerance" policy. Petitioner complains of two isolated instances of what the evidence clearly shows to be workplace "horseplay" as the basis of her unlawful employment discrimination claim. On one occasion, a shift manager placed a promotional sticker on Petitioner's forehead. The second involved ice cream being placed on Petitioner's face. The evidence reveals that the "horseplay" complained of was typical of this workplace and not race or sex based. Practical jokes, food fights, ice down shirt backs, and similar activities, while not encouraged by corporate management, were a part of the routine at this restaurant. Petitioner was not the singular focus of the "horseplay"; it involved all employees. There is no evidentiary basis for alleging that it was racial or sexual in nature, as it involved employees of differing races and sexes. Approximately a month after the latest of the incidents complained of, on March 17, 2001, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment. Six months later, in September, 2001, Petitioner complained to Dexter Lewis, an African-American corporate employee who is responsible for investigating claims of unlawful workplace discrimination, about the two incidents. She claimed that she had been embarrassed by the incidents but did not suggest to him that they had been racially or sexually motivated. Mr. Lewis investigated the alleged incidents; he confirmed that the incidents had occurred and that similar incidents were widespread, but not racially or sexually motivated; he reprimanded the store manager and shift manager for their unprofessional management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Hadley 135 Minna Lane Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia Brennan Ryan, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802-1526 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, LP Ormond Beach, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare ("Signature") committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race by subjecting her to disciplinary procedures that were not applied to non-minority employees.
Findings Of Fact Signature is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7). Signature is a provider of long-term nursing care in many markets in the United States. Signature operates the skilled-nursing facility in Ormond Beach that is the locus of this proceeding. Petitioner is a black female. On February 29, 2012, Petitioner was hired by Signature as a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”). Petitioner’s job consisted of providing personal care to the residents of Signature’s Ormond Beach facility, including assisting the residents with their activities of daily living (“ADLs”). Signature terminated Petitioner’s employment in August 2013, when she failed to show up for work or call to notify her superiors that she would not be there. Petitioner did not contest the grounds of her dismissal in this proceeding. Petitioner’s complaint is limited to her allegations of disparate treatment on the job at Signature. At the time of her hiring, Petitioner was provided a copy of Signature’s “Stakeholder Handbook,” a document setting forth the company’s employment policies, including its anti- discrimination and anti-retaliation policies. The handbook sets forth Signature’s policies and procedures that prohibit, among other things, discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national origin, or any other categories of persons protected by state or federal anti-discrimination laws. Prior to filing her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR, Petitioner never made a complaint of employment discrimination while working at Signature. Signature also has a written “Abuse, Neglect and Misappropriation Policy” (abbreviated herein as the “Abuse and Neglect Policy”). Petitioner received a copy of this policy during her orientation and raised no objection to any of its contents. The policy states that the facility will “immediately report and thoroughly investigate allegations of mistreatment, neglect, abuse, misappropriation of resident’s property or any injury of unknown origin.” The policy further states, “Employees accused of participating in alleged abuse will be immediately suspended until the findings of the investigation have been reviewed by the Administrator, Director of Nursing Services, and Human Resources Director.” Signature’s uniform practice is to suspend the accused employee without pay during the investigation. If the investigation discloses that the employee did not commit the alleged abuse, then the employee receives back pay for the period of the suspension. On September 27, 2012, Petitioner’s supervisor, Director of Nursing Judy Wade, issued a “Stakeholder Performance Improvement Plan” to Petitioner because of resident complaints. Ms. Wade wrote: You’ve had three residents complain of your care in the past five months. Complaints summarized as “less than gentle” care, that you told resident you couldn’t provide care because we didn’t have enough staff, sitting in resident room without resident’s permission, rudeness, and lack of assistance to residents in need.[2/] These complaints resulted in you being removed from providing care for these residents. Staff complaints summarized as: Not open to direction, makes excuses, confrontational, not a team player, and off the floor without informing nurse. Ms. Wade went on to outline Petitioner’s future expectations, which included providing care “in a timely, gentle and caring manner,” assisting co-workers and taking direction from superiors “in a positive, friendly manner,” and not leaving the floor without permission of the supervising nurse. The Performance Improvement Plan concluded with the statement, “If any expectation is not fully met your employment will be terminated.” Petitioner was not suspended pursuant to the Performance Improvement Plan because it addressed work performance issues, not “abuse” or “neglect” as defined by the Abuse and Neglect Policy. In late October 2012, Signature suspended Petitioner without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an incident in which a resident whom Petitioner had placed upright in a wheelchair, fell out of the wheelchair and was injured. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she placed the resident in the wheelchair and saw the resident fall. Petitioner’s only contention is that a white co-worker, Claudia Dominique, was also present and witnessed the fall but was not suspended. Luz Petrone, then the human relations director for Signature’s Ormond Beach facility, and Tiffani Petersen, the facility’s abuse prevention coordinator, testified that at the time of the incident they were not aware of any involvement by or allegation of abuse and neglect against Ms. Dominique. Therefore, they were in no position to suspend Ms. Dominique for the resident’s fall. Both women testified that Ms. Dominique would have been suspended if there had been an allegation of her involvement in the incident. The investigation concluded that Petitioner needed additional training on wheelchair usage but that she had not engaged in any abuse or neglect. Signature reinstated Petitioner to her position and paid her for the time she had missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On November 19, 2012, Petitioner was suspended without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an allegation of abuse and neglect. Petitioner did not allege that any white employees were involved in this incident. The record does not disclose the specifics of this incident, but does indicate that the investigation concluded with a finding that Petitioner had not engaged in any abuse or neglect. Petitioner was reinstated to her position on November 26, 2012, and reimbursed for the work she missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On January 15, 2013, Petitioner was suspended without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an allegation that she was being “rough” with a resident while providing care. One of Petitioner’s co- workers, Tina Williams, was involved in the incident and was also suspended pending the investigation. The investigation concluded that Petitioner needed additional training but had not engaged in any abuse or neglect.3/ Petitioner was reinstated to her position and paid for the time she missed while on suspension, as was Ms. Williams. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On March 5, 2013, Signature suspended Petitioner without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation regarding rough handling of a resident and failure to toilet a resident when the resident asked to use the bathroom on March 2. A white co-worker, Patricia Capoferri, was also involved in the incident and was also suspended without pay pending investigation. Ms. Capoferri asserted that the resident in question was assigned to Petitioner but that Ms. Capoferri had to answer the resident’s call light because Petitioner would not do so.4/ Ms. Capoferri claimed that she had to answer Petitioner’s “lights all the time, because she don’t answer them.” Upon completion of the investigation, Signature determined that the allegations of abuse or neglect against Petitioner were not substantiated. Petitioner was reinstated to her position and paid for the time she had missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. Petitioner credibly testified as to the hardship caused by the suspensions imposed on her during the investigations. It is reasonable to assume that a person attempting to survive on a CNA’s wages can scarcely afford to go a week without being paid, even when she ultimately receives full compensation for the suspension. Petitioner suffers from high blood pressure, and the tension generated by the frequent suspensions required several visits to her physician. On March 11, 2013, Signature terminated Ms. Capoferri’s employment as a result of the investigation. Petitioner claimed that Ms. Capoferri never went into the resident’s room on March 2, and that Signature suspended and fired Ms. Capoferri in order to cover its tracks regarding its pattern of discriminatory actions against Petitioner. Petitioner claimed that Signature acted against Ms. Capoferri only after Petitioner filed her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR. However, Ms. Capoferri was suspended on March 5, three days before Petitioner filed her complaint. Ms. Capoferri was fired on March 11, three days after Petitioner filed her complaint, but Ms. Petrone and Ms. Petersen credibly testified that they were unaware of the complaint at the time Ms. Capoferri’s employment was terminated. Petitioner offered no credible evidence to support her somewhat fanciful claim that Signature would fire a white employee solely to shield itself from a charge of discrimination by a black employee. Signature offered persuasive evidence that it applies its Abuse and Neglect Policy consistently and without regard to race or any other protected category. In April 2013, an allegation of abuse and neglect was made against Nancy Harnonge, a white CNA working at the Ormond Beach facility. Consistent with its policy, Signature suspended Ms. Harnonge without pay pending investigation and then reinstated her to her position with back pay after the investigation concluded that the allegations could not be substantiated. In May 2010, an allegation of abuse and neglect was made against Ms. Capoferri, who was suspended without pay pending investigation and then reinstated with back pay after the investigation did not substantiate the allegations. Petitioner never complained of discriminatory treatment or harassment to any supervisor at Signature prior to filing her Employment Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Signature for her several suspensions pending investigation of abuse and neglect allegations. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Signature's stated reasons for her suspensions were a pretext for race discrimination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Signature discriminated against her because of her race in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner made no claim that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of Signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that LP Ormond Beach, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2014.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed discriminatory employment practices against Petitioner in violation of Chapter 70 of the Pinellas County Code as alleged in the Complaint, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner is a 44-year-old African-American male. FMS is a package delivery company that does business in Pinellas County. According to Petitioner, FMS has more than 100 employees. FMS was provided due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing in this case, but no appearance was made on its behalf. Petitioner’s Job Duties and Salary at FMS Petitioner started working for FMS in late 1999 or early 2000 as a “driver.” Petitioner’s primary job responsibility was to drive a delivery truck along a designated route to deliver and pick up packages. Petitioner was also responsible for loading the to- be-delivered packages on his truck in the morning and then unloading any picked-up packages from his truck in the evening. Petitioner worked Monday through Friday. His shift started at 7:00 a.m. each day. Petitioner’s gross pay was initially $650 every two weeks, but at some point Petitioner's salary was increased to $750 every two weeks.1 Petitioner did not receive health or dental insurance or other benefits. Failure to Switch Trucks as Directed (Complaint, Count III) Chronologically, the first event alleged in the Complaint as a basis of Petitioner’s discrimination claim started on the morning of Friday, February 8, 2002, when Petitioner’s boss, Tom Aliotti, directed Petitioner to switch trucks with another driver named Eddie. Later that day, Mr. Aliotti told Petitioner that he would switch the trucks over the weekend. As a result, Petitioner and Eddie did not switch the trucks on Friday. The trucks were not switched over the weekend, and on the morning of Monday, February 11, 2002, Mr. Aliotti again directed Petitioner to switch trucks with Eddie. Petitioner did not switch the trucks on Monday morning as directed by Mr. Aliotti because he was too busy preparing to run his delivery route. Petitioner testified that Eddie was equally responsible for the trucks not getting switched because he could not switch trucks with Eddie without Eddie’s participation; however, it is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony what specifically Eddie did or did not do in regard to switching the trucks. After Petitioner failed to switch the trucks on Monday as directed, he was given a written reprimand for insubordination by Mr. Aliotti. The written reprimand, which is referred to as a Counseling Sheet (see Exhibit P4), stated: “[Petitioner] will switch trucks tonite [sic] 2/11/02 or [he] will not be working 2/12/02. Day off without pay.” Petitioner testified that he did not switch the trucks even after the directive on the Counseling Sheet. It is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony whether he was suspended without pay on February 12, 2002. According to Petitioner, Eddie was not reprimanded for the incident. It is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony whether a reprimand was appropriate for Eddie because it is unknown whether Mr. Aliotti also told Eddie to switch the trucks and, as stated above, it is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony what specifically Eddie did or did not do to frustrate the truck switching. Eddie, like Petitioner, is an African-American male. Attendance Issues in March 2002 (Complaint, Counts I and II) The other allegations of discrimination in the Complaint relate to discipline imposed on Petitioner for his unexcused absences from work on several occasions in March 2002. Petitioner submitted a written request for a half-day of leave on Friday, March 1, 2002, in which he stated that he needed to “go out of town to attend a funeral” because of a “death in [his] family.” See Exhibit P1, at page 3. That request was approved, and Petitioner was expected to be back at work on Monday, March 4, 2002. Petitioner attended the funeral of his brother in Largo, Florida, on Saturday, March 2, 2002. Later that same day, he traveled to Madison, Florida, to attend funeral services for his uncle. See Exhibits P2 and P3. For reasons that are unclear in the record, Petitioner did not return to work on Monday, March 4, 2002, as he was expected to do. If a driver was going to be unexpectedly absent from work, he or she was required to let the boss know before 7:00 a.m. so that a substitute or “on-call” driver could be contacted to take over the absent driver’s route. Getting another driver to take over the absent driver's route was important to FMS because some of the packages that the company delivers have to get to the customer by 10:30 a.m. Petitioner understood the importance of this requirement. According to Petitioner, he tried to call his boss before 7:00 a.m. on Monday to let him know that he would not be coming into work, but he was not able to reach his boss until several hours after 7:00 a.m. Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence to corroborate his testimony that he attempted to call his boss prior to 7:00 a.m. on Monday, and the documents introduced by Petitioner include conflicting statements as to whether Petitioner ever called on that date.2 Nevertheless, Petitioner’s testimony on this issue is accepted. When Petitioner returned to work on Tuesday, March 5, 2002, he was suspended for the day and, according to Petitioner, his delivery route was taken away. The Warning Letter that was received into evidence (Exhibit P1, at page 1) references the suspension, but not Petitioner’s route being taken away. According to Petitioner, his delivery route was given to a white female, whose identity Petitioner did not know. Thereafter, Petitioner was given menial tasks such as sweeping the floor and taking out the trash, although he also helped load packages onto the delivery trucks in the morning. Petitioner submitted a written request for leave on March 19 and 20, 2002, because he planned to be in Kentucky on those dates. Petitioner stated in the request that “I will be back to work on the [sic] 3-21.” See Exhibit P1, at page 2. The leave requested by Petitioner was approved, and he was expected to be back at work on March 21, 2002. Petitioner got a “late start” on his drive back from Kentucky, which caused him to miss work on March 21, 2002. According to Petitioner, he used his cellular phone to call his boss before 7:00 a.m. on March 21, 2002, to let him know that he would not be coming into work, but he was not able to reach his boss until 7:30 a.m. Petitioner did not present any credible evidence, such as his cellular phone records, to corroborate his claim that he attempted to call prior to 7:00 a.m. Petitioner’s testimony on this issue was not persuasive. The record does not reflect what, if any, discipline Petitioner received for not calling prior to the start of his shift to report that he would not be coming into work on March 21, 2002. Petitioner’s pay was not reduced at any point during his employment with FMS even though, according to Petitioner, his primary job duties were changed from driving a delivery truck to sweeping the floors and taking out the trash. Petitioner continued to work at FMS until April or May 2002 when he was injured on the job while lifting a box. Petitioner’s Post-FMS Activities and Employment After his injury, Petitioner could not and did not work for approximately one year. During that period, Petitioner collected workers' compensation at the rate of $500 every two weeks.3 Approximately one year after his injury, Petitioner’s doctor allowed him to return to work on “light duty.” Thereafter, in April or May 2003, Petitioner tried to return to work with FMS but, according to Petitioner, he was told that there were no available “light duty” positions. That effectively ended Petitioner’s employment relationship with FMS. The Complaint does not allege that FMS’s failure to re-hire Petitioner was a discriminatory employment practice, nor is there any credible evidence in the record that would support such a claim. From April/May 2003 to approximately March 2004, Petitioner held only one job. He worked for approximately one week cleaning floors at a nursing home, but he left that position because of his back problems. After leaving the floor cleaning job, Petitioner did not actively look for other employment. He briefly attended a training class to become a security guard, but he did not complete the class after learning that he would not be able to be licensed as a security guard “because of his prior record.” In approximately March 2004, Petitioner was hired by a former acquaintance to work as a driver for a mortgage company. In that position, Petitioner is paid $11 per hour and he typically works 40 hours per week, which equates to gross pay of $880 every two weeks. As of the date of the hearing, Petitioner was still employed by the mortgage company. Lack of Evidence Regarding Similarly Situated Employees Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding any “similarly situated” employees, i.e., employees who engaged in conduct that was the same as or similar to that for which Petitioner was disciplined.4 Although Petitioner testified that he “had heard” of situations where other employees had “put a manager off,” rather than immediately doing what the manager told them to do, he was not able to offer any specific examples of such insubordination. Petitioner also presented no credible evidence regarding how other employees (of any race) were disciplined for conduct that was the same as or similar to that for which Petitioner was disciplined.5
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint against FMS. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Barnett is a resident of Ocala, Florida. She executed Lifestream's employment application form on January 30, 2007. She claimed a bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College and a Master's in Social Work from Upsala College in East Orange, New Jersey. Her application indicated that she was a social worker in New York from September 1987 until December 2003. Ms. Barnett moved to Florida and was employed by the Marion County Drug Court, but quit, according to Ms. Barnett, because she had a heart attack in November 2005. Thereafter, she worked for a company named ResCare in Gainesville, Florida. Her job entailed working with mentally handicapped adults. She was discharged from this job for losing her temper. Lifestream operates a detoxification facility and crisis stabilization unit among other things. It provides services to children, adults, and the elderly. Lifestream's mission is to provide quality life enrichment services through prevention, education, and treatment. Ms. Barnett was employed as an emergency evaluator on or about February 15, 2007. An emergency evaluator works in the receiving area of the Lifesteam facility. Clients are brought to the facility by law enforcement or friends or family. Some clients appear voluntarily. Clients enter the facility at irregular hours. As an emergency evaluator, it was Ms. Barnett's job to search new clients to ascertain if they possessed weapons, in order to ensure the safety of the client and staff, and to evaluate them for mental status using Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV. It was her job to notify the nursing supervisor of the health status of new clients and to prepare records. Occasionally clients were violent, and at least once Ms. Barnett was attacked by a client. This attack occurred on May 3, 2007. She claimed that she had 17 injured discs in her back. She claimed that these injuries occurred in part while working for Lifestream, although she did not assert that all of these injuries occurred during the alleged attack. Ms. Barnett also stated that she was scheduled for surgery and stated that a steel rod would be inserted in her back at Tampa General Hospital. Although there was no medical evidence introduced that corroborated her testimony, it was unrebutted and is accepted as true. There was no proof that these claimed medical deficiencies resulted in a disability. In any event, the record is completely devoid of any evidence that anyone at Lifestream was aware of that Ms. Barnett might have been disabled or that anyone perceived her as disabled. Moreover, she never requested an accommodation. Ms. Barnett's alleged disability first surfaced in Ms. Barnett's Employment Complaint of Discrimination, subsequent to her termination, which occurred on December 15, 2007. During the approximately 10 months of employment at Lifestream, Ms. Barnett was absent for her scheduled shift on 56 days. She did not inform Lifestream in advance that she was not going to appear for work and as a result, Lifestream found it necessary to replace her with other employees. This often resulted in Lifestream bearing the cost of overtime pay. When Ms. Barnett did work, her performance was poor, and she was counseled about it. The charts that she was required to maintain often failed to contain necessary documentation and signatures. During the course of her employment, she received five verbal and written reprimands addressing her poor job performance. Lifestream's constant uncertainty regarding Ms. Barnett's attendance at work, an essential part of her job, coupled with her poor performance, culminated in her being removed from the work schedule in October 2008. She was not formally discharged until December 2008. She remains eligible for re-hire at Lifestream.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition of Candice Barnett. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Candice Barnett 1850 Southeast 18th Avenue, No. 1601 Ocala, Florida 34491 Victoria McCloskey, Esquire Albert Guemmer, Esquire Guemmer & Ritt 3002 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a hostess with Respondent because of her handicap, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, a 47-year-old female, was hired by Respondent on or about July 15, 2003, as a part-time hostess at Respondent's restaurant in Cocoa Beach, Florida. The understanding at that time was that she would be called in to work three to four hours a day, three to four days a week, as a leased, at-will employee from SkilStaf. SkilStaf would be the employer of record for wage and payroll reporting purposes. Respondent, BB & D of Cocoa Beach, Inc., is a franchisee of Perkins Restaurant and Bakery and is an employer under the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner first reported for work on July 17, 2003, and received training as a hostess/cashier by Debra Russell, associate manager, and received the same information about the job requirements, duties, and benefits given to all new hires. During her training, Petitioner was advised that in addition to seating guests and operating the cash register, a hostess would be required to bus tables when the restaurant was busy and the other staff was in need of help, although this requirement was not listed on the printed job description. Petitioner did advise Respondent that she had a disability and that she required a reasonable accommodation in order to perform her job. She stated that several years before she had undergone back surgery as a result of an injury that was not job related and could not perform a job that required heavy lifting. Petitioner advised Russell that she could not bus tables because it would require heavy lifting. Russell asked Petitioner to provide Respondent with a doctor's note advising them of the nature of her disability and what accommodations she required. Petitioner continued to work as a hostess at the Perkins Restaurant through July 22, 2003, and performed the job satisfactorily. She was not asked to bus tables during this period. Petitioner was not called back to work as a hostess after July 22, 2003, and did not receive any notification that she was terminated. Petitioner obtained a note from her physician dated July 28, 2003, which indicated that she was capable of working four to five hours a day as a hostess. This evidence is hearsay. In addition, it is not convincing that Petitioner turned in a copy of the note to management anytime after that date. She tried to talk to management about her status, but was unsuccessful. Although Petitioner did not prove that she is a disabled person, she was perceived to be disabled by her employer. Petitioner testified that she talked to Russell some time in early August. Petitioner claimed that Russell said that she had talked to the owner who said that he did not think Petitioner should be working as a hostess, but should get a desk job sitting down. Russell denied making such a statement. No other evidence was offered to support this statement. Therefore, said statement is uncorroborated hearsay and unreliable, and will not be relied upon as a finding of fact. Petitioner presented evidence that since July 2003, she has been unemployed, in spite of her making reasonable efforts to obtain suitable part-time employment. Respondent demonstrated that Petitioner sought to have several days in a row off after working only three days. Petitioner worked six shifts total during her employment with Respondent. Respondent needed two other part-time hostesses for the other shifts because the restaurant was open seven days a week, 24 hours a day, for a total of 21 shifts per week. Respondent demonstrated that the summer business that year was slower than projected and never picked up. The restaurant business is labor-intensive and accounts for 30 to 40 percent of overhead costs. In order for management to control costs, it must cut back on employees. Petitioner was involuntarily terminated because sales were underperforming projections and labor costs were being controlled by a reduction in force. Petitioner was unable to prove that her termination was the result of her disability or perceived disability and that Respondent's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Shahrooz Banapoor BB & D of Cocoa Beach, Inc. 5590 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Anne E. Dorfler 700 North Courtney Parkway Apartment 524 Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has been subjected to an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Chipola is a college located in Marianna, Florida, and offers two-year and four-year degrees. In August 2005, Ms. Tucker contacted personnel at Chipola inquiring about a faculty position. She sent an e-mail to Karan Davis (Ms. Davis), Chipola’s associate vice president of Human Resources and included a brief résumé. No positions were available at that time. On or about May 18, 2006, Ms. Tucker submitted an application for employment at Chipola as an adjunct instructor. An adjunct instructor position is a temporary position on an as- needed basis to instruct a specific course. Health benefits are not provided for adjunct instructors. The employment application which Ms. Tucker submitted requested that applicants complete a section on educational employment and a section on non-educational employment. In each section, the application provided space for the listing of three present or former employers. The application stated, “If you wish to further describe your work experience, please attach a resume to this application.” Ms. Tucker did not attach a résumé to the application. In the section for educational employment, Ms. Tucker listed employment as a substitute teacher for two school districts and one private school. In the section for non- educational employment, Ms. Tucker listed employment in 2006 at Florida State University, employment from 1979 to 1988 with the United States Postal Service, and a position as a legal secretary from 1975 to 1977. The application asked, “Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign from a previous position?” to which Ms. Tucker replied, “No.” The application contains an applicant certification, which states: I am aware that any omissions, falsifications, misstatement or misrepresentations may disqualify me for employment consideration, and if I am hired, may be grounds for termination at a later date. Ms. Tucker signed the applicant’s certification. Wendy Pippen (Ms. Pippen) is employed by Chipola as the human resources coordinator. She is responsible for coordination of the daily activities and tasks in the Human Resources Department, including review of employment applications and résumés. She did not receive a résumé from Ms. Tucker at any point during the hiring process. Ms. Tucker was interviewed for the position as adjunct instructor. During a conversation with Ms. Pippen following Ms. Tucker’s interview, Ms. Tucker mentioned that she had worked at the University of South Florida. Ms. Pippen did not recall seeing the University of South Florida listed as an employer on Ms. Tucker’s application. She checked Ms. Tucker’s application and confirmed that the University of South Florida was not listed on the application. Ms. Pippen immediately advised her supervisor, Ms. Davis, of the omission. Ms. Tucker told Ms. Pippen that she had omitted her employment with the University of South Florida because an employment agency had advised her to do so due to the potential for a negative reference. Ms. Tucker vehemently testified at the final hearing that the reason she did not list employment with the University of South Florida was that she was terminated for medical reasons, and it was “no one’s business.” However, she also testified that the University of South Florida gave “bad references.” She had told others that she was concerned that the University of South Florida would give her a bad reference. It was her opinion that the University of South Florida was not ethical in giving references on former employees. Having judged the demeanor of the witnesses, Ms. Pippen’s testimony is credited that Ms. Tucker told her the reason that she did not put the University of South Florida on her application was that she felt the University of South Florida would not give her a good reference. Upon being informed by Ms. Pippen that Ms. Tucker had worked at the University of South Florida, Ms. Davis contacted the University of South Florida to check Ms. Tucker’s past employment. Ms. Davis was advised that Ms. Tucker had been employed by the University of South Florida and that she had been terminated for medical reasons. Ms. Davis did not inquire why Ms. Tucker was terminated. That information was volunteered by personnel at the University of South Florida. Ms. Davis did not ask for an explanation of the medical reasons, and no explanation was volunteered. Ms. Davis did not inquire whether Ms. Tucker had a disability, and no one from the University of South Florida told Ms. Davis that Ms. Tucker had a disability. The decision was made not to hire Ms. Tucker as an adjunct instructor because she had failed to include the University of South Florida on her application and had stated in her application that she had not been discharged or forced to resign from a previous position. Ms. Davis perceived that the omission of the University of South Florida from the application and the failure to indicate that she had been discharged from previous employment amounted to falsification of the application, which was a reason for disqualification from employment as clearly stated in the application form. Ms. Tucker contends that Ms. Davis was aware that she had been employed by the University of South Florida because she had included the employment on the résumé that she sent to Ms. Davis in 2005. Ms. Davis did not recall seeing the résumé and given that there was a lapse of seven months from the time that Ms. Tucker sent her résumé in 2005 until she submitted an application in May 2006 without a résumé, it is reasonable that Ms. Davis would not recall seeing the résumé or was not aware that Ms. Tucker had listed the University of South Florida on a résumé. After Ms. Tucker was advised that she would not be hired as an adjunct instructor, she wrote Dr. Spires at Chipola, stating that she had not put the University of South Florida on her employment application because she had been advised by an employment agency to omit the University of South Florida because it had a long history of illegal employment practices. Ms. Tucker does not contend that she has a particular disability which served as the basis for Chipola’s failing to hire her, and she did not inform staff at Chipola that she has a disability or identify any medical condition she has. Her claim is that she was not hired because of a history of medical problems. The evidence overwhelmingly established that Ms. Tucker was not hired because she had made misrepresentations on her application and not because of any history of medical problems. It is clear that Ms. Tucker did not include the University of South Florida on her application and did not inform Chipola that she had been discharged because she was afraid that the University of South Florida would give her a bad reference.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entering finding that Chipola College did not discriminate against Ms. Tucker and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2007.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent Wildwood Golf Operations, LLC, committed an unfair employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner when it terminated Petitioner's employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Wildwood Golf Operations, LLC, is a multi- faceted business, consisting of a 71-room hotel with meeting facilities, a 5,000-square-feet restaurant with banquet facilities, tennis courts, a swimming pool, a driving range, and a golf course. While Petitioner's nephew was employed by Respondent as a clerk in its pro shop, he introduced Petitioner to Peter Sands, the director of golf, and Paul Earnhart, the golf manager. The four of them played golf together on several occasions, and Petitioner was considered to be a pleasant, cheerful person like his nephew. When Petitioner's nephew was about to leave Respondent's employ, he recommended to Sands that Sands hire Petitioner as his nephew's replacement. Sands and Earnhart were amenable to the idea. In July 2009 Petitioner completed an application for employment form and was subsequently hired to work part-time in the pro shop. He also gave golf lessons and continued to play golf on Respondent's course. On his application for employment, Petitioner left blank the section asking for information on Petitioner's prior employment. He did answer the question asking if he had ever been convicted or pled guilty to any crime, felony or misdemeanor, other than a minor traffic offense. By answering that question in the negative, he failed to disclose his two prior convictions for shoplifting, to which crimes he had pled guilty. Shoplifting is an offense which would have prevented Petitioner from being hired. Membership information, including the types of memberships Respondent offers together with cost information, was kept in a file folder in an open file folder holder behind the counter in the pro shop. It was part of Petitioner's job duties, as it was for Respondent's other employees, to provide that membership information to anyone inquiring. The importance of selling memberships for the economic viability of Respondent's business was stressed to Respondent's employees. On three separate occasions, Earnhart came into the pro shop and asked Petitioner for a copy of the membership information which was kept in the file. On the first occasion, when Petitioner was unable to retrieve it, Earnhart retrieved the information himself and explained to Petitioner that providing membership information was an important part of Petitioner's job duties. On the second occasion, which occurred approximately a week later, Earnhart again came into the pro shop and asked Petitioner for the membership information. When Petitioner was unable to comply with his request, Earnhart again showed Petitioner where the information was kept. He also told Petitioner that that was the second time he was unable to provide membership information to Earnhart and that Petitioner should not let that happen again. Approximately a week later, on September 27, 2009, Earnhart again came into the pro shop and requested a copy of the corporate membership information from Petitioner. When Petitioner was unable to provide it, Earnhart went to the computer in the pro shop and printed a copy from Respondent's website. While Earnhart was at the computer, Petitioner came to him, bent down next to Earnhart's face, probably less than a foot away, and said, essentially, that he was too well-educated to be reprimanded. Earnhart was shocked and angered by Petitioner's belligerent and confrontational manner. Earnhart retorted rudely and left the pro shop. He encountered Peter Sands, who was on his way into the pro shop, and told Sands what had happened, told him that was Petitioner's third and last time, and instructed Sands to find a replacement for Petitioner, train the replacement, and then terminate Petitioner's employment. On October 14, 2009, Sands had a conversation with Petitioner advising Petitioner that Petitioner's employment was going to be terminated. On October 21, 2009, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. At that time, Petitioner was still within his probationary period, which, under Respondent's policies, meant he could be terminated without cause. The day after he was fired, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent advising that he was disabled and requesting accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The letter did not specify what disability Petitioner was claiming. Until receipt of that letter, Petitioner had never advised Respondent that he was disabled and he had not been perceived to be disabled by any of Respondent's employees who testified in this proceeding. During the term of his employment by Respondent, Petitioner made no request for accommodations due to any disability. While he did request a footstool to put his feet on while he was sitting behind the counter in the pro shop, he did not advise that his request was related to a disability rather than simple comfort. Likewise, when Petitioner requested to not work the normal Sunday 12-hour shift, he did not mention it was related to a disability. He was given a shorter Sunday shift as were other employees who requested one. Although Petitioner used a handicapped flag on occasion on his golf cart when he was playing golf, so do other people who are not handicapped but simply want to enjoy the privilege of driving closer to a green. In 1996 Petitioner was involved in an accident while working as a paramedic. He suffered a broken arm and tendon damage "throughout his body." After he was rehabilitated, he returned to work for another three years before he lost his job. Petitioner exhibited reluctance to disclose the nature of his alleged disability during the final hearing in this cause. He eventually disclosed at the final hearing that he was 100 percent disabled for "physical limitations," post-traumatic stress disorder, and chronic depression, but identified his disability in his deposition as post-traumatic stress disorder and insomnia. No medical evidence was offered to support Petitioner's allegations that he is disabled. He relied, instead, on hearsay documents, such as his motor-vehicle- handicapped-parking placard, his Medicare card, and his social security card. No competent evidence was offered as to whether Petitioner still has the disability he had when those documents were obtained or for which alleged disability each of those documents was issued. Rather, Petitioner admitted during the final hearing that his insomnia is controlled by medication, that it has been over five years since he received any treatment for post- traumatic stress disorder, and that he doesn't remember who diagnosed him with that condition. He testified in deposition and at final hearing that his post-traumatic stress disorder and his insomnia do not affect his ability or prevent him from being employed. More importantly, Petitioner testified at the final hearing that his alleged conditions did not affect his ability to retrieve membership information from the file folder and, further, that he does not believe that he was terminated by Respondent based on his disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of committing an unfair employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Joubert 7 Farrier Lane Crawfordville, Florida 32327 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Grubbs, Esquire Quintairos Prieto Wood & Boyer, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 510 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race, his alleged disability, and in alleged retaliation for his attempt to file a workers' compensation claim in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. Petitioner also has been diagnosed with obsessive/compulsive disorder and major depression. On March 21, 1997, Petitioner began his employment with Florida Department of Corrections as a substance abuse counselor at Lancaster Correctional Institution. Petitioner's employment status was in career service, probationary status for six months from the date of his employment. A probationary status employee can be terminated without cause. Petitioner's employment as a counselor required him to be present at the institution a reasonable amount of time in order to perform his counseling duties. From March 21, 1997 through September 2, 1997, Petitioner failed to report for work 39 full workdays out of a possible 115 workdays. In addition, Petitioner had five other workdays that he only worked part of the day, with a total of 16 hours of leave used over those days. Sixteen hours is the equivalent of two full workdays missed by Respondent. As a result, Petitioner was absent from work approximately 35 percent of the time. Thirty-five percent absence rate was excessive based on Petitioner's job duties. Most of the leave was without pay because Petitioner had not accumulated enough sick or annual leave to cover his absences. The leave was taken for various reasons, but a large part of the leave was taken when Petitioner was hospitalized due to his mental condition. Petitioner's doctor released him from his hospitalization on August 8, 1997; however, Petitioner did not return to work until August 20, 1997. The last pay period ran from Friday, August 22, 1997 to Thursday, September 4, 1997. Petitioner only worked 20 hours out of 40 the first week and two hours out of 40 the second week. Around September 1, 1997, Petitioner went to the personnel office to inquire about filing a workers' compensation claim based on his disability. The staff person he spoke to did not know the procedure for filing a workers' compensation claim. She told Petitioner she would find out the procedure and asked him to return the next day. Other than Petitioner's speculation about the events following his initial inquiry about filing a workers' compensation claim, other material evidence regarding the events following his initial inquiry and Respondent's response thereto was submitted into evidence. The evidence is insufficient to draw any conclusions of a factual or legal nature regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation claim and his termination. Petitioner was terminated on September 2, 1997, the day following his initial inquiry about workers' compensation. Petitioner received his letter of termination on September 2, 1997. Petitioner was a probationary status employee when he was terminated. Eventually, Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim. The claim was denied by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. In 1997, L.D. "Pete" Turner was the warden at Lancaster Correctional Institution. As warden, Mr. Turner supervised Petitioner. Mr. Turner made the decision to terminate Petitioner due to his excessive absences. Mr. Turner did not terminate Petitioner based on Petitioner's race, his alleged disability, or because of Petitioner's attempt to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner was needed at work and he was not there a sufficient amount of time to fulfill his job duties. In fact, there was no competent evidence that there was any connection between Petitioner's termination and/or his race, disability, or desire to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner alleged that two employees at the institution were excessively absent but were not terminated. The employees were Doris Jones and Victoria Englehart. Both individuals were career service employees with permanent status. They were not probationary status employees. Doris Jones is an African-American female. Victoria Englehart is a white female. No other evidence was produced at the hearing regarding these two employees, their attendance records, job duties or anything else of a comparative nature. Clearly, the evidence is insufficient to make any comparison between these two employees and Petitioner's employment and termination.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Otis Ware Post Office Box 2155 Trenton, Florida 32693 William J. Thurber, IV, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Azizi M. Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Robert F. Cameron, was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Osceola County, based on his disability, race, or national origin in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. 1 All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2020), unless otherwise noted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner brings this action alleging that the County discriminated against him based on his disability, race (white), and national origin (Canadian). Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the County failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation to allow him to participate in the application and selection process for a County job. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and under the governance of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he is a disabled individual with at least seven disabilities. Pertinent to this matter, Petitioner stated that he is partially deaf in one ear which limits his ability to hear.4 In addition, Petitioner relayed that his disability(ies) affect his normal life in that he has frequent medical appointments and requires an increased number of restroom breaks. On October 15, 2019, Petitioner, who is from Canada, applied for the position of Budget Analyst II (the "Analyst Position") with the County. The Analyst Position falls within the County's Office of Management and Budget Department ("OMB"). The OMB is responsible for preparing the County's 2 By requesting a deadline for filing a post-hearing submission beyond ten days after the filing of the hearing transcript, the 30-day time period for filing the Recommended Order was waived. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216(2). 3 Petitioner filed a revised version of his post-hearing submittal on October 9, 2020, which the undersigned considered as Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order in writing this Recommended Order. 4 At the final hearing, Petitioner initially strenuously objected to identifying his specific disability, asserting that his right to privacy protects him from having to disclose personal medical information, except as requested by a medical professional. annual budget, as well as analyzing and evaluating budget transfers for the County Commissioners. The County initiated the recruitment process for the Analyst Position by posting the opening on the website www.governmentjobs.com on October 14, 2019. Petitioner found the posting on the website and submitted his application through the same. At total of 15 individuals applied for the position, including Petitioner. The application window for the Analyst Position closed on October 21, 2019. Thereafter, the County's Human Resources Department screened the 15 applications to ensure the interested persons met the minimum qualifications for the job. Eleven applicants, including Petitioner, possessed the required qualifications. The Human Resources Department forwarded those 11 applications to the OMB for consideration. The OMB reviewed the 11 applications and selected three individuals to interview. These applicants included Petitioner (a white male), Lizette Rivera (a Hispanic female), and Sean Lower (a white male). Thereafter, the Human Resources Department set up a panel of five County employees to interview the candidates. Petitioner learned that he was being considered for the job on Thursday, October 24, 2019. That morning, the County called Petitioner at his home in Canada to inquire whether he was available for an interview the next day, Friday, October 25, 2019. Damaris Morales, an administrative assistant in the OMB, made the call. This case centers around what was said during that morning phone call. Petitioner and Ms. Morales left the conversation with vastly different impressions of what transpired. The Phone Call According to Petitioner Petitioner testified that Ms. Morales called him at a most inopportune time. His home phone rang at 8:44 a.m. At that moment, Petitioner was rushing out of his apartment to reach a 9:00 a.m. doctor's appointment. In fact, Petitioner had already started his car with an automatic starter, and it was running in his driveway. After he heard his phone ring, however, he turned back to answer the call. Petitioner answered the phone and greeted the caller. The caller identified herself as "Tamaris" from Osceola County.5 Ms. Morales then informed Petitioner that she was calling to set up an interview for the Analyst Position. Petitioner initially expressed to Ms. Morales that her call was "great" news. He then explained that he was running out the door to a medical appointment. Therefore, he asked if she would email him details about the interview, and he would respond to her as soon as he returned home. Ms. Morales informed Petitioner that the interviews would take place the next day (Friday). Petitioner was alarmed at the short notice. He explained to Ms. Morales that he was currently at home in New York state and could not travel to Florida for an in person interview the next day. Ms. Morales replied that she could arrange a telephone interview. Petitioner then asked Ms. Morales when the interview on Friday was scheduled. Ms. Morales relayed that she would email him the specific information when she obtained the time from her manager. Petitioner stated that he would "clear my schedule tomorrow for that interview." Petitioner then signed off saying, "Thank you. I do have to run. Sorry." Ms. Morales hung up the phone first. The conversation lasted 1 minute and 30 seconds. As Petitioner left for his doctor's appointment, he was under the impression that Ms. Morales would email him imminently regarding available times for the Friday telephone interview. The Phone Call According to Ms. Morales At the final hearing, Ms. Morales described a vastly different conversation with Petitioner. As further discussed below, Ms. Morales's 5 At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he heard Damaris Morales state her name as "Tamaris." initial impressions of Petitioner from that phone call ultimately led the OMB to decide not to interview Petitioner for the Analyst Position. When Petitioner answered the phone, Ms. Morales testified that Petitioner's "aggressive" tone quite startled her. In a "loud" voice, Petitioner declared, "Yeah. What do you want? I don't have time to talk right now. I've got to be somewhere." Ms. Morales was not expecting such an abrupt and jarring reception. After a few seconds of stunned silence, Ms. Morales explained to Petitioner that she was calling about his application for the Analyst Position. Continuing in his harsh tone, Petitioner replied, "I have somewhere I need to be right now. Send me all the information via email. I am in Niagara Falls, New York." Petitioner then hung up the phone first without providing Ms. Morales his availability for a Friday interview. The whole conversation took less than 30 seconds. At the final hearing, in response to Ms. Morales's testimony, Petitioner suggested that she may have overheard an exchange between him and his son, Stewart, with whom he lives. Petitioner explained that, as he was leaving his apartment, his son called out from his bedroom asking whether the bathroom was free. Petitioner yelled back, "What do you want, Stewart? I am leaving." Petitioner explained that his phone may have malfunctioned and engaged Ms. Morales' call without him actually picking up the receiver. Petitioner strongly denied that he directed the comment "what do you want?" at Ms. Morales. Petitioner also theorized that if he spoke in a loud tone with Ms. Morales, it may have been due to his disability. As indicated above, Petitioner testified that he is deaf in one ear. Petitioner explained that Ms. Morales was talking very fast during their phone call. In responding to her questions, Petitioner was not trying to be abrupt or argumentative. However, he was in a rush to reach his appointment and was frustrated at the delay. Continuing with Petitioner's story, after the phone call, as Thursday morning progressed into Thursday afternoon, Petitioner did not receive an email back from Ms. Morales. Therefore, around 2:15 p.m., Petitioner called the County to speak with her. He was forwarded to her office phone, where he left a voicemail. In his message, Petitioner expressed that he was available for an interview any time the next day (Friday). He also left his Skype contact information. Time continued to pass on Thursday. With no response over the next two hours, at 4:14 p.m., Petitioner again called for Ms. Morales. This time, he was able to reach her. Petitioner inquired about his interview time for Friday. Ms. Morales momentarily demurred, telling Petitioner that she had to check with her manager. After several minutes, Ms. Morales came back on the line. She then told Petitioner that the Friday interviews were "full up." When Petitioner asked about an interview on another day, Petitioner claims that Ms. Morales promptly "slammed the phone down in my ear." Ms. Morales, on the other hand, testified that after she informed Petitioner that no interview times were available on Friday, Petitioner got angry and threatened her with a "legal matter." Petitioner then hung up on her. Petitioner was not content to let the matter drop. Therefore, on Friday morning at 9:47 a.m., he emailed the County Manager, Don Fisher, to complain about the County's Human Resources Department and the OMB. In his email, Petitioner summarized the events from the previous day. Petitioner focused on the fact that Ms. Morales told him that she would provide him an interview time. Then, when he contacted her Thursday afternoon, Ms. Morales informed him that the interviews were "full up," and he would not be offered an opportunity to interview for the Analyst Position. Petitioner sent Mr. Fisher follow-up emails at 10:01 a.m. and 10:03 a.m. In the first follow-up email, Petitioner stated: I am disabled and covered under the ADA Act. I make this request for accommodation under the ADA Act. At 10:10 a.m., Petitioner sent an email to another County employee, Maria Colon, the Director of the Human Resources Department and the County's Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") coordinator. In this email, Petitioner stated: You are the designated ADA Act Coordinator, but you are discriminating against me and denying my ADA rights to accommodation under the ACT and Title VII. I formally ask for this interview to be rescheduled and Oscola [sic] County to stop this discrimination. Attached to this email, Petitioner included a copy of his Ontario Disability Support Program Certificate of Disability ("ODSP Certificate"). At the final hearing, Petitioner explained that the ODSP Certificate, which was determined in 2013, is proof of his disability. Petitioner's certificate states: Your file with the Disability Adjudication Unit has been adjudicated and you have been found to be a person with a disability as defined in the Ontario Disability Support Program Act. 1997. At the final hearing, Petitioner expounded on the reasons for his request, explaining that he sought an accommodation to enable him to conduct a telephonic interview because his disability prevented him from driving from Canada to Florida to interview in person. Furthermore, as a disabled person, he needed more time to prepare and participate in the recruitment process. The specific accommodation he desired was to be allowed to interview by telephone on Monday, October 28, 2019. Not hearing a response from Ms. Colon by Friday afternoon, at 3:03 p.m., Petitioner dispatched another email to her. He again attached his ODSP Certificate. In this email, Petitioner wrote that "your staff member Tamaris" refused to schedule an interview and then "hung up the phone on me." Petitioner also repeated that he was "requesting reasonable accommodation for the Budget Analyst II position." Ms. Colon called Petitioner shortly after his second email. During this call, Petitioner informed Ms. Colon that he was disabled, and he needed a telephone interview for the County job opening. Petitioner added that he was located out of state, and he could not travel to Florida in time for an in-person interview. Petitioner further declared that the County was discriminating against him because of his disability and his national origin. Ms. Colon advised Petitioner that she would look into his concerns and get back to him. Petitioner claims that Ms. Colon ended this conversation by slamming the phone in his ear. During this call, despite Ms. Colon's request, Petitioner refused to identify his specific disability. At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that the law protects those with disabilities from having to disclose their actual medical conditions. He said that, to safeguard their privacy, the disabled do not have to reveal their disability, except to the limited extent necessary to relate the disability to the requested accommodation. At 6:01 p.m. on Friday evening, Ms. Colon emailed Petitioner stating, "Per our phone conversation, I will look into your concerns and get back with you on Monday." By late Monday morning, October 28, 2019, however, Petitioner had not heard from Ms. Colon. Therefore, he sent her two emails. At 11:43 a.m., Petitioner wrote, "When is my interview? I am not available tomorrow." With no response to this first email, at 3:48 p.m., Petitioner wrote, "As per your reply above, you indicated my accommodation request under the ADA and interview time would be dealt with today. It is 4 pm EST. Please respond." Petitioner then signed off, "I am available for an interview 10am to 11 am tomorrow and then on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday." Petitioner received a response from Ms. Colon at 6:10 p.m., Monday evening. In her email, Ms. Colon wrote: I had the opportunity to look into your concerns. To be honest, customer service is very important in the Budget Analyst II role, and we're assessing those skills in every contact with candidates. The OMB Department had concerns about the way you handled the call and treated the employee that contacted you on October 24th for the purpose of scheduling an interview. Therefore, the Department has moved forward with other candidates. Petitioner was most displeased at Ms. Colon's email, and at 6:54 p.m., he responded: I did nothing except indicate I was available for an interview. Regardless none of this over-rides the ADA and my rights to employment and accommodation. I will be discussing your actions, the "OMB" in denying my constitutional and ADA rights, my Title VII rights with [a County attorney] tomorrow. If they fail to resolve this, then I will be suing you personally, Tamaris, the OMB and the County on a substantial indemnity basis for well in excess of $500g. Petitioner ended the email with "See you soon in court." Six minutes later, at 7:01 p.m., Petitioner sent another email to Ms. Colon. In this message, Petitioner stated: I must commend you for trying to deflect the egregious violation of my rights through trying to claim my rights to an interview are somehow superceded [sic] by this department withdrawing an interview based on race, geography, nationality and disability … in a call in which this Tamaris said and I quote – "we are full up" … . I asked her to leave my interview time through an email. If that qualifies as "poor customer service" then you have a very BIG legal problem using that as a diversion for blantant [sic] discrimination based on race, color, nationality, and disability. Petitioner ended this email with, "I will be happy to take you to Federal Court not the Courthouse right across the street. See you soon in court." Petitioner wrote Ms. Colon once more at 7:03 p.m. In this email, Petitioner accused Ms. Colon of "a blatant discrimination of interest in applying the ACT. Your superiors told you to deny me my rights under the ADA and you did so." Petitioner then declared that he was going to "sue you personally. … Trust me on that." After Monday, October 28, 2019, Petitioner never heard back from Ms. Morales or Ms. Colon regarding his application for the Analyst Position. Consequently, Petitioner claims that the County, by refusing to respond to his request for a telephone interview, denied him his rights under the FCRA and the ADA. At the final hearing, Petitioner vehemently denied that he was rude to Ms. Morales or during his call with Ms. Colon. Petitioner professed that he was perfectly polite to Ms. Morales. In addition, he asserted that Ms. Morales's testimony that he hung up the phone on her is totally false. Petitioner also contended that he did not threaten Ms. Colon with legal action as a means of intimidation. He was just exercising his rights as a disabled person. Petitioner further charged that the County's excuse for removing him from consideration was based on a misconstrued comment overheard during a brief phone call. Petitioner insists that his single utterance, "What do you want (Stewart)," cannot and should not justify the County's discriminatory action. The County ultimately hired Lizette Rivera for the Analyst Position. Petitioner alleges that the decision to hire Ms. Rivera is evidence of the County's female employees working together to eliminate white, male candidates. Petitioner maintains that Ms. Morales, a Hispanic female, favored another Hispanic (nondisabled) female (Ms. Rivera) for the Analyst Position. Consequently, Petitioner claims that Ms. Morales rigged the process and discriminated against Petitioner. At the final hearing, the County did not dispute that, while the OMB initially considered Petitioner for the Analyst Position, it quickly decided not to interview him for the job. The County also confirmed that the OMB did interview, and ultimately hire, Ms. Rivera to fill the Analyst Position. Regarding the County's decision not to interview Petitioner, after the initial phone call, Ms. Morales testified that she was quite startled by Petitioner's rude and unprofessional conduct. She immediately reported the conversation to her supervisor, Sharon Chauharjasingh, who is the Director of the OMB. Ms. Morales expressed to Ms. Chauharjasingh how shocked she was by Petitioner's behavior. Ms. Morales further relayed that because Petitioner was "in a rush," he did not provide her his availability for a telephone interview. Consequently, she had no information which would allow her to schedule him for an interview on Friday. Ms. Morales's testimony describing the telephone interaction with Petitioner was credible and is credited. Petitioner admitted to parts of Ms. Morales's versions, including that fact that he was in a rush and that he yelled, "what do you want?" Other than the two phone calls with Petitioner on Thursday, October 24, 2019, Ms. Morales was not involved in the OMB's decision not to interview Petitioner or to hire Ms. Rivera. (Those decisions belonged to Ms. Chauharjasingh.) Ms. Morales did not participate on the interview panel for either Ms. Rivera or Mr. Lower. Ms. Morales further testified that at no time during her phone calls with Petitioner did he inform her that he had a disability, or that he needed an accommodation to participate in the interview process. Ms. Chauharjasingh also testified at the final hearing. Ms. Chauharjasingh initially explained that the OMB is tasked with preparing the County's annual budget of approximately $1 billion. The person who fills the Analyst Position will work in the OMB. The duties of the Analyst Position include reviewing the budgets of the different County departments, as well as assisting those departments with budget questions and preparation related tasks. The Analyst Position will also review budgetary impacts and projections, and be prepared to personally discuss these issues with County representatives. In addition, the Analyst Position will interact daily with other staff members and occasionally contact outside companies and the public. Regarding the hiring of Ms. Rivera, Ms. Chauharjasingh disclosed that, because she oversees the OMB, she was responsible for selecting the person to fill the Analyst Position. For this opening, Ms. Chauharjasingh was the individual who narrowed down the applicants to the shortlist of three individuals including Petitioner, Ms. Rivera, and Mr. Lower. In selecting these candidates, Ms. Chauharjasingh looked at each applicant's past experience as a budget analyst, as well as their aptitude to efficiently assume the job duties. Based on their resumes, Ms. Chauharjasingh believed that each finalist was qualified for the Analyst Position. After selecting the three candidates, Ms. Chauharjasingh asked her assistant, Ms. Morales, to call each applicant and set up an interview. Ms. Chauharjasingh asked Ms. Morales to schedule the interviews for either Friday, October 25, 2019, or Monday, October 28, 2019. At the final hearing, Ms. Chauharjasingh represented that the County routinely interviews job applicants by telephone. Ms. Chauharjasingh further testified that the decision not to continue the interview process with Petitioner was hers. Ms. Chauharjasingh recounted that on Thursday morning, October 24, 2019, Ms. Morales came into her office looking "shaken up." Ms. Morales reported that she had just spoken to Petitioner, and he yelled at her and was rude and unprofessional. Ms. Chauharjasingh had never heard of a job candidate reacting the way Ms. Morales described. Ms. Morales has never complained to her about any other applicant. Based on Ms. Morales's interaction with Petitioner, Ms. Chauharjasingh immediately decided to remove Petitioner from consideration for the Analyst Position. She therefore directed Ms. Morales to "move on" from Petitioner and not to communicate with him any further. Instead, Ms. Morales was to only schedule interviews with the other two candidates (Ms. Rivera and Mr. Lower). The County's panel of five interviewers, which included Ms. Chauharjasingh, conducted an in-person interview of Ms. Rivera on Friday, October 25, 2019, at 11:30 a.m. Mr. Lower was interviewed, in person, on Monday morning, October 28, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. Following the interviews, the panel ranked the candidates, and then sent the list to Ms. Chauharjasingh. Ms. Chauharjasingh extended the offer of employment to Ms. Rivera, who was the top-ranked candidate. Ms. Chauharjasingh concluded her testimony by asserting that Petitioner's disability played no role in her decision not to interview him. Ms. Chauharjasingh explained that, at the time she decided to terminate the interview process with him, neither she nor Ms. Morales had any knowledge or information regarding Petitioner's disability. Instead, the sole basis for removing Petitioner from the shortlist was Ms. Morales' interaction with him during her initial phone call. Ms. Chauharjasingh testified that, based on the specific responsibilities of the Analyst Position, personal traits such as good communication skills, decorum, and telephone etiquette are very important. For example, the Detailed Job Posting for the Analyst Position includes a Physical Demand Requirement of "Expressing or exchanging ideas by spoken word or perceiving sound by ear." Consequently, upon hearing Ms. Morales's description of Petitioner's attitude and behavior during the telephone call, Ms. Chauharjasingh decided that the County did not need to consider Petitioner's application any further. In her testimony, Ms. Colon expressed that she had no part in the OMB's decision not to interview Petitioner. She became involved in this matter only after she received Petitioner's email, addressed to her as the County's ADA coordinator, on Friday morning, October 25, 2019. Ms. Colon stated that after she read Petitioner's email, she did not immediately respond because she first wanted to determine what exactly had transpired between Petitioner and Ms. Morales the previous day. Ms. Colon spoke with both Ms. Morales and Ms. Chauharjasingh on Friday. From these conversations, Ms. Colon heard that Petitioner was "rude" during Ms. Morales's first telephone call. Further, Petitioner was so "abrupt" that Ms. Morales was not able to offer him an interview time. Ms. Morales also informed Ms. Colon that Petitioner did not mention a disability or request an accommodation during either of their calls. Regarding her own phone call with Petitioner on Friday afternoon, Ms. Colon described an experience very similar to Ms. Morales's. Ms. Colon testified that the conversation was "not pleasant." As with Ms. Morales, Ms. Colon recounted that Petitioner was "agitated," loud," and "extremely unprofessional." During the exchange, Petitioner also threatened to sue her and the County. Regarding her email to Petitioner on Monday evening, October 28, 2019, in which she wrote that, "The OMB Department had concerns about the way you handled the call and treated the employee that contacted you on October 24th," Ms. Colon stated that the decision not to schedule Petitioner for an interview was made on October 24, 2019. Specifically, after talking with Ms. Morales and Ms. Chauharjasingh, Ms. Colon learned that Ms. Chauharjasingh had decided not to interview Petitioner immediately after Ms. Morales reported to her regarding Petitioner's rude and unprofessional interaction with her during their first phone call. As a final witness, Ms. Fatima Lozano testified regarding her participation on the interview panel for the Analyst Position. Ms. Lozano described herself as a Human Resources "generalist" with the County. Ms. Lozano has taken part in a number of interviews of applicants for County employment. She relayed that the County routinely conducts telephonic interviews. Ms. Lozano repeated that, when hiring employees, the department responsible for the position sets up the interviews and selects the winner. For the Analyst Position, the OMB selected the applicants who would interview for the job. Regarding scheduling the interviews for the Analyst Position, Ms. Lozano testified that, on October 21, 2019, she received a calendar invite requesting her availability. The interviews then took place on Friday, October 25, 2019, at 11:30 a.m. and Monday, October 28, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. While the above findings chronical the key aspects of Petitioner's discrimination claim, Petitioner also raised several other complaints against the County. Petitioner was exceedingly frustrated by the County's failure to schedule his interview through the www.governmentjobs.com website. At the final hearing, Petitioner elicited testimony from several County employees that, although the County pays a hefty annual fee to recruit employees through governmentjobs.com, the County only uses the website to solicit applications. Petitioner was "shocked" to learn that the County did not take advantage of the website's functions to schedule interviews with candidates. Petitioner was also "stunned" at the County's attempt to schedule his interview with less than one day's notice. Petitioner found the practice unprofessional and unacceptable. Petitioner represented that the standard process used by governmentjobs.com is to email a notification to the job applicant at least four to seven days prior to the agreed interview time. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the record, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the County discriminated against Petitioner based on his disability (handicap), race, or national origin. Instead, the credible evidence establishes that the decision not to interview Petitioner was made without knowledge of his disability prior to his request for an accommodation, and without regard to his race or national origin. The decision to not interview Petitioner was based solely on his own behavior, considered rude and unprofessional, effectively disqualifying him from the job. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that the County committed an unlawful employment practice against him in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Robert F. Cameron, did not prove that Respondent, Osceola County, committed an unlawful employment practice against him, and dismissing his Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert Finley Cameron 1 Churchill Street, Apartment 10 St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L25 2-P3 C (eServed) Frank M. Townsend, Esquire Osceola County Attorney's Office 1 Courthouse Square, Suite 4700 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent, City of Apopka, Florida, was guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner, Scott A. Roberts, according to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, based on his "disability"; and whether or not he received "disparate treatment."
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year-old Caucasian male, who, in November 2004, retired from Respondent's Fire Department as a engineer-paramedic as being permanently and totally disabled. Respondent is a municipality in Orange County, Florida. After Petitioner suffered a job-related injury that resulted in an anterior disc excision and fusion, C5-C6 and C6-C7, he elected to pursue disability retirement. In furtherance of his claim of total disability, he was examined by three physicians, Drs. Portnoy, Rojas, and Goll. Drs. Portnoy and Rojas determined that Petitioner had medical limitations that disqualified him from employment as a firefighter. Dr. Goll, prior to Petitioner's decision to proceed with a disability pension, had opined that he was fit for duty without limitations. Dr. Goll had the same opinion in January 2009. In 2009, Petitioner sought re-employment with Respondent. Incidental to his effort to be re-employed, he had an additional examination by Dr. Portnoy. Dr. Portnoy examines "thousands" of firefighters for Central Florida municipalities and usually conducts examinations for Respondent. Based on Dr. Portnoy's 2009 examination of Petitioner, Dr. Portnoy determined that Petitioner "was not qualified to be a firefighter for the City of Apopka." The National Fire Protection Association Standard 1582 ("NFPSA 1582") is referenced in Subsection 633.34(5), Florida Statutes, dealing with physical qualifications of a firefighter. While not required by statute, this standard is relied on by physicians conducting qualifying examinations. Petitioner's surgery is a basis for disqualification under NFPSA 1582. Respondent accepted Dr. Portnoy's opinion and did not re-employ Petitioner based on that opinion. Kevin Kwader, offered by Petitioner as an individual who received disparate treatment, apparently had cervical surgery; however, it is unclear whether the surgery was as comprehensive as Petitioner's. Mr. Kwader was returned to work by the surgeon who performed the surgery with "no restrictions." He was never evaluated by the physician conducting annual physical examinations for Respondent as "not fit for duty." Petitioner did not seek accommodation for a disability; in fact, he indicated, specifically, that he was not seeking any accommodation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent, City of Apopka, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Moore, Esquire Moore, Peterson & Zeitler, P.A. Post Office Box 536636 Orlando, Florida 32853-6636 Frank Kruppenbacher, Esquire City of Apopka 120 East Main Street Apopka, Florida 32703 Scott Roberts 2839 West Fairbanks Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789
