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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. ANNETTE J. RUFFIN, 85-001319 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001319 Latest Update: Sep. 05, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Annette J. Ruffin, held real estate broker license number 0076385 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. When the events herein occurred, respondent was owner and broker for Century 21 A Little Bit Country at 915 Lithia Pinecrest Road, Brandon, Florida. She is presently employed by U. S. Homes Corporation in Tampa, Florida. James and Shirley Yaksic wished to sell their residence at 3512 Plainview Drive in Brandon, Florida. They listed their property with Century 21 Solid Gold Properties II, Inc. in Brandon in December, 1983. Deborah Cassidy was a salesman at respondent's office, and knew her parents, J. R. and Helen Anderson, were in the market for a new home. With Cassidy's assistance, the Andersons executed a contract on February 16, 1984, to purchase the Yaksics' residence. The contract called for a purchase price of $65,000 with a down payment of $10,000, including a $500.00 cash deposit which was given to respondent's firm several days after the contract was executed. The deposit was placed in Ruffin's escrow account on February 28, 1984. The Andersons were also required to seek VA financing on the balance owed. After the contract was accepted by the Yaksics on February 17, Helen Anderson made application on February 23 for a $55,000 VA loan with Norwest Mortgage, Inc., a lending institution in Tampa. Florida. Since her husband was in New York State, only Helen signed the loan application agreeing to allow verification of all representations made in the application. While filling out the loan application at Norwest, Helen Anderson learned that the Veterans Administration allowed applicants to apply for loans equal to 100% of the value of the property. Since the Andersons preferred to make no down payment, Helen Anderson wrote Norwest in early March requesting that their loan application be increased from $55,000 to $65,000. She also noted that she did not sign the "disclosure statement" on behalf of her husband since "it would be incorrect." In response to this Letter, Norwest wrote the Andersons in early April requesting a number of items needed to process the application as well as an amendment to the contract reflecting that the sellers agreed to 100% financing by the buyers. The Andersons did not respond to this inquiry. In addition, they never, advised the sellers that they had changed their loan application to 100% financing, and that the sellers would be required to pay more discount points at closing. Because no amendment to the contract was ever filed, Norwest processed the application for a $55,000 loan. Due to insufficient income and excessive obligations, the application was denied. The Andersons were so notified by letter dated May 3, 1984. After Helen Anderson received the denial letter she telephoned respondent's office manager on several occasions to seek a refund of her deposit. This information was apparently conveyed to Ruffin by the office manager. About the same time the sellers were advised by the listing salesman that the Andersons did not intend to close. On May 5, the sellers wrote a letter to Solid Gold requesting that it notify the selling broker to not "release the binder to the buyers as we are entitled to this money." For some reason, a copy of this letter was not mailed to respondent until May 31, and she received it in early June. Even though Ruffin may have been orally advised in early May of the Yaksics' intended claim by the listing office, she had no concrete evidence of this intention until she received their letter in early June. On June 29, 1984, Helen Anderson wrote respondent's office manager a letter requesting a return of her deposit no later than July 9. She also indicated the letter was being sent pursuant to instructions received from petitioner. On July 2, Ruffin replied by letter stating that "we cannot release your deposit as the house was off the market for such a long time," and that Norwest had advised her that the Andersons "did not bring in a lot of the information until it was too late." After Helen Anderson filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), DPR wrote respondent a letter dated July 19, 1984, stating in part that Anderson had been refused her deposit and that its records did not show that respondent had notified DPR of conflicting demands for that money. On July 30, 1984, respondent replied to DPR's inquiry and gave her version of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. After receiving no reply to this letter, she wrote a second letter in late December, 1984 to the Division of Real Estate (Division) requesting advice on the deposit matter. The Division sent a her form for requesting an escrow disbursement order on January 4, 1985 which was returned by respondent within a few weeks. An escrow disbursement order was eventually issued by the Division on April 19, 1985 directing her to refund the deposit to the Andersons. She did so on May 5, 1985. In conjunction with its investigation, DPR obtained copies of respondent's escrow account bank statements during the period when the Andersons' deposit was retained by Ruffin. Although the $500.00 deposit should have been maintained in that account from February, 1984 until disbursement in May, 1985, her account dropped below $500.00 on sixteen separate days during this period of time, and continuously from February 28 through April 30, 1985. Respondent, who has been a broker since 1977, maintained a record of all escrow deposits and expenditures in a ledger book which reflected when the Anderson money was deposited and when it was paid out. Although she inferred the problem may have been attributable to her bookkeeper, no adequate explanation was given as to why her bank balances dropped below $500.00 on a number of occasions. She acknowledged that she learned of the conflicting demands in May, 1984, but felt that she could still "solve" the credit problem of the Andersons. She stated that she intended to give notice to the Division of the conflicting claims on the deposit and needed no encouragement from the Division to do so. There is no evidence that respondent has ever been disciplined on any other occasion since first receiving her salesman license around twelve years ago.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this order. All other charges should be DISMISSED. It is recommended that respondent's broker license be suspended for ninety days and that she be fined $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of September, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Bearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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SEAN FISHER vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 05-002773 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Aug. 01, 2005 Number: 05-002773 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate broker should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been a licensed real estate sales associate since 2000. His license number is 693538. Most of Petitioner’s work in the real estate industry has involved business transactions, but he has also handled transactions involving residential properties. On August 23, 2004, Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a real estate broker. Petitioner disclosed in the application that, in July 2003, his sales associate license was suspended by the Commission for 30 days and that he was placed on probation for a period of six months. That disciplinary action was based upon a single incident that occurred on or about November 7, 2001. Petitioner agreed to the disciplinary action as part of a “Stipulation” to resolve an Administrative Complaint charging him with fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and with having operated as a broker without a license in violation of Sections 475.42(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2001). The Administrative Complaint contained the following “essential allegations of material fact,” which were admitted by Petitioner as part of the Stipulation: On or about November 7, 2001, Respondent, a seller’s agent, facilitated a purchase and sale transaction between Buyer and Seller. On or about November 7, 2001, [Petitioner] was not registered with a broker.[1] The transaction referenced above failed to close. Buyer released a $1,000.00 payment to Seller. [Petitioner] submitted the $1,000.00 payment to Seller. [Petitioner] instructed [Seller] to execute a check in the amount of $500.00 payable to “Cash.”[2] [Petitioner] accepted the $500.00 payment as his own payment for services. The Final Order adopting the Stipulation was filed with the agency clerk on June 25, 2003. Petitioner’s suspension commenced on July 25, 2003, which is “thirty days from the date of filing of the Final Order.” The suspension ended 30 days later, on August 24, 2003. Petitioner’s probation ran “for a period of six (6) months from the Effective Date [of the Stipulation],” which was defined as the date that the Final Order was filed with the agency clerk. As a result, the probation period ran from June 25, 2003, to December 25, 2003. Petitioner was required to complete a three-hour ethics course and a four-hour escrow management course during the probation period, which he did. Petitioner has not been subject to any other disciplinary action. Petitioner has taken several continuing education courses in addition to those required as part of his probation. He is working towards certification by the Graduate Realtor Institute. Petitioner has taken the classes necessary to become a real estate broker, and he passed the broker examination. Petitioner has worked for broker Phillip Wetter since March 2005. Petitioner manages the day-to-day operation of Mr. Wetter’s brokerage firm. His responsibilities include preparing listings, negotiating contracts, and handling escrow funds. He has been involved in over 50 successful real estate transactions under Mr. Wetter’s supervision. According to Mr. Wetter, Petitioner is meticulous in his work, including his handling of escrow funds, and he always makes sure that he “dots all his ‘I’s’ and crosses all his ‘T’s’.” Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony before the Commission and at the final hearing that what he did in November 2001 was wrong. He credibly testified that he has learned from his mistake. In his testimony before the Commission and at the final hearing, Mr. Wetter attested to Petitioner’s honesty, ethics, good moral character, as well as his qualifications to be a broker. That testimony was unrebutted and is corroborated by the letters of support from Petitioner’s former clients that are contained in his application file, Exhibit R1. Mr. Wetter’s opinions regarding Petitioner’s fitness for licensure as a real estate broker are given great weight. Those opinions are based not only on his personal observations as Petitioner’s current qualifying broker, but also on his personal experience with Petitioner representing him in several business transactions while Petitioner was working for other brokers.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order approving Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2005.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569475.17475.180475.181475.25475.42
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MARLENE MONTENEGRO TOIRAC AND HOME CENTER INTERNATIONAL CORP., 05-001654 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 09, 2005 Number: 05-001654 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2019

The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are: (1) whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed within a reasonable time to satisfy a civil judgment relating to a real estate commission; (2) whether Respondents failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; and (3) whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them, if Petitioner proves one or more of the violations charged in its Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Veloso Judgment Toirac and Elena Veloso ("Veloso") did business together and wound up as opponents in court. Veloso got the better of Toirac, obtaining, on June 5, 2001, a judgment in the amount of $4,437.60 against her and HCIC from the Dade County Court. The judgment liquidated a real estate commission that Veloso claimed the defendants owed her. On June 12, 2001, Toirac filed a Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment, wherein she asked the county court to (a) vacate its judgment in favor of Veloso, on the ground that the defendants had not been served with process and (b) consolidate Veloso's county-court proceeding with an action then pending in circuit court, which Toirac had brought against Veloso.1 As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac's motion, after four years, had not been heard or decided. As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac had not satisfied the judgment in favor of Veloso. The Escrow Account Shortfall On January 24, 2002, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt, on or about June 20, 2001, of a complaint from Veloso.) Pursuant to the audit, Ms. Morales determined that the balance in Toirac's escrow account was $4,961.05. Ms. Morales determined further that Toirac's trust liability, i.e. the total amount of money that she should have been holding in escrow on her clients' behalf, was $12,242.00. Thus, there existed a shortfall of $7,280.95 in Toirac's escrow account. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to explain the shortfall. A few weeks later, however, by letter dated February 13, 2002, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that the shortfall had been caused by the issuance, "in error," of a check in the amount of $7,345.00, which was drawn on HCIC's escrow account and payable (evidently) to HCIC; HCIC had deposited the funds into its operating account, thereby creating, according to Toirac, an "overage" of $7,345.00 in the latter. To correct the problem, Toirac had arranged for the transfer of $7,345.00 from HCIC's operating account to its escrow account, which was accomplished on or about February 1, 2002. The Charges In counts I and IV, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.2 Petitioner's position is that Respondents failed within a reasonable time to satisfy the county-court judgment in favor of Veloso. In counts III and V, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that the escrow account shortfall identified on January 24, 2002, is proof that funds held in escrow had been disbursed without proper authorization. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no dispute (for Toirac admitted at final hearing) that the judgment debt owed by Respondents to Veloso relates to a real estate commission. It is also undisputed that, as of the final hearing, the county-court judgment had not been satisfied. The undersigned determines that Respondents have failed to satisfy the civil judgment in Veloso's favor within a reasonable time.3 Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.4 It is determined that the erroneous transfer, via check, of funds from HCIC's escrow account to its operating account constituted an unauthorized disbursement of funds entrusted to Toirac by others who had dealt with her as a broker. While this might have resulted from the simple mistake of an incompetent bookkeeper, as Toirac maintains, nevertheless the disbursement was unauthorized and substantial——amounting to approximately 60 percent of Toirac's total trust liability. Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has established the charges set forth in counts I, III, IV, and V of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents guilty as charged in counts I, III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint; (b) suspends Respondents' respective real estate licenses for 90 days; and (c) imposes an administrative fine of $2,500 against Respondents, jointly and severally; and (d) places Respondents on probation for a period of at least 3 years, subject to such lawful conditions as the Commission may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68475.25961.05
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERTS AND GILMAN, INC., AND DELAIR A. CLARK, 76-000012 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000012 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1977

Findings Of Fact Robert & Gilman, Inc. at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate broker by the State of Florida. Delair A. Clark at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate salesman by the State of Florida. Residential property owned by William L. and Frances Crummett was listed with J.B. Steelman, Jr. real estate broker and put on Multiple Listing Service. On June 17, 1972, immediately after the For Sale sign was erected, Respondent, Delair A. Clark, presented an offer to the sellers on this property which was accepted by sellers on the same date presented (Exhibit 9). This contract provided the purchase price of $28,500 with a $300 earnest money deposit, the usual clauses in a form contract for sale and purchase, and two special clauses to wit: "A. Subject to: Buyer being reassigned to central Florida prior to June 22, 1972. In the event the assignment does not materialize by June 23, 1972 deposit will, be returned in full and contract will be null and void. B. Subject to: Buyer obtaining a 90 percent conventional loan for a period of 25 years or an FHA loan for 30 years." By telegram dated 6/20/72 (Exhibit 8) buyer confirmed re-assignment to Orlando, thus satisfying condition A in the contract. Buyers thereafter asked for earlier occupancy than originally called for. Since special arrangements would have to be made by sellers, Mr. Crummett asked for an amendment to the contract to increase the earnest money deposit to $1,000 of which $500 would be non-refundable if contract was not consummated. This amendment was duly executed by the buyers on July 15, 1972 and by the sellers. A copy thereof was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 which provides: "SPECIAL CLAUSE" "C. An additional deposit of $700 will be made on July 17, 1972, of which $500 will be non-refundable in the event the referenced contract is not consumated (sic)." This amendment was forwarded to the sellers by Respondent's Roberts & Gilman letter of July 17, 1972 which amendment was executed by the sellers upon receipt and mailed back to Roberts & Gilman. The July 17, 1972 letter was signed by Judy L. Rostatter of the sales processing department. A copy of the check received from the buyers was not enclosed although the letter stated it was enclosed. Prior to receipt of this amendment Crummett was advised by Richter, the buyer, that he had mailed a $700 check to Roberts & Gilman made payable to Crummett. Crummett was also advised by Respondent Clark that the check had been received. Since closing was scheduled to be held within a couple of days Crummett requested Clark to hold the check and he would endorse same at closing. Crummett never saw the original check for $700. On the day originally scheduled for the closing (circa July 18, 1972) Crummett received a telephone call from Respondent Clark to the effect that the appraisal on the property had come in some $3,000 below the asking price and inquiring if Crummett would accept $26,000 for his property. The latter advised he would not and, after some heated words, Crummett hung up. At this time it was evident to Respondent Clark and the sellers that the sale would not be consummated. Clark put a memo in the file dated July 28, 1972 saying: "Return checks of $700 + $300 in estrow (sic) to Richter. Seller advised we had no contract." A few weeks later, on August 3, 1972, after making several phone calls to Roberts & Gilman without success, Crummett had the listing broker, J.B. Steelman, write a letter (Exhibit 7) to Gilman making demand for the $500 deposit refund. By letter dated August 11, 1972 (Exhibit 6) Roberts and Gilman replied that they considered the contract had been terminated by the seller and saw no "justification by the seller to claim any escrow that has been returned to the buyer". This letter was signed "Dan T. Gilman /b.c." Several months later, in the spring of 1973, Crummett went to the office of Roberts and Gilman and obtained a photostatic copy of the check dated 7/15/72 that had been made by J.A. Richter in the amount of $700. This was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12. At the hearing Dan G. Gilman, President of Roberts & Gilman, Inc. denied any recollection of any part of this transaction or ever having heard of the incident prior to the investigator from the FREC coming to inquire about the incident. At the time of this transaction the realtor's office was very busy with several branch offices and some 120 salesmen handling transactions in eight or ten counties in central Florida. He has no recollection of dictating Exhibit 12 or anything about the incident but his secretary at that time was Beverly Cass. It was standard practice for a broker to review every contract before trust account money was disbursed or refunded. His initial testimony that numerous people in the office had authority to sign his name to letters going out of the office was recanted when he was recalled as a witness after the close of the Commission's case. He then stated he never authorized anyone to sign his name to a document having legal implication. Clark testified that the first time he ever saw Exhibit 11, the amendment to the contract, was when shown to him by the investigator for the FREC. Likewise he claims never to have seen or received the $700 check signed by Richter. With respect to the return of the deposit to Richter, (after being shown Exhibit 13) his recollection of the cancellation of the contract was that Richter was not re-assigned to the Orlando area. This was the only contract ever handled by Clark which involved the return of an escrow deposit. He has no recollection of talking to any member of the realty firm regarding clearing the return of the escrow deposit to Richter. Exhibit 5 is a photocopy of the check by which the $300 earnest money deposit was returned to Richter. It is obvious that the contract for the sale of the residential property herein involved was amended to provide for an additional deposit from the buyers and a clause which required the buyer to forfeit one half of his deposit in the event the transaction was not consummated. It is incomprehensible that such an amendment to the contract could be made without the knowledge of the salesman or the broker. It therefore appears that the Defendants either: (1) are not telling the truth; (2) have faulty memories; (3) allowed the duties normally performed by brokers to be carried out by secretaries; or (4) operated a realty company in a slipshod manner without due regard to the duties and responsibilities imposed upon brokers and salesman by the real estate license law.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs CLYDE J. SPINDLER, T/A ALLMAC REALTY; ROBERT F. MCCARTHY; AND JACQULYN B. MCCARTHY, 92-001344 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Feb. 28, 1992 Number: 92-001344 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1992

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Clyde J. Spindler, is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0185572 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Spindler is the broker of record for a real estate firm known as Allmac Realty, 5331 Commercial Way, Spring Hill, Florida. When the events herein occurred, respondent, Robert F. McCarthy, held broker license number 0415199 issued by the Division. Respondent, Jacqulyn B. McCarthy, is a licensed real estate salesperson having been issued license number 0482611 by the Division. On January 15, 1991, the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) entered a final order suspending Robert F. McCarthy's broker license for three years, effective March 7, 1991. At that time, McCarthy operated a real estate firm known as Allmac Realty, Inc., t/a Allmac Realty, at 4040 Commercial Way, Spring Hill, Florida. The same order suspended the corporate broker's license for three years. At the time the order was entered, Jacqulyn McCarthy was a salesperson in her husband's firm. Although the suspension order was not served on McCarthy until February 21, 1991, he learned on January 15, 1991, that his license was going to be suspended. After McCarthy disclosed this fact to Spindler the same day, Spindler agreed to operate a real estate firm using the name of Allmac Realty. Thereafter, Spindler registered as a broker effective February 18, 1991, for a new firm known as Allmac Realty at 5331 Commercial Way, Spring Hill, Florida. Upon the advice of his attorney, on March 4, 1991, Robert McCarthy made application with the Division for registration as a broker-salesman with the new Allmac Realty. Because he believed that this action was legal, Robert McCarthy had no intent to circumvent the action taken by the Commission. Apparently unaware of the suspension order, the Division approved the registration effective March 6, 1991, or the day before the suspension of the broker's license became effective. Also, his wife, Jacqulyn McCarthy, placed her license with the new firm the same date. The broker of record of a firm is required to review, sign and date each monthly reconciliation statement of the firm. Robert McCarthy, who held a valid broker's license until March 1991, did so for the January and February 1991 statements. This responsibility was then given to Spindler for all subsequent statements. After receiving a complaint from the Hernando County Board of Realtors, a Division investigator, Marjorie F. May, visited Allmac Realty's office on October 7, 1991, to conduct a routine audit. As a result of her audit, May learned that Robert McCarthy was using his license with the firm even though it had been suspended since March 7, 1991. She also learned that Jacqulyn McCarthy, a salesperson, was the only signatory on the firm's escrow account while the broker of record (Spindler) was not. Rule 21V-14.010(1) requires that the broker of record be a signatory on the account. By failing to be a signatory on the account, Splinder contravened this rule. It should be noted that after being told of this omission, Spindler immediately corrected this deficiency. It should also be noted that Spindler was a signatory on two other firm accounts and was under the impression that he had properly signed for all necessary bank accounts. The audit further revealed that on August 30, 1991, a prospective tenant gave Jacqulyn McCarthy a $375.00 check as a security deposit on a rental house. Before McCarthy was able to deposit the check in the firm's escrow account, the tenant advised Jacqulyn that she was not going to rent the property and asked that the check be returned. McCarthy promptly returned the check to the client. However, during the time interval between receiving the check and the subsequent request for refund, McCarthy wrote herself a $200.00 check from the firm's operating account as her share of the commission for securing the rental. There is no evidence that any imbalance in the escrow account occurred as a result of this transaction. There is also no evidence that McCarthy violated any Division rule by failing to immediately deposit the check in the firm's escrow account since the check was returned to the client the same day that it was written. During her examination of the firm's monthly statements, May discovered that even though Spindler had signed the monthly statements, he had failed to date the same. This omission contravened a requirement in Rule 21V-14.012(2), Florida Administrative Code, that he "date the monthly statement- reconciliation". However, this was an oversight on Spindler's part and was not an intentional violation of the rule. There was no intent on the part of Robert McCarthy to circumvent Division rules or the prior order of suspension. Indeed, he acted on his counsel's advice and, after learning that his continued participation as a salesman was improper, immediately stopped all real estate activities. At that point in time, and after being notified by McCarthy, the Division also cancelled the previously issued broker-salesman registration. Spindler has been a real estate broker since 1977 and is now semi- retired. He visits Allmac's offices two or three times per week but does not actively solicit listings or sales. This is because of his practice not to compete with salespersons in his firm. However, he is advised of all decisions that must be made on behalf of the firm and is an active participant in those decisions. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Robert McCarthy was the de facto broker of the firm after Spindler registered as its broker of record.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered finding Clyde J. Spindler guilty as charged in Counts VIII and IX and Jacqulyn McCarthy guilty as charged in Count VI. All other counts should be dismissed. It is further recommended that the licenses of those two respondents be placed on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1344 Petitioner: 1-4. Accepted in finding of fact 1. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 7-8. Accepted in finding of fact 3. Accepted in findings of fact 3 and 8. Accepted in finding of fact 5. 10a. Accepted in finding of fact 5. 10b. Accepted in finding of fact 7. 10c. Accepted in finding of fact 6. Accepted in finding of fact 9. Accepted in finding of fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Mr. Clyde J. Spindler 12156 Fairway Avenue Brooksville, FL 34613 Mr. Robert F. McCarthy 5331 Commercial Way Spring Hill, FL 34606 Ms. Jacqulyn B. McCarthy 5331 Commercial Way Spring Hill, FL 34606

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs GLORIA CORSORO AND ORANGE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 95-000334 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Jan. 27, 1995 Number: 95-000334 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro, has been a licensed real estate broker. She is the qualifying broker for the company known as Orange Management Corp. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating real estate licensees in the State of Florida. On or about July 20, 1994, the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of unlawful use of a notary. As a result, the Respondent was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation for a period of six months, and required to make payments and serve community service as directed by the court order. The plea and conviction stemmed from Respondent's conduct in connection with a warranty deed (the deed) which was recorded in the public record for Indian River County, Florida, on October 12, 1993. The deed conveyed a condominium unit from Leon R. Leavitt to the G. Corsoro Family Trust. The deed, notarized on October 1, 1989, purportedly bore the signatures of Leon R. Leavitt, the grantor; Mamie Cellura, a witness; Marie Copley, a witness; and Joseph Cellura, the notary before whom the document was executed. In fact, the document was not signed by Marie Copley or Leon R. Leavitt. At the time of the hearing, Mamie Cellura and Joseph Cellura were deceased. They were the parents of Marie Copley and her sister, the Respondent. At the time the deed was executed, Respondent signed Mr. Leavitt's name under a power of attorney he had reportedly given to her. Respondent further claims that Mamie Cellura signed for herself as a witness, signed for Marie Copley as a witness, and signed her husband's name with him (he had Parkinson's disease) as the notary. All this was completed, according to Respondent, Marie Copley, and Leon R. Leavitt, with everyone's full consent and knowledge. Marie Copley and Leon R. Leavitt were not present when the document was executed. Since they claim Respondent was authorized to execute the document, they are not concerned as to who signed the document but believe Mamie Cellura and Respondent signed as represented by Respondent. According to Nicholas Burczyk, the Respondent signed the document for all signatories on the instrument. Even by Respondent's account, the named parties did not execute the deed as presented on the face of the document. Respondent was originally charged with uttering a forged instrument and forgery. She chose to enter the plea as to the misdemeanor charge of unlawful use of a notary because she was "financially unable to pay to go to trial."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, through the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order determining the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro violated Section 475.25(f), Florida Statutes, and imposing a reprimand together with an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0334 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is accepted as stated in findings of fact paragraphs 6 through 14 above; otherwise rejected as incomplete statement of fact. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. Respondent's assessment of the charges against Respondent together with the argument has been considered in the preparation of the foregoing. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Michael F. Berry MICHAEL F. BERRY, P.A. 2145-15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960

Florida Laws (2) 475.25475.42 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs DONALD ELBERT LESTER, 96-004718 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 03, 1996 Number: 96-004718 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1997

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate, in violation of Sections 475.42(1)(e) and 475.25(1)(e); committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) (two counts); failing to account for or deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1; failing to maintain trust funds in a real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement is authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k); failing to provide a written agency disclosure, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(q); being found guilty for a second time of any misconduct that warrants suspension or of a course of conduct or practices that show such incompetence, negligence, dishonesty, or untruthfulness as to indicate that Respondent may not be entrusted with the property, money, transactions, and rights of investors or others with whom Respondent may maintain a confidential relation, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o); and failing to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failing to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions together with such additional data as good accounting practice requires, in violation of Rule 61J-14.012(4) and Section 475.25(1)(e).

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license numbers 0489551 and 3000384. Respondent is the qualifying broker for Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc., of which Respondent was a principal. Respondent has been disciplined once previously. On December 8, 1994, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order, pursuant to a stipulation, ordering Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $500 and complete 30 hours of professional education. In late 1993, Respondent, Armand Houle, and Svein Dynge formed DSA Development, Inc. (DSA). Respondent, Houle, and Dynge were directors of the corporation. On December 1, 1993, Respondent, Houle, and Dynge formed Gulf Southwest Developers, Ltd. (GSD). DSA served as the sole general partner of GSD, whose original limited partners included Houle and several foreign investors represented by Dynge, but not Respondent or Houle. The investors formed GSD to assemble a vast tract of land in Collier County, through numerous purchases, for purposes of mining, development, and speculation. The initial investors contributed or agreed to contribute over $4 million to GSD. Respondent's role was to find suitable parcels of land and negotiate their purchase by GSD or its agent. GSD agreed to pay Respondent $1000 weekly for these services. GSD also authorized Respondent to take a broker's commission of 10 percent of the sales price for each fully executed contract presented to the closing agent. This is the customary broker's commission in the area for transactions of this type. Respondent's claim that he was entitled to a commission of 20 percent is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. There is some dispute as to whether the seller or the buyer was to pay the commission. The contracts provide that the commission was to be deducted from the seller's proceeds. However, regardless of the source of the commission, Respondent was entitled only to 10 percent, not 20 percent. Respondent knew that he was not entitled to 20 percent when he took the additional sum from GSD funds. Thus, the act of taking the funds constituted no less than concealment (due to his failure to disclose his withdrawals), dishonest dealing, culpable negligence and breach of trust, if not actual fraud. There is some evidence that Respondent took substantial sums from GSD without authorization. Without doubt, part of these sums represented the additional ten percent commission described in the preceding paragraph. Petitioner has attempted to prove that Respondent took sums in excess of the extra ten percent commission without authorization. However, as to such sums in excess of the additional ten percent commission, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either that Respondent took such additional sums or, if he did so, that these withdrawals were not authorized or at least ratified. As agent for GSD, Houle entered into numerous contracts in the second half of 1994 and first half of 1995. In each of these contracts, Respondent signed the contract below printed language stating that he, as broker, and Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc. had received the initial escrow deposit under the conditions set forth in the contract. At no time did Respondent or Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc. hold the escrowed funds in an escrow account under the name of Respondent or Buyers Realty. Respondent maintains that he transferred the funds to the title company to hold in escrow. The record does not permit a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not do so, although there is some evidence indicating that the title company did not hold such funds. However, it is sufficient that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that neither Respondent nor Buyers Realty held these escrow funds, despite clear misrepresentations by Respondent in each contract that he or his company held these escrowed funds. Respondent's misrepresentations constitute fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, and breach of trust. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not make the required agency disclosures in a timely fashion or that Respondent did not make available to Petitioner's investigator the books and records that he is required to maintain. Likewise, Petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to complete the education required by the prior final order or participated in the fraudulent endorsement of Houle's signature on checks by a secretary, who later obtained Houle's consent to the act.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 James H. Gillis James H. Gillis & Associates, P.A. Law Offices of Gillis & Wilsen 1415 East Robinson Street, Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801-2169 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RONALD E. FETTERS, T/A RONTRON REALTY AND INVESTMENT, AND TARIK HYDER CHOUDHURY, 89-001660 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001660 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 1989

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Fetters has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, trading as RONTRON Realty and Investment, with offices in Largo, Florida, and Choudhury has been a licensed real estate salesperson at RONTRON Realty. Fetters was Choudhury's broker at all times material hereto. Stanley and Mary K. Jankiewicz listed their home for $189,000 with Harvey Seybold, a licensed real estate broker, and neighbor. On January 28, 1988, Choudhury contacted Seybold and asked to see the Jankiewicz house. Seybold showed the house that same day. On January 30, 1988, Choudhury presented a contract for the sale and purchase of the home to Seybold and Jankiewicz. The purchasers, John and Gail Taylor, offered $185,000, but this offer was unacceptable to Jankiewicz because it called for him to hold a $150,000 purchase money mortgage. Jankiewicz proposed a counteroffer, which still provided for a sales price of $185,000, but only required him to hold a purchase money mortgage of $25,000. It also required the Taylors to obtain a firm financing commitment within 45 days for a first mortgage in the amount of $129,000. The Taylors accepted this counteroffer, and the transaction was scheduled to close on March 30, 1988, as proposed in Jankiewicz' counteroffer. Jankiewicz and Seybold testified that Choudhury told them, on January 30, 1988, that the Taylors had a net worth of from $2 to $3 million, and that he had a copy of their financial statement in his office, which he had reviewed. They claim that he promised to provide them with a copy of this financial statement on February 1, 1988. Jankiewicz testified that Choudhury's representation about the financial condition of the Taylors was a significant inducement for him to propose his counteroffer, and he would not have gone through wish this sale had he known on January 30, 1988, what he subsequently learned about their net worth. Choudhury denies making any representation about the Taylors' net worth. He testified that he had only met the Taylors on one occasion, and had no way of knowing their net worth since he denies having a copy of their financial statement at that time. When the Taylors' financial statement was not provided on February 1, 1988, Jankiewicz and Seybold made repeated attempts to contact Choudhury, most of which were futile. He would not return their calls. Finally, on March 7, 1988, Choudhury did send Seybold a copy of the Taylors' financial statement, and Seybold immediately forwarded it to Jankiewicz. The financial statement is dated January 31, 1988, and indicates a net worth of $238,100. Choudhury testified that he forwarded this financial statement to Seybold as soon as he received it from the Taylors, but that when he looked it over he was "shocked". Choudhury offered no credible explanation of why he would be "shocked" to see the Taylors' financial statement, unless he had expected a far higher net worth. Yet, he testified that he had no knowledge of their net worth. Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the testimony of Choudhury, Seybold and Jankiewicz, as well as Choudhury's unexplained testimony about being "shocked" to see the Taylors' net worth, it is found that Choudhury did represent to Jankiewicz and Seybold on January 30, 1988, that the Taylors had a net worth of from $2 to $3 million. This statement was false, but it was a material inducement which led Jankiewicz to make his counteroffer, accepting a $25,000 purchase money mortgage. The contract for sale did not provide any contingency which addressed Jankiewicz' concerns about the Taylors' net worth. He and Seybold believed Choudhury's representations, and admitted at hearing that it was an oversight on their part not to insist on a contingency in the sales contract. They simply took Choudhury's word that he had seen their financial statement, and it showed a net worth of $2 to $3 million. When he received the Taylors' financial statement in early March, 1988, Jankiewicz tried to back out of the deal, but because there was no contingency in the sales contract, and because the Taylors threatened to sue him for breach of contract if he did not close, he went through with the sale. The sale closed, as scheduled, on March 30, 1988. The Taylors had obtained a first mortgage through bank financing in early March, and have subsequently made payments to Jankiewicz under the purchase money mortgage which he holds, although on occasion they have been late with their payments. At no time did Fetters participate in the discussions which took place with Jankiewicz and Seybold concerning this sale. Choudhury made all contacts with them, presented the sales contract, and attended the closing. The Petitioner's investigator, Leo Huddleston, visited Fetters on June 28, 1988, to examine Fetters' records concerning the Jankiewicz transaction, but Fetters brought no records with him to this meeting. He claimed that Choudhury had all of these records. Subsequently, he did provide Huddleston with escrow records showing a $20,000 deposit in his escrow account, and copies of three checks from the Taylors totaling $20,000, which he claimed he received as their deposit on the Jankiewicz house, and which he stated he then deposited in his escrow account. These checks do indicate on their face that they were for a house deposit. However, Fetters was never able to produce a copy of his deposit slips or bank records which would directly establish that the Taylors' checks were in fact deposited into his escrow account. There was no indication on the face of the checks that they were deposited into his escrow account, or that he had an escrow account established for this purpose. Fetters testified at hearing, that he had lost his bank records, and presumed that a former tenant had taken them when he moved. Fetters failed to keep adequate records of his escrow account that would allow an audit of funds deposited into, and withdrawn from, such account. He could not establish that he had an escrow account on which he was signatory. He was also negligent in failing to safeguard any such records which he may have had, and could not produce complete records of his escrow account which would establish that the Taylors' deposit checks were placed in his escrow account, and remained there until they were withdrawn by a $20,000 cashier's check that was exchanged at closing. Following initial investigation of a complaint filed by Jankiewicz against Fetters and Choudhury, a probable cause panel decided not to issue an Administrative Complaint, and they were informed, in August, 1988, that this complaint file had been closed. Subsequently, however, new evidence was discovered concerning the fact that Seybold had also been present on January 30, 1988, when Choudhury met with Jankiewicz, and Seybold confirmed Jankiewicz' recollection of Choudhury's statements. Thereupon, this complaint was resubmitted to a probable cause panel, and the Administrative Complaint which is at issue in this case was filed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order suspending Respondent Fetters license for a period of six months, and suspending Respondent Choudhury's license for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The Petitioner did not timely file Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent Choudhury did file a Memorandum of Law which contains unnumbered paragraphs under a section referred to as "Facts". This Memorandum has been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order, but specific rulings cannot be made on the matters contained in the section labeled "Facts" since this consists largely of argument on the evidence without any citation to the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), F.A.C. Rulings on the Respondent Fetters' Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding 1. 3. Adopted in Findings 2, 8. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 4. Rejected in Finding 5, and as argument on the evidence, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings 10, 11. Rejected in Finding 11. Not a proposed finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: ARTHUR R. SHELL, ESQUIRE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE P. O. BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 LESLIE M. CONKLIN, ESQUIRE 2120 U.S. 19, SOUTH SUITE 210 CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 34624 RONALD P. TEEVAN, ESQUIRE 200 NORTH GARDEN AVENUE SUITE A CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 34615 DARLENE F. KELLER DIVISION DIRECTOR P. O. BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 KENNETH EASLEY, GENERAL COUNSEL NORTHWOOD CENTRE 1940 NORTH MONROE STREET SUITE 60 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0792 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs DOROTHEA L. PRISAMENT AND WARRICKS REAL ESTATE, INC., 89-006293 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 17, 1989 Number: 89-006293 Latest Update: Jul. 20, 1990

The Issue The issues in this case are whether the respondents, Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate , Inc., should be disciplined on charges filed in a six-count Administrative Complaint, three counts for each respondent, and alleging that the respondents: (1) were culpably negligent in allowing their escrow account to have a negative balance, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); (2) failed to maintain trust funds in a properly maintained escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1989); and (3) failed to maintain a proper office sign, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.024 and Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.22, Florida Statutes (1989).

Findings Of Fact Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate, Inc., are now, and were at all times material hereto, licensed as real estate brokers in the State of Florida. Dorothea L. Prisament was the active real estate broker for the corporate broker, Warricks Real Estate. On or about August 16, 1989, investigator Marjorie G. May conducted an office inspection and audit of the escrow accounts of the respondents. Ms. May also reviewed the outer office of the respondents. The entrance sign did not have the name of Dorothea L. Prisament on it; however, the sign did have Warricks Real Estate correctly identified and identified as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. May advised Ms. Prisament of the fact that Ms. Prisament's name needed to be on the sign and identified as a real estate broker. Ms. Prisament had a new sign made which fully complies with the statutes and rules. There was no evidence introduced at hearing to show that the escrow account of the respondents had a shortage in any amount; directly to the contrary, both the Department of Professional Regulation investigator and Ms. Prisament agreed that there was no shortage in the account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in light of the fact both that the respondents' violation was a very minor and technical one which was immediately corrected and that the respondents had to undergo the costs of defense of this case and suffer the mental duress of defending this case, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint and reprimanding the respondents for a minor and technical violation under Counts V and VI. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine A. Bamping, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire One Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Darlene F. Keller Director, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729

Florida Laws (2) 475.22475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs NOEL D. CLARK, JR., AND ABC HOME BROKERS, INC., 98-002722 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jun. 15, 1998 Number: 98-002722 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue The issues are whether Respondents failed to comply with the requirements of keeping and producing records, committed fraud in any business transaction, and, if so, the penalty.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Noel D. Clark, Jr. (Clark), has been a licensed real estate broker at all material times. From August 24, 1994, through November 9, 1997, he was the qualifying broker for ABC Brokers, Inc. From November 10, 1997, through April 21, 1998, Clark was the qualifying broker for Respondent ABC Home Brokers, Inc. (ABC). From April 22, 1998, through the present, Clark has been an individual real estate broker. ABC was a licensed real estate brokerage corporation from November 10, 1997, through April 21, 1998. Since April 22, 1998, ABC has not held a valid registration due to the lack of a qualifying broker. Respondent Betsy L. Brennan (Brennan) has been a licensed real estate salesperson since December 8, 1997. From December 8, 1997, through April 13, 1998, she was a salesperson under ABC. Since April 14, 1998, Brennan has been a licensed real estate salesperson under Clark. At all material times, Patricia and Lauren Hanson owned a mobile home located on a rented lot in North Fort Myers. By a listing agreement entered into in October 1996, the Hansons listed the home for sale with ABC. The listing price was $34,500 cash. Charles and Cynthia Harvey contacted Brennan and expressed an interest in purchasing the mobile home. They told Brennan that they were interested in buying a home after they sold Mr. Harvey's 1977 Ford dump truck. Brennan and Clark showed them several mobile homes. The Harveys decided that they wanted to purchase the Hansons' home. Brennan told the Harveys that she, as Trustee of the Driftwood Family Trust, would sell them the mobile home after buying it from the current owner. Most of the beneficiaries of the Driftwood Family Trust are related to Clark or Brennan. On December 4, 1997, Brennan, as Trustee of the Driftwood Family Trust, as purchaser, executed an ABC dealer order form to purchase the Hansons' mobile home for $28,000, which with tax and miscellaneous items rose to $30,430. On December 6, 1997, Brennan, as Trustee of the Driftwood Family Trust, as purchaser, executed an Agreement and Promissory Note reflecting the same purchase price. ABC faxed these materials to the Hansons on or about December 6. On December 5, 1997, Brennan, as Trustee of the Driftwood Family Trust, as seller, and Charles and Cynthia Harvey, as buyers, entered into an Agreement and Promissory Note for the purchase and sale of the Hansons' mobile home. The price was $42,000 with a $12,000 down payment. In the agreement, Brennan, as Trustee, warrants that she is the lawful owner of the property with the right to convey it. For the down payment, the Harveys delivered to Brennan the executed title to the dump truck, which Brennan accepted, somewhat generously given the value of the truck, in full payment of the $12,000 down payment. The delivery of the title certificate did not take place until January 10, 1998, by which time, probably due to her awareness of problems with the deal, Brennan decided not to cause the issuance of a new title in her name. The Harveys began moving into the mobile home on December 6. The evidence is especially vague as to the dealings between Respondents and the Hansons during this period of time. Except for faxing the Driftwood Trust offer to purchase, the record reveals only that, on or about the day that the Harveys moved into her mobile home, Patricia Hanson consented to their doing so. Three or four days later, though, Patricia Hanson's sister visited the Harveys and told them that her sister had not sold the mobile home. The Harveys informed her that they had a binding contract to purchase the mobile home. That evening, the Harveys telephoned Clark. He assured them that everything would work out. However, the Harveys refused to pay on the note, and Clark called them and informed them that he would foreclose. By letter dated January 26, 1998, Brennan, as Trustee, informed the Harveys that the December 5 agreement was "void ab initio" because they had induced the agreement through fraudulent inducements of "their credit and financial situation, employability and job stability." The January 26 letter states that the December 5 agreement was contingent upon Brennan's closing on the mobile home with the Hansons and that the Harveys understood that they were not to disturb the Hansons' property or furnishings until Brennan acquired the property from the Hansons. The January 26 letter states that the Harveys misrepresented to Brennan that they had good credit, that Mr. Harvey earned $42 per hour with the truck, and that Mr. Harvey would earn $15 per hour driving a dump truck for someone else. The January 26 letter states that Brennan has hired an attorney to litigate and "will be entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees since the agreement contains a 'prevailing party' provision which by its nature survives the voiding of the agreement." The December 5 agreement contains a provision for attorneys' fees, although the provision does not appear to survive its voiding. In any event, the Harveys made no representations in the Agreement concerning their creditworthiness, and no misrepresentation concerning creditworthiness constitutes a breach of the December 5 agreement. Eventually, Brennan offered to rescind the deal and return to the Harveys their money and truck. They got the truck back several months later. In the meantime, Mr. Harvey contacted Patricia Hanson, and they agreed on a lease/purchase arrangement. The Harveys continue to occupy the mobile home under this arrangement. Analysis of the fraudulent misrepresentations in the Hanson/Harvey transactions case requires close consideration of the allegations of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 98-4081. The first material allegation is that Brennan, as Trustee, offered to purchase the mobile home from the Hansons. Petitioner has established this fact. The second material allegation is that Clark had a verbal listing from the Hansons to sell their mobile home. Petitioner has established this fact by reasonable inference. The third material allegation is that Clark told Hanson that Brennan would offer $30,000, less the commission. Petitioner has not established Clark's role in this offer, but Petitioner has established that Brennan, as Trustee, made such an offer. The fourth material allegation is that, even though the Hansons had not agreed to sell, Clark allowed the Harveys to move into the Hansons' mobile home. Petitioner has established this fact, but the record reveals that this was with the permission of Patricia Hanson. The fifth material allegation is that Respondents "offered" to sell the mobile home to the Harveys for $42,000. Petitioner has established this fact, but the record reveals that the Harveys knew that Brennan, as Trustee, was acquiring the mobile home from a third party. However, this allegation does not inform Brennan that she is facing a charge of misrepresentation in the contract, in which she warrants title that she does not have. This allegation only states that the "Harveys had been offered the mobile home by the Respondents for $42,000, despite the fact that a bona fide sale had never taken place between . . . Brennan and the Hansons." The sixth material allegation is that the Harveys paid $12,000 down in the form of the truck and other credits. Petitioner established these facts, except that the value of the truck was less than $12,000 and no other credits existed. The seventh material allegation is that Respondents did not advise the Hansons of the price or financing on the Harvey sale. Petitioner did not establish these facts. The eighth material allegation is that Brennan tried to void the purported sale, but Respondents kept the Hansons' furniture and refused to return the truck to the Harveys. Petitioner established that Brennan tried to void the Harvey transaction. Petitioner did not establish that Respondents kept the Hansons' furniture, and the evidence established that Respondents returned the Harveys' truck. This allegation informs Brennan that she allegedly committed fraud in trying to void the transaction without returning the parties to the status quo, but this allegation does not inform her that she is facing a charge of misrepresentation for her misstatements in the letter itself. For the reasons stated, Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction. By subpoena issued March 27, 1998, Petitioner ordered "Noel D. Clark" and ABC to produce, on the same date, all records concerning a sale from Betty A. Smith, Trustee, to John E. and Elizabeth M. Crawford. The copy of the subpoena contains no return of service. Petitioner's investigator testified that he served the subpoena on Clark, who is "Noel D. Clark, Jr." Neither Clark nor ABC produced records in connection with the March 27 subpoena. Justifiably concerned with the enforceability of the subpoena, Petitioner issued two more subpoenas, both dated April 6, 1998, to produce documents relating to the Crawford transaction. One subpoena was directed to Clark and the other to ABC. The Clark subpoena bears a return of service, but it shows that the investigator served the subpoena on April 6 on Brennan, not Clark. The ABC subpoena bears no return of service, and the investigator who purportedly served the subpoena did not testify.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaints in DOAH Case Numbers 98-2722 and 98-4081. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Herbert S. Fecker, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Geoffrey T. Kirk, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Noel D. Clark Betsy L. Brennan ABC Home Brokers, Inc. 18060 North Tamiami Trail North Fort Myers, Florida 33917

Florida Laws (5) 120.57475.25475.2755475.278475.5015 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-14.012
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